The political show goes on

By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 06 Mar, 2009

A QUESTION on the lips of most Pakistanis these days is whether the Sharif brothers and their political party – the PML-N – will manage to push back their rival – the PPP – and its leader Asif Ali Zardari.

After the Supreme Court decision disqualifying the Sharif brothers from electoral politics and holding public office, the PML-N seems to have had no other option but to muster street support in the form of the lawyers’ movement and seek out parties and groups of the religious right.

People across the country were getting ready for political show-time on the streets until March 3 happened. On this day, matters appeared to take another turn as terrorists struck in Lahore. Now the problem is that as much as the Sharif brothers might want to up the political ante, the reality is (to put it in the words of an Indian film song) that ‘Pappu nach naheen sakta’. Surely, Nawaz Sharif will be cautious in overexposing himself and his followers to the threat of a terrorist attack. The last leader to ignore security calls was Benazir Bhutto who succumbed to a terrorist attack. The identity of her killers remains unknown.

Security is bound to be enhanced now and there will be greater vigilance to allow for major processions on the streets. In any case, people will be terrified at least for a few days and would be averse to risking their lives by congregating and taking out processions, be they lawyers or others. The security situation does not bode well for them, especially at a time when the PPP is trying hard to buy the loyalties of the people through restoring the nazims and resorting to other measures to undermine the strength of the PML-N.

The political battle was meant to be fought on the streets. It would be the Sharifs’ ability to mobilise the people in this regard that would impress external powers and opposing political forces in the country. As far as mass protests go, the PPP has an edge in terms of its jiyalas who are rabid party supporters willing to give up their lives for the PPP and its leadership. There is a general understanding that the PML-N never had this edge. But this is not to underestimate the fact that the Sharif brothers have the support of the trader-merchant class in Punjab and other places. Historically, they fund the protest even though they are not actively a part of it. So, one could have had a situation as in 1977 when the conservative trader-merchant class funded the PNA movement.

Although it would be extremely conspiratorial to hint that the government may have been involved in the terrorist attacks, the fact is that the peculiar turn of events must have made the PPP leadership very happy as it provided an opportunity to contain the upcoming long march and the street protests by the Sharifs. The party’s calculations possibly included buying off parliamentarians in Punjab which would enable it to make a government in the largest province and then use the power to wipe out the PML-N in the next elections. The emphasis is on patronage politics which helps in purchasing loyalties. Voting patterns are affected by a number of

factors including popular ideas on who will make it to power. Equally, they have much to do with people’s perceptions of who has been wronged.

There is great worth attached to physical and political martyrdom in South Asia and the Third World in general. Not to mention the fact that patronage politics is generally an inefficient system. At the end of the ruling party’s term, there are always a large number of disgruntled people who then decide to switch over to the other side in the hope of getting better benefits. Considering the short life of civilian regimes, patronage politics rarely support the ruling party.

But convenient times do not necessarily mean that the battle is or will be over soon. The PPP indeed made a difficult choice by derailing the Punjab government. It might be able to form the provincial government, but it will have to face the uncomfortable situation of dealing with a strong opposition. This means that it will be difficult to undertake policymaking and the party will eventually have to fall back on patronage politics. It should also not be forgotten that the bulk of the Sharifs’ party constituents were happy (or not so unhappy) with the PML-N.

In any case, extreme conflict between the two parties in Punjab will make both policymaking and service delivery harder if not impossible in the largest province which means that the people will ultimately be unhappy with the situation. The prospect of such a degree of unhappiness in the largest province is worrying particularly when we consider the fact that the military still predominantly belongs to Punjab.

What we are looking at is protracted political warfare in which the battle lines may ultimately be drawn on the basis of ideology (it is still a blessing that confrontation has not taken on an ethnic colour). Even if nothing happens as the long march approaches, the Sharifs will not give up the street fight or the one that has started inside parliament. It is a fact that a number of forces that have an impact on Pakistan’s politics such as the US do not support the PML-N. Given Washington’s understanding that the Sharifs are ideologically conservative as compared to the PPP and its leadership, the US does not seem inclined towards the PML-N. However, this would add to the ideological angle of the battle. Many would interpret this confrontation as a conflict between pro-Pakistan elements and those that are at the beck and call of the US. Ultimately, this will further make politics in this country extremely wonky.

More importantly, political confrontation is a reminder not only of the past but also of the myopia of the politicians and political parties. The fact is that Pakistan’s political system in general is driven by predatory instincts in which players do not value loyalty, partnership, ideology or the betterment of the people. Instead, they are driven by concern for short-term gains and their desire for personal power. Under the circumstances, one can easily predict that the boots will eventually march back from the barracks into the corridors of power — if not today or tomorrow then certainly the day after. And then, they will be the ones dancing rather than Pappu and his mates or rivals.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.

ayesha.ibd@gmail.com
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/...l+show+goes+on

Absence of alternatives

The lack of political alternative at this hour is due to the death of politics in the country. One wonders what it would take for a new political force to emerge.

By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday Mar 13, 2009


THE country is in a state of political, economic and social chaos, leading us to contemplate the question of finding another political alternative, perhaps in the form of a new political party.
The crisis is two-fold. On the one hand there is the decay of existing parties, on the other the absence of an alternative. However, a new party that could fill the political vacuum is nowhere to be seen.

There is Imran Khan who is quite popular amongst some segments of the urban elite but has not managed to win mass support, mainly because he hasn’t offered a clear alternative and continues to drift between right and left political ideologies. To give Imran Khan his due, he and his backers have emerged as a pressure group though not as a political force.

Perhaps this lack of alternative is due to the death of politics in the country. One wonders what it would take for a new political force, the kind that previously created the two major parties, to emerge.

