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  #11  
Old Friday, May 15, 2009
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How can they win friends?


By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 15 May, 2009


THE world is worried about increasing Talibanisation in Pakistan. It is concerned that this phenomenon might reach other countries too. Hence expatriate populations are looked upon with suspicion and blamed for all ills in foreign countries.

However, it is important to recognise that these states are equally responsible for creating an environment that propels people towards aggression or a certain ideology.

A case in point is the British government and relations between Pakistanis and the UK state. There is a growing perception in the UK that Pakistani expatriates are linked with terrorism and there are several cases in which such linkage has been established. More importantly, there is concern regarding the links between these expatriates and their country of origin. A number of young men are exposed to militant organisations and join these outfits during visits to Pakistan.

London’s response has been to curb communication and enhance scrutiny measures pertaining to these expatriates and Pakistanis visiting the UK and to concentrate on issues which, in its view, will help resolve Pakistan’s extremism problem. To begin at the end, the British government is keen to help Pakistan with building the capacity of the police and paramilitary so that militants can be fought effectively. This approach is beneficial for the government and consultants who thrive on aid. However, this formula alone might not work when the police are artificially disempowered. London does not seem too keen to ask the recipients of its aid any questions.

Similarly, the British government is trying to exercise greater control over the community in the UK that has some links to Pakistan. London is also busy making efforts to control the movement of Pakistanis to the UK. The recent case of the Pakistani students is an example of this policy. So is its peculiar visa policy. The general policy is problematic and will exacerbate the threat that the British are trying to eliminate.

For instance, the arrest and holding of innocent Pakistani students without charge is not going to win the British friends. The case of the students and the earlier incident of the shooting of a Brazilian man after the London bombings in 2005 demonstrate the need for the British police to build their capacity. In both cases, the police miscalculated badly. The shooting of the Brazilian proved to be a case of mistaken identity and the students were probably arrested without any evidence.

The above argument does not mean that one does not sympathise with Britain’s sense of insecurity. A state and its government must protect the people. However, methods of protection must not be confused with faulty and problematic policies. What is required is a lot more integration of communities in the country rather than looking out for those ‘others’ who can be blamed for whatever has gone wrong.

Despite all the hue and cry about justice, fair play and respect for rules and regulations, the fact is that all governments tend to stray when they feel the need to do so. So, whatever high values the British system subscribes to, its policies and the behaviour of its representatives can be held questionable, especially in the current context of the strategy on fighting the war on terror. Surely, London has never thought about the highly questionable position of its diplomatic outposts. These days, embassies and high commissions appear more like an extension of the East India Company.

Take the simple case of obtaining visas. In Pakistan, it is not the exorbitant visa fee which is the problem. Rather, it is the unfriendly attitude of the high commission which is bothersome. One would expect that after charging huge sums of money, it would have an effective system of response. But that does not seem to be the case and there have been several instances where passports have been stuck with the high commission in Islamabad for months. Besides, there doesn’t seem to be a workable system where people can get their passports back in case of an emergency that entails travel to another country.

Is this approach reserved for ordinary Pakistanis? Where an exorbitant visa fee is involved, there might be consistency and other nationals may also be subjected to it. However, there is much to suggest that stringent treatment is reserved for a few nationalities, Pakistanis being among them.

This kind of behaviour can make people reluctant to visit Britain and bar genuine travellers from doing so — a group of people that could otherwise have been sympathetic to Britain’s concerns. Inconvenience and humiliation can hardly win friends.

Furthermore, not everyone can lay claim to an ‘above board’ attitude. In Britain’s case, there have been stories of the involvement of prime ministerial families selling weapons to countries perceived as having dubious intentions and of kickbacks given to certain Middle Eastern countries to buy British military technology. It would make a lot of sense for the British government to investigate its own missions as part of its strategy to fight the war on terror.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.

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  #12  
Old Friday, May 22, 2009
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Death of a terror group


By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 22 May, 2009


A FEW days ago, Sri Lanka announced that the Tamil Tiger leader Velupillai Prabhakaran was dead. This victory might not be a major milestone in the development of the Sri Lankan state and civil society, but it certainly speaks volumes for the coming of age of Colombo’s armed forces. At another level, it reflects the gradual unravelling of Prabhakaran’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

Two years ago, had someone told Colombo or the Tamil expatriates, who backed and funded the Tamil cause, that Prabhakaran would be dead, they would have laughed. Since committing their first political murder in the early 1970s of Jaffna’s mayor and forming the group called the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), later the LTTE, the rebels had given the Sri Lankan government a run for its money. His guerilla organisation aimed to fight the authoritarian Sinhalese state that discriminated against the Tamils. (In fact, Sinhalese too were treated badly. In the 1980s, the army butchered about 60,000 Sinhalese youth involved in a leftist protest.)

Formed by Velupillai Prabhakaran in 1974, the LTTE developed into a potent force that fought the Sri Lankan state for 35 years. Its notorious suicide squads, personally baptised by the leader, wreaked havoc throughout the country and in India where they killed Rajiv Gandhi. In fact, Tamil rebels carried cyanide capsules round their necks which they were ordered to swallow in case they were caught by state forces. This was also their sign of commitment to the cause. Over the years, the LTTE established control over Sri Lanka’s north and east, operating, in fact, as a de facto government whose reins were held by Prabhakaran. The Tamil rebels had their own ‘navy’ and ‘air force’ as well. From a distance all that was left was for the international community to give some formal status to Prabhakaran’s control of this territory which he had hoped might happen through the involvement of some international players such as the Norwegians in the Sri Lankan crisis. Oslo tried several times to negotiate peace between the warring parties.

