Thursday, June 20, 2013
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Fall of Dhakka was a political mistake!
|Discussion Discuss current affairs and issues helpful in CSS only.
Saturday, June 05, 2010
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i personally believe our insecurities which lead us to vie for a strong centre contribute to provincial unrest, thus provincial autonomy is the only solution. as much as we try to strengthen the centre, we sow the seeds of hatred in provinces.
It takes courage to live with disappointments.
Saturday, June 05, 2010
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I have some questions in mind, if u please answer them.....
Why Comission Report was not published?
Was the separation of East Pakistan already decieded?
If United Pakistan exists today, what will be the strategic condition of Pakistan?
Was East Pakistan a burden on West Pakistan?
Saturday, June 05, 2010
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report of commsion wz not publish bcoz of many reason as we all know role played by army in our governament aur phr kuch perda nasheeno k nam atey thy so report was not published
yea that sepration was already decided by indians n one of east pakistan leader said bangladesh wz made that day wen pakistan waz made...
east pakistan was not a burden on west pakistan.....stratgically it wz not big deal to manage for away land it will have not effect on or stratgical position
baki ALLah knows well this is my personal opinion
Don't miss the magic of the moment by focusing on whats to come.
Saturday, June 05, 2010
@kiyani it was a political mistake. I read in Sahab NAma that a Bengali student was killed by police during protest and at that time Bhutto inflated the situation. He put the dead body of that guy on road and start protesting against Ayub and he gave the statement that government is discriminating the rights of East Pakistan. Which inflated the sentiments against government. Bhutto did it for his own sake but the consequences were horrible and many students were arrested.
East Pakistan was not a burden for West Pakistan. It produced joot and rice in good quantity. Adam ji Industry was contributing its sahre in economy.
@Bhutto and Najib coflict was another reason fo Partition. And "Hm idher Tm Udher" was the slogan by Bhutto which conveyed a message to East Pakistan that u r not part of us.
I think I have HamoodurRehman Commission Report.
If i can find it , i will definately share it .
Sang Dil Riwajoon k Khasta Hal Zindan Main ASEER SEHZADI
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(Saturday, June 05, 2010)
Saturday, June 05, 2010
Join Date: Nov 2009
Thanked 117 Times in 76 Posts
But as far as my knowledge is concerned comission report was made by the CJ of Pakistan Hamoodur Rehman. Political leaders, Z.A Bhutto, especially, involved in the creation of this report.The people who read this report were under oath as Qudraatullah Shahab mentioned in Shahabnama:
"because i have read the comission report that is why i am unable to exlain.......!
It is said that this report was made to critically analyse the failure in East Pakistan and afterwards GHQ was declared responsible for the separation of East Pakistan.
Anyways it remains mystry uptill now.
Now God knows the truth.
@ call for change
if u can find it, it will be the great effort.
Last edited by Andrew Dufresne; Saturday, June 05, 2010 at 11:19 PM.
Saturday, June 05, 2010
HAMOOD UR REHMAN COMMISSION REPORT
REASONS FOR SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT
This commission of Inquiry was appointed by the President of Pakistan in December, 1971 to inquire into
and find out "the circumstances in which the Commander, Eastern command, surrendered and the
members of the Armed Forces of Pakistan under his command laid down their arms and a ceasefire was
ordered along the borders of West Pakistan and India and along the ceasefire line in the State of Jammu
and Kashmir." After having examined 213 witnesses the Commission submitted its report in July 1972.
2. Before we submitted that report of necessity we did not have the evidence of most of the persons taken
as prisoners of war, including the major personalities, who played a part in the final events culminating in
the surrender in East Pakistan with the exception only of Major General Rahim. Although we did our best
to reconstruct the East Pakistan story with the help of such material, as was then available, inevitably our
conclusions had to be of a tentative character. We also felt that since we had found reasons adversely to
comment upon the performance of some of the major figures involved it would have been unfair to pass
any final judgment upon them without giving them an opportunity of explaining their own view point. For
this reason we said that "our observations and conclusions regarding the surrender in East Pakistan and
other allied matters should be regarded as provisional and subject to modification in the light of the
evidence of the Commander, Eastern Command, and his senior officers as and when such evidence
becomes available." (Page 242 of the Main Report).
3. Accordingly, after the prisoners of war and the civil personnel who had also been interned with the
military personnel in India returned to Pakistan, the Federal government issued a notification directing
"that the Commission shall start inquiry at a place and on a date to be fixed by it and complete the inquiry
and submit its report to the President of Pakistan, with its findings as to the matters aforesaid, within a
period of two months commencing from the date the commission starts functioning." A copy of this
notification is annexed as Annexure A to this Chapter. Lt. Gen.(Retd.) Altaf Qadir, who had also
previously acted as Military Adviser to the Commission, was re-appointed as such as also was Mr. M.A
Latif as Secretary to the Commission. At the request of the commission the government also appointed
Col. M.A Hassan as Legal Advisor.
4. The commission issued a Press Release on the 1st June, 1974 offering an opportunity to the prisoners
of War and others repatriated from East Pakistan to furnish such information as might be within their
knowledge and relevant to the purposes of the Commission. A copy of this Press Release is in Annexure
B to this Chapter.
5. Commission held an informal meeting at Lahore on the 3rd June, 1974 to consider various preliminary
matters and then decided to resume proceedings at Abbottabad from the 16th July, 1974. In the meantime
a number of questionnaires were issued to various persons, including those who were at the helm of
affairs in East Pakistan, at the relevant time and others whom we considered likely to have relevant
knowledge. Statements were also sent from members of armed forces, civil services and the police
services involved and we then proceeded after scrutiny of these statements to summon the witnesses.
We recorded evidence of as many as 72 persons and these included particularly Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi,
Commander Eastern Command, Major Generals Farman Ali, Jamshed ad the generals who held during
the relevant time commands of divisions, Rear Admiral Sharif, who was the senior most Naval Officer,
Air Commodore Inam the senior most Air Officer, and civilian personnel, including the then Chief
Secretary Mr. Muzaffar Hussain and the Inspector General of Police Mr. Mahmood Ali Chaudhry.
Besides, Maj. Gen. Rahim was reexamined. The only exception which was unavoidable was that Dr.
Malik who till very nearly the end was the Governor of East Pakistan, but in his case also we had
firsthand evidence of every important event and we, therefore, now feel ourselves competent to submit
our final conclusions.
6. After the examination of evidence the Commission, finding itself unable to submit its report for a
number of reasons by the 15th of September 1974, asked for time which was extended till the 15th of
November 1974 and again till the 30th November 1974. At the conclusion of the recording of evidence on
the 5th September 1974 we had to disperse principally because two of us were required to attend the
special session of the Supreme Court at Karachi from the 9th to the 21st September, 1974 and the
President had also to proceeded to Geneva to attend an International Conference. We, therefore,
reassembled on the 23rd of October, 1974 at Abbottabad to prepare this Supplement to our main report.
Scheme of the Supplementary Report
7. In general although we have examined a considerable volume of fresh evidence we have found no
reason whatever to modify the conclusions that we reached and stated in the Main Report; if anything by
reasons of more detailed information we are confirmed in those conclusions. We, therefore, propose to
avoid a repetition of what we stated in the Main Report except to some slight degree necessary for
restating briefly some of the conclusions with which we are principally concerned in this supplement.
There are also some matters upon which our information was then scanty if not negligible and, these we,
therefore, propose to deal with in some detail. We do, however, propose to write this, supplement,
following the same pattern as far as is practicable, as we did in the main report. In Part II of that report we
dealt with the political background and to this we now intend to add only matters which occurred in 1971,
or to be more specific on and after the 25th March, 1971. We have nothing to add to Part III of the Main
Report dealing with International Relations. As to Part IV we propose to say nothing in regard to the
military aspect in so far as it concerned West Pakistan except to a limited extent as to its repercussions in
East Pakistan and as to some controversy that has been raised before us as to the wisdom of opening the
Western Front at all.
Of necessity in this part, however, we shall deal in greater detail with the matters dealt with in Chapters
II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII and IX of the Main Report in so far as they concern East Pakistan. We then
propose to deal with the subject of discipline of the armed forces in East Pakistan which would include
the questions of alleged military atrocities in East Pakistan. We shall of necessity, mainly in this part,
have to deal with the individual conduct of several persons though aspects of this will emerge from earlier
Chapters. We shall then need to discuss some evidence which has come before us suggesting that there
were, during the period of captivity in India, concerted efforts on the part of some high officers to present
a consistent, if it necessarily accurate, account of what took place. We propose finally to wind up this
supplement by making the recommendations.
GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN
Rawalpindi, the 25th May, 1974
No. 107/19/74-Min -Whereas the Commission of Inquiry appointed under the late Ministry of Presidential
Affairs Notification No. 632 (1)/71, dated the 26th December, 1971, had, in its report of 8th July, 1972,
submitted, inter alia, that the Commission's findings with regard to the courses of events in East Pakistan
were only tentative and recommended that "as and when the Commander Eastern Command and other
senior officers now prisoners of war in India are available, a further Inquiry should be held into the
circumstances which led to the surrender in East Pakistan";
AND WHEREAS all the prisoners of war and civil internees have now returned to Pakistan;
AND WHEREAS the Federal Government is of the opinion that it is necessary in the light of the
recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry to finalise the said inquiry as to the circumstances which
led to the surrender in East Pakistan, after examining any of the said prisoners of war and civil internees
whose examination is considered necessary by the Commission;
Now, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (I) of Section 3 o the Pakistan
Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1956 (VI of 1956) the federal government is pleased to direct that the
commission shall start inquiry at a place and on a date to be fixed by it and complete the inquiry and
submit its report to the President of Pakistan, with its findings as to the matter aforesaid, within a period
of two months commencing from the date the Commission starts functioning.
Lahore, the 1st June, 1974
The War Inquiry Commission which has been asked by the government of Pakistan to resume its
deliberations and submit a final report was appointed by the then President of Pakistan, Mr. Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto, on the 26th December, 1971 to enquire into the circumstances in which the Commander, Eastern
Command surrendered and the members of the armed forces of Pakistan under his command laid down
their arms and a ceasefire was ordered along the borders of West Pakistan and India and along the
ceasefire line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Commission is headed by the Chief Justice of
Pakistan, Mr. Justice Hamoodur Rahman. The other two members of the Commission are Mr. Justice S.
Anwarul Haq, Judge, Supreme Court of Pakistan and Mr. Justice Tufaif Ali Abdur Rahman, Chief Justice
of Sid and Baluchistan High Court. Lt. Gen (Rtd) Altaf Qadir and Mr. M.A Latif, Assistant Registrar of
the Supreme Court of Pakistan are Military Adviser and Secretary of the Commission, respectively.
