The big winner of recent events has been the Nepal Army and Indian Government.
Much of the recent instability in Nepal lies an Indian change of course. New Delhi framed the peace deal and acted as its de facto guarantor, pressing all parties to comply with its terms. Never able to digest the Maoist victory and uncomfortable with popular demands for change, it has pursued increasingly interventionist tactics through proxies in Nepali political parties while continuing its policy of ring-fencing the army as the most reliable bastion against Maoist takeover or anarchy. Its resolute opposition to all but token People’s Liberation Army (PLA) integration has unbalanced the peace equation without offering any alternative.

Nepal’s peace process is in danger of collapse. The fall of the Maoist-led government, a mess largely of the India and Nepal army making, was a symptom of the deeper malaise underlying the political settlement. all moderate politicians still publicly insist that there is no alternative to pursuing the process, private talk of a return to war – led by generals of the Nepalese Army who have never reconciled themselves to peace – has grown louder.

That India’s position has been rather more assertive: ‘The reality is that South Block is up to its neck in the crisis’. ”When the Maoist leader said he would strive for political consensus before taking the drastic step of dismissing Gen. Katuwal, New Delhi queered the pitch by sending clear signals to parties like the Unified Marxists-Leninists and the Nepali Congress that they should oppose the Maoists.

The end result: the Cabinet went ahead and exercised its prerogative to replace the army chief, while the Unified Marxist-Leninists walked out, thereby reducing Prachanda’s government to a minority.” Indian Ambassador to Nepal, Mr Rakesh Sood was a visible actor in the downfall of the government and the moves to ‘save’ the COAS when the government threatened his sacking.

India’s representative in Nepal has openly supported the Army on key elements of the peace process. On the issue of integration of the two armies the CPA is unclear and unresolved. Debate has fallen between two extremes: ‘that no Maoist combatants should be allowed to join the Nepalese Army (NA), or that all should be allowed to join – and in formed units rather than individually under the existing chain of command and regulations’

In these two extreme positions India has publicly taken the position of the Army. Ambassador Sood’s remarks are a matter of public record: “First of all, peace process implies the complete disarmament of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Second, it implies the integration of the PLA combatants into the Nepali society in a manner in which they become economically active members and are able to contribute to the political stability and economic development as Nepali nationals in Nepali society.

The idea that PLA integration is into the Army and rehabilitation is into the society, he said, are not in the peace agreement” Assertions of non-interference also sit uneasily with India’s consistent role in the Security Council with regard to Nepal. India has openly restricted UNMIN’s mandate from any political role.

The immediate cause of the Maoists’ departure from government on 4 May 2009 was their bungled attempt to dismiss the army chief. Maoist leader Prachanda quit on grounds of principle; the question of the balance of power between prime minister and president remains in dispute.

The Maoist resignation made the formation of a new administration an urgent necessity and, by Nepal’s standards, the transition was relatively prompt and smooth. However, the new government, led by the centrist Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), UML, is inherently unstable and incapable of addressing the most pressing challenges. Backed by 22 parties, it is yet to take full form and its major constituents are internally riven. Many UML leaders are openly sceptical of the new government, while the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) is now formally split. Between them, they have achieved the unlikely feat of making the Nepali Congress (NC) look the most cohesive and internally democratic of the non-Maoist parties.

On the other hand The Maoists had not proved as effective in power as many had hoped. Moreover, they alienated two important constituencies: India (both by appearing to make overtures towards China and by refusing to become a pliant, dummy force) and the Kathmandu upper middle classes (by making them pay taxes and failing to deliver basic services, in particular electricity). Yet their main problem is their own refusal to give clear and credible assurances on their commitment to political pluralism and non-violence.

There are 109 armed groups operating. 109 armed groups in Terai of Nepal. Those armed groups are operating in Nepal. It cannot leave India unaffected. According to the Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), a Kathmandu-based human rights organisation, there are currently more than 100-armed groups in Terai

The past two years and 10 months has witnessed a total of 1,284 deaths, 2,100 abductions and mushrooming of over 100 underground armed outfits, according to Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC) records.One distinct feature of post-CPA killings is that around 33 percent of them are committed by unidentified armed groups.

According to the report, while the UCPN-M and the state allegedly killed a total of 31 and 112 people respectively, 1,141 people were killed by new armed groups.

The CPN-M has increased its use of bandhs since moving Into opposition. Organizations affiliated with the CPM-M enforced 22 bandhs and strikes in June 2009 and 17 in May 2009. The party enforced 69 bandhs in the past six months. The NC and UML organized 15 and 17 bandhs respectively in the last six months. Local people have enforced 175 bandhs across the country. Armed groups and Terai-based groups in southern Nepal enforced 145 bandhs while the transporters and traders organized 92 bandhs in the same period.

