Bush visit

[Godoo]

To Pak, A Punch
Pakistan felt like the lesser mortal vis-a-vis the hugely successful India leg of the US president's Asia tour

When President George W. Bush got off Air Force One at the Chaklala air base, 6 km from Islamabad, his first remark reportedly was: "Where’s President Musharraf?" Not only was the general not there on March 3, even Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz was missing from the Pakistani entourage assembled to receive the US president. As analysts recalled, both Musharraf and Aziz had been at the airport to welcome King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia not many weeks back. Spin doctors then struggled to portray the lukewarm reception as a measure to obviate the possibility of terrorist attacks. The more elaborate the ceremonies at the airport, the greater the risk the US president would have been exposed to, they suggested.
Yet the opening snapshot at the airport set the tone for a pessimistic assessment of Bush’s visit to Pakistan last week.

For Bush, it was a success. He had the chance to lecture Pakistanis, on their own soil.

Just about every word the President spoke was analysed threadbare to read annoyance with Musharraf and his country. Sarcasm was seen in Bush’s remark thanking Musharraf for the friendship displayed. "...your daughter was there to greet us," said the president.

"That was a really kind gesture, and I thank you very much for that."
Bush’s visit to Pakistan wasn’t anyway expected to be the huge success it was in India. He lavished praises on India’s commitment to democracy, stitched a civil nuclear deal with New Delhi, and declared, quite openly, that Islamabad wasn’t yet ready for such exceptional treatment. This, despite Washington’s claims of having a strategic partnership with Pakistan, especially post-9/11. The mood in the establishment was already sullen before the US president set foot on Pakistani soil.

Worse, at the popular level, the mood was decidedly anti-Bush.

The movement against Danish cartoons had already snowballed into anti-West and anti-US sentiment. A large section of Pakistanis has been enraged by Bush’s West Asian policy, and the penchant of US forces to hunt and shoot Al Qaeda terrorists in Pakistan, often without Islamabad’s approval. Anti-Bush rallies were held a day before his arrival; countrywide security sweeps saw Opposition leaders placed under house arrest. Piqued, the Opposition boycotted the banquet for Bush. Add to this the woes of Islamabad and Rawalpindi residents, who countenanced for days unprecedented multi-layered security arrangements, frequent cellphone disruptions, body and vehicle searches. The US president could not have hoped for the affection that the Indians had displayed.
Yet, from his own perspective, Bush could claim his visit was a success. Never before has he had the chance of lecturing Pakistanis on their own soil. Like a schoolmaster, with Musharraf sitting on the dais at the other end, Bush hectored, "Part of my mission today was to determine whether or not President Musharraf is as committed as he has been in the past to bringing these terrorists to justice." He then gave a thumbs-up sign to his host. "He is (committed). He understands the stakes, he understands the responsibility and he understands the need to make sure our strategy is able to defeat the enemy."

In his editorial, Daily Times editor Najam Sethi parsed the joint press conference for two implied messages: "One, that Pakistan’s primary importance is linked to how much and what it can do to help the US fight Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups like the Taliban, and two, that while Pakistan may have captured and killed scores of terrorists it still needs to do more." Former diplomat Tayyab Siddiqi saw two other messages in Bush’s remarks last week: one, the only way to defeat terrorists in the long run is through democracy; two, Pakistan still has a distance to travel on that road.
The war on terror overshadowed just about everything, even Bush’s reference to a bilateral investment treaty to encourage fdi: "By fostering economic development and opportunity, we will reduce the appeal of radical Islam and demonstrate that America is a steadfast friend and partner of Pakistan’s people."



Even Kashmir was seen from this lens. Before the trip, Musharraf had publicly urged Bush help advance the current efforts to resolve the contentious issue. All the US president said was, "Kashmir has been a source of violence and distrust between the two countries. I’ll encourage them to address this important issue." Obviously, Musharraf’s hope for US facilitation to resolve Kashmir turned out to be quite misplaced, even though the establishment claimed the Pak-US relationship has been placed on a higher pedestal.

Dr Mohammad Waseem, analyst and teacher at the Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, says the traditional zero-sum model of Washington’s relations with India and Pakistan has become redundant. "The new Indo-US strategic partnership is part of Washington’s China policy, whereas the post-9/11 Pak-US alliance is part of the US policy towards the Middle East. Therefore, it has become possible for the US to cultivate a friendship with the two countries simultaneously, in pursuit of two separate agendas which focus on two different regions. The two agendas also revolve around two different projects: one global in nature and scope, in the context of managing China’s emergence as a major power; the other essentially regional in character, aimed at addressing what’s largely understood as political Islam in and around Middle East."

