Dr. Rasul Bakhsh Rais's articles
 

What breeds extremism?
By: Rasul Bkahsh Rais.
21/04/2009.

Some fundamental questions divide Muslim societies today: who should determine what is Islamic or not; does an individual have the right to practice or not practice religion; or should religion be rigidly imposed by the modern state through its coercive institutions?

Religion may provoke controversy in other societies, but there, the issue of the relationship between religion and the state is largely settled. Such societies consider religion to be a matter between an individual and his creator; the state does not regulate the religious lives of citizens. Through experience, these societies have learned that it is better to leave religion out of the affairs of the state, and have realised that otherwise the state would be oppressive and would leave little space for personal freedoms.

The relationship between state and religion has not been a simple issue in Muslim countries. Why?

Societies are polarised to different degrees on the principles that would guide the restructuring of state-society relations in the modern age. The consensus of the medieval period, of two separate realms — of religion and of worldly authority — based on mutual non-interference and the condition that no rule violating Islam would apply, seems to have disappeared.

New ideologies in the early decades of the last century, like communism, fascism and nationalism, stirred a debate as to which ideological stream could best fit Islamic societies. Religious intellectuals and political activists wanted to chart a new course, independent of western ideologies, much like the modern-day line of the Iranian clergy: neither East nor West.

Unfortunately, Islamic societies were divided then, and remain divided along sectarian lines, even if one ignores the cultural and regional aspects of Islamic thought and practices beyond the fundamentals of belief. The troubling question, therefore, is: whose Islam is it going to be? Who is the legitimate authority to interpret it? To what extent is religion a private matter and to what extent will it be transferred to the state?

The debate is not about finding absolute answers. If it were that simple, we would have found the answers by now and would have also achieved a grand Islamic consensus on what constitutes an Islamic political order.

All political orders have some principles or ideological foundations. Therefore, no society can hope to progress if its political order is reduced to a lawless power-grabbing game played by greedy individuals. Constitutional democracy is one such framework that restrains individuals, forcing them to stay within legal bounds.

It is the weakness of constitutionalism and democratic norms, and a general crisis of governance, in Pakistan that has created such great space for Islamist groups. An odious alliance between corrupt bureaucrats and the political class at the district level and the higher echelons of power has caused the collapse of governing institutions.

It is not really class conflicts or mobilisation of the poor by the militants that might cause a shift from traditional power structures to the Taliban order, but the erosion of hope and frustration at the lack of fulfilment of legitimate expectations. The failure of the state in performing its tasks is fuelling questions of legitimacy of the political order.

Once a political order loses its legitimacy, it becomes vulnerable to any force — religious, secular or revolutionary — that promises change. The disillusioned Muslim population of Iran turned to the clergy. Some would argue that the Iranian clergy hijacked the revolution, which comprised many fronts with the clergy being just one of the forces that shaped it.

In Pakistan, it is partly the old unsettled debate about the relationship of Islam with the Pakistani state, but also how the rapacious ruling elites have repeatedly failed to live up to the promise of building a democratic, constitutional state and exercising power within the limits of the law. They have flagrantly violated their end of the social contract, and have thus weakened the system and their own moral authority.

Can the Taliban or similar groups be the alternative to these largely discredited elites?

Some may object to the term ‘discredited’ on the grounds that these leaders have been re-elected and returned to power through the popular vote. True. But that is what alienates sections of society from democratic politics when corrupt politicians escape accountability. Not all of them fall in this disgraceful category, but their dominance clearly gives religious militants a propaganda point, that ‘western type’ democracy has failed Pakistani society.

In fact, the reverse is true. The democratic process did not get enough time and space to gel, and every democratic effort was aborted prematurely.

Extremist ideologies, including militant Islamism, have flourished not under true democracies but in less open, misgoverned societies. Like other ideological brands, Islamists have used religion as an alternative way of organising society and a panacea for all the evils inflicted by traditional elites.

Religious politics is therefore less about piety and more about power and using religious symbolism to question the legitimacy of the traditional ruling classes. Religious values become embedded in one’s life, though in different degrees and practiced in different ways. Those who take a hegemonic view of religion may not accept religious pluralism and term the individual’s search for true faith, if it happens to be different in any manner from established norms, as heretic deviation.

The age of such religious hegemony has long past in almost every part of the world, but not here. A section of the religious right in Pakistan rejects religious pluralism, and does not respect or tolerate the historical diversity of belief within Islam.

The religious and the secular have historically co-existed in all faith streams, more so in modern times with the increasing neutrality of the state. But what is happening in Pakistan is quite the reverse of contemporary political trends elsewhere. It is the political function of religion that needs to be examined closely and rejected as a hegemonic cultural quest.

Religion is embedded in our society, its culture and values system, and is equally a very strong force that shapes social institutions and the general attitudes of people. Religion is not at risk, and does not need to be rescued through the agency of the state; it is the liberties of the citizens and the idea of a free society that are at risk if the hegemonic view of religion replaces pluralism of faith.

Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email]

Solidarity against violence —Rasul Bakhsh Rais
28/04/2009.


Pakistan has, like many other societies, faced violence of many types — sectarian, ethnic, and now religious. But there is a difference. Most societies in Asia, Africa and Latin America that went through agonising cycles of violence, revolutionary or motivated by criminal and other considerations, have largely stabilised or are in the process of defeating them. Some have been more successful than others.

What is our story; what forces and elements fuel violence and what we can do about it? We need to debate these questions very candidly. In our view, violence is not a cultural trait of any society as is generally assumed. Therefore, it cannot be ascribed to or associated with any particular regional group.

National, regional and international circumstances produce various groups and shape their choice of violence as a weapon of political and social coercion. In making this terrible choice, two sets of belief guide the perpetrators of violence.

The first is about the self; that these individuals and groups are pursuing the right cause, have justified grievances and can convince their followers about the moral basis of violence against the state or other communities and groups that may be competing for the same space, political power or resources.

The second belief is that they can get away with violence, and that the state is too socially and politically weak to sustain a confrontation with them. There are also external interests that have destabilised Pakistan and many other states facing challenges of nation and state building. Local groups organised around ethnicity, religion or sect associated with regional states is more of a norm than an exception in South Asia, because states in this part of the world have yet to embrace the fundamental value of the Westphalian system: inviolability of borders and sovereign jurisdiction within national boundaries.

Foreign support for local militants, whether in Pakistan or other South Asian countries, is not a primary factor, however. It is the outcome of adversarial relations in the past and a covert form of coercion parallel to normal diplomacy. Foreign elements become active only when local groups create a critical mass to disrupt activities of the state or start posing a challenge to national security.

While debating what role our neighbours play in fomenting trouble inside our territories by aligning with anti-state groups, we cannot shift our analytical or policy focus away from what propels some of these groups to take up arms. Not all violent groups have similar motivations; in our history, we have confronted ethnic, sectarian and religious groups.

Ethnic and sectarian groups are pretty old and have confronted us in many forms, but their power and ability to harm the nation has depended on the political and security climate of the region and the country. For example, the absence of democracy and true federalism has alienated some sections of the Baloch people.

This created bad conditions for national integration because autocracy and centralisation worked against the spirit of ethnic and regional pluralism. The Baloch more than others rightly felt robbed of their resources, powerless to influence the policies of the centre and humiliated by the personal style of governance of Pakistan’s last strongman, General Pervez Musharraf.

And the history of internationalising domestic conflicts, particularly in relation to Afghanistan and India, has created the right atmosphere for local groups in Pakistan and these countries to work together against Pakistan’s national interests. Much of the trouble we face today in Balochistan and the Pashtun borderlands have both domestic and regional roots.

We are facing multiple security challenges today, not just the one from the Taliban. Too many groups confronting us may stretch our security resources and also divide our political attention.

As we think about our collective response to security challenges, it is also important to shape them appropriately. Parliament and political consensus among the major parties can be the starting point. Fortunately, it is already happening both on Balochistan and the Taliban threat. Provincial autonomy for Balochistan and other provinces under the 1973 Constitution should have been granted long time ago. Denial of autonomy and provincial rights is a clear violation of the social contract by the federation. This naturally feeds into the grievances of disillusioned nationalist leaders.

There appears to be an emerging sense among the major political parties that the issue of provincial autonomy is serious and needs to be settled quickly and made part of the new package of constitutional amendments. But while we wait for that to happen, the transfer of the concurrent list to the provinces shouldn’t await new amendments. That will be simply implementing the national consensus and honouring the federation’s compact with the units. Things will then hopefully start calming down in Balochistan.

Talibanisation is a complex issue because it is not confined to a particular ethnic group or region of the country. Also, it mixes politics, power and religion; and that combination makes such movements difficult and costly to defeat.

Unlike the ethnic demands of devolution of power, assertion of provincial rights on resources and autonomy that are negotiable, the Taliban’s demands about changing the very identity and writ of the Pakistani state are beyond the framework of the Constitution.

While we may employ power when there is no other choice left against a group that takes up arms and is unrelenting, something that every state does no matter how weak or small or how big the challenges, we need to mobilise society. Local communities quite often become hostage to the power and cruelty of armed groups. Also, outside the affected areas, other parts of society blame the state and security forces more than the militants. Nor are the militants always engaged in reactive violence, as people outside the conflict zones tend to believe.

It is equally necessary, if not more, to mobilise society against the violent groups, as is it is to use to force, if and when inevitable.

The cultural, historical and civilisational foundations of solidarity among the people of Pakistan are strong and have manifested themselves even without the agency of the state on occasions of national distress and emergency. Religious extremism and the violence associated with it cannot be left out of the social sphere as the exclusive responsibility of the state.

It is our country, our society, our identity and our political order under our Constitution that are threatened. Our resolve to stand up against violence and show greater solidarity would morally and socially weaken violent groups and give us the collective strength to face our challenges. We cannot afford to pass on our responsibility to others.

Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email]

Do we have democracy? —Rasul Bakhsh Rais
 

People often put this question to us, at intellectual forums or social gatherings. And then, without waiting for comment, answer it themselves: no, we don’t have democracy!

Why do people think we don’t have democracy, when we have held elections, have representative governments at the centre and in the provinces, and Pervez Musharraf is no longer our president?

The answer we get is in the form of more questions, about everything that is wrong with our society, policies, education, the economy etc. People ask: what has really changed; is this government not following the same policies as its predecessor; don’t the same people get elected every time elections are held; is it democracy when the same ruling families return to power again and again?

There are other questions, too, that raise doubts about the relevance of democracy to the socio-economic conditions of Pakistan. Some literate urbanites wonder in their conversations about democracy how a poor and illiterate population can make sensible decisions in the electoral process. They ask: is this why the same lot is elected again and again; why aren’t the poor or even the middle class represented in the provincial and national assemblies?

These are the kind of questions that we need to discuss and debate as we reflect on the quality of democracy in our country, so that we can make it better by putting greater effort into our democratic project. Interestingly, the people who raise doubts about the quality of democracy would not welcome dictatorship, they also don’t believe there is a better alternative to democracy.

Let us address some of these doubts and questions. But before that, some general remarks about democracy:

First, democracy in its simplest and basic form is about giving people the right to elect their government. Second, through this system, the aim is to create stability and certainty in society by establishing a system under which a government can be created and changed peacefully. Third, public approval of a political party to form government gives it political legitimacy and social support to manage public affairs, and formulate and implement policies. At the centre of this system is the idea of fundamental rights, political equality and individual freedoms.

These are some of the underlying assumptions about the goodness of democracy and its relevance to all cultures and civilisations. Why, then, do some societies have democracy and others don’t; why is it that the quality of democracy in some countries is better than others; and why are some societies better candidates for a transition to democracy?

The answers to these questions lie in the history of political development in a society, the nature of its elites and the political consensus among them, and how long democracy, even it its procedural, basic form, has been practiced.

Thus when looking at Pakistan, questions about democracy are more about what it could and must have done than about its inherent weakness as a system or about its relevance. Natually, popular expectations of elected governments to deliver services, maintain law and order, promote economic progress and social stability are much higher than of other forms of government. And it should be noted that other forms of government, especially dictatorships, do not require popular legitimacy; they want acceptance based on better performance.

It is still debateable whether military dictatorships have out-performed civilian governments or vice versa. Though it should be kept in mind that except for the government that came to power in 2002, no civilian government after 1985 was able to complete its tenure. We also cannot ignore the distributive effects of economic growth and investment in social projects, which were emphasised more during democratic periods than during dictatorships.

The development of democracy, let us not forget, has been hampered by the troublesome legacies of the military regimes, including ethnic fragmentation, alienation of the smaller provinces, and concentration of wealth and privilege among the class co-opted by the dictators.

Democracy is an evolutionary system; and it does not come in a perfect template. We may have some universal principles like popular sovereignty and representative government, but these have to be rooted in the socio-cultural climate of a country. The class character of society and the layers of influence and power are reflected in who usually gets elected.

During the first phases of democratic development, it is always the aristocratic classes that dominate the electoral process, but the urban landscape may have a different set of representatives, for example from Karachi or some urban centres of Punjab. Greater representation of the middle and professional classes increases over election cycles, within political parties as well, and the stability of elected governments increases too.

To meet popular expectations, and to out-perform rivals and predecessors, elected leaders need to ally with the middle and professional classes. In many countries, this has become a political necessity rather than a choice.

The quality of democracy and its stability has thus depended generally on the growth of the middle class, which in our view has expanded, and continues to rise. But the middle clas is neither organic nor ideologically homogenous. Its economic character wants to achieve more and pulls it closer to the idea of freedom, and makes it a stakeholder in political stability.

The Pakistani middle class may not be seen as yet in the elected assemblies but it occupies alternative spaces of influence, in the robust civil society movement, in the intellectual circles and in the media. The freedom of the media and the emergence of civil society and its successful movement for the restoration of deposed judges are signs of democratic change.

Pakistan may remain a transitional democracy until we have had at least three peaceful transfers of power through elections. Our elected representatives have a heavy burden to disprove the sceptics inside and outside the country by forming coalitions as they have and by building national consensus on difficult issues, as they appear to be doing.

Democracy is a natural system for an ethnically diverse and culturally pluralistic society like Pakistan. And this is why after every failed and discredited dictatorship, we have returned to democracy. Yes, we have democracy, but it may not be comparable with the quality of democracy in countries that have consistently followed this path of social and economic development.

We need to make our democracy better in the interest of the common man. And it is a collective social enterprise that we cannot leave to the dominant elites. Popular stakes and popular civic engagement will keep us on the democratic track and will speed up the process to make up for lost time.

Do we have democracy? —Rasul Bakhsh Rais 5/5/2009.
 

People often put this question to us, at intellectual forums or social gatherings. And then, without waiting for comment, answer it themselves: no, we don’t have democracy!

Why do people think we don’t have democracy, when we have held elections, have representative governments at the centre and in the provinces, and Pervez Musharraf is no longer our president?

The answer we get is in the form of more questions, about everything that is wrong with our society, policies, education, the economy etc. People ask: what has really changed; is this government not following the same policies as its predecessor; don’t the same people get elected every time elections are held; is it democracy when the same ruling families return to power again and again?

There are other questions, too, that raise doubts about the relevance of democracy to the socio-economic conditions of Pakistan. Some literate urbanites wonder in their conversations about democracy how a poor and illiterate population can make sensible decisions in the electoral process. They ask: is this why the same lot is elected again and again; why aren’t the poor or even the middle class represented in the provincial and national assemblies?

These are the kind of questions that we need to discuss and debate as we reflect on the quality of democracy in our country, so that we can make it better by putting greater effort into our democratic project. Interestingly, the people who raise doubts about the quality of democracy would not welcome dictatorship, they also don’t believe there is a better alternative to democracy.

Let us address some of these doubts and questions. But before that, some general remarks about democracy:

First, democracy in its simplest and basic form is about giving people the right to elect their government. Second, through this system, the aim is to create stability and certainty in society by establishing a system under which a government can be created and changed peacefully. Third, public approval of a political party to form government gives it political legitimacy and social support to manage public affairs, and formulate and implement policies. At the centre of this system is the idea of fundamental rights, political equality and individual freedoms.

These are some of the underlying assumptions about the goodness of democracy and its relevance to all cultures and civilisations. Why, then, do some societies have democracy and others don’t; why is it that the quality of democracy in some countries is better than others; and why are some societies better candidates for a transition to democracy?

The answers to these questions lie in the history of political development in a society, the nature of its elites and the political consensus among them, and how long democracy, even it its procedural, basic form, has been practiced.

Thus when looking at Pakistan, questions about democracy are more about what it could and must have done than about its inherent weakness as a system or about its relevance. Natually, popular expectations of elected governments to deliver services, maintain law and order, promote economic progress and social stability are much higher than of other forms of government. And it should be noted that other forms of government, especially dictatorships, do not require popular legitimacy; they want acceptance based on better performance.

It is still debateable whether military dictatorships have out-performed civilian governments or vice versa. Though it should be kept in mind that except for the government that came to power in 2002, no civilian government after 1985 was able to complete its tenure. We also cannot ignore the distributive effects of economic growth and investment in social projects, which were emphasised more during democratic periods than during dictatorships.

The development of democracy, let us not forget, has been hampered by the troublesome legacies of the military regimes, including ethnic fragmentation, alienation of the smaller provinces, and concentration of wealth and privilege among the class co-opted by the dictators.

Democracy is an evolutionary system; and it does not come in a perfect template. We may have some universal principles like popular sovereignty and representative government, but these have to be rooted in the socio-cultural climate of a country. The class character of society and the layers of influence and power are reflected in who usually gets elected.

During the first phases of democratic development, it is always the aristocratic classes that dominate the electoral process, but the urban landscape may have a different set of representatives, for example from Karachi or some urban centres of Punjab. Greater representation of the middle and professional classes increases over election cycles, within political parties as well, and the stability of elected governments increases too.

To meet popular expectations, and to out-perform rivals and predecessors, elected leaders need to ally with the middle and professional classes. In many countries, this has become a political necessity rather than a choice.

The quality of democracy and its stability has thus depended generally on the growth of the middle class, which in our view has expanded, and continues to rise. But the middle clas is neither organic nor ideologically homogenous. Its economic character wants to achieve more and pulls it closer to the idea of freedom, and makes it a stakeholder in political stability.

The Pakistani middle class may not be seen as yet in the elected assemblies but it occupies alternative spaces of influence, in the robust civil society movement, in the intellectual circles and in the media. The freedom of the media and the emergence of civil society and its successful movement for the restoration of deposed judges are signs of democratic change.

Pakistan may remain a transitional democracy until we have had at least three peaceful transfers of power through elections. Our elected representatives have a heavy burden to disprove the sceptics inside and outside the country by forming coalitions as they have and by building national consensus on difficult issues, as they appear to be doing.

Democracy is a natural system for an ethnically diverse and culturally pluralistic society like Pakistan. And this is why after every failed and discredited dictatorship, we have returned to democracy. Yes, we have democracy, but it may not be comparable with the quality of democracy in countries that have consistently followed this path of social and economic development.

We need to make our democracy better in the interest of the common man. And it is a collective social enterprise that we cannot leave to the dominant elites. Popular stakes and popular civic engagement will keep us on the democratic track and will speed up the process to make up for lost time.

Blast from the past —Rasul Bakhsh Rais 12/05/2009.
 

[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred]What is happening in the borderlands of Pakistan is blowback from the policies that we pursued in the second wave of the Cold War as an American ally and a front-line state against the former Soviet Union. According to American strategic thinking at that time, communists were the greatest enemies of humanity and a primary threat to the stability of the global system.[/COLOR][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred]Islamists from all over the world were encouraged, trained, financed and supported in the war against the Soviets. The United States and Pakistan gave no serious consideration to the long-term consequences of supporting an Islamist insurgency and effects of the militarisation and empowerment of the multi-national Muslim groups that came to dominate the Afghan jihad.[/COLOR][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred]The history of this conflict cannot be forgotten. We continue to deal with its repercussions in FATA and other areas of Pakistan and around the world. And it is for this reason that quite a few leaders and commentators in Pakistan questioned our support to the US-led war on terror. These questions were not about the morality or legality of the required actions, but how dangerous and difficult it would be to comply with an unending list of unreasonable American demands.[/COLOR][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred]Even after close cooperation with the US, American leaders have continued to doubt our commitment and sincerity as an ally, and continually point fingers at us for the resurrection of the Taliban insurgency. Given this attitude, would the Americans have accepted and respected our neutrality? Not really.[/COLOR][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred]In national fury and frustration, the Americans lost sight of some bitter realities of asymmetric conflict. The lessons learnt from Vietnam and the Soviet debacle in Afghanistan did not figure prominently in their assessments. They had a new enemy now — political, militant Islam; more immediately visible in the form of Al Qaeda and its Taliban protectors. They conveniently forgot about the long patch of Afghan history during which they had aligned themselves with these very Islamist forces. Hence this new adversary had its genesis in America’s own anti-communist strategy, and also in the many wrongs that it had committed against the Arabs and Palestinians in support of Israel.[/COLOR][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred]Pakistan and the world understood the American reasons for going after the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. There was hardly any international outcry against the American invasion to oust them from power; rather there was great support for the military operation against the Taliban within and outside the region. There was, and still is, vast support for rebuilding Afghanistan as a secure, stable and peaceful nation.[/COLOR][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred]But the degree of that support and goodwill for the US-led coalition is dwindling fast. Plenty of time, money and policy focus have been wasted on the wrong priorities, with greater focus on war than on the reconstruction of Afghan economy and state institutions.[/COLOR][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred]The initial policy — winning the hearts and minds of the Afghans — has ended up in a mess that has generated widespread anti-American sentiment not only in Afghanistan but also across the Durand Line. This is clearly a loss for the US as it has failed to create a favourable impression and lost support among the local population.[/COLOR][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred]Something has gone terribly wrong in the American approach to Afghanistan. US policymakers are not examining the failures and weaknesses of their framework. The ethnic lopsidedness of the power structure they have created in Afghanistan has alienated majority of the Pashtuns; their focus has remained keeping the Taliban on the Pakistani side of the border out of the conflict.[/COLOR][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred]It has not been an easy for Pakistan to prevent Taliban movement into Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban also frequently enter our troubled zones along the border. These groups are bound by ethnic, religious and historical linkages, especially against foreign forces.[/COLOR][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred]Pakistan’s border areas have been greatly influenced by the three cycles of war in the region: the war against the Soviets, the Afghan civil war and then the post-9/11 American-led occupation.[/COLOR][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred]In this latest war, the US, in its efforts to sanitise Afghanistan of terrorists, tasked Pakistan to effectively control the border, and flush out Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Pakistan primarily employed the same strategy in the border regions that the US applied across the border, including a larger military presence (in some areas for the first time ever), capture of foreign and Pakistani terrorists, and military operations against militant hideouts.[/COLOR][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred]Perhaps the successful stabilisation of Afghanistan would have positively contributed to Pakistani efforts in effectively controlling and governing the border. But contrary to their expectations, the US and its coalition partners faced tough resistance, which has been growing in ferocity every year.[/COLOR][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred]One major flaw in the American strategy has been heavy reliance on guns and bombs, which is the same mistake that the Soviets had committed. By relying on the military component and not employing reconciliation tactics, the Americans have shown that they have learned nothing from Afghanistan’s history.[/COLOR][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred]For Pakistan, this was not a controversial policy because its forces have often taken action against their own people and territory, something that runs against popular sentiment. The political and security costs of these operations have been horrendous. Not only has Pakistan lost over two thousand security personnel, but the entire Pashtun region, as deep as Swat, has been destabilised. Many Pashtun tribes on both sides of the border have become alienated and drifted back towards supporting the Taliban insurgency.[/COLOR][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred]Pakistan attempted to reverse this trend by singing a peace accord with the tribes in Waziristan in September 2006, and then again with the Taliban in Swat in 2008 after elected governments took over. The deal promised peace and stability in return for cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Pakistani forces. The Taliban, though, had other designs; they used peace agreements more as pauses to regroup and reorganise than to reintegrate into society peacefully.[/COLOR][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred]There were many critics of the peace deals with the Taliban inside and outside Pakistan, but the elected provincial and federal governments wanted to give the strategy a chance. This was interpreted as surrender and a weakening of Pakistan’s resolve to stay the course in the war on terror. Subsequent events have proved the critics right.[/COLOR][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred]This time around, public opinion has turned against the Taliban both in the insurgency-hit areas and in rest of the country. Another positive sign is that the major political parties are on the same page; there is growing realisation in the country that we cannot surrender anything to the armed groups or allow the Taliban to threaten the local population.[/COLOR][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred]Winning this war remains a major challenge for the entire nation. With the evolving political consensus, we need to mobilise the society in support of national efforts to stabilise the country.[/COLOR][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][COLOR=darkred]Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email][/COLOR][/FONT]

Consensus against violent groups —Rasul Bakhsh Rais
 

[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue]Consensus against violent groups--- 19/05/2009[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue]Dialogue with violent groups is about ending violence and not about conceding political ground or territorial control. In a fragmented political scene like ours, it is a major challenge to reach this understanding[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue]Political support for fighting insurgencies of all types requires national consensus. The term consensus however doesn’t mean perfect or total agreement. The major stakeholders, players and state institutions must have an agreement on who the enemy is and how best to end the violence against citizens.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue]In the present political map of Pakistan, the political parties, civil society and social groups from the Swat region and FATA are the real stakeholders. Rationally speaking, their interests are peace, stability, progress and good governance. There should be no doubt about the true aspirations of the people of this region.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue]All militant political or religious groups that take up arms against the state have a narrative of grievances, both real and fictional, that they use to build up a support base and to convince people about their path. But argument is never a strong weapon for the militants; it is through the gun, through torture and through mass murder that they establish control over communities.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue]Every insurgent group in our region, throughout history, has the narrative of injustice and hopelessness. They deliberately trashed the good intentions of governments and those political elements that wanted to reach out to them, and doubted their sincerity in resolving disputes through negotiations and peaceful means. This is not to say that all governments or those in positions of authority in Pakistan or other parts of South Asia were always people of peace and good judgement. Many of them are greatly responsible for the conditions of conflict.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue]We have often written about the causes of our current troubles, but this piece is essentially about how we can defeat those who are not willing to live under the Constitution and threaten the people, society and state of Pakistan with violence.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue]Sadly we have been through many violent conflicts and the threat of non-religious political violence still persists. Ethnic violence in Karachi for the past few years, notably on May 12, 2007 and April this year is a stark reminder of the many trouble spots that could divert our political attention and spread our security resources too thin.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue]What is then the consensus about? It is primarily about zero tolerance of violence and violent groups, regardless of their religious, sectarian or ethnic make-up. One reason some of these groups have become more violent is to establish territorial domains and dominance in the face of a weakened state and government. It is weak in terms of political legitimacy, moral standing and the political capacity to take bold decisions. Economic strains, ineffective leadership and disagreements among some vital sections of society on how to deal with terrorists further add to the weakness of the Pakistani state.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue]The narrow political interests of Pervez Musharraf and political expediency shaped his regime’s alliances with an ethnic group with a violent past in Karachi and the religious right, which has very close affinity with the Taliban. We now face the boomerang effects of his political strategy both in Karachi and in the border regions.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue]The writ of the Pakistani state is threatened by more than one group and in more than one region. Our present focus on Swat shouldn’t blind us to even greater and clearer dangers that we may face if we continue to fail in building national consensus against violent groups.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue]There are two important reasons for this failure. The first is duplicity; for example when a head of state celebrates violence in one part of the country as a sign of his political strength while using force against militants in another part, or when a political government fails to call a spade a spade owing to political expediency.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue]Such duplicity is a clear and dangerous sign of the weakening of the state. The politics of any party or group needs to be separated from the violent and criminal acts of activists, workers or hired guns, regardless of their affiliation. Tolerating the violence of one group encourages others to do the same, and further undermines the legitimacy of use of force by the state, especially if it is being selective in its targeting.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue]Use of force is not the preferred solution or the only option that a state must employ; and in an ethnically pluralistic and politically complex society like Pakistan, it cannot be the weapon of choice. As we have seen, it can be more divisive than uniting when the violent groups have a strong ethnic social support base and are plugged into nationwide religious networks.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue]The second important reason for our failure is a lack of clarity among our political elites on the identity of the enemy. The definition of enemy is politically loaded and every group will have its take based on its particular political imperatives. The picture becomes more confusing when there is more than one enemy, internal and external, and prevents the formation of a national consensus both on the identification of threat and how to deal with them.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue]Pakistan faces multiple internal and external threats today; we have referred to the linkages between the internal enemies, and the identity of our external foes is also very clear. We need to have clarity on these threats and how best to use our social, political and military resources to counter them, and to bring violent groups into mainstream politics and society.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue]This is what makes politics an art, and not a science; it seeks to make things possible and explore the outer limits of dialogue and understanding to resolve conflicts. But dialogue with violent groups is about ending violence and not about conceding political ground or territorial control. In a fragmented political scene like ours, it is a major challenge to reach this understanding; but without such an understanding and consensus, we will neither be able to point out our enemies nor find the right means to fight them.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=blue]Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]

Pipeline or pipe dream? —Rasul Bakhsh Rais 26/05/2009.
 

[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]After more than a decade of negotiations and many ups and downs, Iran and Pakistan signed the framework on the Iran-Pakistan ‘peace’ pipeline during President Asif Ali Zardari’s visit to Tehran, pushing the much-delayed project a notch forward. The gas pipeline project makes economic sense: Iran has surplus gas to sell and Pakistan needs gas.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]But situations, particularly in the extended Southwest Asian region, don’t always follow economic logic; instead, they are determined by politics, strategic interests, rivalries and conflicting views, particularly about Afghanistan. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Since the pipeline project presently concerns Iran and Pakistan, it would be better to comment on the nature of Pak-Iran ties and whether or not moving forward with pipeline will also move forward the somewhat troubled relationship between the two states. The answer lies in how we read the nature of this relationship and how it is likely to develop in the context of the larger context of power between a variety of players — Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and the United States. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]The smiles and tight embraces of diplomats and political leaders of Iran and Pakistan don’t tell much about the hidden tensions, mistrust and cloak-and-dagger behaviour between the two countries. All the talk about common cultural and civilisational roots doesn’t carry much weight for territorialised nation states, which have their own interests. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]It is the conflict or congruence of these interests that can either cause rifts between states or bring them closer together. And in today’s world, specific issues drive relations between states like Iran and Pakistan, and within the context of the larger strategic vision of each country. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]We are not sure if the strategic visions or regional and outside powers and the games they play create any groundswell for comprehensive partnerships beyond certain specific issues. The strategic partnership between Iran and Pakistan was shaped by the dynamics of the Cold War, and American dominance in Iran ended three decades ago with the Iranian clergy’s capture of the state.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]The Iranian clergymen, like their counterparts in Pakistan, have a worldview, a strategic map and a policy framework to order Iran’s regional and global relationships. In their bipolar view of the East (Muslim countries) and the West, Pakistan has been on the other side of their policy and ideological fence. It has not been easy for Pakistan to win real friendship of the post-Shah Iranian leadership.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]We don’t think Pakistan’s pragmatic tilt toward the West, more specifically the United States, was or could be a major roadblock in the way of closer relations between Tehran and Islamabad. What causes these hidden tensions, then, are conflicting interests in Afghanistan and horizontal partnerships between feuding Afghan social groups and regional states like Pakistan and Iran. This rivalry has fuelled the fire between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, causing tremendous harm to Afghan society at large.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Conflicting visions of Iran and Pakistan have not changed in the structural sense, but there appears to be a growing agreement on three specific issues that may perhaps help to transform this relationship: the war on terror; the stability and reconstruction of Afghanistan; and energy trade.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]These are not ordinary problems. They are critical and have the potential to reshape the development and security paradigms of the entire region. They key to all these issues is closer cooperation between Iran and Pakistan on the one hand, and between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the other. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]While stabilising Afghanistan and creating a shared regional interest in the future of this state may take a long time, and the war against terrorism may require greater understanding than we have at the moment, the gas pipeline has a real chance of success. It can be a great infrastructural project, and the first of its kind to connect Pakistani consumers, industries and power plants to Iranian gas-fields. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]What are its potential benefits and drawbacks for Pakistan?[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]A straightforward argument is that the pipeline project is a perfect match between a country with an energy surplus and an energy-deficient country, and that the deal is going to benefit both. It is a win-win situation. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]The real potential benefit of energy trade between Iran and Pakistan, with the possibility of its extension to India once New Delhi is on board, is in creating latent interdependence. The reason for naming the proposed gas pipeline as a ‘peace’ pipeline is because of its value in making the three countries interdependent on one another, and thus subjecting old disputes to the economic rationalism required in this day and age.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Economic interdependence leads to much larger and complex relationships, forming an unbreakable web and creating dense partnerships, and causing a spill-over from one set of issues to another. It is of course not an automatic process, and is subject to critical political decisions. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]And those decisions are about how to harmonise conflicting strategic visions that dominate in our region in all other aspects of inter-state relations. We can also approach the issue of energy trade and larger economic cooperation by separating them from conflicting strategic pursuits, and then let the real economic benefits work on reshaping the respective strategic visions of each country. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]The outcome will depend on whether it is economic rationalism or divergent strategic views that shape this partnership. It is better to realise economic benefits and let them shape the future course of our relationships than unsettled strategic problems and conflicts. But in a region like ours, competing security interests cannot easily be sidelined from the decision-making process. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Pakistan, however, runs the potential risk of over-dependence on Iranian gas, which may affect efforts to explore and develop our own gas fields. If all or most of the Iranian gas is used for the power sector, as stated by the government, then our energy mix will remain lopsidedly dependent on imported fuel.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Another serious question is why our rulers continue to ignore our hydroelectric power potential and the Thar coal deposits, some of the largest in the world. The lack of consensus that is often cited as the reason for not utilising our own resources is also politically manufactured, as the interests of important political players at a given point in time may demand something else. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Before we find leadership with a national vision and the political will to help ourselves through our own resources, let us do what energy-starved countries do: import.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]

Securing victory —Rasul Bakhsh Rais 02/06/2009
 

[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Battling warlords and religious militants cannot be a seasonal venture or an on-and-off operation. As indicated by the plight of millions of displaced persons from the conflict zones and the great sacrifices made by our security forces and civilians, it is an extraordinary situation that nobody would like to repeat.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]The presence of militant groups, both religious and ethnic, their warlordism — coercive self-imposition — on local populations and holding them hostage under perpetual fear of violence poses a grave national security threat. We cannot leave people at the mercy of private armies and their gendarmes.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]If we allow such situations to develop, as has happened in our western borderlands, not only would the sovereignty of the state erode, as it has, the successful warlordism of one group would encourage similar or other types of groups — sectarian or ethnic — to take up arms against the state and challenge its writ. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]It is not only the logic of coherence and territorial unity of the state, but also a fundamental constitutional responsibility of the state to guarantee freedom and safety of local populations and free them from brutal warlordism. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]The nation state and the warlords trying to run a parallel system of security and governance have a dialectical relationship. The two cannot co-exist; one has to eliminate the other for its own survival. Pakistan faces this challenge because violent groups have established little fiefdoms on the periphery that now threaten the peace and security of our major population centres.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Why have such groups emerged and how can we effectively defeat them?[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]There is a pile of well-argued explanations for the emergence of militant groups, from the residue of our support to the liberation of Afghanistan from Soviet occupation to the rise of militant political Islam. Also there happened to be a confluence of interests between an international coalition led by the United States during the Cold War to defeat communism, against which Pakistan was a frontline state, and the Islamist groups that had purely religious motivations against the Red Army.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]The alliance between the two was opportunistic and accidental; neither ideological nor beyond the limits of Afghanistan. There was no clarity on what they would do after the common enemy was defeated, except for a vague expectation that the United States would stay on the ground and lead efforts to rebuild Afghanistan. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]But Washington washed its hands of Afghanistan as soon as the Soviets began to withdraw, leaving it at the mercy of warring Mujahideen factions and Afghanistan’s predatory neighbours.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]The international coalition that supported the Afghan Mujahideen gave no serious thought to normalising the devastated Afghan state and society. No one really bothered to consider the impact religious forces gloating over a historic victory against the Soviet Union and Afghan communists would have on regional security.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Being fixated just on humiliating and defeating the Soviet Union and not devoting political attention and resources to rebuilding Afghanistan and reintegrating Islamic militants peacefully back into society was a mistake of titanic proportions. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]We now know the consequences of that neglect: civil war among Afghanistan’s social groups and the eventual emergence of the Taliban movement. Every neighbour of Afghanistan got sucked into the conflict, fuelling the fire of a war that demolished what was left of Afghan state and society. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]The Taliban movement, backed by Pakistan and the Pashtun ethnic groups inside Afghanistan, routed other groups and warlords that were supported by Iran, Russia, India and some Central Asian states. That victory further contributed to two dangerous developments: rule by military conquest and transnational linkages among Islamist groups from an extended Central Asia to Pakistan.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]It is a moot question whether it was the triumphalism of the transnational Islamists and their regional networking or the weakened position of countervailing forces like local opposition groups or the collapse of the state that facilitated the Taliban victory. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]While making references to all other reasons related to the Cold War and Pakistan’s policy, let us not forget that militant religious groups and warlords have risen from the ruins of the states and their weak governing structures. In Afghanistan, there was no state left; only rival ethnic groups were left to fight the Taliban, and they couldn’t stand against the ferocious and determined Taliban force until the American-led international coalition with the cooperation of the Taliban’s ethnic rivals displaced them from power in 2001.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]The governing capacity of the Pakistani state has gradually weakened in all areas, but notably more in the border regions because of the social, religious and political impact of the wars next door in Afghanistan. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Pakistan today faces the adverse consequences of the failure of the United States and other coalition partners in Afghanistan. After eight years of brutal and costly war, Afghanistan remains a fragile state, fragmented and in a state of perpetual war. The Taliban are now once again a rising force in Afghanistan as they have so far resisted the American efforts to pacify and rebuild the Pashtun areas. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]There has indeed historically been a nexus between what happened in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s western borderlands. In this part of the world, conflicts and groups involved in conflicts have often spilled over across borders on grounds of religion or nationalism or both. Now there is yet another malignant factor: the presence of our adversary across the border that acts with malicious intent to destabilise the country and make our war against the Taliban costlier. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]The mission and determination of the armed forces, political leaders and the nation at large today is to defeat the Taliban and their affiliated militant groups permanently. The political consensus and national solidarity that we have succeeded in building against the Taliban can lead us to an enduring victory if we pay greater attention to the non-military components of reconstruction and rehabilitation of the millions of displaced persons.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]More importantly, the very causes that have contributed to the rise of the Taliban militancy need to be addressed. We have to rebuild credible state capacity with a focus on strengthening the police, the paramilitary forces and intelligence, accompanied by transparent development and good governance. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]As Afghanistan is largely an American baby and its responsibility in terms of security and reconstruction, we can only hope the US will do better than it has done so far. We have a direct stake in the peace and political integrity of Afghanistan because its failures are going affect our security very adversely.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]One way we can isolate our borderland from the conflicts in Afghanistan is to integrate these regions into mainstream Pakistan with similar institutions, legal system and social services delivery. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]It is time to rethink tribal exceptionalism and its outdated institutions. The Afghan wars and the rise of militancy have damaged Pakistan, and no amount of social repairing is likely to succeed. The solution lies in slow political integration, economic development and effective and participatory statehood. Only that will win us the current war and future peace.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]

Now for concrete steps —Rasul Bakhsh Rais---09/06/2009
 

[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]There is no doubt that this is a historic moment in American history and a great opportunity for the US to refashion its relations, particularly with the Muslim world[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]No American president in recent history has raised such high hopes at home and abroad, and on every issue, from equality among races to settling one of the most challenging rifts between Muslim societies and the Western.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]This optimism about Obama presidency is not without reason. It is not just about his personal qualities, his rise to power from a very humble background, his personal struggles or the quality of his leadership; it is also — more so — about his charisma, his liberal vision and his political capacity to build coalitions.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]After the countless blunders of the Bush presidency, and a mostly flawed worldview of the neo-conservatives, Barack Obama appears to be the right person at the right time to restore faith in American ideals at home and trust in its leadership abroad.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]The United States has accumulated a great trust deficit with a large number of countries. Its image as a benign and generous power always willing to help societies in need during the early Cold War years has changed dramatically over the last quarter-century.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]It is now viewed generally as an imperialistic, pushy, greedy, self-centred and interventionist hegemonic power in most of Latin America. These perceptions have a history and some bitter facts behind them.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]But if one looks at the larger global perception of the US, such images are not confined to Latin America alone. Even some European countries, including close allies of the US, have negative perceptions of American power and its ruling establishment. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]This is only one side of the story about American society, values and culture. At a more personal level, many people who may have a negative image of the American establishment show great praise and recognition of the strength of American society, its ideals and institutions. It is not without reason that American colleges and universities attract the largest number of the brightest students, scientists, philosophers and intellectuals from every corner of the world.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Compared to many European countries, the former colonial powers, the US has treated ordinary immigrants, foreign students and intellectuals much better, often giving them the same benefits and privileges as US citizens. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Today, perhaps the greatest number of immigrant Muslims in any single foreign country might be found in the US. It has been historically a welcoming society, very warm and non-hostile to peoples from other religions, civilisations and nationalities. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Therefore, multiculturalism, individualism, personal freedoms and generally dignified space for all have been the real strength of the American society. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]But like any society, it had its flaws, like resistance in some spheres to granting equal rights to members of coloured races, specifically African Americans. In fact slavery, racial segregation and denial of civil rights were the norm until the civil rights movement of the ‘60s, successfully led by a charismatic and determined American leader, Martin Luther King Jr. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]The election of a black person, the son of an immigrant exchange student from Kenya with a Muslim background, to the White House, justifiably characterised as the most powerful office on earth, is not an ordinary political event. American society, in contrast to traditional societies like ours, recognises personal merit, achievement and excellence. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Obama being the first African American President represents the soft and real strength of American society, which is constant accommodation of new social forces like creativity and the ideas of positive change. He symbolises a revolution in American politics, something that many people unfamiliar with American history, institutions and values are unable to fathom. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]There is no doubt that this is a historic moment in American history and a great opportunity for the US to refashion its relations, particularly with the Muslim world.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]How to reach out to the Muslim world has been one of the central questions on the mind of Barack Obama, along with how to rehabilitate American prestige and respect, which seemed to be a running theme even in his inaugural address. With American troops involved in two wars in two Muslims states, Iraq and Afghanistan, and the troubling legacy of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that has historically fed into alienation and anger of Muslim societies, Obama faces a big challenge of selling his vision of reconciliation.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]It is a liberal belief that reconciliation between the Muslim societies and the West is not only desirable but also a workable project, and very fundamental to peace and harmony in the world.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Only the conservatives in Western society, though not all brands and shades of them, and the fundamentalists and religious right in the Muslim world, again not all of them, may think that reconciliation is neither possible nor necessary. Civilisational confrontationists represent only a tiny minority and cannot be allowed to cause conflict that leads to suffering and pain, mostly in Muslim countries.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]President Obama’s landmark speech in Cairo last week represents a new vision, truly a way forward in seeking co-existence and reconciliation based on mutual respect and recognition of each other’s rights and obligation to achieve peace and stability. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]It is heartening that he has recognised the centrality of the Palestinian issue to the larger menu of perceptual issues between Muslims and the West. The central message is that let us not be held hostage to history and continue to live on grievances and victim-hood of the past. This is as good as it sounds though.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]The real challenge for the United States and President Obama is the creation of a Palestinian state that is coherent and sustainable; the challenges being the return of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 that will require rolling back Jewish settlements on lands owned by the Palestinians and the return of Palestinian refugees that were forced to leave by the Zionists in 1948. Other American presidents in the past have been unwilling to use the power and influence that the US has over Israel, due to the countervailing force of pro-Israel lobbies in Congress and other power centres. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Have American interests changed in relation to the Palestinians and the Arab and Muslim world at large to an extent that warrants a major shift in American policy? Will Obama be able to build the necessary coalition between the Democrats and the Republicans to push forward his agenda of reconciliation with the Muslim world? And finally, how much pressure and influence can he really exercise over Israel to make genuine concessions to the Palestinians?[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Talking peace is good but good speeches are hardly the stuff that peace and reconciliation are made of. They are merely statements of good intentions that require concrete steps to make others, in this case the Muslim world, believe that US policy has changed.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]

Southern Punjab’s troubles —Rasul Bakhsh Rais----16/06/2009.
 

[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Culturally, there is not one but three Punjabs, excluding the one on the Indian side. If we don’t consider religion and its influence on community and identity formation, Indian Punjab would culturally and linguistically be a part of Central Punjab in Pakistan.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Apart from the familiar commonalities that are found among the ancient lands and peoples of the Indus, their dialects and social structures are very different. So are the patterns of leadership, elite formations and power relationships in society.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Southern Punjab, much like other parts of the country, no longer represents any ethnic cohesion. The ethnic-linguistic mix has greatly changed with migration from the other Punjabs since canal colonisation. And the pattern of migration through various land acquisition schemes, particularly after the absorption of the State of Bahawalpur into Punjab, has continued.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Powerful civil bureaucrats with political roots in Central Punjab have allotted hundreds of thousands of acres state land to relatives, friends, and to those who could bribe them. This pattern continues in Cholistan and Thal (Layyah). Fake land claims by the migrants from India at the time of Pakistan’s creation, which continued to be entertained for decades, were another factor that robbed a great majority of local (Seraiki) landless peasants of their rights to own land.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]In some areas, migration has even changed the historical demographic balance, particularly in major cities and towns of Southern Punjab. The region today represents a complex mosaic of linguistic and ethnic groups, including Baloch, Punjabis, Seraikis, Mohajirs and Pashtuns. The latter are in smaller numbers as a residual social class of the Pathan rulers of the Derajat (Dera Ghazi Khan and Dera Ismail Khan) and the Multan state before its conquest by Ranjit Singh. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Social characteristics of a region, complex as they are in Southern Punjab, are important to understanding which social groups control resources — land, political power and social influence — and how they affect social relations and development patterns.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]The ever-expanding towns of Southern Punjab represent a very complex picture of ethnicity and culture, provide a common space for all and an opportunity for liberation from feudal bondage for the peasant as well as the middle income agriculturalist. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Although all cities of Punjab have been rotting for decades under massive political and bureaucratic corruption, the towns of Southern Punjab have suffered the most.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Just visit any town, including Multan, the seat of some of the ruling families of the region: the dust, smog and litter will hit you in the face. You will see broken potholed roads, leaking sewage and constant construction under special programmes by prime ministers, presidents and hordes of provincial and federal ministers from the region.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]The villages and rural areas of the region are worse than the towns. At least in the towns, there might be some functioning public schools and a few colleges, but not in most of the rural areas. There is at least one ghost degree-college that this writer has observed in one of the southern districts. In town colleges, teachers do not attend classes or lecture regularly. The teachers of natural sciences run private academies and don’t devote themselves to teaching at the colleges.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]The same is true of government hospitals where even the poor patients needing some surgery are driven to private clinics run by doctors on the payrolls of government hospitals. There might be a few noble exceptions to this practice that robs both state and society, but what this writer has witnessed over several visits to the region is heartbreaking.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]What hurts more is that the ruling classes of the region continue to be elected by the same helpless peasantry that is hauled to the polling station every time to confirm political legitimacy on their lords. Democracy therefore has to go a long way to make the ruling classes accountable to anyone — the law, institutions or the common voting citizen. But this is the only route to progress; we have tried all others. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Great difference is visible in the quality of education delivery and some other social services among the rural areas of Southern Punjab between the native and the settler communities. The settler or migrant communities fare much better in terms of quality of education, particularly in areas where they have demographic strength. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]The native villages that we have observed in more than one district of the region have seen very little or no development: their schools are dysfunctional or most of the teachers are absent; basic health centres have no doctors; and roads break down within a few months of their construction. This is no fiction; it is a cruel reality that is very visible in so many areas.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]How do we explain these troubles of Southern Punjab?[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]They are primarily because of feudalism, semi-tribal social structure and monopoly of landowning families over political representation. This class has misused its power and continues to do so. There appears to be an unbreakable nexus between the civil bureaucrats heading different government departments at the district level and the elected representatives both of local governments and the members of provincial and federal legislatures. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Again, with few exceptions, they have joined hands to misappropriate development funds by spending very little on projects and pocketing most of the money. During the Musharraf years, Southern Punjab witnessed greater plunder than perhaps any other region of the country. Transparent and fair accounting and auditing, including quality checks of public works programmes in the region, would reveal the scale of this plunder.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Has any thing changed under the new elected government of Punjab?[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]No. Sadly, nothing has really changed in Southern Punjab. We have the same number of ghost schools — mostly girls’ schools — absentee teachers and doctors, and poor quality of public works. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Punjab as whole and Southern Punjab in particular has been in constant decline as a result of poor governance and an ineffective system of accountability. Regrettably, the greatest number of poor, landless and miserable people live in Southern Punjab. These are perfect conditions for alienation and driving people towards hopelessness and desperate actions.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Accountability of both corrupt bureaucrats and public representatives — past and present — may gradually restore some trust in governing institutions. The new rulers of Punjab need to understand the troubles of Southern Punjab and take remedial actions. Some of these actions are doable, like better governance through efficient and reliable service delivery. For change in social and power relations, we’ll have to wait till true democracy takes root.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkred]Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]

For Iran’s soul —Rasul Bakhsh Rais---23/06/2009
 

[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]For the first time in the three decades since the Revolution, Iran’s clerical regime is facing a serious challenge to its political legitimacy. Hundreds of thousands of people, men and women, young and old, have taken to the streets across Iran to protest what they claim was an election rigged against the popular reformist candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]Scores of protestors have been killed so far and hundreds arrested. Since Iran’s media is strictly controlled by the regime and the foreign media have been asked to close down and leave the country, it is not possible to confirm how many have died and how many have been take away by the security forces. What is certain, however, is that Iran’s clerical regime has gradually lost its mass appeal.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]The dissent against the clerical regime is not new. Social and political resistance against Iran’s theocratic configuration has been brewing for long. The alleged rigging has given the sentiment a fillip. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]To understand today’s Iran it is important to revisit the social history of the revolution against the Shah of Iran, an upheaval which was given a hegemonic interpretation by the Ayatollahs, as being Islamic. The Iranian revolution was essentially a multi-front social and political resistance against the US-installed and protected regime of the Shah in which the clergy was one of the major, though very central, actors.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]This is why initially the post-revolutionary Iranian government was more representative of diverse social and political interests of the society. Soon, however, the clerical establishment with a charismatic and highly respected Ayatollah Khomeini as the leading figure began to redefine the ethos and ideology of the Iranian revolution in absolutist Islamic terms.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]The Islamic character of the revolution then drowned all other definitions of the phenomenon. Taking advantage of the popular anti-American sentiment, the clerics de-legitimised any opposition by terming them anti-revolution. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]In more ways than one, the Iranian revolution and how one social group took control of the state resembled the classic revolution. It quickly transformed into one great leader, one interpreter of what the revolution was all about, and one ideology. There is so much evidence about how other claimants of revolutionary legitimacy were brutally suppressed.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]The dissent against the clerical establishment was not confined to other relatively democratic and liberal forces of the society. Even some of the noted clerics with the high-sounding rank of Ayatollah became opposed to the direction the revolution was taking.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]The grand theocratic narrative won over, however and the post-revolutionary reconstruction of the Iranian state and society since then has been a one-sided show, dominated by the clergy. They managed it by capturing the state and using its coercive instruments. The rest of the job was done by Iraq when it attacked Iran to take advantage of the country’s internal turmoil and in the process forced Iran to close ranks which played to the advantage of the clergy. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]The clerical rule has had an aura of popular legitimacy, which the clergy has achieved through constant social mobilisation, mostly of the poor sections of the society. This explains partly the dilemma of the Islamic Republic and how it has landed itself into serious trouble. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]Its social mobilisation strategy needed an enemy and it had one from the beginning — the United States of America. For three decades, the regime has presented itself and its ideology as anti-western with appeal beyond its national boundaries to all Muslim groups to unite and struggle against American imperialism and hegemony. It has actively supported groups that are close to its sectarian view and world outlook in the Middle East and Central Asia.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]But the social mobilisation strategy of the clergy seems to have overspent its social and political capital with enormous economic and social costs to the Iranian society and citizen. Socially, the clerical regime became intolerant, morally oppressive and demanding political loyalties beyond the normal span. It has continued to ground its policies in fear of counter-revolution or the resurgence of forces that supported by external enemies would undermine its stable control of the society.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]Not all the fears were unfounded. Some of the Arab countries, notably Iraq under Saddam Hussein and Western countries wanted to destabilise and discredit the Islamic revolution and they imposed a costly war on Iran in its early phase of social and political consolidation. The way Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini’s leadership fought back even in a state of international isolation was quite remarkable. As noted earlier, the war provided the regime deep social roots in the society and far greater popularity than many other post-revolutionary regimes.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]The clerical establishment of Iran has squandered off much of that popularity and its popularity among the masses today is questionable at best. The political dissent against the suffocating rule of the clergy has taken many subtle forms in the arts and culture and focused on human rights because outright political opposition can have very serious consequences in Iran. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]The popular sentiment in Iran to reform the regime and the system with greater freedoms and lesser social and political restrictions is over a decade old. The reform movement of Iran today that Mr Mousavi and his supports in the street lead, represents the same popular sentiment that got Mohammad Khatami elected as president. But Khatami failed to deliver on freedoms and reforms and had very little to stand against the clerical establishment, and had to bow out eventually, tearful and heart-broken. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]Today the Iranian social and political is very different. The decades-old reform movement is powered by anger, frustration and the energy of old and new social classes of Iran that want change. And it is seemingly built on a serious political theme: an election and popular mandate have been stolen. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]This change in not to start a new revolution, it is about reforms at the moment. But movements often take different turns and produce consequences that surprise those who hold power.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]Will there be change in Iran?[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]It is a very difficult question. There are divisions, serious ones within the founders of the Islamic revolution. A good number of them, including former president Ali Akbar Rafsanjani have come out openly in support of the anti-establishment candidate, Mr Mousavi. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]What is certain is that Iran is now caught in a big political rift, which is more than simply an issue of ascertaining who really won the presidential election and who lost it. It is once again about how Iran must define itself internally and in relation to its neighbours and the international community. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]

Betraying the peasant —Rasul Bakhsh Rais---30.06.2009
 

[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]While many of us sit in air-conditioned offices during the hottest period of the summer, my thoughts go out to the peasants, literally millions of them, working in the fields, sowing and tending crops under the blazing sun with their barely covered sunburnt bodies. Never does their routine of work change with the changing cycles of seasons — cool, hot, good or bad. They have to do what they have to do for a living; unending work without much compensation from their lords.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]The peasantry of Pakistan, from the Northern Areas down to the coastal zones of Sindh, grow everything we have on our dining tables, and feed our textile and many other industries round the year. They contribute a substantial amount of their time, energy and, frankly speaking, most of their productive lives to generating our national wealth and keeping the rent-seeking landlords happy and prosperous. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]What have the lords, the state and society done for the peasants?[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]First, let us talk about the lords. There is socially a dialectic relationship between the lords and the peasants. Lords cannot be lords without a passive, obedient and socially depressed and economically deprived peasant class. In almost every region of Pakistan where we have landowners, and peasants working for them, we have traditional, hierarchical social relations. Much of this hierarchy rests on ownership of land on the one hand and landlessness on the other.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]The real question is who gets what on account of the ownership of land and work on the land. There may be some regional variation in how the costs and benefits of agricultural produce are distributed between the landowners and the peasants, but those who contribute physical labour, quite often with the entire family — men, women and even children working as a team — get very little. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]Peasant families, even when they are overworked, barely get enough to survive and often end up in some kind of debt-trap. Most landlords have never been interested in improving the social and economic conditions of their peasants. Rather, they have obstructed almost every type of development, like education, that could lead to social mobility and economic liberation for the peasants.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]How have they managed that?[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]The landowners comprise our governing elite at level of the society, from the Union Council to the national parliament. They have the power to ensure that girls’ schools for peasant families are set up close to them but also function with teachers present and classes held regularly. Unfortunately, that is not the case in most of the areas where we have a small landowning class dominating the social and political scene and lording over a large landless peasantry.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]The social conditions of the peasant communities are appalling, particularly in rural Sindh and Southern Punjab, domains of large land-owning families. Half-hearted land reforms and the fragmentation of land among successive family members has not eroded either the economic power of these families or their social significance. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]Landlords are a social class more than an economic class. They have found ample means, mostly through politics and political office, to maintain their hold on their respective areas of influence and have also become more prosperous. Therefore the argument that land holdings have shrunk in size is not valid in proving that the social or political influence of the landlords has declined.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]Yes, the emergence of small land holders has been a positive development in many areas of Pakistan. This group has expanded substantially over the decades as a result of two important developments. A section of them has been allotted government lands under various land distribution schemes. Others have purchased small parcels because of the Dubai factor or due to the social and economic mobility of a member of the family who became a professional or joined government service. And they are the vanguard of modern-day capitalist farmers. But compared to the vast peasantry, the number of small and medium landowners is relatively small.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]A section of the peasantry has been liberated by slow growth, but that is not enough. State and society cannot leave social development of the peasantry to the laws of nature or to the trickle-down Musharraf-Aziz economy that our elected governments should have thrown out as soon as they left the political scene. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]Besides economic exploitation of the peasantry, we see the old system of social oppression in place. It is still not uncommon for peasant girls to be kidnapped and forced to satisfy the sexual desires of a member of the local landowning clan. Lacking skills and means, these unfortunate peasants are resigned to their fate and are never able to move out. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]What has the state done for the peasants; what can it do?[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]True land reforms could have brought about a social revolution like the one small landowners are bringing about in central Punjab. The small landowner has become socially and economic independent and has opened many opportunities for quality education and thus greater social and economic mobility. Many families in Southern Punjab that have slowly entered this class are the beneficiaries of the Ayub Khan and, to some extent, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto land reforms.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]We know the reasons why land reforms are not possible. Military rulers could do it because they were not socially or institutionally bound to the landowning class. The current crop of leaders from all parties, except the urban MQM, has its social and thus political roots in land ownership. Why would these leaders destroy their own social and political base?[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]But there are a lot more positive things that the state can do for the peasants without land reforms. First, we need to do something about the state of governance. The failure of governance that has pushed Pakistan to the top ten failed states index hurts the peasantry the most. All rent-seeking elements of the state, from the local policeman to higher ranking government officials, suck the blood of the peasantry like wild leeches and nobody really comes to their rescue. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]None of the major or minor political parties is organised at the local level, has any dedicated local cadre to organise the peasantry or works toward their welfare. And unfortunately whatever peasant movements we had in the sixties and seventies have declined in their ideological appeal and scope of activities.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]Education is the key to the liberation of the peasantry. Failure in delivering this basic social service, and others like health, is keeping the peasantry bound in tradition and in the unfailing service of the lords. Effective, quality and universal public education along with better governance is the least we can give to the peasant, in return what he has done to improve the quality of our lives and the national economy.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]

A decisive shift —Rasul Bakhsh Rais---7/7/2009
 

[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]We are not sure if the Pakistani Taliban and their brand of justice and political violence ever had grassroots public support. There is only one objective measurement of public support, and that is the percentage of the popular votes a party or group wins at the elections. The Taliban and their public defenders, their numbers on a constant decline, don’t have trust in the common man or seek power through popular legitimacy. Their route to power is through tribal-type conquest and absolute subjugation of the people.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]But then the Taliban are a very kind of people: they don’t accept democracy, the constitution, fundamental human rights, equality among citizens or the sovereignty of parliament. Nor do they represent Islam, as it is understood and interpreted by great classical or modern day Muslim scholars and jurists. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]The Taliban, those who have taken up arms against the people, society and state of Pakistan, have neither learnt the ethical, philosophical and cultural content of Islam nor have they any respect for religious pluralism within the broader understanding of Islam as is practiced by different streams of religious thought in different countries. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]How did they emerge as a religious and militant force? [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]The political and ideological roots of the Pakistani Taliban are in the Taliban movement of Afghanistan and its successful overthrow of the fragmented Mujahideen government. Two other factors need to be mentioned regarding their rise. First is the Pashtun ethnicity and the philosophy of tribal jihadism to redress wrong, seek justice, punish wrong doers, and realistically establish their control and political domination. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]The second is our alliance with the Taliban as a formidable demographic and military force against other ethnic groups in Afghanistan, which were supported by our rival regional powers — Iran, India and Russia. Many political leaders in Pakistan and in other countries thought that the Taliban were a good force as long as they could end violence and warlordism, establish peace and security and de-weaponise Afghan society. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]Since the Mujahideen war against the Soviet Union, private Pakistani religious groups along with our government and Western powers became deeply involved in Afghanistan. It was a strange mix of powers with different post-Soviet outlooks for the region, rooted in different ideological traditions but with an immediate common goal: defeat of the Soviet Union and the Afghan communists.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]Our Taliban tradition — armed struggle by mainly religious groups to establish an Islamic regime — is based on history, factional beliefs and political ethos linked to the Afghan Taliban. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]The closet Taliban in the media, the religious and political parties, and some political commentators created a benign myth about the Taliban as an Islamic force willing to sacrifice anything to defeat western imperialism and its surrogate elites in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A wide array of other Muslim groups from the Middle East have similar agendas and have trans-national linkages through Al Qaeda and other organisations to fund and promote this mindset. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]The Taliban mindset further flourished during the Musharraf regime with what was virtually the political front of the militant Taliban running governments in two critical provinces — Balochistan and the NWFP, both bordering Afghanistan, where a Taliban insurgency was underway. It was really during the tenure of General Musharraf that the Pakistani Taliban in Swat, Malakand and FATA became organised and started taking control of territory through the use of violence. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]The anti-American sentiment in the context of Afghanistan was carefully cultivated by Taliban sympathisers in Pakistan, which further nurtured the image of the Taliban as an ‘anti-imperialist force’ and some kind of liberators. Some leaders, mostly from the religious parties, justified crossing of the Pak-Afghan border by the Pakistani Taliban much like the Mujahideen that fought against the former Soviet Union.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]The supporters of the Taliban, now silenced by the majority view, still don’t see them as a threat to society and the state. It doesn’t really matter to these Taliban supporters if people are humiliated, whipped or slaughtered publicly and on camera. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]But finally, the people of Pakistan, the silent majority, have woken up to the threat that the Taliban and their supporters in different political formations pose to society and, in a broader context, to the image of Muslims and Islamic civilisation. The Taliban actually further the same caricatured view of Islam and Muslims societies as intolerant, primitive and hostile to modernity and human liberty as the one held by some orientalists.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]Pakistan’s standing as an Islamic society suffered a great deal during the Musharraf regime as it was caught between the Taliban and him with no respect for the constitution, the people’s mandate or democratic principles. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]As the fake democracy and political manipulations of the Musharraf regime and his political associates and their corruption have become exposed, so has the brutality and violent face of the Taliban. As the Taliban ordered suicide bombing of civilians, killed security personnel, targeted locally influentials and engaged in criminal activities to sustain their war against the Pakistani state and society, the people of Pakistan realised who the real enemy was.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]The people in Swat and FATA have been held hostage and have suffered the cruelty and totalitarianism of the Taliban for too long. Neither successive Pakistani governments nor the rest of society came to their rescue, while the Taliban’s supporters continued to praise them as patriotic, just and selfless warriors. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]A big shift in the image of the Taliban and their supporters has occurred, not accidentally but after a careful analysis of what Pakistan and its society would become if the Taliban and other religious zealots were allowed to capture power. Life in Pakistan under the Taliban or forces like them would fare no better than the Hobbesian state of nature — brutish, nasty and short.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]We believe the support for the Taliban was exaggerated and their image hyped up unrealistically. Actually, those praising the Taliban should have migrated to live under their brutal rule with the daily drill of public executions, mass murders and dehumanisation of women.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]The strong sentiment against the Taliban that has emerged is comparable to the patriotic sentiment during our wars with India. Many people in Pakistan and outside the country believe that the Taliban are a worse enemy that any other internal or external adversary that we have ever faced.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]This realisation, though late in the day, is going to help the security forces and the nation marginalise and effectively counter the Taliban threat. Pakistan has already secured a big victory against the Taliban by creating a national consensus against them. The Taliban and their supporters that scared us for so long have suffered a big blow and may not able to socially and politically recover. But this also offers us a respite and opportunity to address the domestic and foreign policy issues that created the Taliban monster in the first place.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=green]Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]

All politics is local —Rasul Bakhsh Rais---21/07/2009
 

[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen]If there is anything real and basic to democracy, it is local government institutions. No genuine democrat can think of developing democratic culture and traditions without grassroots democracy. Thomas Phillip “Tip” O’Neill Jr, a long-time Speaker of the American House of Representatives and an outspoken Democrat, emphasises how local political issues and rooting politics at the grassroots level would matter for any political aspirant in his All Politics is Local and Other Rule of the Game.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen]Although it was said and written in the American political context, it is a meaningful phrase and we cannot grasp its wisdom unless we know a bit about the the evolution of democracy and the development of democratic ideas in the western world. In almost every mature democratic country, including developing ones, that has chosen instrumental democracy for social and political development, local government institutions are considered the foundations of democracy.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen]Democratic systems are intended to have multiple institutional layers and that is for a purpose: to diffuse and separate powers. Horizontal separation of powers — among institutions — and vertical separation of powers — among geographical units — is meant to create a competitive political environment and create a spirit of accommodation and working together.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen]Contrarily, concentration of powers in a single institution or single unit, even if the governments were elected, would work against the spirit of democracy. And this practice in the past has damaged democracy, giving us civilian dictators. We have substantial evidence for this leadership flaw.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen]Why have the two major political parties, the PPP and PMLN, allowed local governments to die out, and have then come up with a proposed ordinance allowing provincial governments to appoint administrators at the district level?[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen]The reasons that representatives of the Punjab government and others opposed to elected local governments have given are frivolous. Yes, there has been corruption in the projects implemented by the district governments, and yes, quite a few District Nazims supported Pervez Musharraf. But are these reasons good enough to not hold fresh electiosn? And it is also a thoughtless argument that a military dictator created the system of present local governments to serve his own political interests.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen]The idea and practice of democratic local governments is centuries old and has nothing to do with the political ideology of Pervez Musharraf or his regime. Even in our country, there have been so many attempts in the past to institutionalise local democracy, mostly by military dictators, but each time elected governments somehow thought they were useless.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen]Sadly our elected governments have yet to learn some basic principles of shaping true democracy and have to travel some political distance in this respect, beyond elections and getting elected. That is necessary for legitimacy, but it takes more than just elections to build democracy based on shared powers and political cooperation.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen]There are two reasons why the two major political parties have decided to gun down local governments. First, the district is the real hub of administrative powers and the key centre of social services delivery. The provincial governments run by the PPP and the PMLN in Punjab and Sindh, and the PPP’s allies in Balochistan and the NWFP want greater control over districts through administrators from the bureaucracy.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen]The bureaucracy today has lost all institutional autonomy as it has increasingly been pushed to serve the political interests of those who happen to rule at the Centre and in the provinces. It is a sad reflection on the decline of administrative institutions. While the chief ministers can handpick civilian administrators, shuffle them around and repost them, they cannot do that to an elected Nazim. Even curtailing the Nazim’s powers might involve political risk and spark unwanted political confrontation.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen]The second reason is related to the issue of centralised control over the entire province. It is very simplistic to argue that the solution to the bad governance that is a defining character of our country is to place more powers in the hands of provincial chief executives. It has not worked in the past and it is not going to work in future.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen]The entire struggle against Musharraf and his regime was not about creating civilian dictators but building a democratic polity. That we cannot accomplish without sustaining local government institutions and building their true democratic character.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen]The local government system that is soon going to be replaced by bureaucratic administrators was not without defects. There were essential controls left in the provincial capitals, like finance and administrative machinery to facilitate a Nazim aligned with the regime, and create hurdles for those who were not. And the chief ministers under the federally designed local governments ordinance could exercise powers against an elected Nazim if he took a different political line.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen]These flaws were wilfully inserted into the legal system governing the local governments to remote control them and make them dependent on the provincial bureaucracy and the provincial chief executive. Such levers of control in our view are against the essence of local-tier democracy.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen]We thought that post-Musharraf political governments would be different in dealing with democratic institutions, that they would rebuild them and not destroy them. The recent move through the presidential ordinance in consultation with the provincial governments to end the Musharraf-era local governments is not a contribution to democratic transition, quite the reverse of it.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen]Democracy operates at different levels, and for open and competitive politics it must have different centres with greater dispersal of power. And that is not taking place, and never will it if we have selective democracy that suits the interests of party bosses.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen]Continuity in democratic practices is what makes incomplete or even bad democracy get better, and over time transform into a truly people-centred, representative and responsive system.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen]The system bureaucratic administrators will empower the political bosses with the personalised power of appointment and removal. It may serve the political interests of the parties, but not the interest of building democracy. Our democratic transition has certainly received a major setback with the removal of local governments.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen]Let us remind the party bosses and the provincial chief executives that democracy is not what they can pick and choose and what essentially serves their immediate political interests. Rather democracy is about sharing power and building different layers, recognised ones in any federals system. And that is not happening.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen]By removing one basic and fundamental tier of democracy, we have harmed our democratic cause. The institutional flaws and bad practices in the local government system can be corrected with continuity, not by throwing the entire system out of the window.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=darkgreen]Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]

[SIZE="5"][COLOR="DarkRed"][B]Will the surge work?[/B][/COLOR][/SIZE]


[B][I][U]By Rasul Bakhsh Rais[/U][/I][/B]
[B]Tuesday, July 28, 2009[/B]


This is a war of attrition, and the surge will not make a difference, except raising costs on both sides. Time in such long cycles of war becomes a crucial variable. Local combatants, in this case the Pashtun Taliban, think it is on their side

The US-led war in Afghanistan has now entered its eighth year and victory against the insurgent Taliban is nowhere in sight. Rather, both the Taliban insurgency and the recent expansion of the counter-insurgency campaign mainly by the American and British components of the NATO/ISAF forces has intensified the conflict.

Afghanistan is more troubled today than it was about four years ago. The Taliban, entirely from the Pashtun ethnic background, have regrouped, reconstituted their networks of fighters and have greatly improvised their insurgency tactics.

Far from being defeated, the Taliban present existential threat to the Afghan state that is still in the process of reconstruction and development. Will the Afghan state, its leadership and power structure, survive the Taliban offensive if international coalition forces leave the country?

No. The Afghan state and its security apparatus are very weak, and everything that has been built so far may collapse. Nobody in the international community would like to see that happen. The implications of the post-Taliban Afghan state’s defeat for the peace and stability of the country and the entire region would be disastrous.

What, then, is the solution to the Afghan conflict?

The American view, shared to a great degree by Western countries, is that quitting Afghanistan mid-way before achieving the objectives is not an option. Therefore, the public face of their strategy is that they will do whatever it takes, no matter how long it takes, to destroy the Al Qaeda leadership and prevent it from regrouping and using Afghanistan as a base to attack western security interests in the region or on their home turf.

The Americans and their British allies are apparently not deterred by the recent rise in the number of casualties in the war against the Taliban, and say that the sacrifices they have made are worth the effort to defeat their enemies.

There are many unexplained and unanswered questions about the American-led war in Afghanistan. One troubling question is why this war targets the Pashtun regions, leaving so many of warlords from other ethnic groups that have committed heinous war crimes against fellow Afghans unharmed? And we even find these warlords in the ruling establishment in Kabul, which has been set up with American money and the sacrifice of its young soldiers.

The answer lies in the fact that the many things the Americans did or didn’t do at the time of military intervention in the fall of 2001 to rout the Taliban regime were done in a rage, without time to pause and reflect calmly on the effects of that war on Afghan society and bordering countries.

While reeling from the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US did not care about what might happen next, to them or to Afghan society, which they were attacking with the most modern and lethal war machine on the planet. Never in modern history was there such disequilibrium of power, and such disproportionate use of indiscriminate force without much thought to where bombs fell or what damage was done to the civilian population.

An odious aspect of the military intervention was the alliance with northern warlords, filled to the brim with anger and hate for the Taliban, who had defeated their forces and were instrumental in the assassination of their hero, Ahmed Shah Masud.

They allowed the warlords to apply whatever barbaric methods they wanted against their captured enemies, the Pashtun Taliban. There is no evidence that American forces encouraged them to torture their captives, but then there are stories of terror suspects being held in other countries, being tortured there for information.

Further, the fact that the Bush administration hushed up war crimes investigations and the Obama administration is equally not open to a war crimes investigation against allied Afghan warlords will not bring them closer to the Pashtun Taliban or create an environment of trust.

American strategy in Afghanistan has alienated the Pashtuns. If they have read any old Afghan history, they shouldn’t be surprised if they face greater resistance today than they did in the first couple of years.

The larger part of Afghanistan is reportedly under Taliban influence. The state-building efforts that were not part of the original objectives of the American forces have faltered. Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan are in turmoil; this has created a grave security situation for us.

The Americans may want an exit strategy, but given that they are deep in conflict, they cannot openly say anything about it or the fact that they cannot achieve a decisive victory in this war, or be sure if post-American Afghanistan will be stable and peaceful.

The war that the Americans have landed themselves in, and in a society that has resisted foreign forces by combining Islam and nationalism, cannot really produce the kind of victory the Americans might be thinking of. And if it is ever achieved, it will come at a tremendous material and human cost.

Fearing the collapse of everything that the Americans have tried to build in Afghanistan, we don’t think that American leadership, Democrat or Republican, will exit Afghanistan without achieving its objective of nabbing or killing Al Qaeda leaders. That will be the kind of face-saving that would allow the Americans to wind up their war in Afghanistan.

In the meantime, their focus is on securing the Afghan state and building its capacity to defend itself against internal enemies, notably the Taliban. There has been some progress on the political aspects of state-building, like the drafting of a constitution, elections and parliaments. These gains are now increasingly threatened by the deteriorating security situation in the country.

The surge of American forces in Afghanistan has come in the light of the Iraqi experience, and is also dictated by the need to ensure that the presidential elections scheduled for August 20 have a respectable level of participation among the Pashtuns, largely the constituency of Hamid Karzai.

The surge may temporarily push the Taliban back into remote areas, or force them to disperse, but it may not end the insurgency. Around eight years of wars are by any measure too much. And if other options, like negotiations with the adversary, are not exercised because that would convey an impression of weakness, we will see more bloodshed and mayhem in Afghanistan unless one side realises it cannot go on fighting.

This is a war of attrition, and the surge will not make a difference, except raising costs on both sides. Time in such long cycles of war becomes a crucial variable. Local combatants, in this case the Pashtun Taliban, think it is on their side.

Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email]

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A lost generation —Rasul Bakhsh Rais---11/08/2009
 

[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]We have seen countless pictures from Swat and FATA of men in the prime of their youth sporting long hair and untrimmed beards, and with guns strapped to their shoulders. There are tens of thousands of such mercenaries who have taken up fighting as a vocation in the private armies of warlords like the dreaded and dead Baitullah Mehsud and many others that have established their fiefdoms across the tribal belt.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
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[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]At first glance, these young men known as the Taliban, and mostly Pashtun, appear to be well trained in the art of killing, suicide bombing and offering any sacrifice their commanders may wish them to offer. They have a kind of faith in and certitude about their mission in life, which might be subject to many interpretations. And the accounts of the atrocities they have committed against their local opponents and the security forces battling them out suggest they are ruthless and hard-hearted.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]There has emerged a glorified cult of militancy that has attracted the unemployed and uneducated youth of FATA. This region has remained out of the formal structure of governance since the colonial times, when modern nation states starting forming under British rule.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]It is true that many times in history, tribesmen have rebelled and many times they have raised lashkars or private armies, but those were for limited objectives and stayed mobilised for a limited time. And the target was not always the colonial power or, later, the government of Pakistan. Tribes and sub-tribes have quite frequently taken up arms against rival social formations to settle old scores. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]Neither the warrior tradition, nor social anarchy can alone define the new generation of militants. It is the neglect of this region, by keeping it on the fringe of the nation state and out of the socio-economic development of mainstream society, that has produced this constant flow of militants. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]There are other factors that are extraneous to us as well. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]But what we have witnessed over the last decade or so in the tribal areas and beyond the Durand Line in the adjoining provinces of Afghanistan is very different from past tribal uprisings. This insurgency seems to be organised neither along tribal lines nor for limited local objectives. Also, it involves transnational militants from many other countries, mostly Muslim, that have larger, regional ambitions.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]The war in Afghanistan has truly spilled over into Pakistan, though the wars of Afghanistan have never been confined to its territorial limits and have had a direct impact on the Pashtun tribes and population in Pakistan.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]There are multiple factors that have shaped militancy inside Pakistan’s borderlands. Given the thirty years war in Afghanistan, no one should be surprised about the insurgency Pakistan faces, and the fact that it has sustained itself for so many years and may not die out so easily even after the top commanders of the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan are eliminated.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]The ethnic as well as political roots of Pakistan’s troubles in the borderlands are in the war in Afghanistan, which is in its fourth cycle. An international coalition of forces led by the United States and NATO is struggling to defeat in Afghanistan militants similar to the type Pakistan is fighting against. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]Some Pakistanis have argued that the troubles the country is facing today are the result of its policy toward Afghanistan when it was invaded by the former Soviet Union. The debate about Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan in support of the Mujahideen and later the Taliban may remain controversial and inconclusive. But no one can deny the malignant effects of the wars that two superpowers have fought next door to us for different reasons. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]Could a state like Pakistan with a major Pashtun community within its fold and long a history of support to the Afghan resistance remain disinterested? We cannot isolate regime interests and strategic considerations from the general question of the Afghan state and the regional rivalry to influence the outcome of conflict there. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]Pakistan faces today the boomerang effects of these Afghan wars, some of which might have been calculated quite in advance. One of the questions in this respect that should have occupied our strategic thinkers and planners was how address the twin issues of security and development in the vastly changed social structure of FATA, under the impact of the commanders and veterans of the Afghan wars. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]The tribal borderlands have traditionally been left to an archaic system of governance under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, tribal leaders and the political agents. But the effects of the Afghan wars have changed the traditional power equation: the local commander with international links and patronage has replaced the power of the khans and the maliks. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]Pakistan has already lost a lot of time in rethinking the borderlands. The old system cannot deliver and has been under stress for decades. Only the old power elites from the region and the bureaucracy administering the region has defended the old system. The region should have been integrated into the NWFP with representation in the provincial assembly and extension of normal state apparatus.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]That option is still missing in the priorities of the federal government as it fights the insurgents. Maybe it doesn’t want to open up too many fronts, but at least the social and economic development agenda, focusing on the education and retraining of FATA youth, should have topped the list.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]We understand the difficulty of launching social and economic development projects in zones of conflict, but the government could start projects in relatively peaceful areas and build from there. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]The biggest challenge is not when and how security forces eliminate warlords, it is about winning back the youth and taking them away from the influence of these warlords. Their position would weaken if they don’t have young recruits joining their militias. And that doesn’t seem likely any time soon.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]Counter-insurgency requires multi-pronged strategy, involving political and institutional reforms and social and economic development. It is never too late for some path correction, and the time for that is now. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]We have heard a lot about economic reconstruction zones and FATA development plans. These need to be pursued effectively without wasting time, starting with the areas that have been cleared of militants.[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]We have lost an entire generation to militancy in the FATA region. While we try to bring them back towards normal social and economic activity, we must be focused on how to meaningfully educate our new generation there and create economic opportunities for the tribal regions. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]Many of the militants in the business of war could be scientists, engineers, and educators if they had been given the gift of modern education. We as a society and as a nation have to answer for what they are today, what they have done, and why their worldview is in conflict with ours. [/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Comic Sans MS][SIZE=3][COLOR=slategray]Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email][/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT]

Afghanistan’s step forward —Rasul Bakhsh Rais---18/08/2009
 

It is a mark of progress itself that Afghanistan, countering an insurgency, is holding its second presidential elections. It is also a sign of some political progress that Afghanistan has a constitution, an elected parliament and elected provincial councils. These are the fundamental institutions that provide critical infrastructure for the development of the state and rooting it properly in society.

Afghanistan has never been a robust state or a democracy in any meaningful sense or for long enough duration. This fresh experiment in state and nation-building is part of an international effort to secure Afghanistan from local insurgent groups like the Taliban and from their foreign collaborators, i.e. Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups.

There are two basic principles that guide these fresh endeavours to recreate and restructure Afghanistan as a viable and effective state. First is the hardware of the state: physical infrastructure, roads, communications, public works, schools, colleges and health centres. That is necessary to firm up statehood through the delivery of security and other social goods to the citizens.

There is good progress on many counts in different sectors that would give strength to the state and its capacity to govern. But the result of whatever has been invested so far are patch at best and their impact on the ground varies from one region to an other. Relatively peaceful regions have done better than the troubled zones for obvious regions.

The second principles that guides the international coalition in rebuilding Afghanistan is establishing legitimate basis of political authority. For the first few years, the interim Afghan government was endorsed by the Bonn Conference and had sanction of the United Nations and the great powers. That was necessary to start the political process, which included the framing and adoption of a new constitution.

The next stage was holding presidential, parliamentary and provincial council elections. Under very difficult circumstances, Afghanistan and its international partners have accomplished a gigantic task in providing a popular support base for the legislature and the presidency.

One may question the quality of democracy or raise doubts about participation of ordinary Afghans in public affairs, but these questions are not as important in the formative stage, when seeds of democratic life are being sown through the introduction of ideas and institutions that would sustain democracy. What is important in countries like Afghanistan is the very first act of creating some space for democracy and seeking its social acceptance.

As democracy among other things is built around self-interest, it motivates individuals to participate as individuals or as members of groups to elect candidates to public office whom they believe would serve their interests better. It also brings different communities, members of diverse social groups and people belonging to different ethnicities together, as building coalitions becomes necessary to achieve common objectives.

Therefore, the second presidential elections are part of a greater political project of building Afghanistan as an effective state and unified nation. It is truly an international effort, but which is very much about Afghans and their country.

It is also a sign of progress that Afghan authorities and the powers intensely involved in Afghanistan’s rebuilding are not deterred by the threat from the Taliban to disrupt the electoral exercise. There is no other legitimate exercise to confer political legitimacy than elections, because they mean political and social support.

In difficult and uncertain times like these, continuity of democracy and more of it would help bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. The elections will also help build a support base for the presidency.

But questions remain about the conditions under which the presidential elections are being held and the results they are likely to produce.

There appears to be a great deal of interest among the candidates that have fielded themselves: there are more than forty candidates contesting the elections, including two women. The candidates have no political parties as none exist in this phase of Afghan democracy. Their identities and support bases are essentially ethnic and not political or ideological.

But learning from the first presidential elections in which we witnessed essentially ethnic voting for candidates, this time around the vice-presidential candidates represent another significant community in the case of the three front-runners — Hamid Karzai, Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani. Over time, we will see more of mixed ethnic tickets.

The recent public opinion polls conducted by the International Republican Institute place Hamid Karzai far ahead of his rival candidates, but short of support for winning the election in the first round. The Afghan constitution requires that the winning candidate must secure more than fifty percent of the votes cast on the polling day.

The big question is will Hamid Karzai be elected in the first round or will the other candidates fragment the vote and force run-off elections a few months later. There is greater probability of a fragmented vote but one cannot be sure of how people will vote in a country like Afghanistan, still in the primary phase of democratic governance.

People are generally not happy with the performance of the Karzai government but they seem equally sceptical about the ability of his rivals to perform better. This sentiment may get a second term for Karzai, but mainly because of the lack of a viable alternative.

We may see an interesting situation develop if Karzai fails to win fifty plus one in the first round. Much will depend on the collective vote bank of the two trailing candidates, Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani. Will they team up to contest against front-runner Karzai? No doubt failure in the first round would weaken Karzai politically and encourage his rivals to forge greater unity in the run-off, perhaps to defeat him.

There are two more questions that would overshadow the presidential elections on August 20. The first is the deteriorating climate of security on account of the surge in fighting and the greater capacity of the Taliban to disrupt activities. There is also a possibility that the Taliban allow elections to take place as they did last time to facilitate the election of Karzai, a fellow Pashtun.

Voter turnout is another issue that will dominate discussion, especially regarding the credibility of the elections. This will be more important than who wins the election. Low turnout will weaken the government of whosoever gets to form it and further undermine its effort to extend its writ beyond cities.

Elections are important markers of political progress and no matter what the results, with this election, Afghanistan will take one step further towards recovery from the chaos that has marked its recent history.

Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email]

What did Jinnah stand for? —Rasul Bakhsh Rais---25/08/2009
 

The recent book on Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah by Jaswant Singh, the expelled member of the BJP and former Indian minister of external affairs, has raised a fresh controversy in Indian politics because of his reassessment of the founder of Pakistan. What enraged the conservative leaders of the BJP was Singh’s portrayal of Jinnah as secular, and not solely responsible for the partition of India.

Why does such a depiction boil the blood of conservative Hindu political leaders and some intellectuals in India? The answer is very simple: it doesn’t fit the historical picture of Jinnah that they have drawn in their minds, and they have kept their minds tightly closed since independence. The story of the creation of Pakistan that they have taught successive generations and would want everyone in the world to believe has contributed to an intellectual and political mindset about Jinnah and Pakistan that is difficult to change.

Jaswant Singh is not a run of the mill politician. He is a thinking man and very reflective about India’s past. This scribe, interviewing him in May 1984 on a different subject, found him deeply interested in exploring what happened to India since the Muslim invasions, and why and how they happened. My Indian academic friends recommended that I see Mr Singh not as a politician but as an intellectual; I found him very engaging on many subjects.

His book, which we have yet to find and read in Pakistan, appears to be one of those intellectual journeys that Jaswant Singh has been taking to understand India’s complex past, its present and its future. As we can see from the strong reaction from conservative Hindu social and political groups, writing about Jinnah is not an easy task in India, where a man who struggled for the independence of India for decades before embracing the idea of an independent Pakistan has been made out a villain of the piece.

Objective historians or those who have written on Jinnah and on the events leading to the partition of the subcontinent have never disputed the fact that Jinnah was a modernist Muslim devoted to the freedom of India, and when he found Congress leaders to be unreasonably hostile to legitimate Muslim political interests, he demanded a separate state — Pakistan.

Jinnah tried, till the end of the Cabinet Mission, to work within the constitutive framework of the Indian union but without compromising on three basic principles that would constitutionally safeguard Muslim interests — autonomy of provinces, representation of Muslims in the legislature proportionate to their demographic strength, and share in power.

The idea of concurrent majority was not a new concept. The southern states in the US that were a numerically minority used it to seek accommodation of their interests in founding of the American republic. Likewise, interests of such a large number of Muslims that constituted more than a quarter of the Indian population required constitutional arrangements beyond the logic of one-man-one-vote. And the dominant section of the Congress Party was not willing to concede on this issue.

This essay is not about why or under what conditions the idea of Pakistan became popular among Muslims and how the struggle for a separate homeland for Muslims in regions of their great concentration succeeded. It is about the principles and ideology that Jinnah stood for.

But we cannot actually discover the real Jinnah out of the many controversies about him in Pakistan without settling the debate on whether he wanted to create a state for Muslims or an Islamic state.

The evidence for the fact that Jinnah demanded a homeland for Muslims comes from the major religious political parties — the Jama’at-e Islami and the Jamiat-e Ulema-e Islam — which opposed the creation of Pakistan. This was because they did not endorse the idea of a territorial Muslim state, and secondly because they feared that Pakistan led by the secular Jinnah and his Muslim League would not be an Islamic state.

Our dragging of Islam into our politics for decades and the state-sponsored Islamisation programme under General Zia ul Haq have buried the true ideology and political struggle of the Quaid under the debris of autocratic and self-centred politics of the dictators.

We need to rediscover the Jinnah that we lost during the dark decades of military dictatorships aligned with the religious and right wing political groups.

A careful reading of Jinnah’s political life in the Congress Party and later in the Muslim League, and his ideas about politics, constitutionalism, representation and every other issue concerning statehood and government would reveal that he was a modernist-rationalist to the core.

His ideas and thoughts about the state of Pakistan have been equally, if not more, been misrepresented in his own country.

What, in a nutshell, was the ideology of Jinnah?

He was essentially a secular Muslim, not that he rejected religion as something irrelevant on a personal level, but wanted the state of Pakistan to be neutral among various religious communities of Pakistan. This is one of the old renaissance ideas that have transformed relations between societies and states in the modern world.

It is not strange that we find the religious right of Pakistan and the Indian Sangh Parivar with its core elements of the RSS in total agreement in portraying Jinnah as non-secular. Theirs is a distorted view of history, and specifically of Jinnah, that is meant to serve their narrow political interests.

Neither Indian Hindu parties nor Islamic groups in Pakistan feel comfortable with the real Jinnah. Islamic groups in Pakistan may not treat Jaswant Singh any differently than he has been by the Sangh Parivar for characterising Jinnah as secular. Maybe they treat him here with some respect, but that is for a different reason.

Secularism may be a controversial idea among common Pakistanis beyond those who may have a nuanced understanding of the origin and significance of this philosophy. But what have our military dictators and supporting political outfits using the shell of the Muslim League have done to other two political ideas — democracy and constitutionalism?

Four military generals sitting under Jinnah’s portrait have suspended and abrogated constitutions and sent elected governments packing. In every episode, they had the evergreen political class on their side. Nothing could be more insulting to Jinnah and his political legacy than what the dictators and their political associates have done.

As we try to rebuild Pakistan as a democratic state, we need to revisit Jinnah, recover him from the usurpers and shape the future of Pakistan according to his ideas of democracy, constitutionalism, peaceful struggle for rights, and the separation of religion from the state. Therein lies our future.

Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email]

A step in the right direction —Rasul Bakhsh Rais---01/09/2009
 

Granting a sort of autonomy, or self-rule, to the Gilgit-Baltistan region is the first critical step in the right direction. This is something that the people of the region have been demanding for a very long time.

But is the proposed structure of self-governance that is going to be implemented through a presidential ordinance enough, or do we need more in terms of autonomy from the outset of reforms than wait for further political demands? Have we, in this sense, neglected Gilgit-Baltistan?

The people of this rugged and difficult region have their own individuality and a sense of ethnic identity that has been shaped by history and geography over a long period of time. There is no doubt that this sparsely populated, vast region has diverse communities within it, but at the same time there are overlapping bonds of religion, language and social networks.

Parallel to unifying themes, there are also distinctive feelings among communities at the local level, a pattern similar to the social patchwork that we see in mountain communities.

Unlike tribal communities, the social networks that we have observed in Gilgit-Baltistan are essentially non-feudal, less hierarchical and more open to social change and development than even mainstream areas in the rest of Pakistan. One is greatly impressed by how local communities have embraced the idea of education, community organisation and development, often in competition to outdo others in achieving social and developmental objectives.

The people of Gilgit-Baltistan rightly take pride in liberating themselves from the Raja of Kashmir in 1947 and unconditionally acceding to Pakistan. This region like many others in the subcontinent had changed hands among local and foreign rulers before the Raja of Jammu and Kashmir annexed it in his ambitious quest of empire building.

Since Gilgit-Baltistan was part of the Jammu and Kashmir state, its final fate became linked to which way the disputed state would go. This was implicitly the reason for the six-decades-long delay in restructuring the governance of the region. In fact, equally crucial was the act in 1948 to separate Gilgit-Baltistan from what became known as Azad Kashmir or the Pakistani part of the disputed Jammu and Kashmir state.

It is interesting that Kashmiri nationalists on both sides of the Line of Control claim Gilgit-Baltistan as an inherent part of the Jammu and Kashmir state. The Indian government also took a similar position when it raised questions about Pakistan’s border demarcation agreement with China in 1963. In fact, Pakistan and China while signing the border agreement added a proviso that it was subject to the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

In the coming weeks and months, we will see a storm of protest from Kashmiri nationalists and even mainstream Kashmiri leaders over granting self-rule to Gilgit-Baltistan. One of the fundamental reasons Gilgit-Baltistan couldn’t get the status of a province was our interest in placating Kashmiris’ feelings.

There are two important issues that we need to discuss in this regard. First, who should really determine who the people of Gilgit-Baltistan are? No external power and group can fix the identity of any community. What is important in this case and universally acknowledged is how the people define themselves and the identity they give to themselves.

In our part, there are two sides to such identities, territorial and linguist-ethnic. The latter is much fuzzier because the territorial units we have evolved over centuries are not ethnically exclusive but contain other ethnic and linguistic groups. Gilgit-Baltistan has a territorial identity and a deep sense of historicity. But its linguistic particularities that are natural features of mountain communities living in isolated valleys are not too sharp to divide them into smaller identities.

How do the people of Gilgit-Baltistan define themselves? They may have petty regional differences, and sub-regional identities like Hunza and Nagar, but they don’t refer to themselves as Kashmiris. The only thing apparently common with the state of Jammu and Kashmir is their being subject to foreign rule against their will, and against which they rebelled and secured their freedom. But their freedom from the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir was unfortunately followed by direct federal rule from Islamabad in an independent Pakistan. But then the complex triangle of Kashmir, India and Pakistan and the sensitivities of the Kashmiri leaders that we have supported unconditionally at a great cost and may continue to do so were resistant in recognising the historic name and character of Gilgit-Baltistan.

The name sounds so natural and comes so easy on tongue than the bureaucratic characterisation of this historic people as the “Northern Areas of Pakistan”. The title Islamabad gave to this region and its people was devoid of human touch, as if territory mattered more than the people who have lived there for thousands of years.

The people in fact matter when they are granted the identity they wish to adopt, freedoms, and autonomy within a national framework of the state. There is no conflict and cannot be conflict between a national government and a region and province when powers are adequately devolved to the units to their satisfaction. This kind of federalism is a necessity in ethnically diverse countries like Pakistan.

Recognising self-rule for Gilgit-Baltistan should be considered a first instalment of governance reform with the objective of giving it the full status of province. The region has all the essential features, strengths, resources and more importantly political aspirations to become a province. The size of population should never matter in recognising such an historical realities; just cast a look at the variations in the sizes of American states: what matters is history for Rhode Island, Delaware and New Hampshire and not their demographic strength compared to California and New York.

The decision that the PPP and its coalition partners have taken in recognising rights of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan is courageous and politically mature. More than that it will pull the people of this region out of administrative mumbo-jumbo and set them on a clear path of political evolution to a province. It would be better and more far reaching if provincial status for Gilgit-Baltistan is settled in the constitutional reform package now, than to leave it for future political dispensations.

Finally, Kashmiri nationalists lack sound reasons for tagging Gilgit-Baltistan to Jammu and Kashmir. In their own struggle, what matters is their sense of identity, constitutive elements of community and historical facts that they believe separate them from the rest. Why then do they deny the same right to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan to define who they are and what type of political arrangements they want for themselves?

Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email]

Is America our friend? —Rasul Bakhsh Rais ---08/09/2009
 

This is a wrong question that is often raised and debated in the media, academic and political circles. Why it is a wrong question? Friendship between and among states has a different quality to it, and has more substance and meanings than the conception of friendship between people. And it is not really friendship between states, but the totality of relationship — its nature, extent, diversity, depth and commonality of objectives — that matters. Otherwise all countries with which a country might have diplomatic ties could qualify as ‘friends’, with very rare exceptions.

Relations among states have many dimensions and depths, and are motivated less by moral considerations and more by how the two sides in the relationship can benefit from what they do together on issues of peace, security or economic cooperation.

What really matters then is the issue of benefit. It is assumed that all states are rational actors, and those who govern them think rationally about the interest of their states and forge relationships to achieve national objectives. This may sound a bit academic and theoretical, but it is necessary to spell out what generally the operating assumptions of any country’s foreign policy are.

It is equally true that politicians and others types that control the states may fail to understand what the real interest of their states could be in a given situation. This could be due to false or incomplete information or due to some personality factors — any perceptual or emotional defects that may stand in the way of fully understanding and appreciating the dynamics of power politics or other forces that shape modern nation states.

All types of states, in disregard to their internal political configurations, are driven by self-interest. But self-interest in a globalised world requires cooperation with other states; no state can help itself, achieve progress or peace without the cooperation of other states. Yes, there can be serious questions about who gets how much and when out of cooperative enterprises among states, with so many layers of non-state actors like the multi-national corporations opening many paths and adding to the complexity of interactions.

Relations between states, however, cannot be zero-sum games; there are obvious and objective reasons for shaping them and there are benefits to be drawn. Never are such relations one-way traffic, at least not since the end of colonialism, with benefits flowing in one direction and costs accumulating on the other side.

We need to have some clarity about how the world system functions and how states form cooperative relationships in order to answer the question we have raised above.

It is not just our relationship with the United States but with other states as well that requires a degree of pragmatism and some basic knowledge of the operating principles and realities of world politics. Much of this knowledge is lost when one takes an ideological position on who can be a friend and who cannot be in the world arena.

The national debate on our relationship with the United States has interesting points that show how ideology and emotions have shaped it more than any clear ideas about what we have gained in different areas of national life.

This is not to discount the fact that this relationship has been controversial and remains so in the context of the current war in Afghanistan and our support to the international coalition to defeat the Taliban. And there have been hidden costs and negative consequences on our political landscape with great impact on the balance between political forces and state institutions.

But such costs are as much a result of our own state weaknesses, internal political confrontations, institutional conflicts and the character of ruling groups as the rentier quality of our state. No state can think of operating in an ideal environment, let alone Pakistan with so many internal problems and a highly complex regional security environment.

We need to apply a rational approach to the debate on our relations with the United States, with a full understanding of our objectives and how best we can realise them in an imperfect world with self-centred and competing states. This perspective is unfortunately lacking when we try to understand and explain state-to-state relations in personalised terms.

In the contemporary world, given our vital interests and multiple internal and external vulnerabilities, no other relationship for us can be more important than the one we have with the United States today. The question is how best we can turn this relationship to the benefit of Pakistan. We have in the past on many occasions protected our vital interests, like the nuclear programme, without yielding any ground, no matter what the amount of pressure.

Today, we seem to be divided not on the quality of relationship with the United States but essentially on whether or not Pakistan should be extending the support it is to the international coalition, mainly the US, in Afghanistan to defeat the Taliban insurgency. There is a section of Pakistani society that feels that the Taliban in Afghanistan are justified in resisting what they call a foreign occupation, and argue that Pakistan must stand neutral in this conflict.

That is not possible. Perhaps they don’t realise that the Tehreek-e Taliban of Pakistan is inspired, guided, funded, and controlled by the Afghan Taliban. The two have the same ideology and worldview, and believe in using violence to capture state power. It is however debatable what the best strategy is to deal with the issue of non-state actors and how can we peel local populations away from them.

Pakistan and Afghanistan face similar internal security threats but at varying degrees as state capacities are different. The war in Afghanistan, the current phase and its earlier cycles, have affected Pakistan very badly. Pakistan’s security and peace hinges on the success of the international effort to secure and rebuild Afghanistan.

The United States has come to occupy a central position in the strategic environment of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This may not be an ideal situation for us but that is the reality. Our rational self-interest in this situation dictates that we help rebuild a stable Afghanistan, help end the war and deepen our relationship with the United States, taking it beyond the contingencies of Afghanistan. There is genuine interest in the US and other world capitals in stabilising and normalising Pakistan by giving it a democratic and developmental orientation. It depends on us how best we leverage our position and advance our national interests.

Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email]

Graveyard of empires —Rasul Bakhsh Rais ---15/09/2009
 

Will Afghanistan live up to its history and tradition of defeating foreign armies that invaded it to shape its politics and foreign policy in the ongoing war?

This question is important as shadows of gloom extend over the capacity, political will and resource-sustainability of the United States and its NATO allies to achieve the objectives they set for themselves nearly eight years ago.

They have neither won nor have they lost the war entirely. At best, it appears to be a mixed picture, and maybe it is not anymore as the question of when troops return home becomes politically significant in the United States and other countries involved in the fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Americans have increasingly started questioning the wisdom of continuing with a war that seems to have no exit strategy, or any clear idea about when the Afghan state and its institutions will be able to stand on their own.

The question now is about the ownership of the war, its objectives, costs and whether or not Americans will succeed in establishing a preferred state structure, a security order and peace by defeating the forces it has been at war with for the last eight years. Recent surveys clearly indicate that American society is exhausted and not willing to support this adventure endlessly.

And it is not just public opinion in the US or other countries that is turning against the war; it is also the breakdown of consensus among American political elites from the Democratic and Republican parties, and even within their ranks. In industrial democracies, no party or leadership can pursue an unpopular set of policies for too long or without seriously damaging its support base. That is a cost that pragmatic politicians never pay. They try to convince the population, invoking responsibility and national interest, but when they fail, as appears to be the case in the US today, they undertake path correction.

Will President Barack Obama change American policy toward Afghanistan in the face of some hard facts? The Taliban are on the rise, their attacks against coalition forces have increased and so has the casualty rate of American and British soldiers in war zones.

The characterising of the war by President Obama as a ‘war of necessity’ smacks of defeatism. Without some moral foundation, wars like the one in Afghanistan can neither be fought effectively nor can they sustain the necessary support from the people back home. Much has changed over the past eight years in the US and in the theatre of war in Afghanistan. A rational approach, at least at the popular level, has replaced the national emotions generated by the tragedy of 9/11 in the United States.

Unpopularity of the war in the US and in NATO countries that have sent forces in Afghanistan has encouraged the Taliban insurgency. The basic assumptions of the Taliban about the war are undeniably rational and right on the money. They are right in assuming that time is on their side and not on the side of invading forces that cannot stay on the ground and fight an unpopular war; that they can ‘win by not losing it’; and that they can rely on the time-tested strategy to use Islam and nationalism to portray foreign forces as occupiers, thus demanding Afghans to help in the liberation of their homeland.

In a climate of ethnic divisions, however, not all Afghans today share the views of the Taliban or have responded to their call for war. The country is sharply divided between old foes: the Taliban rooted in the Pashtun ethnicity, and the Tajiks and others that have supported the American-led war for their own liberation from Taliban rule.

Much to the advantage of the Taliban, the security and political situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated and the reconstruction of the Afghan state and building up of its security forces lag far behind the benchmarks set.

The members of international community that have sent their forces to secure Afghanistan or have committed economic resources to rehabilitate its infrastructure are increasingly becoming pessimistic about the political capacity of the Afghan government to deliver any goods to the society. Frequent reports of corruption, infighting among leaders, rigged elections and a heavy cloud of illegitimacy hanging over the presidency may not inspire much confidence about stability and political cohesion.

There is growing sentiment within Afghanistan and around the region that the United States cannot politically and economically sustain this war, let alone decisively win it. What may matter now is when foreign forces will withdraw and what kind of state and society they will leave behind.

Even if the Americans and the British redefine their role and stay on as watchdogs, shifting greater responsibility to the government in Kabul to fight the Taliban, they may not be able to prevent the outbreak of all-out civil war among the ethnic groups. That would mean more bloodshed, and territorial fragmentation of Afghanistan along ethnic lines and regional rivalries.

While American planners think more about the surge, dump more weapons and launch more operations, they must also think about what they have achieved so far through war. If the purpose was to defeat the Taliban, they have not accomplished this task beyond removing them from power. All indications are that the Taliban are a rising force. People, particularly in the Pashtun-dominated regions, are alienated, insecure and unwilling to risk their lives by supporting foreign forces. The important point is that siding with foreign forces against local militias is simply not a Pashtun tradition; it is against their values of honour and national obligation.

The United States is the third great power that has invaded Afghanistan, though for very different reasons and under different circumstances as compared to what confronted the British in the 19th century and the Soviet Union in the 1980s. There is no hope that Washington will succeed where others failed. There is great likelihood, as the unfolding of events in Afghanistan suggests, that the country may prove once again to be a ‘graveyard of empires’. The war may also prove another point: conquest through overwhelming force may come easy but not the effective control of a society with a long martial tradition and a strong myth of resistance.

Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email]

Women and power —Rasul Bakhsh Rais---06/10/2009
 

Gender and politics are today two of the most debated issues worldwide, but have not drawn significant attention in Pakistan. There is now a greater degree of female activism in our country, both in terms of scale and quality, which has yet to acquire a critical mass to change traditional thinking on gender equality and the transformative role women can play in social and economic change.

The fundamental question is how to challenge inequality among sexes, which in our society is rooted in more than one source — tradition, religious beliefs and a social construction of gender roles that doesn’t favour women.

The good thing is that international civil society moments can, and have, influenced social movements, including those concerned with gender and power issues, throughout the world. As feminist activists the world over have begun to question political inequality among the sexes, the issue cannot remain unsettled forever in Pakistan.

Contemporary feminism has raised fundamental questions about the essence of the male-dominated democratic system in which women find themselves formally or informally excluded from political power. In recent decades, they have focused on the vital issues of empowerment, rights, social and political equality, and the end of discrimination in its all forms.

The feminist movement, even in a male-dominated, socially conservative society like Pakistan, has brought into sharp focus more or less the same issues about social status and adequate representation in the political power, as well as participation in politics.

There are similarities in the challenges women face at the structural level, but they have a different sense of issues due to cultural variation. However, the feminist movement around the world startlingly reached the same conclusions on the issue of gender and political power.

Although women in different parts of the world face different problems and confront different challenges and the feminist movement has many shades and strands, all of them, disregarding the nature of the societies they live in, share some common beliefs about the structure of societies: males dominate and control politics and power; women are co-opted and work in subordinate roles; and male dominance is not a natural but cultural thing that must change.

Therefore, how to change gender relationships, empower women and get the first principle of democracy — equality — accepted are some of the questions that are at the centre of women’s political movements. Pakistan is no exception to this global process.

While women in other parts of the world have made great progress, Pakistani women remain greatly disadvantaged mainly due to social and cultural conditions. Their struggle, perhaps as old as the country itself, has not evoked the same responses as elsewhere in the world and not achieved the same results either.

Although they have long way to go, what is heartening is that women in Pakistan are getting more organised; their activists are highly educated, skilled and very articulate. And all women’s groups have a clear vision, a convincing agenda and more forward-looking politics than similar women’s groups in other Muslim societies. Yet, they have to travel a long distance before they get equal rights or increase their share in different professions or in political power.

What holds women in Pakistan back? Why do so few women, compared to their substantial numbers (roughly fifty percent of the population), exercise or seek to exercise political power? These questions have been the subject of many theories, much conjecture and several sociological explanations in different countries.

Many of the factors that work against equality of women in both developed and developing countries are more deeply ingrained in Pakistani society. At a general level, women in politics face similar problems everywhere — cultural and role constraints, and male domination.

But in explaining the low participation of women in the political process of our country, we have to account for variations and relatively greater influence of some factors than others, and look for what is unique and so different from other situations.

In Pakistan’s case, one must fully comprehend the cultural constraints and how they have reinforced the subordinate social role of women. The social structures that are at the base of any type of political process consist of power relations and relative positions of individuals; groups establish identities and determine roles. The larger question about sex and power can only be understood in terms of the social structures and how they distribute values in society.

Looking at the general values, social structures, and cultural orientation of the Pakistani population, one finds Pakistani women as the most oppressed social and political class. Dependence, passivity, low self-esteem and denial of even some basic rights characterise their general status.

At the same time, we find great variations in the status and roles of women depending on their social circumstances. Educated and professional women in urban areas and from the upper classes of the society enjoy much better status and rights than illiterate women in rural areas. Women in the tribal areas of Balochistan, the NWFP and remote areas of southern Punjab and interior Sindh live in more adverse social conditions than women in the urban parts of the country.

In less developed areas, honour killings, domestic violence and discrimination by male members of families are too common, but not confined to these areas alone. Our argument is that exclusion from the political process or even voluntary low participation of women are culturally and socially determined traits; and that the state in the political culture of the traditional male-dominant society of Pakistan has done very little to meaningfully empower women.

The low social status of women because of the customs of the largely feudal and tribal culture of the society poses the biggest barrier in the way of women’s involvement in public affairs of society in general and electoral politics in particular.

So many studies on political participation have repeatedly demonstrated the relationship between social status and participation in electoral politics and engagement in civic and public affairs. The real question then is how to change the status of women, and who will be the agent of that change. Education, and social and economic development takes a longer time. In some areas like protection of rights and empowerment, state policy can be the catalyst.

The formal measures that the democratic government may take to end discrimination against women and protect their rights are the necessary first steps. But real change will come when the social barriers gradually come down.

Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email]

Deep trouble —Rasul Bakhsh Rais---13/10/2009
 

Pakistan faces several complex internal security challenges today that require a comprehensive, holistic and national response. Not addressing these challenges immediately, in a serious and consistent fashion, may land the country and its peoples in serious trouble. So what are these challenges; wherein lie their roots; what can be done to tackle them efficiently and effectively?

Taliban militancy and organised violence against the state and society presents the most serious threat to national security. The grimness of this threat lies in its religious roots and radical worldview. The Taliban movement is a variant of political Islamism that has renounced democratic, constitutional and political paths to power and instead believes in the theory and practice of conquest in the image of medieval adventurists. The problem is that the national and international atmosphere today is different. We now live in territorial nation states and bounded political communities. The Taliban and their allied religious groups reject the territorial state and maintain transnational political and ideological links that spread across the globe. They have a mutual support system, sanctuaries, and common sources of funding and share a common vision and project of terrorising, defeating and replacing the present state structure, which in their view doesn’t represent Islam or the ‘real’ interests of Muslims. Their narrative of historic grievances against the local and global order and critique of the national ruling classes ‘naturally’ facilitates their political communication with the disempowered, unskilled, and unemployable youth in the socially and economically depressed regions of Pakistan.

Social structures that shape power relations, determine the social significance of individuals and groups and allocate political roles are neither just nor based on prudence and rationality. Dominant groups like the land-owning class, caste and tribal elites and the gadinasheens have monopolised the social and political spaces of value. They could continue in their privileged positions, without a major challenge, were they to fulfil the role that similar conservative, status quo social groups in other societies have performed; being responsive to society and responsible in their exercise of power while pushing society forward through an emphasis on equity and equality. Even members of the middle class, which play a subordinate role in the dynastic party system, have joined in the rapaciousness of the ruling groups. This doesn’t send a message of hope to the disenfranchised youth and disillusioned social classes. The frustration of these classes has thus proved a fertile ground for the Taliban insurgency and Islamic radicalism.

Our focus on contemporary violence and its optics shouldn’t divert our attention from a larger and more complex issue of the sociology of violence; the social conditions that promote and breed violent beliefs and practices.

The second and equally dangerous category of security challenges comes from sectarian groups. Communalism and sectarianism are rooted in the intolerance of difference and diversity of faiths. Much of the religious violence in the subcontinent and its more frequent eruption and persistence in Pakistan is rooted in unarticulated but easily discernable form of religious fascism.

The irrational logic that animates this universal brand is absolute self-righteousness and denial of the religious authenticity of other religious sects within Islam. Unfortunately, theological and philosophical debates around these issues have become politicised; so have the sectarian leaders who use sect and sectarian mobilisation to maintain power within the country and abroad. Sectarian groups live, hide, plan and execute sectarian violence from deep within society. They work in multiple organisations, and it is the complex web of their relationship with ‘ordinary’ members of society that makes the security situation so intractable.

Militant ethnic movements in Karachi and Balochistan pose yet another set of internal security challenges. Ethnic feelings are natural and mobilisation of ethnic identity to stake a claim on national power and resources is neither an uncommon strategy, nor out of the fold of normal political discourses or processes. But this can be done legitimately within the limits of law and the framework of peaceful political struggle. Violence by any ethnic group and any attempt to hold local populations political hostage must provoke a national security response. We have seen much ethnic violence in Karachi in the past and sporadically in Balochistan. Violence, ethnic or religious, starts when there is no room for argument; when the political process is seen as flawed or inadequate.

There are relatively easy remedies for ethnic violence. These remedies lie in the political realm; in understanding the ethnic and cultural pluralism of Pakistani society and devising a political order that accommodates the legitimate aspirations of all social groups.

The elected government at the federal level has not realised the seriousness of militant ethnicity and has failed to bring about constitutional reforms on which there is national consensus to grant greater rights to the provinces. The lopsided distribution of power and resources between the centre and the provinces must not be allowed to linger on. Federalism is a dynamic process, and must be so especially in conditions of ethnic diversity, where adjusting and balancing the requirements of national cohesion with demands of the units for adequate power and resources is a pressing issue.

Another factor that has greatly multiplied troubles in Pakistan is the thirty-year-long war in Afghanistan, first against the former Soviet Union and now the United States. Contestation between foreign powers, apparently helping to rebuild Afghanistan, and the forces resisting them, has influenced Pakistan’s national security in more ways than one. Our role in mobilising religion and nationalism to defeat the Soviets under Washington’s cold war strategic outlook is now become the albatross around our neck.

To solve its multiple security threats, Pakistan needs to evolve a long-term strategy of social and political reconstruction; invoking national spirit and solidarity must rest at the centre of such a strategy. The focus must be on political institutions, openness, rule of law, and accountability of the political class.

Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email]

LUMS, diversity and pluralism —Rasul Bakhsh Rais---20/10/2009
 

In recent weeks, we have seen a spate of comments and editorials in some English dailies on the issue of public displays of affection at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), where I have been working for the past seven years. Having lived on campus and been part of the LUMS community, which includes students, faculty and staff, I have some claim to knowing the place inside out, and feel obliged to comment on campus life at LUMS.

We can describe academic life at LUMS with two simple but very meaningful words — diversity and pluralism. LUMS is reflective of the diverse character of Pakistani society at large. There is hardly any region, ethnic and linguistic group, or religious stream that is not represented at the university. Also, LUMS, with its national and international reputation, has grown very rapidly over the last two decades in the number of academic programmes, students and faculty, including foreign faculty. This further places these values higher on the list of institutional priorities.

Naturally LUMS, and for that matter all academic institutions, have a particular academic culture and a campus life of their own. Patterns of academic life and culture become rooted in traditions that evolve over time and depend on the vision, values and internal processes of universities.

While diversity may be a universal characteristic of all universities of Pakistan, pluralism may not. We shouldn’t confuse diversity with pluralism, which is often done without understanding the latter in intellectual and sociological terms. Diversity essentially means people with different religious and ideological orientations living and working together.

What is important is that difference is something natural and is a universal characteristic of human societies. But that cannot be turned into ‘Us and Them’ or the basis for determining superiority or inferiority, as is the case in normal social situations. Every individual has a right to experience life the way he or she wants to, and each of us has a natural right to be what we want to be. This also extends to the realm of values, beliefs and the social choices we make as responsible and rational individuals.

This is the attitude that separates the modern world from the old one built on conformity, loyalty and deference to peers. Pakistan is a transitional society. As such, we are caught between the old world that pulls us towards conformity and the modern world that allows us freedom to think for ourselves and make independent choices.

The real difficulty however is how to cultivate pluralism in transitional society where the forces of the old order, with their social hierarchies and rigid beliefs and social attitudes, are strong. Tolerance of diversity and respect for an individual’s choice of values, though conditioned by the general norms of society, still leaves a big space for the individual to pursue an ideological line or make social choices away from the normal spectrum.

At a time when religious militancy surrounds us and identity issues dominate in a complex world contextualised by globalisation, individualism and liberty to pursue social goods or different ideological lines are obviously under threat in Pakistan. But one place where we can preserve a culture of pluralism and celebrate diversity is the university. We have lost a lot of social ground to extremist religious and ethnic groups in all public universities, where student bodies are controlled through sheer terror and fascist tactics.

I am glad to say that LUMS has escaped that fate. No student or faculty group has ever tried to capture LUMS and turn it to its little fiefdom, the fate unfortunately many public universities have met. The reason it continues to be a genuinely pluralistic place where all religious beliefs and social outlooks exist in mutual tolerance is strong roots in liberal values.

These values must not be taken to mean an absence of social norms, but more in the philosophical sense: the freedom of an individual student or a faculty member to pursue his or her own truth; and all truths and pursuit of religious beliefs and ideologies deserve equal respect.

The idea of a university is about being universal and holistic in exploring different ideas and judging them critically. Neither meaningful higher learning nor production of knowledge is possible without liberal values that place intellectual curiosity and cultivation of free, thinking individual quite high in the hierarchy.

Recent media comments have not captured the essence of diversity and pluralism in the debate among LUMS students on public displays of affection; rather, they have focused on ‘tension’ and ‘conflict’, which may imply an uneasy relationship among students with different cultural and religious orientations on campus. Debate and discussion, tolerance of opposite views and giving equal respect and social space to the self and the other are hallmarks of progressive thinking and forward looking societies.

LUMS, in this respect, is comparable with some of the best institutions in the world.

Academic life at LUMS is very different from popular misperceptions of it as a social island and a walled-in-life, standing in contrast to the more conservative society outside. Going by the optics of things may be deceptive and may take one’s attention away from the actual strengths of an academic institution like LUMS toward trivial or non-issues.

LUMS is truly a great institution of learning and a path-breaking experience in institution building not just for the reason that its graduates are accepted in some of the best universities around the world or they have better marketability, but also for its vision, values and pursuit of excellence.

But the work on institution building and further development never ends; it requires perpetual re-evaluation of where we are and how we can do better.

We are involved in an internal debate on how effectively we are pursuing our vision and how we can do better. LUMS is not a perfect institution; nor does it claim to be one. But on all issues, from religious practices to social attitudes, it does reflect a reasonably mature degree of pluralism.

LUMS should also solicit and welcome outside comments and evaluation from the society, media commentators and educationists. That would help us identify mistakes and things we may have overlooked. Universities grow with the rest of society and must have deep connections with the community outside. For this matter, we must receive with open hearts what others write about LUMS, but I wish it was about larger, more significant issues of academic culture, programmes and quality of instruction, and not just “pecks on the cheek”!

Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email]

In the Afghan marshes —Rasul Bakhsh Rais
 

Afghanistan is a dry country, but it seems that coalition forces are stuck in the mud and more they try to pull themselves up, more they sink in. A marsh is a more apt description of the situation because it reminds everyone of America’s Vietnam experience.

The Vietnam War is one of those uncomfortable truths that American society has lived with for almost a generation. The American establishment and the leaders at that time thought they had a global responsibility to defend the ‘free world’ and resist by all means the ‘evil’ forces of communism.

But what has Vietnam got to do with Afghanistan today?

The American-led war in Afghanistan today has a great deal of resemblance with Vietnam, except for the place, time and actors. No two wars are the same, and perhaps never will be, but analogies can be drawn on several counts.

The first and foremost common factor is war in other time zones, far away from the homelands. It may be said that all foreign wars, from ancient times to the colonial era, were fought in distant lands. True, but those didn’t last eight, ten or fifteen years, and the citizens of the homeland were not directly affected. Rather, domestic support for atavistic and economic reasons was stronger both in the ancient times and the age of colonial empire building.

The Soviet Union, despite being geographically contiguous to Afghanistan through its Central Asian republics, and with easy land access, couldn’t win its last colonial war against the Afghans. The Americans were the first to recognise that Afghanistan could become the Soviet Union’s Vietnam. And it did.

Who turned Afghanistan to the Soviet Union’s graveyard? American and Saudi Arabian money and the superb insurgency strategy of Pakistan played a great role in defeating the Soviets. No doubts about that. But it was finally the Afghan’s sacrifice, his suffering, his blood and his deep love for his country that forced the Soviet Union out. Make no mistake about who really defeated the Soviet superpower.

Mercenaries do not fight wars of national liberation; they can be hired only to suppress such wars by providing intellectual or material support.

The irony of history is that the Americans have become trapped in Afghanistan in more or less like the Soviets. Both had a new vision for Afghanistan according to their own respective ideological templates. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan to defend and consolidate a socialist regime that they helped cultivate. They interpreted events in the country as all invading countries do: they wanted the world and their own citizens to believe that only a minority, backed by foreign powers, mainly Pakistan and the United States, supported the Afghan Mujahideen.

And the Soviet cast the their war with the Afghans in ideological terms — against feudal tribal culture and reactionaries that wanted the clock of progress and history to be turned back. They presented themselves in exactly the same way as during their colonisation of Muslim regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia: in the name of progress and civilisation.

This is an old beaten argument and has no resonance in modern times when we place European colonisation in some international context. Nor had this view any popular acceptance in old times beyond the local collaborators.

The American-led coalition has similar ‘noble’ and ‘altruistic’ objectives — peace, state- and nation-building, and above all freedom and democracy in Afghanistan. I doubt if this was the original intent. If it was, the Americans and other Western powers that supported the Afghan resistance should have stayed back and rebuilt Afghan state and society after the war with the Soviets.

Freedom and democracy are good selling points at home to obtain public support and resources to fight such long wars. More than democracy, it was and continues to be a national security debate that shaped the American decision and will be a factor as Afghan security experts and commanders on the ground assess the situation and advise President Barack Obama on reworking the US strategy in Afghanistan.

The war in Afghanistan started in the wake of 9/11 tragedy, as Washington found the fingerprints of Al Qaeda leaders hiding in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan all over it. The primary objectives were to displace the Taliban regime, arrest or destroy the Al Qaeda leadership and their transnational network operating from Afghanistan.

The first objective was achieved sooner than expected because there was really no match between the US war machine and the Taliban militia. The Taliban rather conserved their manpower and resources by melting back into the population, mostly comprising complex but supporting networks of tribes and sub-tribes.

The Americans in their hubris and triumphal sentiment lost lot of capital and good will in Afghanistan by courting the warlords, against whom the Taliban movement had in fact emerged more popular, in the beginning at least. The American political roadmap for Afghanistan, beginning with the Bonn conference, began to be shaped by ethnic warlords from the non-Pashtun regions that acted as the ‘true’ victors against the ‘vanquished’ Taliban.

Playing one ethnicity, particularly the minorities, against the majority, is an old game of foreign powers, and the Americans couldn’t escape this trap because of its convenience: they had non-Pashtuns and obviously some prominent Pashtuns already on their payroll. The post-Taliban state and nation building has alienated the Pashtuns and good number of them have seen only military operations, bombardments and collateral damage; and very little on the ground in terms of development, peace and security.

The resurgence of the Taliban over the past four years, and more so in the past couple of years, is a consequence of many failures, mostly political and relating to state and nation building.

Today, the question is: can this eight-year-old war be won? Not any time soon, and not with the present level of troops and resources. The follow-up question then is how long can the Americans and their international coalition partners stay in Afghanistan and fight this war? The political and public answer is: as long as it takes and as much resources as it requires.

The political reality in the home countries of the troops fighting in the ‘marshes’ of Afghanistan and on the ground is very different. The Taliban insurgency is stronger and growing at a time when the popular support for the war is declining fast. This may impose difficult choices, each with not so pleasant consequences.

Going back to the hearts-and-minds strategy may save American pride and peace in Afghanistan — less war and more development, and people see it happening in their lives. And it is time to get serious about negotiating with the Taliban leadership. But for that to happen, the Americans will have to change their lenses that see the Taliban and Al Qaeda not as two, but one entity.

Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of “Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan” (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email]

@shallowwater
 

very nice collection of articles

thanks

The question of tolerance —Rasul Bakhsh Rais---10/11/2009
 

It is hard to contest the growing view that in recent decades, the social trends in Pakistani society have changed a bit for the worse in becoming less respectful of diversity. The question is, is it accommodative of or tolerant toward the religious difference as it used to be about three decades back? Our tentative answer is that it is not.

What is then the trend? The trend is toward seeking conformity to the dominant views on religion and religious values. There are many causes for this, but one of the salient ones is the failure to develop educational institutions into places of free debate and inquiry. We cannot expect it to happen with poor quality of academic leadership. And of course another reason is political expediency guiding the policies of governments that have lacked a vision and a practical programme to restore true spirit of learning and reflection in the colleges and universities.

We need to focus more on modern institutions than on other factors is for obvious reason; the primary function and the historical identity of the academy is associated with the training of free thinking, rational, tolerant and open individual that develops himself to respecting others and giving equal value and respect to beliefs of others. Sadly, our colleges and universities that churning out graduates in thousands and the majority of those who are imparting them modern knowledge lack some of the essential qualities of modern man.

Let me also discuss briefly two other reasons for growth of extremism and violence. The first is the worsening quality of governance at all levels. Contrary to official claims, our system of governance, including all branches has deteriorated. There are so many elegant philosophical and political debates, mainly in the western societies, about the purposes of the government.

These debates are open to everyone, and are part of collective human heritage; our rulers will greatly benefit by opening some pages of literature on why the government was created. Even if we take the first principle, law and order, being the primary responsibility of the government, we see a poor record of the Islamic Republic.

Most of the questions about law and order become centred on the fundamental rights of the individual—life, property, and in the Lockean sense, pursuit of liberty. Property rights are poorly enforced; life, if not short and brutish, its fullness and self-actualisation is uncertain and problematic; and liberty is hostage to tradition, conservative religious values and hybrid of feudal authoritarianism. The combination for these forces overtime has created an intolerant society. Because all elements of the iron triangle—mullah, bureaucracy and the feudal by their class interests and organisational culture seek conformity and punish dissent.

Whether or not the ruling classes help create a pluralistic social order would depend on what is their vision of the society and what institutions they create to resolve conflicts and help create a pluralistic social order. To gauge their capacity we need to look at their own socialisation or social learning. In the end it is culture of our ruling elites and their being insensitive or sensitive to larger question of social injustice violence against women, religious minorities that would increase tolerance or intolerance.

Our debate about the failure of the state in dealing with religious, ethnic and sectarian violence often revolves around its capacities. That is true, but not enough an explanation. The general mindset of three major groups that I have referred to above and their attitudes, values and orientation toward accommodation of difference need to be looked at closely to understand ineffectiveness of the government.

Intolerance stems from arrogance, from a belief that a person’s religion and ideology are true while all else is false. But above all intolerance grows from an individual taking responsibility for scrutinising and guarding the beliefs and practices of other and passing a final judgement on them.

The numbers of men and women who think it is their primary religious duty to make other Muslims believe and behave like them seem to be growing. They are possessed with an artificial sense of certitude, authenticity and being on the right-path to influence others’ religious and social choices.

A good number of them have become self-appointed soldiers of God, His judges and executioners. Violence motivated by sectarian considerations is not so infrequent and takes many forms of humiliation, physical assault and target killings of prominent individuals—religious scholars, professionals and community leaders of rival sects.

Religion is part of life and society and will remain so even in post-industrial societies, though it may take different forms. Religion has a great value in answering questions about the mystery of existence and giving a positive and purposive direction to a person’s life.

But we cannot rely on religion alone to create a peaceful, orderly and tolerant society. An individual made up of greed, ambitions and lust for power cannot be tamed by religious values alone. This role has to be played by the state through its strong arm of law. But then, law cannot be strong enough without the rule of law. Here we are back to the basics.

Never will intolerance and violence disappear from Pakistani or any society for that matter with sermons, speeches and florid statement of religious and political leaders. We must start a reform process in the governance, accountability of ruling political groups that have alternated in power.

We need to build tolerance by reforming the education system. A public education system that functions and has quality and public trust will go a long way toward cultivating young persons in modern values of respecting diversity and an opposite point of view.

The process of promoting social change and cultivating modern rational attitudes of tolerance of difference is a long-term developmental issue. No matter how difficult and long this social journey might be but we must set ourselves on this path by investing more in social development and by making calculated interventions through law and public policy into the structures of our social and political life.

Tolerance is dependent on culture, religious orientations and general social framework of the society. Our tradition cultural values both in social and religious realms were tolerant of other communities and accorded respect to the beliefs and practices of other religions and sects within Islam.

Unfortunately, the traditional social pluralism has been under constant threat for the last thirty years mainly because of militancy among some of the religious sects. This trends must be reversed, but it is not going to happen without major reforms, good political, better governance and rule of law regime.

Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of “Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan” (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email]

Caste in the agrarian social system —Rasul Bakhsh Rais---17/11/2009
 

What determines political affiliations and capacity to participate in any political action or articulate local, community interests? The answer — maybe tentative — is position in the social system, at least in the agrarian society that we have. There is a deep-seated social hierarchy and ranking of all castes. There are privileged and under-privileged or higher or lower castes. The lower castes are not well equipped to participate. And they are not sensitised to their citizenship rights, or even granted opportunities to move out of the old social relationships. The lower castes are a true subject of our feudal culture, completely devoid of their essential humanity.

The conception of civil and political rights is alien to the millions of lower caste individuals, families and groups. Under social oppression for who knows how long in the old world of the Indus, they have grown fatalistic about their fate, living conditions and low status conferred upon them by other social layers above them. They carry a heavy social burden of a lot of conforming to a standard of behaviour that the feudal lords imposed on their forefathers. We have seen remarkable social and economic mobility among the lower castes but only in cases when they had the gifts of modern education and professions. The lives of those who are stuck up in the rural environment and dependent on their traditional professions have not changed much.

Democracy, human rights, equality and civil liberties are as alien notions to the lower castes as they are to their lords. Most of them are just pushed to polling stations on election day to cast their votes by the local lords. Free will and self-determination, the well-known principles of democracy, are idealistic propositions in the traditional, caste and class-based society of Pakistan.

Caste differentiation, though not the same as in India, remains strong as a social marker. The lower castes of Pakistan have many groupings. The first category consists of those who are engaged in hereditary menial professions like shoemaking, carpentry, hairdressing, pottery, and weaving. Salient but less recognised in the lower castes are working on agricultural farms and in the households of major landowners. They are not wage earners, but get some grain at the end of each crop and very little cash for clothing and other necessities. They survive mainly as semi-slave dependents of the feudal lords. In the agriculture sector, there is also the pervasive phenomenon of bonded labour, with entire families working to pay back the loans they took to either feed themselves or procured for social or other reasons. Household servants both in the urban and rural areas of Pakistan are a much understudied and under-observed social category.

The question of the political rights of these castes and social groups is very important. Their dependent economic and social status makes them just a political appendage of the lords that they serve. They cannot think of any other political opinion or exercise a choice different from the lord. It was only during the populist era of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, though himself a feudal lord, that the lower classes had their first awakening through his mobilisatory politics. He gave them a sense of dignity, pride, and a feeling of worth. They defied their lords for the first time in the 1970 elections to vote for the candidates of Bhutto’s party. His populist appeal, charisma and style of politics stirred an electoral revolt of the oppressed against their masters. That spirit and sense of freedom among the lower castes and classes did not last very long after the elimination of the founder of the people’s struggle in Pakistani politics.

The discrimination against the lower castes is deeply rooted in society and takes place at an informal level. Along with economic bondage is the fear of the state agencies like the police that their masters and lords use to keep them in servitude. Even a slight sign of rebellion is suppressed with the most severe punishment, which may take many forms, stealing of animals, theft, registration of false case in police stations, harassment by the lord’s tough guys, and in more severe cases, abduction of women. Illegal confinement and even jailing of lower castes in the private jails that still exist in the interior of Sindh and Balochistan is not too uncommon. Their unconditional social and political obedience is a condition for social and economic survival where the state laws and institutions are too weak to protect them.

Political liberty and exercise of free will in elections, let alone contesting elections, would be an unrealistic expectation from the lower castes in the feudal agrarian conditions of Pakistan.

Even with the harsh and oppressive environment in which the lower castes are kept, their masters have not earned their trust. Rather, they are always suspect for doing something different from what is expected. To make sure they would turn up for casting their votes, they are hauled early in the morning to the polling stations with families and minors. They remain under close vigil by the workers of the lords until they have cast their votes and departed back to their villages. Let me say this on the basis of my own observation and many reports that most of them vote due to fear and intimidation rather than exercise a real choice.

Quite often elections put the lower castes in a real dilemma when they are caught between many influential local rivals. They essentially make a choice between more harmful and less harmful and tend to vote for the one who might have greater capacity to do evil to them in case of their disobedience. They do not have effective legal remedies, local institutions to protect them, or independent economic means to move away to better places.

Physical movement and relocation is a part of economic and social mobility. There is a visible trend in the lower castes among others to move to major towns and industrial cities for better economic opportunities. Many families that have done so have shown others the way. A real transformation, however, has yet to take place, and that would depend on how the economy of the country performs in the coming years. That is the only way to end discrimination in the rural setting of a village.

Even the dominant castes in terms of numbers resort to feudal means of intimidation, physical abuse and trapping the innocent members of the lower castes in civil and criminal cases. Theft of property and animals are the weapons of choice in Punjab and Sindh. The land ownership pattern in Southern Punjab and Sindh, where big landowners also represent a particular tribe or caste, allows discrimination in all forms to be widely practiced.

In our view, it is generally the feudal political culture that has sustained oppression and discrimination against the lower castes. Will this change? My contention is that until the quality of democratic governance improves, the political and social conditions of the feudal age would continue to determine class and caste relations in our society. But once democracy and rule of law become consistent functional political patterns, a new political culture of equal rights would emerge that would provide for political space and institutional remedies to lower caste groups against discrimination and exploitation.

Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of “Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan” (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email]rasul@lums.edu.pk[/email]