Living with delusions
Daily Times.
By Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi.


It was not surprising that the followers of Sufi Muhammad celebrated parliamentary approval of a sharia-based judicial system for Swat.

This was the realisation of their struggle, launched in the early nineties. Their success did not owe to the genuineness of their demands; rather, having failed to restrain militant groups in the Swat area, Pakistan’s federal and provincial governments accepted their demands hoping that it would reduce violence and give some space to wrest the political and administrative initiative from various militant groups. Official circles thought that if they succeed in co-opting Sufi Mohammad’s TNSM, militancy will be weakened.

Sufi Muhammad was not directly involved in the current violence, but this cannot be said of all of his followers, who have overlapping affiliations with militant groups. Further, the Sufi was in detention until last year, which made it difficult for him to lead the Islamist militant movement in Swat.

By the time he was released under an agreement to stay away from violence, other groups, especially those working under the warlord Fazlullah, had entrenched themselves. Sufi Muhammad did not condemn any violence by the Swat-based militants and showed no concern about anti-women actions, including the destruction of girls’ schools.

These groups share ideological affinity and goals that keep them on good terms. They diverge only in tactics. Sufi Muhammad’s position has also been weakened among the militants because of his miserable failure in the venture to lead his followers to Afghanistan to fight the Americans after the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. In fact, it was this latest agreement with the provincial government that brought him back into the limelight.

The NWFP government, led by the secular ANP, is downplaying the religious character of the Nizam-e Adl Regulation and projecting it as a mere change of nomenclature of the judicial system in Swat. It argues that judges under the new system would be appointed by the government as was the case in the past, and the role of the Peshawar High Court and the Supreme Court is built into the system. Further, it claims that this system has been brought about to ensure speedy justice by fixing deadlines for the disposal of cases.

The ANP interpretation is different from that of Sufi Muhammad, his spokesman and senior followers. They see the introduction of the new judicial system as a triumph that brings the judicial system in Swat under their supervisory control. Refusing to recognise the jurisdiction of the Peshawar High Court or the Supreme Court of Pakistan over Swat, Sufi Muhammad and his spokesman have made it clear that judges would be appointed with their consent and the Sufi would monitor if the judges were fulfilling the obligations of sharia law.

Efforts to introduce such a system failed in the 1990s because the Sufi objected to the appointment of judges. At that time, the provincial and federal governments did not accept his demand. Now, both lack the confidence to check Sufi Muhammad’s interference in the management of the Nizam-e Adl.

Four sets of issues raise doubts about the capacity of the new system to contain militancy.

The first pertains to the implementation and management of the new judicial system in a manner that it does not become an instrument for the militants to exercise more effective control of the area. What happens if the militants ask for Islamic administrators and Islamic law enforcement agencies for implementation of the qazi courts’ judgements?

Second, what is going to be the operational relation of these courts with the Peshawar High Court and the Supreme Court? Can a qazi court’s judgement be challenged in the High Court or the Supreme Court? Will the sharia-based courts sentence people to death or life imprisonment?

Third, the agreement has been signed with Sufi Muhammad and not with the Taliban leaders, who use violence to pursue their religious-ideological agenda. Sufi Muhammad has appealed to them to give up their weapons. However, they refuse to do so; they perceive themselves to be on the ascendancy and see no reason to voluntarily accept government authority.

Fourth, the new judicial system is being introduced to appease militants with the hope that this may enable the government to win the support of some militants. This appears to be a false assumption because the Swat deal gives a clear signal to the militants that if they can firmly hold on to an area, the government would opt for political compromise on their terms. The Sufi and the Taliban reject the Pakistani constitution, law and the primacy of the Pakistani state. They view themselves as a party at par with Pakistani government and want agreements on terms of interaction between the two rather than agreeing to Pakistani government control.

The Swat agreement is a desperate move to improve the law and order situation in the Taliban-infested area in order to deflect the criticism that civilian and security authorities have lost the capacity and the will to fight extremism and terrorism.

The focus of the civilian government is now on showing the public that it has the capacity to withstand American pressure and India’s tough line since the Mumbai attacks. There appears to be a well-orchestrated effort by official civilian circles to encourage the media and societal leaders to sharply criticise the US and India.

Military/intelligence circles are perturbed by the persistent American campaign against the ISI. It has now launched a counter-offensive though its loyalists in the media and in political and societal circles to defend the agency as a national asset and take on the US and India, who are at the forefront of the anti-ISI campaign.

This has brought the Army/ISI as well as sections of the official circles close to the Islamists and the political right, which has an ideological anti-US, anti-India and pro-Taliban disposition.

Pakistan faces a complex dilemma. On the one hand, the top civilian and military leadership vows repeatedly to fight extremism and terrorism. It has obtained economic assistance pledges for over $5 billion at the Tokyo Conference on this plea.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s civilian and military authorities want to dispel the impression in the country that they cannot withstand American pressure. They are now encouraging Islamists and the political right to adopt a more strident approach towards US and Indian policies. The favourite themes for criticism are US drone attacks and proposed benchmarks for the utilisation of American aid to Pakistan. Of late, the federal government is arguing that Pakistan has lost over $35 billion in the war on terrorism since September 2001, but it got foreign assistance far less than these losses. Official and nonofficial circles talk repeatedly of an international conspiracy to fragment Pakistan in order to take over the country’s nuclear programme.

Strident nationalism has given boost to Islamic political discourse in Pakistan. The major beneficiaries of this perspective are the Taliban and other militants who are not described as adversaries in the Islamist-nationalist discourse. Attention is now focused on the perceived threat to Pakistan’s integrity and its nuclear programme from western countries and India.

Such a domestic environment may help the government to take a somewhat tough line in the dialogue on foreign economic and military cooperation, but it impedes the Pakistani government from pursuing counterterrorism in a coherent and consistent manner.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

Militancy and the state:
26/04/2009.


The Pakistani people are worried about political developments in the aftermath of the Swat agreement. The government’s uncertain handling of the situation has raised doubts about the its capacity to cope with the growing threat of militancy

Pakistan’s religio-cultural landscape and civic order is threatened by the efforts of the Taliban and other militant Islamist groups to enforce their vision of Islam through intimidation and force. As they subdue local administrations and establish their religious-cum-political domain in various parts of the NWFP, provincial and federal governments are unable or unwilling to counter this onslaught.

There is a lack of consensus both at the elite and popular levels about the nature of the Taliban challenge and how to cope with it. Divergent statements and discordant reactions of political leaders and parties clearly indicate that all are not convinced that the Taliban are a threat to Pakistan. Most say that they are opposed to terrorism but they either do not believe that the Taliban are engaged in violence or condone their violent actions by arguing that US policies in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s decision to support it led the Taliban to take up arms. Islamists and other sympathisers argue that the Taliban are reacting to the use of force against them by the US and Pakistan.

The Pakistani Taliban, originally based in the tribal areas, emerged as an affiliate of the Afghan Taliban to fight US troops and the Karzai government. With the passage of time, they developed a Pakistan-oriented agenda and targeted its state institutions and personnel, expanding beyond the tribal areas into the adjoining areas of the NWFP.