The Commission which had started its proceedings in camera in Rawalpindi on the 1st February, 1972
recorded evidence of 213 witnesses. It had submitted its report to the then President of Pakistan on the
12th July, 1972. In the Report the Commission had observed that its findings with regard to the causes of
surrender in East Pakistan were only tentative. It, therefore, recommended that as and when the
Commander, Eastern Command and other senior officers who were in India at that time were available, a
further inquiry should be held into the circumstances which led to the surrender in East Pakistan. Now
that all the prisoners of war and civil internees have returned to Pakistan, the Government has asked the
Commission to complete this part of its inquiry.
A temporary office of the Commission has been set up for the present in the Supreme Court building at
Lahore and the Commission has decided that before commencing its proceeding a place to be announced
later on the members of the public civil services and the armed forces who were either prisoners of war in
India or were otherwise repatriated from East Pakistan should be given an opportunity to furnish to the
commission such relevant information as may be within their knowledge relating to the causes of
surrender in East Pakistan. This information should be submitted in writing, preferably 5 copies, as briefly
as possible by the 30th June, 1974 at the latest to the Secretary of the Inquiry Commission care of
Supreme Court of Pakistan, Lahore. The informant should also state whether he will be willing to appear
before the Commission.
All such information and particulars of the persons given the information will be strictly confidential. It
may be mentioned that according to a public announcement of the Government of Pakistan published in
newspapers on the 11th January, 1972 all proceedings before the Commission would be in camera and the
statements made before and addressed to it would be absolutely privileged and would not render a person
making any such statement liable to any civil or criminal proceedings except when such statement is false.
The Commission is empowered to call before it any citizen of Pakistan to seek information. The
Commission can if necessary even issue warrants to secure the attendance of any person unless he is
otherwise exempted by law from personal appearance before a Court. The serving personnel of defence
services who are willing to give evidence before the Commission should have no apprehension of
victimization for assisting the Commission in its task.
THE MORAL ASPECT
In Chapter I of Part V of the Main Report, we have dealt at some length with the moral aspect of the
causes of our defeat in the 1971 War. This became necessary in view of the vehement assertions made
before the Commission by a large number of respectable witnesses drawn from various sections of
society, including highly placed and responsible Service Officers, to the effect that due to corruption
arising out of the performance of Martial Law duties, lust for wine and women and greed for lands and
houses, a large number of senior Army Officers, particularly those occupying the highest positions, had
not only lost the will to fight but also the professional competence necessary for taking the vital and
critical decisions demanded of them for the successful prosecution of the war. It was asserted by these
witnesses that men given to a disreputable way of life could hardly be expected to lead the Pakistan Army
2. After analysing the evidence brought before the Commission, we came to the conclusion that the
process of moral degeneration among the senior ranks of the Armed Forces was set in motion by their
involvement in Martial Law duties in 1958, that these tendencies reappeared and were, in fact, intensified
when Martial Law was imposed in the country once again in March 1969 by General Yahya Khan, and
that there was indeed substance in the allegations that a considerable number of senior Army Officers had
not only indulged in large scale acquisition of lands and houses and other commercial activities, but had
also adopted highly immoral and licentious ways of life which seriously affected their professional
capabilities and their qualities of leadership.
3. We then offered specific comments on the conduct of certain high officers including the Commander,
Eastern Command, Lt. Gen A.A.K. Niazi. However, we observed, in Paragraph 35 of that Chapter, that
"as we have not had the opportunity of putting these allegations to Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi any finding in
this behalf must await his return from India where he is at present held as a prisoner of war". We have
now examined not only Lt. Gen. Niazi but certain other witnesses as well in relation to his personal
conduct, and the general allegations made against the Pakistan Army during its operations in the former
East Pakistan, and are accordingly in a position to formulate our final conclusions in the matter.
Effect of Martial Law Duties
4. In the situation that developed after the military action of the 25th of March 1971, the civil
administration in East Pakistan practically came to a standstill, and the burden of running the Province
fell heavily upon the Army Officers. Their involvement in civil administration continued unabated even
after the induction of a sizable number of senior civil servants from West Pakistan, including the Chief
Secretary, the Inspector General of Police and at least two Division Commissioners.
5. According to the Inspector General of Police, Mr. M.A.K Chaudhry (Witness No. 219), "after the
disturbances of March-April 1971, there was a Military Governor with a Major General as his adviser at
the head of the civil administration. There was a parallel Martial Law administration at all levels. All
wings of administration, relating to law and order were under the control of Martial Law Authorities. A
West Pakistan Deputy Inspector General of Police in the field was not permitted by the local Martial Law
Authorities to come to the Provincial Headquarters" for a conference with the Inspector General of Police.
In the view of Syed Alamdar Raza (Witness No. 226), Commissioner of Dacca Division, "efforts were
made to make civilian officers responsible or at least routine matters within the general supervision and
control of the Army Officers, but no substantial results could be achieved. Those Bengali Officers who
had been restored lacked confidence and were not sure if their loyalties were not suspected. Action was
taken against them, even their arrests were ordered without any body knowing about it, including their
superiors or the Government of East Pakistan."
6. The Army's involvement in civil administration did not come to an end even with the installation of a
civilian governor (viz. Dr. A.M Malik), and the ministers appointed by him. The observations made in
this behalf by Maj Gen. Rao Farman Ali (Witness No. 284), who held the appointment of Maj General
(Civil Affairs) in the governor's Secretariat are worth quoting:
"A fully civil government could not be formed in East Pakistan as had been announced by the ex-
President. Dr. Malik an old man and politician, had a weak personality. He could not annoy, the Martial
Law Administrator (Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi) also because of the unsettled conditions obtaining in the
Wing. Gen Niazi, on the other hand, cherished and liked power, but did not have the breadth of vision or
ability to understand political implications. He did not display much respect for the civilian Governor,.....
The Army virtually continued to control civil administration".
7. The impression created on the mind of the West Pakistani civilian officials, then serving in East
Pakistan, has been stated thus by Mr. Mohammad Ashraf, (Witness No. 275), former Additional Deputy
Commissioner, Dacca: "The installation of a civilian governor in September 1971 was merely to
hoodwink public opinion at home and abroad. Poor Dr. Malik and his ministers were figureheads only.
Real decisions in all important matters still lay with the Army. I remember the first picture of the new
Cabinet. Maj. Gen Farman Ali was prominently visible sitting on the right side of the Governor, although
he was not a member of the Cabinet."
8. This impression is fortified by the fact that at a later stage even the selection of candidates for the byelections
ordered by General Yahya Khan was made by Maj Gen Farman Ali. Lt. Gen Niazi and some of
his subordinate Martial Law Administrators have no doubt claimed that they allowed full liberty of action
to the civilian officials at various levels, but even they have conceded that in the peculiar situation
prevailing in East Pakistan after the military action the Army necessarily continued to be deeply
concerned with the maintenance of law and order, the restoration of communications and the revival of
economic activity in the Province.
9. The evidence of Officers repatriated from India leaves no doubt that this extensive and prolonged
involvement of the Pakistan Army in Martial Law duties and civil administration had a disastrous effect
on its professional and moral standards. According to Brig. M. Salcemullah, who was commanding 203
(A) Brigade in East Pakistan, "prolonged commitment on Martial Law duties and interment security roles
had affected the professional standards of the Army." According to Rear Admiral M. Sharif (Witness No.
283) who was the Flag Officer Commanding the Pakistan Navy in East Pakistan, "the foundation of this
defeat was laid way back in 1958 when the Armed Forces took over the country ..." While learning the art
of politics in this newly assigned role to themselves, they gradually abandoned their primary function of
the art of soldiering, they also started amassing wealth and usurping status for themselves." Similar views
were expressed before us by Commodore I.H. Malik (Witness No. 272) who was the Chairman of the
Chittagong Port Trust until the day of surrender, Brigadier S.S.A Qasim, former Commander Artillery,
Eastern Command, Col. Mansoorul Haw Malik, former GS-I, 9 division, East Pakistan, and Col. Ijaz
Ahmad (Witness No. 247) former Colonel Staff (GS) Eastern Command, to mention only a few.
10. The fresh evidence coming before the Commission has thus served only to reinforce the conclusions
reached by us in the Main Report that the involvement of the Pakistan Army in Martial Law duties and
civil administration had a highly corrupting influence, seriously detracting from the professional duties of
the Army and affecting the quality of training which the Officers could impart to their units and
formations, for the obvious reason that they did not have enough time available for this purpose, and
many of them also lost the inclination to do so.
Living off the Land
11. A new aggravating factor made its appearance in East Pakistan in the wake of the military action of
the 25th of March 1971, when units of the Pakistan Army undertook "sweep operations" throughout the
Province to deal with the Awami League insurgents. The Army had to go out into the countryside without
adequate logistic arrangements, and was compelled, at least in the early stages of its operations to take its
requirements of foodgrains and other essential supplies from civilian sources. Unfortunately, however, the
practice appears to have persisted even when it became possible to make proper logistic arrangements.
There is evidence to the effect that civilian shops and stores were broken into by the troops without
preparing any record of what was taken and from where. The need for commandeering vehicles,
foodstuffs, medicines and other essential supplies can certainly be appreciated, but this should have been
done under a proper method of accounting so that compensation could be paid on return of normal
conditions. As no such procedure was adopted, it led to a general feeling among the troops, including
their officers that they were entitled to take whatever they wanted from wherever they liked. This appears
to us to be the genesis of the looting alleged to have been indulged in by the Army in East Pakistan.
12. In the early stages this method of procurement seems to have been encouraged by senior commanders,
including Lt. Gen Niazi, whose remarks on the very first day of his taking over command from Gen Tikka
Khan have already been quoted by us in an earlier chapter, viz: "what have I been hearing about shortage
of rations? Are not there any cows and goats in this country? This is enemy territory. Get what you want.
This is what we used to do in Burma." (vide Maj Gen Farman Ali's Evidence). Gen Niazi did not, of
course, accept having made any such statement and asserted that "whatever we took we gave a chit so that
civil government should pay for that". This assertion is not supported by other officers. On the contrary,
some officers like Lt. Col. Bukhori, (Witness No. 244) have made a positive statement that even written
orders were received by them emanating from the Eastern Command to live of the land during sweep
13. However, at a later stage the Eastern Command and the divisional Commanders issued strict
instructions in an effort to stop such practices, and some Commanders caused searches to be carried out of
the barracks occupied by the troops for the recovery of looted material which included television sets,
refrigerators, typewriters, watches, gold, airconditioners and other attractive items. We were informed that
in several cases disciplinary action by way of Courts of Inquiries was initiated but the cases could not be
finalised for one reasons or the other before the surrender on the 16th of December 1971.
