The people of India have reasserted faith in their democracy. Over 60 per cent of the 714 million registered voters cast their vote last week, which must be some sort of world record, and there were no significant cries of foul play. They have also confounded the pundits. Caste, religion and political ideologies have been diminished. Incumbency was not a negative factor unreasonably. Businessmen are happy that the 9 per cent growth rate will be maintained despite the global recession. India has moved to the centre, which is a vote for performance, moderation and global-interdependence.

From the region’s point of view, there is one significant development. Fear or the psychosis of fear didn’t play a major part in voter behaviour. After the Mumbai episode, the BJP certainly tried to whip up anti-Pakistan outrage and blame the UPA government both for a security lapse and for its inability to strike back in retaliation. But the voter didn’t fall prey to prejudice and passion. Realism and pragmatism was the order of the day. Indeed, the politics of hope seems to have triumphed – hope of a better economic future for Indians regardless of caste, colour or creed; hope of peace in the neighbourhood, especially with Pakistan. Indians seem to understand that if Pakistan has been painted by their nationalist establishment as “a historic culprit”, it is currently a victim too of the most vicious form of terrorism that can easily spill over the border if it is not contained within. In other words, India cannot be sanguine if its neighbour’s house is on fire and the wind can change direction and start to blow India’s way. This is a sort of Obama factor. President Bush used fear to win two elections while President Obama talked of hopeful change. In much the same way, the BJP’s national security paradigm didn’t impress the voters and the UPI’s middle path with 9 per cent annual growth, strategic partnership with America, responsible regional behaviour and trickle down economics seemed a better bet.

This is good news from South Asia’s point of view. Pakistan and India desperately need to get back on the peace track immediately. The terrorists attacked Mumbai precisely in order to derail the peace process. If Dr Singh had ordered retaliatory strikes on any part of Pakistan as demanded by the BJP hardliners, the terrorists would have succeeded beyond their dreams because the region would have been plunged into war and anarchy. Before the elections, Dr Singh was obliged to take the position that Pakistan must crack down on terrorism unequivocally before talks about conflict resolution could restart with India. If he hadn’t done that, the BJP might have succeeded in whipping up nationalism and accusing the Congress of a weak-kneed response. But there is no such compulsion now. The UPA doesn’t need to appease anyone left or right. Indeed, it is heartening to recall that mid-way through the general elections Dr Singh risked a statement acknowledging the fact that back-channel diplomacy between his government and that of General Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan had traveled a significant distance in trying to find solutions to old disputes, including Kashmir, until political instability in Pakistan froze the process in 2007.

In the last few days, a couple of significant developments seem to point the way forward. First, there is the MOU signed in Washington with the Pakistan government which talks of a transit trade corridor from Central Asia to South Asia through Afghanistan. Clearly, the idea is to make Afghanistan, Pakistan and India inter-dependent in a meaningful and positive sense as opposed to the sum-zero game that has been played until now in the region. There is bi-partisan support in Pakistan for building enduring peace with India and for opening up the region to one another and becoming interdependent. The proposed Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline is also a step in the same direction.

Second, Washington appears to be seized of the necessity of helping resolve outstanding conflicts between India and Pakistan so that Pakistan can concentrate on confronting the terrorist enemy within Pakistan – which is also the enemy facing America in Afghanistan – instead of being obsessed with India. Indeed, the insistent message from Washington to Pakistan in the last few weeks has been to change its anti-India mindset and replace it with an anti-Taliban-Al Qaeda mindset. To India, America is saying that it must solve outstanding disputes with Pakistan and build trust. Interestingly, the New York Times has, rather unprecedentedly, editorialized that India must take the initiative to resolve the Kashmir dispute, and, failing that, quickly move to settle water and other territorial issues with Pakistan. So the hope is that Dr Singh will move swiftly to reduce India’s troop deployment on the border, thereby facilitating the reduction of Pakistani troops on the other side and their redeployment in FATA.

Dr Manmohan Singh should not stick to the pre-election tactic of insisting firmer action by the Pakistani authorities against its homespun terrorists before reopening the peace dialogue. Indeed, he must do the very opposite so that Pakistan can concentrate on the task at hand. That would be a blow for hope not just in India but also in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Consensus against terrorism?

On May 18, 2009, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani convened an all-parties conference at his residence in Islamabad to discuss the ongoing operations against the Taliban in Malakand Division and to build national consensus in favour of this move. The political aspect of the operation cannot be ignored, as the support of all parties is seen as crucial to sustaining the offensive against the Taliban and also reinforcing the national will to fight the internal threat. This week, The Friday Times looks at the politics surrounding Pakistan’s counter-terrorism efforts, especially in Malakand Division.

Following is the text of the draft resolution of the May 18 All-Parties Conference:

The meeting after being briefed and having detailed discussion stated and resolved as under;

1. Recalled, the consensus Resolution passed by a Joint Sitting of Parliament on 22nd October, 2008;

2. Reiterated, its support to the Resolution passed on 22nd October 2008 and the subsequent Recommendations made by the Parliamentary Committee on National Security, as required by the Resolution and impressed upon the need for a speedy implementation;

3. Reaffirmed, its commitment to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution and sovereignty of the State of Pakistan;

4. Emphasised, the need to establish and maintain the writ of the State and ensure the supremacy of the rule of law;

5. Condemned, all violent challenges to the Constitution and the state of Pakistan;

6. Expressed, grief for the martyrdom of security personnel and innocent civilians;

7. Maintaining, that the safety and security of civilians is paramount, it should be ensured that minimum harm is caused to the non-combatant civilian population;

8. Re-emphasised, the need to ensure the safety, well being and rehabilitation in their respective areas of the Internally Displaced Persons;

9. Called upon, the Pakistani people to respond as one nation to mitigate the suffering of our brothers and sisters, the Internally Displaced Persons;

10. Emphasised; that Pakistan is a vibrant dynamic democracy;

11. Re-affirmed, that Pakistan’s nuclear assets are under effective command and control authority;

12. Asserted, that the strategic decisions regarding military issues including troop deployment are the sole prerogative of the State of Pakistan.