This movement to the settled areas was facilitated by the MMA government that ruled the province from 2002 to 2007. As the MMA shared the Taliban’s ideological agenda, it did not mind the expansion of militant influence beyond the tribal areas.

By the time the present ANP government assumed power in the NWFP, the Taliban were well entrenched. During the last year under the ANP, the Taliban have made new territorial gains, especially in Swat and its adjoining areas.

The Taliban are so well entrenched in Swat that provincial officials cannot function there without the blessing of Sufi Muhammad, chief of the TNSM, and Fazlullah, leader of the Swat Taliban. The Taliban control day-to-day life there and, as the local administration and the provincial government cannot protect the people from the Taliban, the survival instinct has led the locals to either leave the area or obey the Taliban.

In addition to the Taliban, there are several militant groups in the NWFP, Punjab and Sindh. Some operate as formal and determined entities with religious-cum-cultural agendas. Some madrassas and mosques are under the control of radical and militant clerics who preach radical Islamic messages. Some such institutions serve as recruiting grounds for new volunteers and function as hospitality centres for the Taliban and other militants visiting their areas. They also serve as local guides for the militants coming to their area on some assignment, i.e. information gathering, suicide bombing etc.

If these groups and clerics are able to entrench themselves in mainland Pakistan, Pakistani state and society will suffer an irreparable loss of authority and credibility. Further, their increased influence and efforts to implement their version of sharia law may cause inter-sect tension and conflict.

The Taliban represent an extreme form of the Wahabi/Salafi Islamic tradition combined with local tribal practices that may not be acceptable to other schools of Islamic fiqh. Already, a number of clerics belonging to South Asian Barelvi Islamic tradition have taken strong exception to Taliban assaults on some Sufi shrines.

As compared to the determined disposition of the Taliban and other militants, the federal and NWFP governments appear confused and, at times, refuse to recognise the failures in Swat and adjacent areas. The governments seem determined only in defending the Swat agreement, although Sufi Muhammad and the Taliban have not honoured all its terms.

Sufi Muhammad refuses to acknowledge the primacy of the Pakistani state and rejects its institutions and processes as un-Islamic. The Taliban, who are not a direct party to the agreement, refuse to surrender their weapons and live like normal citizens. They are not prepared to lose their territorial gains and the sense of power which they have acquired over time. The withdrawal of the Taliban from Buner on April 24, 2009 under instructions from Fazlullah does not mean that they have given up arms or discarded their tactics of intimidation. It was a tactical withdrawal to meet immediate needs. There is no change in their long-term goals.

Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani has issued several statements on this subject, which reflect a poor understanding of the situation and hardly address the public concern about the seemingly faltering disposition of the government in coping with the Taliban. The prime minister’s talk of a “home-grown” strategy for peace is misplaced in view of how the Sufi and the Taliban have behaved after NWFP agreement.

On April 24, the prime minister talked of the possibility of the government adopting a tough line towards the Taliban if they did not honour the agreement. It is surprising that the prime minister has not yet noticed the violations of the Swat agreement.

More categorical was the Army Chief’s statement on the same day, emphasising the determination to defend and protect the Pakistani state and society against Taliban dictation.

Another problematic aspect of the situation is that the prime minister and other senior government official have now adopted the political discourse of the Islamist parties on the current situation. The prime minister recently talked of a “conspiracy”, with reference to Balochistan, “to destabilise Pakistan...to seize and destroy the nation’s assets.”

The Governor NWFP also talked of world powers attempting to divide and fragment Pakistan. Prime Minister Gilani and Governor Ghani did not name these world powers or international conspirators. However, Islamists talk of the US, India and Israel as the conspirators against Pakistan. The federal interior advisor has also named India, Afghanistan and Russia for instability in Pakistan.

If we go by these statements, two questions arise. First, why have all the major countries turned against Pakistan to the extent of conspiring against it; does not this expose the weakness in Pakistan’s diplomacy? And second, the Taliban appear to be Pakistan’s friends because they are fighting against Pakistan’s two so-called adversaries, i.e. the US and Afghanistan.

There is an additional concern. Annoyed by persistent US and Western claims that some elements in the ISI are linked with the Taliban, Islamist-nationalist political circles and a section of the media have launched a major propaganda campaign against the US as an adversary of Pakistan. The Jama’at-e Islami’s new chief has taken a clear lead in this campaign. This campaign is expected to enjoy the tacit blessings of the ISI to show to the US that the agency enjoys support in Pakistan.

The government needs to address these ambiguities and clarify its position so that the perception of the government’s lack of unity of mind and determination is removed. The Pakistani people are worried about political developments in the aftermath of the Swat agreement. The government’s uncertain handling of the situation has raised doubts about the its capacity to cope with the growing threat of militancy.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

__________________
CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

The Taliban are anarchist in their disposition because they want to destroy the Pakistani state system without presenting a clearly articulated alternate vision of the future that accommodates the religious and ethnic diversity of Pakistan

Pakistan has always had elements that questioned Jinnah’s notion of a modern, democratic and pluralist state that sought its ethical inspiration from the teachings and principles of Islam. However, this challenge has become more menacing with the ascendancy of the Taliban and other militant Islamist groups that reject the Pakistani state and want to establish a religious Islamic authority that represents a combination of the Wahabi/Salafi tradition and local tribal norms backed by their coercive power.

The current challenge to the soul of Pakistan has become so overwhelming and threatening that if the Taliban and other militants continue to expand their domain, Pakistan’s civil and military authorities will be left with no option but to either give in or confront them to reclaim the primacy of the Pakistani state.

The chances of a peaceful resolution of the conflict are fading and Pakistan is likely to witness a lot of violence, including suicide attacks, when Pakistan’s civil and military authorities assert their primacy in the areas over-run by the forces of Islamic orthodoxy and militancy.

There are a large number of people both at the elite and popular level, who share the perspectives of the Islamist political parties or the political right, who do not view the growing onslaught of the Taliban as a threat to the Pakistani state and society. They support the Taliban based on Islamic-ideological considerations or due to their political simplicity. They argue that Taliban violence is a reaction to US military presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s pro-US policies or injustice against the Muslim world by the policies of the West, especially the US.

There are those who refuse to admit that Islamist militants and the Taliban are engaged in violence. They argue that Pakistan’s foreign adversaries are sponsoring some people who assume the garb of Taliban and engage in violence. The genuine Taliban are friends of Pakistan and the state must not use force against them, they argue.

Pakistan’s civilian and military leaders never thought until 2006-07 that the Taliban could become a major threat to the state. Elements within Pakistan’s civilian and military establishments continued to extend limited support to the Taliban and other militants even after Pervez Musharraf’s speech in January 2002 announcing his determination to control militancy.

This ambiguous official disposition gave enough opportunity to Islamist parties and groups to continue supporting the Taliban. It caused polarisation in the society on the role of the Taliban.

The divided state of mind at the societal level runs deep into official civilian and army/intelligence circles. In April 2009, the Governor NWFP maintained that foreign powers were out to fragment Pakistan. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani said that Pakistan’s foreign adversaries wanted to grab the country’s strategic assets. One federal minister openly supported the Taliban and described American policy as a threat to Pakistan.