Glaring Cases of Moral Lapses Amongst
Officers Posted in East Pakistan
(1) Lt. Gen A.A.K. Niazi
14. In the Main Report we have mentioned the allegations, and the evidence relating thereto as regards the
personal conduct of Gen Yahya Khan, Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan the late Maj Gen (Retd) Khuda Dad
Khan, Lt. Gen A.A.K. Niazi, Maj Gen Jehanzeb and Brig Hayatullah. We wish to supplement those
observations as regards Lt. Gen Niazi.
15. From a perusal of Paragraphs 30 to 34 of Chapter 1 of Part V of the Main Report, it will be seen that
the graveness of the allegations made against Lt. Gen. Niazi is that he was making money in the handling
of Martial Law cases while posted as G.O.C Sialkot and later as G.O.C and Martial Law Administrator at
Lahore; that he was on intimate terms with one Mrs. Saeeda Bukhari of Gulberg, Lahore, who was
running a brothel under the name of Senorita Home, and was also acting as the General's tout for
receiving bribes and getting things done; that he was also friendly with another woman called Shamini
Firdaus of Sialkot who was said to be playing the same role as Mrs. Saeeda Bukhari of Lahore; that
during his stay in East Pakistan he came to acquire a stinking reputation owing to his association with
women of bad repute, and his nocturnal visits to places also frequented by several junior officers under
his command; and that he indulged in the smuggling of Pan from East Pakistan to West Pakistan. These
allegations were made before the Commission by Abdul Qayyum Arif (witness No. 6), Munawar Hussain,
Advocate of Sialkot (Witness No. 13), Abdul Hafiz Kardar (Witness No. 25), Maj Sajjadul Haq (Witness
No. 164), Squadron Leader C.A Wahid (Witness No. 57) and Lt. Col Haliz Ahmad (Witness NO. 147).
16. During the present phase of our inquiry damaging evidence has come on the record regarding the ill
repute of General Niazi in sex matters, and his indulgence in the smuggling of Pan. A mention may be
made in this behalf of the statements made before us by Lt. Col. Mansoorul Haq (Witness No. 260), ex
GSO-I, 9 div. Lt Cdr. A.A. Khan (Witness No. 262), of Pakistan navy, Brig I.R Shariff (Witness No. 269)
former Comd. Engrs. Eastern Command, Mr. Mohammad Ashraf (Witness No. 275) former Addl. D.C.
Dacca, and Lt. Col. Aziz Ahmad Khan (Witness No. 276). The remarks made by this last witness are
highly significant: "The troops used to say that when the Commander (Lt. Gen. Niazi) was himself a
raper, how could they be stopped. Gen. Niazi enjoyed the same reputation at Sialkot and Lahore."
17. Maj Gen Qazi Abdul Majid Khan (Witness No. 254) and Maj Gen Farman Ali (Witness No. 284)
have also spoken of Gen Niazi's indulgence in the export of Pan. According to Maj Gen Abdul Majid,
Brig Aslam Niazi, commanding 53 Bde, and Senior Superintendent of Police Diljan, who was residing
with Gen Niazi in the Flag Staff House at Dacca, were helping Gen Niazi in the export of Pan. Maj Gen
Farman Ali has gone to the extent of stating that "Gen Niazi was annoyed with me because I had not
helped him in Pan business. Brig Hamiduddin of PIA had complained to me that Corps Headquarter was
interfering in transportation of Pan to West Pakistan by placing limitation on poundage. I told ADC to
Gen Niazi, who visited me in my office, that this was a commercial matter and should be left to the
arrangements arrived at between PIA and Pan exporters." We understand that the insinuation is that a son
of Gen Niazi was engaged in the export of Pan from East Pakistan to West Pakistan. According to Major
S.S. Haider (Witness NO. 259) and Brig Atta Mohammed (Witness No. 257) even Brig Baqir Siddiqui,
Chief of Staff, Eastern Command, was a partner of Gen Niazi in the export of Pan.
18. The allegations mentioned in the preceding paragraphs were put to Lt. Gen. Niazi during his
appearance before us, and he naturally denied them. When asked about his weakness for the fair sex, he
replied, "I say no. I have been doing Martial Law duties. I never stopped anybody coming to see me. I
became very religious during the East Pakistan trouble. I was not so before. I though more of death than
19. As regards the allegation that he was indulging in the export of Pan, he stated that he had ordered an
enquiry into the matter on the complaint of a man called Bhuiyan who was aggrieved by the monopoly
position occupied by the Pan exporters. He alleged that in fact Brig Hamiduddin and PIA staff were
themselves involved in the smuggling of Pan.
20. From the mass of evidence coming before the Commission from witnesses, both civil and military,
there is little doubt that Gen. Niazi unfortunately came to acquire a bad reputation in sex matters, and this
reputation has been consistent during his postings in Sialkot, Lahore and East Pakistan. The allegations
regarding his indulgence in the export of Pan by using or abusing his position in the Eastern Command
and as Zonal Martial Law Administrator also prima facie appear to be well-founded, although it was not
our function to hold a detailed inquiry into the matter. It is for the Government to decide whether these
matters should also form the subject of any inquiry or trial which may have to be ultimately held against
(2) Maj Gen Mohammad Jamshed, former GOC 36 (A) Division, East Pakistan
21. Col. Bashir Ahmad Khan (Witness No. 263) who was posted as DDML, Eastern Command, stated
before the Commission that the wife of Maj Gen Jamshed Khan had brought some currency with her
while being evacuated from Dacca on the morning of 16th of December 1971. He further alleged that Lt.
Col Rashid, Col. Staff o the East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces, commanded by Maj Gen Jamshed Khan,
was also reported to have been involved in the mis-appropriation of currency. It further came to our notice
that the General had distributed some money among persons who left East Pakistan by helicopters on the
morning of 15th or 16th of December 1971.
22. An inquiry was made from Maj Gen Jamshed Khan in this behalf, and his reply is as under. :
The total sum involved was Rs. 50,000 which I had ordered to be drawn from the currency that was being
destroyed under Government instructions and the total amount was distributed by the officers detailed by
me and strictly according to the instruction/rules and regulations to the Binaries and Bengalis, informers,
and to the needy on night 15/16th December 1971.
A secret fund was placed at my disposal by the Government of East Pakistan for the purpose of payment
of rewards and purchase of information and in this case the expenditure was from the secret fund at my
disposal. This fund was non-auditable. The money given to the needy families who were dispatched by
helicopters on night 15th/16th December, 1971 was from the EPCAF Director General's Fund. I was the
sole authority to sanction from this fund and considering the circumstances under which this expenditure
was made I had no intention to recommend recovery from persons concerned.
From the above clarification it will be appreciated that there was no requirement to furnish details of the
above expenditure to any accounts department."
23. We regret we cannot regard the reply given by Maj. Gen Jasmhed as satisfactory. Even though the
funds disbursed by him may not be auditable in ordinary circumstances, it would have been appropriate
and advisable for him to supply such information as was possible for him to do in the circumstances once
the question of the disposal of these funds had arisen on the basis of information supplied to the
Commission by officers who heard of these transactions in East Pakistan and later in the prisoners of war
camps. We suggest, therefore, without necessarily implying any dereliction on the part of the general, that
the matter should be enquired into further so that the suspicion surrounding the same is cleared in the
General's own interest.
(3) Brig Jehanzeb Arbab, former Commander 57 Brigade.
(4) Lt. Col. (Now Brig) Muzaffar Ali Khan Zahid, former CO 31 field Regiment.
(5) Lt. Col. Basharat Ahmad, former CO 18 Punjab
(6) Lt. Col. Mohammad Taj, CO 32 Punjab
(7) Lt. Col Mohammad Tufail, Col 55 Field Regiment
(8) Major Madad Hussain Shah, 18 Punjab
24. The evidence of Maj Gen Nazar Hussain Shah (Witness No. 242 GOC 16 Div, Maj Gen M.H Ansari
(Witness NO. 233) GOC, 9 Div, as well as of Brig Baqir Siddiqui (Witness No. 218) Chief of Staff,
Eastern Command, disclosed that these officers and their units were involved in large scale looting,
including the theft of Rs. 1,35,00,000 from the National Bank Treasury at Siraj Gaj. This amount was
intercepted by a JCO at the Paksi Bridge crossing when it was being carried in the lower part of the body
of a truck. The driver of the truck produced a chit reading "released by Major Maddad". We were
informed that a Court o Inquiry was conveyed under the Chairmanship of Maj Gen M.H Ansari who had
recorded some evidence, but could not complete the inquiry owing to the outbreak of war.
25. The GHQ representative was not able to inform us as to what action had ultimately been taken by
GIIQ in respect of these officers, except that Brig Jehanzeb Arabab had been appointed to officiate as
GOC of a Division. The Commission feels that this appointment, before the completion of the inquiry and
exoneration of the officer from any blame, was highly inadvisable on the part of the GHQ. We
recommend that action should now be taken without delay to finalise the proceedings of the inquiry
commenced by Maj Gen Ansari in? East Pakistan. There should be no difficulty in re-constructing the
record, if necessary as the material witness appear to be now available in Pakistan.
26. Before we conclude this Chapter, we would like to state that we had no desire to embark on any
inquiry into personal allegations of immorality an dishonestly against senior Army Commanders, but
were persuaded to examine these matters owing to the universal belief that such infamous conduct had a
direct hearing on the qualities of determination and leadership displayed by these officers in the 1971 war.
We have regretfully found that this was indeed so. It is, therefore, imperative that deterrent action should
be taken by the Government, wherever it is justified by the facts, in order to maintain the high moral
standards and traditions for which the Muslim Army of Pakistan was justly proud before degeneration set
Alleged atrocities by the Pakistan Army
As is well-known, the conduct of the Pakistani army, while engaged in counter-insurgency measures is
East Pakistan since March 1971, has come in for a lot of criticism from several quarters. We had occasion
to deal with the subject in Paragraphs 5-8 of Chapter II of Part V of the main report. We have examined
this question further in the light of fresh evidence recorded by us.