Prabhakaran clearly had an advantage over his enemies. He managed to become the uncontested leader of the Tamil rebels. In the end, this also proved to be his undoing. Experts believe that the concentration of power in one person and the merger of the political and military wings of the LTTE did not provide sufficient space to the organisation. Eventually, cracks appeared in the top command because Prabhakaran tried to be political leader as well as military commander, resulting in a major rift between Prabhakaran and his commander in the east Colonel Karuna. The rift was later exploited by Colombo to its advantage. Eventually, Colombo managed to squeeze the Tamil leader to the north.

However, Colombo’s plans to fight its rival did not take off until it managed to build an internal consensus to defeat the Tigers and to develop its military. Historically, the Sri Lankan military was a ceremonial force. It was not until the beginning of 2000 that decision-makers focused on the need of restructuring the armed forces, introduce central planning and give it the shape of a professional force. In 2006, during a study tour of Colombo I met young gentlemen who were part of the team of experts that had been hired to establish a more professional ministry of defence that could plan for a winnable war. So, the period at the beginning of this century when the LTTE was seemingly gaining ground, also saw the Sri Lankan military building itself to fight the war. Some of the officers that I met during a trip expressed greater resolve to fight the LTTE.

The above developments coincided with the regional and global resolve to push back the Tamil Tigers. Since assassinating Rajiv Gandhi, the LTTE had lost the support of the Indian government. Having lost the war in Sri Lanka, New Delhi, in any case, had lost the appetite for a Sri Lankan adventure and had begun to understand the high cost of an independent Tamil state. So, it stepped aside while Colombo procured weapons from all over, including Pakistan, to add to its firepower. Apparently, a couple of shiploads of infantry equipment and other stuff produced at PoFs, Wah, arrived in Sri Lanka every month.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that this firepower could not have an impact until the greater professionalisation of the security services. In fact, during the 1990s, Colombo had tried to enhance its military capability through the purchase and use of Kfir fighter bombers from Israel that did not impede the advancing Tamil Tigers. Moreover, aerial bombardment had proved pretty useless.

Some grave tactical mistakes were made by the LTTE. One major blunder was its constant flip-flopping between two positions: war and peace. The bid to attract international attention by agreeing to the Norwegian-sponsored peace initiative meant that the rebel group compromised on its war efforts. The last nail in the coffin, as many suggest, was forcing the people to boycott the presidential elections which resulted in Ranil Wickremesinghe losing to Mahinda Rajapaksa the current president, one who was found to be much more rabid in his approach towards the LTTE.

Politically, the test for the Sri Lankan state begins now regarding its moral and political capacity to accommodate the Tamil population which must be quite confused and scared at this juncture. The LTTE-controlled area along with the rest of the island requires development to repair the battle-scarred areas. This is tough in a place where social sensibilities have changed dramatically. There is a serious chasm between the Sinhalese and Tamil population that can only disappear with the integration of the Tamils in the Sinhalese-dominated state.

As for the region, let’s see if Prabhakaran’s death proves to be a precursor to the physical and ideological elimination of other terrorists in other parts of the region as well. The task shouldn’t be difficult because the militants we are fighting are no match for those of Velupillai Prabhakaran, who will certainly be remembered in Sri Lanka as a legend of terror.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.

ayesha.ibd@gmail.com
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  #13  
Old Friday, May 29, 2009
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The lesser evil?


By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 29 May, 2009


FACEBOOK is a great invention. It allows you to interact with people, without having to meet them, and have discussions. I accidentally got into a discussion with some on my friends’ list regarding my comment on Gen Musharraf’s current status.

There were quite a few who responded to my question about who was paying for the former military dictator’s stay at the expensive Dorchester hotel.

There were immediate suggestions regarding the source of money. Some believed that he might have earned his money courtesy his lecture circuit. For instance, the Indian Express paid him millions of rupees for his lecture in Delhi. But then Dorchester is no child’s play. It is truly expensive and we are talking a lot of money.

The interesting point about the discussion was not whether my friends and I managed to solve what had begun to look like something out of the Da Vinci Code, but that the debate highlighted our attitudes towards democracy versus dictatorship or civilian versus military rule. Very quickly the entire debate began to focus on the issue of the lesser evil as opposed to the bigger one and on whether or not Musharraf was a greater problem than the current regime.

Of course, there were some views that were easier to understand such as those of a serving air force officer who tried to reprimand the rest of us for showing lack of respect towards the leadership. One wondered why he bothered to contribute since the discussion was among civilians, generally considered less nationalist and second-class citizens by the men on horseback. One really wondered if the air force officer himself understood that leadership was not about heading an organisation but about motivating people with a set of clear achievements.

However, the rest was more interesting as it reflected the confusion that has gripped the entire nation today regarding the lack of choice as far as the leadership is concerned. The problem has intensified due to the inability of the present regime not managing to capture the imagination of the people, especially the middle class and the educated and affluent upper middle and upper classes. It is indeed sad that Asif Zardari seems to have broken all records where losing the people’s confidence is concerned. Consequently, Pakistanis with a US Ivy League background and those in a better position at home are immediately reminded of the days when Musharraf was in power.

It is also rather comical that today when Zardari announces that he has brought home money no one is willing to believe that the funds are meant for IDPs. A popular perception is that corrupt practices will take care of a lot of these resources. There are also more fingers being pointed at the behaviour of the ministers. We are probably once more in the same cycle that is the fate of praetorian societies. Short-term planning driven by greed, rather than a long-term vision is the hallmark of such societies. Such behaviour is not specific to Pakistan and can be found in a number of Latin American countries where there is a general inclination towards the military whenever things go wrong, but not to the point of wanting the military to continue permanently.

