If military rule in Guinea is not rapidly ended, there is a serious risk the country will slide into a civil war that could destabilise all West Africa.

This ICG report focuses on the events of 28 September – when security forces killed at least 160 people in a crackdown on opposition to the military regime – and their implications for the stability of the country and the sub-region. It discusses dangerous fractures within the military and signs that various members are raising ethnic militias, warns that Guineans will not accept an attempt by the army to remain in power and calls for the end of military rule and a re-opening of the democratic transition process.

“The mood on the street is hardening against the junta”, says Richard Moncrieff, Crisis Group’s West Africa Project Director. “The Guineans are desperate for democratic change and an end to economic misery, while security forces are ready to use lethal force to remain in control. Worse trouble is likely unless combined domestic and international pressure is applied to force the soldiers from power”.

The junta, the National Council for Democracy and Development (Conseil national pour la démocratie et le développement, CNDD), seized power in December 2008 following the death of Guinea’s long-time autocratic ruler, Lansana Conté. Since then, it has steadily consolidated its grip on power despite widespread opposition. The tragic events of 28 September, which included widespread sexual violence against women, came after a breakdown in dialogue over the democratic transition process and increasing indications that junta leader Dadis Camara intends to seek the presidency in the January 2010 election in violation of the commitment he and his fellow junta members gave at the beginning of the year.

The junta must drop any plans to contest the elections in any form. It should agree to a handover to a civilian coalition government that includes representation from the Forces Vives, the umbrella group of opposition parties and civil society, and accept the offer by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to mediate talks on its exit from power.

ECOWAS, which has named Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaoré to mediate, should consider sending an exploratory military mission to establish requirements for stabilising the country. The UN Secretary-General should dispatch the Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial Killings to investigate the 28 September massacre. If the junta digs in, the international community must isolate it by imposing targeted sanctions on CNDD members and key supporters. It should also begin contingency planning with ECOWAS for a rapid regional military intervention should the situation deteriorate further.

“It is urgent to devise an exit strategy for the junta,” says Crisis Group’s Africa Program Director, François Grignon. “Unless immediate and concerted efforts are made by the Forces Vives and the international community to wrest the transition process away from the military, further violence threatens first Guinea and then its neighbourhood, which is just beginning to recover from years of civil war”.

The military operation in South Waziristan is unlikely to succeed in curbing the spread of religious militancy in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), unless the Pakistan government implements political reforms in that part of the country.

This ICG report examines the Talibanisation in FATA, and argues that only reforms that encourage political diversity, enhance economic opportunity, and guarantee civil and political rights will address the problem. So far, short-sighted military policies have aggravated the conflict’s impact on inhabitants and fuelled Islamic militancy. The consequences are dramatic: over one million people, i.e. one third of FATA’s population, have been displaced, and the numbers are growing. Militancy and heavy-handed military force have destroyed an already deficient infrastructure and hindered business opportunities.

“FATA belies the military’s claims of successfully countering Islamist militant networks”, says Samina Ahmed, Crisis Group’s South Asia Project Director. “The state should rather counter religious extremism by extending constitutional rights and expanding economic opportunity”.

FATA, a tribal belt bordering Afghanistan, has been tenuously governed since independence, due to deliberate policy, rather than Pashtun tribal resistance. The region is ruled by the colonial-era Frontier Crimes Regulations. These are laws that allow the federally appointed political agent to arrest individuals or punish entire tribes for crimes committed on their territory, fuelling resentment among locals and hindering the region’s economic growth. Both the administration and judicial system rely on tribal chiefs, many of whom accept the authority of militant leaders. Thus, public sector development tends to be channelled towards local and religious elites. Poorly-trained, underpaid militias further undermine the rule of law.

On 14 August 2009, President Zardari announced a reform package that curtails the political administration’s arbitrary judicial and financial powers. While this is a step forward, further measures are needed to end the region’s ambiguous constitutional status. Pakistan’s government must repeal the Frontier Crimes Regulations, incorporate the region into the provincial and national justice system, and replace tribal militias with the national police. Economic growth needs to be encouraged by developing infrastructures and education opportunities.

The U.S. and the international community should combine aid with a robust dialogue on institutional reform. They may enhance the region’s development by supporting specialised economic zones that tap FATA’s indigenous resources. Finally, the military should be pressured to allow humanitarian access to the conflict zones, and to prevent the region from being used by extremist groups.

“The state’s failure to provide basic services and support economic opportunity is contributing to the growth of the insurgency”, says Robert Templer, Crisis Group’s Asia Program Director. “Only long-term political and legal reforms that extend the law of the land to FATA will reverse this tendency”.