13. Appreciated, the tremendous sacrifices given by the Pakistani people economically, politically and in terms of human life while fighting terrorism, more than any other country or people;

14. Condemned, the violation of Pakistan’s political, economic and territorial sovereignty including drone attacks;

15. Conveyed; that Pakistan is a sovereign State and any aid, economic or military which carries conditionalities will be counter productive.

16. Resolved, to make efforts:

a. To unite the nation in the face of insurgency in Swat and Malakand Division,

b. To struggle collectively for the security and welfare of the Internally Displaced Persons,

c. To unite the nation to combat terrorism, extremism and sectarianism.

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CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

Learning from the Swat deal.
Moeed Yusuf.



Public sentiment in Pakistan regarding militancy has undergone a major change in the past month. After a prolonged period of ambivalence, popular discourse has begun to reflect the gravity of the situation.

This dramatic shift occurred in the wake of the Swat peace deal. The Taliban over-reached, crossing the tolerance threshold of the average Pakistani and consequently generated mass support for the military action against themselves.

The liberal enclave has declared the failure of the Swat deal as a vindication of their stance: the deal was a bad idea to begin with as it allowed the Taliban to consolidate their hold on governance and delayed the inevitable military operation thus enhancing the militants’ preparedness.

The Swat deal contains several lessons that the Pakistani state may benefit from should a similar situation arise in the future. The take-home message, however, is antithetical to, not supportive of, the liberal argument.

The liberal contention is focused solely on the desired outcome but ignores the prerequisites for achieving the end-goal – i.e., it glosses over the necessity of a consensus on a military operation which was certain to cause massive human suffering. Just bullying in, as the liberal discourse demanded, without creating the space for the military option would have been suicidal.

Consider that at the time of the Swat deal, the local population was vehemently against the continuation of a military operation. Defying this sentiment and continuing to operate on the liberal premise would have allowed the Taliban to easily win adherents to their cause by pointing to the state’s reluctance to negotiate. Trust in the army would have further eroded, and the political atmosphere would have sooner or later pitted the Awami National Party and the Pakistan People’s Party against one another. This is precisely what the Taliban hoped for.

So how could the state have achieved the desired end of quashing active insurgency – shared by the liberals as well – in a sustainable manner?

The state either needed to negotiate a permanent truce with the Taliban which left them subordinate to the recognised authority and minimised the likelihood of future challenges to the state’s writ or it required popular backing which would allow the army to take on the Taliban with the aim of eliminating their presence but without facing any political backlash.

In this sense, the Swat deal, far from being an abdication, was a win-win.

Broadly speaking, there were only two possible outcomes. The TSNM could have been sincere about fighting for the institution of Nizam-e Adl; after all, this has indeed been a longstanding demand of the people of the region. In that case, the Sufi would have allowed the state to execute the Ordinance with his input and as a quid pro quo would have forced the Taliban to silence their guns.

The state could then have gradually increased its intelligence penetration to ensure that the Taliban were not spreading their tentacles quietly. Meanwhile, the state would remain in charge of the region and justice would be dispensed by state-appointed qazis in line with the agreement with the Sufi. Indeed, in this scenario, these very courts would have held the Taliban accountable for any excesses.

Second – and this was always more probable for those who understand the Taliban – the situation could have unfolded exactly as it has, i.e. the Sufi sought more concessions than the agreement, he began to coerce the government, he could not control the Taliban, and the latter, in their exuberance found this the perfect opportunity to spread their control, instituted their extremist philosophy proudly, and boasted about taking the government head-on.

Scholars who have studied the Taliban movement as well as those who know the empirics at the moment were convinced that the third obvious option whereby the Taliban would act shrewdly and expand their presence only gradually while delaying the process of instituting their extremist laws was never on the cards. The belief stems from the rather un-savvy understanding of grand strategy among the core Taliban leadership and their absolute rejection of flexibility in matters relating to regulation of society.

Among the two options left then, the state could not have gone wrong. The first possibility would have satisfied the quest to pacify the insurgency without abdicating to the militants. The second would have (has) achieved for the Pakistani state a massive shift in public sentiment whereby the very polity that pointed fingers at the state would take a U-turn in no time to back state actions against the militants.

The transformation in public sentiment was bound to have a multiplier effect. The antipathy generated against the Taliban after the media coverage of the Swat flogging incident, reports of Taliban excesses in the region, and growing resentment against the militants among Swatis themselves created bottom-up pressure that in turn forced the political elite to lend an ear to their constituencies.

Indeed, an all-parties conference and broad consensus on the issue of militancy would not have been possible had the Taliban not been exposed. Their post-Swat deal behaviour allowed even the hitherto non-committal Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz to realise that the Taliban were as big a threat to its existence as they were to the PPP’s. This change of heart meant that the three largest parties – PPP, PMLN, and PMLQ – were on board on the issue. In fact, at the APC held on Monday, May 18, no party disagreed that the Taliban needed to be tamed one way or the other.

The dissent that remained was also in line with political realities; the Jamiat-e Ulema-e Islam cannot support any direct mention of action against the ‘Taliban’, and the Jama’at-e Islami, sitting outside parliament, wants to use the anti-US and anti-Islam card to position itself as the new face of moderate Islam (the PMLN being ‘secular’ and the Taliban being the new extreme right wing force). Therefore, their public rhetoric is understandable.

The lessons the entire episode leaves us with are much broader than the peace deal itself. The argument here is not that peace deals in particular need to be supported unequivocally. Rather the point to note is that mere agreement on the end-goal does not imply that the tools to achieve it become available automatically. Timing of action is of crucial importance.

For one, prior to undertaking any controversial policy measure, a broad consensus is always essential.