The former army chief, Gen Rookmangud Katawal, was seen as the main obstacle in the merger and the Maoists, during their brief government, tried to sack him. However, the move boomeranged when the general was reinstated by President Ram Baran Yadav, and the Maoist government collapsed after its allies pulled out in disagreement. The quarrel continues even today with the Maoists refusing to let parliament convene.

July 28, 2009, claimed that the government of Nepal had already imported six consignments of weapons from India. The weapons, entered Nepal on Sunday and Monday (July 26 and 27, 2009) through the Birgunj customs entry point. The Prime Minister also said that the government was totally committed towards the peace process and will not do take any steps that have a direct negative impact on the ongoing peace process.

Similarly, Ashok Rai, the vice chairman of the United Marxist Leninists’ Party, on Monday, July 27, 2009, told that the Government was committed to import weapons from India and that they would be used for the training of the Nepal Army men.Three years after they signed a peace pact with the Maoist guerrillas to end a decade-long insurgency, Nepal’s major parties are now seeking a one-sided change in the deal in a move certain to widen the growing rift between the two sides.

Defence Minister Bidya Bhandari, who belongs to the ruling Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (UML), has created a furore by asking a parliamentary committee to allow the communist-led government to recruit fresh soldiers for the Nepal Army and buy arms, both of which are forbidden by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in November 2006.
Unified CPN (Maoist) Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal has reportedly warned Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal that the government's plan to import weapons from India will derail the fragile peace process.

The Army continues to talk about Maoist insurrection and a military response to the ‘Maoist problem’. There should be no doubt about the nature of the Army’s planned operations. The Chief of Army Staff (COAS) has defiantly pushed the new government to promote officers who have a well publicized involvement in massacre, torture, summary execution and disappearance of detained Maoists.

Threat, counter-threat and violence are framed by growing insecurity driven by criminality and violence from the proliferation of armed groups and mob rule.

The Kathmandu elite, sections of the media, politicians and some members of civil society appeared willing to cast the Maoists as ‘the’ threat to Nepal’s peace and democracy. Any action against the Maoists was increasingly portrayed as somehow part of the defence of democracy. This has permitted the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), General Rukmangad Katuwal to portray the army as the saviour of democracy and in alliance with other rightist forces manoeuvre in a new government.

The level of blame that can be realistically apportioned to United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) is limited. This was never a UN-driven peace process. UNMIN was expressly prevented from having a political mandate by India and Nepal. UNMIN’s involvement verification was technical. It was asked by the Nepalese government to verify Maoist combatants. the reality, the UN has been marginalised and is now less able to play a positive role.

Not bringing the Maoists into government means the government cannot govern, the security situation deteriorates and ‘the longer they [the Maoists] stay in opposition the more they’ll be tempted to revert to their tried and tested tactics of rebellion.’

While the immediate crisis has been averted by the Maoists’ decision to cooperate with the Parliament, the wider dynamics suggest that there is momentum behind polarization, political in-fighting and rhetoric that is moving Nepal toward confrontation and a breakdown in the peace process and law and order.

India has a mixed record on Nepal. Its role in facilitating the twelve point agreement that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and elections is a model that earned India the gratitude of most Nepali people. But the current policy is redolent of India’s misguided support to Gyanendra and the Army in 2003; its support to restore King Tribhuvan to the throne in 1951.

Karan Singh’s desperately ill-informed mission to save the King during the people’s movement in April 2006 is another example of where the Embassy has clearly poorly advised Delhi. Similarly, India confidently but wrongly predicted the outcome of the election in 2008.

If India fears Maoist extremism then the only logical response is to take actions that will result in this threat diminishing. The current policy does not appear an appropriate response and is wholly inconsistent with India’s own approach at home.

As noted journalist, Bharat Bhusan notes: ‘There should have been no doubts on which side New Delhi is. For far less than this, Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat was removed as Chief of the Naval Staff in December 1998. New Delhi has kept its own military under what is perhaps the tightest leash anywhere in the democratic world. But reports suggest that India has actually backed General Katwal, and its ambassador, Rakesh Sood, desperately lobbied to prevent the sacking’

India should be supporting the peace process. Integration will take the guns from the radicals in the CPN-M and begin the process of transforming the Maoists into a political party: which is why a responsible section of the Nepal brass sees some merit in this process; but not so Gen. Katuwal or his backers inside and outside the country grasp of the withering influence of militarisation.
USMAN KARIM based in Lahore Pakistan lmno25@hotmail.com