At this point, there are two issues one would like to raise. First, how real is the corruption of politicians in Pakistan? Surely, we would all like to believe that the present set-up is just as corrupt as that headed by its predecessors. It is a fact that the government suffers from genuine inefficiencies and an inept top leadership. However, do we really have a lot of evidence to produce in a court of law regarding alleged corruption? Why is it that successive civilian and military governments were unable to catch ‘thieves’ despite keeping these leaders in prison, throwing others out of the country and having access to all official records?

This is not to argue that politicians are clean, but then are they any worse than the generals who take over with the excuse of cleaning up the political and economic system and who manage to do nothing except create greater chaos? Why is it that military regimes never manage to catch the corrupt or is it that there is far more propaganda than what is actually stolen from the coffers? For instance, while the grapevine is rife with stories about illegal money being made by this government, there is very little on how some of the most influential members of the previous government earned their billions.

Second, why should a bad and inefficient civilian leadership make former military dictators or future ones any better? Sadly, the middle and upper classes in Pakistan, as in other parts of South Asia, are constantly tempted by Singapore’s political model. Things have to be modern and tidy even if it means no democracy which is not a lame concept dictated by Washington but a system that is marked by good governance and the rule of law.

Moreover, why should we imagine that the inept civilian leadership is not a product of its military predecessors? Like many Latin American states, the ineptitude of the civilian leadership distracts people from understanding that corrupt and incapable leadership elements in the military and civilian are interlinked. The greedy senior military generals, businessmen, industrialists, large land owners and influential mullahs are interconnected. These days there are deep familial connections as well. Hence, it is not surprising that the military does not manage to catch any of the corrupt politicians despite its claims of possessing the ‘capability to meet any challenge’.

So, while there is no forgiveness for what this government is unable to achieve, it is unfair to get into the lesser evil-versus-bigger evil debate (this reminds one of the classification made by the US of the good Taliban versus the bad Taliban). Evil multiplies and this is what we have seen happening throughout the six decades of our history.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.

ayesha.ibd@gmail.com
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  #14  
Old Friday, June 05, 2009
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Indian stakes in Pakistan


By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 05 Jun, 2009


ISLAMABAD’S idea to allow transit trade facilities to Afghanistan and India has caused the media to react strongly with many believing that this would prove inimical to Pakistan’s security interests and clear the way for undesirable characters to enter the country for the purpose of spreading violence.

Besides, there is apprehension that the terms of trade will not be to Pakistan’s advantage. Still others tie the trade issue – in the same way as the composite dialogue between India and Pakistan – to a solution of the Kashmir standoff.

Beginning with the tactical issue of concern for security, the reasoning in Islamabad is as valid and lame as it is in India. Surely, terrorism is one of the primary problems on both sides of the border which makes the concern valid. Security was one of the reasons why the Indian external affairs bureaucracy clamped down on issuing visas to Pakistanis arguing that greater traffic was breeding terrorism. However, restricting visas or trade is a bureaucratic measure that does not take into account the fact that greater legal interaction will develop greater understanding and, perhaps, sympathy for each other’s position.

In any case, the bulk of the terrorists don’t seek permission to enter. Also, terrorists do not necessarily have to accompany goods in transit between New Delhi and Kabul because there is already enough smuggling taking place between India and Pakistan for terrorists to make use of. Better monitoring could ensure that trade does not assist the terrorists.

As far as terms favourable to Pakistan are concerned, this is not really an issue of transit trade but about the capacity of the government to evaluate what’s good or bad for it. One really wonders what the issue is because technically speaking Islamabad has already made an offer of transit trade to India – the gas pipeline between Iran and India via Pakistan for which Islamabad hoped to receive attractive compensation. The trade between Afghanistan and India would mean compensation for Pakistan for allowing the use of its territory. Also, what is being discussed at the moment is transit facilities for Afghan goods.

But then what does one do about the Kashmir issue? More than 60 years of experience tell us that we were not able to solve it militarily and using the issue to withhold solutions for other matters is not likely to work either. At the moment, India has no stakes in solving the issue to Pakistan’s advantage especially when it is investing in its own political system to come up with a solution for the Indian state and the Kashmiri population. For instance, while some groups challenged the national elections and the turnout was low, there were others that did go and vote. The Indian state could always argue that there was a low turnout in other parts of the country as well. Eventually, participation in elections could lead to a dialogue between the centre and the territory under India’s control.

Part of the reason why India refuses to be sympathetic to Pakistan’s position is that it has no major stakes here. Transit trade and bilateral trade is one of the formulas for starting a more constructive relationship between the two countries. Allowing Indian investment to come into Pakistan for Pakistan’s benefit was reportedly recognised in a State Bank report which never saw the light of day. It was argued that opening up commercial links could help Pakistan capture some of the NRI investment coming into India.

Trade and transit trade as part of larger economic relations is a major way to change attitudes and perspectives. This is not to suggest that economic relations would automatically translate into a solution for Kashmir and here we can take the example of the US and China, that despite having huge stakes in an economic relationship, continue to confront each other on the issue of Taiwan. But Beijing has not tried to use its current financial investment in the US to the latter’s disadvantage. At present, Washington’s huge deficit financing is funded by the Chinese. Any diversion of funds at this stage would further cripple the US economy which Beijing is not doing because it also has stakes in the American economy. The softening of political positions, of course, takes time.

Pakistan and India need to learn from this example. There are many who disagree on the basis that any economic link will be to India’s advantage and not to Pakistan’s. This perception is a fallacy but will continue to be held as long as Islamabad does not reflect on its own strengths. For instance, Pakistan’s agriculture sector is fairly competitive and has much to offer if we build on its advantages.

Unfortunately, there is greater worry in the policymaking circles regarding industry, especially the automobile industry currently being subsidised by the state. While it is one of the sectors that might get affected due to trade with India, we could think about building our industrial base through negotiating offsets with our neighbour. This is an industrial process that pertains to a systematic but real transfer of technology and not what we have been used to thus far. Using offsets to build our industrial base is something we must consider with other partners as well, particularly in the defence sector.