Second, the strengths and weaknesses of the adversary must be known and the state must operate with those in mind. For instance, the Swat deal would not have been permissible had the Taliban been a strategy-savvy outfit who could have used the media and public sentiment to further alienate the writ of the state without overreaching once they had forced the state’s hand into cutting a deal with them.

Third, if the state’s objective can be met with moves that may entail short-term losses or may seem opposed to values of a particular segment of society, that may be no reason to reject them outright. As long as the local and overall majority sentiment is satisfied, the state’s writ does not wither away by the action (in Swat’s case, it would not have if the Sufi had applied in letter and spirit the Nizam-e Adl agreement), and the Pakistani constitution is not undermined, state actions remain legitimate.

Fourth, events following the Swat deal suggest that public pressure can influence both political sentiment as well as the outlook of the media. The three seem to be intrinsically linked with multiple feedback loops tying them together. However, change does not necessarily have to be top down. Tremendous potential gains can be had from civil society efforts to mobilise public opinion irrespective of the political will at the top.

The Swat situation is not the last one the Pakistani state will have to face prior to eliminating militancy for good. Similar conundrums are bound to come up again in other regions infested with Taliban or their active sympathisers. The state’s actions must continue to be guided by the lessons of the Swat episode; whether this would imply striking deals or shying away from them and finding alternate means to forge a consensus depends on the particular case in question.

The writer is a research fellow at the Strategic and Economic Policy Research (Pvt Ltd.) in Islamabad. He can be contacted at myusuf@sepr.com.pk

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CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

The party meta-politics.
Khaled Ahmed.



No one really knows what the parties feel like doing in Pakistan because all of them are busy doing a meta-politics of issues that they would rather not discuss in public. The public in fact is the unspoken variable here. The parties swing with the public opinion as it swings with the media. The media is dominated by rightwing, religious and pro-state-agencies journalists doing popular programmes with high revenue ratings.

There are rare occasions when ‘national consensus’ breaks surfaces like a tired whale. But it is heavily underpinned with isolationist reservations. It is short-lived if the rest of the world tends to agree with it. Political parties first bow to this ‘national consensus’ even if it goes against their grain, then look for loopholes through which to escape without getting bruised. Proprieties are embraced at the verbal level but unworthy ‘ethnic’ and ‘toppling’ passions are nurtured secretly.

PPP and the Taliban: The Pakistan People’s Party has most suffered in the absence of its last great leader Benazir Bhutto. It suffered because she was a statesman and thought of Pakistan not always through the national prism but in the context of global politics. Under General Zia-ul Haq, religion was internalised even by those who opposed him. Hence when the media became free, religious programmes headed the list of popular shows. The PPP rank and file wanted to support laws like the Blasphemy Law but Benazir Bhutto wouldn’t allow it. They wanted also to hate India like the rest as a badge of Pakistani nationalism; but she wouldn’t have it.

The PPP cut its teeth on anti-Americanism. Supporting the Taliban should have been natural to it, but Bhutto took a stand that smacked of pro-American opportunism. As time passed, Punjab, closest to state ideology, largely abandoned the PPP. The PPP became a “liberal” party despised by the clerically dominated Pakistan that was to elect the Mutahidda Majlis-e Amal in 2002. Under President Asif Ali Zardari, it sees the party once again sucking up to America as the rest of the country abominates the US as an enemy of the Muslims. The PPP government therefore is ‘defensive’ as it adopts ‘flexible’ foreign policy postures. It has taken on the Taliban knowing it goes against the public opinion but is hopeful that the ‘national consensus’ born of the shenanigans of Sufi Muhammad would last.

PMLN and the Taliban: The Nawaz League sits on top of the dominant rightwing vote in Punjab. Its power is owed to the fact that Punjab is more than two-thirds of Pakistan’s population. It rides on the tide of religiosity internalised by the population under General Zia whose patronage was one of the elements in the rise of Nawaz League. The League therefore cuts into the traditional Jama’at-e Islami vote bank in Punjab by dint of its usurpation of some of the Jama’at’s Islamic agenda. But Nawaz Sharif is not too comfortable with it after being exposed to governance in 1990s and contacts with the outside world.

The League and the PPP have an adversarial relationship which should be normal under democracy; but it is abnormal by reason of its being based on the politics of ‘toppling’, that is, getting rid of the government before the completion of its five-year term in office. The vote bank is anti-American thanks to the media; therefore, the PMLN has taken an anti-American stance which automatically becomes pro-Taliban under the slogan of ‘it is not Pakistan’s war’. It is not clear on the National Reconciliation Ordinance, as agreeing with it would affect its anti-American stance. It is perturbed by the fact that visits by American officials at Nawaz Sharif’s home have not been liked by the ‘public’ (read media). The meta-politics is that of toppling the PPP and non-opposition of the Taliban.

MQM and the Taliban: The Mutahidda Qaumi Movement has a steady presence in parliament and dominates the cities in Sindh, especially Karachi, where 18 million people contain a majority of loyal MQM ‘ethnic’ voters. It is challenged by a weak Sindhi community and the ‘ethnic’ Pashtun presence of nearly 4 million in Karachi, mostly aligned to the Taliban because the Taliban are Pashtun. It fears the Taliban as interlopers into Pakistan’s sovereignty as a state and constant suppliers of hostile opponents inside Karachi. It sees the 3,500 madrassas of Karachi and their predominantly Pashtun seminarians as potential weaponised manpower in the street battles to come.

It supports the PPP at the centre more sincerely than the other coalition partners because it regards the Taliban in the tribal areas (meaning FATA and Malakand) as potential migrant population to Karachi. It wants Pakistan to work more closely with the international community in general and the US in particular to face up to the challenge of the Taliban. It senses the weight of the past record of its relationship with the Sindhi PPP just as the PPP feels that its partnership with the MQM in Sindh is an act of statesmanship by the party boss, Asif Zardari. As it stands up to the Pashtun challenge in Karachi, the MQM knows that the natural instinct of the PPP is to go against the MQM.