A common feature of all parties is a very strong leadership at the top, and an oligarchic structure which then connects with the lower rungs on the basis of the redistribution of rewards. Ultimately, the reward depends on access to and approval of the top leadership routed through the oligarchy. This works as a bond at the lowest level rather than at the top which makes most parties quite similar, especially the two major national parties of the country.

The Muslim League emerged from the pre-1947 crisis. However, after independence and the death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, reactionary forces not only strengthened their control but also paved the way for the disintegration of the Muslim League. Since it was the only key party at that time, powerful establishment forces hijacked it. Thus, it was not surprising that the Muslim League kept splitting into several factions. Beginning with the first major splinter group controlled by Ayub Khan, the PML recreated itself in the form of different factions. At this point, the party leadership is divided on the basis of personal interests rather than on that of ideology.

The political crisis of the 1960s resulted in the creation of the PPP in the western wing and the Awami League in the eastern wing. The crisis led people to the streets. In West Pakistan, the PPP came into being with the combined efforts of socialist, left-of-centre, Islamic socialist and reactionary forces. The PPP’s political agenda and election manifesto of ‘roti, kapra aur makaan’ attracted the common man in search of his rights and hopeful of getting a state that could perform better in delivering basic services to the people.

However, the greatest mistake was to accommodate reactionary forces such as feudal lords and other powerful cliques. These were included in the party by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto because he was one of them, and without making deals he couldn’t build a strong party to displace Gen Ayub Khan and his political partners in a short time. In any case, in Pakistan there is a strong tradition of cutting deals with reactionary forces to enable the elite to remain in power.

The inclusion of this powerful elite was the PPP’s ideological undoing. During the 1970s, leftist and Islamic socialist forces were pushed to the background and the landed feudal and other powerful groups took their place. However, the PPP’s advantage rested in those pockets that looked upon Bhuttoism as an ideology and a symbol of empowerment for the dispossessed. The memory of Bhutto’s fiery slogans and the times when big business was pushed back, though in a superficial manner, did not go away. Without assessing the ability of their leadership to empower the masses, PPP voters were caught in a time warp, also the result of successive military interventions.

The PPP’s greatest advantage was in having charismatic leaders like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto followed by Benazir Bhutto, keeping the vote bank engaged with the idea of delivering to the masses once the party got the opportunity to do so. Credit also goes to the par ty’s peculiar vote-bank management structure for keeping Bhuttoism alive. A strong central control also ensured the absence of splinter groups. The PPP-SB is not even a proper splinter group; it merely indicates a division within the Bhutto family.

Like other national and ethnic parties, the PPP has a highly centralised structure controlled by a strong leader able to create and recreate slogans without delivering much. But, unlike the Muslim League, the PPP has an integrated three-tiered party management structure. With a strong leader surrounded by a set of senior leaders representing the party elite, the operations of mobilising voters and distributing rewards is carried out by the middle tier that also delivers the lower tiers to the top leadership. In the context of the country’s political patronage system, the middle tier has a better chance of getting rewards for keeping the ideology alive and the vote bank engaged.

This is a highly bureaucratic structure which feeds into the larger political structure of the country. This means that the political party structure is fundamentally part of a system where military dictatorships are replaced by dominant political parties, only to be replaced by another military dispensation. Party management depends on keeping the vote bank alive with the expectation of the even distribution of rewards once the military dictatorship is gone. This may keep the party alive but will not solve political crises.

The efficient party structure might come under greater pressure now that a charismatic leader is gone. While we hear about dissent inside the party, a real break might happen with help from the establishment. The long march and divisions between the prime minister and president could well be a precursor to the fragmentation of the PPP.

The bottom-line is that most parties have become less imaginative as far as ideology goes. This feeds directly into the death of politics in this country. All new alternatives now depend on the establishment as it was in the past. ¦

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.
ayesha.ibd@gmail.com
http://epaper.dawn.com/ArticleText.a...3_2009_007_004

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How did they triumph?

By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 20 Mar, 2009

THE movement for the restoration of the judiciary makes Pakistani civil society proud of its achievement. It is awesome how ordinary professionals struggled for two years to ensure that a civilian and military dictatorship did not obstruct the move for the independence of the judiciary.

The symbolism of the chief justice’s refusal to bow to dictatorial pressure was enormous for a society in dire need of the strengthening of its institutions.

However, no matter what the extent of joy, this is the time to reflect on some of the possible challenges that lie ahead of us. In any case, the game is not over as yet. At least at the time of writing it appears that the ruling party could be tempted to try once more to isolate Nawaz Sharif and not lift governor’s rule in time. It would be quite a feat to get the people to agitate once again now that the judiciary issue is resolved.

Firstly, it is important to ensure that independence of the judiciary is truly institutionalised. Now, more than ever, will the chief justice have to work hard to ensure that he doesn’t give any semblance of bias and that efforts are truly put in to institutionalise the judiciary so that people don’t have to revert to the streets everyday. This means that he should now focus his attention on fine-tuning, streamlining and managing the judiciary and the legal profession, especially focusing on cleansing the lower courts and even the higher courts of alleged corruption and inefficiency. Affordable and timely justice is what the entire nation requires.

Second, he has to struggle to keep himself from becoming controversial. The coming months will be quite crazy as all sorts of cases will find their way into the courtroom. In any case, it is now the chief justice’s responsibility to make sure that the judiciary doesn’t pose to become the recipe for all ills in the political system and the state. However, it must play a role to keep the government in check.

Third, it is hoped that the energy invested in street power, which was instrumental in restoring the judiciary, now goes towards strengthening the political party system which continues to be weak. In the coming months and years, the political balance, as far as political parties go, will experience a change (provided the PML-N government is restored).

While the PML will strengthen its position in Punjab and pick up strength in the other provinces through expanding its support base and building coalitions, the PPP will weaken considerably. Its chairman is under-age and the co-chair will be weakened further mainly because of the rift at the top. A possible scenario is loose control at the top without a major split because the other leaders do not have the privilege of a symbolic legacy as in the case of the Bhutto progeny. It will require a strong and visionary leader with excellent management skills to put the party together under an alternative leadership which the party lacks at the moment.

While the current co-chair has taken a hit in Punjab, he has not done any better in his own province of Sindh either, because of controversial decisions and trying to launch his own set of cronies through replacing the old ones. Meanwhile, Tehrik-i-Insaf and the Jamaat-i-Islami will try to win some space. Yet, they might still not be able to provide an alternative. Under the circumstances, street power could emerge as an arbiter without the building of institutions. This is a slippery slope that we must avoid.

Fourth, there is bound to be a strengthening of the bureaucratic establishment. While the streets played a major role, the army chief and external forces that were nervous at the instability in the country provided the final push. This is not to suggest that either the army or America had conspired to weaken the president. It means that the president played a flawed game, the kind that can even inadvertently strengthen the military’s position in the state’s power politics.

The new president didn’t realise that he could not afford to engage on multiple fronts which saw rifts within his party, taking on the military through extra-institutional ventures, not strengthening existing institutions and challenging political opponents all at the same time. His strategy was to build an alternative security mechanism comprising the IB, FIA and a special anti-terror organisation, aimed at creating a balance of power internally as an institutional mechanism capable of delivering on the war on terror.

Without strengthening existing organisations such as the defence ministry, the new structure was bound to make the army insecure about his intentions as did Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Federal Security Force. Asif Zardari could still have managed had he not opened another front against his political rivals. Now, he has no one to blame but himself for creating a situation where the army has won a victory in terms of its overall image, posing yet again as a neutral arbiter.

It would not be surprising to see the state bureaucracy demand its pound of flesh by clamping down on the powerful alternative institutional mechanism that President Zardari was building. Now even the MQM may not support him the way they did earlier. The ethnic party’s leader was keen to welcome the restoration despite the fact that the MQM had left no stone unturned on May 12, 2007 to oppose the lawyers’ movement.

Eventually, the three players managing the change were the streets of Pakistan, the army and external pressure. Had he restored the chief justice after having got rid of Gen Musharraf, Asif Zardari would have earned a lot of political mileage. One wonders why he forgot so soon that people were pleasantly surprised at his initial moves after the PPP formed the government. (The media was patient with him until he started breaking his promises.) Had this restoration come at that time through an executive order, his popularity would have remained steady.

This would have given him an opportunity to make many institutional changes to strengthen political institutions and build new ones. All the while when he thought he was the best man for the job of running this state and that he had more experience than any other politician, he didn’t realise his basic flaw of not understanding that democracies in transition are strange animals that must be handled carefully.

The greatest challenge is to find the balance between the streets of Pakistan, conscious of their power to bring about change, and the state bureaucracy which is conscious of being the final arbiter once again.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.
ayesha.ibd@gmail.com

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Sarkozy or Putin?

By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 27 Mar, 2009

Why couldn’t we see our president, like Nicolas Sarkozy, as someone who was well-meaning, despite his scandalous behaviour, he asked. More recently, a Russian friend asked me why Mr Zardari could not be like Vladimir Putin — using an authoritative style of governance to control the ‘mafia’. So who is our president like — Sarkozy or Putin?

If Sarkozy is to be judged based on his propensity to raise eyebrows on account of his social behaviour, then, yes, Mr Zardari is someone with a similar style. He had warmed up to the then vice-presidential nominee in a style that most Pakistanis objected to, but perhaps that was his manner. However, the French president has other serious matters on his agenda as well.

So, what about Vladimir Putin who is considered authoritarian, eager to silence all other voices around him and keen to remain in power against all democratic norms. Given his long association with KGB, the Soviet spy agency, the Russian prime minister’s style does not come as a surprise. He was trained as a member of a coercive organisation in the communist Soviet Union. Nonetheless, there is a major difference between the two men. While using authority, which makes him popular with the rest of the world, Putin does not seem too keen to destroy the Russian bureaucracy that was the linchpin of communist power. In fact, the concern to save some state institutions is one of the reasons behind attempts to bring powerful segments of the mafia under control. This is considered critical to the survival of the Russian state.

Is Pakistan’s head of state honouring the integrity of institutions? There are times when one gets glimpses of a plan to build a new political system not dominated by forces traditionally powerful in Pakistan. This is not a bad idea. However, the approach adopted has so far not proved supportive of the aspiration to break old power centres. In fact, there is a risk that these may be strengthened. For instance, the military more than any other institution benefited from the president’s recent conflict with segments of civil society and the lawyers’ movement.

Unlike Putin or Sarkozy, who do not weaken themselves or their institutional support base, Mr Zardari’s primary dependence has been on external powers. His calculation seems to be that as long as he delivers on some counts, such as issues relating to military security, he can continue to have the support of outside players. Since the world will not tolerate a military takeover, they have an interest in strengthening a civilian regime in Pakistan even at the cost of tolerating its political inadequacies. Sources also say there was hope at the top of receiving approximately $40bn in foreign aid that would help improve the presidential image and be a strong antidote to all arguments condemning Mr Zardari as a failed leader.

One wonders if there is any realisation in Pakistan that the US will not be able to offer anything more than $7bn spread over five years and that too attached to certain conditions. In addition, there is also a possibility that weary of the political turmoil in Pakistan the international community feels too dejected with the present government and is, thus, less inclined to support it.

