Talking with the enemy

Rahimullah Yusufzai
It has now become obvious that the claims by the US authorities that they were facilitating talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban weren’t true. Government spokesmen in Washington and military commanders in Afghanistan were so persistent in making such claims that many people all over the world started believing that the long-awaited negotiations for peacefully ending the conflict had finally begun.
No talks were held and none are in sight, at least for the time-being. Sections of the media, particularly in the US, faithfully reported the claims about the non-existent talks without bothering to check the facts. The US and NATO military commander in Afghanistan General David Petraeus was the first to make such claims, apparently as part of psychological warfare to create confusion in Taliban ranks and prepare the ground for triggering defections from the group.
Together with his claim about giving safe passage to Taliban commanders to Kabul to hold talks with the government of President Hamid Karzai, he was also claiming success on the battlefront by arguing that his strategy to reverse the Taliban momentum was working, particularly in the strategic and politically important Kandahar province as a result of the recent military operations. All this fitted well with the declared intention of the Obama administration to weaken the Taliban to such an extent following the surge of around 38,000 extra US and NATO troops that they agree to talk a deal on the terms set by the West and the Afghan government.
As the situation in Afghanistan is entering a critical phase ahead of the July 2011 timeline given by President Barack Obama for beginning the withdrawal of some American troops from Afghanistan, the pressure on General Petraeus is mounting to show results in the fight against the resurgent Taliban. Petraeus has been pursuing an aggressive military campaign against the Taliban since he replaced the disgraced General Stanley McChrystal more than five months ago. It is true that the military operation in and around Kandahar city has inflicted damage upon the Taliban and forced them to retreat.
The efforts to secure Kandahar, the birthplace of the Taliban and their spiritual capital, is important as Taliban leader Mulla Mohammad Omar and his fighters had been posing a threat to the city and preventing the population from making the choice whether to side with the Taliban or throw in their lot with the Afghan government and its foreign patrons. However, the Taliban bounced back from a similar situation in neighbouring Helmand province in the spring of this year when a big military push by around 25,000 NATO and Afghan troops in the small farming district of Marja forced them into retreat. They are again active in Marja and causing harm to foreign and Afghan forces and could make a similar comeback in Kandahar.
The fighting nowadays is fierce in parts of Afghanistan due to the new NATO military operations and the rise in Taliban attacks, but the arrival of winter is certainly going to cause reduction in violence and provide an opportunity to the combatants not only to regroup but also review their strategies. They would also want to formulate their next moves on the political front at a time when there is much talk about holding talks to end the Afghan conflict. The US and its allies have already set the conditions for talks with elements of the Taliban by demanding that they renounce violence, accept Afghanistan’s constitution and delink from Al-Qaeda. President Karzai has been given the green signal to talk to those Taliban who accept these conditions and also pursue the goals of his reintegration policy that basically aim at buying off commanders and fighters linked to the armed opposition groups.
However, the US has drawn some ‘red lines’ and instructed President Karzai to keep Mulla Omar and certain other top Taliban figures and also former mujahideen leader Gulbaddin Hekmatyar out of the negotiation process as these men still figure high on its ‘terrorist’ list. This effectively means not talking to armed Afghan opposition leaders who really matter and without whose participation no political process for ending the conflict could achieve success.
The Taliban leadership too has reportedly been discussing its future course of action in view of the developments in Afghanistan. It hasn’t articulated the Taliban roadmap for the future, but there are reports that a list of demands is being debated that could be put forward in case they become involved in a political process in future. A seven-point ‘wish-list’ is said to be under consideration and could become the basis of the Taliban position in peace talks. The recently formed High Council for Peace led by former Afghan President Prof Burhanuddin Rabbani has been asking the Taliban to present their demands to it, but the latter have rejected the council and refused to interact with it and also with President Karzai’s government until the foreign forces withdraw from Afghanistan.
The seven demands in the Taliban ‘wish-list’ are as follows:
(a) All prisoners at the US detention centre in Guantanamo Bay should be released; (b) The names of all Taliban figures should be removed from the UN ‘blacklist’; (c) The Taliban Islamic Movement should be formally recognised as a legitimate political party and allowed to work in Afghanistan; (d) A timeframe for withdrawal of US-led foreign forces from Afghanistan should be announced and it should be proven through actions that the foreigners were sincere in implementing it. The timeframe for pulling out foreign troops from Afghanistan should be two months; (e) Military operations by foreign forces and the Afghan government should come to an end and all sides to the conflict should agree to a ceasefire; (f) All political prisoners in Afghanistan including those in the Bagram, Kandahar and other airbases under control of US-led coalition forces should be freed; (g) Islamic Shariah should become the law of the land and the system of justice in place of the existing constitution of Afghanistan.
It is understood that some of these Taliban demands have come up in different forms and at various forums earlier. It isn’t the official Taliban position yet and could be altered in case a political process was launched. At the Peace Jirga held by the Afghan government in Kabul, some of the above-mentioned points in context of the likely Taliban demands were discussed. The Rabbani-led, 70-member High Council for Peace was formed in the light of the recommendations made by that jirga to pursue efforts for peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan by contacting and talking to the armed opposition groups including the Taliban.
A perusal of the likely Taliban ‘wish-list’ shows that it contains all demands that have been articulated by their leaders and spokesmen from time to time. The issue of prisoners has always been a high priority for the Taliban and so is the question of recognition as a legal political group and, in case it assumes power, as a legitimate government. The matter of withdrawal of foreign forces is the most important Taliban demand along with enforcement of shariah in Afghanistan. Taliban are also hinting at reforming some of their harsh practices and accommodating all ethnic and political groups in a national government if they recapture power. This is something that didn’t happen when they were in power the last time and it is difficult to believe the Taliban in view of their past record of exercising absolute power.
The ‘wish-list’ makes no mention of Al-Qaeda. It is clear that the Taliban aren’t ready at this stage to accept the demand by the US and its allies to end their contacts with Al-Qaeda. This could become the subject of some bargaining once all sides to the conflict agree to hold serious and sincere talks to peacefully end the Afghan conflict. For the moment though, there is only talk about the talks and a lot of fighting all over Afghanistan.
The writer is resident editor of The News in Peshawar.
Email: rahim yusufzai@yahoo.com



Tayyab Siddiqui
Pakistan’s energy crisis is assuming alarming proportions, with no immediate solution in sight. Pakistan entered into negotiations with Iran and India on the IPI gas pipeline project in the mid-1990s. After inordinate delays, the agreement was finally signed on March 16 in Istanbul. India had earlier walked out of the talks. Under the agreement, Pakistan will receive 750 million CMFD (computational multiphase fluid dynamics) of gas per day by the middle of 2015 for the next 25 years. The total cost of the project is estimated at $7.4 billion.
The agreement had hardly been signed when US special envoy Richard Holbrooke reiterated US opposition to any deal with Iran in view of Washington’s standoff with Tehran on the nuclear issue. As an alternative, the US offered to assist Pakistan in obtaining liquefied natural gas (LNG) and electricity from Tajikistan via Afghanistan, within four years.
In June, President Obama signed into law the Comprehensive Iran Sanction, Accountability and Divestment Act. Under the law, the US can bar from the US markets and financial system foreign companies which have any investments in, or dealings with, the Iranian energy sector.
The US also offered an alternative pipeline from Turkmenistan. The $7.6-billion, four-nation project known as TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) was conceived in the mid-1990s by the US as part of a grand design for a regional power grid stretching from Kazakhstan to India.
A report prepared jointly by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Pakistan, and sponsored by the Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FODP), supported Pakistan’s plan to import natural gas from Iran. Some of these discussions were presided over by Holbrooke, and hence the recommendations in the report were deemed to have US approval. It said “gas imports via the cross-border pipeline must start in the medium term (2014-15), then increase to cover the long-term gap”. However, the US appears to have had different ideas.
TAPI was revived in September and the four nations signed a new procurement agreement in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. The project was formally approved by the federal cabinet on Oct 27 with the US promising to “fast-track” the project. Russia’s gas monopoly giant Gazprom may also participate in this project, “in any capacity, builder, designer participant, etc.,” in the words of Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin.
The IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India) project has obviously fallen victim to geopolitics, and Pakistan has caved in, having little choice. Under the present circumstances, despite mutually beneficial initiatives, funding was the key issue. Since the funding decision would have taken time, even a positive response from China would have further delayed the project.
There are no indications that the IPI agreement has been renounced. In any case, it has not been formally revoked, perhaps to prevent any negative political fallout. The whole issue has been kept under wraps. But the signing of the TAPI agreement on October 27 amounts to abandonment of the IPI project.
The development is unfortunate indeed. The Iranians are understandably upset. According to media reports, President Ahmadinejad, foreseeing the abandonment, cancelled his trip to Pakistan scheduled for September for visits to the flood-affected areas. Pakistan must recognise the importance of its relations with Iran and should pursue their improvement with greater vigour, goodwill and understanding. We are already isolated in the region and should not add to our difficulties.
Addressing the UN General Assembly, the Iranian president expressed his sympathy, support and solidarity regarding assistance to the flood victims of Pakistan. He “urged everyone to assist their fellow men and women as a human duty.” How sad that such a friend is being rejected.
The writer is a former ambassador. Email: m.tayyab.siddiqui @gmail.com