At the current session of the Geneva-based 65-member Conference on Disarmament (CD), Pakistan had no choice but to question the insidiously choreographed ambiguity on implementation of the "programme of work" adopted at the CD's session last year. The elected government this time must be credited for showing grit and taking a position in Pakistan's national inertest. There will be pressures, as always, to force us to bend but the government must remain steadfast in its position.

Last year, Pakistan had joined the consensus on the CD's "programme of work" in "good faith" on the assumption that the CD would be enabled to substantively address all the four "core" issues on its agenda — namely, nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances, prevention of an arms race in outer space and a fissile material treaty — without any selectivity or discrimination. This was a clear evidence of Pakistan's constructive approach in support of the CD's work as a building block for an eventual nuclear weapon-free world.

As anticipated, Pakistan soon discovered alarming manoeuvres on the part of some countries which traditionally have had a one-dimensional approach on nuclear disarmament issues. An attempt is now being made to bulldoze a selective and preferential agenda rather than adopt an integrated approach to holistically address the four core issues identified as the crucial elements of nuclear disarmament. Pakistan is thus doing what it ought to in its vital national interest.

By asking for balanced and equally substantive attention to all the four core issues included in the CD's "programme of work" adopted by consensus last year, Pakistan is only seeking to strengthen, not weaken the cause of disarmament. Rather than opening up the document on the "follow-up and implementation" for consultations, an accepted norm in any multilateral process, the Western countries are portraying this well-meaning initiative as an attempt by Pakistan to block the CD.

The core issues are crucial elements of nuclear disarmament and constitute the very raison d'etre of the CD as the world's only multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. But ever since the creation of this body to negotiate a treaty for elimination of the world's nuclear arsenals, the major Western nuclear powers have circumvented meaningful debate on genuine nuclear disarmament. They kept negotiations on a verifiable fissile material treaty, which is in cold storage only because they were allergic to the very concept of verification.

This was a clear breach of the 1995 Shannon Mandate for a multilateral, non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable treaty. It became a big issue because without verification states can easily cheat on their actual stocks. We had this experience with India in 1992 when in a non-verifiable bilateral agreement it undertook not to develop chemical weapons. Subsequently, while joining the chemical weapons convention, India turned out to be a possessor state.

In any case, a non-verifiable and mere cut-off treaty will not be a disarmament measure. It will just freeze the status quo and not further the goal of disarmament.

After more than a decade of stalemate in CD negotiations, the US restored its support last year for a verifiable fissile material treaty. That is how a consensus became possible on the CD's programme of work last May which Pakistan joined in good faith on the assumption that in its subsequent work the CD will accord equal treatment to all the four core issues.

It was a misjudgement on our part. We forgot our experience in NPT negotiations in the sixties when the US managed to exclude the issues of negative and positive security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon states. Regrettably, the multilateral system is again being used only to legitimise the strategic and security setup suited only to the few. The Cold War is long over, yet tens of thousands of nuclear weapons remain in arsenals around the world. Together, the US and Russia alone possess 95 percent of the world's nuclear weapons.

To our friends in the Western world the nuclear question has traditionally been one-dimensional. Symptoms, not the disease, are their problem. Their undivided focus has been on non-proliferation only as a concept which they have ingeniously adapted to their own objectives. Partial efforts at arms reduction and arms limitation between them also do not amount to disarmament. These measures only take away the focus from Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The self-serving non-proliferation policies of the key powers and their selective and discriminatory "waivers" from the non-proliferation regime in violation of treaty obligations have only been weakening UN disarmament processes and institutions. A whole network of non-proliferation regimes has been built up by them only to confine "everybody else" within its four walls. What they really keep saying is that they can have their weapons forever, but others should do without them, a situation that amounts to telling people not to smoke while you have a cigarette dangling from your own mouth. It is nuclear apartheid.

This discriminatory policy has already failed. Country-specific and short-sighted policies for access to nuclear technology motivated by narrow gains, in disregard of equitably applicable criteria, have further undermined the international non-proliferation regime and detract from its credibility and legitimacy. The situation is compounded by the distinct possibility of such arrangements leading to diversion of nuclear material for military purposes. The US-India nuclear deal is a case in point.

Pakistan must resist attempts to make exemptions in line with the US-India deal with negative consequences for our security, as well as for regional stability. What the Western countries should realise is that their attempts to disturb the strategic balance in South Asia are no service to its peoples, or to the cause of peace and security in this region. They must understand that instead of making "preferential" and discriminatory nuclear deals they should be contributing to strategic stability by reducing security gaps in this volatile region.

Any nuclear cooperation arrangement without adequate international safeguards has the potential for increasing fissile material stocks that can be diverted towards weapons production, as has been done in the past. For this reason, the issues of verification and stocks have become vital for Pakistan in any negotiations on an FMT. We also cannot ignore the ominous implications of the US-India nuclear deal which bolsters India's massive nuclear and conventional build-up, including its nuclear "triad" and its adoption of an offensive "cold start" doctrine based on a rapid conventional strike capability.

In any case, the Geneva impasse cannot be blamed on Pakistan. Before joining last year's consensus on the CD's programme of work, we imposed no conditionalities and only sought to strengthen the modalities of and implementation of the conference's agenda. We asked for "outcome-based" equal treatment to all the four core issues included in the programme of work in line with certain recognised principles so that no state is put at a disadvantage vis-a-vis other states.

In contrast, India spelled out on the floor of the conference a number of conditionalities for joining the consensus. It linked its concurrence to joining the negotiations on an FMT to its perspective that the scope of the treaty will be limited only to "cut off" future production of fissile material. On this aspect, India and other major nuclear-weapon states seem to have complete convergence of interests. No wonder, India exempted itself from any limitations on its existing stocks or on facilities covered under the US-India nuclear deal.

These are double standards. We are used to them since 1974, when India conducted its first nuclear test not far from our border. Pakistan's security and survival then faced double jeopardy. On the one hand, we faced India's nuclear ambitions as a direct threat to Pakistan's security and survival; on the other, we faced sanctions imposed by our friends and allies in the name of nuclear "non-proliferation." They even denied us the means of a conventional defence.

While we are pursuing since 1999 our proposal for a strategic restraint regime involving three interlocking elements of conflict resolution, nuclear and ballistic restraint and conventional balance, India continues with its threatening doctrines against both China and Pakistan. This ominous perspective cannot be overlooked in CD negotiations. There is no cause to fault ourselves for an impasse and a disarmament setback in Geneva. The process was a non-starter from the very beginning.

On its part, China also sees many procedural pitfalls in the Geneva negotiations, and is citing an ancient Chinese proverb that "this melon is not ripe yet" to forewarn that the harvest season has not arrived yet, and CD members "still need to exercise a bit of patience."



The writer is a former foreign secretary. Email: shamshad1941@ yahoo.com