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Old Monday, May 22, 2006
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Arrow Liaquat: An Assessment

By Sharif-Al-Mujahid

Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan (1895-1951) was the first Prime Minister of Pakistan (1947-51). That fact alone says a great deal about Liaquat as leader, as administrator and as statesman. And he was chosen for that office by the All-India Muslim League (AIML) which, having won some 88 per cent of the Muslim seats and secured about 85 per cent of the total votes cast in the Muslim constituencies during the 1945-46 general elections, was the sole representative body of the hundred million Muslims of India. This meant that Liaquat was next only to Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948) at that historic moment.

Now, what were Liaquat's credentials that got him nominated without any opposition whatsoever as the Executive Head of the new state of
Pakistan? Liaquat was the leader of the Muslim League bloc in the Interim government for some nine months (October 1946 July 1947). He was the Deputy Leader of the Muslim League Assembly party in the Central Legislature since 1940, and since Jinnah, because of his pressing engagements, seldom could attend the Assembly sessions, Liaquat was for all practical purposes the de facto leader of the party in the Assembly. He was also the General Secretary of the Muslim League to which post he was elected unanimously at the Bombay (1936) League session, and this at the instance of Jinnah himself; he was the longest serving General Secretary of the League in all its annals, even out-serving the legendary Sir Wazir Hasan (1912-19) of yester-years. Liaquat was also a member of the League Central Parliamentary Board; he was, thus, in part responsible for the selection of League candidates for the Central Assembly and for adjudicating disputes between prospective League candidates for the provincial polls during 1945-1946.

Jinnah was known to be a strict disciplinarian; he was also an exacting President. To work in an organization headed by him, and that next only to him, was no mean task, nor was it enviable. That Liaquat served under him for an eleven long years and still continued to enjoy his confidence say a good deal about his capabilities to implement policies and programmes decided upon by the League's high command, to look after day-to-day organisational matters, and, more important, to keep the factious and feuding provincial leaders within reasonable limits of divergence and infighting. Liaquat was unassuming all the time; he believed in working behind the scene; he never sought the limelight; above all, he was content to work under Jinnah's towering shadow. Hence his role in the organization and in solving problems that arose from time to time has not generally received the kind of attention and recognition, it should normally have.

However, a study of the Quaid-e-Azam papers and the archives of Freedom Movement which have become accessible to researchers only recently reveal that all through this period he served as a shock absorber and trouble shooter, and his quiet diplomacy and unassuming demeanour enabled him to play out this role rather superbly.

Indeed, several top leaders (e.g. Nawab Ismail Khan of the U.P., Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan of the
Punjab and Fazlul Haq of Bengal) sent messages to Jinnah through Liaquat - messages which they could not address directly to Jinnah for fear of being misunderstood. Thus, Liaquat helped to narrow down differences within the party's leadership from time to Time; to keep Jinnah informed of developments which, if left unchecked, could have led to crises, to mollify estranged leaders or Jinnah, as the case may be, to checkmate the differences coming into the open and to keep the somewhat'monolithic' edifice of the League's leadership intact. Clearly, this was a critical pre-requisite for success in the ongoing tussle against the Congress and in the struggle for Pakistan.

On occasions Liaquat deputised for Jinnah and also, served as his (un-official) spokesman. For instance, in his address to the
Aligarh students on 22 September 1945 when Liaquat called upon them "to play their part boldly" in the forthcoming elections which was "a matter of life and death to the Muslims", arguing what use would be a degree "if the future is dark and disappointing". Likewise, at the Meerut Divisional Conference on 25-26 March 1939, where he propounded partition as the most rational solution to India's constitutional problem. Again in December 1939, in his interview with Sir Stafford Cripps when he proposed three possible constitutional solutions, outright partition between Muslims and Hindus, a loose confederation with a limited centre, and the provincial option. Remarkably though, these proposals corresponded to the three major British answers to the Indian problem in the 1940s: Mountbatten's partition plan (1947), the Cabinet Mission's three tier scheme (1946), and the Cripps' (local option) offer (1942). On all these occasions, Liaquat's call and proposals, as the case may be, were meant to be trial balloons, if only to test the mood and reaction of the respondents, without however committing Jinnah and the AIML to them officially.

One "blemish" during this period was the Desai-Liaquat "Pact" of 1945, which, ostensibly contracted behind Jinnah's back, when he lay seriously ill at Matheran, was exploited by Liaquat's critics to run him down. But, in retrospect, the "Pact" established the principle of parity between Congress and the League for the first time - the principle which the League had long demanded in any coalitional setup, but which was not conceded thus far. In fact the "Pact" became the basis for the quota of seats for Hindus and Muslims/Congress and League in the subsequent Wavell (1945) and Interim Government (1946) proposals, thus assuming a milestone status in future constitutional developments. That Jinnah, a disciplinarian to the marrow of his bones, accepted Liaquat's "explanation" and took no action against him while Desai (though blessed by Mahatma Gandhi in devising the proposals, but which he subsequently disowned) was even denied a ticket by the Congress for his talks with Liaquat exonerates him of any "breach of trust" which Sir Yamin Khan alleges.

Jinnah was, of course, the supreme leader, but as I have argued in my "Jinnah" (1981) book, he was, like Lenin, essentially a party man, with his personality being sustained by. and developed within, the party. Moreover, during the momentous decade of 1937-47, he came to be identified as the Party, yet even he needed a team of lieutenants to put his plans through. And as Philip John Noel-Baker, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (1947-50), said on his death, "his power was great, yet his greatness was that he used his power to make a team of men, who could carry on the work when he was gone". And Liaquat headed that team.

