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  #1  
Old Thursday, December 09, 2010
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Default Wikileaks: US cables about Pakistan

ID e.g. #06ISLAMABAD3705.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ISLAMABAD3705 2006-03-07 153 2010-11-30 219 SECRET Embassy Islamabad

VZCZCXRO0913
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #3705 0661510
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071510Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1540
INFO RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 9891
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 7852
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 5674
S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 003705

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 03/07/2016
TAGS EFIN, PK, PREL, PTER, KTFN
SUBJECT: POST REQUESTS TWO WEEK DELAY IN JUD DESIGNATION

REF: A. A. MAIER - QUINN EMAIL MAIL 06 MARCH 06 B. B. LAMBERT - ENGLEKEN EMAIL 21 FEB 06

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (S) After reviewing the time line presented in ref A and B for moving forward with the UN 1267 and domestic terrorism finance designation of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) as an alter-ego of current terrorism finance designee Lashkar-e-Tayyba (LeT), Ambassador requests a two-week delay in pre-notificaion, presentation to the UN 1267 Committee and in the domestic designation. Post’s preferred timeline is:
-- pre-notification: no earlier than 30 March -- request to UN 1267 Committee: no earlier than 15 April -- domestic action: no earlier than 15 April

¶2. (S) Post’s reasoning for requesting this delay is based solely on force-protection considerations. DAC-PAK personnel will continue flying helicopter sorties in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Pakistan-administered Kashmir (AJK) until the end of March; ground support personnel will be deployed in Muzaffarabad, AJK as long as the helicopters are flying. By the end of the first week of April, U.S. military personnel will have redeployed from NWFP and AJK to the Islamabad area, awaiting onward tranport out of Pakistan. In order not to increase the risk to our military personnel as they conclude their successful mission to Pakistan, post recommends that no action on the JuD designation be taken until all DAC-PAK operations have concluded and DAC personnel are in the Islamabad area. CROCKER
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ID e.g. #06ISLAMABAD22174.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ISLAMABAD22174 2006-11-27 099 2010-11-30 219 SECRET Embassy Islamabad

VZCZCXRO8925
OO RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #2174/01 3310955
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 270955Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5260
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 9704
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 1473
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 3879
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0882
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 1018
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 1775
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 6528
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4696
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9755
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1023
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 2184
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0968
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 3612
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 0676
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 8896
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 6068
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1501
RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 022174

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SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 11/25/2016
TAGS AF, EFIN, PK, PREL, PTER, KTFN, UN
SUBJECT: TERROR FINANCE: EMBASSY PRESSES GOP ON UN 1267
COMMITTEE CASES
REF: ISLAMABAD 22000

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: As noted in Ref A, post has raised the ongoing operations of two UN 1267 Committee-designated entities -- Al Rashid Trust, Al Akhtar Trust and Lashkar-e-Tayyba/Jamaat ud-Dawa (LeT/JuD) -- with contacts throughout the Government of Pakistan (GOP). While the Ambassador has pressed the issue with the Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor, emboffs have engaged the MFA’s UN Directorate and the Information Ministry. The GOP has responded by reviewing its procedures to disseminate information on the prohibitions that accompany UN 1267 designation to ensure that broadcasters and print media are aware that they should decline requests to purchase advertising space. No GOP official, however, has committed to taking direct action to close the operations of these entities. In addition to raising the issue with GOP officials, post has also shared open source reports of these entities fund-raising activities with like-minded missions in the Islamabad diplomatic community, as well as with the visiting UNSC Counterterrorism Executive Directorate delegation. End summary.

¶2. (C) In a November 17 meeting, the Ambassador presented Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan with open source material detailing Al Rashid’s television solicitations for Zakat donations, a website highlighting federal Minister of Information Durrani’s participation in an Al Akhtar Trust Ramadan event, and a press report on the declaration of the Ministry of Defense Parliamentary Secretary that he was proud to be a member of LeT and that he seeks to extend support to jihadi organizations when they seek his “cooperation.” Each of these reports is disturbing in itself, the Ambassador said, as they seriously damage Pakistan’s image in the international community. These incidents point to a more fundamental question: is the GOP is committed to implementing the sanctions that follow a UN 1267 Committee designation?