ANP and the Taliban: As a Pashtun ethnic party, the Awami National Party is the champion of all Pashtuns, but has been drastically cut down by the state because of its feared ‘provincialism’ and its championship of what the centre thought was Pashtun separatism. In fact, in the past, the state has opposed the ANP and the MQM by turns as enemies of the state. The ANP opposed the anti-Soviet jihad because it subsumed the Pashtun ethnic identity of its warriors under an Islamic label. The mujahideen hit back by negating the Pashtun slogan of the party. The MMA wanted to prove the point when it ruled the NWFP 2002 onwards. It failed and was ousted by the gravitation of the disenchanted Pashtun vote back to the ANP in 2008.

The ANP supports the PPP against the Taliban. But its relationship with its Pashtun voters can no longer be on the basis of a secular appeal. Its handling of the Taliban in Swat has made its job easier but the power-base of the Taliban is in FATA where the ANP can hardly operate. Its meta-politics is anti-American based on the history of the party, which is undermined the moment it advocates standing up to the threat of the Taliban. It is in the awkward position of supporting the Nawaz League on the latter’s anti-American posturing while going with the PPP on the war against the Taliban. Its championship of the Pashtuns in Karachi is ethnic-based but the Pashtuns of Karachi are mostly from FATA and naturally opposed to its secular credentials.

JUI and the Taliban: The JUI is an Islamic party but its base in Balochistan is ethnic by which device it undermines the avowedly ethnic Pashtun party, the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP). JUI has the most obscure political stance among those in the federal coalition. It cannot oppose the Taliban because its support hinterland is in FATA and Balochistan; and the Taliban are all Deobandi like the JUI. To retain popularity among the Pashtuns, it has to oppose the US while cohabiting with a presumed pro-US PPP. It opposes the PPP policy in Swat but will not resign from the cabinet.

JUI is pragmatic in politics because of its leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman, which is most unlike the Pashtun who will disagree and thus go into heroic isolation. The JUI is neither heroic nor does it want isolation from the perks of being in government. Its pragmatic retreat in the face of Talibanisation has thrown the Pashtun of Karachi into the ANP’s lap. The madrassas of Karachi, offended by this pragmatism, have shifted their allegiance to the extremist elements within the radicalised Pashtun as Karachi gets ready for its next bout of ethnic violence. The Taliban have no love lost for Maulana Fazlur Rehman but others in the party can and have been able to reach out to them.

JI/Tehreek-e Insaf and the Taliban: The Jama’at-e Islami opted out of the 2008 elections because it had lost hope of regaining its position in Punjab after a bad innings as JUI’s partner in the NWFP under the MMA. As a desperate attempt to get its lost constituency back in Punjab, it had signed the 17th Amendment with Pervez Musharraf with the aim of preventing Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto from becoming prime ministers forever. Qazi Hussain Ahmad was a Pashtun leader but he had erred in the past in supporting Hekmatyar in the face of almost a consensus of Afghan mujahideen against the warlord. The JUI had stayed aloof till the Deobandi madrassas were used by the state for its covert wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir. It had the Pashtun tribal votes in its pocket. The Jama’at had nothing in Punjab.

The Jama’at competes with the JUI for Taliban support. It wants to shine while the JUI is bedimmed by its association with the ‘ ghaddar ’ PPP in Islamabad. The Tehreek-e Insaf has a vote but it is thin. Imran Khan can continue to glow if another MMA is created and his party joins it. If it succeeds it will succeed in Punjab with a breakaway PMLN vote. The PPP is organisationally weak in Punjab but its voter will not budge. The PMLN is well organised and its vote bank is swelling in number, and is not going anywhere. Tehreek-e Insaf’s middle-upper class supporters with anti-Americanism picked up from Noam Chomsky may get put off with Imran Khan’s championship of the Taliban cause.

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CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

Peace, security and nuclear weapons.
Najam Sethi's E d i t o r i a l.


Has Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons brought it security, prosperity and stability as envisioned by its military and political leaders? Or has it served to reinforce the civil-military imbalance without enhancing security or building prosperity or strengthening democracy? These questions are as relevant today as they were in 1974 when India tested a nuclear device and Pakistan responded by embarking on a secret plan to build a similar bomb for Pakistan. Or in 1998 when India tested five nuclear devices and Pakistan tit-for-tatted, despite the huge economic and military costs which followed in its wake.

India has since consistently refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Pakistan has hid behind India’s skirts and spurned it too. But there has been one big difference. India didn’t have to pay any price for defying the West because it hadn’t entered into any strategic alliances with it. But when the cold war ended, the US walked out of Af-Pak in 1989 after accusing it of having crossed the nuclear “red light” and subjecting it to a range of economic and military sanctions in the 1990s for its nuclear defiance.

On May 11, 1998, India upped the ante by testing five nuclear devices. In dismal straits already, Pakistan could test and be damned, or abstain and hope to reap rewards from the West. For over two weeks, Pakistan’s civilian leadership dithered. But, apart from some phone calls from President Bill Clinton to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif with vague promises of a financial reward, there was nothing concrete on the table.

Meanwhile the rhetoric from India was becoming more threatening and taunting by the day. The gist of it was: if you have the bomb, show it now; if you haven’t got it, get ready to be thrown into the Arabian Sea for meddling in Kashmir. In the event, all doubts and confusions in the mind of Pakistan’s people, media, military and civilian leadership were swept aside and all were shoved on to the same page of national anger and honour, propelling Pakistan to test six devices and going “one up”. The day after, as expected, the sky fell on Pakistan’s head. Faced with a suffocating economic embargo by the West, the Sharif government devalued the rupee by 50 per cent and froze over US$10 billion in private forex reserves. The sanctions were replaced by huge doses of economic and military assistance after the US “returned” to Af-Pak following 9/11 and Pakistan’s military leadership agreed to another “partnership” with it, as in the 1960s and 1980s, in pursuit of American goals in the region. That partnership has now been reinforced in the wake of the Taliban’s threat to the state of Pakistan, mainly because of the West’s fear that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons could fall into the “wrong hands”.