Dr Waseem sees this difference as vital, both in impression and content. While Bush is setting up a perceived emerging power such as India against a perceived superpower as China, the second agenda is "couched in intra-state conflicts between anti-West popular sentiment and pro-West ruling dispensations led by men such as Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan and Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan." Adds former secretary (foreign affairs) Shamshad Ahmed Khan, "The Pak-US joint statement on peace and security listed a number of areas of cooperation including defence, arms and technology transfers, training, joint exercises and so on. Yet none of this reaches the level the US proposes or intends to reach out to India."

Dr Waseem shudders at the consequences Bush’s visit could have on the Indo-Pak peace process. "In the last two years, the peace process has been sustained essentially on the strength of CBMs rather than through the mechanism of conflict resolution per se. The Indo-US pacts, which threaten to disrupt status quo in the region, can throw a spanner in the peace process."

Imtiaz Alam, current affairs editor, The News, is perplexed at the despondency in Pakistan over America’s emerging equation with India. "We want America to fulfil our every wish, and yet we curse it on every possible pretext—even for our own failures." Alam says Bush’s refusal to treat Islamabad on par with New Delhi on the nuclear energy issue should make Pakistanis realise how reckless they had been in not exercising control over "possible proliferation" that Dr A.Q. Khan and his network had indulged in. "What else could we get from the Americans after having been bailed out on the charges of proliferation? Thank God, we are not being tried by the iaea. Expecting the US to offer Pakistan the same ‘privilege’ as it did to India was asking for a little too much," he says.

Link: www.outlookindia.com

But some analysts in India believe that one atom in hand is worth than two with Mr. Bush

regards

[Yasir Hayat Khan]

By Carol Giacomo, Diplomatic Correspondent

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - President George W. Bush's visit to India and Pakistan this month underscored dramatically the increasingly divergent U.S. approaches to the South Asian nuclear rivals.
India is the celebrated rising democratic power for whom Washington is willing to jettison 30 years of non-proliferation policy so New Delhi can buy U.S. nuclear energy technology.
Pakistan, its future stability in question, gets nudged by Washington to do more to fight terrorism and to expand democratic freedoms.
"If Pakistan is going to judge its relationship with the United States by how close the United States is to India, it's bound to be disappointed because the U.S.-India relationship is at a historic high-water point," said Teresita Schaffer of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
India, whose relations with the United States were long mired in Cold War politics, is now basking in the glow of the landmark nuclear energy deal and of being anointed by Bush as a global power central to U.S. geopolitical strategy.
In Pakistan, by contrast, commentators expressed concern that President Pervez Musharraf had little to show for an alliance with Washington that has pitted its army against its own people in the post-September 11 hunt for al Qaeda militants on the Afghan border.
Many Americans "aren't understanding the level of anxiety Pakistanis now feel and how Musharraf is seen as being pushed in a corner," said Alan Kronstadt, South Asia analyst for the Library of Congress's Congressional Research Service.
This was underscored by Bush's unusually public rejection of Musharraf's request that Pakistan get a nuclear deal like India's, Kronstadt said.
Beyond the visit itself, "there was really nothing given to Musharraf ... India got a huge gift in the nuclear deal and Pakistan got a pat on the back and advice to do more on terrorism and on democracy," Kronstadt told Reuters.
DIFFERENT PATHS
Richard Boucher, assistant secretary of state for South Asia and Central Asia, noted that Bush announced U.S.-Pakistani partnerships and dialogues on strategic issues, education, energy and economics. We believe that these respond to Pakistan's needs as it develops a stable, modern, prosperous and democratic society ... (and) the real test is whether we are helping the Pakistani people move into a better future," he told Reuters.
Pakistan, one of the largest U.S. aid recipients, remains a valued ally in the war on terrorism, but is not seen by Washington as measuring up to India as a democracy or a state willing to guard against weapons proliferation.
Pakistan's former top nuclear scientist ran a black market that sold technology to Libya, North Korea and Iran.
Pakistan's anxiety over its U.S. ties is long-standing. The two were allies in the 1980s struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, but once the Soviets withdrew, relations cooled -- in large measure because of U.S. concern over Pakistan's nuclear-weapons program.
Although Washington has worked to dispel this notion, "there is a common fear in Pakistan that the United States is going to wash its hands" of the relationship, Kronstadt said.
Bush's visit was intended to underscore U.S. support and he "paid a lot of attention to Musharraf," said Schaffer.
But she criticized the administration for focusing too much on personal ties with Musharraf and for not reaching out to political opposition and civil society groups crucial to Pakistan's democratic evolution.
Some analysts worry the enthusiastic U.S. embrace of India -- especially the landmark nuclear deal -- is encouraging Pakistan to lean more heavily on its long-time ally China.
"Pakistan feels endangered by the closer U.S.-India relationship (and) while the United States will try to keep relations with Musharraf strong, Musharraf will be able to play the two (U.S. and China) off against each other," said Daniel Blumenthal, a former Pentagon official.

© Reuters 2006. All Rights Reserved.