Considering the fact that the US and UK (as disclosed by a former British diplomat) were keen to support the PPP government over other opposition parties, especially the PML-N, before the 2008 elections, the possibility of the aforementioned thinking within the present government is not surprising. Since a lot of people in Pakistan including my milkman, hairdresser, maid and chowkidar also believe that Pakistan’s policies are made in Washington, the political and military leadership cannot be blamed for getting excited by promises of cooperation from western capitals.

After all, even western powers don’t understand that stability in Third World countries does not grow on trees or cannot be brought about through tactical political manoeuvres. Like its predecessors, the present PPP government cannot survive, at least not in the form it started out with, unless it shows an interest in building and strengthening national institutions.

However, the American emphasis is always on finding short-term solutions to complex problems by routing US regional policies through individuals who can carry out one-window operations. So, when Gen Musharraf, who was perceived as a staunch ally for a long time, couldn’t deliver, others were allowed to throw him away. The general’s predecessor, Gen Zia, was also a US favourite until Washington and Rawalpindi parted ways.

The fondness for the current Pakistani leadership may not be any different. There is also no guarantee that the US will continue to look down on the PML-N leadership. The situation is bound to get trickier with changes in the larger geo-political environment. Once the cash-strapped West finds greater challenges to its existence in Afghanistan and the South Asian region, the probability of encouraging other local partners increases. At that time if Mr Zardari’s behaviour appears as frustrating as it is now, it won’t take long for Washington to reconsider its options.

The patronage system, be it local or international, is highly destabilising for players that don’t fully appreciate the rules of the game. Under the circumstances, Asif Zardari’s survival depends on building institutions rather than killing them. Even if he loves authority, the rules of the game would build his strength as much through institutions as cronies. Perhaps, if he really seriously thought about becoming Putin he could survive.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.

ayesha.ibd@gmail.com

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Many readings of Sharia

By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 03 Apr, 2009

THE students of Jamia Hafsa want nizam-i-adl implemented in the entire country as a way out of the current crisis. They also want Taqi Usmani, their mufti, as chief qazi.

Their demands must have attracted plenty of attention and support, especially from those who feel that the new legal system in Swat is the best possible solution to the conflict there.

Some people support the Sharia in Swat for at least three reasons. First, it is believed that the Sharia alone will give ordinary people in Swat the speedy system of justice that they want. Second, since the Sharia is the demand of the Swat Taliban, they believe that it is a good idea to implement the system there while ensuring it remains disconnected from the rest of the country. Third, imposing the Sharia is not an issue because that’s what is prescribed by the 1973 Constitution according to which all laws have to be in conformity with the Sharia.

But it is worth clarifying that the 1973 Constitution stipulates that all laws conform to the Quran and Sunnah, with no mention of the Sharia. This means that Sharia was not treated on a par with the Quran and Sunnah. This also indicates that the constitution gives the right of interpretation of laws of the state to legislators acting on behalf of the people rather than dogmatic ones of the past.

Those responsible for law- and constitution-making did not depend on the Sharia for both deliberate and inadvertent reasons. There was a conscious decision to keep the state from becoming a theocracy. A theocracy was certainly not the intention of the father of the nation Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Another critical factor pertained to the larger question of which interpretation to apply.

After all, the Sharia is an interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah. A quick reading of Islamic history amply demonstrates that the rulers and the socio-cultural environment of their time equally influenced interpretations by various individuals. For instance, it is said that the Abbasids directly influenced the process of the development of religious laws, during the latter’s codification, to suit their own interests. According to Islamic scholar Tahir Wasti, some of the comparatively minor crimes then were punishable by the state. However, the bigger crime of murder was left out of this categorisation.

In Pakistan, the Sharia debate started under Ziaul Haq whose primary objective was strengthening his power rather than making society Islamic. Unfortunately, there were certain judges who helped the military dictator cheat the entire country by boosting his efforts to have in place Sharia laws that suited his interests. This in itself is indicative of the fact that the Sharia was open to interpretation.

The main purpose of any law is to bring peace and justice to society. A law becomes meaningless if it cannot do so. In Pakistan’s case, as demonstrated by Wasti through his meticulously gathered data on the implementation of the law of Qisas and Diyat in the country, there appears to be a correlation between the imposition of religious laws and increasing crime in the country, especially homicide.Since the law of evidence makes the implementation of Qisas difficult, the state had primarily depended on using the law of Diyat. This essentially meant that a crime like murder, that can have far-reaching repercussions for society at large, was deemed a private matter that could be settled through compromise.

For those, who argue that the purpose of blood money and compromise denote the spirit of forgiveness encouraged by Islam, the implementation of this law in Pakistan proved to be better suited to the interests of the powerful and did not, in fact, reflect a sense of evenhanded justice and forgiveness for all tiers of society. In many cases, the poor and weak were forced to accept a compromise. Interestingly, the system was never strongly challenged by the legal community as a whole, perhaps because a compromise could mean less work while being paid the same fee in the case of some lawyers.

Referring to the peculiar situation in Swat, could one expect any better from Sufi Mohammad and his son-in-law Fazlullah than to implement the Sharia law in a way that suited their interests? The law of Qisas is also problematic because the conditions for a witness cannot be met by most including Sufi Mohammad, Fazlullah and the rest of their crew. It seems quite likely that those people whose loved ones have been murdered by the militants will be forced to accept a compromise in the name of the Sharia.

