Pakistan old problems and new answers

[TANIA SHAIKH]

PAKISTAN: OLD PROBLEMS, NEW ANSWERS?
Teresita C. Schaffer
Issue: Despite substantial domestic opposition, Pakistan’s
Musharraf government provided and continues to provide
invaluable support to the United States in its intervention in
Afghanistan. At the same time, Pakistan’s military-dominated
government and the nexus between Pakistan’s military and radical
Islamic groups inside that country are glaringly in contradiction
with U.S. political values and counter-terrorism interests. How
should a new U.S. administration address these policy anomalies?
Introduction
The fundamental forces that have made Pakistan central to U.S.
strategic interests will carry on into the next administration and
beyond. The United States needs to deal with two urgent problems:
the impact of a porous border on instability and terrorism in
Afghanistan, and domestic insurgency in Pakistan. It must also
support the health of Pakistan’s democracy, its weak institutions,
and the economy. These long-term issues will undermine progress
on counter-terrorism if not attended to. The time is not ripe for an
India-Pakistan initiative, but the United States needs to have an
active “watching brief ” on that difficult relationship.
The United States has had a roller-coaster relationship with
Pakistan, with periods of intense collaboration ending in abrupt
cutoffs. The closest ties have come during periods of military rule.
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This includes the years since 9/11 — marked by close collaboration,
good military ties, and high aid flows, but also growing
resentment. Many Pakistanis blame the United States for hypocritical
lip-service to democracy and for sucking Pakistan into
“America’s war” in Afghanistan and its spillover in Pakistan.
Anti-Americanism is at record highs, and many Pakistanis have
been wondering when the next U.S.-Pakistan “divorce” is going
to occur.
Pakistan is struggling through the transition to an elected government.
The United States had personalized its relationship to
President Musharraf and, until the last few months before the
February 2008 elections, gave little support to restoration of
democracy. Pakistan’s voters rejected Musharraf ’s party, but he
remained president. If we want Pakistan to have a reasonably
orderly government and to sustain policies that advance regional
peace, then democracy and civilian institutions need to become
stronger. The internal contradictions in a government composed of
two parties that mistrust one another make this a difficult job. The
collective paranoia about the United States will require us to act
with extraordinary discretion.
The Pakistan-Afghanistan Nexus: Borders and Insurgencies
At the same time, the United States has invested heavily in building
a new Afghanistan, and is looking to increase its troop strength
there. Controlling the porous border must remain a major focus of
U.S. policy. The new Pakistani government, like the Musharraf
government, will want to continue this effort. But success in border
management is impossible without tackling the much deeper
problems on both sides of the border.
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Pakistanis would like to have a stable neighbor in Afghanistan,
but are increasingly skeptical that the current Afghan government
is capable of integrating the provinces bordering Pakistan into the
rather rudimentary polity that is the Afghan state. Pakistan’s
elected government has tried to put Pakistan-Afghanistan relations
on a better footing, but it is too early to say how well they
have succeeded.
Pakistanis would like to have a stable neighbor in Afghanistan,
but are increasingly skeptical that the current Afghan government
is capable of integrating the provinces bordering Pakistan
into the rather rudimentary polity that is the Afghan state.
Bad relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are nothing new.
What gives their discord such importance today is the support
Afghan insurgents are receiving from within Pakistan. Afghans
blame it on a cynical dual policy by Pakistan’s intelligence services;
others argue that it represents Pakistan’s “plan B” in case Karzai’s
government proves incapable of exercising firmer and more
constructive control. The Pakistan government hotly denies both
contentions. Pakistan considers U.S. calls for Pakistan to “do
more” about this problem unfair, considering the difficulty of
the task and Afghanistan’s inability to control its side of the
border. From Washington’s point of view, sanctuaries for Taliban
leaders in Pakistan present a mortal danger to the possibility of
a peaceful Afghanistan.
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Bad relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are nothing
new. What gives their discord such importance today is the support
Afghan insurgents are receiving from within Pakistan.
Border management leads directly to the most contentious issues
in Pakistan’s domestic politics. The Pakistan-Afghanistan border
runs along the parts of Pakistan that are the least well integrated
into the Pakistani state, including the province of Balochistan –
where insurgency has flourished off and on for more than 30 years
– and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, which have been
largely ungoverned for at least a couple of centuries. The leadership
of Afghanistan’s Taliban movement goes to Balochistan for R&R;
Pakistan’s counterpart of the Taliban movement has a kind of headquarters
in the tribal areas.
