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Old Monday, May 18, 2009
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Identifying the core issues in Balochistan
By M. Abul Fazl
Sunday, 17 May, 2009


I.A.RAHMAN, talking about Balochistan’s woes, observes incisively that the Baloch leaders, who “have, quite comprehensively, documented the wrongs done to them …,” should go beyond statements to implement “their plans for their people’s liberation from anachronistic bonds …” (Dawn, May 7, 2009). It is a recognised law of history that the oppression and exploitation of a society by outsiders can be durable only if it is linked organically to the exploitation of its masses by their own ruling class. The exploitation by the outsiders can only be an extension of the internal exploitative regime.

Governor Z.A. Magsi of Balochistan states that the problems faced by his province are not because of nawabs and sardars or the Baloch tribal system. They are due to the issues between the province and the centre. The demands of the Baloch leaders and politicians are genuine and the federal government must meet them, warning for good measure that the failure to meet them may lead to disintegration of the country. (Dawn, April, 30, 2009).

This must be the most fragile country in the world, perpetually on the brink of disintegration, as various provinces and groups inform us from time to time that if their particular grievances were not addressed immediately, there may be secession. Everyone is constantly assuring us that he is making an incredible sacrifice by agreeing to be a citizen of Pakistan. And it is the only country where the citizens, specially the most privileged ones — the ones to whom independence brought everything — appear to relish at least making the prediction of a disintegration.

Balochistan is a special case, being more retarded socially than other units. This does not mean that it lacks class differentiation but this process, having started, has stopped for a while for lack of economic development. Its dominant mode of production is pastoral, organised politically in the tribal form. There are also patches of agriculture, fishing etc., the whole super-imposed by a modern sector of trade, railway, transport and mining. Productivity is low in the pastoral sector. This militates against the development of class struggle. It is similarly low in agriculture and fishing, which makes the tribal-feudal ruling class’s position secure.

The Baloch intelligentsia has developed a semi-independent existence with the rise of the educational institutions. However, the road to social change being closed by objective conditions, it can operate only in a situation of class collaboration. Therefore, the easiest way out is Baloch ‘nationalism,’ particularly for the unemployed educated young, driven by frustration. They combine with the feudal-tribal ruling class to demand that the province’s natural resources be handed to it. The question of an internal re-distribution of wealth can presumably be considered later.

Balochistan’s soil being full of natural resources and probably oil, and with a total lack of local capital and technology to develop it, why not hand over it to foreign capital and live off the rent? Another Kuwait, another Abu Dhabi. Here the sardars do not come in the way of the intelligentsia.

The ruling class is, of course, opposed to the building of roads, schools, industries etc. It also criticises the Gwadar project. But this is only as long as these are built by the federal authority. If all this is done by foreign capital answerable to the provincial government, it would not mind it so much.

The problem with the federal leadership is that while it wants to integrate Balochistan, economically and administratively, with the rest of the country, it would like to do so by keeping its tribalism and social backwardness intact. It does not propose a major social change there. Indeed, a government which is happy with feudal power in Punjab and Sindh and which thinks the country’s industrialisation can be left entirely to private, mainly foreign, capital, cannot be expected to make a serious attempt to even understand any complicated problem, for example, the fact that the Taliban movement is the result of blocked capitalist transformation.

Our national ruling coalition is composed of the feudal class, the bourgeoisie as its much weaker partner and the global capital, represented by the IMF-World Bank combine. The bourgeoisie is no more led by the industrial sector. It has therefore neither the inclination nor the strength to reach out for the conquest of the state power or to oppose the foreign domination of the Pakistani state or economy. It accepts the hegemony of the army. Thus the dominant mode of production in the Pakistani socio-economic formation is feudal. And the feudal class lends its social outlook to the entire society.

Our socio-political analysis is incomplete without noting the role of the army in our government and its effect on our social formation. The army is an autocracy. This means that, though it may rise above classes, it is not independent of them. True it does not share power with the ruling classes. But it works in the interest of the whole ruling coalition though, in the field of distribution, it may have a privileged position. The resulting structure of power unites the army’s interests so closely with those of the ruling classes that it has been objectively, i.e. by its very vocation of exercising power, opposed to social change. That renders the feudal power safe in Punjab and Sindh and the feudal-tribal power in the NWFP and Balochistan. There is no question of land reforms or of the abolition of the tribal sardari.

The violent end of Akbar Bugti at the hands of the federal law-enforcement agencies exposed again a major contradiction in the administrative policy of the army leadership. While it favoured outmoded, almost medieval, systems over most of the country, it insisted upon governing the society with the prerogatives of a modern state.

The first army government, emerging from the coup of 1958, was allied to the nascent bourgeoisie. It carried out land-reforms, mild but real, and accelerated industrialisation. Z.A.Bhutto’s “land-reforms” reversed them, actually increasing the ceiling of land-holdings. But, more important, the wholesale nationalisation of industries by his government destroyed the industrial bourgeoisie, closing the road to industrialisation and progress of the country. Whatever his Third World, indeed “socialist,” rhetoric, he made the power of the feudal class unassailable. And this ensured that Pakistan would be mired perpetually in backwardness at home and be in thrall to the global finance capital abroad.

The army returned to power in 1977, apparently having learnt the lesson that if it wanted to rule and enjoy the fruits of that rule, it must not attempt social change. Technology can be allowed in, indeed, encouraged, since no technology threatens to upset, by itself, the existing social relations. Any society accepts only that technology which it can absorb. Feudal-tribal society of course absorbs the consumer products of technology. However, the social relations, the society as such, can be changed only by conscious political action. In the absence of such action, the society may stagnate. It may even tend towards disintegration. It would not be transformed, whatever the quantity of the products of technology it may use.

As a result, the post-Bhutto army rule, far from wanting to reform society, inserted itself into the existing class structure of the country and is now committed to perpetuating it. Therefore, the people of Pakistan have, confronting them, a solid wall of domination and reaction stretching from feudal-tribal power to comprador bourgeoisie to the imperialist capital, the whole backed by the military power.

The long-term solution of Balochistan’s problem lies in the growth of differentiation between its pre-capitalist and capitalist economies, which would open the possibility of the modern sector and the bourgeois intelligentsia waging an effective struggle against the primitive exploitation characterising the Baloch society today. But the growth of differentiation is itself blocked by the low level of surplus produced in the society. In such a situation, neither the economic sectors e.g. agriculture, pastoralism, industry, differentiate satisfactorily, nor does the political struggle develop.

The main task in Balochistan is to bring its intelligentsia into the mainstream of Pakistani society. This cannot be done by buying them with sinecure jobs, though that can perhaps also be tried in the short run. The Pakistani state must itself take a hand in the quick industrialisation of the province in order to draw the intelligentsia into the modern sector and turn this proto-bourgeoisie into industrial bourgeoisie.

And, in spite of what the IMF, World Bank advise, this job must be undertaken by Pakistani capital of both state and private sectors. Balochistan must not become the hunting ground of the global capital, out to make a quick buck. That way leads to ruin. Maybe the army’s own economic enterprises can take the lead in the project of industrialisation.

The tribal-feudal chiefs have to be dealt with firmly though not necessarily violently. They are the product of Balochistan’s extreme backwardness and are the main hurdle to change. Their power demands the preservation of the misery of the Baloch masses, combined with growth in their own rentier incomes i.e. they favour material growth only as long as it does not involve a re-distribution of wealth and resources, and a change in the relations of production.

Ideally, they would want an undefined “autonomy” for Balochistan which would permit them to hand the province’s subterranean wealth to the global capital for exploitation in return for royalty to them. It is only with the embourgeoisement of the Baloch society that they would be forced to cede place to the rising bourgeoisie and the progressive intelligentsia.
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Defeating the Taliban is the only option
By Izzud-Din Pal
Sunday, 17 May, 2009


THE insurgency in Swat and Malakand region and the existential threat of Talibanisation should have been used as a unique opportunity by the PPP-led government to establish a comprehensive plan to address the multiple questions of which Talibanisation is only one manifestation. Localised military operation cannot deal with the larger issues relating to national identity, to political instability and economic underdevelopment.