Misdeeds of the Awami League Militants:
2. It is necessary that this painful chapter of the events in East Pakistan be looked at in its proper
perspective. Let it not be forgotten that the initiative in resorting to violence and cruelty was taken by the
militants of the Awami League, during the month of March, 1971, following General Yahya Khan's
announcement of the Ist of March regarding the postponement of the session of the National Assembly
scheduled for the 3rd of March 1971. It will be recalled that from the 1st of March to the 3rd of March
1971, the Awami League had taken complete control of East Pakistan, paralysing the authority of the
federal government. There is reliable evidence to show that during this period the miscreants indulged in
large scale massacres and rape against pro-Pakistan elements, in the towns of Dacca, Narayanganj,
Chittagong, Chandragona, Rungamati, Khulna, Dinajpur, Dhakargaoa, Kushtia, Ishuali, Noakhali, sylhet,
Maulvi Bazaar, Rangpur, Saidpur, Jessore, Barisal, Mymensingh, Rajshal??, Pabna, Sirojgonj, Comilla,
Brahman, Baria, Bogra, Naugaon, Santapur and several other smaller places.
3. Harrowing tales of these atrocities were narrated by the large number of West Pakistanis and Biharis
who were able to escape from these places and reach the safety of West Pakistan. For days on end, all
through the troubled month of March 1971, swarms of terrorised non-Bengalis lay at the Army-controlled
Dacca airport awaiting their turn to be taken to the safety of West Pakistan. Families of West Pakistani
officers and other ranks serving with East Bengal units were subjected to inhuman treatment, and a large
number of West Pakistani officers were butchered by the erstwhile Bengali colleagues.
4. These atrocities were completely blacked out at the time by the Government of Pakistan for fear of
retaliation by the Bengalis living in West Pakistan. The Federal Government did issue a White Paper in
this behalf in August 1971, but unfortunately it did not create much impact for the reason that it was
highly belated, and adequate publicity was not given to it in the national and international press.
5. However, recently, a renowned journalist of high-standing, Mr Qutubuddin Aziz, has taken pains to
marshal the evidence in a publication called "Blood and Tears". The book contains the harrowing tales of
inhuman crimes committed on the helpless Biharis, West Pakistanis and patriotic Bengalis living in East
Pakistan during that period. According to various estimates mentioned by Mr. Qutubuddin Aziz, between
100,000 and 500,000 persons were slaughtered during this period by the Awami League militants.
6. As far as we can judge, Mr Qutubuddin Aziz has made use of authentic personal accounts furnished by
the repatriates whose families, have actually suffered at the hands of the Awami League militants. He has
also extensively referred to the contemporary accounts of foreign correspondents then stationed in East
Pakistan. The plight of the non-Bengali elements still living in Bangladesh and the insistence of that
Government on their large-scale repatriation to Pakistan, are factors which appear to confirm the
correctness of the allegations made against the Awami League in this behalf.
7. We mention these facts not in justification of the atrocities or other crimes alleged to have been
committed by the Pakistani Army during its operations in East Pakistan, but only to put the record straight
and to enable the allegations to be judged in their correct perspective. The crimes committed by the
Awami League miscreants were bound to arouse anger and bitterness in the minds of the troops,
especially when they were not confined to barracks during these weeks immediately preceding the
military action, but were also subjected to the severest of humiliations. They had seen their comrades
insulted, deprived of food and ration, and even killed without rhyme or reason. Tales of wholesale
slaughter of families of West Pakistani officers and personnel of several units had also reached the
soldiers who were after all only human, and reacted violently in the process of restoring the authority of
the Central Government
The Nature of Allegations
8. According to the allegations generally made, the excesses committed by the Pakistani Army fall into
the following categories:-
a) Excessive use of force and fire power in Dacca during the night of the 25th and 26th of March 1971
when the military operation was launched.
b) Senseless and wanton arson and killings in the countryside during the course of the "sweeping
operations" following the military action.
c) Killing of intellectuals and professionals like doctors, engineers, etc and burying them in mass graves
not only during early phases of the military action but also during the critical days of the war in December
d) Killing of Bengali Officers and men of the units of the East Bengal Regiment, East Pakistan Rifles and
the East Pakistan Police Force in the process of disarming them, or on pretence of quelling their rebellion.
e) Killing of East Pakistani civilian officers, businessmen and industrialists, or their mysterious
disappearance from their homes by or at the instance of Army Officers performing Martial Law duties.
f) Raping of a large number of East Pakistani women by the officers and men of the Pakistan army as a
deliberate act of revenge, retaliation and torture.
g) Deliberate killing of members of the Hindu minority.
Substance of Evidence
9. In view of the seriousness of the allegations, their persistence and their international impact as well as
their fundamental importance from the point of view of moral and mental discipline of the Pakistan
Army, we made it a point of questioning the repatriated officers at some length in this behalf. We feel that
a brief reference to some typical statements made before us by responsible military and civil officers will
be instructive, and helpful in reaching the necessary conclusions.
10. Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi, apparently in an endeavour to put the blame on his predecessor, then Lt. Gen.
Tikka Khan, stated that "military action was based on use of force primarily, and at many places
indiscriminate use of force was resorted to which alienated the public against the Army. Damage done
during those early days of the military action could never be repaired, and earned for the military leaders
names such as "Changez Khan" and "Butcher of East Pakistan." While the military action was on, the
then Martial Law Administration alienated the world press by unceremoniously hounding out foreign
correspondents from East Pakistan, thus losing out in the propaganda war to the Indians completely." He
went on to add: "on the assumption of command I was very much concerned with the discipline of troops,
and on 15th of April, 1971, that is within four days of my command, I addressed a letter to all formations
located in the area and insisted that loot, rape, arson, killing of people at random must stop and a high
standard of discipline should be maintained. I had come to know that looted material had been sent to
West Pakistan which included cars, refrigerators and air conditioners etc." When asked about the alleged
killing of East Pakistani officers and men during the process of disarming, the General replied that he had
heard something of the kind but all these things had happened in the initial stages of the military action
before his time. He denied the allegation that he ever ordered his subordinates to exterminate the Hindu
minority. He denied that any intellectuals were killed during December, 1971. He admitted that there
were a few cases of rape, but asserted that the guilty persons were duly punished. He also stated that
"these things do happen when troops are spread over. My orders were that there would not be less than a
company. When a company is there, there is an officer with them to control them but if there is a small
picket like section, then it is very difficult to control. In Dacca jail we had about 80 persons punished for
11. Another significant statement was made in this regard by Maj. Gen. Rao Barman Ali, Adviser to the
Governor of East Pakistan namely: "Harrowing tales of rape, loot, arson, harassment, and of insulting and
degrading behaviour were narrated in general terms.... I wrote out an instruction to act as a guide for
decent behaviour and recommended action required to be taken to win over the hearts of the people. This
instruction under General Tikka Khan's signature was sent to Eastern Command. I found that General
Tikka's position was also deliberately undermined and his instructions ignored...excesses were explained
away by false and concocted stories and figures."
12. About the use of excessive force on the night between the 25th and 26th March 1971, we have a
statement from Brigadier Shah Abdul Qasim (witness No. 267) to the effect that "no pitched battle was
fought on the 25th of March in Dacca. Excessive force was used on that night. Army personnel acted
under the influence of revenge and anger during the military operation." It has also been alleged that
mortars were used to blast two Residence Halls, thus causing excessive casualties. In defence, it has been
stated that these Halls were at the relevant time not occupied by the students but by Awami League
insurgents, and were also being used as dumps for arms and ammunition stored by the Awami League for
its armed rebellion.
13. Still another significant statement came from Brigadier Mian Taskeenuddin (Witness No. 282):
"Many junior and other officers took the law into their own hands to deal with the so-called miscreants.
There have been cases of interrogation of miscreants which were far more severe in character than normal
and in some cases blatantly in front of the public. The discipline of the Pakistani army as was generally
understood had broken down. In a command area (Dhoom Ghat) between September and October
miscreants were killed by firing squads. On coming to know about it I stopped the same forthwith."
14. Maj. Gen. Nazar Hussain Shah, GOC 16 Division, conceded that "there were rumours that Bengalis
were disposed of without trial." Similarly, Brigadier Abdul Qadir Khan (Witness No. 243) Commander
93 (A)? admitted that "a number of instance of picking up Bengalis did take place." Lt. Col. S. S. H.
Bokhari, CO of 29 Cavalry, appearing as Witness no 244, stated that "In Rangpur two officers and 30
men were disposed of without trial. It may have happened in other stations as well." An admission was
also made by Lt. Col. S. M. Naeem (Witness No 258) CO of 39 Baluch that "innocent people were killed
by us during sweep operations and it created estrangement amongst the public."
15. Lt Col. Mansoorul Haq, GSO-I, Division, appearing as Witness No 260, has made detailed and
specific allegations as follows:
"A Bengali, who was alleged to be a Mukti Bahini or Awami Leaguer, was being sent to Bangladesh-a
code name for death without trial, without detailed investigations and without any written order by any
Indiscriminate killing and looting could only serve the cause of the enemies of Pakistan. In the harshness,
we lost the support of the silent majority of the people of East Pakistan.... The Comilla Cantt massacre (on
27th/28th of March, 1971) under the orders of CO 53 Field Regiment, Lt. Gen. Yakub Malik, in which 17
Bengali Officers and 915 men were just slain by a flick of one Officer's fingers should suffice as an
There was a general feeling of hatred against Bengalis amongst the soldiers and officers including
Generals. There were verbal instructions to eliminate Hindus.
In Salda Nadi area about 500 persons were killed.
When the army moved to clear the rural areas and small towns, it moved in a ruthless manner, destroying,
burning and killing. The rebels while retreating carried out reprisals against non-Bengalis.
16. Several civilian officers have also deposed in a similar vein, and it would suffice to quote here the
words of Mr. Mohammad Ashraf, Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dacca, to whose evidence we have
also referred earlier in another context. He stated that "after the military action the Bengalis were made
aliens in their own homeland. The life, property, and honour of even the most highly placed among them
were not safe. People were picked up from their homes on suspicion and dispatched to Bangladesh, a term
used to describe summary executions. .... The victims included Army and Police Officers, businessmen,
civilian officers etc....There was no Rule of Law in East Pakistan. A man had no remedy if he was on the
wanted list of the Army.... Army Officers who were doing intelligence were raw hands, ignorant of the
local language and callous of Bengali sensibilities."
17. About the attitude of senior officers in this behalf, Brigadier Iqbalur Rehman Shariff (Witness no.
269), has alleged that during his visit to formations in East Pakistan General Gul Hassan used to ask the
soldiers "how many Bengalis have you shot".