As Pakistan has tried to bring both areas under tighter control, a new
and more acute insurgency has flared up, sparking trouble not just in
these border areas but in the “settled areas” of the country. The
dividing line between the Pakistani Taliban and their Afghan counterparts
is blurry. Pakistanis across the political spectrum recognize
that the insurgency is a mortal threat to the authority of the state.
The year 2007 saw more than 1,300 people killed in militant
attacks. Suicide bombings claimed some 270 lives in the first three
months of 2008, most of them in attacks on military personnel or
installations. The army moved into the enormous Red Mosque complex
in central Islamabad in July 2007, after its radical leadership
and students amassed a large cache of arms and began conducting
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“raids” and kidnapping people off the capital’s streets. The operation
left well over 100 people dead. A radical cleric and his vigilantes held
several towns in the Swat Valley last year. While the army reclaimed
some of this territory, the test of wills is far from over.
Making Policy in an Uneasy Coalition
This was the situation that the newly elected Pakistani government
inherited when it took office in early March. The issues of reducing
the powers of the presidency and restoring the judges
Musharraf had fired in 2007 soon became a proxy for their ability
to keep the coalition together. After several crises, the secondlargest
party, the Muslim League of former Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif, pulled out of the Cabinet on May 13, 2008, promising to
continue to support the government. Musharraf ’s presence as president
tends to push the coalition together, at least for the time
being. As long as the coalition holds, Musharraf ’s power will be
limited. But there will be further crises, and Musharraf will surely
be looking for an opportunity to move back to center stage if the
elected leaders are discredited.
The one issue on which the government has tried to act is the
insurgency. Like the problems of the judiciary and of presidential
powers, it is a tightrope walk – but this time, the United States is
deeply involved. “The war on terror” is now seen as synonymous
with “America’s War” – and with Musharraf. A government whose
principal members ran as “the un-Musharraf ” recognizes that it
must find a more effective way to end the domestic insurgency.
But in doing so, it needs to establish its credibility as an independent
actor, and must show that its policy is different from those of
Musharraf and of Washington.
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“The war on terror” is now seen as synonymous with
“America’s War” – and with Musharraf.
The new government’s efforts stressed political negotiations rather
than military action. The lead role in the negotiations went to the
newly elected Chief Minister of the Northwest Frontier Province,
representing the Awami National Party, long the voice of Pashtun
nationalism and a resolutely secular party. The government concluded
a cease-fire with the leader of the Pakistani Taliban. The
jury is still out on this effort. Suicide bombings stopped for five
weeks in late March and April 2008, which was much welcomed
in Pakistan, but a couple more took place in May and, on June 2, a
car bomb hit the Danish Embassy in Islamabad. Not surprisingly,
the emphasis on negotiation is causing deep uneasiness in the U.S.
government. In fact, political negotiation is not new. Musharraf ’s
deal in Waziristan, part of the Tribal Areas, ended badly, like the
military intervention that preceded it.
Economics and Institutions
Despite its need to avoid over-identification with Washington, the
new Pakistani government wants to keep the United States engaged.
It does not want to lose U.S. economic and military assistance.
Both it and the army want to enhance the military’s counter-insurgency
capacity, a high priority for the United States military.
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Despite its need to avoid over-identification with
Washington, the new Pakistani government wants to keep
the United States engaged. It does not want to lose U.S.
economic and military assistance.
Looking further ahead, Pakistan’s high economic growth of the
past few years conceals an inadequate level of investment, both in
the Pakistani people and their productive capacity. Pakistan’s food
and electricity crises, which erupted during the election campaign,
need tending. Sustaining growth will require job creation as well as
a major jump in health and education.
The second long-term issue is the weakness of Pakistan’s civilian
institutions. Pakistan has spent over half its independent life under
military-led regimes. The army remains by far its strongest institution,
and it expects to have the dominant say on all aspects of
national policy that touch on security, including relations with
Pakistan’s immediate neighbors and with the United States.
Civilian institutions have not prospered. Pakistan’s major political
parties are family-dominated; the judiciary has been intimidated by
both military and civilian governments; and the institutions that
make government work – revenue collection, policing, civil service,
and others – are widely regarded as not up to the challenges they
face. Fixing these institutions is a long-term challenge for Pakistan.
The United States cannot do the job, but needs to play a supporting
rather than obstructing role.
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Civilian institutions have not prospered. Pakistan’s major
political parties are family-dominated; the judiciary has been
intimidated by both military and civilian governments; and
the institutions that make government work – revenue collection,
policing, civil service, and others – are widely regarded as not
up to the challenges they face.
If the elected government survives its internal contradictions, this
may be a moment when Pakistan is more amenable than usual to
institutional change. Musharraf ’s final year before the elected government
took power revolved around his efforts to regain control
of the judiciary. The issue of judicial independence has popular
steam behind it, and there may be an opportunity to strengthen
rule of law despite the questionable track record of several of
Pakistan’s current political leaders. The army appears inclined to
take something of a sabbatical from direct involvement in politics.
If the country’s institutions of civilian government can make a
fresh start, they may be more successful in the future in balancing
civilian against military needs.
Recommendations and Conclusions
Many of the interests that drive U.S. policy will remain substantially
the same, but the experience of the past seven years and the
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changed circumstances in Pakistan argue for some fresh thinking
about how best to achieve them. Three elements are key:
First, both border management and the long-term U.S. relationship
with Pakistan argue for strong connections with the Pakistan
military. The primary channel for this should be the U.S. military,
however: the United States has no interest in encouraging new
political ambitions on the part of the Pakistan military.
Counterinsurgency training and professional contacts are important
tools. In addition, a stepped-up effort at joint strategic planning
including the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan is
urgently needed for addressing Afghanistan’s insurgency. This
should ideally lead to an understanding on deployment of the foreign
forces in Afghanistan so that they can reinforce Pakistan’s
efforts at border management from the other side of the border.
A stepped-up effort at joint strategic planning including the
United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan is urgently needed
for addressing Afghanistan’s insurgency.
Second, Senator Biden’s proposal for a generous economic “democracy
dividend” for Pakistan is attractive, but needs to be coupled
with a strategic approach to Pakistan’s economy. Energy price
increases have already driven down the value of the rupee, and
Pakistan’s growth in the past few years has been very energy-intensive.
The United States could help the resulting foreign exchange
squeeze by liberalizing market access for Pakistan’s textiles. The formidable
political obstacles to textile liberalization might be man-
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ageable if the administration made the case that this was central to
our anti-terrorism goals. Our aid program should focus on job creation
and investment in Pakistan’s people.
The United States could help the resulting foreign exchange
squeeze by liberalizing market access for Pakistan’s textiles.
The formidable political obstacles to textile liberalization
might be manageable if the administration made the case that
this was central to our anti-terrorism goals.
Third, we must focus more on strengthening democracy and government
institutions. This means doing everything possible to
encourage the elected government to succeed, and working seriously
with its leaders; but not portraying any particular individual as
Washington’s favorite. Economic assistance is part of this long-term
support, as is public and technical assistance for the institutions on
which any decent government in Pakistan will depend, including
the judiciary.
The challenge for the United States will be to keep its eye on
both the Afghanistan and insurgency problems and the long-term
health of Pakistan’s democratic institutions. We cannot ignore
any of these. If Pakistan’s elected government falls apart and is
unable to manage a decent succession, the result will not be a
return to the relatively orderly days of the “old Musharraf.”
Rather, it is likely to lead to an authoritarian regime presiding
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over massive social discontent – not a recipe for an improved
policy environment.
The challenge for the United States will be to keep its eye on
both the Afghanistan and insurgency problems and the long-term
health of Pakistan’s democratic institutions. We cannot ignore
any of these.
Other U.S. policies that go beyond Pakistan will also be important.
While the time does not seem right for a major initiative on India-
Pakistan diplomacy, Washington needs to keep an eye on that
peace process, and if possible work to avoid the kind of sudden crisis
that has occurred in the past. And the overall success of U.S.
policy in Pakistan will hinge on the United States’ ability to change
the widespread perception that U.S. policy in recent years has
become anti-Muslim.
Putting this new approach in place should not wait for the new
administration. Things are moving fast in Pakistan. Reversing the
trend toward insurgency and strengthening democracy is a national
task, not one that should be linked with a particular administration.
There is no time to lose.
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