Also in the atmosphere of the crisis invoked by militancy, direct rapport by the top leadership with the people would have served as a strong morale-building strategy. There are some fundamental questions involved here such as territorial integrity of the country and the ideology of the Taliban. (Concerning the latter, see my article in Encounter, May 02. 2009). Only on May 7 Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani took to the airwaves to deal with this urgent matter. It was too little, but may not be too late, if Mr Zardari and his colleagues would put their act together and make a concerted effort to open a meaningful dialogue with the people.

The problem with Mr Zardari is that he seems to lack what may be called the soft power of communication. His style which he has brought with him in his responsibilities for governance is to rely exclusively on closed-door organisational and Machiavellian political capacity in order to achieve his objectives. Lacking in real experience as a political leader, he relies heavily on a small kitchen cabinet of his cronies. As the events have unfolded, his style of governance has now come almost full circle.

Mr Zardari has found out that it is easier to cobble up coalitions, governing is a very lonely business as Harry Truman used to observe. It is the supreme test for the person who aspires to have this top job.

In the national elections held in February 2008 two majority parties emerged in the country, the PPP and PML-N, respectively. Contrary to the wishes of the people, General Musharraf carried on as ruler, albeit sans the military uniform. In September 2008, however, Mr Zardari took over the presidency through an indirect election and assumed all the powers inherited from the previous regime. As a civilian president, to hold military style powerful position is inconsistent with the spirit of democracy and can create flaws in leadership, and they have, as demonstrated by his participation in the recent tripartite meetings in Washington DC.

The PPP government is now faced with the Taliban insurgency at home which has brought it face to face with the international implications emanating directly from the situation. The ANP move for Nizam-i-Adl was a short sighted approach, from the point of view of national interests. Was it aimed at solving Pakhtun problem for the Pakhtuns is difficult to say. Historically, Pakistan has been faced with strong centrifugal tendencies and this could be one demonstration of the renewed phenomenon.

In fact this problem has never been resolved, from Liaquat Ali Khan’s Objectives Resolution to the present times. Islamic brotherhood among people in East and West Pakistan tuned out to be a pipe-dream; the anti-Qadiani movement of the early fifties almost derailed the unity of the country; then, later the creation of one-unit of West Pakistan, sponsored by landed-interests, failed in its objective; and the relations between the centre with the provinces have never been resolved even though according to the 1956 and 1973 constitutions Pakistan was to be a federal republic. Under the weak civilian regimes and the long military rules, this principle has been followed more in breach than observance. With Asif Zardari, greater attention has been given to consolidation of power than matters of governance, i.e., policies, plans, programmes about the pressing issues facing the country regarding education, poverty, and health of the ordinary people. The legislative record of the parliament has been very disappointing.

On the international front, the latest drama played in Washington presents a depressing spectacle. From all the reports in the media, it is evident that the mission led by Mr Zardari left the Obama administration as well as the Congress unsure about Pakistan’s case; there was no coherent policy and the message was never articulated effectively. (Emphasising ‘my’ democracy was not entirely helpful). The mission was of course paid for by the taxpayer for the entire entourage, from Bilawal Bhutto Zardari to the valet to the president.

Now that the military operation has started in full swing in Swat, it is of paramount importance to build a viable political machinery in Islamabad through a home-grown framework. Any US-sponsored reconstruction of the government in order to handle the situation would create more problems than it would solve. Similarly, a mid-term election under the present circumstances would further exacerbate the political atmosphere in the country. The party should focus on the core issues which are important for the survival of Pakistan as a modern state: first, to restore the 1973 constitution to its original consensus status and, second, to amend the constitution to integrate the entire frontier region to the east of Durand Line into the body politic of the country.

Whatever links were established between the state and society in the formative years by the recurring and short-lived civilian government were neutralised by the military regimes. They mutilated the document to legitimise their rules and weakened the direct link between government and the people. The 1973 constitution was an imperfect document but it was the result of intense negotiations between Mr Z.A. Bhutto and representatives of the alliance which had challenged his leadership. The country can move forward only by returning to this document.

This point is important because there is a nexus between the version of Islamic Order that was incorporated by Ziaul Haq in the constitution and the revival of traditionalist interpretation of Islamic law. As is well known, this has become a seriously divisive phenomenon in the society, where emphasis on the Quran and Sunnah unites the people but the Shariat with its multiple interpretations divides them. Once again this reality must be properly emphasised.

The Tribal Areas have been an anachronism which might have made sense in 1947 when Pakistan was born. Around 1955 when the Basic Principles Committee report was being finally prepared, the issue should have been carefully examined. The need for dealing with this unfinished business was loudly pointed out in the First Five-Year Plan, 1955-60, which suggested that to have a tribal belt in a backward state was incompatible with the ideal of democratic republic. It was ignored.

As I have pointed out elsewhere (Encounter, July 12, 2008), the important business concerning the consolidation of the state has never been taken into consideration. With the dismantling of the One-Unit of West Pakistan in 1971, the tribal territory was divided with agencies adjacent to Balochistan and NWFP mandated to these provinces and the remaining agencies forming into Federally Administered Tribal Areas. This was only an organisational change, and no more. The old colonial pattern remained intact.

The move to settle the constitutional vacuum about the area, therefore, will confirm that the real responsibility about this issue lies with the government, not the military, because the military can perform its duties efficiently only when the political leadership is willing to own the problem. For a sustainable solution the focus must be on Islamabad, not just on the military. Also, integrating the area will provide the government with an opportunity to focus on economic development, on building the infrastructure including facilities for educating the young. Fortunately there are several knowledgeable persons in the country available who are thoroughly familiar with the structure of the society, of the tribal configurations, and who can make significant contribution to this task.

But it will be an immense undertaking; the region is no longer a no-man’s land. If the military operation succeeds in Swat, there will still be more obstacles to overcome, especially in South Waziristan where the Taliban already seem to have established an autonomous rule.

What are the chances of success for these two constitutional amendments? In some respects they will complement each other, aimed at clearing the legacy of the military dictators, stopping fragmentation of the country, and enhancing the legitimacy of the government. The real obstacle might come from within the PPP coalition. Behind the façade of self-proclaimed secular predilections, it is not easy to differentiate between the PPP and other right-leaning parties.

This will nevertheless present a test to the parliamentarians as representatives of the people to show how committed they are to upholding the constitution which demands that laws of the country must be applied uniformly to all citizens. The alternative, not to act on the amendment, will be tantamount to abject surrender of sovereignty.

The position of the MQM is well known with reference to Nizam-i-Adl, and of a couple of lonely members from the PML-N and PPP. Others will have to stand up and be counted.

Articles 246 and 247 of the constitution had become redundant long time ago; they were kept alive to promote specific vested interests. For the sake of protecting and promoting the identity of the nation, the region would need massive assistance for its economic and social reconstruction, from Pamir Plateau to Mekran Coast.
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Transit trade issues
By Riaz Missen
Sunday, 17 May, 2009


THE tripartite meeting among the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan leaders has ended up on a good note: they have agreed on the course of action against the rising scale of militancy in the areas on this side of the Durand Line. A significant decision was the transit trade agreement between Islamabad and Kabul under which India may also be allowed to send its goods to Afghanistan.

One may recall that Asif Ali Zarari had once said that “India has never been a threat to Pakistan.” What he said was quite unconventional. The tradition, of course, has been different. The South Asian neighbours have fought three wars while the strategic pundits don’t exclude the chances of another one given animosities and mistrust they have about each other.

In fact, what Asif Ali Zardari meant by his unusual statement must not be difficult to understand for India. He wants to put the economy first. To achieve this objective, he has to win war on the western borders imposed by Taliban. The infrastructure of militancy has to be pulled down with force and he has skilfully taken all the stakeholders on board. Taliban now stand isolated — the full-scale military operation is likely to be continued till their unconditional surrender. It is quite possible that India does not believe him. Actually many of his own countrymen have little confidence in his leadership despite his claims of several achievements. He has chosen for himself the role of a president along with the sweeping powers under the 17th amendment which ex-dictator Pervez Musharraf manipulated to obtain from the previous parliament.

What Mr Zardari has got message for India? He wants to treat Kashmir as a humanitarian, not a territorial, issue. The parliaments of the two countries, not the armies, should find a solution to the miseries of the people in the troubled valley. He wants to form an economic union with India, right on the pattern of European Union, and bridge the trust gap by allowing free movement of people and goods across the border. To him the issue of terrorism is of immediate concern and that the two countries should cooperate with each other to tackle the menace.

Yes, there are difficulties around. There is structure of militancy that has to be dismantled. It constitutes the real test for the democratic forces of the country, which Zardari represents now. This herculean task cannot be done without the help of the international community; India should have been the first to stand by Pakistan when the lattert is determined to put its house in order.

Should India believe Mr Asif Ali Zardari? Yes, it should believe him more than any president of Pakistan they have dealt with. By believing Zardari India will believe in the existence of a democratic Pakistan. By strengthening his hands, India will be certainly paving its way to a better environment in the region — it should not have failing states in its neighbourhood.

Mr Zardari is the head of the largest political party besides being the president of the state. He represents a country achieved through democracy but subjected to military dictatorship for the most part of its history. He belongs to the generation of politicians who see a promising future for their land if it returns to the vision of its founder, the Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah who wanted to make Pakistan a modern state that does not discriminate its citizens on the basis of their castes and creeds.

There was no doubt in the mind of the Quaid about democracy as the system of government in Pakistan. He wanted to do away with feudalism. He warned about the divisive forces that could endanger unity and integrity of the state. Unfortunately, he expired after one year of independence. Sadly enough, his successors betrayed him and forgot his vision. The country divided against itself, on the basis of language and culture, fell prey to the factional politics.

America has not favoured democracy in Pakistan during Cold War years. The funds doled out to the authoritarian regimes in those years were spent in only those areas, which were ideologically committed to serve the ends of the capitalist bloc in this part of the world. Schools, colleges and universities were established only to promote a bigoted worldview and a regimented mentality.
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Beyond the Swat operation
By Syed Muhammad Ali
Sunday, 17 May, 2009




The news coming from Swat is both encouraging and worrying. Encouraging on two accounts; firstly, because Pakistani Security forces have killed a large number of militants in large-scale land-air military campaign. Secondly, COAS General Kayani has declared that Pakistan Army has developed full-scale facilities to focus on ‘Low-Intensity Conflict’ related operations and will employ requisite resources to ensure a ‘decisive ascendancy’ over the militants.

The more worrying news is that the mass exodus from Swat and adjoining areas has reached a level which if not properly and timely handled could eclipse the gains made on the military front. According to the latest estimates, almost a million people could be displaced as a result of this conflict and this could be the beginning of a huge humanitarian crisis on the scale Pakistan had faced after the October 2005 earthquake.

Although the government has announced relief efforts and donations but unfortunately the mood of the civil administration and political leadership does not reflect the same will, sense of urgency and commitment that a nation at war needs. A full blown campaign on a divison-level theatre is afoot in Swat but the government and public support it needs hasn’t got the necssary momentum yet. President Zardari has been outside the country at this crucial hour whereas the NWFP government is repeatedly calling the aid money announced by Prime Minister Gillani as far from satisfactory. The PML-N is pre-occupied with trying to deflect PPP’s continued demands to join the federal cabinet while the religious parties, including the JUI, have already begun to distance themselves from the military action. The media is divided between those supporting the war and Taliban apoligists. The international dimension of Swat conflict is even more complex and poses a unique set of challenges to Islamabad’s long-term security interests. Although allied for almost eight years since 9/11 against terrorism, the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan continue to compete for conflicting interests in the region. Islamabad and Kabul’s distrust in each other is not restricted to occasional banters from the Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

Amidst rising Taliban insurgency, until last year Mr Karzai did not control most of his country and had begun to lose favours with Washington, forcing key policy-makers there to look for his alternatives. This year, Mr Karzai has succeeded in shifting the eye of the storm of war on terror from his country to Pakistan and in convincing Washington that Afghan Taliban cannot be taken care of until the Pakistani Taliban were dealt with. Only a couple of days before the tripartite summit in Washington between Presidents Obama, Zardari and Karzai, the Afghan Ambassador in Washington, Mr. Said Jawad accused Pakistan of not discontinuing support to militant groups and said that Pakistani security institutions do not consider extremism and terrorism as ‘a serious threat’.

As regards the US, Obama Administration’s regional apporach towards the war on terrorism highlights three things; recognition of costly lessons learnt in Iraq and admission by Washington that it cannot go solo in Afghanistan. Secondly, need for an exit strategy. Thirdly and perhaps linked to the second point and most importantly for Pakistan, the recognition of New Delhi as a ‘critical partner’ in the future of Aghanistan.

The last point poses serious security as well as economic challenges for Islamabad in a region it has traditionally considered its own backyard. Despite the much-hyped recent transit trade related MOU signed in Washington, it is unlikely that Islamabad’s security establishment will easily digest giving Delhi a free trade corridor right across the strategic and industrial heart of Punjab and the NWFP.

In fact, this MOU could create new frictions between the Zardari government and the military, further complicating matters domestically. In their eyes, it is like handing Pakistan’s not only security but also economic interests over a silver platter to New Delhi for free at a time when India is reluctant even to restart the peace process, five months after the Mumbai attacks. This is particularly peculiar considering the fact that even amidst the best of diplomatic climates during the composite dialogue, Islamabad was still not willing to accept Indian demand of a trade route to Afghanistan via Pakistan. It also needs to be noted that only recently Mr Rehman Malik has on the floor of the house categorically accused India of being involved in sabotage activities inside Pakistan.

At this rate, conflict of interests between US, Pakistan and Afghanistan could enlarge the deficit of trust between them and seriously jeopardise joint efforts in the areas of intelligence-sharing and choice and priority of targets. But most important and possibly the decisive factor in the outcome of this war on terror and determining the fate and shape of this region could be how the rising human, economic and political costs of this war against terrorism are shared and met by these allies.

The history of ‘low-intensity or ‘fourth generation war’ tells us two very important lessons. Firstly, an enemy is not defeated by physically routing it on the battlefield but by breaking its will to fight. Pakistan lost East Pakistan not merely because of Indian intervention or its support for ‘Mukti Bahni’ militants but because the Pakistani government and forces lost support of the Bengali people.

Let’s hope the government and the army have learned their lessons from 1971 and would use force judiciously only where it is necessary with optimal utilisation of all available credible intelligence about militants and avoid all possible collateral damage and civilian casualties. We don’t want to turn the loyal Pakistanis of Swat into Taliban because their houses were bombed due to error of judgement.

This is a lesson from the US air campaign in Afghanistan when whole tribes joined in the fight against the US when their houses were bombed due to poor intelligence or pilot error. Secondly, unlike a conventional war, low-intensity conflicts whether it is against Tamil Tigers, IRA, ETA or Al Qaeda, it usually is a long term conflict and requires patience and perseverance both by government, armed forces and even more so by the affected common people.

Lastly, the best way to counter Taliban insurgency is to take care of the displaced people of Swat as best as we can even if it takes cutting corners in other areas of government spendings at the moment. It is a matter of urgent national security interest that these displaced people are provided the necessary food, clothing, shelter and medical aid not only during the present conflict but appropriate resources are also generated at this stage for their post-war rehabilitation when they return to their homes.

Let them know that the moderate, liberal, peace-loving and educated Muslim nation of Pakistan can take care of its own people only then we can hope to eliminate the support base which the ideology and mindset of insurgents like Taliban survive on. Let our nation stand together with the armed forces this time by helping our Swati brethren so that the million people fleeing from their homes in Swat can one day return in safety to hope for a better future and not lose hope and confidence like our East Pakistani brethren did in 1971.
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War against Taliban and the refugee crisis
By Karamatullah K. Ghori
Sunday, 24 May, 2009



DRIFTING listlessly like a rudderless ship in choppy, hostile, waters the state of Pakistan is up against the heaviest fog since that cataclysmic crisis in East Pakistan that eventually lopped off half the country.

Say that to a votary of the establishment that there is a marked similarity in the drift of events between what is happening in Malakand Division today and what transpired, nearly four decades ago, in the then East Pakistan and it’s likely he would bristle with disagreement and snarl at you. That, in itself, is a tragedy. The crisis of East Pakistan that truncated the country was a calamity. But a greater calamity is that we have drawn no lessons from it and, so, history is threatening to repeat itself for a people who refuse to learn from it.

That President Zardari could find it convenient to absent himself from the country for no less than 25 days at a stretch says it all about the sense of drift and despondency among its people. What kind of a leader is that who steals himself from the scene — for days and weeks-on-end — every time there’s a crisis, real or of sorts, in the country?

Then, as now, back in 1971 when the crisis of East Pakistan started unfolding in all its ugly and dire propensities, there were visible fault lines in the leadership of Pakistan at the top. General Yahya Khan’s sole interest was riveted in keeping himself as the sole arbiter of Pakistan. Lacking political maturity and devoid of any insight into how the political forces then ruling the roost among the people would react to his diktat he opted for the use of force to settle a political problem. He thought his show of strength would puncture the resilience of the people of East Pakistan to fight on for their usurped rights and he, in the end, would muzzle all opposition to his rule.

Yahya couldn’t be more wrong in his prognosis of the crisis, as the ignominious surrender of December 16, 1971, by that caged (tiger) General Niazi to his victorious Indian counterpart, singed forever the conscience of every self-respecting Pakistani.

Zardari is, likewise, hooked on keeping himself in power as the nation’s sole arbiter. That explains his reluctance to part with any of those powers that General Musharraf’s notorious 17th amendment to the constitution vests in him. The military action against the Taliban in Swat, Dir and Buner, was timed to give him the maximum mileage in his extended sojourn in US, vis-à-vis its current leadership.

Indeed, the establishment partisans may protest that there could be no parallel between East Pakistan and Malakand, for the simple reason that there is no India fuelling the crisis, which it did in East Pakistan’s case. True there’s no India, up front, feeding the flames of the Taliban. But that may just be half the truth. There must be someone providing the logistics and a sophisticated arsenal to the Taliban. What else could explain the stiff resistance being put up by them against a modern and well-trained Pakistan Army equipped with hi-tech weapons and logistics?

Our military experts and commentators were dismissive, before the operation got under way, about the capabilities and manpower of the Taliban. But the so-called rag-tag fighters armed with an obscurantist ideology have been holding out against the military onslaught for almost two weeks, already, and no one is predicting an early end to the operation.

A pivotal point being missed is that the Mukti Bahiniin East Pakistan were able to keep the Pakistan army at bay for nearly nine months because, one, they had complete faith in the invincibility of their cause and, two, they had the people of East Pakistan firmly in tow behind them. Their backs were, proverbially, secure. On top of it there was India feeding their ‘movement’ in more senses and ways than one for well known reasons.

We may, and must, denounce the Taliban for their stone-age mentality and their obscurantist agenda. But they are battle-hardened veterans of their fighting tactics and their beliefs, howsoever deplorable they may be to a vast majority of Pakistanis, carry a lot of weight with them.

There’s no India, for argument’s sake, on the radar to be pointed at as the supplier of deadly arsenal to the Taliban. But there must be someone, some power below the radar keeping the gun powder dry for the Taliban and funnelling sophisticated weapons to them to take on the Pakistan army. Let the conspiracy theory buffs argue it out till the cows come home from pasture as to who that power may be; this scribe, for one, isn’t in the business of conspiracy theories. However, in the process of arguing who is feeding the Taliban’s appetite for battle we mustn’t miss the forest for the tree.

What’s keeping the Taliban fighting, on our side of the border and in Afghanistan, is the presence of the Americans and their Nato allies on the Afghan soil. That’s the prime raison d’etre for the Taliban to fight on and it can’t be denied that there’s support for them on both sides of the Durand Line among the tribes dotting the landscape. There could, otherwise, be no other explanation. That point is also, sadly, being missed by our political parties — all 43 of them assembled at the All Parties Conference convened by Prime Minister Gilani in Islamabad, on May 17, while Mr. Zardari was still on his capitals-hopping safari.

The official communiqué issued at the end of the day-long Islamabad conclave claimed that all the participants endorsed the military action against those challenging the writ of the state. There was a unanimous endorsement by the participants — notwithstanding an effete post-conference claim by Maulana Fazlur Rehman of JUI that there was some dissent — that this ‘existential’ threat to the security and integrity of Pakistan must be eliminated.

That brings the dark memory of 1971 rushing back like a dam-burst. Back then, in March 1971, when Yahya had ordered the guns to roar in East Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, of all the canny politicians of that time, had proudly proclaimed, without mentioning the ‘existential’ threat, that Pakistan had been saved! There weren’t any among his peers disputing his claim. On the contrary, it was the beginning of the end of Pakistan in its eastern wing.

The present lot of politicians may not be as savvy as the one in 1971. But with their remarkable survival instinct shouldn’t they be behaving with more finesse than invested in their forebears? The question our politicos should be asking of themselves and of the ruling elite is what comes at the end of the military action and how is it going to impact the political chessboard given, in particular, the plight of nearly two million internally displaced persons (IDPs)?

Perhaps the military brass didn’t have time to think it through, or wasn’t allowed to because of the paucity of time due to Mr Zardari’s tryst with his mentors in Washington. But the fallout on the affected civilian population is something everybody in the government and among the politicos must be worried about.

The poor management of the disaster is itself a disaster, as can be gleaned from the extensive media coverage of the affected people and the camps where they have been accommodated. Even by our low standards of preparedness to deal with disasters, natural or man-made, this performance is highly flawed. The question that should be agitating every sane politician among our present crop is, will it or will it not play into the hands of the ‘enemy?’ Isn’t there a possibility of these poorly-looked after camps becoming a rich recruiting source for the Taliban? The Taliban have been feeding on swamps of discontent and resentment which are ideal breeding grounds of those swayed by their ideology of hate. Wouldn’t they go for the youths enraged by the short-shrift received by them at these camps?

Our politicians should better prepare to deal with this burden like sensible people and not sleep-walk through this crisis as did their forebears in 1971. Their task, primarily, is to first convince themselves — and later the government — that the option of force may only serve the agenda or agendas of others, not of Pakistan.

Secondly, they should work as the conduits between the government and the Taliban for a dialogue to end the avoidable bloodshed. There are a number of political parties and politicians with their lines to the Taliban still believed to be intact. They should work for the end of fighting and commencement of a dialogue for a durable peace in the region. Giving a blank cheque to the government is the easiest way out of their collective onus and amounts to a woeful abdication of responsibility, something unwarranted under the unleashing storm.

In 1971, the establishment was fanning hope, until the lights went out in Dhaka that the American 7th Fleet was steaming to the Bay of Bengal to come to Pakistan’s assistance. That was a ruse but was clutched on to by the naïve and the gullible in our political class.

There is no such ‘saviour’ syndrome being marketed this time. However, Mr Zardari made an attempt to justify his extended sojourn in US by appearing on a raft of American television channels and taking obvious pride in fighting a war that was, to him, as much ‘his’ as of the Americans. That was just humbug.

Pakistani politicians of different shades and stripes currently lending their support to Islamabad’s military adventure ought to draw a clear and visible line between our agenda and that of Washington’s. The two aren’t the same and there’s absolutely no justification for us to be re-enacting the tragic episode of 1971. Let us, for a change, convince ourselves and the world that we can learn from history and are loath to repeating it. That’s what history expects of us at this crossroads.

The writer is a former ambassador.
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The origin and politics of the Seraiki movement
By Shafqat Tanvir Mirza
Sunday, 24 May, 2009



BEFORE one comments on Riaz Missen’s piece ‘Seraiki nationalism in focus’ (Encounter, May 2) it is inevitable to quote Abdul Majeed Pirzada’s remarks at an Awami Tehreek Conference on provincial autonomy held at Hyderabad on May 10. He says: “Pakhtoons should not be alienated because they were ‘natural allies’ of the Sindhis against the Urdu-speaking people.” This is what can be termed a principle of necessity, if not the law of necessity — a principle that sustains the campaign against Punjab by the other three provinces in the federation.

Once, the Bengalis were in a majority in Pakistan. Their majority was snatched by the feudal West Pakistan and all the four provinces combined to impose parity on them. And when the Bengalis won a majority in the assembly, they were thrown out by the triangle of the feudals, generals and the bureaucrats under the command of a feudal leader from Sindh and an army general from the Frontier.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was given the task to confront the majority, and he did it. The feudal lords from all the four provinces in West Pakistan, in and out of his Pakistan People’s Party, were on his back. The feudals were thus saved from the radical agrarian reforms all the political parties which contested the 1970 election had committed themselves to. The Bengalis had a 36-acre ceiling while we still enjoy almost unlimited acreage.

Z.A. Bhutto was committed to radical agrarian reforms and other labour-capital socialistic relationship. On that basis he swept the polls in the Punjab districts of Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Lahore, Gujranwala, Sialkot, Sheikhupura, Faisalabad, Sahiwal and the present-day Sargodha. He was clean bowled in the feudal-dominated districts where the Seraiki speaking people were in a majority and they were: Attock, Mianwali, Khushab, Jhang, Dera Ghazi Khan and Rajanpur. The PPP won overwhelmingly in Gujrat, Bahawalnagar, Multan and Muzaffargarh.

After the separation of East Pakistan most of the Seraiki MNAs and MPAs including Khosas, Legharis, Qureshis, Mazaris, Wattoos and Nawabs of Bahawalpur joined the PPP and saved their fiefs and the fear of the radical agrarian reforms subsided. However, the radical political verdict from the central Punjab loomed large. After the feudals of the Seraiki belt joined the PPP there was a conscious effort to bifurcate Punjab into two provinces and after the failure of the campaign for a separate Bahawalpur province, the language, or the dialect, was made the basis for this bifurcation move.

The first all-Pakistan Seraiki Conference was convened in Multan which was allegedly supported by the PPP Sindh chief minister and many of the Sindhi intellectuals including Rasul Bukhsh Palejo participated in it. But it ended in fiasco when some people in Multan published and distributed a map of the Seraiki province which included some of the Seraiki speaking areas of Sindh. The Sindhi participants raised the slogan of Hosho Sheedi: ‘Sir daisoon Sindh nah daisoon’ (I will give life but will never let go of Sindh) . With that the Seraiki movement of Punjab abandoned the idea of merging the Seraiki areas of Sindh in its proposed province, the most common factor between the two being the feudal power.

To alienate central Punjab the slogan of local (Multani) and non-local (Punjabi) was raised in 1962 elections by Sajjad Qureshi, the sajjada nasheen of Bahauddin Zakria, who took on Farooq Sheikh, an industrialist from Chiniot (part of Seraiki-speaking Jhang). Qureshi also raised the point of Multani as a separate language in the National Assembly. The word Seraiki was not in vogue in those days but anyhow bureaucrats close to Ayub Khan, such as Qudrat Ullah Shahab, allegedly supported Multani as a separate language.

Dr Tariq Rehman in his book Language and Politics in Pakistan, writes: “According to the antagonists of Seraiki, a powerful bureaucrat in General Ayub’s government, Qudrat Ullah Shahab, patronised the writers of Seraiki, asking twenty of them to claim that their language was different from Punjabi.” (P. 180).

Whether this is correct or not the fact is that the Writers Guild was used by Shahab and Jamiluddin Aali, the two architects of the Guild, to suppress the Lahore-based Punjabi Wing before the wing was dissolved unconstitutionally.

The Guild was not the only forum where politics of this kind flourished. Politicians also had their interests to watch. The Awami National Party of the Frontier and the Pakistan National Party of Balochistan formed their Seraiki units. Both these parties were against the hegemony of Punjab. The nature of this alliance was identical to what Mujeeb Pirzada has suggested in the context of the Sindhi-Pukhtoon alliance.

The two major national parties — the Muslim League, of all colours and hues, and the Pakistan People’s Party — have been reluctant to give support to the Seraiki movement which emerged after the merger of Bahawalpur state in Punjab following dismemberment of the One-Unit. The ‘Bahawalpur Suba’ movement was not based on the language issue but when it fizzled out after the 1970 election, Multan became the centre of Seraiki activities.

One of the early protagonists of the Seraiki language, area and perhaps a separate Seraiki province, was a senior irrigation engineer Syed Noor Ali Zamin Haidri. His book, Mua’arif-i-Seriaki (1972) forcefully argued that from time immemorial the area of Pakistan had been ruled by the people from Sindh Sagar Doab and from those who came from the western bank of the Indus. These areas, he said, had produced much more superior rulers including Z.A. Bhutto, who was the president of Pakistan at the time the book was published, and Gen Ayub Khan.

Haidri’s list of able rulers was quite long, but exclusive. It included names of Nawab of Kalabagh, Sir Sikander Hyat, Sir Khizr Hyat, Sir Feroz Khan Noon, Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Gen Tikka Khan, Ayub Khuro, G.M. Syed, Pirzada Abdus Sattar and Allah Buksh Soomro, etc. On the other hand he declared Ghulam Muhammad, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali from Ravi and Jullunder Doaba and Iftikhar Mamdot and Mumtaz Daultana (from the bank of river Sutlej) as unfit by birth to be rulers.

Haidri quoted a Hadith attributed to the Prophet (PBUH) that only Quresh were entitled to be the khalifas of the Muslims. He also quoted the second Khalifa Hazrat Umar who was said to have governed according to the Hadith. (It may be mentioned that Hazrat Umar was the first to give representation to the Ansars or the locals of Madina in the council). The line of argument led to a total rejection of the Punjabi language and one of the stalwarts of Multani-Seraiki, the late Dr. Mehr Abdul Haq, declared that Punjabi was not the language of any part of Pakistan. This was linguistic extremism based on the presumption that Punjabi was the language of the Sikhs who had dethroned the Muslim ruler of Multan, Nawab Muzaffar Khan in 1818. Thus, the issue was given a religious and political complexion: Sikhs represented Punjabi while the Muslims of the south Punjab or the province of Multan represented Seraiki.

Purely on linguistic basis, some of the British writers and civil servants described Seraiki or Multani as Western Punjabi or Lehnda, which was refuted by some other British scholars and students of Punjabi language. C.F. Usborne, in 1905, wrote an article on Bulleh Shah referring to the Gazetter of Multan and said: “It is hardly true to say, as the writer of Multan Gazetter does, that the ballads (kafis) are written in Multani dialect of the Punjabi language. Undoubtedly they contain some forms of verbs which are peculiar to that dialect, but they could probably be understood by any peasant from Pindi to Delhi and from Delhi to Multan.”

Another modern protagonist of Seraiki, Dr Shackle says that ‘many shared morphological details, as well as overall agreement in much of the vocabulary and syntax, link it (Seraiki) quiet closely to Punjabi with which it has a higher degree of mutual intelligibility.” And Tariq Rehman is of the opinion: “The linguistic fact seems to be that Seraiki and Punjabi are mutually intelligible.”

Economic and political reasons must also be taken into account. Just recall General Ziaul Haq’s period when the political aim of the martial law regime was to divide the support of Mr Bhutto’s party in its strongholds. The Mohajir Qaumi Movement was supposed to divide Sindh on Urdu-speaking and Sindhi-speaking basis and on the same basis Punjab was to be divided on the basis of dialect.

His regime, without consulting linguistic experts, recognised Seraiki as an independent language in the 1980s which according to Husain Ahmad Khan (Rethinking Punjab) was a triumph for Seraiki political advocates and the intelligentsia. This was the period when the Seraiki Qaumi Movement (SQM) emerged. According to Tariq Rahman this was based on the successful model of MQM. The SQM had three centres Karachi, Khanpur, Katora and Ahmadpur Sharqia.

Here, one may mention that many of the feudals of south Punjab who had embraced the PPP after its coming to power had by now crossed the floor and most of them participated in the 1985 non-party election boycotted by the PPP. Unfortunately Mr Bhutto, in the 1977 election, had given the control of Punjab to the so-called Seraiki lords like Nawab Muhammad Ahmad and Sadiq Qureshi plus Muhammad Hayat Taman of Attock. It was against the original aims of the party and jeopardised the original vote bank of the PPP in the province.

The feudal realities have not changed and Dr Ayesha Siddiqa who hails from Bahawalpur, writes in her column, ‘Deadly social change’ (Dawn, May 1, 09): “This part of Punjab is prominent in terms of large landownership and feudal lifestyle. This is also an area where feudal institutions in terms of economic power merged with political and spiritual power. So many political families are not just significant due to their wealth and political power but because they are connected to the shrines as well. The gradual institutionalising of the power of the shrine has strengthened them rather than giving same breathing space to ordinary people some of whom are moving in the direction of rabid religious ideologies….The growing radicalisation in southern Punjab shown up in the inability of the state to carry out land reforms and shift the socioeconomic and political power structure from a pre-capitalist society to a capitalist one will have its consequences in the year to come.”

The utmost attempt of the feudals of the southern Punjab and Sindh plus the Sardars of Balochistan and Khans of the Frontier would be to avoid the move towards the radical economic and democratic changes and in that the Seraiki province can play a big role to keep intact the hegemony of the traditional politics of inheritance which is threatened by the changes in other parts of Punjab and Sindh.

As far as the economic and social grievances of the Seraiki area are concerned, the major responsibility for these lies with the big landlords of the area for it is they who for most of the time were in power in the province and the centre and failed to address them. The clash between the two dialects of Punjabi (Punjabi and Seraiki or Mohajir or local dialect) has also a political and economic background to it. The main aim of the Seraiki province is to give strength to the feudal Sindh, Sardari Balochistan and Khan-ruled Frontier and their politics of inheritance. One of the serious grievances is that the lands of the Seraiki areas are being given to non-Seraiki people. If the land reforms are carried out in true sense, the land will go to the person who is cultivating it and not to the absentees.

One may remind Riaz Missen that when Daultana tried to touch a subject as sensitive as the rights of the tenants the MLAs from the Seraiki belt, under the leadership of Naubahar Shah, Budhan Shah and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, raised an organisation to defend the big landlords which, if memory serves one right, was named Zamindar Bachao Morcha. And in their support Maulana Maudoodi and Ahmadi khalifa Bashiruddin Mahmud authored books in support of the unlimited rights of the landlords who were given propriety rights over land by the British government (in the Mughal and Sikh period the land was the property of the state).
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Indians vote for dal-roti, ignore stability
By Devinder Sharma
Sunday, 24 May, 2009


THE results of the 2009 Indian elections suggest that the majority of the electorate did not vote for stability; they voted for dal-roti.

In May 2004, an angry rural protest vote had driven out an arrogant Shining India brigade. Five years later, in 2009, rural anger seems to have mellowed down. Probably for the first time, dal-roti has taken precedence over the competitive caste calculus. The rural poor certainly voted for those who gave them their daily bread. Political stability at the national level was not on their minds, it never was.

It is also not a vote for reforms. In fact, if the Congress is back in saddle it is despite the reforms. Corporate India’s excitement at the verdict is obvious, but if the Congress gets swayed by a corporate-controlled media which continues to chant the reform mantra day and night, it will script its own demise.

A year back, Rs600,000 million farm loan waiver was announced in Budget 2008. The loan waiver was subsequently raised to Rs710,000 million. Before the loan waiver came, the UPA had already launched the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. Promising to provide a guaranteed employment for at least 100 days in a year to an adult member of any rural household, it was launched on Feb 2, 2006 in 200 districts. In April 2008, at the insistence of Rahul Gandhi, the NREGS was expanded to cover the entire country.

Reports of corruption and misuse notwithstanding, the NREGS has certainly changed the economic profile of the landless workers. Ever since the scheme was launched, daily wage of workers have at least doubled. In Bihar, from Rs50-60 in 2007, the daily wages have now gone up to Rs120-130 in 2009; in Andhra Pradesh, from Rs70-80 to Rs140-150; in Maharashtra, from Rs65-75 to Rs150-180 and in Gujarat, from Rs70-85 to Rs150-160.

Both the NREGS as well as the farm loan waiver were strongly opposed by neoliberal economists. It is well known that the Planning Commission and the Ministry of Rural Development had initially opposed the launch of NREGS. Later, the World Bank opposed it saying that the NREGS actually created barrier for free movement of labour.

The third, and an equally important decision that has weighed heavily in favour of the ruling UPA is the quantum jump in the procurement price of wheat, rice, cotton, and also in some other crops like sugarcane, soybean, tur and arhar. It really is a significant hike, unprecedented since the days of the Green Revolution. In the past three years, wheat procurement prices have risen by a whopping 69 per cent, whereas that of rice by 61 per cent. Cotton prices have been raised by 50 per cent, from Rs 2050 a quintal in 2008 to Rs3000 a quintal in 2009.

During the NDA regime, procurement prices had remained more or less stagnant.

With wheat prices going up by approximately Rs300 a quintal in a span of 2-3 years, Punjab and Haryana farmers had enough reasons to cheer. In Uttar Pradesh, media reports highlighted the distress sale of wheat in the absence of regulated mandis. Wheat farmers had to take their produce to neighbouring Haryana and Madhya Pradesh to realise the procurement price of Rs1080 a quintal. If only the State government had stepped in at the right time, probably Mayawati’s electoral fortunes would have been a little brighter.

In Bihar, Nitish Kumar not only streamlined the law and order machinery but also focused on programmes like NREGS, Mid-Day meal, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan. Bihar voted for an able administrator and not for national stability. West Bengal too uprooted the Corporate driven industrial salvation. By voting for Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress, West Bengal has given a clear verdict against land acquisitions in the name of development. Again, Nandigram and Singur became a symbol of the Corporate efforts to snatch dal-roti from the poor, and the people resisted. The underlying message is crystal clear: land is the only economic security for the poor millions.

In Andhra Pradesh, Y S Rajasekhara Reddy could feel the pulse of the masses, and prepared himself accordingly. Rs2 kg rice for the poor, health insurance through the Argoaysri scheme under which the poor can get surgeries up to Rs2 lakh free, Indiramma houses for the poor and the old-age pension scheme have paid him rich dividends. At least, 18.50 million families living below poverty line gained from the Rs2 kg rice scheme alone.

In addition, YSR has made heavy investments in irrigation projects, not all of which can be justified, but still has generated hope for the farming community. Free power to farmers definitely proved to be the clincher with the rural masses.

In Madhya Pradesh and Chhatisgarh, the BJP rode back to power last December by promising Rs2/kg rice for BPL families. Chhatisgarh’s existing Rs3/kg rice scheme which benefits 3.7 million BPL families is ready to be converted to Rs2/kg scheme on the lines of Madhya Pradesh. In Orissa, Navin Patnaik too picked up and launched a Rs2/kg rice scheme for the poor benefiting 5.579 million families. In these three states, the poverty-stricken beneficiaries of the laudable food security scheme certainly had reasons to vote for the ruling parties in the State rather than aim at national stability.

Besides making available cheap rice, MP government’s popular ‘Ladli’ scheme wherein the government makes deposits in the bank accounts of every girl child attending school has also been able to woo voters. Under this scheme, the state government buys savings certificates of Rs6, 000 each year for five consecutive years for every girl born into a family. The girl gets Rs2,000 after she completes the fifth standard, another Rs4,000 after she completes the eighth standard, Rs7,500 after she completes the tenth standard, Rs200 a month in her eleventh standard, and a lump sum amount of Rs1,18,000 after she enters the twelfth standard, or, alternatively, attains the age of 18 years.

In Tamil Nadu, media reports say that in the run up to the 2006 assembly elections, the DMK had announced free colour televisions; rice at Rs2 per kg (once in power this was reduced to Re1 a kg); two acres of land for the landless; free gas stoves and Rs300 cash doles for the unemployed; maternity assistance of Rs.1,000 for all poor women for six months; as well as free power to weavers. Subsequently, in 2009-10 budget, Tamil Nadu has allocated Rs2.79 billion for supply of free power to farmers and Rs12.51 billion towards free electricity connections to huts and places of worship and subsidised connections for homes and local bodies; Rs.5 billion for free distribution of 2.5 million colour TV sets and Rs.1.4 billion for free gas stoves and connections.

The voters in Tamil Nadu certainly preferred DMK over national stability. By and large you will find that the verdict is clearly in favour of the ruling parties that provided more income and food in the hands of the poor. Providing poor with life-saving support, whether in the form of food or transfer of cash, is also an economic stimulus. Call it ‘populist’ or ‘electoral compulsion’, there is no other way to ensure inclusive growth.

The writer is a New Delhi-based columnist.
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Confusion over source of threat
By Shahid Anwar

Sunday, 31 May, 2009



Beware of a man who says, believe in God as I do otherwise God will punish you. He will say tomorrow, believe in God as I do otherwise I will kill you.

—Thomas Carlyle

At home and abroad, there is a consensus that Pakistan is facing the most serious threat to its existence, but there is a sharp disagreement within the country on the source of the threat and the way to counter it. Many believe it is the Taliban who are the real threat and who are actually dismantling everything that symbolises the state and society of Pakistan but there are some who blame the US for trying to disintegrate Pakistan through a systematic chaos, pushing us to fight the wrong war?

The nation is badly confused and perplexed by these conflicting notions. The recent All Parties Conference called to formulate a unanimous response was hardly helpful to clear the confusion among the common folks. The outcome was a loosely worded resolution allowing different interpretations instead of giving a categorical message. The parties stick to their known positions as the PPP, ANP, PML-Q and MQM support the ongoing military operation against the insurgents, in unambiguous terms, while the JI, JUP, and the PTI continue to oppose it. The PML-N cautiously supports the government position.

A nation faced with a mortal threat cannot afford to lose the perspective. While we recognise that the threat is of existentialist nature, unfortunately we don’t clearly identify the enemy. What impedes the clarity on it?

The roots of confusion lie in four factors: defining the idea of Pakistan, the visible American involvement producing two types of responses; pro-Americanism (compliance at state level) and anti-Americanism (at societal level), the credibility deficit of the political leadership, and our fondness for conspiracy theory. All these factors contribute to make the things more incomprehensible and complex. The unsettled ideological debate on the idea of Pakistan between conservative Islamists and mainstream liberals has confused the average citizens. The Islamists’ retrogressive idea of Pakistan is diametrically different from the progressive concept of the founding fathers and their associates. Islamists’ relentless propaganda about the “ideology” of Pakistan has led to create a unique dilemma regarding our national identity. The question: are we first Pakistani or Muslim? is the corollary of this controversy. No Iranian, Egyptian or Saudi faces such a question. Then, why we have unnecessarily muddled the sense of national identity?

Actually the question of national identity is closely related to power. Historically, the religious parties opposed Pakistan because they believed that Islam cannot be confined within a territorial entity. But, ironically, after the birth of Pakistan they jumped to grab the opportunity by claiming that the country was in fact created for Islam and in the name of Islam. The objective was to make inroads into the power structure. The design was simple: if we accept the proposition that we are first Muslims and the country was created for Islam it automatically gives Mullah a political clout and also veto power in the name of Islam.

The Islamists successfully instilled their version of Islam into the body politic of the country because there happened to be weak and poor leadership at the helm of state affairs. The state’s failure to become a democratic polity gradually weakened the position of the liberal, modernist elite. The successive regimes, being politically weak, succumbed to the pressures and blackmail of the religious lobby and let it to become the interpreter of the idea of Pakistan. The people in general found it difficult to reconcile with the emerging reality but then religion is a sensitive matter for them.

Secondly, the American factor has also played a role in confusing the issues. The US involvement in our national affairs and a collaborationist attitude of the ruling elite along with its inept and half-hearted decision-making has complicated the matters. Given the context of widespread anti-Americanism, even if the leadership acts against local insurgents for its own survival it is seen as doing the American bid.

Thirdly, there is credibility deficit between the leadership and the people. The president is increasingly seen as an incompetent leader who is more interested in foreign trips than the internal affairs. The prime minister remains overshadowed by his powerful party boss and the president. The interior minister is fond of making thoughtless statements. One often gets perplexed about the purpose of his pronouncements.

Finally, the conspiracy theorists also confuse the issues. These theories sit well with the people who are in a state of denial and look for scapegoats. Notwithstanding the uneasy situation, we must recognise that this is time to wake up. Pakistan is fighting for its survival. We need to decide our choice: are we going to live in an Islamic (dynamic and progressive), democratic, constitutional and pluralistic polity or we reconcile with Taliban way of life?

Admittedly, our political system is seriously flawed and needs to be rectified but still it gives us freedom, the right to express, dissent and criticise. The Taliban code extends no such rights. How should we look like? What should we wear and how and when to pray? Who can go to school and who cannot? All these questions are decided by gun. Is this an alternative to (even) a flawed state? Obviously not. We must wake up and fight back to defend our way of life and the country that gives us opportunity to live as free citizens.

The writer is a PhD student in international relations department at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
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Islam and clash of faiths
By Iqbal Jafar

Sunday, 31 May, 2009



THE world always had and will always have fanatics, crackpots and madmen trying to recreate the world in the image of their choice. Two such groups of fanatics occupy the centre-stage today: those who would like to see Islam obliterated from the face of earth; and those who would like to see Islam prevail over all the other faiths. Come what may. Come Armageddon.

This quarrelsome and adversarial view of religion, except one’s own, has unleashed a wave of fanaticism that has pushed Islam into a twister where its pristine spirit is being mauled and battered by believers and disbelievers alike. Strangely enough the fanatics on both sides of the divide, the believers and disbelievers, seem to agree that Islam cannot co-exist with other religions!

Lost in this battle for God, as Karen Armstrong calls it, is the true voice of Islam. Lost also is the fact that within the framework of religious beliefs, the Quranic view of the plurality of faiths is unique in the history of religious thought. That worldview is so universal in its embrace that great mystics and poets have been inspired by it, and so radical that quarrelsome exclusivists of various denominations, faiths and factions would hardly ever accept it.

I have tried to gather together the strands of that worldview, placed in their different contexts in the Quran, in the form of five propositions, each supported by many verses that are reproduced without comment or explanation. While quoting those verses I have followed, except in two places, the English translation of the Quran by Dr. Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din Al Hilali and Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan of the Islamic University, Madina Munawwarah, published by Darussalam, Saudi Arabia. So here are the five propositions.

The first proposition is that diversity of beliefs is ordained by God for reasons best known to Him. This is supported by at least three verses. First, the reference in surah Al-Baqarah (2:253) to different degrees of honour bestowed on different prophets and to the disagreement among those who followed them, and then a simple conclusion: ‘If Allah had willed they would not have fought against one another, but Allah does what He likes’.

Similar observation is made in Al-Anam (6:35) with an admonishment to those who overlook the will of God, in these words: ‘And had Allah willed, He could have gathered them together (all) on true guidance, so be not you one of those who are Al-Jahilun (the ignorant)’. The third verse on the subject, in Al-Anam (6:107), is couched in even stronger words: ‘Had Allah willed they would have not taken others besides Him in worship. And we have not made you a watcher over them, nor are you a Wakil (trustee or guardian) over them’.

The second proposition is that God has sent a Messenger to every nation. It is supported by at least two verses. It first appears as a simple statement of fact in surah Yunus (10:47): ‘And for every Ummah (a community or nation) there is a messenger.’ It is repeated a little more elaborately in surah Ibrahim (14:4): ‘And we have sent not a Messenger except with the language of his people, in order that he might make the Message clear for them’.

The third proposition is that plurality of faiths should lead to competition in good deeds. This is supported by the later part of an elaborate verse in surah Al-Maidah (5:48), best translated by Ahmed Ali: ‘To each of you We have given a law and a way and a pattern of life. If God had pleased He could surely have made you one people (professing one faith). But He wished to try and test you by that which He gave you. So try to excel in good deeds.’The fourth proposition, a logical corollary of the first three, is that there is reward for good deeds irrespective of the denominational identity of the doer.

This is clearly stated in many verses two of which, one in surah Al-Baqarah and the other in Al-Maidah (2:62 and 5:69), are identical: ‘Verily, those who believe, and those who are Jews and Christians, and Sabians, whoever believes in Allah and the Last Day and does righteous good deeds shall have their reward with their Lord, on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve.’The fifth proposition, which is more of a conclusion, is that there should, therefore, be no clash amongst the followers of different religions.

This is supported by two, possibly more, verses. Its clearest and simplest articulation is in the later part of surah As-Shura (42:15) in these words: ‘Allah is our Lord and your Lord. For us our deeds and for you your deeds. There is no dispute between us and you. Allah will assemble us (all) and to Him is the final return.’ And what happens when we return to Him? The answer is in the last part of the verse 5:48, best translated by N.J. Dawood: ‘….for to God shall you return and he will resolve your differences for you.’

These five propositions together constitute an elegant explanation, even justification, of the plurality of faiths, unmatched in its inclusivist universality in the belief-systems of the world.

Unbelievable as it may sound in the present state of inter-faith hostility, Islam is the only religion in the world that gives credence to other religions also, and invites their followers to join in a competition for good deeds. It would like to see the world as a place where people belonging to different faiths compete for good deeds rather than a place where good and evil are engaged in an eternal battle and neither is able to defeat the other.

But why, one may ask, is this spirit of Islam nowhere in evidence? The reason is simple: while the orthodox-obscurantist version of Islam has been part of the agenda of powerful political movements across the Muslim world, the reform of orthodoxy is not on the agenda of any political party in the Muslim world, with the possible exception of Justice and Development Party, AKP, of Turkey.

Instead, the reform of orthodoxy has been consigned to the care of a few scattered bands of scholars, like the ones in the Islamic Ideology Council of Pakistan, who have to work without political support and despite official neglect.

For this reason alone, if for none of the other many reasons, the liberals could lose the ongoing battle for the hearts and minds of the people. That would mean ever shrinking intellectual, social, political and economic horizons of the Muslim societies, and ever expanding clash of the faiths.
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Should executive magistracy be revived?
By Hussain H. Zaidi
Sunday, 31 May, 2009


AMID the National Judicial Committee’s resolve to completely separate the judiciary from the executive, the federal and provincial governments are mulling revival of executive magistracy abolished in August 2001 as part of administrative reforms. Is the revival of the executive magistracy in order?

The local government system introduced by the Gen Musharraf regime in 2001 introduced some drastic changes in the administrative system. Prior to that, the commissioner and the deputy commissioner (DC) were the administrative head of a division and a district respectively. The DC was also vested with judicial powers and was called district magistrate (DM). The 2001 reforms abolished divisions as administrative units together with the office of the commissioner. The district nazim was made the head of the district government.

The office of the DC was replaced with that of district coordination officer (DCO), though the latter was stripped of many of the powers exercised by the former including the judicial powers. Those administrative changes, as well as the devolution scheme, were however not applied to the capital territory of Islamabad, which continues to have the (chief) commissioner and the DC as its divisional and district administrative heads respectively.

The office of the DC/DM was a relic of colonialism created by the British rulers of India to subjugate the local population. Initially, the DC was called collector, his basic duty being to collect revenue. The British also set up the magistracy system consisting of executive officers exercising judicial powers. At the district level, the office of district magistrate was created and the collector was given those powers. It was under the DM that magistrates worked in matters both judicial and administrative. The magistrates exercised enormous powers including the power to issue search warrants, get public property vacated, supervise police investigations, prevent commission of crime and try and sentence accused persons.

Though British colonialism came to an end on August 14, 1947, the colonial psyche persisted and the magistrates, responsible to the executive, continued to wield their pre-independence powers. Special mention may be made of the powers of the DM, which he exercised under the criminal procedure code (CrPC). For instance, he was authorized to detain any person under the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance (MPO). The district police officer was answerable to him and he (DC) was empowered to detain any person during police investigations. He was also empowered to cancel bonds and ban congregations.

In the wake of amendment to the CrPC in 2001, judicial powers of the executive magistracy have come to be vested in the judiciary i.e. judicial magistrates. The accused persons are tried by judicial officers rather than executive-cum-judicial officers. The judicial powers of the DM have been transferred to the session judge, while the power to impose section 144 is vested in the office of the nazim.

These changes cut to size the district management group (DMG) of the central superior services and provincial civil service (executive group), who occupied senior positions in divisional and district administration. With their judicial powers gone and their executive powers attenuated, they have been clamouring that the devolution system and the concomitant administrative changes have proved an abject failure and therefore the old system needs to be revived. Partly because of the efforts of these two groups, who dominate the provincial bureaucracy, and partly because these changes were introduced by the “previous” government, the office of the commissioner has been revived in three out of four provinces and now it seems to be the turn of the restoration of the DC/DM office.

This write-up is not concerned with the merits or demerits of the devolution scheme. The question before us is whether the system of executive magistracy should be revived. To begin with, the restoration of executive magistracy is linked to the principle of the separation of the judiciary from the executive, which is enjoined by the constitution and directed by superior courts (the Supreme Court and high courts) from time to time. This principle is also a prerequisite of a democratic polity, where the judiciary protects the rights of the citizens both against other citizens and the government and ensures the supremacy of the law and the constitution. The judiciary can perform these important functions in a proper way only if it is independent of other two organs—the legislature and the executive. In particular, if the judiciary is not independent of the executive, it will be under a lot of political pressure and the judges will not be able to act freely without fear or favour.

One of the safest ways to ensure the independence of the judiciary is to separate it from the executive. This implies that the executive should not be in control of the judiciary. Nor should the former meddle into the affairs of the latter. It further implies that the same person should not have both executive and judicial powers. He should not be at once the judge and the persecutor.

Recognizing this principle, the 1973 constitution directs the separation of the judiciary from the executive. Article 175 (3) states: “The judiciary shall be separated from the executive progressively within fourteen years from the commencing day”. Originally, the constitution provided for a period of five years for the separation but later the period was enhanced to fourteen years through constitutional amendments.

Hence, going by the constitution, the judiciary should have been separated from the executive by the year 1987. However, that was not done until 2001. Prior to that, the judiciary was only partly separated from the executive. The superior courts and the sessions courts were separate from the executive. The civil courts were also independent of the executive. However, at the courts of the district magistrate and those of first, second and third class magistrates, the judiciary and the executive were not separate. The same person performed both the judicial and executive functions. He executed laws as well as settle disputes.

Lack of separation of the judiciary from the executive was replete with serious shortcomings. First, it impaired the independence of the judiciary. Take the case of the office of the DC. On the one hand, the DC was the head of the district administration. It was his responsibility to maintain law and order in the district. In his capacity as DM, he settled disputes in criminal cases. Though he exercised both judicial and executive powers, he was essentially an executive officer and his services were at the disposal of the provincial government. It frequently happened that when a top government functionary was involved in a case and the same came up for hearing before the DM, that person would always be in a position to influence the DM who as DC was his subordinate. The same was true of subordinate magistrates. They performed judicial functions but the terms and conditions of their service were those applicable to executive officers.

All those officers because of their vulnerable position were susceptible to the pressure of the executive and thus liable to make a departure from justice. Hence, not surprisingly, magistrates often made decisions favourable to the administration. Secondly, lack of separation of the judiciary from the executive leads to concentration of power. Now, power has a strong tendency to corrupt and the greater the concentration of power, the stronger is the tendency towards corruption. Third, it resulted in miscarriage of justice. An administration official issues an order and executes a law. But if as a judicial officer he is called upon to review his order or the way he implemented it, in all probability his verdict will be in favour of the order passed by him or the manner in which he executed it. But the grievances of the petitioner will persist.

Finally, the dispensation of justice is delayed. Take the example of DC/DM. His executive duties were multifarious. Apart from being the chief administrator of the district, he was the chief revenue officer and member of many development committees/boards. Besides, he had protocol duties to perform. This badly affected his duties as judicial officer. Hundreds of cases kept pending as he could not attend to them for want of time. Justice delayed is justice denied. Hence, lack of separation of the judiciary from the executive obstructs justice.

One may argue that revival of executive magistracy will not much obstruct justice since the upper judiciary will remain separate from the executive. However, to this one may reply that it is the lower judiciary with which the ordinary man comes into contact for most of the time and it is here that justice is often denied.

The advocates of the restoration of executive magistracy may also argue that the judiciary is already burdened with work and trial of local offences is a low priority area for it. No doubt, the lower judiciary has a lot of work to dispose of, which delays dispensation of justice. But the solution to the problem consists not in revival of executive magistracy but partly in raising the number of judges, partly in increasing the pace at which cases are disposed of and partly in recalling judicial officers holding executive offices back to the bench (as recently announced by the National Judicial Committee). Another argument is that the DC/DM was the one person responsible for maintenance of law and order in the district, which ensured administrative ‘efficiency’. Assuming that the old system ensured administrative efficiency, why does an executive officer need to have judicial powers to do justice to his work?

To conclude, the abolition of executive magistracy was a right decision, as the combination of administrative and judicial powers in one office violated the principle of the separation of the judiciary from the executive as enshrined in the constitution. The revival of the old system will serve little good.
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