If Pakistan’s nuclear program has been the bane of its life by provoking instead of resolving conflict, it has also been a boon by “renting in America”. But has the bomb served its original purpose of bringing security to Pakistan and obviating the need for a prohibitively expensive conventional arms race in the region with India? The record shows an interesting relationship between provocation, lack of conflict resolution and deterrence.

In the 1980s India seized Siachin and provoked Pakistan to support the Khalistan insurgency in Punjab. The two countries edged towards war after India launched “Operation Brasstacks” in 1987. Pakistan’s dictator General Zia ul Haq announced that Pakistan was a screw driver’s turn away from the bomb and reinforced the signal by nudging Dr A Q Khan to confide to Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar in early 1988 that Pakistan had the bomb. Did this stop India from teaching Pakistan a lesson? In the 1990s, Pakistan bled India in Kashmir. But India didn’t launch a war against Pakistan across the international border, not even after the Kargil provocation by Pakistan in 1999. Was the invisible deterrence working overtime? Again, in 2001 December, India was provoked by the Pakistani-backed jihadis, who attacked the Indian parliament in New Delhi, to move its army to the border with Pakistan and think of retaliatory strikes. Did Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent halt India in its tracks? Much the same thing happened in 2008 after Mumbai. India was outraged but didn’t retaliate militarily. Did Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent play a role?

The short answer is: Yes. But the nagging question remains: if the cause of war – a serious provocation by one or the other in the presence of passionate unresolved disputes – is removed through conflict-resolution, there is no need for expanding the nuclear deterrence in Pakistan. Certainly, in view of a continuing expansion of Pakistan’s conventional military might, a de-emphasis on nuclear weapons coupled with better safety procedures is just the sort of restraint that is needed to reassure the world and bury conspiracy theories of Pakistan’ impending dismemberment. A starting point in this direction could be to revitalize the process of conflict resolution entered into by India and Pakistan in 2004 as soon as possible. India should now realize that the oblique threat of terrorism which haunts it is already an existential issue for Pakistan and nothing can be gained by putting pre-conditions on the peace process.

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CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

Nuclear nuisance?
Moeed Yusuf.



As Pakistan enters its twelfth year as an overt nuclear state, the spectrum of views on the utility of the capacity remains extremely broad. On balance, critics retain a strong voice, their main argument that the nuclear capability has not delivered on its promises. Concerns include: the inability of nuclear weapons to eliminate crises/conflict with India; increased suspicion by the international community and continuous diplomatic pressure to disarm; and lack of benefits in terms of decreased defence and increased development expenditures.

The anti-nuclear argument is misplaced and reflects a lack of understanding about the role nuclear weapons play in a state’s overall strategy.

The multi-dimensional nature of the nuclear capability notwithstanding, just like any other military platform, these weapon systems have limitations in terms of their potential utility. In Pakistan’s case, most of the failures the anti-nuclear lobby points to were never meant to be fulfilled in the domain of strategic weapons. Also, that our leaders presented the nuclear capability as the be all and end all of Pakistani problems is another problematic matter.

Let’s consider these three concerns in turn.

The foremost rationale for acquiring nuclear weapons was to deter India. On this count, Pakistan has succeeded. Since 1998, there has been a tangible shift in the Indian outlook towards Islamabad. The 1999 and 2003 initiatives to converge at the negotiation table were an outcome, partly, of the realisation on India’s part of its inability to resolve the Pakistan problem militarily. This is especially true for Operation Parakram in 2001-02, which confirmed for New Delhi the fact that Pakistan’s sub-conventional proxy war could neither be tackled through coercion, nor through an all-out conflict.

As for the limited war at Kargil, two points should be noted. One, nuclear deterrence does not prevent limited conflicts. In fact, the “stability-instability paradox” suggests that stability at the strategic level will increase the likelihood of short, confined wars. Kargil is empirical evidence of this paradox. So while limited wars under the nuclear overhang are not inevitable, nuclear weapons place far greater demands on decision makers not to succumb to the temptation of making limited tactical gains through military means despite having the option to do so.

Here, the Pakistani military officers who ordered Kargil failed miserably. In fact, in hindsight, it is clear that they lacked any understanding of the new dynamics nuclear weapons had introduced into the South Asian equation. The planners may have erroneously believed that Pakistan’s elevated international status as a nuclear power would force the world to treat its claim on Kashmir more respectfully post-Kargil.

In reality, any strategist would have been able to forecast that the nuclear overhang would bring excessive embarrassment to the aggressor given the inherent risk of escalation. The world simply could not adopt a stance that would have encouraged a nuclear-armed state to hold the entire region hostage.

As far as increased suspicion by the international community and continuous diplomatic pressure to disarm are concerned, the fact is that because of the nuclear capability, the US has put up with Pakistan in a much more conciliatory manner than it would have otherwise.

On the terrorism front, Pakistan has been a frontline ally, but one which according to the American outlook has created serious headaches for Washington. While the argument need not be stretched beyond what it is worth – there is nothing to say that the US would have intervened directly in FATA had nuclear weapons not been present – one does hear constant concerns among decision makers in Washington that the latter cannot afford to abandon a destabilising nuclear power .

Taking instability as exogenous to the nuclear equation (this is warranted as instability has not been caused by nuclear weapons), the presence of nuclear weapons has allowed Pakistan a somewhat larger manoeuvring space vis-à-vis the US.