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CrisisWatch N°75, 1 November 2009

Three actual or potential conflict situations around the world deteriorated and four improved in October 2009, according to the new issue of the International Crisis Group’s monthly bulletin CrisisWatch, released today.

In Pakistan, a military ground operation against Taliban strongholds in South Waziristan triggered a new wave of displacement and was surrounded by a brutal escalation in militant attacks across the country. At least 200,000 have been forced to flee fighting in the northwest region amid reports the military is impeding humanitarian access. Attacks elsewhere left hundreds dead, with over 100 killed in bombings targeting a market in Peshawar on 28 October.

In Iraq, over 150 were killed when several massive explosions struck government buildings in heavily-guarded central Baghdad for the second time in three months. Progress towards national elections scheduled for January 2010 also faltered, as parliamentarians failed to reach agreement on a crucial electoral law. The situation also deteriorated in Zimbabwe, as Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai disengaged from the unity government to protest stalled implementation of September 2008’s power-sharing deal. While Tsvangirai has stopped short of withdrawing from the government, the move has underscored risks attendant to the current political impasse between the power-sharing partners.

Hopes for peace in Nigeria’s Niger Delta increased, as thousands of militants laid down arms in response to the government’s three-month amnesty program and the dominant militant group MEND announced a new indefinite ceasefire. Whilst these are significant steps forward, concerns for stability in the region remain, including the government’s capacity to deliver reintegration programs and prospects for much-needed development.

In Honduras, a late month deal between the de facto government and ousted President Zelaya increased chances for an end to the political crisis that has gripped the country since the 28 June coup. The deal awaits approval by the country’s Supreme Court and Congress, and would see Zelaya reinstated as president under an interim power-sharing government. A new peace agreement between Tuareg rebels and the government in Mali consolidated progress towards an end to the long-running conflict in the north and resulted in agreement from elusive rebel leader Ibrahim Ag Bahanga to disarm.

Armenia and Turkey took a further step towards normalising relations, following the signing of draft protocols on 10 October restoring diplomatic ties and opening their common border. Both parliaments now need to ratify the accord, and Crisis Group identifies the situation as a conflict resolution opportunity.

Crisis Group identifies a conflict risk alert for Afghanistan, as the country heads towards a crucial second-round run-off scheduled for 7 November following highly flawed presidential polls in August. Political uncertainty increased considerably as CrisisWatch went to press, as incumbent president Hamid Karzai’s opponent Abdullah Abdullah withdrew from the race over risks of electoral malpractice. A second disputed election risks further eroding confidence in Afghanistan’s electoral process and strengthening the hand of Taliban insurgents. Urgent action is required to ensure accountability for electoral fraud during the first round and to push forward key governance reforms.

October 2009 TRENDS

Deteriorated Situations
Iraq, Pakistan, Zimbabwe

Improved Situations
Armenia/Turkey, Honduras, Mali, Nigeria

Unchanged Situations
Afghanistan, Algeria, Armenia, Armenia/Turkey, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Basque Country (Spain), Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chechnya (Russia), China (internal), Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, India (non-Kashmir), Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Macedonia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, Myanmar/Burma, Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, North Caucasus (non-Chechnya), Northern Ireland, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Western Sahara, Yemen, Zimbabwe


November 2009 OUTLOOK

Conflict Risk Alert
Afghanistan

Conflict Resolution Opportunity
Armenia/Turkey

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The stalled electoral process has plunged Somaliland into a serious political crisis that presents yet another risk of destabilisation in the region.

This ICG report examines what stalled democratisation could mean. It concludes that politicians must finally uphold the constitution, abide by electoral laws and adhere to inter-party agreements if the region, which seeks independence from Somalia, is to hold genuinely free and fair elections in 2010. Otherwise, there is a risk that hard-earned stability will be lost as clan militias remobilise.

“President Rayale and his ruling party have benefited from more than a year-and-a-half of additional time in power”, says E.J. Hogendoorn, Crisis Group’s Horn of Africa Project Director. “But all the political stakeholders are in some way responsible for the selection and continuation of an incompetent electoral commission, widespread fraud during voter registration, frequent skirting of the constitution and failure to institutionalise democratic practices”.

The current crises stems from repeated rescheduling of elections despite the expiration of President Rayale’s term in May 2008. The elections due in September 2009 were suspended because both opposition parties planned boycotts after the electoral commission said they would proceed even though massive fraud made the voter registration list unusable. The parties were brought back from the precipice by agreement to delay the vote, revamp the electoral commission and refine the list.

Improving the political culture will be a long-term, internal process but extensive electoral reforms must be implemented urgently. As a start the electoral commission and the voter registrar need to be professionalised and depoliticised. The new commissioners must focus on preventing electoral fraud, working with international experts to choose a date for the next election and identifying problems with the current electoral list. As a priority, they must hire a competent, impartial registrar. Then the electoral laws and agreements must be adhered strictly by both political parties and voters.

Elections should also be held for both the House of Representatives and district councils in 2010. The constitution calls for selection of the Guurti, the non-elected, clan-nominated upper house of the parliament, every six years but does not say how this is to take place. This must be defined urgently. International partners should keep a close watch on developments and sustain pressure for truly free and fair general elections next year.

“Somaliland has made genuine progress in its democratic transformation, but political wrangling has corrupted governing institutions and undermined the rule of law”, explains Daniela Kroslak, Crisis Group’s Africa Program Deputy Director. “Its democratic process needs to be institutionalised. If not, non-violent means to resolve conflict could be replaced by the remobilisation of the militias and a risk of a return to civil war”.

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Damascus/Washington/Brussels, 14 December 2009: Syria’s foreign policy has long been a contradictory mix of militancy and pragmatism, but new dynamics create opportunities for the U.S. if it does more to deepen its engagement.

This ICG report examines changes in Damascus’s outlook and concludes that further shifts will hinge on the regime’s assessment of the costs – in terms of domestic stability and regional standing – of its choices. That, in turn, largely will depend on what other parties do.

“At the heart of the problem is a profound mismatch of expectations”, explains Peter Harling, Crisis Group’s Iraq, Syria and Lebanon Project Director. “The West wants Syria to fundamentally alter its policies – loosen or cut ties to its allies and sign peace with Israel – as a means of stabilising the region. Syria, before contemplating any fundamental shift, wants to know where the region is headed and whether its own interests will be secured”.

Despite a turbulent and often hostile neighbourhood, the Syrian regime has proved remarkably resilient. Still, on virtually all fronts, it can see hazard. The economy is wobbly; to prosper, it will require significant reforms and massive investment. Regime policies have done little to stem Islamist sympathies that chip away at its secular foundation. The potential for domestic spillover of regional tensions – the spread of sectarianism, stalemate in the Arab-Israeli peace process and threat of confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program – is real. As a result, while Damascus is keen to maintain close ties with Tehran, it has sought to rebalance them through new alliances that broaden its strategic portfolio.

This is an opportunity to be seized, but to do so the U.S. and Syria need to devise a diplomatic process through which both test their intentions, promote their interests and start shaping the Middle East in ways that can reassure Damascus about the future. This should start around realistic goals that could include containing Iran in arenas such as Iraq or Yemen; cooperating to encourage national reconciliation in Iraq; and encouraging the Lebanese government to insulate itself from the regional tug-of-war by refocusing on governance. Washington and Damascus could also work together by combining Syrian efforts to restrain Hamas with a more welcoming U.S. approach to intra-Palestinian reconciliation.

“The U.S. is looking for evidence that, at the end of the day, Syria is prepared to cooperate on regional issues”, says Robert Malley, Crisis Group’s Middle East Program Director. “But so too is Syria – in its case, for proof that the risks it takes will be offset by the gains it makes. The region’s volatility drives it to caution and to hedge its bets pending greater clarity on where the region is heading and, in particular, what Washington is prepared to do”.

Crisis Group will analyse changes in Syria’s regional approach and prospects for improved relations with Washington in further detail in a companion report to be published shortly.

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If the international community does not step in to ensure full implementation of Sudan’s North-South peace deal and shore up other failing centre-periphery agreements, the country risks a return to all-out civil war.

This ICG report examines the situation in the run-up to national elections due next year and the early 2011 referendum on self-determination in the South. It concludes that key elements of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ended the two-decades-long civil war between North and South Sudan, have not been implemented. The failure to foster democratic transformation in the North has also undermined the chances for political settlement in Darfur and exacerbated tensions in other parts of the country.

“Sudan is sliding towards violent breakup, and time is running out” says Fouad Hikmat, Crisis Group’s Sudan Adviser. “Less than thirteen months remain to ensure that national elections and the South’s self-determination referendum lead to democratic transformation and stability in the country”.

The current negotiations between President Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) cannot achieve an all-Sudan peace. Both want elections but for the wrong reasons. Bashir’s party wants to re-establish its political legitimacy, the SPLM to ensure that the referendum, which must be no later than 9 January 2011, goes ahead. The situation is the more urgent because national unity is no longer attractive to Southerners. The referendum will almost certainly decide for independence, despite the difficulties of establishing a stable, viable separate state.

It is essential to move rapidly on a number of fronts. The CPA provides the overall political framework but lacks inclusivity. Parties must negotiate an additional protocol to address a number of issues as a matter of urgency. The Khartoum government must also implement a number of legal reforms to ensure a free and fair national election process. A Darfur peace agreement that allows all Darfuris to vote in the national elections is a priority. The elections, due in April 2010, should be postponed to November to allow all this to take place. Crucially, the NCP and SPLM must negotiate framework arrangements early in 2010 for how the two highly interdependent states will relate to each other.

With the sides drifting apart and still no Darfur solution, the role of outside actors is critical. The international community should support selection of a prominent lead mediator to facilitate negotiations that reconcile the several peace processes. He or she should mobilise commitment to give the parties economic and political incentives to cooperate but also to isolate and sanction recalcitrant parties.

Progress should be monitored so a decision can be taken no later than July whether the full agenda can be maintained. If not, it will be necessary to concentrate on achieving the minimum needed to prevent new deadly chaos: the South’s referendum on schedule, with a day-after arrangement in place.

“The challenge is to craft a process that produces credible and fair elections, an on-schedule referendum and, if its decision is independence, two economically viable and stable democratic states,” says François Grignon, Crisis Group’s Africa Program Director. “Democratic transformation should remain a key goal, as ultimately only this can entrench peace and stability”.

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The international outrage generated by last month’s massacre in Maguindanao, southern Philippines, of 57 men and women, half of them journalists, may offer opportunities to make progress in the areas of justice, security and peace.

This ICG report shows how the 23 November killings were not the result of a clan feud, as widely reported, but of Manila’s deliberate nurturing of a ruthless warlord in exchange for votes.

“To call it a feud is to diminish the Arroyo administration’s role in allowing a local despot to indulge his greed and ambition, including through building up a private army in the name of fighting insurgents”, says Sidney Jones, Senior Adviser to Crisis Group’s Asia program.

The immediate trigger for the killings was the decision of one man, Esmail “Toto” Mangudadatu, to run for governor of Maguindanao province, which for the last decade has been the fiefdom of the Ampatuan family. Political patronage of the Ampatuans by successive governments in Manila allowed them to amass absolute power, including the possession of a private arsenal that included mortars, rocket launchers and state-of-the-art assault rifles. The family either controlled or had terrified into submission the police, the courts, and the local election commission. Andal Ampatuan Sr is believed to have given the order for the killings. His son, Andal Jr, who has now been indicted for multiple murder, is suspected of carrying it out, with about 100 armed followers.

The government now has three urgent tasks. The first is to see that justice is done by trying and convicting the killers as expeditiously as possible. The second is to improve security by ending private and local funding for civilian auxiliaries to the police and military and asserting far more control over procurement and issuance of firearms. The third is to ensure the peace process with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) moves forward. It was on the pretext of fighting the MILF that the Ampatuans built their private force.

“The massacre has opened opportunities to move forward on all these fronts”, says Jim Della-Giacoma, South East Asia Project Director. “The tragedy of the killings will only be compounded if those opportunities are not pursued”.

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The recent tightening of economic sanctions, compounded with domestic problems, could trigger North Korean instability as the country’s human security tragedy continues to deteriorate.

This ICG report warns that although it appears stable on the outside, the regime has been shaken by tough international sanctions, several domestic challenges and the consequences of its own extremely poor policy choices. The internal problems could have unanticipated implications for regional and wider international security.

“Pyongyang is facing several domestic problems that in isolation would each be manageable but together could threaten regime survival”, says Daniel Pinkston, North East Asia Deputy Project director. “The North Korean government has demonstrated an extraordinary ability to survive, but the regime is under extreme pressure when it must also deal with looming succession issues”.

Foreign exchange sources are dwindling, while humanitarian assistance, which feeds millions of North Koreans, has declined due to political factors and donor fatigue. In addition to international sanctions, Pyongyang is trying to cope with the pressures resulting from its disastrous currency reform, chronic and deteriorating food security problem and collapsed public health system. The balance of power on the Korean Peninsula has shifted against Pyongyang, and the country’s leadership is not likely to start a war it knows it would lose. However, its motivation to survive could lead it to engage in more dangerous proliferation activities when other sources of foreign exchange are no longer available.

Human security has been a long-term crisis in North Korea, with human rights abuses and economic deprivation widely documented, but the international community has no effective policy instruments to produce improvements. The regime is adept at transferring the costs of sanctions to the weakest segments of society.

Although Pyongyang’s opaque policymaking process makes it nearly impossible to understand regime motivations, the pressures of cascading and overlapping mini crises are unmistakable. For now, the state security apparatus and the barriers to collective action make a “revolution from below” impossible. But despite the loyalty of elites in the party and the military, a sudden split in the leadership, although unlikely, is not out of the question.

“Instability, a coup d’état or even regime collapse would not be observable from the outside until well underway”, says Robert Templer, Crisis Group’s Asia Program Director, “and any of these scenarios could create a humanitarian emergency that might require international intervention”.

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Long Live my Homeland