18. The statements appearing in the evidence of Lt. Col. Aziz Ahmed Khan (Witness no 276) who was
Commanding Officer 8 Baluch and then CO 86 Mujahid Battalion are also directly relevant. "Brigadier
Arbbab also told me to destroy all houses in Joydepur. To a great extent I executed this order. General
Niazi visited my unit at Thakargaon and Bogra. He asked us how many Hindus we had killed. In May,
there was an order in writing to kill Hindus. This order was from Brigadier Abdullah Malik of 23
19. While the extracts of evidence given above reflect the general position in regard to the allegations we
are considering, it appears to be necessary to deal specifically with certain matters brought to the notice of
the Prime Minister of Pakistan by the Bangladesh authorities, or which have otherwise been particularly
mentioned by certain witnesses appearing before the Commission during the present session.
Painting the Green of East Pakistan Red
20. During his meeting with the Prime Minister of Pakistan at Dacca on Friday, the 28th of June 1974, the
Bangladesh Prime Minister Sh. Mujibur Rehman, complained inter-alia that Maj Gen Rao Farman Ali had
written in his own hand on Government stationery that "The green of East Pakistan will have to be
painted red." Sh. Mujibur Rehman promised to supply a photostat copy of this document to the
Government of Pakistan." The same has since been received and is added to annexure "A" to this chapter.
The insinuation is that this writing amounted to a written declaration of the intentions of the Pakistan
Army and the martial law administration in East Pakistan to indulge in large-scale bloodshed in order to
suppress the movement for Bangladesh. This writing is being put forward as a proof of the killings
alleged to have been carried out in East Pakistan during the military operations.
21. We asked Maj. Gen. Farman Ali to explain the significance of this writing and the circumstances
under which it came to me made by him. He has stated that the words "the green of East Pakistan will
have to be painted red" were uttered by one of the NPA leaders in Paltan Maidan, Dacca in a public
speech during June 1970. The Martial Law headquarters thought that these words had been uttered by Mr
Mohammad Toha of the NAP, and the General was asked to call for the explanation of Mr Tolia and warn
him not to say things prejudicial to public peace. To remind himself he wrote these words down on the
back of his table diary, when they were repeated to him on telephone by Lt. Gen. Yakub, the then Zonal
Martial Law administrator in East Pakistan. Toha later denied having uttered these words and mentioned
the names of Qazi Zafar and Rashid Memon in this connection. As these gentlemen had gone
underground, General Farman Ali could not take any further action against them. The General has further
explained that as Mr Toha and his associates had communist leanings, these words were intended to
convey their conviction and objective that East Pakistan would be turned into a communist state, and not
that there would be bloodshed. Finally, Maj. Gen. Farman Ali has stated that he did not give any
importance to this note and it must have fallen into the hands of his Bengali Personal Assistant, when the
diary for the year 1970 was replaced at the close of that year.
22. From the photostat copy sent to the Government of Pakistan by the Government of Bangladesh, it
becomes clear that the paper on which these words are written was apparently in the nature of a writing
pad on which notes are jotted down as an aid to memory. The paper bears the heading:-
"Governor's Secretariat, East Pakistan"
Then there are miscellaneous entries, which do not have any connection with each other, for instance,
"Siraj-Iqbal Hall, D.C."
Below these words a line in ink is drawn and then appear the words "Case against Mr. Toha and others".
These words are followed by the telephone number of the Chief Justice and then by some other entries
relating to some accommodation and the name of one Mr. Karamat. Then appear the words in question,
enclosed by a circle in black ink. There is a further entry of an Officer's name below these words, which
apparently has no connection with this matter.
23. A perusal of this document leave no doubt in our mind that it was indeed in the nature of a writing pad
or table diary on which the General made miscellaneous notes during course of his work. The words
"Case against Mr Teha and others", appearing in the same page, do support Maj. Gen. Farman Ali's
contention that it was in this connection that he noted these words to remind himself, while confronting
Mr Toha as directed by the Martial Law Administrator. We consider that it is highly fanciful to regard this
note as being in the nature of a solemn declaration of Maj. Gen. Farman Ali's intention to shed blood on
the soil of East Pakistan. The explanation given by the General appears to us to be correct.
24. This again is a matter, which was specifically raised by Sh. Mujibur Rehman during his meeting with
the Prime Minister at Dacca. According to Maj. Gen. Farman Ali it was on the 9th and 10th of December
1971 that he was rung up in the evening by Maj. Gen. Jamshed, who was the Deputy Martial Law
Administrator for Dacca Division and asked to come to his headquarters in Peelkhana. On reaching the
headquarters he saw a large number of vehicles parked there. Maj. Gen. Jamshed was getting into a car
and he asked Maj. Gen. Farman Ali to come along. They both drove to Headquarters of Eastern
Command to meet Gen. Niazi and on the way Maj. Gen. Jamshed informed Gen. Farman that they were
thinking of arresting certain people. Gen. Farman Ali advised against it. On reaching General Niazi's
headquarters he repeated his advice, on which Gen. Niazi kept quiet and so did Gen. Jamshed. Gen.
Farman Ali has stated that he cannot say anything as to what happened after he came away from the
headquarters but he thinks that no further action was taken.
25. When questioned on this point, Lt. Gen. A. A. K. Niazi stated that the local Commanders had, on the
9th of December 1971, brought a list to him which included the names of miscreants, heads of Mukti
Bahini etc but not any intellectuals but he had stopped them from collecting and arresting these people.
He denied the allegation that any intellectuals were in fact arrested and killed on the 9th December 1971
26. Maj. Gen. Jamshed has, however, a slightly different version to offer. He says that it was on the 9th
and 10th of December 1971 that General Niazi expressed his apprehension of a general uprising in the
Dacca city and ordered him to examine the possibility of arresting certain persons according to lists which
were already with the various agencies, namely the Martial Law Authorities and the Intelligence Branch.
A conference was held on the 9th and 10th of December 1971 in which these lists were produced by the
agencies concerned and the total number of persons to be arrested came to about two or three thousand.
According to him, arrangements for accommodation, security guards, missing and the safety of the
arrested persons from bombing/strafing by the Indian Air Force presented insurmountable problems and
therefore, he reported back to Gen. Niazi that the proposal be dropped. He states that thereafter no further
action was taken in this matter.
27. From the statements made by the three Generals who appear to be directly concerned in the matter, it
seems that although there was some talks of arresting persons known to be leaders of the Awami League
or Mukti Bahini so as to prevent chances o a general uprising in Dacca during the closing phases of the
war with India, yet no practical action was taken in view of the circumstances then prevailing, namely the
precarious position of the Pakistan Army and the impending surrender. We consider, therefore, that unless
the Bangladesh authorities can produce some convincing evidence, it is not possible to record a finding
that any intellectuals or professionals were indeed arrested and killed by the Pakistan Army during
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Killings During Disarming of East Pakistan Units
28. In the evidence specific allegations were made before the Commission that Lt. Col. Yakub Malik, CO
of 53 Field Regiment was responsible for the killing of 17 Officers and 915 other ranks at Comilla Cantt.,
while disarming 4 EBR, 40 Field Ambulance and Bengali SSG personnel. An explanation was
accordingly called from this officer, in which he has denied the allegation, and has asserted that resistance
was put up by the particular units aforementioned as a result of which casualties were sustained on both
sides. He asserts, however, that in April 1971 when the situation stabilised a large number of disarmed
Bengali personnel detained in the barracks were reported to Headquarters 9 Div., thus implying that no
such killing took place during the disarming process towards the end of March 1971.
29. Similar allegations have also been made before the Commission regarding the disarming of East
Pakistani personnel of 29 Cavalry at Rangpur, although the number of persons said to have been killed is
mentioned as being only two officers and 30 other ranks. An explanation was called from the
Commanding Officer, Brigadier, Saghir Hussain and he has denied the allegation stating that all the
personnel, barring a few who had either deserted or did not return from leave, were safely evacuated to
West Pakistan under arrangements of Eastern Command, and they were later repatriated to Bangladesh
along with other East Pakistani personnel.
30. The evidence before the Commission in respect of these allegations is obviously not conclusive, It is
possible that there may have been other instances of casualties inflicted during the disarming of East
Pakistani personnel. The Commission feels that the Army authorities must conduct a thorough inquiry
into these matters so as to elicit the truth and fix responsibility.
Magnitude of Atrocities
31. In the circumstances that prevailed in East Pakistan from the 1st of March to the 16th of December
1971, it was hardly possible to obtain an accurate estimate of the toll of death and destruction caused by
the Awami League militants and later by the Pakistan Army. It must also be remembered that even after
the military action of the 25th of march 1971, Indian infiltrators and members of the Mukti Bahini
sponsored by the Awami League continued to indulge in killings, rape and arson during their raids on
peaceful villages in east Pakistan, not only in order to cause panic and disruption and carry out their plans
of subversion, but also to punish those East Pakistanis who were not willing to go along with them. In any
estimate of the extent of atrocities alleged to have been committed on the East Pakistani people, the death
and destruction caused by the Awami League militants throughout this period and the atrocities
committed by them on their own brothers and sisters must, therefore, be always be kept in view.
32. According to the Bangladesh authorities, the Pakistan Army was responsible for killing three million
Bengalis and raping 200,000 East Pakistani women. It does not need any elaborate argument to see that
these figures are obviously highly exaggerated. So much damage could not have been caused by the entire
strength of the Pakistan Army then stationed in East Pakistan even if it had nothing else to do. In fact,
however, the army was constantly engaged in fighting the Mukti Bahini, the Indian infiltrators, and later
the Indian army. It has also the task of running the civil administration, maintaining communications and
feeding 70 million people of East Pakistan. It is, therefore, clear that the figures mentioned by the Dacca
authorities are altogether fantastic and fanciful.
33. Different figures were mentioned by different persons in authority but the latest statement supplied to
us by the GHQ shows approximately 26,000 persons killed during the action by the Pakistan Army. This
figure is based on situation reports submitted from time to time by the Eastern Command to the General
Headquarters. It is possible that even these figures may contain an element of exaggeration as the lower
formations may have magnified their own achievements in quelling the rebellion. However, in the
absence of any other reliable date, the Commission is of the view that the latest figure supplied by the
GHQ should be accepted. An important consideration which has influenced us in accepting this figure as
reasonably correct is the fact that the reports were sent from East Pakistan to GHQ at a time when the
Army Officers in East Pakistan could have had no notion whatsoever of any accountability in this behalf.
34. The falsity of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's repeated allegation that Pakistani troops had raped 200,000
Bengali girls in 1971 was borne out when the abortion team he had commissioned from Britain in early
1972 found that its workload involved the termination of only a hundred or more pregnancies. Question
35. For almost three years now, the world has repeatedly heard a list of 195 names said to have been
prepared by the Dacca authorities in connection with the commission of these atrocities and crimes. As
the Commission has not been supplied with a copy of this list, it is not possible for us to comment upon
the justification or otherwise of the inclusion of any particular names therein. It is, however, clear that the
final and overall responsibility must rest on General Yahya Khan, Lt. Gen. Pirazada, Maj Gen. Umar, Lt.