As for the question of constant worries about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons finding their way into the ‘wrong’ hands, criticism is indeed warranted. However, again, we find ourselves in this situation not because of the presence of nuclear weapons but because of our track record on nuclear proliferation. For example, the AQ Khan affair has put Pakistan squarely on the back foot in terms of its credibility in the comity of nations. The proliferation scandal was borne out of horrendous management errors with regards the security of the arsenal. Even so, the distinction between the strategic capability and its management should never be eschewed. It is the latter, not the former, that ought to be criticised.

Finally, the concern about Pakistan’s growing economic and social problems is completely irrelevant to the nuclear weapons debate. The idea that nuclear weapons reduce pressure on conventional arms spending and thus have a downward effect on overall military budgets is academic at best. The Cold War experience has long rendered this argument invalid. That such rhetoric nonetheless remained at the forefront of justifying Pakistan’s nuclear capability only reflects political expediency. It was indeed a lack of understanding on the part of our civilian elite that allowed politicians and military alike to run away with this false pretence.

The only charm of nuclear weapons in terms of spending is that a modest capability is cheap to acquire (the official figure of Rs 272 billion thus far is reasonable when compared to conventional spending). However, to have expected Pakistan to reduce its conventional expenditure was never realistic since Pakistan bases its defence strategy primarily on conventional, not nuclear, deterrence. Nuclear weapons only present an overhang in the background. This is a tactical imperative. Any move to rely heavily on nuclear weapons as the chief deterrent will be both highly destabilising for the nuclear regime and non-credible as a threat to hold out to India.

The implication of the above for development is obvious. Nuclear weapons end up adding, not reducing, the overall cost of defence marginally; thus there is no possibility of freeing up further funds for development.

If we are to have objective cost-benefit analyses of nuclear weapons, the true picture of what the capability promises must be established publicly: one, India will continue to be deterred from taking an all-out offensive; two, as long as Pakistan can continue to maintain robust command and control of the weapons and the country does not decent into total chaos, the US will remain engaged with Islamabad in constructive endeavours; three, the expenditure on nuclear weapons will increase but will still constitute a relatively small share in overall spending; four, if conventional expenditure is curtailed it will be due to growing economic compulsions, not because of the presence of nuclear weapons; five, nuclear weapons will increase Pakistan’s importance but whether this enhances Islamabad’s leverage in diplomacy or undermines it (by creating mere nuisance value as Kargil did) will depend on what role leaders demand from nuclear weapons in the country’s overall strategy; and finally, nuclear weapons bear no relevance to the country’s development.

The writer is a research fellow at the Strategic and Economic Policy Research (Pvt Ltd.) in Islamabad. He can be contacted at myusuf@sepr.com.pk.

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CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

Interpreting Pakistan’s bomb.
Khaled Ahmed.



Man made nuclear weapons to scare his enemy and thus ‘deter’ him. He did not make the nuclear bomb to attack; he made it to lighten the burden of defending. The enemy too developed the bomb because he too wanted to scare his enemy off. In fact, the bomb is born of fear but its development is aimed at arousing a kind of counter-fear in the breast of the enemy. Possibility of mass destruction is what does the trick. When two states have the nuclear bomb they appear to be in a state of aggressive deadlock. They live under ‘assured mutual deterrence’.

Pakistan started a ‘reactive’ bomb programme after India was seen to be moving steadily towards its first bomb. The conundrum was: why was India making a bomb? It had no enemy whom it feared. In the region at least it had fought a war in 1947 with what had just become Pakistan. Did India make the bomb for Pakistan? The Indian ‘theory’ says it is not against Pakistan but China. Yet the development of the Indian nuclear programme started much before Nehru saw China as an adversary.

Pakistani bomb, India-specific and revisionist: Pakistan thinks the Indian bomb Pakistan-specific. Its own doctrine about its bomb is quite frankly India-specific. It says if India dismantles its bomb Pakistan will do the same thing. This is the ultimate statement of making your bomb specific to one country. It rests on Pakistan knowing that India will never dismantle. India will not dismantle if China dismantles, and it never asks China for dismantling. In fact, China and India are not candidates for a nuclear war at the theoretical level despite India’s enhancement of the delivery system. But the potential is there. The nuclear bomb is the bomb of imagination.

India and Pakistan are nuclear rivals. The deterrence between the two is still red hot. A kind of covert low-intensity war is going on between the two. Simply because it is unequal in conventional arms, Pakistan is more likely to launch its bomb first. Deterrence is red hot because the two have not sat down and discussed the status quo which has to be frozen under the nuclear doctrine of deterrence. They don’t have the Helsinki Accords (1975) which would have cooled down the deterrence. Pakistan remains revisionist with a bomb. This is not a good situation to be in.

Bombs without status quo agreement: The onus on Pakistan as a revisionist power is not to leverage its covert war with India with its bomb. Pakistan says India has to first decide the status quo. This goes against the history of the development of nuclear theory in the West. In the East-West standoff, the status quo was accepted by both sides more or less as it was. When India and Pakistan as nuclear powers are asked to accept the status quo, India does while Pakistan doesn’t. In other words, Pakistan wants a dividend from its nuclear bomb. On the other hand, in deterrence there are no such dividends. The dividend is in the freezing of the status quo and avoidance of war.

Pakistan and India are both at a crossroads. They have the bomb but no agreement on status quo. Both have to make some very fundamental decisions about their place at the global and regional levels. The fact that they have the bombs should help them make the big decisions. The bomb is a weapon of peace and stability. Pakistan can relate to India any way it wishes except a warlike relationship without fear of being cheated. If it free-trades with India it will not be like Sri Lanka trading with India and not having the guts to complain about its unfair aspects.

The bomb and low-intensity war: Delaying change in its revisionist status and allowing military officers to leverage the nuclear bomb to carry on dangerously risk-taking covert operations against India has endangered Pakistan. It has alarmed the world and lowered the level of acceptance of nuclearised Pakistan together with India and Israel. The Kargil Operation greatly put off the world; it is no longer popular in Pakistan either. But the Pakistani nation wants to retain its nuclear status; it wants to retain the bomb as an option of defence. It is justifiably offended when it is told that its nuclear arsenal is not safe. It is offended at the implied threat that Pakistan should be denuclearised.