How ably he headed that team comes out demonstrably during the birth-pangs of the fledgling state. Pakistan's birth, it may be remembered, was made all the more cataclysmic by a host of problems that engulfed the new-born nation on the morrow of freedom - problems such as the Punjab holocaust, the en masse migration of the Hindu and Sikh business, managerial and enterpreneur class, the immigration of some eight million refugees from across the border, the lack of a central government, a capital, an administrative core and an organized defence force, and India's denial of a major share of Pakistan's cash balances and defence equipment and store, her occupation of Junagarh and her backdoor entry into Kashmir through fraudulent means, and the shutting off, in April 1948, of the flow of water from head works in India into Pakistani canals, which irrigated some 1.7 million acres. Jinnah's presence at this juncture was, of course, critical - not only in formulating policies to steer the new-born nation out of the crisis she had found herself enmeshed in, but, more important, in energising the people, in raising their morale, and in canalizing along constructive channels the profound feelings of patriotism that the coming of freedom had generated. But Liaquat was the man who supervised the implementation of these policies, filled in the gaps, and attended to the details.

However, the acid test came in the wake of Jinnah's death in September 1948.Some American circles, for instance, speculated whether the desire for a separate existence among Muslims would survive the catastrophic event. Even George Bernard Shaw wrote to Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru on
18 September 1948. " I am wondering whether the death of Jinner (Jinnah) will prevent you from coming to London. If he has no competent successor you will have to govern the whole peninsula." But during the next three years Liaquat proved to be more than a competent successor. He believed the assumption that Pakistan would collapse once she had to face the problems by herself without the guidance of the Great Leader.

Liaquat was, of course, the political heir, but to fill in the vacuum caused by the Founding Father's death was by no means easy. More so, because in the wake of his death came the Indian invasion and occupation of
Hyderabad. The nation was downcast, in view of India's consistantly aggressive record coupled with Pakistan's deficiency in respect of armour and armed forces; but Liaquat raised its drooping morale by taking a bold stand at this juncture. "In the event of an attack on Pakistan....", he declared, "myself, my colleagues and every Pakistani will shed his last drop of blood in defending every inch of the soil of Pakistan." Thus the nation came to regain its self-confidence.

During the next three years,
India besides mounting a war of attrition created several problems, designed to throttle Pakistan. In September 1949 came the Indian refusal to recognise the unaltered value of the Pakistani rupee when India devalued her own currency. This led to a trade deadlock, and Pakistan was put to severe economic strain since India was then by far the largest buyer of Pakistani jute, the country's premier cash crop.

Then, early in 1950, the repercussions, though mild, in East Bengal to large-scale communal riots in West Bengal soured relations between the two dominions all the more. The Indian Prime Minister talked of using "other methods" to pressurise
Pakistan into accepting the Indian viewpoint; she also got her troops massed within easy striking distance of Pakistan. Despite lurking dangers and uncalled for provocation, Liaquat remained calm and unruffled, proceeded to New Delhi for direct talks with Nehru, and drew up the Minorities Pact of April 1950.

Again, in July 1951,
India massed her troops on West Pakistan's borders once again, without any ostensible reason or provocation. While Liaquat galvanised the people internally to stand as a solid phalanx against Indian designs, he simultaneously induced several Western countries to pressurise India into pulling back her troops.
Simultaneously, he initiated policies designed to enable
Pakistan to play her role in the comity of nations and at the world forums. He used diplomatic skills to garner support abroad in Pakistan's disputes with India, and especially on Kashmir. When the Commonwealth Prime Ministers were found lukewarm in discussing these disputes and suggesting solutions, he took a bold stand: he refused to attend the third Commonwealh Conference in 1950 unless Kashmir was put on the agenda. Likewise, he was extremely successful in setting Pakistan's viewpoint 'during his extremely rewarding official visit to the United States in May 1950. This is indicated by the New York Times' editorial of 5 May 1950. Liaquat, it said, "spoke with fervour to our Congress yesterday when he declared that 'no threat or persuasion, no material peril or ideological allurement' could deflect this country from its chosen path of free democracy. These are strong words and they were spoken in an international atmosphere marked, as he noted, by ugly manifestations of greed, aggression and intolerance."

Even as Liaquat stood for peace within and without, he was a believer in the unity of the Muslim world, which he considered indispensable for getting justice at the international level, and for ensuring them their due place in the comity of nations and at the world forums. "If the Western democracies can enter into pacts to protect their way of life, if the communist countries can form a block on the basis that they have an ideology:, he argued. "Why cannot the Muslim peoples get together to protect themselves and show to the world that they have an ideology and a way of life, which ensure peace and harmony for the world. In pursuance of this objective, he took concrete steps to strengthen Pakistan's still tentative link with several Muslim countries: he extended support to liberation movements in Indonesia, Malaya, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Nigeria, and the Arab cause in Palestine; he called the first International Islamic Economic Conference in late 1949; he inspired the holding of the Motamar-e-Alam-e-Islami Conference in early 1951, which was attended by, among others, the Grand Mufti of Palestine, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, and Aden Abdullah Usman of Somalia; he himself visited Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Iran, and held extended discussions, in an attempt to formulate a viable, common Muslim foreign policy plan.

The deft manner in which he tackled internal and external problems and consolidated
Pakistan in the wake of the Quaid's death won him recognition, both nationally and internationally. And as Sir Olaf Caroe said, "three years of Liaquat Ali Khan's leadership carried Pakistan through difficulty and crisis to the achievement of a degree of political stability rare in any democratic country..., of economic prosperity beyond her own rosiest dreams, and of an honoured place in the affairs of nations." Indeed, in his time, torn as several Asian countries were by communist subversion, internal disorders and political strifes, Pakistan was considered the most stable and unified nation in Asia, with a firm commitment to freedom, democracy, social justice and world peace.
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