¶3. (S) While the Foreign Secretary recognized the detrimental consequences of the news reports of these incidents, he cited Al Rashid’s pending challenge to the GOP’s implementation of 1267 sanctions (freezing accounts, closing offices, etc.) as an impediment to more active government intervention. The Ambassador emphasized that this series of incidents could lead reasonable observers to conclude that the GOP is not serious about its UN 1267 obligations; he urged the GOP to take immediate and definitive steps against the designated entities. The Ambassador concluded by stating that without strong public action by the GOP, the U.S. will be forced to formally bring these incidents to the attention of the UN 1267 Committee. (Note: In an aside, the Foreign Secretary asked the Ambassador whether the U.S, has evidence linking JuD to terrorist activity. The Ambassador replied affirmatively, noting that the USG has shared such information with GOP intelligence agencies. The Ambassador also advised the Foreign Secretary that there is a growing concern in the USG about LeT/JuD support to the insurgency in Afghanistan. End note.)

¶4. (C) A week later, in a November 24 meeting with National Security Advisor Tariq Aziz, the Ambassador presented the same points, supported by copies of the open source reports. (Note: This package of open source material included a ISLAMABAD 00022174 002 OF 003
November 20 report of a full page Al Akhtar advertisement in a Karachi Urdu-language paper solicit donations of meat for the poor during the coming Eid-al-Adha holiday. End note.) The Ambassador reported that he had also raised the issue with the Foreign Secretary, but was not certain that the gravity of these UN 1267 Committee violations had registered with the MFA. The Ambassador observed that the bilateral relationship would not be helped if the U.S. is forced to formally notify the UN 1267 Committee of Pakistan’s lax implementation of its international obligations. NSA Aziz agreed that the GOP wished to avoid a formal referral to the UN 1267 committee, expressing serious concern over the broadcast and publication of the Al Akhtar and Al Rashid zakat solicitations and particular irritation over the remarks by the Parliamentary Secretary for Defense. While saying that the GOP cannot close down the accounts and operations of JuD, as the entity is not yet the subject of a 1267 designation, Aziz agreed that there is no similar impediment to taking firm action against designees Al Akhtar and Al Rashid Trusts. Aziz promised the Ambassador that he would pursue the matter within the GOP interagency.

¶5. (C) Complementing the Ambassador’s outreach, Public Affairs Counselor and econoff have raised the issue of 1267 designees’ published and broadcast fund-raising solicitations with the Information Secretary and with the MFA Spokesperson and Director General (UN). The Information Secretary pleaded ignorance that UN 1267 sanctions applied to broadcast and print media; once the matter was brought to his attention by the Embassy, he said that he ordered the Information Ministry to advise all state-affiliated media outlets that they must not/not to accept advertising or public service solicitations from any of the 1267 designees. (Note: According to the MFA, a similar effort to reach private media outlets is said to be underway by the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority. End note.) Tasneem Aslam, the MFA spokesperson and UN Director General, reaffirmed the GOP’s commitment to honoring its UN obligations, but noted that a way must be found to “rehabilitate” designated entities, as their charitable and humanitarian activities are a vital part of Pakistani society.

¶6. (C) The Ambassador discussed the recent spate of public reports on 1267 designee solicitations with Ambassador Ruperez, who led the UNSC Counterterrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) delegation on a November 17-24 mission to assess Pakistan’s commitment to combat terrorism. PolCouns also privately briefed the senior legal advisor on USG concerns over the continued operation of these entities in Pakistan. PolCouns has also shared the open source reports of the 1267-designated entities with like-minded colleagues in the diplomatic community whose Embassies’ also engage the GOP on terror finance issues.

¶7. (SBU) Post’s efforts have not gone unnoticed: the November 25 edition of the English-language “The Pakistan Post” carried a front-page article with the headline “Banned Outfits’ Ads Annoy US.” The article said that the Interior Ministry has instructed relevant government departments “to create awareness” within the press that media should not accept advertising by organization designated by the UN. The Pakistan Post says that the Interior Ministry’s report notes that “our each and every paper is monitored by the U.S. State Department that (sic) has a separate section to monitor Urdu newspapers.” The Post article also reviews alleged U.S. efforts to include JuD in the LeT 1267 designation, a campaign the paper describes as stymied after China demanded
ISLAMABAD 00022174 003 OF 003
evidence that JuD is connected to terror finance activities. (Note: The Post’s story coincided with banner headlines describing dozens of new bilateral Pak-Chinese initiatives announced during Chinese President Hu’s November 23-26 state visit to Pakistan. End note.)