Gen. Mitha. It has been brought out in evidence that Maj. Gen. Mitha was particularly active in East
Pakistan in the days preceding the military action of the 25th of March 1971, and even the other Generals
just mentioned were present in Dacca along with Yahya Khan, and secretly departed there on the evening
of that fateful day after fixing the deadline for the military action. Maj. Gen. Mitha is said to have
remained behind. There is also evidence that Lt. Gen Tikka Khan, Major Gen. Farman Ali and Maj. Gen
Khadim Hussain were associated with the planning of the military action. There is, however, nothing to
show that they contemplated the use of excessive force or the Commission of atrocities and excesses on
the people of East Pakistan.
36. The immediate responsibility for executing the plan of this action fell on Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan who
succeeded Lt. Gen. Mohammad Yakub on the 7th of March 1971 as Zonal Administrator, Martial Law, as
well as Commander Eastern Command. This last responsibility was passed on by him to Lt. Gen. A.A.K.
Niazi on the 7th of April 1971. From that day until the day of surrender the troops in East Pakistan
remained under the operational control of Lt. Gen. Niazi who also assumed powers of the Martial Law
administrator on the appointment of a civilian Governor in August 1971. It is a question for determination
as to what share of responsibility must rest on these commanders for the excesses allegedly committed by
the troops under their Command. It is in evidence that Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan was always willing to redress
grievances and take disciplinary action whenever complaints of excesses were brought to his notice. It has
also to be said that both these Generals had issued repeated warnings to troops to refrain from acts of
violence and immorality. At the same time there is some evidence to suggest that the words and personal
actions of Lt. Gen. Niazi were calculated to encourage the killings and rape.
37. The direct responsibility of the alleged excesses and atrocities must, of course, rest on those officers
and men who physically perpetuated them or knowingly and deliberately allowed them to be so
perpetuated. These officers and men not only showed lack of discipline in disobeying the directives of the
Eastern Command and Zonal Martial Law Administrator, but also indulged in criminal acts punishable
under the Army Act as well as the ordinary law of the land.
Conclusions and Recommendations
38. From what we have said in the preceding paragraphs it is clear that there is substance in the
allegations that during and after the military action excesses were indeed committed on the people of East
Pakistan, but the versions and estimates put forward by the Dacca authorities are highly coloured and
exaggerated. Some of the incidents alleged by those authorities did not take place at all, and on others
fanciful interpretations have been deliberately placed for the purpose of maligning the Pakistan army and
gaining world sympathy. We have also found that the strong provocation was offered to the army owing
to the misdeeds of the Awami League. It has also been stated that use of force was undoubtedly inherent
in the military action required to restore the authority of the Federal Government. Nevertheless, inspite of
all these factors we are of the view that the officers charged with the task of restoring law and order were
under an obligation to act with restraint and to employ only the minimum force necessary for the purpose.
No amount of provocation by the militants of the Awami League or other miscreants could justify
retaliation by a disciplined army against its own people. The Pakistan Army was called upon to operate in
Pakistan territory, and could not, therefore, be permitted to behave as if it was dealing with external
aggression or operating on enemy soil. Irrespective, therefore, of the magnitude of the atrocities, we are of
the considered opinion that it's necessary for the Government of Pakistan to take effective action to punish
this who were responsible for the commission of these alleged excesses and atrocities.
Inquiries and Trials
39. On the basis of the evidence coming before the Commission, we have been able to indicate only in
general terms the direct and indirect responsibility of certain senior commanders and others, but the
question of fixing individual responsibility and awarding punishment appropriate thereto need to be
determined according to the prescribed procedures available under the Pakistan Army Act and other
applicable laws of the land. We would, accordingly, reiterate the recommendation made by us in
Paragraph 7 of Chapter III of Para V of the main report that the Government of Pakistan should set up a
high-powered Court or Commission of Inquiry to investigate these allegations, and to hold trials of those
who indulged in these atrocities, brought a bad name to the Pakistan Army and alienated the sympathies
of the local population by their acts of wanton cruelty and immorality against our own people. The
composition of the Court of Inquiry, if not its proceedings, should be publicly announced so as to satisfy
national conscience and international opinion.
40. The Commission feels that sufficient evidence is now available in Pakistan for a fruitful inquiry to be
undertaken in this regard. As the Government of Bangladesh has been recognised by Pakistan, it may be
feasible to request the Dacca authorities to forward to this Court of Inquiry whatever evidence may be
available with them.
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF CERTAIN SENIOR ARMY COMMANDERS
In Chapters 1, 2 and 5 of Part 5 of the main report we have dealt with the moral and disciplinary aspects
of tee events and causes leading to the defeat of the Pakistan Army in the 1971 war, and have also
touched upon the individual responsibility of certain senior officers. In the preceding two chapters of the
Supplementary Report, we have offered further observations on these aspects and have commented upon
the conduct of certain Army Officers posted in East Pakistan. There, however, still remains the question
of determining whether any disciplinary action is called for against certain senior army commanders for
their failings in the discharge of their professional duties in the conduct ad prosecution of the war in East
Nature of Disciplinary Action
2. In view of the glaring weaknesses and negligence displayed by some of the senior officers operating in
East Pakistan, we have anxiously considered the nature of the disciplinary action required in the case. We
find that there are several provisions in the the Pakistan Army Act 1952 having a direct bearing on this
matter. In the first place, there is section 24 which is in the following terms:- "24. Offences in relation to
enemy and punishable with death. Any person to this Act who commits any of the following offenses,
that is to say,-
(a) Shamefully abandons or delivers up any garrison, fortress, airfield, place, post or guard committed to
his charge or which it is his duty to defend, or uses any means to compel or induce any commanding
officer or any other person to do any of the said acts;
or (b) in the presence of any enemy, shamefully casts away his arms, ammunition, tools or equipment, or
misbehaves in such manner as to show cowardice;
or (c) intentionally uses word or any other means to compel or induce any person subject to this Act, or to
the Indian Air Force Act, 1932 (XIV of 1932) or Pakistan Air Force Act 1953 or too the Pakistan Navy
Ordinance, 1961, t abstain from acting against the enemy or to discourage such persons from acting
against the enemy;
or (d) directly or indirectly, treacherously holds correspondence with or communicates intelligence to, the
enemy or who coming to the knowledge of such correspondence or communication treacherously omits to
discover it to his commanding or other superior officer;
or (e) directly or indirectly assists or relies the enemy with arm, ammunition, equipment, supplies or
money or knowingly harbours or protects an enemy not being a prisoner;
or (f)treacherously or through cowardice sends a flag of truce to the enemy;
or (g) in time of war, of during any operation, intentionally occasions a false alarm in action, camp,
garrision or quarters, or spreads reports calculated to create alarm or despondency;
or (h) in time of action, leaves his commanding officer, or quits his post, guard, picquet, patrol or party
without being regularly relieved or without leave;
or (i) having being made a prisoner of war, voluntarily serves with or aids the enemy;
or (j) knowingly does when on active service any act calculated to imperil success of the Pakistan forces
or any forces-operating therewith or of any part of such forces' shall, on conviction by court martial, be
punished with death or with such less punishment as it is in this Act mentioned",
. Section 25 is also relevant, and reads as under:-
25. Offences in relation to the enemy and not punishable with death. Any person subject to this Act who,
on active service -
(a) without order from his superior officer leaves the ranks in order to secure prisoner, animals or
materials, or on the pretence of taking wounded men to the rear;
or (b) without orders from his superior officer, willfully destroys or damages any property;
or (c) is taken prisoner for want of due precaution or through disobedience of orders or wilful neglect of
duty, or, having been taken prisoner, fails to rejoin service when he is able to do so;
or (d) without due authority, either holds correspondence with, or communicates intelligence, or sends a
flag of truce to the enemy;
or (e) by words of mouth, or in writing, or by signals, or otherwise spreads reports calculated to create
alarm or despondency;
or (f) in action, or previously to going into action, uses words calculated to create alarm or despondency;
shall on conviction by court martial, be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may
extend to fourteen years, or with much less punishment as is in this Act mentioned".
4. Finally, there is section 55 which is of a general nature, and provides;- "55. Violation of good order and
discipline-Any person subject to this Act who is guilty of any act, conduct, disorder and of military
discipline shall , on conviction by court martial, be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which
may extend to five years, or with such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned"
5. We are fully cognizant of the fact that defeat in war, even entailing surrender, is not necessarily
punishable as a military offence unless it has been occasioned by wilful neglect of the Commander
concerned in the performance of his duties in respect of the appreciation of the situation regarding the
enemy's intention, strength, own resources, terrain, etc; or in the planning and conduct of the operations;
or a wilful failure to take action as required under the circumstances. A callous disregard of the
recognised techniques and principles of warfare would clearly amount to culpable negligence, and could
not be excused as an honest error of judgement. A deliberate failure to adopt the proper courseof action to
meet a certain contingency cannot be covered by taking shelter behind the plea that his superiors did not
advise him properly in time. It further appears to us that every Commander must be presumed to possess
the calibre and quality, appurtenant to his rank, and he must per force bear full responsibility for all the
acts of omission and commission, leading to his defeat in war, which are clearly attributable to culpable
negligence on his part to take the right action at the right time, as distinguished from (illegible) or
circumstances beyond his control. He would also be liable to be punished if he shows a lack of will to
fight and surrenders to the enemy at a juncture when he still had the resources and the capability to put up
resistance. Such an act would appear to fall clearly under clause (a) of section 24 of the Pakistan Army
Need and Justification for Trial and Punishment
6. Having heard the views of a large number of witnesses drawn fro m all sections of society, professions
and services, the Commission feels that there is consensus on the imperative need to book these senior
army commanders who have brought disgrace and defeat to Pakistan by their professional incompetence,
culpable negligence and wilful neglect in the performance of their duties, and physical and moral
cowardice in abandoning the fight when they had the capability and resources to resist the enemy. WE are
also of the view that proper and firm disciplinary action , and not merely retirement from service, is
necessary to ensure against any future recurrence of the kind of shameful conduct displayed during the
1971 war W e believe that such action would not only satisfy the nations demand for punishment where it
is deserved, but would also serve to emphasise the concept of professional accountability which appears
to have been forgotten by senior army officers since their involvement in politics, civil administration and
Martial Law duties.
