Seeking an end to the Kashmir Quagmire

[Waqar Abro]

Seeking an end to the Kashmir Quagmire: can India and Pakistan be brought to the table to resolve the conflict that has been ongoing for more than half a century?

SINCE THE PARTITION of British India into India and Pakistan in August, 1947, the Kashmir dispute between the two countries has become an intractable one. They fought wars in 1947-48, 1965, 1971, and 1999, but have not been able to resolve the issue, as India and Pakistan, like the Israelis and Palestinians, claim the same territory. The conflict revolves around the issue of self-determination for the Kashmiri Muslims. While Pakistan insists that India must honor the commitment it made to the United Nations Security Council, India claims that circumstances have changed and that Kashmir is an integral pan of its nation. Hence, the conflict continues.
When British India was partitioned into India and Pakistan, Hari Singh, the autocratic and unpopular Maharajah of Kashmir and Jammu, a predominantly Muslim state, resisted the pressure to accede to either Pakistan or India, hoping to seek independence or autonomy from both countries. To buy time and to accomplish this goal, he signed a stand-still agreement with Pakistan on Aug. 16, 1947, and was seeking to sign a similar one with India. Following the partition, communal rioting erupted in Punjab among Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims as this state was divided between India and Pakistan. In September, the rioting against Muslims spilled into Kashmir. In Poonch, in the southwestern part of Kashmir, Muslim insurgents, supported covertly by the Pakistani army with arms, transport, and men, rebelled against the Maharajah and established their independent (Azad) Kashmir government. By Oct. 22, the insurgents had pushed within 15 miles of the state's capital city, Srinagar. Alarmed by this invasion, Singh sought India's military assistance, but the latter refused to help him unless he signed the instrument of accession, a standard procedure under which other princely states had acceded to India or Pakistan.
India agreed to accession after receiving the consent of Sheikh Abdullah, the secular and popular leader of the National Conference (NC) party in the state. Following Singh's signing of the accord on Oct. 27, Indian armed forces entered Kashmir to repel the raiders. Local Muslims, mostly members of the NC, provided the logistical support for the Indian troops. This intervention by India infuriated Pakistani Governor-General Mohammed Ali Jinnah. On the evening of Oct. 27, he ordered Lt. Gen. Sir Douglas Gracey, chief of the Pakistani army, to dispatch regular troops into Kashmir, but, persuaded by British Field Marshall Claude Auchinleck, the Supreme Commander of the transition period, Jinnah withdrew his orders. However, in November, Jinnah sanctioned the transfer of military supplies to the invaders while also sending Pakistan regular troops to join their effort in early 1948 as "volunteers," though not admitting its direct involvement until July.
As the fighting continued, on Jan. 1, 1948, on the advice of British Governor-General Lord Louis Mountbatten, though opposed by Deputy Prime Minister Sarder Patel, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru lodged a complaint with the Security Council by invoking Articles 34 and 35 of the UN Charter (that calls for pacific settlement of disputes) against Pakistan, suspecting that it was behind the invasion. In the complaint, as it had already been pledged by Mountbatten in his letter to Singh on Oct. 26, India reiterated its vow of conditional commitment to a "plebiscite or referendum under international auspices" once the aggressor was evicted--a pledge which India later regretted and that continues to haunt it to this day. Following the passage of Security Council resolutions calling for a plebiscite in Kashmir, the UN Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) made several attempts to conduct it from 1948 to 1958, but to no avail, as India and Pakistan had disagreed on the conditions and modalities of the implementation of the resolutions. The stalemate, therefore, led to another war provoked by Pakistan in September, 1965.
In January, 1966, mediated by the Soviet Union, Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahaddhur Shastri and Pakistani Pres. Ayub Khan met in Uzbekistan and signed the agreement known as the Tashkent Declaration. The parties agreed to resolve the Kashmir dispute bilaterally without resorting to force.
In 1971, India and Pakistan fought a third war over Bangladesh's independence in which the latter was dealt a humiliating defeat. However, the Kashmir dispute was peripheral to this war. It was Pakistani Gen. Yahya Khan's military dictatorship's atrocities committed against the people of Bangladesh and the fleeing of 10,000,000 refugees from Bangladesh into India that provoked India's response.
On July 2, 1972, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi signed the Simla Agreement with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the first President and later Prime Minister of Pakistan after he had succeeded Khan in 1971. Under this agreement, India and Pakistan, among others, committed themselves to "settling their differences through bilateral negotiations." They also agreed that, in "Jammu and Kashmir, the Line of Control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side." The agreement became the basis for the renewal of official relations between the two countries, thus ending any role either for the Security Council or outside powers, including the U.S. With Sheik Abdullah having accepted Kashmir as an integral part of India, it seemed as though the dispute had finally been settled through the signing of the Kashmir Accord on Feb. 12, 1975. It became an illusionary peace, however, since the state plunged into a secessionist militancy in January, 1990, that continues today with Pakistan's active support and promotion.
Despite the fact that the APHC leaders had rejected entering into negotiations without Pakistan being included, the Vajpayee government extended the six-month cease-fire on May 25, 2001, and invited Musharraf for unconditional talks. The summit talks were held in Agra, India, on July 14-16, but with no agreement, as Musharraf insisted on Kashmir being the core issue, while India insisted on a "composite dialogue" which would also include Kashmir. Musharraf blamed India's intransigence as the cause for failure of the summit.
Although Vajpayee and Musharraf agreed to continue the dialogue, it soon came to an abrupt halt, as Pakistani-based terrorist groups such as the Laskar-Taiba, led by Hafiz Mohammed, and Jaish-e-Mohammad, led by Azhar, intensified crossborder terrorism even after Musharraf had joined with the Bush Administration to fight the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. This decision helped him to change from a status of pariah to that of a courageous statesman. It also led to America lifting most of its sanctions as well as giving economic aid from U.S. and international institutions at a time when the country was on the brink of bankruptcy.
To demonstrate that they were not intimidated by the U.S.-Pakistani coalition, the terrorists launched a suicide bomb attack on Oct. 1, 2001, destroying Kashmir's state assembly building and killing 38 people in it. Azhar's group took the credit. This was followed by a deadly attack on the Indian parliamentary building on Dec. 13 by members of the Laskar-Taiba in which 40 people were killed as the Parliament was in session. The Vajpayee government lost patience and, presumably to force Musharraf into stopping crossborder terrorism, canceled rail and road links with Pakistan; banned its airspace to Pakistani commercial air flights; recalled its ambassador from Islamabad; and moved 800,000 troops to the border.
Although crossborder terrorism has not ended, as a conciliatory gesture, India lifted the ban on Pakistan's commercial airlines (Pakistan so far has not reciprocated with the lifting of its ban); recalled its warships to the port of Bombay; and withdrew troops from the border. However, India insisted that there would be no dialogue with Pakistan unless it completely stopped crossborder terrorism and handed over 20 hardcore terrorists to India for trial. Pakistan has not responded to either of these demands.
Imperatives
The Indian government's primary emphasis on military strategy to quell terrorism has failed. Therefore, a new approach addressing the root causes must be initiated. It needs to involve the Muslim separatists, Pakistan, and the U.S. to help resolve the conflict by persuading the parties to accept the LOC as an international border. Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto reportedly told Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that the LOC would become the international border and that he would convince his people to accept it. In 1997, a Kashmir Study Group report found the same sentiment among the establishment elites in both India and Pakistan. Nevertheless, to facilitate the acceptance of this option by Pakistan and the militants, we offer the following imperatives for consideration by India:
1. The center should fully support the conciliatory approach of the recently elected government in Kashmir toward the militants. According to foreign and domestic observers, the September-October, 2002, state elections held in Jammu-Kashmir were open and fair. Although the APHC boycotted them under coercion by Pakistan and denounced them as sham, and although terrorists killed more than 100 people to disrupt the elections, 45% of the Kashmiris defied the threats and voted. The NC, Congress, the BJP, and six other separatist groups contested the elections. The people rejected the ruling NC, reducing its strength to 28 out of a total of 87 seats, while voting mostly for Congress and the People's Democratic Party (PDP). These two main parties have formed a coalition government, with the PDP's leader Mufti Mohammad Sayeed as chief minister. He has adopted a conciliatory policy of releasing all those militants who have been imprisoned to bring them back into the mainstream society as part of a "healing touch." If they disavow their militancy, the Vajpayee government should fully support his approach. It also should provide him not only with generous public funding, but encourage private investments from within and outside the country so as to enable him to address the mounting social, economic, and educational problems faced by a great majority of Kashmiris.
By doing this, the center could help Sayeed's government not only gain political legitimacy, but consolidate his position vis-a-vis the militants infiltrating the state from across Pakistan. As it is, 86% of Kashmiris want an end to militancy. The center should seize this opportunity by meeting the rising expectations of the people of Kashmir, especially the youth, so that they may not again resort to violence driven by a sense of alienation. Despite continuing militancy in the state, India still enjoys allegiance from a large bulk of the Kashmiri Muslims. For example, in an opinion poll conducted by the independent United Kingdom-based Market and Opinion Research International in June, 2002, 61% of Kashmiris said they are better off as part of India, as opposed to six percent who cited Pakistan. Therefore, India has an opportunity to regain the support and trust of the militants if it can address their issues decisively.
2. Grant autonomy to the state as per the 1952 New Delhi Accord. In July, 1952, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru signed an accord with Sheikh Abdullah in New Delhi granting autonomy to Kashmir. This subsequently was partially undermined by the constitutional amendments such as Articles 357 and 365, as well as other central government actions. In 1998, the NC overwhelmingly approved a resolution in the legislative assembly asking that the center restore the 1952 Delhi agreement. Restoration is likely to satisfy a large bulk of the Muslims, including some of the irredentist leaders. This decision should not open up a Pandora's box in other states with similar demands, since Kashmir enjoys a special status under Article 370 of the Indian constitution.
3. Adhere to the condition of linking dialogue to Pakistan's ending of crossborder terrorism. Although the Indian government repeatedly and unequivocally has put the conditionality of talks on Pakistan's ceasing crossborder terrorism, it compromised its stance by talking to the Pakistani leadership. It gave the impression that it can be pushed around. Henceforth, it should show that it means business and will not talk unless there were a credible evidence of reversal in Pakistan's behavior. As former External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh has demanded, any future talks should be linked to Pakistan closing terrorists camps in Azad Kashmir, with credible evidence to show that Musharraf meant it when he said he was against the terrorists.
4. Avoid contemplating "hot pursuit" of the terrorists across the borders lest it should lead to a Pakistani nuclear response. Even though "hot pursuit" is allowed under international law, given Musharraf's threats of using nuclear weapons if his country is attacked (said during a CNN interview in 1999), it is wise to shun such an approach. An open confrontation should be avoided to the greatest extent possible lest it result in nuclear exchange that would bring unthinkable consequences for both nations.
5. Strengthen covert capabilities to undercut the ISI's operations. It is reported that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has a contingent of 40,000 members. Since 1990, they have been "bleeding" India. Now that the Taliban and Al Qaeda have been crushed in Afghanistan, the' ISI, which has become a state within a state, could intensify its hostile covert activities in Kashmir and India. Therefore, the strength of India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) should be augmented to match the ISI numbers in order to neutralize its operations in Kashmir effectively by making it pay high costs for fostering crossborder terrorism. According to the RAW's former-counter intelligence operations director B. Raman, its operations were wound up in 1997 as a unilateral gesture to India's neighbors. This decision, he contends, has caused irreparable damage to India's intelligence capabilities. This has to be reversed. In addition, India should upgrade its surveillance operations on the Indo-Pakistani borders by deploying communication systems, sensors, radar, and other electronic equipment to spot terrorists sneaking through the porous mountainous borders. The RAW should also increase its covert operations among the training camps in Azad Kashmir to learn about the terrorists' activities, tactics, and plans, then notify the Indian security forces so that they can deal with them as they attempt to cross into Kashmir.
6. Strengthen diplomacy to win over Pakistan's intelligentsia so that, once it replaces military rule with a civilian one, India can achieve peace. For more than half of its existence as an independent nation since 1947, Pakistan had the misfortune of being run by military rulers whose legitimacy--and the enjoyment of attendant perks and power--are linked to their obsessively fostering a continued conflict in Kashmir. India is unlikely to achieve peace with Pakistan as long as the latter's military controls the country, directly or indirectly. Only a well-established civilian rule with a depoliticized military could achieve peace with India. To facilitate this, India should strengthen person-to-person contacts, especially among the Pakistani intelligentsia so that, as happened in the Philippines, they could create a "people's power" to dethrone the military for good and help usher in a stable civilian rule. Then, without the fear of having to appease the military, as Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto had acknowledged in June, 1999, it can achieve peace with India.
As it is, there are quite a few organizations--such as the Delhi Policy Group (DPG), Indo-Pak Initiative for Peace, Women's Initiative for Peace in South Asia, and India-Pakistan Neemrana Initiative--that are working bilaterally with Pakistanis. The government should encourage these groups and many others so that the Pakistanis could pressure the military to give up its illegal power. Only with civilian leadership can peace be reached by both parties by agreeing to the LOC as an international border. Instead of closing railway and bus links, they should keep them open so that travel and communications between Indians and Pakistanis can be continued. This diplomacy could help to erase the misperceptions and mistrust that have vitiated the relations between the two nations for so long.
Musharraf, who holds three titles--President, Chief Executive, and Chief of the Army--is not likely to leave power unless forced out by his people. In an attempt to legitimize his praetorian rule, he abruptly held a referendum on Apr. 30, 2002, asking Pakistanis if he should continue as President for another five years. It became a farce since just 10% voted, thus making him lose whatever credibility he had with the middle classes. He conducted parliamentary elections on Oct. 10 in which only those with a college degree could vote. He exiled former Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Sharif for contesting elections and has threatened to arrest them if they return to the country. He engineered a split from Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League (MLN) party and formed the Muslim League (ML-QA). Even then, to his dismay, for the first time in Pakistan's history, an alliance of five fundamentalist Islamic parties, the Muttahida Maklis-I-Amal, swept the vote in two provinces bordering Afghanistan--Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier--and made significant gains nationwide to become the third largest political bloc in the 342-member National Assembly
These parties are vehemently opposed to Musharraf's coalition with the U.S. This coalition may make his regime ungovernable in the future, although he has the power to dissolve the Parliament on the spur of the moment if he wishes. He has issued 29 ordinances amending the constitution with a stroke of his pen so that he can appoint and sack the Prime Minister and his cabinet; dissolve the provincial assembly; and establish a national security council through which the President and the army will oversee the working of the Prime Minister.
Musharraf helped to establish a sham civilian government headed by Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali as Prime Minister while keeping all the power for himself. He seems to be modeling his actions after his predecessor dictator, Zia-ul-Haq, who had treated the country's constitution as a piece of paper. It is no wonder that middle classes who had welcomed Musharraf's coup are disillusioned with his leadership. If an opportunity arises, they will be more than happy to get rid of him.
Given the militantly anti-Indian posture of the regime, it should be obvious that it is not likely to abandon promoting and funding terrorism in Kashmir unless it is forced to pay high costs for this involvement. In fact, its sustenance as a legitimate institution is very much linked to its perpetuating the conflict in Kashmir. Addressing the country's pressing social and economic problems is its lowest priority. Musharraf, who is a minority member, a Mohajir (immigrant from India), cannot afford to soften his stance on Kashmir in a Punjabi-dominated military (90% of the generals are Punjabis). It is little wonder that Robert Wirsing, in his interview-based article published in the Indian Journal of Politics (July-December 1998), found interest about Kashmir solely among Punjabis, but very little among Sindhis, Baluchis, Pathans, and Mohajirs.
7. Increase the paramilitary forces by limiting the military primarily to guard only the borders. Continuing to use the military to deal with internal secessionist movements may undermine the professionalism and preparedness so essential to protect the country's integrity from any external threat. Therefore, the center should build its paramilitary force's strength, even by recruiting Kashmiri Muslims (this will also solve part of the unemployment problem) so that it can deal with terrorism at home while the military forces can handle any threat from Pakistan. Assisted by the counterinsurgency force, they could do exactly what U.S. forces have done to the terrorists in Afghanistan in coalition with the Northern Alliance. The use of the military to fight the militants has tarnished its image, especially because of its alleged commission of human rights abuses.
8. Welcome the Bush Administration's mediatory role. For the first time in Indo-American relations, the U.S. has gained a great deal of credibility and trust in India after Pres. Bill Clinton played a mediatory role in ending the Kargil war. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack on the U.S., this relationship has been further strengthened politically and strategically. Pakistani-U.S. relations also improved after Musharraf joined the Bush Administration against terrorism. Therefore, as Pakistan has repeatedly sought out, India should welcome the Bush Administration's mediatory role, which is not likely to jeopardize India's national interests. It could convince the Pakistani leadership to accept the LOC as an international border, something India desires badly now. However, the fact that the Pakistan military's fortunes are linked to its sticking to self-determination in Kashmir, India and the Bush Administration may find it hard to convince the military to accept the LOC as an international border. Therefore, it is possible only when the military is depoliticized, sent back to its barracks, and compelled to submit itself to a civilian authority. Only time will tell if Pakistanis are capable of changing the praetorian guard for good. If these suggestions are considered as part of new a policy approach to the conflict, it could end peacefully soon.