Conspiracy season
 

[B][SIZE="4"]Conspiracy season[/SIZE][/B]
[B][CENTER]By Cyril Almeida
Friday, 05 Nov, 2010 [/CENTER][/B]

[B]Nothing gets tongues wagging in the land of conspiracy theories like flux in the alphabet soup of PMLs. The reason is straightforward enough: shifting coalitions within the Muslim League are the thin edge of the wedge, a potential harbinger of change in the political configuration in Islamabad.
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Lending credence to the speculation is the cast of characters involved in the latest round. Pir Pagara, Humayun Akhtar, Ejazul Haq, Mian Azhar, Sheikh Rasheed, et al have at one point or the other — or at all points in their political careers — orbited in the circle of the establishment.

Connecting the conspiracy dots isn’t very difficult. The army’s unhappiness with the performance of the Zardari government and at Zardari’s inner circle isn’t exactly a secret. The political cast of characters sniffing around at the moment are old establishment handmaidens. Ergo, something must be afoot.

At this point it’s difficult to say what’s triggered the moves. The PML guys in the mix have a singular ability to keep their ears to the ground, their fingers to the wind and sense shifts in the political climate. That they have been instigated by external agents is certainly a possibility, but so is self-motivation.

The original problem here, though, is — surprise, surprise — Zardari and his ribald bunch of misfits. Here’s why.

Through no doing of his own, Zardari has over the past couple of years found himself the lucky beneficiary of perhaps the single greatest cancelling out and neutralisation of political foes.

The three main threats — the uniform, the robe and the N-League — certainly have some confluence of interests, but they have been unable to act in concert or reconcile themselves with the thought of one of the other two running the show. With no clear answer to ‘if not Zardari, then whom?’ question, Zardari has had a fairly clear and unobstructed path towards governing. But here’s the problem: he’s a scrappy political operative, not a governance guy.

Give the man a room full of politicians and he’ll wheel and deal until the numbers are on his side. Hand him a one-page cheat sheet on power-sector woes or tax reforms and his eyes are likely to glaze over. He doesn’t get and doesn’t really want to get the policy stuff.

In a personality-based political system like Pakistan’s, the boss’s attitude matters. And having chosen a prime minister largely for his anodyne, uninquisitive disposition hasn’t helped matters either. With the party boss and the chief executive uninterested in matters of governance and policy making, governance and policy making have really become beside the point for the government as a whole.

On the fight against militancy and fixing an ailing economy — the two biggest issues in present times — the government has nothing to offer. For sure, none of the opportunists trying to coalesce in opposition to Zardari have a clue about how to fix those problems either. But the burden of incumbency is necessarily greater — as is the blame you must shoulder for when things remain pear-shaped on your watch.

The PML vultures circling at the moment — regardless of whether they are doing so of their own volition or have been prompted — are able to circle because Zardari has given them a real opening.

In the thrust and parry of politics you need to be perceived to be on the winning side of an argument. It’s one thing for the PPP to be harried and harassed and pressured by the same ol’ establishment unwilling to let the PPP rule. It’s quite another for the PPP to find itself under pressure because it has proved to be a governance disaster. The former is something the PPP can exploit; the latter something the PPP’s opponents will relish.

While it remains in power, the PPP has a pressure valve to resort to: it could get serious about the business of governance — the policy, not the politics. In fact, ultimately that may be the goal of the behind-the-scenes machinations among the PML detritus. Zardari understands the language of politics: where he can’t be convinced to do something by above-the-board appeals, he could be induced by behind-the-scenes political scheming. If the carrot doesn’t work, use the stick.

What the PML manoeuvres demonstrate over and above all else are two things. First, the parliamentary system can create political ripples which could lead to better outcomes. When a government refuses to govern, opponents sensing an opportunity to strike will begin to manoeuvre into position. The government at that point has two options: adjust its strategy or fight until it goes down. Just having the option of the former — a strategy adjustment — is an improvement on any other system.

Second, survival in the political waters here requires a certain deftness of touch. A touch that Zardari’s closest advisers appear to lack. The circle which surrounds and advises Zardari is unidimensional in their approach and zero-sum oriented when it comes to political strategy.

With the instincts of street brawlers, they go for the head-on fight where craftiness and guile could produce better results. Babar Awan epitomises the approach and we’ve seen the results with the judiciary. Now, with his foray against the N-League in Punjab, Awan’s unnecessarily set in motion a chain of events that could produce adverse outcomes for his party and his boss.

Why do Awan and others continue to get away with it? The unhappy truth: the boss, Zardari, is a street fighter himself and likes and approves of such tactics.

And therein also lies the strength in much of the rumours that the powers-that-be are up to something again.

Think of it this way. You know the direct approach with Zardari hasn’t worked and won’t work: asking him politely or even firmly to address governance issues won’t get him to budge.

So you approach him in a language he does understand: political intrigue. Let him sink in the mire of his government’s misgovernance — something he’s done to himself — and then release the vultures.

Suddenly, Zardari’s threatened with the loss of what he craves most — power — while at the same time the possibility of becoming a political martyr, his fallback plan, stands eroded (it’s hard to convince people you’re a helpless victim of the establishment when people are blaming you for running the country into the ground).

They do tell a good conspiracy story in Islamabad, don’t they?