In fact, the Swati people have little choice in the matter because the state has abdicated the right to administer justice. This is certainly not in line with the instructions of the Quran and Sunnah, which, were these to be implemented in their true spirit, would require a fundamental re-negotiation of the legal regime in Pakistan and all over the Muslim world. Other Muslim countries including Saudi Arabia are not any safer even with the implementation of religious laws by the most powerful. Ultimately, any law has to have the inherent capability to protect the individual and society at large. It is a question of debate whether religious laws in the Muslim world have been able to achieve this.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.


ayesha.ibd@gmail.com

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Social transformation

By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 10 Apr, 2009

IT is no secret that today’s Pakistan is different from what it was before the 1980s. Society’s norms are changing, especially from the perspective of women. Intolerance is slowly increasing towards working women, an issue that must be addressed.

This attitude towards women cannot be resolved simply by increasing the number of female parliamentarians. Real empowerment of women can only come about when there is strong legal protection provided to women at the workplace. In addition, it is necessary for the media to monitor the treatment of women.

The present government tried to empower women through working on some useful legislation. This year in February the cabinet approved two bills making sexual harassment at the workplace a punishable offence. The first bill mandates every public, private or semi-private organisation to have a code of conduct against sexual harassment at the workplace and to constitute a three-member committee to handle individual complaints. It establishes the authority of the said committee and related major and minor penalties.

The second bill is an amendment to the Pakistan Penal Code through Section 509A which defines sexual harassment and makes it a punishable offence. Although the bill awaits parliamentary approval, women in the country are hopeful regarding an improvement in their status.

However, there is a gap between the government’s promises and actions. This is clear from a case at the Pakistan Audit Department where a senior officer was accused of sexually harassing a female colleague under his supervision. The department’s preliminary inquiry established the charges against the officer and recommended disciplinary action against him. Later, when the department sought permission from the competent authority, which in this case was the prime minister, to proceed against the said officer, the accused requested an inquiry officer other than one from the PAD. Interestingly, this inquiry officer exonerated the accused on the basis that the complainant had not submitted a written complaint. No credence was given to the fact that the accused could not produce any witness in his favour during the proceedings while over a dozen witnesses had appeared on behalf of the prosecution.

Furthermore, the extra-departmental inquiry is in contravention of the draft bill which only provides for an independent ombudsperson for the complainant under the aegis of the National Commission for the Safety of Women if she is not getting a sympathetic hearing from her own department. What is worse, the Establishment Division is even considering the accused for promotion to BPS-21.

Given this situation, one wonders what will happen to the bill once it comes up for discussion in parliament. With the likes of Maulana Fazlur Rahman and his brother or tribal chiefs sitting in the assembly, there is the danger that they might extract major concessions from the government before the bill is finally passed. After all, parliamentarians such as Israrullah Zehri could always justify changes or their resistance to women’s empowerment on the basis of archaic tribal traditions or societal attitudes.

But then the attitude of society is something that evolves or is constructed by many factors such as the approach of policymakers, opinion-makers and others. Human agency is critical in constructing social attitudes and norms. Should we forget that a few decades ago, especially during the 1960s and the 1970s, we had a different social attitude with greater liberalism than what we see today?

Liberal society then was the result of attitudes of the critical human agency. Watching some television dramas these days will explain the changes that key sectors such as the media are bringing to society. For instance, there are plays in which we are shown love affairs between the maidservant and the master of the house. The underlying message is that the lady of the house, who is probably educated and a working woman, is not good enough when compared to the less educated or illiterate maid.

Such an exercise in perception-formation feeds into attitudes at the workplace. At the risk of generalising matters it could be said that the man or boss could begin to perceive educated women at the workplace as those who are not attending to their homes and can, hence, be mistreated.

Such representation of women in the media is also an indicator of the larger danger of a kind of radicalisation in society that has gradually begun to threaten life in the country, especially in urban centres. Given such representation, is it strange that families of working women should be threatened in Karachi, Islamabad and Lahore? The other day I was talking to a friend who was in a dilemma over not being able to send her four-year-old daughter to school as it had received threats from militants in Lahore. Taliban-type forces in all major cities threaten schools to stop educating girls else they will be bombarded.

Should civil society not do anything about it? The answer is no. Given the threat of radicalisation, civil society must congregate to protest and show its resolve to fight radical elements in society. Those claiming to be the soldiers of God should not get the right to determine the future of state and society for their own power interests. Such an exercise must go hand in hand with a movement for bringing greater justice and fairness to state institutions.

It goes without saying that change will only come about when the media adopts a more constructive attitude vis-à-vis social issues. Women constitute half this country’s population. They deserve a better work environment and treatment. Portraying those who are capable as useless creatures is nothing but a travesty of justice. Without capable women, who are protected by the legal system, state and society will not be able to grow.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.

ayesha.ibd@gmail.com

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Beyond the ‘original sin’

By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 17 Apr, 2009


THE Nizam-i-Adl Regulation 2009 has been promulgated by the NWFP government after being approved by the president at the recommendation of the National Assembly – all in the name of national security.

Many will consider this a forceful response to the Obama administration which seems to have its own plans to fight the war on terror and influence Islamabad’s behaviour.

This raises the fundamental question of whether our policymakers actually realise what path they are treading. Or as Cyril Almeida stated in his excellent article on these pages last Friday, that Pakistan is a dangerous place because it doesn’t know what to do about militancy.

Why is it important to give the US a bloody nose? Because, according to some Pakistani commentators, America is solely responsible for the bloodshed in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Had it not been for 9/11, violence of the scale in Pakistan today might not have occurred. Driven by their Pakhtun nationalism, many individuals quickly formed militant gangs to fight the invading force. As demonstrated in Afghanistan and other parts of the world, foreign invaders contribute to the acceleration of chaos in a major way. Had Washington listened to Mullah Omar and allowed him to gently deal with Osama bin Laden, there wouldn’t have been this war on terror.