Cases Requiring Action by Way of Court Martial
7. In Part III of the present report, we have discussed and analysed at some length the concept of defence
of East Pakistan adopted by Lt. Gen Niazi, and the manner in which he and his Divisional and Brigade
Commanders formulated their plans to implement that concept within the resources available to them in
East Pakistan. We have then narrated the important events involving the surrender of well-defended
strong points and fortresses without a fight , desertion of his area of responsibility by a Divisional
Commander, disintegration of brigades and battalions in frantic and foolish efforts to withdraw from
certain posts , and abandoning of the wounded ad the sick in callous disregard of all human and military
values. We have also seen how the Eastern Command had failed to plan for n allout war with India and
particularly to provide for the defence of Dacca which had been described as the political and military
lynch-pin of East Pakistan. We have also described the painful events leading to the ultimate surrender of
such a large body of men and materials to the Indian Army at juncture when, by all accounts, the Pakistan
Army was still able to put up resistance for anything upto two weeks or more. In this context we have also
taken note of the inexplicable orders issued by the Eastern Command to stop the destruction of war before
material before the surrender , and the abject and shameful attitude adopted by the Commander, Eastern
Command, at various stages of the surrender ceremonies in the presence of the Indian Generals. Finally,
we have observed that during his period of captivity at Jabbalpur (India) Lt General Niazi made efforts to
persuade, by threats and inducements, his subordinate Commanders to present a coordinated story so as to
mitigate his responsibility for the debate.
8. Judged in the light of this analysis of the events leading to the surrender of our surrender of our Army
in East Pakistan, and the relevant provisions of the Pakistan Army Act and the considerations thereto, as
outlined in the preceding paragraphs, we are of the considered opinion that the following senior officers
ought to be tried by court martial on the charges listed against them , and we recommend accordingly.
(1) Lt Gen A.A.K. Niazi, Commander, Eastern Command
(i) That he wilfully failed to appreciate the imminence of all-out war with India, inspite of all indications
to the contrary, namely the declarations of the Indian Prime Minister and other important Government
leaders, the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty in August, 1971, the amassing of eight divisions of the
Indian Army, eleven squadrons of the Indian Air Force, and a large task force of the Indian Navy in and
around East Pakistan , and the clear warning given to him by the GHQ on the basis of reliable intelligence
regarding Indian plans of invasion of East Pakistan, with the n consequence that he continued to deploy
his troops in a forward posture although that deployment had become entirely unsuited for defence against
open Indian aggression;
(ii) That he displayed utter lack of professional competence, initiative and foresight, expected of an Army
Commander of his ran, seniority and experience, in not realising that the parts of his mission concerning
anti-insurgency operations and ensuring that "no chunk of territory" was to be allowed to be taken over by
the rebels for establishing Bangladesh, had become irrelevant in the context of the imminence of all-out
attack by India on or about the 21st of November ,1971, and that the mast important part of his mission
from that juncture onwards was to "defend East Pakistan against external aggression"' and "keep the
Corps in being and ensure the entity of East Pakistan"' with the result that he failed to concentrate his
forces in time , which failure later led to fatal results;
(iii) That he displayed culpable negligence in adopting the concept of fortresses and strong points without
fully understanding its technical implications as regards their ability to lend mutual support, availability
of the necessary reserves to strike at the enemy in the event of his by passing any of the fortresses or
overwhelming them with superior numbers , and the existence of a non-hostile population, with the
disastrous consequence that was forced to surrender even though several of the fortresses and strong
points were still intact on the 16th of December, 1971;
(iv) That he was guilty of criminal negligence in not including in his operational instruction No. 4 of
1971, issued on the 15th of July, 1971, any clear directive for a planned withdrawal of forces behind ??
river obstacles to face the Indian onslaught and to defend what may be described as the Dacca Triangle
for the purpose of keeping East Pakistan in being by giving up non-vital territory;
(v) That he in fact showed wilful neglect and culpable negligence of the worst order in failing to make
any positive plan for the defence of Dacca;
(vi) That he displayed lack of generalship and mature judgement in requiring his subordinate commanders
to simultaneously maintain a forward defence posture, occupy unmanned fortresses, and yet not withdraw
from any position without sustaining 75% casualties and obtaining clearance from two-up, a variation
from the norm of one-up, with the result that several formation commanders felt confused and bewildered
and acted in a manner prejudicial to the sound conduct of operations and resulting in unnecessary
casualties, as well as disorder and chaos arising from haphazard and unplanned withdrawals under
pressure from the enemy;
(vii) That he displayed culpable negligence and wilful disregard of established principles of warfare by
denuding Dacca of all regular troops by moving out 53 Brigade, which had been previously held as Corps
reserve, on the expectation that he would be getting more troops as agreed to by GHQ on the 19th of
(viii) That he was guilty of criminal negligence in not ensuring beforehand satisfactory arrangements for
transport, ferries, etc., with the result that even his last minute desperate efforts to withdraw troops from
forward positions for the defence of Dacca were unsuccessful, and whatever troops did manage to reach
Dacca did so minus their heavy equipment, besides suffering unnecessary casualties en route.
(ix) That he wilfully failed to defend Dacca, and agreed to a shameful and premature surrender inspite of
his own assertion before the Commission that Indians would have required at least a period of seven days
to mount the offensive and another week to reduce the defences of Dacca, notwithstanding the
shortcomings of his concept and plans, inadequacies and handicaps in respect of men and materials as
compared to the enemy, the absence of air support and the presence of Mukti Bahini in and around Dacca.
(x) That he deliberately and wilfully sent unduly pessimistic and alarming reports to GHQ with a view to
eliciting permission to surrender as he had lost the will to fight as early as the 6th or 7th of December,
1971, owing to his own mismanagement of the entire of war and his inability to influence , inspire and
guide the subordinate Commanders;
(xi) That he wilfully, and for motives and reasons difficult to understand and appreciate, stopped the
implementation of denial plans, with the result that large quantities of valuable war materials wee handed
over intact to the Indian forces after surrender, inspite of the fact that GHQ had specifically ordered by
their Signal of the 10th December ,1971, to carry out denial plans;
(xii) That he displayed a shameful and abject attitude in agreeing too surrender when he had himself
offered a ceasefire to the Indian Commander-in-Chief; in signing the surrender document agreeing to lay
down arms to the joint command of the Indian forces and the Mukti Bahini; in being present at the Dacca
Airport to receive the victorious Indian General Arora; in ordering his own ADC to present a guard of
honour to the said General; and in accepting the Indian proposal for a public surrender ceremony which
brought everlasting shame to the Pakistan Army.
(xiii) That he was guilty of conduct unbecoming a Officer and Commander of his rank and seniority in
that he acquired a notorious reputation for sexual immorality and indulgence in the smuggling of Pan
from East to West Pakistan, with the inevitable consequence that he failed to inspire respect and
confidence in the mind of his subordinates impaired his qualities of leadership and determination, and
also encouraged laxity in discipline and moral standards among the officers and men under his command;
(xiv) That during the period of his captivity as a prisoner of war in Jabbalpur (India) and on repatriation to
the Pakistan he made efforts to subvert the truth by trying to exercise undue influence on his Divisional
and Brigade Commanders by offering them threats and inducements , so as to persuade them to present
before th GHQ Briefing Committee and the Commission of Inquiry , a coordinated and coloured version
of the events in East Pakistan for the purpose of mitigating his own responsibility for the defeat; and
(xv) That, on repatriation to Pakistan, he deliberately adopted a false and dishonest stand to the effect that
he was willing and able to fight but was ordered to surrender by General Yahya Khan, and that as a
dutiful soldier he had no option but to obey the said order against his best judgement.
2. Maj Gen Mohammad Jamshed, ex-JOC 36 (ad hoc) Division, Dacca
(i) That having been appointed as GOC 36 (ad hoc) Division for the express purpose of taking over from
14 Div., major responsibility for the defence of Dacca, he wilfully failed to plan for the same, in
accordance with sound principles of warfare, and showed culpable lack of initiative in this behalf;
(ii) That in the aforesaid capacity he wilfully neglected to point out to Lt Gen Niazi, during various
conference, the inadequacy of the resources at his disposal for the defence of Dacca, pointing out after the
19th of Nov, 1971, when 53 Brigade was sent out of Dacca to Feni;
(iii) That he displayed gross neglect in ordering the abrupt withdrawal of 93 Brigade from Jamalpur to
Dacca without planning for it, well knowing that it was defending Dacca by holding that fortress, and in
consequence of this ill-planed move 93 Brigade got completely disintegrated enroute owing to the capture
by the enemy of the Brigade Commander and a considerable portion of the Brigade;
(iv) That he showed complete lack of courage and will to fight in that he acquiesced in the decision of the
Commander, Eastern Command, to surrender to surrender to the Indian forces at a juncture when it was
still possible, in spite of the paucity o resources, to hold the enemy for a period of two weeks or so;
(v) That he deliberately and wilfully neglected to inform the authorities concerned, on his repatriation to
Pakistan, about the facts that he had got distributed Rs 50,000 out of Pakistan currency notes and other
funds at his disposal or under his control, amongst certain evacuated from Dacca on the morning of
December, 1971, and the manner in which he did so.
(3) Maj Gen M. Rahim Khan, ex-GOC 3? (ad hoc) Division
(a) In Paragraphs 9 to 11 of Chapter III of P art V of the Main Report , we had occasion to comment upon
the conduct of Maj Gen Rahim Khan, GOC 39 (ad hoc) Division, who abandoned his Division , and
evacuated his Divisional HQ from Chandpur , of course, with the permission of the Commander, Eastern
Commander, with no replacement, and with the consequence that his Division disintegrated and had to be
replaced with another Headquarter called the Narayan Sector Headquater under a Brigadier. We had then
recounted that the conduct of Maj Gen Rahim Khan in abandoning his troops and shifting to a place
outside his area of responsibility prima facie called for a proper inquiry to determine whether the General
was guilty of dereliction of duty or/and cowardice. We also added some other points which needed to be
looked into in this behalf.
(b) As Maj Gen Rahim Khan was one of the senior officers serving in East Pakistan during the war, he
voluntarily appeared before the Commission during the present session, primarily for the purpose of
clearing his position. As will be seen from a detailed discussion of the operation of the 39 (ad hoc)
Division in the narration of the military events, the Commission is far from satisfied with the performance
of this General Officer. In the light of the information now available we now consider that he should be
tried by a court martial on the following charges:
(i) That he shameful cowardice and undue regard for his personal safety in seeking, and obtaining,
permission from the Eastern Command to abandon his Division and vacate his Divisional Headquarters
from Chandpur on the 8th of December 1971, simply because Chandpur was threatened by the enemy,
with the result that he deserted his troops and his area of responsibility in the middle of the war with
(ii) That y his wilful insistence on moving by day against competent advise, owing to fear of Mukti
Bahini, caused the death of fourteen Naval ratings and four officers of his own HQ, besides injuries to
several others, and to himself due to strafing by Indian aircraft;
(iii) That in his anxiety to get away from Chandpur, he wilfully abandoned valuable signal equipment
with the result that the communication system of the Division disintegrated and his subordinate
commanders and troops were left to their own fate;
(iv) That he on the 12th of December, 1971, by word of mouth,,, caused alarm and despondency by
General Niazi, Jamshed and Farman Ali that "it is all over , let us call it a day"' and that the Mukti Bahini
might resort to massacre'
(v) That he wilfully avoided submitting a debriefing report to GHQ, on being specially evacuated to
Pakistan in early 1971, so as to conceal the circumstances of his desertion from his Div HQ at Chandpur
with the consequence that the authorities were persuaded to appoint hi as Chief of the General Staff
without any knowledge of his performance in East Pakistan
4. Brig. G.M. Baqir Siddiqui, former COS, Eastern Command, Dacca
(i) That as Chief of Staff, Eastern Command, he was guilty of wilful neglect in failing to advise the
Commander , Eastern Commander, on sound professional lines in regard to the matters mentioned in
charges (i) to (ix) framed against Lt. Gen Niazi;
(ii) That he wilfully collaborated with, and assisted, the Commander, Eastern Command, in sending
unduly pessimistic and alarming reports and signals to GHQ with a view to elicit permission to surrender,
as he had also lost the will to fight owing to his culpable negligence and failure in the performance of his
professional duties as the Chief of Staff of the Eastern Command;
(iii) That he showed culpable disregard of sound principles of planning for the war in that he excluded the
Commanders of the supporting arms like signals, engineers, logistics, medical, etc. from full participation
before the plans of the Eastern Command were finalized, with the result that the full benefit of the advice
of these Commanders was not available to Lt Gen Niazi at the proper time;
(iv) That he was guilty of culpable negligence in not properly advising the Commander, Eastern
Command, of the imminence and enormity of the Indian threat even though he had been fully briefed in
this behalf by the GHQ at a conference in Rawalpindi in October 1971, and he also similarly failed to
advise the Commander on the imperative need of readjusting troops to meet this threat;
(v) That he was responsible for abrupt changes in command in the middle of the war , and also for giving
orders to subordinate formations over the head of their superior commanders, thus resulting in uncertainty
and confusion during the critical days of the war;
(vi) That he wilfully, and for motives and reasons difficult to understand and appreciate stopped the
implementation of denial plans with the result that large quantities of valuable war materials were handed
over intact to the Indian forces after the surrender, in spite of the fact the GHQ had specifically ordered by
their of the 10th December 1971 to carry out denial plans;
(vii) That in particular, he instructed the commander Signals to keep the inter-wing transmitter in
operation even after the surrender, apparently for the purpose of conveying recommendations to GHQ for
the grant of gallantry awards etc. with the result that this valuable equipment fell intact into the hands of
(viii)That he was unduly friendly with the enemy during the period of his captivity, so much so that he
was allowed to go out shopping in Calcutta, a facility not allowed to anyone else by the Indians;
(ix) that he acted against good order and the custom of the Service in being instrumental in conveying
threats and inducements to formation commanders for the purpose of presenting a coordinated story
before the GHQ and the Commission of Inquiry in regard to the events leading to surrender in East
5. Brig Mohammad Hayat, former Comd. 107 bde. (9 Div)
(i) That as Commander 107 Bde., he displayed neglect in not formulating a sound plan for the defence of
the fortress of Jessore;
(ii) That while launching counter attack at Gharibpur he neglected to obtain full information about the
enemy strength, and did not himself command this important Brigade counter attack, in consequence
whereof he lost seven tanks, his en suffered heavy casualties, and the defence of Jessore fortress was
(iii) That on a report that enemy tanks had broken through the defences of Jessore he, without even
verifying the same, shamefully abandoned the fortress of Jessore without a fight on the 6th of December
1971, delivering intact to the enemy all supplies and ammunition dumps stocked in the fortress, and
without issuing any orders to his unit in contact with the enemy, who had to fight their own way during
the following night.
(iv) That after abandoning Jessore without contact with the enemy, he withdrew to khulna in wilful and
intentional violation of the clear orders of G.Q.C. 9 Division to withdraw to Magura in the event of a
forced withdrawal fro jessore, thus making it impossible for the Divisional Commander to give battle to
the enemy across the Madhumati River.
6. Brig. Mohammad Asla Niazi, former Cod., 53 Bde (39Ad hoc Div.)
(i) That as Commander 53 Bde. he displayed culpable lack of initiative, determination and planning
ability in that he failed to prepared defences of Mudafarganj as ordered by the G.O.C. 39 (As hoc)
Division on the 4th of December 1971, with the result that the place was occupied by the enemy on or
about the 6th of December 1971 , thus seriously endangering the line of communication between Tripura
and Chandpur where the Divisional Headquarters was located;
(ii) That he showed culpable lack of courage, planning ability and determination in failing to eject the
enemy fro Mudafarganj as ordered by the GOC on the 6th of December 1971, with the result that
contingents of 23 Punjab and elements of 21 A.K. surrendered to an Indian unit on the 11th of December
1971 in highly adverse circumstances, without water or food and the ammunition having been nearly
(iii) That he shamefully abandoned the Fortress of Laksham on or about the 9th of December 1971, which
it was his duty to defend;
(iv) That he displayed wilful neglect in failing to properly organize ex-filtration of his troops fro the
fortress at Laksha to Comilla on the 9th of December 1971, with the result that out of a strength of about
4000 men only about 500 or so, including the Brigade Commander himself and C.O. 39 Baluch with
approximately 400 men surrendered to the enemy when he was barely three miles outside Comilla, and as
a consequence 53 Bde and all its battalions thus disintegrated;
(v) That he wilfully acted in callous disregard of military ethics in abandoning at Laksha 124 sick and
wounded with two Medical Officers who were deliberately not informed about the proposed vacation of
the fortress; and
(vi) That while vacating the fortress of laksha he wilfully and intentionally abandoned all heavy weapons,
stocks of ammunition and supplies for the use of the enemy, without implementing the denial plan;
Sang Dil Riwajoon k Khasta Hal Zindan Main ASEER SEHZADI
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only reason fall of dahaka!
according to my point of view army,politician,establishment,administration,and all other prominent figure
were not directly responsible in this case, the basic problem is geography
diference between east and west pakistan was 1000 mile,in this condition people of both side were failed to understand exact situation.
in current period the situation of balochistan is dangours comparison to bangal
but balochistan never attain independence
politician of bangal started propoganda against west pakistan, india took advantage at right time , draw a barrer b/w east and west pakistan
so politician, army and establishment failed to control whole situation.
the fall of dahaka was temporary defeat of pakistan.
creation of bangaladesh is a great bless for pakistan. after 10 years many struggle started in india for independence.
mostly indian rebel live in bangladesh. india spent a large amount on borders security at both pakistan and bangaladesh.
pakistani and bangali attach with muslim brotherhood, so in every field
bangali support pakistan
mohd murshed a bangali says in 1970 india face one pakistan
but know he face 2 pakistan both are strong
pakistani cricket team lost his match in 1999 worldcup only for this reason that bangladeh attain one day status
The world suffers a lot. Not because of the violence of bad people, but because of the silence of good people!"
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16th December will always be a black day for Pakistanis, because it is the same day when a part of Pakistan became an independent country called Bangladesh. A lot has been said and inquiries have been performed to find out the exact reason for the separation of East-Pakistan but there seems no valid answer for it. A number of reasons contributed in the Dhaka debacle. The part of Pakistan that; out shined every other province in its contribution to the exports and foreign currency of the country and yet was the most under-privileged.
An important point here to remember is that India played a very important part in the great debacle. A dictator with his rusty mind was not willing to give up the power – a certain trait mark of a Pakistani dictators and current politicians.
Current country is not our Quaid’s Pakistan, with every passing day we are weakening the roots of this strong nation. It has always been the stubbornness of individuals sitting at the top that have divided this nation; whether mentally or geographically.
Why have we not brought the then rulers whether military or civil to courts and hanged them even if they were dead? Why have we not deported their families and taken away the Pakistani nationality? What was the fault of those 90,000 vigilant men of Pakistan Army that were left high and dry at the disposal of enemy in the form of ‘Prisoner of Wars’, where my country men were mentally and physically tortured!
And guess what, we have already forgiven all the culprits of the Fall of Dhaka and also India for being part of it! We are such a benevolent nation that it does not matter to us, what if we lost a part of country! What if we lost a hundred thousand men! What if we lost our brothers, sisters and fellow nationals! We yet continue to benefit the families of those culprits one way or the other. We yet continue to benefit the same country by watching their movies, dramas and taking their culture on us!
I think all those people saying that it is Taliban spreading terrorism in Pakistan should think again then, because the name Taliban is only being used by the hidden evil that is India, which already has hurt our country once and will keep on trying one way or the other. I have already mentioned this in one of my articles, ‘Who Killed Our Fathers, Brothers and Children’ and yet again I believe the India has the biggest motivation to destabilize this country. I have heard one of our very senior analysts mentioning that why would India like to spread terror in Pakistan as a destabilize Pakistan will be dangerous for India but contrary to it is the fact that a destabilize Pakistan will be much easier to disintegrate; which India has been dreaming of, from the very first day of the existence of this country.
The eyes are all set on Balochistan by India and America. If America uses drone in Balochistan, it will give fuel to fire and many will question the credibility of Pakistan to protect its province from foreign invasion, which in return will lead to a revolt from the locals of the province, causing further trouble for this struggling country and a developing nation. America has already entered Pakistan using the same technique as did by the East-India Company than; and it is not a hidden fact that Jacobabad base is already under U.S military.
Why we are repeating the same mistakes again and again? Why are we sleeping as a nation again and waiting for our enemies to play havoc with us! Why is this nation being fooled by the leaders again and why don’t we recognize the true face of these politicians!
We have to unite as a nation and our leaders have to take a notice of the public wishes. The leaders should know that nation and they should complement each other and not criticize each other. Our leaders have to learn to give more to the nation whereas they are taking more than the nation can afford to give. If such attitudes are not changed then not one but many black days will be observed by this nation!
Money won't buy happiness, but it will pay the salaries of a large research staff to study the problem.
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Pakistan's History From 1947-till present
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Principles of Political Science
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Democracy In Pakistan
||News & Articles
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Plato's Political Philosophy.
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