Such statements make it easy for Taliban sympathisers in Pakistan to combine strident nationalism with Islamic militancy and emphasise that Pakistan’s troubles are caused by its foreign adversaries. If we go by this political discourse and maintain that the root causes of Pakistan’s problems are located outside of Pakistan, how could the Taliban and other militants be viewed as adversaries?

In the aftermath of Pakistan’s independence in August 1947, there was a small section of the political class, including some non-Muslim leaders, who talked of a secular state system for Pakistan. However, a more serious challenge came from conservative and ideological Islamist circles, including the Islamist parties that had opposed the establishment of Pakistan. They wanted to create a religious political order that gave precedence to Islamic clerics in the formulation and interpretation of laws.

A compromise was evolved by the political leaders that identified Pakistani state with Islam and the constitution stipulated that all laws be in conformity with the teachings and principles of Islam. However, the elected parliament and the superior judiciary were given the right to decide if the law violated Islamic principles. Religious parties accepted these stipulations with reservation.

Pakistan’s political system tilted heavily towards Islamic orthodoxy during the Zia years (1977-1988). General Zia cultivated Islamist parties and groups to legitimise his rule, and used state power to promote Islamic orthodoxy and militancy at the official and non-official levels.

Pakistan’s participation in the US-sponsored effort to build an Islamic-Afghan resistance to Soviet military presence in Afghanistan strengthened Islamist parties and orthodox groups in Pakistan because state apparatus and funding became available to them. Madrassas proliferated and all extremist groups were militarised. The origins of the present-day Taliban can also be traced back to this period.

The injurious implications of the ascendancy and militarisation of the religious orthodoxy were visible at the societal level in the early 1990s but the government continued to use these groups as instruments of foreign policy in Afghanistan and Indian-administered Kashmir.

It was only in 2002-2003 that the government began to pull back from these groups in a selective manner. However, it was unable or unwilling to control the Afghan Taliban and militants of other nationalities that moved out of Afghanistan to Pakistani tribal areas in 2001-2002. These militants had no problem reactivating their linkages with Pakistani Pashtun and non-Pashtun groups who now hosted them, and joined their struggle against American military presence in Afghanistan.

By 2007, these militant elements established their domain outside of the tribal areas and launched determined attacks on state personnel and institutions as well as any person or group questioning their authority.

The Taliban do not simply represent a reaction to American or Pakistani policies. They have a definite ideological Islamist agenda and represent a culture of intolerant orthodoxy, and use intimidation and violence to pursue their agenda. The notion of power is central to their worldview and they will continue to use force to expand their control over more people and territory.

Given the power orientation of the Taliban and the fact that their domain has expanded in the last two years, they are not expected to accept the primacy of the Pakistan state. They do not believe in the Pakistani state. Therefore, the Taliban constitute a bigger threat than any ethnic regional dissident or separatist challenge. The latter have always expressed willingness to seek accommodation of their political and economic concerns within the framework of the Pakistani state and constitution.

The Taliban, however, reject all institutions and processes of the Pakistani state and constitution. They are anarchist in their disposition because they want to destroy the Pakistani state system without presenting a clearly articulated alternate vision of the future that accommodates the religious and ethnic diversity of Pakistan.

The longer Pakistani state authorities deny the Taliban threat and shy away from challenging their expansionist designs, the more difficult it will be to check their onslaught. Time is running out for Pakistan to re-establish its primacy within its territorial limits.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst.

__________________
CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

The breakdown of the Swat agreement and the resumption of armed confrontation between the Taliban and Pakistan’s security forces do not come as a surprise to dispassionate observers of the Taliban movement. What was surprising was the disposition of the ANP-led NWFP government and the PPP-led federal government: ANP leaders had presented an emotionally charged defence of the Swat deal as an enduring solution to the Taliban problem, and the federal government went along with the provincial government.

All political parties, with the exception of the MQM, endorsed the agreement in the National Assembly as a panacea for the trouble in Swat and elsewhere. Now, within a month of the parliamentary endorsement, the agreement is dead. The failure of the agreement exposes the irrelevance of parliament in solving the problem of religious extremism and militancy.

The TNSM and the Taliban in Swat display contempt for Pakistani state institutions and processes as well as political and societal leaders. They consider political leaders to be misguided people that need to be brought on to what they describe as the right path. Now it is clear to more people that the Taliban are not working towards the establishment of an Islamic and expeditious judicial system for Swat.

On the other hand, surrounded by an aura of self-righteousness, the Taliban and TNSM leaders have a comprehensive and categorical agenda to set aside or overwhelm the Pakistani state and establish their domain of authority.

The TNSM and the Taliban were never secretive about this agenda; it was the civilian political leaders that were either unable or unwilling to understand the Taliban’s intentions.

Hopefully Pakistan’s civilian and military authorities are now fully cognisant of the Taliban threat. The stage is now set for a decisive armed confrontation with the militants. This, coupled with local institutions weakened by the Taliban, will create massive humanitarian issues. However, inaction does not guarantee peace and order either.

Pakistan’s current predicament is the consequence of indecisiveness and inaction on the part of the civilian and military leadership. They allowed the situation to fester, hoping that the Taliban would not challenge them. They believed that the Taliban would continue to focus on the foreign troops in Afghanistan or threaten the Kabul government, and therefore did not oppose the Taliban’s efforts to entrench themselves in the tribal areas and adjoining districts of the NWFP.

The Taliban and other militant groups are using their coercive power to assert control over the people and territory of Pakistan. Given their successes over the last two years, they cannot be party to any political or administrative arrangements that negate their domain of authority and acknowledge the primacy of the Pakistani state.

Most Pakistani Taliban come from the lower strata of society and have used organisational strength and coercion to empower themselves and establish their authority over certain areas. Their movement is not class-based in Marxian terms. Their goal is not to empower the ordinary people and improve the quality of their lives by destroying the “exploitative” state and societal structures. They are working towards grabbing power which is not possible without challenging two sources of the existing power structure: state officials and machinery; and the local societal elite that sustain their clout by identifying with the state.

The Taliban target state officials and symbols as well as the local societal elite to displace their embedded power. The latter varies from area to area. If the Maliks are the dominant elite in the tribal areas, the landed aristocracy and business elite dominate elsewhere. The Taliban either force the local elite to join them or kill them or force them out of the area. The Taliban have resorted to these tactics to establish their hegemony, not to improve the lot of the ordinary people. The latter also face a fate similar to the local elite if they challenge the armed cleric or Taliban commanders. The disposition of the Taliban and other militant groups towards the people is shaped by Islamist-sectarian considerations.

Civilian political leaders, inside and outside government, have failed to provide coherent and effective leadership to the people, which has polarised society about the Taliban threat and weakened the government’s resolve to cope with this problem in a forthright manner. They either denied the existence of the threat or attributed Pakistan’s problems to a global conspiracy. The Islamist parties also extended varying degrees of support to the Taliban.