¶8. (C) Comment: Emboffs will continue to engage GOP officials and contacts in the press, financial community, political parties and the diplomatic community to raise awareness and generate multiple points of pressure to demand that the GOP take firm action to terminate the operations of 1267-designated entities. Post recommends reassessing GOP progress on this issue in late December, with an eye to formal notification to the UN 1267 Committee in early 2007 if the GOP response is unsatisfactory. End comment. CROCKER
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Viewing cable 07ISLAMABAD31, PRESIDENT MUSHARAFF BRIEFS GEN SCHOOMAKER


Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ISLAMABAD31 2007-01-03 131 2010-11-30 219 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Islamabad
VZCZCXRO7979
OO RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #0031/01 0031351
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031351Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5813
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 9748
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 1624
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 3926
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0899
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 1066
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 1830
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 6608
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4844
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9966
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1042
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 2343
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0979
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 3938
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 0947
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 9210
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1639
RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

Wednesday, 03 January 2007, 13:51
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000031
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/02/2016
TAGS AF, MOPS, PK, PREL, PTER
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MUSHARAFF BRIEFS GEN SCHOOMAKER AND
AMBASSADOR ON STRATEGY FOR BORDER SECURITY

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d

¶1. (C) Introduction and summary: During a December 29 meeting, President (and Chief of Army Staff) Musharraf reinforced for U.S. Chief of Army Staff GEN Schoomaker and the Ambassador that Pakistan and the U.S, are in the war on terrorism together, sharing the same goals and fighting the same enemy. Noting that allies may sometimes see things differently or disagree on how to proceed, Musharraf outlined his strategy to secure Pakistani territory from violent extremism and the prevent it from being used to support the insurgency in Afghanistan. In Musharraf's view, the essence of the problem of (and solution to) the Taliban insurgency lies in Afghanistan; that said, the President also acknowledged Pakistan's responsibility to prevent cross-border collusion and support from militants in Balochistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). To date, Pakistan's primary focus has been on disrupting Islamist extremists in the FATA, Musharraf said, but the government now sees that it must make greater efforts in Balochistan. Musharraf summarized his goal: Pakistan checks support for the insurgency on this side of the border, so that the ISAF-led Coalition can defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan. While underscoring his own commitment, Musharraf questioned the degree to which Afghanistan is willing to respond to Pakistan's needs, noting that Pakistan's request for assistance in capturing Baloch militant Brahamdagh Bugti have yet to produce any results. End introduction and summary.

¶2. (C) Comment: Musharraf was frank and forthcoming about Pakistan’s on-going reassessment of its border security tactics, while underscoring his commitment to a comprehensive strategy: winning the loyalty of the local population along the border through political dialogue and socio-economic investment while using special operations forces to root out and hunt down al Qaeda, Taliban and other anti-Coalition elements based in Pakistan. Admitting that he is dissatisfied with the facts on the ground after the September 5 jirga accord in North Waziristan, Musharraf stressed that the task ahead is not to start over from scratch, but to make the accord work and then extend it to the rest of the border -- an assessment with which Embassy Islamabad agrees. Even as he reaffirmed his determination to secure the border region, however, Musharraf betrayed deep personal frustration that Karzai’s government appears to be doing little to apprehend and repatriate Brahamdagh Bugti, End comment.
How to Proceed?
---------------

¶3. (C) Musharraf described the three critical points underlying his strategy for enhancing border security:
-- Ending cross-border support for the Taliban in Afghanistan -- Closing Afghan refugee camps in Balochistan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) -- Targeting al Qaeda and Taliban senior leaders who have established themselves on the Pakistani side of the border.
In order to stop militants from unlawfully crossing into Afghanistan, Pakistan will selectively mine and fence the border. The President has tasked the Army’s Director General of Military Operations to be prepare to brief an implementation plan that would be deployed on a test basis. Other Pakistani officials have been directed to devise a strategy to close the Pir Alazai refugee camp in Balochistan
ISLAMABAD 00000031 002 OF 003
and to significantly improve monitoring of access to and activities with the three other most troubling camps.

¶4. (C) Finally, Musharraf said that he had directed Pakistan’s security forces that the government must proactively clean the al Qaeda and Taliban presence out of the border region, while simultaneously expanding the political dialogue with the local population. We are now engaged on strengthening enforcement of the North Waziristan Agency jirga accord, the President said, and seeking a similar accommodation with tribal leaders in South Waziristan. Musharraf acknowledged that some of the government's interlocutors in North Waziristan might be considered problematic from an outsider's perspective (a tacit recognition of international criticism of the government's willingness to include local militant commanders and taliban in the jirga negotiations), but these are the people that must be enlisted if Pakistani authorities are to break the ties to the insurgency in Afghanistan. Musharraf stressed that the Special Operations Task Force must act more forcefully in targeting al Qaeda and Taliban commanders in the tribal agencies (a use of force addressed in the North Waziristan accord); senior Army staff will brief him on January 5 on plans to step up this engagement.
Need for Coordination Across the Durrand Line
---------------------------------------------

¶5. (C) Having outlined Pakistan's efforts to enhance security in the border regions, President Musharraf told GEN Schoomaker that he is deeply frustrated that the Government of Afghanistan has not been responsive to greater bilateral cooperation. In fact, Musharraf argued, Afghanistan is supporting terrorist, specifically the violent Baloch nationalist insurgency led by Brahamdagh Bugti, who Musharraf claims shifts between Kabul and Kandahar. Pakistan cannot tolerate the increase in terrorist attacks seen in Balochistan over recent months. Despite pressing President Karzai directly for assistance in repatriating Bugti to face charges in Pakistan and sharing Pakistan’s frustration over Bugti’s apparent safe haven in Afghanistan with a parade of international officials (ISAF GEN Richards, A/S Boucher, etc.), Musharraf said, nothing is being done to address the problem. Pakistan supports its allies in the fight against terrorism and expects the same support when it comes to apprehending terrorists who target Pakistan. Warming to his topic, Musharraf shared his anger over President Karzai’s anti-Pakistan public remarks in December, observing that he had been on the verge of calling a press conference to retaliate in kind until his staff intervened in the interest of dampening the unhelpful cross-border rhetoric.

¶6. (C) Despite Musharraf's personal frustration with his Afghan counterpart, he commended reports that Karzai wishes to arm local militias in Afghanistan southern and southeastern provinces as an idea worthy of consideration. The concept of arming local tribal leaders to stand with the government against the Taliban might work, Musharraf said, if Karzai is working with the right people. (Note: We are not sure whether the President was referring to current efforts to enhance Afghanistans auxiliary police service or to Karzai's spring 2006 push for provincial governors to raise their own militias. It is equally difficult to judge whether Musharraf was sincere in his endorsement or simply trying to say something positive after the heated criticism of Kabul's failure to respond to Pakistan’s requests to apprehend Bugti. End note.) Musharraf said that he had accepted an offer by ISLAMABAD 00000031 003 OF 003
EU representative Vendrell to serve as an informal communication bridge to President Karzai. Musharraf’s first message to Karzai via the Vendrell channel is that the cross-border aspersions and accusations must stop so that both sides can focus their energies and resources on defeating their common enemy -- the Taliban.

¶7. (U) Post has shared the information in this cable directly with Emb Kabul. CROCKER
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ISLAMABAD256 2007-01-17 066 2010-11-30 219 SECRET Embassy Islamabad
VZCZCXRO9574
PP RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #0256/01 0170641
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 170641Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6196
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 9793
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 1719
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4879
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 3977
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 1111
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 1882
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 6679
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0078
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 2438
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 4188
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 1107
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 9386
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

Wednesday, 17 January 2007, 06:41
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 000256
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/13/2016
TAGS EAID, MOPS, PK, PREL, PTER

SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF TELLS BOUCHER ABOUT PAKISTAN’S PLANS FOR
BORDER SECURITY

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (S) Summary and introduction: In his January 12 meeting with Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher, Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf spoke of irritants in Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tactical adjustments to enhance security in the border region. Musharraf described tougher procedures for border crossing, selective fencing and mining of the border region, stronger leadership for local police and plans to close Afghan refugee camps. He also underscored that tribal leaders in North Waziristan have been given a month to improve implementation of the September 2006 agreement or face possible military action. Boucher and Lieutenant General Eikenberry briefed the President on their impression of Afghanistan’s readiness to face a strong offensive by the Taliban in the spring, noting that President Karzai is a stronger and more confident leader than only a year ago. Boucher reaffirmed U.S. support for Pakistan’s development plans for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and offered assistance as the Pakistani and Afghan Jirga Planning Commissions begin to coordinate. Following the 45 minute meeting with the full American delegation reported here, President Musharraf spoke privately for another 45-minutes with Boucher and Ambassador Crocker. End summary.

¶2. (C) Meeting Participants:

U.S. Assistant Secretary Richard A. Boucher, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, Commander, Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan Major General Ronald Helmly, Defense Representative to Pakistan Ms. Caitlin Hayden, Senior Advisor, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs Embassy notetaker
Pakistan

President Pervez Musharraf Lieutenant General Hamid Javaid, Chief of Staff Additional Secretary Shahid Kamal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Major General Shafqaat Ahmed, Deputy Chief of Staff

Afghanistan -- Rhetoric and Bugti

¶3. (C) President Musharraf decried the heated rhetoric emanating from Afghan officials over the past month. Public accusations that al Qaeda and Taliban figures are operating in our border regions are perhaps understandable, Musharraf said, but it is completely unacceptable for Afghan officials to accuse the Government of Pakistan and Inter Services Intelligence of collusion with the enemy. Warming to his topic, Musharraf described Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz's January 4 visit to Kabul as a bad meeting, saying that President Karzai bombarded the Pakistani delegation with outlandish accusations that Pakistan seeks to enslave the Afghans to achieve strategic depth. This is nonsense, Musharraf concluded; to the contrary, Pakistan wants good relations with the Afghan government and with all communities in Afghanistan. Pakistani officials and diplomats are under his personnel instructions not to interfere in Afghanistan’s affairs. Boucher advised the President that U.S. officials have noted the aggravated level of cross-border rhetoric and have counseled Afghan interlocutors not to air their grievance in public. All must appreciate the need to address issues responsibly and, when appropriate, privately.

¶4. (C) Musharraf told Boucher that militant Baloch nationalist and fugitive Brahamdagh Bugti remains at large in Afghanistan, enjoying freedom of movement to commute between Kabul and Kandahar, raising money and planning operations against Pakistani security forces. Boucher said that he had raised Bugti’s presence in Afghanistan with President Karzai, who offered assurances that nobody would be allowed to use Afghanistan as a staging ground for terrorist attacks on Pakistan. Musharraf had a simple response: Thats bullshit.

Afghanistan -- Channels of Communication

¶5. (C) Boucher noted the growth in channels of communication between Kabul and Islamabad, commending the exchange of information that occurs within the military Tripartite Commission and in trilateral intelligence channels. He told his Pakistani hosts that Karzai has agreed to support exchanges between Pakistani and Afghan parliamentarians and encouraged the two countries to seek other opportunities to broaden their relationship. The President agreed, but noted that he was disappointed that the agenda for the January 10 Tripartite Commission plenary session did not address the most critical common challenges facing the two countries: cross-border infiltration, repatriating Afghan refugees and closing camps that have become safe havens for extremists.

Afghanistan -- Better Prepared for Spring Offensive

¶6. (C) Lieutenant General Eikenberry, who was making farewell calls in Islamabad before relinquishing his command on January 21, shared his impressions of the situation in Afghanistan with Musharraf. Eikenberry told Musharraf that, although the we expect the insurgents to launch a strong offensive in the spring, time is not on the Taliban’s side. Afghanistan's security forces -- the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police -- are growing in confidence and capacity. President Karzai is a more confident commander-in-chief and chief executive, replacing corrupt and poor-performing officials. Reconstruction assistance is taking root in districts throughout the country. U.S. forces -- which will reach the highest level of strength in Afghanistan in 2007, despite the inactivation of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan -- stand ready to give NATO all necessary support to achieve it mission. The current winter lull is the time, Eikenberry continued, to move forcefully to disrupt Taliban command-and-control. A strike to the Haqqani network -- which controls some Taliban action from Pakistan -- would deal a serious blow to both Taliban operational planning and recruitment. Responding to Musharraf’s concern that the mil-mil Tripartite Commission is not addressing issues such as refugee repatriation, Eikenberry offered the opinion that the Tripartite Commission operates best when its participants can deal with each other soldier-to-soldier; cross-border issues carrying significant political baggage are better addressed through other channels.

¶7. (C) President Musharraf suggested that NATO forces could enhance the effort against the Taliban in southern and south-eastern Afghanistan by actively enlisting the support of local populations, even to the extent of arming village-level militias against Taliban insurgents. Boucher described an invigorated effort to boost support for Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police through auxiliary police units of local residents serving under the Ministry of Interior. President Karzai is also responding to public frustration with poor governance and corruption by cleaning out corrupt and dishonest local officials. The international community is using the winter months to inject new flows of development and economic assistance out to the provinces. Musharraf applauded this effort, saying that the Taliban will eventually lose popularity the more it is seen obstructing the country's reconstruction.

Time to Close Refugee Camps

¶8. (C) President Musharraf advised Boucher that he and his senior advisors have taken several decisions in recent weeks to improve security along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan, including closing at least one of the large camps inhabited by Afghan refugees. These camps have become safe havens for militant elements, Musharraf explained. As extensive collateral casualties would inevitably follow any military operation to separate the militants from the civilian residents, the only solution is to begin closing the camps altogether. Musharraf has tasked his advisors with devising a camp closure plan that incorporates recommendations on where the refugees could be relocated if they choose not to return to Afghanistan. These measure will then be discussed with Afghan and UN officials under the auspices of the refugee Tripartite Commission. We agree with you that the camps should close, Boucher replied, underscoring the urgency of devising a plan and coordinating with Afghanistan and the UN before spring.

Stronger Border Security Measures

¶9. (C) Stressing that Pakistan understands that it must take firm measure to gain control over its western border, Musharraf reviewed a range of actions already under way. New senior police officials appointed to posts in Balochistan and North West Frontier Province have been personally instructed by the President to crack down on undocumented Afghans and other militant targets. The Ministry of Interior is also in the process of lowering the number of official border crossings in Balochistan from 33 to 6. Enhanced immigrations procedures, including biometric crossing cards, have been introduced at the Chaman border crossing, where 30,000 individuals transit daily. The Army has been ordered to design a plan for selective fencing and mining along the border. Musharraf assured Boucher that Pakistan has long and successful experience with mining along its eastern border, and that extraordinary measures would be implemented to prevent accidental civilian casualties or misappropriation of mines by terrorists. Of course, minefields will not stop terrorism, Musharraf said, but they can help us control the insurgents’ movements across the border. Boucher noted that deployment of land mines is a complicated issue that the U.S. and other Coalition partners will want to discuss with Pakistani military planners. President Musharraf acknowledged that, but said that these are “unusual circumstances” and Pakistan will take “unilateral measures” if needed.

Attack on Insurgents Infiltrating from North Waziristan

¶10. (S) The American delegation briefed the President on the Coalition assault on a massive infiltration of Taliban fighters from North Waziristan on January 10-11. The fighters massed on the Pakistani side of the border before crossing into Afghanistan, where U.S. forces attacked, killing up to 150. Musharraf shared American concern that the enemy could mobilize such a large force during the winter lull, and expressed some frustration that so large a force had been able to collect on Pakistani territory and then cross the border unimpeded. He suggested that this reflected a need for greater aerial surveillance of the area or night-capable helicopter gunships to attack the enemy, indicating his willingness to coordinate with U.S. forces on deploying whatever air assets are necessary to identify and destroy these enemy movements. (Note: The President was specific in calling for reliance on air assets, saying point blank that ground forces are not an option. End note.)

Re-Assessing the North Waziristan Accord

¶11. (S) Musharraf briefed Boucher on the government's recent review of the September 2006 North Waziristan agreement. Governor Orakzai convened the jirga that negotiated the agreement in December, dispatching the members to Miran Shah to make clear to North Waziristan's tribal leaders that they must take action to prevent cross-border infiltration in support of the Taliban, eliminate foreign fighters from the Agency and stop any effort to establish a parallel political administration. Tribal leaders were given one month to gain control of the situation or the government would consider taking military action. Musharraf refused to be disheartened, saying that it will take time for the accord to take hold. In the interim, the government has stepped up recruitment and training for tribal levies and has assigned a Frontier Corps wing to the Political Agent. This will give the Political Agent the muscle he needs to enforce the writ of state, while the Army will be at hand to take on Taliban and al Qaeda targets.
Pak-Afghan Jirgas.

¶12. (C) Boucher commended Musharraf for naming strong leaders to Pakistan’s Jirga Planning Commission, encouraging the Commission to meet soonest with its Afghan counterpart to discuss each country's vision for the process. Noting that he would discuss the jirgas with Interior Minister and Jirga Commission Chair Sherpao later in the day, Boucher told the President that the U.S. stands ready to support the process once Pakistan and Afghanistan determine what assistance will be required.
Federally Administered Tribal Areas Development Assistance

¶13. (C) Musharraf also spoke plans for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas Secretariat and Development Authority to funnel near-term development assistance through tribal maliks, to strengthen their stature within their tribes. Asking maliks to identify development needs and direct resources will reinforce his authority with the local population, said Musharraf. Boucher replied that the U.S. hopes to offer substantial financial support for the Pakistani's Federally Administered Tribal Areas Sustainable Development Plan.

¶14. (U) This cable has been cleared by SCA Senior Advisor Caitlin Hayden.
CROCKER
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