In fact, America’s ‘original sin’ goes back to the 1980s when driven by its passion to give the Soviets a bloody nose in Afghanistan, the CIA partnered the ISI to create jihad and jihadis. It was the most cost-effective way of fighting the war. One cannot forget the historical photograph of American President Ronald Reagan sitting with numerous Afghan warlords in the Oval Office.

But then towards the end of the 1980s both the Soviets and Americans disappeared from the scene which was then taken over by our own armed forces. From then onwards, the jihad project was kept alive for other objectives including the fulfillment of the famous plan of ‘strategic defiance’ of the US envisioned by local military minds such as Generals Mirza Aslam Beg and Hameed Gul. The idea was to build an additional infantry force that would provide Pakistan ‘strategic depth’ in terms of Afghan manpower in case the country was ever attacked. A part of this force would be deployed at other fronts as well. At times, these jihadis were even fed through the slaughter of Pakistan’s Shia community whose members are being targeted since the 1980s.

The plan worked fine until 9/11 after which the US attack on Afghanistan opened a Pandora’s Box. The ideologically motivated elements that otherwise might have taken a bit longer to usurp Pakistani society’s breathing space, came to the surface. This was a plan gone awry because of uncontrolled exogenous factors. Until the American attack the militant forces had been slowly poisoning society in Pakistan. For instance, the killing of Shias taking place since the 1980s was not due to Pakhtun nationalism but the ideology of Ibn Taimiyah. And these forces were further strengthened once the Taliban were assisted in controlling Afghanistan, a regime that was recognised only by three states – Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Now, a combination of historical factors makes it difficult to turn the clock back. First, the war in Afghanistan continues to intensify. This does not mean that American withdrawal will change things dramatically. In fact, if the US were to leave as it left Vietnam many years ago, violence would increase, especially in the short- to medium-term.

Second, a reversal of the social transformation, which is happening rapidly in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, requires major socioeconomic development efforts. This might not happen due to the current global economic conditions.

Third, the intelligentsia is divided between the liberal and the conservative. While the latter continue to focus on America’s wrongdoings without taking into account the evolution of our own society and its responsibility in this the former bury their faces in the sand and imagine that all of this will blow over. There is hardly any willingness to question and challenge the intellectual space which the extremists have taken over. The liberals are not willing to question the religious arguments presented by the other side.

In today’s Pakistan, the common man listens to the religious right and the militants because there is no one out there willing to challenge the interpretation presented by the religious and political right. Since we do not investigate issues pertaining to religion, there is no point looking at that route. I am assuming this is what Cyril Almeida also meant when he talked about our inability to think of what is happening to us. If things continue this way, it won’t be too far when our liberal elite will have to escape to the rest of the world, just like the Afghan elite did during the 1990s.

Finally, we have a state that does not have any clue about where it wants to be in this century. People have classifications for weak states such as banana republic, a term many despise. Probably, the right term for Pakistan is the ‘jalebi republic’, circles within circles and no clarity about the future. We have a political elite which never learns from its past mistakes and is happy being protected by an outside force instead of building institutions at home; a security establishment which like an angry young man can go to any lengths to respond to a challenge to its ego; an establishment that would like to challenge the US without proper planning as to what it would do once external sources of funding, which it heavily depends on, dry up.

This is not to argue that Pakistan cannot survive without foreign aid. The poor are far more resilient than the ruling elite who, in any case, do not allow foreign aid to effectively find its way to the grass roots. So, one wonders what will this elite do once the foreign money disappears?

Last but not least, one must also mention a liberal political party that enters into deals with the Taliban. Given these conditions, the liberal elite might be better off packing their bags.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.
ayesha.ibd@gmail.com

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Fighting the hordes

By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 24 Apr, 2009

THE outcry these days is that the Taliban are now firmly in our midst. While some believe they will eventually be defeated, others are of the view that the tide of Talibanisation will wipe out everything else.
There are two important questions here: one, are the Taliban a temporary phenomenon and, two, does society have the capacity to fight them off?

The Taliban’s growing influence is no secret. The Taliban and their partners ensconced throughout the country have the capacity to weaken the state’s authority in critical parts of Pakistani territory. We are already confronted with a situation where the Taliban have established control over areas where they wield influence. This expansion has taken place over several years in small increments. And all along many of us thought that this was a one-off problem that would eventually be resolved.

In the mid-1990s we had the Taliban state in Afghanistan, then the Sufi Mohammad episode which we tried to resolve by putting him in jail. In later years, it was the Red Mosque stand-off followed by the TNSM’s resurgence in Swat along with a growing Taliban presence in other parts of the Frontier province. Now these staggered events seem to be connecting in the form of new gains for the Taliban and their numerous partners.

There are many good-hearted people who still believe that the Taliban can be defeated. Such assertions continue to be made even though our security forces have failed to gain the upper hand in Swat and other places. Call it a breach of intelligence or lack of capacity to fight an insurgency, the fact is that the state does not command the power to reclaim its territory. Unfortunately, it seems that the Taliban might win due to the combined capacity shortcomings of the security apparatus, the government and society at large.

It is clear that the political government is desperately short on the will to fight. The political actors are mired so deep in point-scoring that the primary objective has been lost. Our policymakers cannot deliberate on issues that will make or mar the Taliban’s forward march. For instance, no strategic evaluation has been undertaken of the Taliban threat and its tactical dimensions. And this applies not just to the present government but also its predecessors. The Malakand agreement and the freeing of Maulana Abdul Aziz clearly indicate this lack of capacity.

Maulana Abdul Aziz was freed on bail even though he, according to his own claim, endangered the lives of hundreds of seminary students during the military’s Red Mosque operation. The maulana’s case, in fact, dates back to 2003-04 when he was charged with sedition for issuing a fatwa considered derogatory to the armed forces and was subsequently removed from his position. He was rescued by none other than a federal minister, Ejazul Haq.