Unstable states normally don’t qualify as nuclear states. The bomb is safe inside a stable state. It has to remain inside the possessor state and must not seem to slip away when the state is in trouble. When the Soviet Union broke up there was a risk that its nuclear arsenal will start dispersing. Pakistan has been politically unstable over the last thirty years, mainly because of the burden of revisionism it had to carry along with its covert war projects. Voices were raised about its bomb throughout these years. When its instability reached a kind of climax in the 1990s and it began to be labelled a failed state, the alarmist voices became strident.

The bomb and the unstable state: Pakistan put in place what is internationally accepted as a failsafe nuclear command and control system. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is safe; it cannot be stolen. Pakistan is not a failed or failing state either, like nuclear North Korea. But it is suffering fallout from its policy of strategic depth pursued by its military during the 1990s. This policy was connected with its bomb but was as ill-advised as the Kargil Operation. It has become an unstable state not in control of all its territory. Its ungoverned spaces are spreading like a bloodstain and its capital Islamabad is counted among cities thought vulnerable to a takeover.

The world vacillates between raising alarm and being consoled. It was alarmed when we said we don’t want to fight the Taliban as they took territory after territory and brutalised local populations. It was alarmed not so much by the situation on the ground as by the state of the Pakistani mind. It began to say the nuclear arsenal could simply pass on to the Taliban as a part of transition of power, as a kind of dower of the bride of the state as it minced its way into the tent of the caliphate. As if aware of this eventuality, the favourite perception in Pakistan is that ‘America is about to grab our bomb’.

Bomb as an equaliser of unequals: Before Iran goes nuclear and the world has two ‘revisionist’ bombs in the region, Pakistan must reach a decision about the freezing of the status quo with India. (Iran’s bomb is only avowedly revisionist against Israel; it is more likely a status quo one, against ‘regime-change’.) Pakistan needs its bomb. It is an asset that should not be lost at a time when we need peace to grow economically. To control massive internal displacement of population Pakistan needs international help. To become stable and to settle down to peaceful coexistence with its neighbours it needs the leverage of its nuclear status.

The bomb is an ‘equaliser’ of unequals. It is a part of the calculus of negotiation of just peace; it is not a facilitator of war. It is a guarantor of prosperity but will become a liability if the state suffers economic collapse. It is the ultimate ‘rational weapon’ which cannot be attached to any irrational collective emotion. It must not be attached to nationalism or to any verse of divine Revelation. It is not meant to defeat the enemy but to prevent the enemy from defeating you. It ensures an absence of winning and losing. It is the weapon of absence of war.

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CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

A tattered coat upon a stick.
Ejaz Haider.



President Barack Obama, during his campaign, talked about banning the “bomb”. North Korea, perhaps the most isolated country in the world after Myanmar, has just conducted another nuclear test and by some reports at least five missile tests to put the icing on the cake.

Whither non-proliferation? But let’s first get closer to home.

Pakistan, which put the bomb on the shelf eleven years ago, has seen a spate of reports in the western, especially US press, casting serious doubts over the safety and security of Pakistani nuclear assets.

The Strategic Plans Division, the secretariat of Pakistan’s National Command Authority, has had it up to its ears. The SPD has held dozens of briefings in the past four years, trying to inform the world that Pakistan’s nuclear assets are safe and secure. But the issue keeps recrudescing like eczema.

Given the nature of the new kind of warfare that involves the state(s) against non-state actors, some analysts doubt the relevance of nuclear weapons. They argue that strategic arsenals, meant to deter state adversaries, are useless against non-state actors; indeed, given the increasing capacity of non-state actors to harm states, there is existential danger of nuclear assets falling into the hands of these actors.

Well, yes and no. But let’s assume yes. Can something be done?

The answer would also have to assume a situation in which inter-state rivalries are a thing of the past. Correct if that assumption were, nuclear weapons capability would no longer be sexy – or at least would lose its buying power.

Mohamed ElBaradei, the outgoing director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, however, doesn’t think so. At the helm of IAEA for eleven years, Mr ElBaradei says nuclear weapons retain their currency because the non-proliferation regime is not “fair”. He predicts more nuclear weapons states, what he calls “virtual NWSs”, that would, while remaining within the NPT, develop weapons capability but remain a screwdriver’s turn away from it. If and when needed, says Mr ElBaradei, they could put a weapon together in a couple of months. And they would inch closer to that line without opting out of the NPT.

Next year in April, the NPT has its quinquennial review conference (RevCon). Mr ElBaradei insists that without deep cuts by the US and Russia (the two possess between them 95 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons), they would not have the moral authority to tighten up the non-proliferation regime.

Would Mr Obama make deep cuts before having the moral authority to tighten up the non-proliferation regime? Difficult, if not impossible. A task force report in the US says the country’s nuclear weapons are in danger of losing credibility. James Schlesinger, a former defence secretary who headed the task force, wants the US to “up its game” or else countries under the US security umbrella might start building their own arsenals.

One report describes General Kevin Chilton, head of US Strategic Command, as lobbying for new, better bombs. Already, the US is moving from LEP (life extension programme) for its weapons under the SSP (stockpile stewardship programme) to RRW (reliable replacement warhead) programme. Some analysts also insist, and technically correct they are, that new weapons and different designs require testing!

So while Mr Obama has talked about ratifying the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) and strengthening the non-proliferation regime, he is likely to face tough debates at home about what needs to be done – and why.

The lesson is not lost on the world. If the US, with the strongest conventional military, needs the bomb, so do states that cannot afford state-of-the-art conventional capabilities.

There is yet another problem. The India-US nuclear deal has already created an exception for India. While it has done much good for New Delhi, it hasn’t redounded to the advantage of the non-proliferation regime. Another lesson here: give the world fait accompli and use the capability as a bargaining chip.

Add to this another twist in the tale. In 2002, the US came out with its NPR (nuclear posture review) which talked about TNWs (tactical nuclear weapons) and, more disturbingly, using them for operational purposes against elusive enemies. The term employed was “forward deterrence”. The two roles envisaged for these weapons were bunker-busting and earth penetration. The most important step in this regard was the decision by the US Congress to revoke the (then) 10-year-old Spratt-Furse ban on the research and development of weapons below a 5-kiloton yield and the allocation of funds for R&D.

That continues. It is meant to plug into the ongoing smaller irregular wars. Use the strategic arsenals to deter states; use battlefield TNWs to take out non-state adversaries.

The problem is: if such weapons are used at some point, the norm against using nuclear weapons on a conventional battlefield against non-nuclear adversaries will be shattered. The consequences could be extremely hazardous. Moreover, while the possibility of terrorist groups stealing a weapon or picking up a broken arrow is remote today, such battlefield weapons, located close to the contested zone, could more easily get into the hands of such groups. And since most would be artillery shells, the delivery vehicles (guns in this case) would also be easy to acquire – especially if a base were overrun.

Finally, the US demarches against Iran have also diluted Article IV of the NPT which stipulated “the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty”. That takes care of the third most important pillar of the treaty.

It is in this backdrop that Pakistan has to decide on what it wants to do with its nuclear capability and how it must add value to it. The issue calls for a clear policy in this regard. So far we do not have any doctrine. Eleven years after having tested, that is not very commendable.

As for the western press and analysts, Pakistan should not react to such absurd reports. The world should either accept our word for how safe and secure our assets are or simply lump it.

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CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

Supreme Court steps in?
Najam Sethi's E d i t o r i a l.



The Supreme Court of Pakistan under CJP Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry has been slowly but surely making some significant, one might even say ominous, moves. The CJP has taken a keen interest in the selection of fellow judges to head key benches hearing politically “sensitive” cases. It is also interesting that the principal SC seat in Islamabad, where all politically explosive cases end up, is packed with restored judges loyal to the CJP while many judges appointed or retained by General Pervez Musharraf or President Asif Zardari have been shunted to faraway benches in Quetta, Peshawar and Sindh.

The fact that these “legal” decisions seem to be potentially tilted in favour of the political ambitions of Mian Nawaz Sharif compels fair comment because Mr Sharif had a decisive role to play in the restoration of Mr Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry as chief justice and his other colleagues last March.

The first step in this direction was taken last month when a specially appointed five member bench of the Supreme Court overturned an earlier decision by a Division bench of the Lahore High Court and a three member bench of the Supreme Court which had banned Mr Nawaz Sharif and Mr Shahbaz Sharif from contesting elections on various counts.

There were three interesting dimensions to this review petition judgment. First, one of the judges from the original three member bench that had sustained the ban on the Sharif brothers was shunted out and three new judges were added to make it a five member review petition bench. Generally, the rule is that barring some exceptional circumstances that make it impossible to retain the old bench, a review petition is heard by the same bench which passed the original judgment. No reasons were given for breaking with the rule. Second, it was also noteworthy that the three judges added to the new bench were judges who had been sacked on November 3, 2007 along with the CJ and subsequently restored – all are considered close to him. Third, the judgment was remarkable because it broke new ground by holding that the presidential “pardon” granted to the Sharifs when they agreed to be exiled to Saudi Arabia in 2000 also entitled them to have their convictions quashed automatically.

This judgment has restored Mr Shahbaz Sharif as chief minister of Punjab and handed the province to the PMLN. It has signaled PMLQ dissidents to join the PMLN, swell its ranks and marginalize the PPP and PMLQ. It has also paved the way for Mr Nawaz Sharif to contest and win a national by-election hands down. Soon Mr Sharif will be ensconced as leader of the opposition in the national assembly. Then another significant chunk of PMLQ dissidents will flock to the PMLN, giving Mr Sharif the muscle to drive a wedge in the PPP-led coalition and try to overthrow it.

The CJP has also made some revealing remarks. He has said that the SC may consider the legality of the November 3, 2007, mini-coup and Emergency by General Pervez Musharraf. He has said that the decision by a seven member bench led by him outlawing General Musharraf’s mini-coup minutes after it was announced remained valid, despite the fact that it was subsequently overturned by a larger SC bench after the event. If the SC now officially makes this decision in response to any petition, a veritable Pandora’s box of political possibilities could be opened up. Everything that happened subsequent to November 3, 2007, including the general elections that brought the PPP to power and the presidential elections that elevated Mr Asif Zardari to the presidency, could then be deemed “unlawful”, with tumultuous consequences for political stability and continuity. Indeed, the SC could well argue in favour of a mid-term election that would objectively return Mr Nawaz Sharif to power and cut Mr Zardari and the PPP out of the loop.

A bench of the SC has now made another remarkable decision. It says that since the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) is under legal challenge, any relief from criminal conviction or cases pending under it received by anyone is not valid until the NRO is upheld by the SC. This is a perplexing judgment in the absence of any formal “stay” order against the NRO in any court. It is ominous because many of the criminal and corruption cases against Mr Zardari and other PPP leaders in parliament and government were earlier quashed under the ambit of the NRO. The CJP has also made noises about the right of the SC to review the 17th constitutional amendment and strike it down if necessary. The fact that President Zardari derives all his powers from this amendment, coupled with the other fact that Mr Sharif is barred from becoming prime minister for a third time under it, should not be lost on anyone.

If the SC under CJP Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry knocks out the NRO and the 17th amendment in the coming months, it would be only a matter of another six months or so before Mr Sharif is able to brush aside Mr Zardari and the PPP and seize office as a powerful prime minister, with or without a new general election.

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CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier