The enormous resources and attention now focused on Afghanistan’s elections must be channelled into strengthening the country’s political and electoral institutions.

This report evaluates the challenges of the presidential and provincial council elections in August 2009 and suggests ways to strengthen processes and institutions in the run-up to National Assembly and district elections in 2010. In particular, outstanding constitutional questions need to be resolved, and there must be a better balance between the branches of government to ensure more equitable representation and increased accountability.

Forty-one candidates for president and over three thousand candidates for the provincial councils are evidence of continued interest in the political process. However, without due attention, these polls risk being a mere collection of separate events rather than a coordinated effort feeding into wider nation building.

“The neglect of electoral institutions and planning in the last years is symptomatic of an overall lack of institution building in Afghanistan”, says Joanna Nathan, Crisis Group Senior Analyst. “The current momentum must be used to drive strategic planning, looking forward beyond even the 2010 elections. Future polls have to be embedded in a broader democratic and institutional process”.

Elections only ever mirror wider societal trends, and the challenges that the 2009-2010 polls confront reflect the political, security and institutional developments -- and failings -- of recent years. Security conditions may make it difficult for people in areas of the south and east to exercise their franchise and could also provide the cover for mass fraud.

Technically, preparations have suffered from a failure to comprehensively build Afghan institutions, which for the first time are in sole charge of the polls, and ensure a robust legal framework and voter registry are in place to guard against fraud. Politically a highly centralised political patronage structure sees the head of state wield enormous powers, with personalities rather than policies to the fore. Such a lack of institutional development has encouraged a culture of impunity fuelling wider instability.

Ensuring the impartiality and professionalism of electoral bodies and driving security planning are essential.

“Ultimately, it is the perception of the Afghan population that will measure electoral success. If they are to be encouraged to vote, they must be confident that their ballots will count”, says Samina Ahmed, South Asia Project Director. “But if perceived to be unfairly conducted, elections could provide a potential flashpoint.”

The Sri Lankan government must reform the country’s judicial system urgently if the military defeat of the Tamil Tigers is to lead to a lasting peace.

This policy report warns that the Sri Lankan judiciary is not working in a fair and impartial way that secures justice and human rights for everyone regardless of ethnicity. This risks undermining the government’s recent military victory over the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam). A durable national reconciliation process is only possible if human and constitutional rights are fully restored.

“The judiciary has not acted as a check on presidential and legislative power but has instead contributed to the political alienation of Tamils”, says Robert Templer, Crisis Group’s Asia Program Director. “Under the former chief justice, the Supreme Court’s rulings strengthened political hardliners among Sinhala nationalist parties”.

Rather than assuaging conflict, the courts have corroded the rule of law and worsened ethnic tensions. They are neither constraining militarisation of Sri Lankan society nor protecting minority rights. Instead, a politicised bench has entrenched favoured allies, punished foes and blocked compromises with the Tamil minority. The judiciary’s intermittent interventions on important political questions have limited settlement options for the ethnic conflict.

Today, neither the lower nor the higher courts in Sri Lanka provide any guarantee of personal security or redress against arbitrary state violence. Although torture in police custody is endemic, courts are unwilling to provide adequate remedies for illegal or abusive detention. Police, judges and government officials have acted in ways that further the goals of powerful political actors, undermine the rule of law and deepen the current political and humanitarian crisis. The possibility of transitional justice, which is necessary for society to break the cycle of violence, is still missing.

The recent appointment of a new chief justice is an opportunity for reforms to begin. A first step toward restoring judicial independence would be a return to an orderly appointment and transfer of judges. This needs to be done both in the lower and appellate judiciary. There should also be fundamental reform of Sri Lanka’s extensive and often abused emergency laws, which are used disproportionately against Tamils. Provisions in the emergency laws concerning arrest, detention and derogation from routine criminal procedures need to be removed, as well as those that criminalise free speech and the exercise of associational rights.

“Fixing institutions and reforming laws will only have a limited effect until political actors, and especially the presidency, feel the cost of infringing on judicial independence”, warns Donald Steinberg, Crisis Group Deputy President for Policy. “Without a concerted effort by the bench and bar, the political costs of interfering with the judiciary will remain minimal”.

__________________
Long Live my Homeland

Iraqi leaders and the U.S. must manage increasing tensions between the Baghdad federal government and Kurdish authorities or face deadly violence following the U.S. troop withdrawal.

This report warns that a new and potentially destructive ethnic conflict has arisen between the Iraqi federal and Kurdistan’s regional government. In particular, tensions have been building steadily along a new, undemarcated “trigger line”, a curve stretching from the Syrian to the Iranian border, where at multiple places the Iraqi army and Kurdish fighters known as peshmergas are arrayed in opposing formations. Both sides have been manoeuvring to gain political, military and territorial advantage before the U.S. withdrawal.

“To prevent an outbreak of deadly ethnic conflict after it pulls out its forces, Washington should craft an exit strategy that encourages Iraqis to reach a series of bargains on power, resources and territory”, says Joost Hiltermann, Deputy Director of Crisis Group’s Middle East and North Africa Program. “The Obama administration should make sure that the peace it leaves behind is sustainable, lest Bush’s war of choice turn into its own war of necessity”.

The conflict is centred on disputed territories, especially Kirkuk, which hosts a mix of populations, as well as untold reserves of oil and gas. Amid increased tensions and without the U.S. presence, some Iraqis, including Kurdish leaders, could seek outside protection, thus potentially regionalising the conflict.

The U.S. must draw down its forces responsibly, leaving in place a clear arrangement agreed by the federal Iraqi and Kurdistan regional governments. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) should facilitate negotiations between the two parties with muscular U.S. backing.

The ultimate deal, as Crisis Group has consistently argued, should comprise a federal hydrocarbons law, a settlement over Kirkuk and other disputed territories and agreement over the division of powers that jointly would pave the way for consensus on amending the constitution. In the interim, the U.S. and UN should help Baghdad and Erbil to improve their mutual communications and security cooperation in disputed territories and persuade them to refrain from unilateral steps along the trigger line.

“President Obama’s late June decision to appoint Vice President Joseph Biden as his informal special envoy for Iraq and the latter’s subsequent visit to Baghdad point in the right direction”, says Robert Malley, Director of Crisis Group’s Middle East and North Africa Program. “The challenge now for Washington is to display determination, persistence and follow-through”.

__________________
Long Live my Homeland

Mostar, the largest city in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a Croat majority will face new and potentially dangerous strains if its leaders do not break a deadlock that has paralysed its government for nine months.

This briefing from the ICG, warns that the administration of that city is breaking down, with no mayor, budget or functioning city council since an October 2008 election. The tensions threaten to poison relations between the leading Bosniak and Croat parties -- coalition partners throughout the country.

The High Representative, the international executive authority, should facilitate a solution consistent with the intent of the disputed statute but not impose it on the city council, which has both responsibility and competence to resolve the crisis.

“The crisis is rooted in demographics, the recent war and a city statute that replicates many of the power-sharing rules that govern the state”, says Marko Prelec, Crisis Group Balkans Project Director. “It should be a warning for the country”.

Mostar’s ethnic structure and political landscape are similar to Bosnia’s, but with the players reversed. Croats are the majority, and the city is important for their community statewide. Bosniaks struggle for equal treatment in the city’s political and economic decision making but also for attention from their Sarajevo leaders, whose focus is on other issues.

The breakdown of Mostar’s internationally-imposed government shows what happens to a consensus system without inter-ethnic agreement. The first part of the solution is election of the mayor. The city council should adopt the statute and, if necessary to remove remaining ambiguity, amend it to avoid a similar deadlock. But that should be only the beginning. The council must guarantee all communities a real voice in government and an equitable share in Mostar’s development.

Mostar’s Croat majority seeks to force the High Representative to impose a solution on its behalf. But use of his special “Bonn powers” should be restricted to the most extraordinary situations: use on a matter the council should handle would perpetuate a culture of dependence. The international community should make clear that fourteen years after the end of their war, it is time for the Bosnians to take responsibility for their own futures.

“The leaders of Mostar, like those of the whole country, will have to assume full responsibility for their governance”, says Sabine Freizer, Crisis Group’s Europe Program Director. “Bosnians must show political maturity to run their own affairs”.

__________________
Long Live my Homeland

The peace process in Burundi has made considerable progress in recent months, but its further consolidation is necessary for successful presidential elections in 2010 and to put a permanent end to the threat of armed conflict.

This ICG report examines the peace process and what could still threaten it. There have been encouraging developments. Since last December, the former rebels of the National Forces of Liberation (FNL) have met legal requirements by dropping the ethnic reference “Hutu” from their name. They have integrated some of their combatants into the security forces, demobilised others and registered as a political party.

There are, however, reasons for concern. Burundi is not yet free of violence. The former rebels have not turned in all their arms, and like the party in power, the CNDD-FDD, they seem ready to use any means, including violence, to win the 2010 elections. The government accuses the FNL of abusing the population, while the former rebels say the authorities subject them to persecution and arrest.

To preserve the peace process, the FNL must stop levying illegal taxes, mistreating civilians and using violence against local officials. For their part, the authorities must end arbitrary arrests, prolonged detentions and improper treatment of FNL supporters.

“If the peace process is to continue and the elections in 2010 to be held successfully, both the FNL and the government must renounce violence and respect the individual and political rights of others”, says François Grignon, Crisis Group’s Africa Program Director. “Moreover, they must play by the rules and not resort to illegal means to bolster their political position”.

Recent positive developments are in part linked to the involvement of regional states and the broader international community. The Partnership for Peace in Burundi, a new mechanism, chaired by South Africa and including the UN, the African Union, Uganda and Tanzania, can play a key role in keeping the peace process moving forward. It should take responsibility for mobilising regional states and the broader international community and for proposing sanctions or other corrective measures as needed.

“The Partnership is an appropriate mechanism for playing a key international role in helping the Burundian parties to consolidate the progress to date”, says James Yellin, Crisis Group’s Central Africa Project Director. “But, of course, the Burundians themselves bear the fundamental responsibility for both the progress and problems and for ensuring that the peace process remains on track”.

__________________
Long Live my Homeland

If its government does not enact meaningful reforms and reach out to all clans, Puntland may break up violently, adding to the chaos in Somalia.

This latest briefing from the ICG, warns about the rise in insecurity and political tension that the semi-autonomous north-eastern region has been experiencing for three years. At its roots are poor governance and a collapse of the cohesion, particularly within the Harti clan, that led to its creation a decade ago.

“Most of the blame rests squarely with the political leadership”, says Daniela Kroslak, Deputy Director of Crisis Group’s Africa Program. “If a wide variety of grievances are not urgently tackled in a comprehensive manner, the consequences could be severe for the whole country and even for the Horn of Africa”.

Puntland’s creation in 1998 was an ambitious experiment to build from the bottom up a polity that might ultimately offer a template for replication in the rest of the country, especially in the war-scarred south. But the dream has faded, and the regime is in dire straits. Intra-Harti friction has eroded the consensual style of politics that once underpinned a relative stability. In a major policy shift from the traditional unionist position, an important segment of the elite is pushing for independence.

Puntland needs to return to its original consensual style of politics. This requires reforming the electoral system, restarting the constitutional drafting process, tackling corruption and rebuilding clan trust.

The Puntland government must take advantage of current international attention resulting mainly from the explosion of piracy in the nearby waters to mobilise funds and expertise to carry out comprehensive political, economic and institutional reforms. These should address the fundamental problems: poor governance, corruption, unemployment and the grinding poverty in coastal villages. Donors need to refocus on long-term measures without which no sustainable end to piracy or true stability is possible.

“The piracy problem is only a dramatic symptom”, says Ernst Jan Hogendoorn, Crisis Group’s Horn of Africa Project Director. “If the deeper problems are not addressed, they could ultimately lead to Puntland’s disintegration or possible overthrow by an underground militant Islamist movement”.

__________________
Long Live my Homeland

Nepal’s major political players must rebuild their common purpose, bringing the Maoists back into government to prevent a possible return to conflict.

This report from the ICG, warns of the deteriorating political situation after the fall of the Maoist-led government in May 2009. The collapse of consensus and widening rifts between the major players have fuelled a more militaristic atmosphere. Meanwhile, the grounds for compromise have become narrower.

“The recent upheaval reflects a deeper malaise underlying the political settlement”, says Rhoderick Chalmers, Crisis Group’s South Asia Deputy Project Director. “Political leaders have forgotten the spirit of the peace deal and risk betraying popular aspirations”.

The Maoists faced a mess largely of their own making. Ineffective in office, they had alienated powerful constituencies while failing to assuage doubts over their commitment to political pluralism and non-violence. Nevertheless, they still have significant support and a coherent agenda for change.

The army has adopted a more overt and assertive political role. It not only survived the republican transition but has thrived as an unreformed and largely autonomous force. Helped by timorous parties, it has retained its full strength and pressed for new lethal arms imports – in breach of the ceasefire.

Behind much of the recent instability lies an Indian change of course. New Delhi took bold steps to drive the peace process but had trouble digesting the Maoist victory in the April 2008 constituent assembly election. Its increasingly naked interventions to force a Maoist change of course are ill thought out. India risks harming the peace process and undermining its own interests.

Kathmandu’s political games look increasingly detached from the country’s complex, pressing problems. The constitution-writing process is behind schedule and losing credibility; many disaffected groups prefer to take their protests to the streets. Public security and local governance are alarmingly weak. Tough economic times are only exacerbating Nepal’s huge inequality and stalled development.

The Maoists’ strategic debates are unresolved but their marginalisation will not strengthen the case for peace. The established parties should lead by example and constructively support a transition that demands change on all sides. There is no viable alternative to reviving the spirit of consensus and compromise that peace requires.

“All parties, civil society and the international community urgently need to concentrate on completing the new constitution”, says Robert Templer, Crisis Group’s Asia Program Director. “If not, they may squander the legacy of a promising process”.

__________________
Long Live my Homeland

If the Chadian government wants to avoid further impoverishment and destabilisation of the country, it must reform its management of oil revenues.

This briefing from the ICG, examines the exploitation of oil revenues. Since 2003 they have contributed greatly to the deterioration of governance in Chad and to a succession of rebellions and political crises. The regime uses the revenues as a means to reward its cronies, co-opt members of the political class, and acquire the military means enabling it to reject genuine political negotiations. This has further limited space for the political opposition and civil society and helped keep the country in a state of political paralysis, stoking the antagonism between regime and opponents.

“There is recurrent political instability that is likely to undermine efforts to use oil for the benefit of the country”, says James Yellin, Crisis Group’s Central Africa Project Director. “For the people who have not seen their lives improve and who are subjected to increased corruption, oil is far from being a blessing”.

The increase in petroleum prices in 2007 provided the Déby regime with sufficient resources to undertake large public works projects. Advertised as a policy to modernise the country through petroleum revenues, these projects led in 2008 to a deep and structural budget deficit that is likely to persist over the long term. Moreover, the opaque awarding of public works contracts increased cronyism and corruption.

To escape this vicious circle and create the conditions needed for durable stability, the government must work to establish a national consensus on the management of oil revenues. Stronger control and oversight over the oil revenues management mechanism should be put in place in order to address the plague of political patronage and favouritism. The emphasis given to military solutions for the resolution of political problems must stop. The political dialogue which started in 2007 should help create this national consensus, with the political opposition, civil society and representatives of Chad’s oil-producing regions.

“The hope aroused by the discovery of petroleum has given way to generalised disenchantment”, says Daniela Kroslak, Crisis Group’s Africa Program Deputy Director. “The principal external partners of Chad – France, the United States and China – need to condition their support for the regime to the creation of a national consensus on the management of oil revenues”.

__________________
Long Live my Homeland

The 17 July 2009 Jakarta hotel bombings have produced calls for a strengthened security apparatus and harsher laws, but the more urgent priority is to understand the terrorists’ local support base and target government programs accordingly.

This report from the ICG, examines the backgrounds of those arrested, killed or on the run in connection with the July attacks. It looks at how individuals close to Noordin Top, self-styled leader of al-Qaeda Indonesia, draw on their friends, family, co-workers and schoolmates to expand the local support network.

“Most Indonesians are outraged by terrorist attacks on civilians, but the ideology that legitimises those attacks is hard to eradicate”, says Sidney Jones, Crisis Group’s Senior Adviser to the Asia Program. “One individual with the right contacts can create a security cordon for Noordin that extends to several different towns and villages”.

The report looks at the information made public thus far about the men involved in the 17 July bombings and the possible role of Middle Eastern funding. In this operation, Noordin Top seems to have relied on an inner circle of long-term Jemaah Islamiyah associates, each of whom brought new people into the mix. One family in particular has emerged as pivotal, with four members deeply involved in the plot. By recruiting just one of them, Noordin got access to the others and to a wealth of skills and contacts.

The report also looks at some of the institutional foundations of Noordin’s support base, including JI schools, local mosques where jihadi preachers have managed to recruit local youth, and Islamic medicine clinics. The government has not come up with a plan for addressing the problems posed by the schools in particular, says Crisis Group, but the answer is not closing them down – it is rather providing much more intensive oversight than is currently taking place. Public information campaigns in vulnerable villages, greater information-sharing among security agencies, and improved pre- and post-release monitoring of “high risk” prisoners are needed as well.

“When the police investigation of these attacks is finally finished, an independent evaluation of lessons learned would be desirable”, says Jim Della-Giacoma, South East Asia Project Director. “The immediate task, however, is to capture Noordin and the other suspects – alive if possible”.

__________________
Long Live my Homeland

If the Afghan government wants to prevent further internal violence and regional instability, it must urgently address the needs of the returning refugees and those in neighbouring countries.

This ICG report examines the renewed population displacement and the consequences of the government’s inability to ensure security and basic services for the returnees. Approximately three million registered refugees still remain in Iran and Pakistan alone, while five million Afghans have returned home. Population displacement, secondary migration and a decrease in returns from exile are causes and consequences of the state’s shortcomings. Meeting the needs of repatriating families will be a litmus test for Kabul’s ability to govern. This includes security issues, overcoming obstacles to return and tackling the continued refugee presence abroad.

“Ensuring regional peace and stability is vital for addressing the needs of Afghanistan’s mobile population”, says Candace Rondeaux, Crisis Group Senior Analyst. “Liberalising mobility and strengthening administrative control over border crossings are essential to prevent further deterioration of the conflict”.

With the rural areas increasingly insecure, many returning Afghans have migrated to towns and cities. This is causing rapid urbanisation which contributes to rising poverty, unemployment and criminality. Young, displaced and unemployed men are particularly vulnerable to recruitment by the insurgency. Land disputes risk sparking deep-rooted tribal, ethnic or sectarian violence. In addition, the shortcomings of the government services compel many Afghans to rely on their informal solidarity networks and patron-client relations. These further undercut the establishment of a durable state-citizen relationship. It is urgent to address the needs of a fast-growing poor and largely marginalised population.

The prolonged refugee presence and the persistence of unchecked cross-border movements have increased Pakistan’s and Iran’s leverage over their neighbour. Migrants and terrorist networks often use the same transport routes, making it difficult to distinguish the two. As a result, Tehran and Islamabad are inclined to seal their borders and pressure the millions of remaining Afghan refugees to return home. With Pakistan and Iran toughening their stance, the threat of mass deportations strains Kabul’s relations with both countries. If carried out, such deportations would further destabilise the already fragile state.

“The governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran must explore legal and political channels to liberalise and enable regional mobility”, says Samina Ahmed, Crisis Group’s South Asia Project Director. “Such approaches can only succeed if they are strongly endorsed by the international community and made an integral part of peace building in the region”.

__________________
Long Live my Homeland