The minister took upon himself the responsibility of mending fences between the maulana and the government. So it is not surprising that a strong case was not brought against him in court to keep him behind bars longer. For those dismayed by the court’s recent decision, it would be worth noting that the judiciary has few options when the prosecution is unwilling to build a strong case.

This is not to say that the judiciary and the legal community stand absolved of responsibility. We have a judiciary that is famed for taking suo motu action. Shouldn’t then there be a judicial inquiry into the sort of environment created by the maulana for his students? Even the students’ interaction with their family members was reportedly controlled and supervised. Or what about challenging the Malakand agreement itself which is a travesty of the 1973 Constitution?

The judiciary must show more resolve than it did after the introduction of Zia’s draconian Nizam-e-Islam regulations. Then, barring a few judges such as Justice Ramday, the majority happily applied laws that trampled on all norms of justice and human rights. And let’s not forget that the legal community in general did not really resist Zia’s laws. None of the bar councils protested against laws that ultimately resulted in an increase in homicide and injustice.

As the country confronts an expansion of the Taliban, the legal community seems unable to muster the courage to launch a movement against what has happened in Swat. It is surprising that some lawyers place a higher value on the restoration of judges than on questioning the Malakand agreement which poses a greater threat to the state.

The maulana’s release sends a clear signal to men of his ilk fighting the state in Swat, Waziristan, Punjab and other places. This needs to be countered. We are in this fight together and the state envisioned by Jinnah — in which people of different castes, creeds, ethnicities and religious beliefs were to coexist — can survive only if we close ranks. Putting the blame on others and not doing our bit is not going to serve the cause. The head of state has to go beyond expecting other countries to fight his battles or capsizing to unknown pressures while signing controversial ‘peace’ deals with militants who refuse to lay down arms.

The Malakand agreement is the legal instrument that will result in the empowerment of the Taliban. These militants will not stop at Swat or even at Buner. They will not only expand their presence in the Frontier but will also move into other parts of the country. The tragedy of the present moment is that while the strength of political and human rights movements is fledgling at best, the Taliban and their ‘jihadi’ partners have increased their capacity to proliferate throughout Pakistan.

This is a time when everyone needs to stand up and not seek shelter in political expediency. As such, Mian Nawaz Sharif cannot hide behind his political deal with the PPP and support the Malakand agreement while at the same time talk about the threat posed by Talibanisation. We can fight this only if we muster the required will, develop a clear understanding of what lies ahead and then evolve a coherent implementation strategy.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.

ayesha.ibd@gmail.com

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Deadly social change

For many, the area from Mianwali to D.G. Khan and Bahawalpur should be the least likely area for Talibanisation. A closer look shows that it is not.

By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 01 May, 2009

A LOOK at today’s Pakistan does not inspire confidence in the state. In addition to the Talibanisation threat in some parts of the country, there is chaos in other areas like Balochistan where people are dissatisfied with what the state has to offer.
Then, there are those areas where there is no conflict but that have begun to look at other options because the state has little to offer. In fact, in places like Gilgit sections of the people are beginning to look north, towards China in fact, which now appears a more attractive proposition. The state and the establishment have little to offer by way of explanation except that this is a conspiracy to destroy the state.

This is not to imply that the Pakistani state does not have enemies. However, this kind of a mindset is not likely to discover solutions to the numerous problems the state faces. The establishment, the government and its functionaries are not prepared to accept that years of an unstable sociopolitical system are unlikely to have better results than the ones we see in the form of Talibanisation and political radicalisation.

Owing to space constraints I will concentrate on the threat of Talibanisation which seems to be growing beyond the Frontier province and is pres ent in south Punjab as well. It would not be surprising to see Swat’s domino effect on other parts of the country in the grip of similar sociopolitical circumstances. The influence and victory of the TNSM in Swat was due to a combination of factors such as the long absence of social transformation in the region, stagnation of the political power system, which the TNSM now claims to have changed, and the inability of political representatives to honour the mandate given to them by the public in last year’s polls. It is tragic that those who were not voted into power by the ordinary Swati are ruling Swat today. The ANP has surrendered its powers.

This model could come to be replicated in other parts such as south Punjab. For many, this area, ranging from Mianwali to D.G. Khan and Bahawalpur, should be the least likely area for Talibanisation. A closer look shows that it is not. First, it has remained a favourite breeding ground for numerous militant outfits especially those linked with the Kashmir struggle. There was not much effort to mop up this area besides superficial measures such as banning some outfits that nevertheless resurfaced under other names.

Second, this part of Punjab is prominent in terms of large landownership and a feudal lifestyle. This is also an area where feudal institutions in terms of economic power merged with political and spiritual power. So, many prominent political families are not just significant due to their wealth and political power but because they are connected to the shrines as well. The gradual institutionalising of the power of the shrine has strengthened them rather than giving some breathing space to ordinary people some of whom are moving in the direction of rabid religious ideologies. So, it is lack of understanding of this background that leads people to show surprise that south Punjab, which was considered a hub of Barelvi Islam, is moving towards Deobandi and Wahabi ideologies.

A closer look, in fact, shows that a lot of Barelvis have shifted towards other ideologies and are part of the jihad industry without abandoning their original ideology. The gap between the Barelvis and Deobandis has narrowed most peculiarly in south Punjab. Is it because of the hundreds of madressahs that mushroomed in this belt especially in the 1980s? The answer is yes and no. Yes because the new madressahs, which were different from the traditional ones in the area, introduced a more dramatic curriculum that nurtured in the students an appreciation of sectarian and ideological differences. Hence, the sectarian violence in the region, which predates the current shift, dates back to the 1980s and 1990s.

The radicalisation, including sectarian violence, represents an urge for social transformation because some prominent landowners in this area are Shia as opposed to the underdogs most of whom are Sunnis. The growing radicalisation in southern Punjab shown up in the inability of the state to carry out land reforms and shift the socioeconomic and political power structure from a pre-capitalist society to a capitalist one will have its consequences in the years to come. So while the proliferation of madressahs is part of the problem it does not explain the social development in its entirety. Not to mention that southern Punjab as a sub-region has suffered due to the gradual, reverse migration of the elite to other parts of the country creating a power vacuum that is ready to be filled by another lot.

The movement of the youth towards jihad, hence, is a warped form of social transformation in which the dispossessed youngsters have suddenly found a source of empowerment. The promise of a better life in the hereafter in which they will get hoors, a crown of jewels and have 70 individuals forgiven is something that they cannot expect in this life. Not to mention the monetary compensation their families get from militant outfits for their sacrifice. What is dangerous is that none of this is being voiced as part of social transformation. When a change takes place the bulk of the people will remain sacrificial lambs while others will replace the existing power elite as in Swat.

Sadly, no one wants to talk about Punjab because the current leadership is too engrossed in its political pragmatism to touch militant outfits. The bulk of the PML-N leadership does not have the vision to mop up the province while there is time to do so. If it were not for the political narrow-mindedness of the political elite, a clean-up in Punjab would require a well-planned police operation to be followed by the arduous task of social reconstruction. ¦ The

writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. ayesha.ibd@gmail.com

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Lost in classification

By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 08 May, 2009

THE other day a friend discussed the idea of organising a conference where social scientists would analyse the current situation in Pakistan. Her idea was to have views presented from perspectives representing the left, centre and right.

The conversation made me think if such classifications worked in this country any more. I was also reminded of an article written by a friend a few months ago arguing that a lot of liberals had joined the restoration-of-the-judiciary bandwagon along with a majority of right-wingers. The fact is that in today’s Pakistan all such older and simpler classifications are defunct. The more we look into these categories, the harder it is to make sense of where things stand.

Gone are the days when it was possible to distinguish leftists from rightists or liberals from the conservatives. In any case, it is not possible any more to come up with a single category that can describe people’s views. As such, those supporting the judiciary movement do not necessarily become rightist or leftist nor do they become liberal or conservative. Individuals, groups and parties are known to vary their positions in accordance with the issues they deal with.

Should the classification be based on how sympathetic is it to the public perspective as opposed to the establishment’s point of view? The problem then is that the public view is not something that is naturally organic but is formed by policymakers and opinion-makers. For instance, the support that is rendered to Sufi Mohammad or the Taliban in some segments of society would not make the relevant policy liberal or leftist.

But then should the classification be based on whether the particular position is secular or religious? This classification is equally defunct because how would one explain the association of parties like the ANP and the PPP with the Taliban? Is it not association when these parties support policies that will only strengthen the Taliban and not the secular forces?

The unfortunate politics of pragmatism has made things highly complex and fuzzy. It is sad that people are being forced to pick sides based on their insecurity rather than principles.

For instance, today many think of the MQM as a liberal party which will protect secular values while forgetting that the party has been accused of brutalising ordinary people or its rivals. A lot of people who once condemned the party are suddenly now convinced that Altaf Hussain might be the only source of salvation for the country.

Many might consider this commentary as a tirade against ‘liberalism’, in much the same way they objected to any criticism of the PPP or the ANP’s deals with the Taliban. However, my point is that such terms lose their meaning in a state where the government systematically surrenders its capacity to establish its writ and in fact outsources the process of safeguarding the interests of the people. Equally condemnable is the state’s inability to provide opportunities to the migrant population, the Baloch and other nationalities and give them a sense of security in the country.

When the majority of people are lost in classification, principles tend to lose all meaning. Parties and groups are striking deals on the basis of their interest to remain in power rather than anything else. Such politics is bound to deepen the chasm in the country. The most glaring example of this is the peculiar nationalist politics that is unfolding in most parts of the country.

One of the most critical developments pertains to the boxing out of Pakhtuns from urban Sindh and Punjab. Although this is not a big movement at the moment, the threat of bloodshed in Karachi aimed at pushing the Pakhtun out is a possibility. Unfortunately, no government or political party has thought about a formula for allocating political space to different communities, which may be the only way that ethnic politics, mired in conflict and violence, may be curtailed.

Similarly, we are observing greater coordination between groups from opposite ideological polls in the Frontier to protect their nationalism. It shouldn’t surprise anyone to see the ANP getting together with the mullahs and other conservative elements in support of Pakhtun nationalism. After all, the ANP’s bid to sign deals with the TNSM and condemn human rights activists that tried to highlight Taliban atrocities in Swat and other places was nothing else but Pakhtun nationalism. The Pakhtuns are not only upset with the treatment meted out to them in other parts of the country, they are also unhappy with the presence of Punjabi militants in the tribal areas and in Afghanistan.

Interestingly Punjab also considers itself a victim, which is obvious from the popular perception that there is some conspiracy by the Pakhtuns (funded by India and the US) to damage the largest province. Hence, the urgency to push out Pakhtun workers in the province. This policy of course does not appreciate that Punjab has its own share of militants that are now popularly known as the Punjabi Taliban.

Over the years, and due to the present conflict, nationalist tensions seem to have become extremely intense. What’s most amusing is that proponents of each nationalism and ideology consider their point of view to be liberal and people-friendly. Most strive to impress that they are fighting imperialism without admitting that their position adds to the strengthening of colonisation rather than achieving the reverse.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.

ayesha.ibd@gmail.com

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