One of the other advantages of encouraging regional trade relations is that it will enhance Pakistan’s financial capacity and the overall productivity of the economy. The country badly needs to transform itself from an aid-dependent economy to a more productive and self-sustaining one. The reason that we fail to go beyond the $12bn mark in our foreign exchange reserves is due to the limited productive capacity of the economy.

Boosting trade and transit trade in the region will give Pakistan access to its own resources, which, in turn, will reduce its dependence on other states. Trade does build its own dependence but not at the cost of independent foreign policy and larger policymaking, a problem that occurs in an aid-based economy. Interdependency build through trade, on the other hand, could help bilaterally resolve contentious issues in the future.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.

ayesha.ibd@gmail.com
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  #15  
Old Friday, June 12, 2009
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South Punjab ‘movement’


By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 12 Jun, 2009


MOHAMMAD Ali Durrani, the former information minister, recently went public with his plan to struggle for an independent Bahawalpur province. One can simply dismiss his views as an extension of the old Seraiki movement which people have heard about for very long.

This time round, however, the idea has been floated by a man reputed for his deep connections with the establishment. The timing of the proposed movement also raises questions about what may happen in that part of the country.

The former minister’s reasons for starting the movement are quite logical. He is of the view that when Bahawalpur was merged into the One-Unit in 1955, the State of Pakistan had stipulated that the princely state would revert to its original status if the One-Unit were dissolved. Durrani believes that not only did the State of Pakistan go back on its promise, it failed to invest in the socioeconomic development of Bahawalpur. Resultantly, there is a lot of poverty and underdevelopment in the region.

What he did not mention was that land in Cholistan, Bahawalpur’s desert area, is routinely distributed to people from outside the area, especially military and civil bureaucrats. Also, since Bahawalpur does not fall into the Punjab (rural) civil services or military quota, there are fewer people from the region in the state bureaucracy.

Durrani’s feeling for the area may not be doubted because he belongs to Ahmedpur, a city in district Bahawalpur. However, one would certainly like to ask the minister if he felt this way while he was part of the previous government and in a position to do things for the region. Did he ever ensure that his party, the PML-Q, make plans for the area? After all, Q-League stalwarts such as Ejazul Haq and Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi contest elections from Bahawalpur division. Or did he ever present a vision for the government to go beyond the construction of an airport, a medical college and a university? Most of the public buildings in Bahawalpur — the central library, its only hospital and others — are a gift of the old nawab.

There is a possibility that Durrani might have tired of waiting for Pervez Musharraf to return to politics and assign some task or important office to his former information minister. Let’s not forget that there are many prominent people from the former State of Bahawalpur who, like Durrani, belong to the local elite and have participated in politics at the provincial and local levels. Makhdoom Shahabuddin, Makhdoom Altaf, Makhdoom Khusro Bakhtiar, Makhdoom Ahmed Alam Anwar, Makhdoom Hassan Mehmood and his sons, Tasneem Nawaz Gardezi and Riaz Pirzada are some of the luminaries of Bahawalpur who have held positions in successive governments.

So it is quite pathetic to argue that these people could not convince the establishment of which they were a part to invest in social development in their region. Not only have these Makhdooms ignored the development of their areas, some are also known for keeping up the archaic tradition of not marrying off their sisters and daughters to keep the family wealth at home. The family of the Makhdooms of Rahimyar Khan is known for this. The airports built at two sites, namely Bahawalpur and Rahimyar Khan, are gifts from the sheikhs of Dubai and Abu Dhabi. In return, Pakistani governments award huge concessions like turning state land into private hunting grounds for these foreign dignitaries.

Yet another possibility is that a movement for an independent province is meant to mask all other socio-political activities in the region so that these might go unnoticed by the rest of the country and the world at large. This refers to the various militant organisations that continue to operate in Bahawalpur division. Although the provincial and central governments are trying their best to constrain these militant outfits, there is no clear plan of action for cleaning up the area. A total elimination of these organisations becomes difficult due to the lack of clarity or a strategy regarding militancy.

Either the central or the provincial government has come up with the brilliant idea of supporting the Barelvi movement, including its armed wing, which means that the area could suffer the way Karachi has through the conflict between the MQM and MQM-Haqiqi. And now there is this mention of a political movement that has no real support at the local level but carries the potential of creating mayhem in the medium to long term. The resulting confusion ought to leave all observers fogged.

It is true that the average Bahawalpuri talks nostalgically about the glory days of the princely state, but the fact of the matter is that the majority are no longer stuck in the past. Consequently, the family of the former nawab of Bahawalpur, which ordinary people still respect, can no longer hope to get all the votes in elections. There are new power networks and groups that have diluted the memory of the state.

For instance, the development work done by District Nazim Tariq Bashir Cheema has strengthened his control rather than that of the traditional power centres. He focused on tehsil Yazman, his personal area of interest, to procure political support for the future. Similarly, there are many other new faces that win support on the basis of services provided to constituents.

A political movement for an independent status could only be built if funded from unexplained sources. If such a movement did manage to take off, it would create such chaos that the other divisive elements which have been systematically planted in the area would be forgotten. The strategy might prove beneficial if the intention is to hide those elements and forces that have a greater impact on peace and stability in the region.

Genuine empowerment of the area will only come through greater development work and a fair distribution of resources. In any case, such a movement will only multiply existing problems rather than solve issues to the benefit of the people. Thus if Mr Durrani really wants to do something for his place of birth, he would be better off talking about improving governance, ensuring the rule of law and eliminating the terror outfits that could destroy the rich culture of Bahawalpur.

Perhaps he could start with his own accountability and a sincere assessment of the area he calls home.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.

ayesha.ibd@gmail.com
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  #16  
Old Friday, June 19, 2009
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What about the police?


By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 19 Jun, 2009


President Asif Zardari announced his decision to allow a cantonment in Swat with more allowances for military personnel, especially those fighting in the difficult terrain. This is indeed an expression of his appreciation for the military’s ongoing efforts in the fight against the Taliban in Swat and Fata, and his concern for national security.
Surely, the nation must take note of the sacrifice of its soldiers, officers and civilians who died to save the state and society from the Taliban.

While the president is involved in appreciating the services of different people and institutions, one would like to draw his attention towards another force. This refers to the police which have been at the forefront of the war on terror for a long time, in fact, much before the army. One hopes that Mr Zardari will also announce some form of compensation and facilities for the law-enforcement agencies rather than just for the military.

This recommendation does not emanate from a sense of competition with the army, as some generals might imagine, but recognition of the fact that one may not actually be forced to use the army on internal fronts if the necessary investment is made in security. It is a matter of getting one’s priorities right and understanding that the police (including Pakistan’s) have the best intelligence network and the necessary information to act against internal enemies and extremist forces. Since the police operate in all neighbourhoods, its officers are aware of all the good or bad guys in the area. Furthermore, the police may use forceful methods but symbolically they are a less coercive tool than the military. Hence, deploying the police should be the first option.

This naturally leads to the larger question of how one can depend on a force that is deemed corrupt and inefficient. One is reminded of a joke about three police officers — American, British and Pakistani — comparing notes. The American boasts of being able to catch a thief within 72 hours of the crime. The British competes with a claim of 24 hours. Not to be left behind, the Pakistani policeman claims to be smarter than the other two: ‘We know of the crime even before it takes place,’ he says. Jokes apart, one cannot expect a great performance from a poorly paid, and badly trained and equipped force that fails to achieve results or impress its clients. The money invested in the police as compared to the military is much less and thus there are fewer impressive results.

The police in this country lack investment in resources that could help motivate security personnel into performing better. In cases where the force has been provided with resources and leadership and backed by those at the top, the results have been nothing short of amazing. The Islamabad Traffic Police (ITP) are an example of how things can be changed with the right combination of resources, leadership and commitment. A visit to the SSP traffic’s office is mind-boggling. Not only are the officers manning the premises polite, a visitor does not require a reference to enter the office of the SSP who tries to solve the visitor’s problems as quickly as possible.

SSP Sultan Azam Taimuri and SP Ashfaq Ahmed Khan seem to have made their office responsive to the needs of the people. Besides investing in better training and equipment, an improvement in services was made possible due to the commitment of the top political leadership. We may fault former prime minister Shaukat Aziz for a lot of things, but it is necessary to appreciate some of his achievements, one being the ITP. Reportedly, the Islamabad police were not stopped from impounding VIP vehicles if the drivers of the latter were caught violating the rules.

Obviously, the top political leadership set the priorities right as far as the performance of the ITP was concerned and showed a commitment to combat the notorious VIP culture in the capital. Visiting the ITP office one realises that the lives of ordinary Pakistanis can be made easier once the system in place is set right. And we have the capacity to do so.

In any case, policymaking is about setting priorities right and then showing a commitment towards fulfilling the goals. Governments often fall into the trap of making policies that may have a symbolic value but comparatively few dividends. The proposed investment in the Swat cantonment is one such issue. Why build another cantonment which would require more funds for its protection? A possible answer could be that a cantonment would guarantee that the Taliban would not ever enter the area again. This is based on the assumption that the inflow of Taliban forces is driven from outside, by enemies of the Pakistani state.

There are two possible scenarios. First, the war continues for many years in which a cantonment will prove to be a sitting duck, highly fortified and with no confidence even among the soldiers who would only be able to use heavy artillery without stepping out. A second scenario, on the other hand, is that most extremist forces are eliminated and people manage to return to their homes. In such conditions what would be of greater benefit is to invest in the socio-economic and human resource development of the area. A better administrative, judicial and law-implementation mechanism might be expensive but would bring greater benefits.

A happy, satisfied and secure set of people would not require the military security that Islamabad plans to invest in. In any case, such expansion would be tantamount to bringing an infrastructure in the area that would dominate everything else. Many would justify it on the basis of development that a cantonment might bring. However, investing in direct development is likely to prove more beneficial than such indirect development.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.

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Old Friday, June 26, 2009
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What are we up against?


By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 26 Jun, 2009


A COUPLE of weeks ago I had a chance to discuss the domestic situation on a local television channel in the company of a renowned intellectual. As in most talk shows, we participants were going around in circles trying to prove our respective points.

However, what I gathered from the debate was the need to define what we are up against. Is it an insurgency that we face or terrorism? Clarity on the issue is necessary.

The difference between how the state treats the ongoing conflict and the way society perceives it is a major problem in the country today. Interestingly, the state tends to use the American definition of calling the conflict an insurgency rather than terrorism. The Americans are justified in using this term because the resistance in Afghanistan and Iraq is partly geared towards evicting the US and other forces considered as invaders. In case Washington loses the war, it will not affect its overall power but only its power interests in this part of the world.

However, the conflict does not remain an insurgency when it enters Pakistan. Contrary to what Imran Khan would like people to believe, the war inside Pakistani territory is not about restoring the honour of the Pakhtun or evicting the invading forces, but about a specific group of people trying to change the nature of the state.

Many people tend not to notice the subtle difference between the two terminologies of insurgency and terrorism. Insurgency pertains to a militant movement by a group of people to attain certain political objectives that relate to the rights of a group of people in a specific territory. So, the insurgent’s violence ultimately affects one part of the state. More important, it is comparatively easier to divide the insurgents or negotiate with them since the ultimate objective is betterment of a group of people. The Baloch movement is the only example of insurgency in Pakistan.

Terrorism, on the other hand, is the use of violence to pursue a larger agenda with the goal of taking over and changing the face of the entire state. So, the only point at which a terrorist might negotiate is the offer of partnership in managing state affairs. Unfortunately, a lot of people in government and outside do not draw the distinction. There are some who even argue that the state can actually negotiate with the terrorists. Such perception delinks ideology from violence and fails to evaluate the significance of the terrorists’ political agenda.

In this case, ideology is a multi-purpose tool. It is used to strengthen the movement. This is something that the terrorist cannot compromise on, else the whole focus of using violence against the state and society would be lost. In addition, ideology helps in winning the support of people beyond the core group and is non-negotiable. More importantly, this ideology is critical in changing the face of the state. Thus, it is more or less impossible to negotiate with terrorists.

For me, it was surprising to hear an intellectual talking about the possibility of negotiating with terrorists — the only discussion possible with the Taliban in Pakistan is on how best to strike a partnership in governing parts of the state or the state itself. It is quite amazing that while Islamabad has shown great resistance to the Baloch insurgency, there is division in its ranks on how best to deal with the others operating in the rest of the country. The inability to bring development

to a disgruntled people in time has encouraged the separatist movement, which, if it succeeds, will only affect one part of the country i.e. Balochistan.

Meanwhile, state functionaries and significant groups in society have failed to build a consensus on how best to fight off Taliban terrorism for two reasons. First, there is the failure to properly define the conflict. Second, there is an inability to differentiate between the Taliban and the rest of the population due to common ideological threads. Many tend to argue, all that the Taliban are asking for is more religion to bring improvement in governance. Perhaps, the only issue on which people tend to disagree with the Taliban is the extent of their violence. As long as the target is other nationalities and not the Pakistani forces or people, the Taliban could be tolerated because of the common ideological thread.

Therefore, there are those that relate to the Taliban mainly as a group which could bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. The Taliban, it is argued, only turned violent after the Americans struck after 9/11. This argument is extended to the Pakistani Taliban as well. However, it is dangerous to believe this because it tends to justify Taliban ideology without condoning their violence.

Those who stress the ‘fight against a foreign occupying force’ theory forget two things. First, the Afghan Taliban might be fighting the US but do not necessarily represent a force of resistance to foreign occupation. After they fought the Soviet forces, the Mujahideen and Afghan warlords were deployed ambitiously on other fronts which gave them the appetite for extending their influence. Religious ideology came in later as necessary ideological clothing for the Taliban expansion. So, the Taliban fighting in Afghanistan and their partners in Pakistan are the ones who have a taste for expansion.

Second, invasion as a concept is not foreign to the region. It dates back to centuries. It includes the invasion of Mohammad bin Qasim who is said to have entered the region from the south and not the north. But what we are witnessing at the moment is an internal expansion which is aimed outwards on the basis of ideology.

So, the Taliban as a group are not just about resistance. They also represent a regional expansionist force which makes them different from other insurgents. Unless we begin explaining this to the people, instead of using terms borrowed from abroad, we might never be able to win the battle for hearts and mind that is necessary to make gains in the military conflict.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.

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Old Friday, July 03, 2009
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More provinces?


By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 03 Jul, 2009


THAT Pakistan must be divided into smaller and more manageable administrative-cum-political divisions is an argument that one has heard for many years.

After all, if India can have new states based on linguistic divisions, why can’t Pakistan have more provinces? It makes a lot of sense if newer and more manageable administrative divisions are carved out of the existing four provinces with the objective of catering to the political sentiments of the people.

Smaller units will mean the decentralisation of power, which should appease those who are worried about the concentration of power. The application of the above formula should make at least two groups happy: Punjab’s Seraiki and urban Sindh’s Urdu-speaking Mohajir communities. They have been struggling for years for recognition of their political and social rights.

Unfortunately for the Mohajir community, it is demographically not in a position to make such a demand. Its political representatives might try to join forces with Sindhi nationalists to stop the inflow of the Pathans or Punjabis. But this will only work as long as they share political objectives, especially when one considers their history of animosity.

More importantly, there is less discussion of a division of Sindh or other provinces and more about the division of Punjab — especially in the context of a province for Seraiki speakers — not to mention divisions within the Seraiki-speaking area and the issue of making Bahawalpur a province.

None of the above means that Punjab today is more prepared for a division than other provinces. However, this indicates the weakening of the elite consensus in Punjab which may eventually move towards the breakdown of the agreement of the ruling elite in the largest province. Although smaller administrative divisions are absolutely logical, one must not be labouring under the misapprehension that the debate we are hearing has anything to do with the betterment of ordinary people.

The Seraiki-speaking elite dwelling mainly in southern Punjab is weary of the concentration of power in Lahore, especially in the hands of the PML-N and the Sharif brothers. A new Seraiki province with its capital in one of the larger cities of southern Punjab will dramatically change Punjab’s political scene. But the role played by central forces is critical. Sources suggest that the PPP government would support this formula so that the power of the Sharif brothers can be diluted.

Electoral results show that PPP support is concentrated in rural Punjab which is basically south Punjab versus PML-N’s following in the urban centres. A new political division will dilute the Punjabi urban versus rural division. Another province will also mean that Punjab would not be directly and totally controlled by the Sharifs and their party. Shahbaz Sharif can only be chief minister in one province, not two. Not to mention the fact that the success of the Seraiki movement will result in the possible creation of the Potohar province or some other division.

The Bahawalpur province debate is inextricably linked to the demand for a Seraiki province. One explanation for a smaller province is that it is bound to kill the movement for a larger province. From a particular perspective, the demand for a Seraiki province versus a Bahawalpur province is the battle between two political poles, one more centrist and pro-establishment than the other.

The entire debate is interesting because it indicates the weakening of elite consensus in Punjab, a province which is considered critical to Pakistan and its power politics. It must also be mentioned that the subcontinent has taken a newer shape every time elite consensus broke down. Starting from the independence of India and Pakistan to the breakup of Pakistan in 1971, this will probably be the third time in our history that the breakdown of consensus might give a new shape to the political division of territory. Of course, this time it will be done in a more decent manner, which is to be expected since there is no grass-roots demand for a new province.

There are many who believe that this is about the betterment of the people. Surely, people in Multan, D.G. Khan, Bahawalpur and other places are bothered by the long trek to Lahore whenever they need to get things done. It is also a fact that there is greater development work in north and central Punjab than in the south. There are three issues worth considering in this regard.

First, the south versus north and centre is also a story of uneven urban development.

Second, the lack of development is not just about the concentration of power in Lahore but the peculiar concentration of capital and industrial development in the province. North and central Punjab are better developed because most industries, including defence, are located there. While this is because the bulk of the military is from the north and centre, the majority of dynamic entrepreneurs are also located here rather than in the south.

Third, the comparative lack of industrialisation is also because the large landowners and politicians of southern Punjab have stuck to the more traditional industries and methods of capital formation. This varied pattern is not surprising since the relatively poorer agriculture of north Punjab led to other forms of money-making. In any case, the Seraiki-speaking elite attached itself to the larger Punjabi elite including the military to get their share of resources. I remember Makhdoom Khursheed Zaman Qureshi of Bahawalpur, interim minister for agriculture in Punjab during Musharraf’s tenure, talk about the benefits of giving free land to the generals in south Punjab. There are others like the Legharis with links to the ISI through the Mehran Bank scandal. The stories are endless.

The fact of the matter is that the Makhdooms, Legharis, Abbasis, Gilanis etc from south Punjab see the division of the larger province as an opportunity to build their own stronghold. In a nutshell we might see a new shape of Punjab but such a change must be planned properly to divert benefits to the people rather than to the predatory elite.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.

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Old Friday, July 10, 2009
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Defence: a grey area


By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 10 Jul, 2009


DECISION-making in the defence sector is generally a grey area because of the secrecy that surrounds the process. However, in decision-making environments where political and accountability systems are not strong, there is greater vagueness.

Two questionable deals in this country involve equipment for the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and the Pakistan Navy (PN). In the PAF’s case, former air chief Kaleem Saadat claimed that Gen Musharraf ruined a $1.2bn deal to acquire Swedish surveillance aircraft. The second instance concerns President Zardari’s alleged link to financial mismanagement in negotiating a deal for new submarines.

According to the current procedure, different directorates in the services headquarters are involved in evaluating weapons’ requirements and then coming up with staff requirements which are evaluated by the planning departments in their respective headquarters. The army’s system is more elaborate than that of the other two services. Once the service boards shortlist their requirements the latter are communicated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) to prioritise the procurement of arms for the three services. This is then communicated to the government through the defence ministry.

The army chief has a lot of influence in the JCSC. This has especially been the case over the past decade because of changes in the system where the post of chairman is occupied by an army general. The position no longer goes to the other services. The contract is taken care of at the defence ministry where officials from their respective service headquarters and posted in the ministry assist the process.

In this system, the head of state, especially if he is also the army chief, plays a major role. As army chief, the president can influence the final selection. So Gen Musharraf was in a position to influence the contract and the final acquisition.

But what about Asif Zardari who was also accused of making money in the past from the acquisition of the French Agosta-90B submarines? It is worth noting that the Musharraf government could not get any real evidence of Benazir Bhutto’s and Asif Zardari’s involvement in the submarine deal despite pulling up former naval chief Admiral Mansoorul Haq. It is important to note that while the previous PPP government could be linked to questionable power-sector deals, it probably had less to do with defence purchases. In any case, the procurement process is longer than the average life of a political government for a single person to influence the decision.

This is not to say that the PPP is above board. This is simply the nature of the defence acquisition system. Any financial mismanagement in defence deals has to involve military personnel at the service HQs and the JCSC. According to the prevalent procurement system, the acquisition of weapons depends on staff requirements decided at the service headquarters. The ‘higher defence reorganisation’ planned under the Bhutto government during the 1970s had made the defence ministry responsible for all weapons-procurement administrative work such as calling for bids, floating tenders, writing contracts and negotiating with sellers.

Ideally speaking, staff requirements must reflect the needs of a service. These muse be based on tactical, operational and strategic intelligence. The defence ministry should be responsible for fine-tuning staff requirements and finding the right system to meet the service’s needs.

Currently, the selection of weapons is done at the services’ headquarters which means there is greater interaction between the divisions responsible for planning and potential sellers. Resultantly, staff requirements also reflect the bias of the procurement team for a specific seller. This is where money is to be made. It is after overt and covert deals have been taken care of that the case is passed on to the government.

Where the PN and PAF are concerned obtaining approval for a major acquisition depends on the interest shown by either the army or the head of the state, the final authority. The air force has been luckier than the navy due to the relevance of the service to the army-dominated military strategy.

With the largest service overly involved in politics, governance and now internal security, the PAF is considered vital to fighting a potential war with India, a concept that dominates our military strategy. On the other hand, the PN, which has less strategic significance, tries to attract top policymakers. There are fears that this could be done through offering them a share in the money. The top management influences the naval staff requirements and the final selection of weapons.

This has happened in the case of the acquisition of the P-3C Orions for which the PN has no naval staff requirement or NSR i.e. no real demand has been generated for the aircraft. Another case refers to negotiations with the Chinese for the F-22P frigates in which the service chief overrode the decision, despite issues raised about the technology by relevant quarters.

There are some that suggest that the appointment of a relatively junior District Management Group officer as ambassador to Paris is meant to facilitate a deal with the French. Such claims do not take into account two factors. First, an ambassador is too insignificant in the entire procurement process to influence a deal which the defence establishment including the ministry of defence manages. Second, the PN’s existing submarine fleet is of French origin.

Changing the source would mean adding to the cost as it would involve setting up newer maintenance and other facilities. Not to mention the fact that Islamabad acquired the Agosta-90B under a transfer-of-technology agreement which not only escalated the cost of the deal but also meant that the PN could make additional submarines. The capital investment in the acquisition of weapons represents about 12 to 15 per cent of the lifecycle cost of the equipment. In simple language, a larger array of weapons in terms of their source will add to the overall cost of equipment without increasing efficiency.

It is time we took another look at our military strategy and weapons-procurement planning which suffers from major flaws starting from the absence of a rational procurement planning loop. Weapons’ procurement suffers from the absence of a ‘system’ that actually qualifies as one. Unless one is introduced, we will keep losing money to corrupt bureaucrats and leaders.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.
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Old Friday, July 17, 2009
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The peace puzzle


By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 17 Jul, 2009


MODERN-day media is a strange animal. It is easily excited, raises expectations quickly and then just as rapidly dashes them.


The excitement focused on the meeting of the Pakistani and Indian prime ministers is a typical example. On the morning of the foreign secretaries’ meeting in Sharm el Sheikh there began a rush of phone calls that increased during the course of the day in which anchorpersons were eager to know what could be obtained from the meeting and why we couldn’t stop talking to India. The tone and tenor of the conversation was similar on the other side as well.

At this point in time, Indo-Pakistan ties can hope to make little movement. Given the highs and lows of our bilateral engagement, there is little that the two establishments expect from each other. They can only try and convince the international community of their eagerness to have a debate and ensure the absence of military conflict.

Socio-politically these are historic days for the subcontinent because the media, one of the most effective tools for lobbying public support for policy, is an active player in the foreign-policymaking debate. The common media refrain in both countries is that their side must not talk to the other. The media is being exceptionally hostile and influencing public opinion and policymaking. Of course, policymakers don’t admit that using the media is dangerous because after a certain point it becomes difficult to roll back public opinion.

Hence, it is not surprising that earlier on Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh spilled the beans (regarding his official position) in front of the Pakistani president even before the press left the room. It was more than an error to put his cards on the table in the presence of both the president and the press. Manmohan Singh was probably not too excited about Mr Zardari’s ability to comprehend the bottom-line in terms of India’s desire to maintain friendly relations with Pakistan — the message was that Islamabad would have to eliminate terror and violence mechanisms operating on Pakistani territory before New Delhi considered talks with Pakistan.

In the past New Delhi had built up a rapport with the Nawaz Sharif and Pervez Musharraf governments to the extent that both sides had the confidence that they were about to improve jinxed India-Pakistan relations for the better and that there would be no turning back. While the dispensations thought that they could carry their security establishments with them to improve relations with India by putting Kashmir on the backburner, the Indian government was convinced that they had finally met Pakistani leaders who could command sufficient respect at home to convince the people and the military to give up on the Kashmir issue. Each time, some crisis prevented a further buildup of relations.

India does not seem to have the same confidence in the present government. In fact, in the days following the Mumbai terrorist attack last year, many in New Delhi were not even sure who the real government in Pakistan was when it came to relations with India. Asif Zardari and his cabal seem to have promised things that they could not deliver later. Moreover, while the president seems to talk about a composite dialogue, especially trade with India, the prime minis

ter appears to follow the traditional line. Interestingly, in the past Delhi was willing to talk about everything including bits of Kashmir. Today, the political regime in Islamabad wants to talk about everything including trade with bits of discussion on Kashmir. The Indians are not too keen on this.

So, Dr Singh wanted to let the fly on the wall know that lest the Pakistani leaders say something in public and raise expectations about normalcy in India-Pakistan bilateral relations, it must be put on record before the press that Delhi wouldn’t budge on a single point. Unfortunately, the war on terror is an issue on which there is no ‘seeing eye to eye’ for the two sides. While India sees Pakistan as the source of all problems, Islamabad believes that India along with its American partners is causing it all the pain. Of course, no one mentions the fact that Islamabad should do more in terms of providing concrete evidence for India and America’s involvement in the violence in the northern areas.

At this juncture, there are two realities. First, it is very difficult to make any movement on any peace initiative because our agendas have become very divergent. The non-state actors whom people would like to see evicted from the South Asian strategic scene have come to stay mainly due to the inability of the state actors to indulge in some out-of-the-box thinking. Second, diplomatic force and pressure might not help beyond a certain point. The two neighbouring states along with their friends and allies will have to sit together with greater patience than before to understand each other’s insecurities and concerns.

The reality is that we are in a historical ideological bind from which there is no getting out, at least, not for the present. Territorial disputes are a component of the real tension. Thus, some form of territorial solution, be it of the Siachen glacier issue or the Kashmir imbroglio, is important as this would indicate the interest of policymakers on either side in evolving newer imagination about each other.

However, what appears more likely at this stage is that India and Pakistan will muddle through the present times and continue with relations that are not normal until a point of greater destruction is reached. This would then teach us a lesson in peace. Or perhaps we would come to learn the worth of the latter through some miracle.

Seen from the lens of the media, it is really a game of patiently sitting and watching events in the subcontinent. After all, both states and the entire South Asian region can either sink or swim together.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.
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