A very real danger

By Moeed Yusuf
Monday, 08 Nov, 2010

FEW developments ought to worry Pakistani strategic analysts more than the prospect of a major terrorist attack on Indian or American soil that is traced back to Pakistan.

New Delhi’s and Washington’s most likely respective responses would undermine the current efforts to eradicate terrorism in South Asia and destabilise Pakistan further.

To begin with, let us be sure that the danger of such an attack is indeed real.

Recently, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the US arrested an American citizen of Pakistani origin in connection with a plot to blow up parts of Washington’s metro rail system. This follows the May 2010 terrorist attempt by Faisal Shehzad in Times Square.

There is also no reason to believe that anti-India militant groups have given up the desire to attack India on its soil. There was constant concern of a terrorist attack during the Commonwealth Games in New Delhi last month. Ahead of US President Obama’s India visit, the Indian media raised similar concerns, pointing to previous high-level visits by US officials when one incident or another took place. And the fear is not without reason.

The prospect of such an attack is horrific enough. But the real damage — and this is what worries most objective observers — to the global effort to eradicate terrorism would come in ‘the day after’ scenario. Let us take the case of a fresh attack in India by a Pakistani-based militant outfit.

Analyses and gaming exercises that I am aware of are categorical in suggesting that India will not hold back next time round. An Indian retributive air strike on specific militant camps within Pakistan is believed to be the likely outcome.

The view is not without merit. India restrained itself both in 2001-02 and after Mumbai. In doing so, it incurred huge reputational costs as it proved Pakistan’s point that nuclear deterrence had secured it against any Indian adventurism for good. Moreover, Delhi saw the international community’s lack of willingness to punish Pakistan after Mumbai as proof that a policy of restraint bears few dividends. Pakistani military planners, on their part, are unanimous in stating that any Indian strike will elicit a response in kind. It would be naïve to dismiss this as mere signalling.

The next terrorist attack would then have unleashed an escalation dynamic that neither side has experienced before. While one would like to believe that nuclear deterrence would put an end to the escalation at some point, the development would nonetheless rekindle Pakistan-India tensions for months to come and may lead to a refocusing of Pakistan’s attention eastward.

As for an attack on US soil, the Bush administration’s retribution plan against Pakistan is now public knowledge. The failed Times Square attempt also elicited a strong message from the US secretary of state, among others. While many argue that better sense will prevail in Washington, one has to be mindful of the negative perception of Pakistan in Washington’s influential circles. The principal image of Pakistan is of a country that has double-crossed America and has undermined its campaign in Afghanistan. While there is little consensus on how to address that, it is clear that the perception is all but entrenched; indeed, Washington’s political circles will have very little sympathy for Pakistan in the depicted scenario.

A successful Times Square type incident will put tremendous pressure on the US president. In fact, having spent some time systematically gathering views on this issue in Washington, one gets the sense that political pressure may end up forcing the American leadership to opt for some sort of retribution, even if limited, as part of the response. Unfortunately, even the minutest retribution against Pakistan would ignite Pakistani anger and propel anti-US sentiments to new heights. The Pakistani view on the street may make it impossible for the collaboration on terrorism to continue unabated.

The conclusion to be drawn from the above is that a terrorist attack in India or the US that is traced back to Pakistan will likely end up eliciting suboptimal responses — from the perspective of eliminating terrorism and long-term stability of the region that is — which would dent Pakistan-India and Pakistan-US ties and significantly undermine the anti-terror efforts continuing in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The ultra-right will be able to cash in with its anti-India or anti-US rhetoric; this will make it more difficult for the Pakistani authorities to retain the present consensus against militancy in the country.

Further destabilisation within Pakistan will also have a blowback effect on coalition efforts in Afghanistan and on US efforts in reaching an acceptable political end state. It may push Washington to opt for lengthier military engagement in Afghanistan, which in turn would fuel further anger and violence in the country. The outright winners would be Al Qaeda and its associates; they would have succeeded in their relentless efforts to destabilise Pakistan, undermine cooperation on anti-terrorism and force India and the US to play into their hands.

The most obvious way to avoid this bleak scenario is for Pakistan to ensure that such an attack does not materialise, and failing that, for India and the US to ensure that knee-jerk reactions are avoided at all costs. The Pakistani security establishment realises the danger in another slip up and it has been working behind the scenes to thwart the possibility. Yet, just how much has been achieved is unclear. In fact, there is a fair amount of candour among the security establishment when it comes to acknowledging that the odds are stacked in favour of the adversary; the odd one will slip through sooner or later.

In terms of the responses from the US and India, there is even less room for optimism. For a mature and measured response, the ground conditions require an appreciation of the need to continue working jointly on anti-terrorism with Pakistan and an understanding of the fallout a heavy-handed response would lead to. This requires an active campaign in Washington and New Delhi to turn around public sentiment, nudge the media to alter its tone and convince political opponents not to gain mileage if the government of the time chooses to avoid retributive action. There are no signs of any such effort in either of the two capitals.