The PMLN has pursued an ambiguous approach towards the on-going militancy. It was initially opposed to the PPP government’s efforts to counter terrorism. A strong sympathy for Islamic militancy was conspicuous in its policy. Subsequently, it moderated its position in order to improve its image at the international level, especially with the US administration.

This has created a dilemma for the party. On the one hand it cannot cultivate goodwill at the international level without cooperating with the PPP government to counter terrorism. On the other, its power agenda in Pakistan’s domestic context can materialise if the PPP government fails to cope with external and internal security and economic pressures. Therefore, if the PPP government collapses under pressure from the Taliban or due to the economic meltdown, the PMLN stands to gain. The PMLN’s partisan power agenda is a major obstacle to consensus building on counter-terrorism.

Divided political leaders cannot provide coherent leadership to the people on the issues of religious extremism and militancy, especially about the role of the Taliban and the other militant groups. The conflicting signals from political leaders have divided people sharply, and that has provided enough space for the Taliban and other militants to cultivate support.

Ambiguity equally characterised the disposition of the top brass of the military. For a long time after September 2001, the military was not sure if the Taliban were a liability or a strategic asset. They could not provide assertive leadership when security personnel were subjected to constant propaganda by Islamist circles that it was un-Islamic to kill co-religionists in the tribal areas. Over 200 paramilitary and regular army personnel voluntarily surrendered to the Taliban in 2007 because of this propaganda and the absence of a clear position by senior commanders at that time.

A good number of army officers who served during the Musharraf years publicly expressed sympathy for the militancy after their retirement. This was often coupled with strong anti-American rhetoric. One can discern similar sentiments during informal interactions with younger army officers.

Of late, the top commanders have been issuing categorical statements against the Taliban and other militant groups. Such messages need to reach the troops deployed in the tribal areas and Swat repeatedly and unambiguously.

Civilian leaders need to rise above partisan considerations in order to cope with the most serious domestic challenge facing Pakistan. A similar message should go out from the military to the people as well as to service personnel. Civilian and military authorities should continue to work together to neutralise the Taliban threat. Neither civilian leaders nor the military can pull the country out of its current predicament alone.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

__________________
CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

The on-going Swat operation is the most difficult internal security assignment for Pakistan’s security forces in a long time. The army is leading the operation with determination to re-establish the authority of state in the areas controlled by the Taliban. This will demonstrate if the Army has upgraded its counter-insurgency capacity. The outcome of this operation will also have implications for the future direction of Pakistani state and society. If this operation fails, it will weaken Pakistan’s resolve and capacity to engage in counter-insurgency in the tribal areas.

Withdrawal of the army and paramilitary forces without restoring the authority of the state is not an option; that would amount to surrendering Swat to the Taliban, and would encourage such elements elsewhere to pursue similar action against the state. This will also give impetus to various Islamist hard-liners in mainland Pakistan to impose their religious and cultural preferences on others.

Pakistan is engaged in an intense struggle to restore its soul, and faces the danger of being overwhelmed by religious and cultural extremism backed by violence. Given Pakistan’s regional, ethnic and cultural diversity, individuals and groups cannot be allowed to operate as self-styled vigilantes to enforce their socio-cultural and political preferences. That would not only destroy the fabric of Pakistani state and society but also invite external intervention by those who would like to contain the fallout from the ascendancy of extremists.

What triggered the current military action was the Swat Taliban’s misreading of the agreement between the NWFP government and Sufi Muhammad’s TNSM. They viewed this as a sign of diminishing governmental authority and moved out into Buner, Dir and Shangla.

On April 23, Taliban fighters ambushed an FC convoy in Buner. On April 25, they stopped a group of security forces from entering the area. As the Taliban appeared determined to march onwards and Sufi Muhammad was unable or unwilling to convince them to respect the Swat agreement, security forces launched an operation in Lower Dir, which gained momentum in a couple of days as they also moved into Buner.

It was on May 7 that Prime Minister Gilani formally asked the Army to launch a full-scale operation to “wipe out the Taliban” from these areas; the army then took control of all military activity. This was a shared decision by civilian-military authorities, including the NWFP government.

The stepped up Taliban activity in and around Swat in the wake of the agreement caused much concern in Pakistan’s official and societal circles. The fear often expressed was that this would not only encourage the Taliban to expand their domain in the NWFP and Punjab in the direction of Islamabad, but also that if the government caved-in, the Taliban’s allies in Punjab, especially those who share their worldview, would be emboldened.

The initiation of military operationswas generally welcomed. With the exception of Islamist parties, which often function as the political front of militants, the major political parties and societal groups supported the action. Even Nawaz Sharif extended guarded support to the government with reference to the Taliban threat.

The media is generally supportive of military operations and the same can be said about a large number of societal groups that are not directly affiliated with political parties. However, the political elite could not sustain the initial consensus and began to look at the military operation from their partisan perspectives.

Among the Islamist parties, the Jama’at-e Islami took the lead in opposing military action in Swat and demanded the withdrawal of troops. Its leadership thought that the country should unite to oppose the US instead of supporting military action. The JUIF chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman, a partner in the PPP-led federal government, warned about the threat of the Taliban before the government decided to take on the militants. However, when the government called out the military, the Maulana opposed the decision. The Jamiat-e Ahle Hadees Pakistan also criticised military action; while Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e Insaf took a position similar to the Islamists.

The Islamist parties’ disposition towards military action is also shaped by the Islamic denominational aspect of the Taliban issue. As a large number of Barelvi religious leaders opposed the imposition of sharia courts and supported military action, the predominant majority of religious leaders identifying with Deobandi/Wahabi/Ahle Hadees Islamic traditions extend varying degrees of support to the Taliban. Most of them have opposed military action as the Taliban subscribe to the Wahabi/Deobandi Islamic traditions.

There are few exceptions to this sectarian polarisation. However, the activism of Barelvi religious leaders in favour of the government and military action has also led religious scholars sympathetic to the Taliban to defend them. Some of them argue that the Taliban do not use force but that some foreign agents are engaged in killings and looting in the garb of the Taliban to malign the movement.

PMLN returned to its partisan approach on the Swat operation when its senior leaders engaged in bitter criticism of the government as well as the Swat operation in the National Assembly on May 12-13. Their arguments sounded very close to the Islamist political parties.

The government is summoning an all-parties conference on May 18, which is likely to approve a generalised statement favouring Pakistan’s solidarity and official policy on controlling extremism and militancy. However, the polarised and confused state of mind of the political elite, especially the highly discordant views of Islamist parties, would make it difficult for the political elite to get their act together when it comes to evolving precise policies on counter-insurgency, or whether Pakistan is threatened by the Taliban or by so-called international conspiracies.

The negative fallout of the Swat operation is the groundswell of refugees from the conflict zones. They numbered about 1.3 million on May 14, and are being accommodated mainly in refugee camps. Necessary assistance is being provided by the federal and NWFP governments. Governments of other provinces have also provided economic and material help to refugees, along with a number of societal groups that are also working hard to help. Some pro-Taliban elements are using the refugee problem to argue for ending the military operation and holding talks with the Taliban.

It is disappointing that some parties, especially the Islamists, cannot overcome their narrow partisan interests, which makes it difficult for them to fathom the gravest ever threat to Pakistan’s internal harmony and security. If retrogressive forces like the Taliban and Al Qaeda succeed, neither the present Islamist parties nor the PMLN, the PTI and others would be able to function. Their future is linked with the future of Pakistan.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

__________________
CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

The May 18 All-Parties Conference on Swat approved a ‘compromise’ resolution to accommodate the sensitivities of some political parties. The unanimous resolution condemned violent challenges to the state of Pakistan and its constitution. It emphasised the need for preservation and protection of the constitution and state structures, and also called upon everybody to work for the safety and well being of the refugees from the conflict zones.

However, the resolution did not mention the Swat operation. Nor did it directly endorse or require its closure. Similarly, the Taliban were neither condemned nor were they asked to give up arms. No reference was made to the role of the United States in Afghanistan and its fallout on Pakistan, although some leaders criticised the US in their speeches.

The APC manifested a split in the political class on the issues of the Swat operation and the Taliban. The major divide is between the Islamist parties and most of the others; the former opposing the Malakand operation at the APC. Post- APC, they have been either defending the Taliban or engaging in a virulent campaign against the military operation, blaming it for the suffering of the ordinary people. These parties are appealing to religious emotions by arguing that Pakistan’s Muslim army is killing its own Muslim citizens.

Islamist parties never made such statements when various militant groups executed civilian and military personnel in public, hanged the dead bodies of clerics from trees, bombed barber and music shops, burnt down girls’ schools, flogged people in public and launched suicide attacks.

Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e Insaf is the only party that is not labelled as Islamist but it opposes military action and sympathises with the Taliban.

The PPP, the ANP, the MQM and the PMLQ are very categorical in their support for the military operation. Other political parties also support these efforts. It can be safely argued that most of the political class is supportive of the efforts to check religious extremism and militancy, especially the efforts to dislodge the Taliban from Malakand. Such support also exists at the popular level, although people are deeply concerned about the problems of the refugees and want them to return to their homes in safety at the earliest.

The Taliban’s fatal mistake was their interpretation of the agreement between the TNSM and the NWFP provincial government as their victory and a sign of the government’s weakness. Therefore, Sufi Muhammad declared Pakistan’s constitution, parliament, democracy and the judicial system as un-Islamic, began to drag his feet on the selection of qazis and asked the regular courts to wind up their work in Swat.

On the other hand, the Taliban led by Fazlullah, moved their fighters to take control of the adjoining areas. Some government officials were kidnapped and the Taliban adopted aggressive posture even within the Swat valley.

These developments forced the NWFP and federal governments to change their disposition towards the TNSM and the Taliban. A large section of the public realised that the Taliban do not believe in a negotiated and peaceful resolution of the problem, and instead want to establish their authority at the expense of the Pakistani state.

Further, taking a cue from the defiance of Sufi Muhammad and the Swat-based Taliban, their denominational allies began to assert themselves selectively in cities like Lahore and Karachi.

This perturbed large sections of civil society, which was not associated with any political party, causing a major shift in public opinion in favour of stern action against the militants.

PMLN chief Nawaz Sharif argued at the APC that tough action must be taken to control terrorism and that the military operation should be taken to its logical end without giving any concessions to extremists and terrorists. His support was very reassuring for the government.

However, Sharif’s statement could not remove ambiguity about the PMLN’s stance on the Taliban. Prior to the APC, some of Sharif’s leading lieutenants took the government to task in the National Assembly for launching the military operation. Even after Sharif’s statement of support, PMLN parliamentarians Saad Rafiq and Ahsan Iqbal were not willing to support the Swat operation. Chaudhry Nisar Ali khan and Khwaja Asif were also not in favour of military action to control the Taliban menace.

The divergent perspectives of PMLN leaders reflect their desire to simultaneously pacify different foreign and domestic interests. Nevertheless, the PMLN position recognises the threat, and distinguishes itself from Islamist parties that defend the Taliban in an unabashed manner.

Jama’at-e Islami leaders are orchestrating a campaign against the Swat operation, describing it as a threat to Pakistan’s solidarity. The PPP-led coalition government is the main target of the Jama’at’s criticism and, at times, the army is also taken to task for “killing Muslims and country-men”. Pro-JI elements in the media are also quite active in advancing the Jama’at’s perspective.

The JUIF is part of the ruling coalition but its chief, Maulana Fazlur Rahman, is also critical of the Swat operation, though he does not want to quit the coalition on this issue. Other Islamist parties are also critical of the Swat operation. However, their appeal has no relevance beyond their members and supporters.

Islamist elements are facing an internal divide based on denominational differences. Religious leaders and groups subscribing to the Deobandi/Ahle Hadees/Wahabi Islamic traditions are generally supportive of the Taliban. They want the Swat operation to be stopped and the government to negotiate with the Taliban. They also view the Taliban as friends of Pakistan, and argue that if the government stops pursuing American agenda in the region, the trouble between the Taliban and the government would come to an end.

This perspective is rejected by most religious leaders from the Barelvi Islamic tradition, who want tough action against the Taliban. This group argues that the Taliban have adversely affected the reputation of Islam and thus cannot be allowed to enforce their version of Islam by coercion. Followers of the Shia tradition also share the Barelvi perspective on the Taliban. This division has weakened the clout of pro-Taliban Islamist parties and religious leaders.

The government and military authorities are determined to subdue the Taliban in Malakand because both are convinced that these elements cannot be allowed a free rein to expand their domain and threaten people.

The Swat operation is a turning point in Pakistan’s official disposition towards religious extremism and militancy. Pakistan will no longer tolerate such activity. However, militancy and terrorism are so deeply entrenched in Pakistan that the government and the military will need to deal with it on different fronts over a long period of time. If they stand firm in their resolve and succeed in subduing the Taliban, Islamist opposition will wither away.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

Militancy in mainland Pakistan---- 31/05/2009


The massive May 27 terrorist bombing in Lahore is the latest evidence — as if further evidence is still needed — of the Taliban’s growing challenge to Pakistan’s internal stability and security. The Lahore attack was followed by two more bombings in Peshawar and a suicide-attack in Dera Ismail Khan the next day.

Deputy chief of the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan, Hakimullah Mehsud, claimed responsibility for the Lahore attack and asked people to vacate Lahore, Rawalpindi, Islamabad and Multan as the Taliban were planning “major attacks on government facilities in the coming days and weeks” in these cities.

Pakistan now faces a serious internal war, something its official circles denied in the past, spearheaded by religious militants that are attempting to overwhelm the Pakistani state, government and society. These extremists use religion to cover up their actual agenda of establishing a territorial domain to pursue their international religious-ideological plans.

The Taliban and their allied groups based in Punjab have resorted to these bombings in order to deter the government and the army from pursuing the Swat operation. They also want to restrain Pakistan from taking similar action in the tribal areas. The militants think that a number of bombings in quick succession will build enough public pressure to stop military action in Malakand.

The other message from the Taliban is that they will take their war to any part of Pakistan if the security forces do not pull back. They have connections with local militant and sectarian groups that act as their hosts and facilitators in cities across Pakistan. These local facilitators could be a local extremist/sectarian group, based at a mosque or a madrassa where the terrorists park themselves and work towards completing their terrorist mission.

Punjab, especially Lahore, has been selected for some major terrorist attacks in the recent past because of the province’s (and the city’s) importance in Pakistan politics and economy. Punjab is also well-represented in the army, the bureaucracy and intelligence agencies. From the Taliban perspective, instability in Punjab will have negative implications for a large number of people and would deeply affect the Pakistani civil and military establishment.

Militancy has developed deep roots in Punjab over the years. Some of the most well known militant and sectarian groups are based in the province. These groups have cultivated links with the Taliban for training and safe havens in the tribal areas. Some Punjabi militants are said to be fighting with the Taliban in the tribal areas and Afghanistan. Naturally, it is easy for the Taliban to operate in the Punjab through these linkages.

The strongest opposition to the current security operation in Malakand is coming from Islamist elements in Punjab. The Jama’at-e Islami, spearheading opposition to the Swat operation, has its headquarters in Lahore. A number of other religious parties opposed to military operations are also primarily based in Punjab. A good number of religious leaders demanding an end to the Swat operation also hail from the Punjab. Most non-Pashtun militant groups, such as the Lashkar-e Tayba and Sipah-e Sahaba, have a strong Punjabi background.

It is interesting to note that a large number of journalists, political commentators and writers in the vernacular press that express varying degrees of support to militancy and oppose the current military operation hail from Punjab. They raise a host of themes, i.e. direct or indirect opposition to military operation, sympathy for the Taliban, accusing Pakistani authorities of killing its Muslim citizens in order to satisfy the US or to get economic assistance, and that Pakistani rulers should be afraid of God rather than the US.

There are similar dynamics of opposition to US drone attacks in the tribal areas. Most vocal criticism comes from the activists of Islamist political parties all over Pakistan or from political activists from Punjab. The issue does not resonate so much with political activists from other provinces that do not identify with Islamist parties.

This does not mean that there is no support for the Swat operation in Punjab. In fact, this support is more pronounced than the opposition by Islamist parties. Similarly, there is enough evidence available to suggest that politically active circles, societal groups and others oppose religious extremism and militancy. This sentiment has increased against the backdrop of the political developments leading up to the operation and the pushing back of the Taliban by the military in Malakand. The only exceptions to this approach are Islamist parties, a section of pro-Taliban religious leaders and Imran Khan’s PTI.

The key issue is that sympathy and support for Islamist militancy and the Taliban, and criticism of the Swat operation, is also pronounced in Punjab. A logical follow up of this argument is that anti-Americanism is equally pronounced in the province.

Given the centrality of Punjab in Pakistani politics and administration as well as the dynamics of support for Islamist militancy, the Taliban leadership made an understandable decision to take the internal war into Punjab. More attacks can take place here in the future; and the Taliban, through these attacks, hope to compel the government to review its counterinsurgency policy.

The Swat operation has for the first time dislodged the Taliban from some areas. They are expected to lose effective control of the Swat valley and adjoining areas very shortly. This setback will have three major implications for the Taliban movement.

First, the Taliban will find it difficult to find new recruits. In the past, participation in the Taliban movement gave status and power to the poor and dispossessed. There was hardly any cost for the militants because the Pakistani state did not fully challenge them. The on-going Swat operation has inflicted serious damage on the Taliban and the myth of their invincibility has been damaged to such an extent that new recruits will think twice before signing up.

Second, the success of the Swat operation will be a morale booster for the security forces and the government. The top civilian and military leadership appears to have come to the conclusion now that the Taliban and similar groups can no longer be allowed to function in defiance of the state.

Third, this will also help remove doubts at the international level about the capacity and willingness of the Pakistan military and government to take on the Taliban. This will also weaken the propaganda that the Taliban might one day overwhelm the Pakistani state and gain access to nuclear weapons and materials.

Pakistan’s civilian and military authorities must be pleased about the successes in Swat. But there is a long way to go to restore the primacy of the state and remove the causes of extremism and militancy. Challenges exist not only in the tribal areas but also in mainland Pakistan where some militant groups continue to hold ground and disparate Islamist elements tend to support or sympathise with them for one reason or another.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

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CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

The Swat operation has effectively countered arguments that the civilian government and the military lacked the will and capability to check the Taliban’s assault on the Pakistani state and society. Security forces seem to have dislodged the Taliban from most of the Swat valley and the major thrust of the operation is expected to be over before the end of June. Although some military presence will have to be maintained in the area for the coming six months to a year for the civil administration to take control of the situation and the displaced people to return their homes safely.

The success in Swat will give greater confidence to security personnel and discourage new recruits from joining the Taliban. In the past, people joined various militant groups, especially the Taliban, because of organisational support and the promise of power and territory.

Now, for the first time, there is a considerable cost attached to joining the militancy. Recruits could get killed or arrested by the army and other security agencies. It was not surprising then that a good number of Taliban loyalists had their beards shaved to escape security forces. People will now be discouraged from joining the Taliban.

The public response to counter-insurgency in the Swat area reflects the usual political divide between the people and groups with strong Islamic orientation and others, the former being a vocal minority. However, sympathy (not necessarily support) for the Islamist perspective runs deep in our society and in official civilian and military circles.

The major criticism of the Swat operation comes from elements that have a strong Islamist orientation with leanings towards or involvement with Islamic militancy. This includes Islamist political parties, the madrassa-related religious establishment, orthodox and fundamentalist religious leaders not directly connected with any political party, and the Islamist-political right.

Some factors moderate their disposition. There is a noticeable divide among religious leaders along Islamic denominational lines. Most followers of the Barelvi tradition support the Swat operation, while those identifying with the Deobandi/Wahhabi and Ahle Hadees traditions support or sympathise with the Taliban.

Some support to Islamic militancy, including the Taliban, is also directly linked to strong anti-US sentiments. The Taliban are viewed as fighting American military presence in Afghanistan and thus enjoy support among rightwing political and Islamist circles.

Opposition to American policies in the region is either ideological or issue-based. In the case of ideological opposition, no matter what the Americans do, their policies will be condemned. Most Islamist parties and orthodox and conservative Islamic groups fall in this category.

Issue-based opposition to American policy includes those who may not necessarily be religious in orientation. As the focus is on specific policy measures (i.e. US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq; the Palestine issue), these people are capable of appreciating positive signals in American policy. They may also extend cautious support to the Swat operation.

Islamist political circles have to be distinguished from mainstream and regional political parties that support the Swat operation and efforts to check extremism and militancy, although some individuals among these parties may express reservations on counter-insurgency. A large number of societal groups based in urban centres also fall in this category. The same can be said about people with liberal and moderate political orientations. The political parties that support military operation against the Taliban include the PPP, the PMLN, the MQM, the ANP and, with some reservations, the PMLQ.

This divide is comparable to the political divergence that cropped up after the US launched air-attacks on Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. Islamist parties and groups opposed the American attack, staging street demonstration, mainly in the NWFP.

Initially these groups established the Afghanistan Defence Council, and later the Pakistan-Afghanistan Defence Council. The remnants of these elements later established the MMA to contest the 2002 general elections. The MMA government in the NWFP (2002-2007) maintained a supportive profile towards the Taliban and allowed them to extend their influence from the tribal areas into adjoining districts.

As the mainstream and regional parties did not join the 2002 Islamist street protest against American military action in Afghanistan, the protests fizzled out in four to five weeks. The same can be said about the current Islamist opposition to the Swat operation.

As the PPP and the PMLN agree on dealing effectively with the Taliban in Swat, the opposition by Islamist parties and groups does not adversely affect the operation. However, there is one significant difference between the two situations. The media has expanded since 2002, giving ample opportunity to Islamists and others to present their perspective to a wider audience.

Grassroots support for the Taliban can be traced back to the re-orientation of Pakistani society towards Islamic orthodoxy and militancy from the days of General Zia-ul Haq’s military rule to well into General Pervez Musharraf’s reign. The relevant years are 1983-84 to 2005. General Zia’s military government used the state apparatus, the media and the state education system to socialise young people into Islamic orthodoxy and militancy. The civilian governments that ruled during 1988-1999 could not reform the state education system to moderate its Islamist militancy tilt.

Regular state-owned educational institutions de-emphasised the notion of Pakistan as a nation-state, citizenship of a territory-based state and religious and cultural pluralism. Instead the emphasis was on Islamic universalism, militancy, and Islam versus the Other.

Young people were socialised into a skewed monolithic worldview derived mainly from Islamic orthodoxy. Domestic and international politics as well as societal issues were articulated in purely religious idiom. Such Islamic indoctrination emphasised that political and social developments are shaped primarily by the conflict-based interaction between Islam and other religions, especially Hinduism, Judaism and Christianity. The indoctrination along these lines was stronger in Punjab than in the other provinces because the Jama’at-e Islami’s student wing was able to entrench itself in major educational institutions.

Islamic discourse in state education was supplemented by Islamic seminaries, which proliferated in the 1980s as a follow-up of General Zia’s policy of strengthening Islamic elements to meet the global imperatives of the Afghan-Islamic resistance to Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.

Consequently, Pakistan has lost over a generation to Islamic orthodoxy and militancy. By now this generation has reached mid-level positions in government, the military and the private sector. They are more receptive to the political discourse that emphasises that international and domestic politics is determined by religious agendas and interaction among different religions.

The long-term solution to religious extremism and militancy would require massive changes in the fundamental agents of socialisation of the polity. Some changes have been made in state education since 2004-05 and also more Pakistani students are now going abroad for higher education, which will expose them to multiple political and social discourses. The key question is how far will the new generation will differ from the one lost to orthodoxy and militancy.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst.

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CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

Pakistan faces a deadly internal war that threatens its future as an effective and coherent nation-state. This threat from extremist Taliban groups entrenched in the tribal areas and their affiliates in mainland Pakistan. The terror attacks in Peshawar, Lahore and Nowshera last week clearly showed that terrorist groups will resort to any method to fulfil their agenda of paralysing the Pakistani state and government and establishing a territorial domain as a base for their operations in Pakistan and abroad.

The situation has deteriorated to such an extent that the people are faced with three choices: challenge these groups straight on; comply with their dictates; or face death threats.

The sudden spurt in Taliban violence in urban centres is a retaliatory move against the military action in Swat, Dir and Buner, as well as limited operations in Hangu and South Waziristan. The Taliban have extended the scope of conflict by taking it to the cities, hoping that the government and the army would not be able to pursue the war simultaneously on different fronts.

During the last week, the Taliban focused on Peshawar, resorting to excessive violence in the NWFP capital to disrupt civil life and discredit state institutions and functionaries. They want to destabilise the ANP provincial government because it has extended full support to the federal government and the army for undertaking military operations in Swat and elsewhere in the province.

The ANP agreed to tough action against the Taliban after the Swat peace deal was subverted by Sufi Muhammad’s attempt to arrogate to himself the right to manage the new judicial system, and Fazlullah and other Taliban leaders interpreted the agreement as the caving-in of the provincial government. They moved out into adjoining areas to establish their firm control on the region at the expense of local administration. Having entrenched themselves in the Swat valley, the Taliban could not comply with an agreement that would have restricted their activities and helped local and provincial administrations assert their primacy.

Among the several terror attacks on Peshawar last week, the city’s only five-star hotel was hit by a massive truck-bomb on June 9. Two days later, a police check post in the city was attacked, followed by a suicide bombing at the same place. Security forces exchanged fire with terrorists after the incident. On the same day, the motorcade of a provincial minister was attacked in Darra Adam Khel; the minister narrowly escaped, his security personnel were killed.

The Taliban are targeting Peshawar because of its proximity to the tribal areas; they can travel easily between Peshawar and the tribal areas. Other cities close to the tribal areas have also been facing varying degrees of Taliban pressure and violence. Most Taliban operating in and around Peshawar are familiar with the city and can undertake their missions even if they do not have local facilitators.

Another high profile suicide attack took place on June 12, when a mosque in Nowshera was targeted. The same day, a suicide bomber assassinated Mufti Naeemi, a well-known Islamic scholar in Lahore who was known for anti-Taliban views.

The killing of a recognised Islamic scholar shows that the Taliban are no longer restricting their attacks to government installations and personnel. They are targeting all those who openly oppose them.

Mufti Naeemi’s assassination may also cause Islamic sectarian tensions, which have been on the rise in the recent past, especially in areas like Dera Ismail Khan. These incidents appear to be intended to inflame sectarian tensions and thus create a host of new administrative problems, which in turn will divert the government’s attention away from Swat and the tribal areas.

The roots of the current spurt in Taliban violence can be traced to the decision of the federal government and the army in April to counter the Taliban efforts to expand their operations to urban centres. By mid-April, it had become quite clear that the Taliban wanted to paralyse state institutions and processes, and that the Taliban were willing to use violence and coercion to achieve this objective. Their activities also encouraged mainland Pakistan-based hardliners and militant groups to identify with the Taliban; these affiliates began to function as Islamic vigilantes in Pakistan’s urban centres.

The Swat operation is the first major success of the army in dislodging the Taliban, although military presence will have to be maintained to ensure that the Taliban do not return. Operations in the adjoining areas of Buner and Dir have also been successful. The army is now pursuing a similar operation in Bannu and Hangu. A limited operation has also been undertaken in South Waziristan.

Success in Swat and the adjoining areas cannot be consolidated unless the federal government and the army take comprehensive and firm action in South and North Waziristan, strongholds of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and also of the foreign fighters said to be located there. Military action in Waziristan would require more planning and greater effort than Swat, but Pakistan cannot neutralise the Taliban threat unless it takes action in the tribal areas.

The Taliban’s attacks show their organisation, determination and enough connections with local militants to challenge the government in mainland Pakistan. This is being done to show that the Taliban have the capacity to hit back. Further, the Taliban think that if security forces get bogged down in securing the cities, they would not be able to pursue counter-insurgency operations. The Taliban also expected that the people, scared by bombings, would pressure the government to stop military action. Their hope did not materialise as the recent bombings have further alienated Pakistanis from the Taliban. Citizens are demanding tough action terrorists and their patrons.

The exceptions are the Islamic parties, a section of religious leaders sharing the Taliban perspective on Islam and Imran Khan’s PTI, which opposes military action. However, these people are in a minority and have very limited electoral support.

The military operation in the Swat area has created an extremely serious humanitarian problem as over 2.5 million people have been displaced from their homes. As the government and societal groups undertake relief work in refugee camps, pro-Taliban elements are exploiting the refugee issue to blame the government and the army for creating this problem.

The outcome of the present internal war will determine the future of Pakistan as a viable nation-state. The mainstream and regional parties that get around 90 percent of the vote in general elections support this operation. Pakistan does not have the option of stopping the operation or not undertaking similar action in the tribal areas. The success of these operations and tackling their humanitarian aspect will further weaken opposition to the army’s efforts to assert the primacy of the Pakistan state.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst.

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CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

The current phase of the security operation in Swat involving direct encounters between the army and the Taliban is nearing completion. The army and paramilitary forces have cleared the cities and main roads of the Taliban, who have been killed, arrested or have fled the area. They have also been dislodged from Buner and Dir.

The army will have to stay in these areas for a year or so to help the civilian administration restore basic civic facilities and to facilitate the return of the population that left the area at the beginning of the operation. They will have to maintain tight security to ensure that the remnants of the Taliban do not regroup and launch attacks. It is understandable that the government has decided to set up an army cantonment in Swat so that some troops are permanently present there.

The dislodging of the Taliban from the Swat-Malakand area reassures the people that the army has the capacity to cope with the Taliban challenge and enhances their confidence in the army. However, the Taliban menace cannot be effectively controlled without dismantling its authority structure in the tribal areas, especially South Waziristan, where they have established their main base. The army has already launched an operation in Bannu and has made initial punitive moves in South Waziristan to build pressure on Baitullah Mehsud and his Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan.

The security operation in South Waziristan is going to be a more challenging affair than the Swat action, because the TTP main base is said to be fortified with a strong presence of foreign fighters, including some Al Qaeda elements. The TTP is expected to use tough guerrilla tactics, including suicide attacks in mainland Pakistan through its linkages with local militant/sectarian groups in Punjab. Al Qaeda’s disposition will also influence the situation in South Waziristan. It is difficult to suggest if Al Qaeda will stay neutral or support the TTP.

Security forces have to cover a large area and the Taliban have the option of moving to another agency or cross over to Afghanistan. Another possibility is that the Afghan Taliban may join Pakistani Taliban in their war against Pakistan.

Pakistan and US/NATO troops need to improve coordination to interdict cross-border movement of people and weapons. Such coordination also serves American security interests in Afghanistan. The US is currently sending fresh troops to Afghanistan that are expected to launch a major security operation in July-August in order to ensure a peaceful presidential election in Afghanistan on August 20. The American operation in Afghanistan can cause cross-border movement of Afghan Taliban to the Pakistani tribal areas, adding to Pakistan’s security problems there. This will compromise the effectiveness of American military operations in Afghanistan. Therefore, both Pakistan and the US need to restrict cross-border movement in the next three months for their individual considerations.

It seems that the army is currently blocking exit points from South Waziristan into other tribal areas and the NWFP so that the Taliban do not easily slip out of the region. This is being coupled with air raids and limited ground offensives using heavy guns on selected targets. The air and ground offensive is expected to pick up pace soon, followed by induction of troops into the area, involving direct encounters with the fighters of Baitullah Mehsud.

Four major factors are in favour of the civilian government and the army. First, the dislodging of the Taliban from Swat and adjoining areas is a morale booster for the security forces and the provincial and federal governments. For the first time the civilian government and the army have pursued counter-insurgency single-mindedly and persistently. The army was not deterred by the human losses it suffered in Swat. The top commanders appear fully determined to move decisively against the Taliban and their allied groups.

Second, anti-Taliban sentiments have increased in Pakistan during the last three months. This shift has been caused mainly by stepped up violence in different cities by the TTP and its allied groups based in the Punjab, starting with the March 3 attack on Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore. Other immediate factors are the efforts of the Taliban to expand their control after the agreement between the NWFP government and Sufi Muhammad, and stories of the brutalities the Taliban inflicted on the people.

The Taliban continue to enjoy some support from Islamist political parties, especially the Jama’at-e Islami, which is engaged in a persistent campaign against the on-going security operation in Swat and opposes any operation in the tribal areas. Most Deobandi/Wahhabi religious leaders express support or sympathy for the Taliban. Barelvi religious leaders invariably support the military operation against the Taliban.

This religious-sectarian divide has become sharper after the assassination of Maulana Naeemi in Lahore, a cleric belonging to the Barelvi Islamic tradition, on June 12. The alienated Barelvi religious leaders are now more vocal in criticising the Taliban, especially suicide attacks. Shia religious leaders are also opposed to the Taliban and their violence against Pakistani state and society. These developments have weakened Taliban support even within Islamic circles.

Third, the military authorities need to exploit the contradictions between Baitullah Mehsud, chief of the TTP, and other militant and tribal leaders that have surfaced this week. Baitullah Mehsud established his control first in the Waziristan area by 2007 after ruthlessly subduing other commanders and tribal leaders who questioned his leadership or methods. Some of these commanders have now declared their opposition to Baitullah.

Two important commanders — Qari Zainuddin and Haji Turkistan — have publicly denounced Baitullah and his violent tactics. More such leaders will surface in the near future, who can be cultivated by Pakistani authorities. Their support will be useful but the Pakistan Army will have to take on Baitullah and his fighters militarily to dislodge them.

Fourth, the recent arrest of some militants in Punjab, accused of involvement in the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team, is a helpful development. If the police and other security personnel contain local militants (‘Punjabi Taliban’), it would vastly reduce Baitullah’s capacity to launch suicide attacks in the cities because he functions in mainland Pakistan though local Islamic extremists and militant-sectarian groups.

These factors have created a favourable environment for a new security operation. Civilian and military authorities are better placed now to move against the TTP. However, this operation could be a long one. The government should make it clear that the security operation does not target the Mehsud tribe but Baitullah and his Pakistani and foreign associates that have established their reign of terror in the tribal areas and sponsor terrorist attacks in mainland Pakistan.

Authorities should not be oblivious to humanitarian issues caused by insurgency and counter-insurgency. The influx of refugees from Swat and adjoining areas is a case in point. A similar problem can arise when a major operation is launched in the tribal areas.

Decisive action in South Waziristan and other tribal areas is a pre-requisite rehabilitating the writ of the Pakistani state and restoring the confidence of the people of Pakistan and the international community in the capacity and determination of the civilian government and especially the military to cope with the Taliban groups. This would also demoralise militant groups in mainland Pakistan.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst.

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CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier