Among Dana Carvey’s most brilliant sketches on “Saturday Night Live” were his dead-perfect impersonations of President George H.W. Bush, which made a permanent contribution to America’s political language. “Not gonna do it!” Carvey-as-Bush would say. “Wouldn’t be prudent!”

What Carvey grasped is that Bush 41 was a conservative not so much by ideology as by temperament. Prudence really was one of his cardinal virtues.

Prudence went on vacation during the administration of the second President Bush, but it’s back as the hallmark of President Obama’s approach to foreign policy. And it was the underlying theme of Obama’s speech on Afghanistan last week.

You would think this would be popular. But it turns out that Obama finds himself almost alone in his effort to define a broad new middle ground in international affairs. It’s not that the center isn’t holding. It’s that most politicians don’t seem to want to go near it.

Here is the most important passage of Obama’s address: “We must chart a more centered course. Like generations before, we must embrace America’s singular role in the course of human events. But we must be as pragmatic as we are passionate; as strategic as we are resolute. When threatened, we must respond with force — but when that force can be targeted, we need not deploy large armies overseas.”

Obama is trying to get out of Afghanistan, carefully. He’s trying to put “a difficult decade” of war behind us. If he is reelected, he would chart a new course freed from the two enormous military engagements that George W. Bush undertook.

The problem for Obama is that what he sees as a grand revival of bipartisanship in foreign policy is being dismissed widely as an improvised set of split-the-difference tactical choices.

His withdrawal schedule from Afghanistan is too slow for the doves, too quick for the hawks. In the case of Libya, he’s too aggressive for those weary of American military intervention and not bold enough for those who think the United States has a moral obligation to bring down the Gaddafi dictatorship. The fact that almost all our troops will be out of Iraq by the end of the year goes unheralded.

Politically, says Rep. Jim McGovern, D-Mass., a longtime advocate of a withdrawal from Afghanistan, Obama risks being in the same position as Democrats were in 1968. Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey were held accountable for the Vietnam War while Republican Richard Nixon could seek votes by promising to end it without offering details as to how.

With so many Republicans moving to the dovish side, Obama could find himself caught in a weird pincer movement between these newly antiwar Republicans and those who will say that he squandered a chance to “win” in Afghanistan by not giving the generals time to use our surge troops during one more “fighting season.”

The administration is stuck making a case whose only virtue is that it might turn out to be right. The United States has done what it could to improve the situation on the ground in Afghanistan. We have to decide whether this commitment will end or whether there will be an endless series of “fighting seasons” in which we need to give it one more try. A political settlement is the only way out, and it’s not obvious that one more round of fighting would substantially improve the outcome of those discussions.

It’s easy, for me at least, to identify with those who want to move out faster. But Obama is not being excessively prudent to worry that a quicker withdrawal could disrupt our alliances, undo our achievements on the ground and weaken our efforts to leave a relatively stable situation behind when we do get out. Yes, wars are harder to end than to start, especially when no clean and clear victory is possible. Other people’s civil wars are like that.

There are times when Obama’s obsession with finding some sensible middle ground is deeply frustrating. In the budget talks, he has made a variety of concessions to Republicans only to have them walk out and insist on defining bipartisanship as getting whatever it is they want. Obama’s conflict avoidance has led him to default on making a case for his own domestic policies.

But his effort to find a more stable middle ground in foreign policy deserves more support than it’s getting. There are worse things than to deserve comparisons with George H.W. Bush, Dana Carvey’s brilliant barbs notwithstanding.

It’s always painful to watch a love affair go sour, as the unrealistic expectations and secret betrayals come crashing down in a chorus of recrimination. That’s what’s happening now between the United States and Pakistan, and it has a soap-operatic quality, in Washington and Islamabad alike. “How could they treat us so badly?” is the tone of political debate in both capitals.

If this were a feuding couple, you’d counsel a cooling-off period, as they recover their wounded pride and balance. And that’s probably the right advice for America and Pakistan, too. These two countries have been bitterly disappointed in the relationship — with each seemingly incapable of understanding what upsets the other — but they have overriding common interests, too.
“There are points of friction, but there is no breakdown,” says Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington who has worked hard to avert a crackup, even when that has meant challenging his own military. Most senior U.S. policymakers would agree with his assessment.

After the cooling-off period, the relationship will be different — with a greater show of respect for Pakistani independence. That’s a good thing, even from the standpoint of U.S. interests. The old embrace had become suffocating, with the Pakistani military looking to its public like a lackey of the United States. This was producing growing national shame and indignation, similar to the anger that toppled Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak.

When looking at recent events in Pakistan, it’s important to remind yourself of some basic realities:

- It’s not surprising that the Pakistanis arrested people suspected as CIA informants on the Osama bin Laden raid and other operations. Working with a foreign intelligence service (even a “friendly” one with good motives) is a no-no in any country. Just ask Jonathan Pollard, who spied for Israel and is still in a U.S. prison more than two decades later. I’m told that four of the five informants arrested in Pakistan have now been released.

- It’s not bad that Pakistani corps commanders (and some leading Pakistani journalists and politicians) are questioning the army chief of staff, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. This dissent frightens Americans who worry about proto-jihadists in the army, but that fear is overdone. Pushback against the military leadership is healthy, and Pakistan needs more of it, not less.

- It’s not wrong for Pakistanis to bristle over what they see as threats to their sovereignty. In any nation, the military is a symbol of independence and national pride. When national sovereignty is seen to be compromised — as by the raid on bin Laden’s compound and regular Predator drone attacks — people get upset. The United States should continue to take unilateral military action against threats (we have our sovereign interests, too). But secrecy in such matters is important to avoid humiliating our partner.

What should we expect from the “odd couple,” going forward?

- First, the two countries this month created what they’re calling a “joint counterterrorism task force” to oversee operations. One goal will be quicker action to avoid tipping off the enemy — as seemed to happen between the May 19 delivery of CIA intelligence about two Taliban bomb factories in the tribal areas and the June 4 Pakistani assault. This joint group is intended to satisfy Pakistani demands that the United States curb its unilateral intelligence operations.

- Second, the Pakistanis plan to end the CIA’s use of the Shamsi air base in southwest Pakistan as a staging area for Predator drone attacks. But they can’t (and won’t) stop Predator missions that originate in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the United States will keep supplying F-16s and may replace two P-3 Orion surveillance planes destroyed in a terrorist attack in Karachi last month.

- Third, Pakistani cooperation with U.S. Special Forces will continue but on a less visible scale. The Pakistanis will take over what had been a joint training mission for the Frontier Corps at Warsak, northwest of Peshawar. But over the next few months, the overall U.S. Special Forces presence will probably return to roughly what it was before the recent flap.

- Fourth, the United States will consult Pakistan as it seeks a political settlement in Afghanistan. A team working for Marc Grossman, the U.S. special representative overseeing those negotiations, recently visited Islamabad to brief officials there.

These arrangements aren’t ideal from the U.S. standpoint, but they should allow continued cooperation against a terrorist adversary that threatens both countries. And over the long run, this new framework is better than a domineering U.S. approach that has the effect of blowing up Pakistan.

DAVID IGNATIUS is a Washington Post columnist (davidignatius@washpost.com).

Source: Goerie

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

It doesn't take much to undermine a peace accord in Pakistan's tribal area.

The most recent example is the peace deal in Kurram Agency, which has a long history of Shi'ite and Sunni sectarian conflicts now compounded by the presence of extremist Sunni Taliban.

Tribal elders have invested hours of negotiations to bring the agency's warring parties to the peace table and end sectarian clashes that have sent hundreds of thousands of people fleeing into camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in other parts of Pakistan.

A key part of the deal has been promises of millions of dollars of compensation for those who have lost their relatives, property, or possessions in the upheavals. The promises have convinced many IDPs to return home and try to make a new start.

In March, the efforts seemed to have finally created a durable peace deal. Many villages celebrated with cultural events that gathered rival leaders peacefully together for the first time in years. Elders spread carpets on the snow and listened to poetry competitions in which poets rejecting the extreme way to Islam sang odes to peace.

"I don't need paradise, [and angels] but I need torches of light to dispel this darkness," said one poet, Yousaf Maranj, refuting Taliban promises to young men that suicide bombing will give them instant entry to paradise.

Broken Peace

But now this carefully crafted accord appears to be in jeopardy over incidents whose small scale only illustrates the enormity of the task of maintaining any peace for long in this volatile region.

Most recently, 12 gunmen opened fire on a caravan of three vehicles carrying members of a Shi'ite tribe from Peshawar to the Kurram Agency city of Parachinar. The ambush, near the city of Bagan, killed eight people on the spot and wounded five others who died later in hospital.

The gunmen locked up the remaining 35 passengers in two of the coaches and disappeared with them. Since then they have released just seven people -- all women and children -- while holding the others hostage in an unknown location.

Shi'ite tribal leaders in Kurram say they know the identity of the attackers and their motives. "Everybody feels sorry, but nobody is telling the truth," says Sajid Hussain Turi, a parliament deputy from the Kurram tribal area.

"The truth is that militants, the Taliban, the groups belonging to Hakimullah Mehsud, Fazal Said Haqqani, and Mullah Noor -- all of them are responsible for the failure of this truce," Turi tells RFE/RL's Radio Mashaal. "The government knows them and is in a position to start operations against them, but the security forces are not willing to root them out, and we don't know why."

Exacerbating Divisions

To many, the Taliban is the most likely suspect for two reasons. First, those killed belonged to the Turi tribe in the Kurram region, whose people have blocked Taliban militants from using their territory to cross into Afghanistan. Second, it is the Taliban that currently stands the most to gain from the chronic outbreaks of communal violence in Kurram.

Over recent months, the Taliban has increasingly moved into Kurram to avoid drone attacks in their strongholds of North and South Waziristan. At the same time, Kurram has become a key Taliban corridor for shuttling fighters and material from bases in the central Orakzai district to attack the NATO supply lines that move through the Khyber Pass to Afghanistan.

The Kurram tribal area has sectarian tensions that predate the Taliban but the Taliban has proved particularly effective at stoking them for its own ends.

Decades ago, Sunni and Shi'a lived side-by-side peacefully but this began to break down in the 1980s when former Pakistani dictator Muhammad Zia ul-Haq began allowing ethnic- and sectarian-based political parties. This made it easier for him to control a divided society but resulted in the formation of militant groups that attacked each other and secular figures.

For decades, Kurram Agency seemed generally resistant to such sectarian violence except for security alerts during the annual observance of Ashura, when Shi'ite faithful hold public processions. Instead, the feuding took such forms as sectarian rivalries to build the tallest minarets. But with the arrival of the Taliban after the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, the rivalries turned lethal.

Central Government Failure

Today, the main cities of Kurram Agency have seen the majority sect chase out the minority one, not only creating IDPs but also a siege mentality on both sides. The Sunnis control the main highway over which supplies move to all parts of Kurram and periodically ambush buses carrying Shi'a. The Shi'a, in turn, divert water that passes through their territories so it does not reach the Sunni areas.

By law, the Pakistan government is responsible for keeping roads in the tribal areas open and for assuring that resources are shared. But while Islamabad was able to do so with the support of tribal leaders when tribal society was intact, it finds it hard to do so today, even with military deployments. Since 2006, more than 937 tribal leaders have been targeted and killed both by the Taliban and by Pakistani intelligence agencies across the tribal areas, shattering the region's traditional social structures.

In an effort to push the government to act, the Shi'ite community decided after last month's ambush near Bagan to launch a "social boycott" of Islamabad. The Turi tribe said it would withhold payments on utilities until the attackers were caught and the captives released. "We decided that we will not have any links and business with the government until our hostages are freed," parliament deputy Turi says.

Promises Not Kept

Still, the failure to arrest the attackers is not the only thing people in Kurram see as Islamabad's lack of support for the peace accord.

Equally problematic is the government's slowness to deliver on its promises of financial compensation for victims of past violence in Kurram Agency. Many local leaders were able to argue successfully for peace by convincing more combative followers that there would be clear and immediate economic awards.

The government of Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani promised up to 1.5 billion rupees (some $17.5 million) to help the rehabilitation of displaced persons -- both Shi'ite and Sunni. The compensation process was to have begun on March 5.

Weeks later, the money has yet to be delivered. "They need to build their homes and those who lost their loved ones have to be paid, and so do those who have been injured," says Malik Waris Khan Afridi, chief of the Grand Jirga of Peace for Kurram. "Only then will the local people trust the jirga and believe that the truce is working."

Afridi adds that the government has now promised that the money will be paid in the next few days but that it has yet to provide any explanation for its delays.

Meanwhile, the newly appointed governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, Masud Kausar, who is also responsible for all of the tribal area, says the roads in Kurram Agency are well secured, despite the recent ambush. He said last week that he would soon drive to Kurram to show the roads were open.

The question now is whether Islamabad can move quickly enough to provide its promised support before further outbreaks of tension undermine its ability to still rescue the peace deal. Prior to the accord, violence in Kurram reached levels that Islamabad was only barely able to rein in.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

More than 1 billion people in the developing world lack access to clean water, with this number slated to rise to more than 2 billion by 2020. According to UNESCO, 2.3 billion people suffer from water-related diseases, 5 million of whom die each year. However, the burden of water scarcity is not shared equally. According to Rajendra Pachauri, chair of the intergovernmental panel on climate change (IPCC), "At one level the world's water is like the world's wealth. Globally, there is more than enough to go round. The problem is that some countries get a lot more than others. With 31 percent of global freshwater resources, Latin America has 12 times more water per person than South Asia."

Pakistan is on the dry end of the water stress spectrum. About a third of Pakistanis do not have access to safe drinking water, while a further 46% lack access to proper sanitation. However, this deficiency is not uniformly distributed. Pakistan is populated to a large extent around the Indus River that runs the length of the country. The Indus plains cover about a quarter of the country's landmass and host two thirds of its people, meaning that people living outside this region are particularly water stressed. Furthermore, according to a World Bank report, Pakistan's per capita water availability has diminished five-fold from 5000 cubic meters in 1951 to 1100 cubic meters in 2006 due to rising consumption by a growing population coupled with rising water waste.

What is even more worrisome is that of the water that is actually available, very little is safe for consumption. A study of 14,000 water sources in 24 major Pakistani districts conducted by the Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources (PCRWR) over a five-year period found that 82% of sources in Pakistan were unfit for human consumption. The major contaminants noted were bacteria, dissolved solids, nitrates and fluoride.

This worsening water crisis is having a drastic impact on public health in Pakistan. According to a UNICEF report, 20-40 percent of hospitalized patients in Pakistan suffer from water-borne infections. Several disease epidemics in Pakistan have been traced back to water contamination, including several outbreaks of the potentially fatal Hepatitis E, rotavirus diarrhea, typhoid fever and dysentery. Polio is also a water-borne infection, and Pakistan is one of the last countries on earth to continue to suffer major problems from the disease.

The sustained high levels of chemical compounds in Pakistan's drinking water supply have also caused the outbreak of population-wide poisonings. Fluoride toxicity, known to cause bone pain and deformation, has been reported from several areas of Punjab province, with a high occurrence in children. Arsenic poisoning, which causes a wide array of dangerous complications, has been reported to be present in up to 73% of the residents of Sindh province's Manchar Lake, the largest freshwater lake in Pakistan and one of the largest in Asia. Pesticide poisoning, also linked to infiltration into the water supply, has been reported in Pakistani farmers.

Pesticide poisoning, among other problems, stems from the endemic misuse of water in Pakistan. About 97 percent of Pakistan's freshwater resources are expended in irrigation and agriculture, yet Pakistan has one of the lowest productivities per unit of water and unit of land in the world. Waste is incurred at several stages: Canal heads, water courses and farms themselves all are the sites of considerable leakage. Furthermore, with Pakistan's major hydroelectric dams losing storage capacity, there is little reserve during times of famine. Pakistan is in dire need of major hydroelectric projects to increase power generation, protect against seasonal flooding, and to have greater control over the water supply. However, provincial politics has stifled this debate, halting any progress in this direction. Concerns abound about the fate and compensation for displaced people, fears of downstream provinces of a reduction in water supply. Another important issue is that most Pakistani rivers originate from Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan and India in 1960 signed the Indus Water Treaty, in which both countries agreed to abstain from any activity that would jeopardize water supply of the other. However, according to a recent U.S. Senate report, India has made several dams in Jammu and Kashmir, which "could give India the ability to store enough water to limit the supply to Pakistan at crucial moments in the growing season." Pakistani officials have argued that in doing so, India has violated the treaty, worsening the water situation in Pakistan.

The lack of access to water in Pakistan only exacerbates the country's already dire public health situation. Hand washing, for instance, is the most effective step against infection in both homes and hospitals, but hand washing practices prescribed by public health organizations are impractical in water stressed areas, with one study concluding that an extra 20 liters per person per year would be required in order to follow handwashing recommendations. Another review of medical literature found that access to potable water sources has far more of an impact on reduced infections than water quality. With a deficit in both water quality and quantity, then, public health in Pakistan faces an immense burden frrom water-related illness.

Several measures need to be taken to ward off this crisis. Water policy, currently a minor issue in Pakistan, needs to be brought to the center stage of national debate. It will remain easy for politicians to defer the contentious issue of building dams unless the masses realize the extent to which they are needed. The good work conducted by the PCRWR should be better-funded and -promoted in order to highlight problems as well as evaluate possible solutions. Water waste in agriculture and irrigation also needs to be addressed; the government must make more of an effort to line canals to prevent leakage, and further promote water efficiency on farms. To increase access of rural populations to potable water, India has developed a successful project to provide piped water and hand pumps, with a particular emphasis on improving child health -- Pakistan needs to develop a similar program. Pakistan should also make the most of the post-Cricket World Cup diplomatic thaw with India, insofar as it still exists, and ensure equitable implementation of the Indus Water Treaty. Access in arid areas such as desert regions of Sindh and practically all of Baluchistan need to be particularly improved. Promotion of hygienic practices such as boiling water to kill bacteria and appropriate sanitary practices needs to be increased to reduce water-borne infections. This can be conducted on both a national level using television programs, and on a grass root level using community health workers and prominent locals. Finally, the most long-lasting solution to improving water supply will be to slow Pakistan's population growth, which will only put further strain on reduced water supplies. Unless measures are taken now, this bubbling crisis might reach the point of overflowing.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

I've just finished reading an advance copy of Steve Inskeep's Instant City: Life and Death in Karachi, which comes out this fall. I don't much like the title, but I really enjoyed the book. I feel like I have a much better understanding of Pakistani politics now.

He takes us through a terrific journey through a sprawling, terrifying city that might be the most important place in the world right now. To my surprise, a lot of the book is about fights over land development, which gets wrapped up in ethnic and political tensions. Imagine Donald Trump as a Pashtun warlord/developer. One of the most striking sections of the book is about a man who protested the misuse/theft of park land, and the day after giving a press conference was shot in the head and killed. His successor in the save-the-park movement also was murdered.

Here are some of the other things I learned about Karachi and Pakistan.

--The military is the single largest property owner in the city, and control of land (not necessarily ownership) is the biggest game in town.

--At the time of the Pakistani independence, Karachi was majority Hindu. That changed quickly.

--Pakistan's parliament building and the Kennedy Center in Washington, D.C. had the same architect. (One more Pakistani grievance against America!)

--The city's police answer not to the mayor but to the provincial government.

--Most of the city's violence is not related to Islamic extremism.

--Karachi has 70,000 Boy Scouts

--Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, owned 200 fine English suits. Also, he was Shiite, as was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the most important leader of Pakistan since Jinnah.

--You always see news photographs of torched busses when ethnic violence breaks out because the bus business is seen as dominated by Pushtuns, and their busses are attacked in retaliation for the burning of shops.

If this book has a warning for the rest of the world, it is this: "When a growing city maintained public services and protected the public interest, then private interests had a chance to prosper. But when the public interest was neglected and the environment was debased, then private interests, too, would be steadily and inexorably destroyed."

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

How Pak, US really see each other?
By
Rob Crilly

Every Sunday a quietly spoken lawyer leads his family in a dignified protest outside the American consulate in Lahore. Mohammed Ejaz-ur-Rehman is not an activist or a rabble rouser, but his family’s tragedy — once headline news, now forgotten — is a damning indictment of US public diplomacy and a reminder of why America is hated in much of Pakistan. Almost six months ago he stood and watched helplessly as his brother, Ibad, was killed – knocked off his motorbike by a 4×4 travelling too fast on the wrong side of a busy street. It was hurtling to the rescue of a CIA agent who had shot dead two men and was in danger of being torn apart by an angry crowd.

With his rescue bungled, the spook, Raymond Davis, was arrested, sparking an excruciatingly awkward diplomatic wrangle between Pakistan and the US. The existence of a covert American operation in Lahore was problematic for a Pakistani government trying to manage widespread anti-Western anger and for an administration in Washington keen to prove its operations in Pakistan were all above board. So it was not particularly surprising when the problem — and the two murder charges — was made to go away before the public scrutiny of a trial.

The price was reportedly $2m to $3m in diyya, or blood money, paid to the relatives of the two murdered men. Davis was immediately whisked back to the US. (Although Hillary Clinton said the US did not pay the money, Pakistani officials suggested the money was stumped by Islamabad to be reimbursed by Washington later.) But that leaves Mohammed wondering whether his family will see justice. His weekly demo, he says, is not about whipping up anti-American feeling (although who could blame him if it was).

“It’s nothing to do with nationalism or Pakistan or anything else. We just want justice. We have heard a lot about American justice, but if their people do any crime overseas then something should be done about that,” he said the last time we spoke. Publicly the US says it is co-operating with inquiries. But Mohammed says the police are stymied because they cannot find the vehicle, which is now believed to be tucked away on diplomatic soil. In one family’s tragedy lies an important truth about how Washington sees Pakistan — one that provides a dangerous lesson if the US doesn’t come clean. It demonstrates exactly how the relationship between the two countries has deteriorated amid mistrust and misunderstandings into a purely transactional relationship. Money is paid when there is something that Washington wants and Pakistan is only too willing to take the cash.

In public, both countries protest the description. The US insists it is in the region for the long haul, and won’t abandon Pakistan when its troops leave Afghanistan. And Pakistan insists its commitment to tackling militancy goes beyond simply vacuuming up piles of dollars. In reality, though, Pakistan has yet to sign up fully. Its military prevaricates over an operation in North Waziristan, allowing the feared Haqqani network to clear out to safer territory, and officers tip off militant leaders when their hideouts have been rumbled. Having realised that their policy of supporting Islamist extremists has failed, they have yet to develop a new strategy of how to contain the threat. That leaves the US pumping in billions of dollars each year to assure its supply routes to Afghanistan and to allow it unfettered access to the skies for its drones programme.

Neither side likes to describe the relationship as transactional. But as Mohammed Ejaz-ur-Rehman will tell you as he stands outside the American consulate, some responsibilities are met, while others are ignored. Leaving him in the dark and refusing him justice only reinforces Pakistani suspicion that the US is only in it for the short-term.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

The army was moved into Fata by dictator Musharraf in total violation of the Quaid’s commitment with the tribesmen. The purpose of the army’s deployment, as Musharraf boasted then, was to guard against infiltration of militants from across the border into Pakistan and also to save the country from being sent back to the Stone Age by the Americans.

When we look back at all these long years of military operations in Fata we see nothing but death and destruction. We have neither stopped militants from crossing the border into Pakistan nor stopped the tribal areas from being bombarded and shelled back into the Stone Age. But in the process, the army has become bogged down in a quagmire without having any idea how to get out.

Most roads which were open for all kinds of traffic before deployment of troops in Fata have now been closed for security reasons. The few roads on which travel is allowed have numerous barriers and check posts every few miles making travelling hazardous, even during the daytime (night time travel in Fata is not permitted). It is not only cumbersome but also very risky. A small mistake can cost one one’s life or even land one in serious trouble with the army.

Having the good luck of hailing from the area I visited recently, South Waziristan, I travelled by public transport like any other tribesman to see for myself the difficulties encountered there. I travelled on the road from Tank to Wana via Gomal Zam Dam and back.

The first check post that one comes across is “Kaur police post”, taken over by the army, at the demarcation between the settled and the tribal areas. At this point, all vehicles have to be taken off the road and driven to an open field at a safe distance from the post where passengers await a security check. Here, passengers and luggage are checked after which the drivers queue up to get permission slips from the solitary czar of a sentry on duty. Only then can their vehicles proceed further on the road to Wana. While this happens all passengers, including women, children, the sick, and the elderly, stand waiting under the blazing sun with no arrangements for cold drinking water or shade.

Such checking is repeated at no less than five different places within a distance of twenty kilometres. It is not the inconvenience that overly bothers one but the humiliating behaviour of the security personnel that upsets people, particularly those travelling with their families. Isn’t it time they realised that civilians are not the scum of the earth and should be treated with due respect? They should realise that times have changed and such attitudes are no longer tolerated any where.

I had mentioned these difficulties in my article “S Waziristan as I saw it” which was published by May 3, 2010. After that, despite having received assurances from a senior military official that speedy corrective measures would be implemented, I saw no improvement upon my recent visit.
The chief of army staff is busy visiting one area after another in Fata. He takes keen interest in the development of Fata and has inaugurated various projects including the establishment of a Cadet College at Wana, widening of roads, and the construction of dams in that region. The frequency of his visits bears testimony to his interest in the development of Waziristan. This has won him the respect and admiration of the local people. While he is trying to win the hearts and minds of the tribesmen, his soldiers in that area are doing just the opposite.

They extend severe punishment on flimsy charges. The incident of a bus burning at Kaur post a year ago is still fresh in the minds of the people. The poor owner of the bus has approached every one who matters including the corps commander and the governor, but to no avail. To mitigate the injustice wreaked by his soldiers, the least the COAS can do is compensate the poor fellow forthwith.

The security personnel there also create unnecessary hurdles on the roads in the countryside, particularly between villages and the local markets. Movement of just a single soldier on the road brings traffic to a grinding halt. There is no exception made even for those who are critically ill and in urgent need of medical attention. And when there is movement of an army convoy, all hell breaks loose. Traffic is required to get off the road immediately, even at the risk of throwing the vehicle into a ravine if no other safe exit is possible. That way there may be some chances of survival but keeping the vehicle on the road may prove more dangerous. Of late, a new element has been noticed in the security personnel’s behaviour towards local people particularly those unable to speak Pashto. They treat the tribesmen with utter contempt, as potential enemies and citizens of a newly conquered territory.
The civil administration also needs to change its behaviour towards the public. Its personnel need to treat the tribesmen as respectable citizens, like elsewhere in the country. They need to make themselves accessible with minimal security restrictions rather than the ones in place these days under which the people are made to walk more than a mile through several check points before being allowed to enter official premises.

Now that the entire gamut of relations in the region is taking a new turn we should also prepare ourselves for coping with the changing situation. We should reassess our policy on the War on Terror and make a paradigm shift in finding a political solution to the problem. If the US can change its stance and work overtime to find the right kind of Taliban to talk to then why should we stick to the old ‘order’ of eliminating the militants altogether.

If the US can go from seeking a military solution to a political one for its problem in Afghanistan, then what stops us from doing the same? Why are we bent upon continuing with the use of force against our own people? Why shouldn’t we look at the problem from a fresh angle?

Again if the US can start a drawdown (retreat) of its troops from Afghanistan and hand over responsibility to the Afghans then what stops us from withdrawing our army from Fata and handing over responsibility to the tribesmen to manage their affairs with the help of the Frontier Scouts who had looked after security of that area earlier and still
enjoy a good rapport with the local people?

The government has to wake up to the new realities that are upon us. It has to take the right political decisions if it really wants to solve the problems that we face in the tribal areas. This is the only way out.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

US President Barack Obama on June 22 announced his plan to withdraw all of the 33,000 ‘surge’ troops in Afghanistan by September 2012. The plan seeking the drawdown of 10,000 troops by the end of this year and the remainder by September 2012 fell short of the slower withdrawal timetable demanded by US military commanders, which would have allowed two combat seasons, with the bulk of US forces still available.

Prior to his address, President Obama called President Asif Ali Zardari to intimate him of the details of the plan. One look at the text of his speech reveals the ominous way in which Pakistan figures in this plan for the next stage of this decade-long war. The plan marks a clear shift from a troop-heavy counter-insurgency strategy, which included large-scale military operations in the southern Taliban strongholds of Helmand and Kandahar. His speech frames the already apparent shift to a counter-terror framework, as the earlier objective of degrading the strength of the Taliban is replaced by the goal of ensuring that there is “no safe haven from which al Qaeda or its affiliates can launch attacks against our homeland, or our allies”.

This renewed focus on al Qaeda and its affiliates is likely to shift the momentum of war to eastern Afghanistan. Coming in the wake of downward spiraling Pakistan-US relations in the aftermath of the Osama bin Laden incident, this tactical shift in the US war plan in Afghanistan has some serious implications for Pakistan. Firstly, as Pakistan moves to limit US access to its military infrastructure — Shamsi Air Base etc. — and to reduce its intelligence and security presence inside Pakistan, the US is likely to enhance its troop presence and bases on the eastern Pakistan-Afghanistan border. We are likely to see an intensification of drone strikes in North and South Waziristan, and even an expansion of the strike coverage to Kurram and Mohmand agencies.

Secondly, this eastward shift in the battlefront also has implications for the fragile and reversible peace process. This essentially means that the operating strategy of talking and fighting at the same time is likely to continue. And the US will still continue to pick and choose those Taliban groups that it considers reconcilable. The peace process, for at least another year to come, is not likely to be as inclusive, as hoped by Pakistan. The al Qaeda affiliate that the US is likely to fight on the eastern Pakistan-Afghanistan border is the Haqqani network, which Pakistan hoped would be allowed to join the peace process.

During his recent visit to Islamabad, Frank Ruggiero, the US deputy special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, was asked by Pakistani officials to explain the ‘deliberate ambiguity’ and lack of clarity which shrouds the peace process. The preliminary contacts between US State Department officials and Mullah Omar’s deputy, Tayyab Agha, have also taken place outside the designated core group — Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US — constituted to undertake this very task. It is not clear how long the US will be able to keep Pakistan on board the peace process, as it moves to intensify its military campaign against those Taliban groups which Pakistan considers central to any lasting peace settlement.

Lastly, this counter-terror endeavour also ties in neatly with efforts to explain to an increasingly sceptical American public and a reluctant Congress, the necessity of signing a strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan. In the president’s words, the US intends to: “Build a partnership with the Afghan people that endures — one that ensures that we will be able to continue targeting terrorists and supporting a sovereign Afghan government.” Such an agreement would oversee the basing of a residual US military presence of approximately 25,000 troops beyond 2014 and commit to long-term economic support to the Afghan state.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

At least 90 people have been killed and scores wounded in Pakistan’s largest city, Karachi, over the last four days. The wave of violence was set in motion when a Pashtun-nationalist Awami National Party (ANP) activist was attacked on Tuesday, an act that led to another ten murders as gun battles broke out in the Orangi Town neighborhood, which has borne the brunt of the violence. Orangi Town is a lower income neighborhood located on the outskirts of the city. The grip on power in Orangi has become tenuous for the ethnic Muhajir Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), Karachi’s largest and most powerful political party, as Pashtun migrants have started to settle in the area, bolstering the ANP’s potential for power.

Politics in Karachi is a war of demographics, and ethnic capital is its most potent weapon. The MQM since its inception has always had a demographic advantage in the city, but over the years, large scale immigration from the north has slowly eroded this edge. The violent nature of politics in Karachi has meant that as land and votes become more valuable, individual lives begins to lose their worth.

The current explosion of violence is not an aberration, and is especially not new to Orangi Town. 40 people lost their lives in one day last August after MQM parliamentarian Raza Haider (elected from Orangi Town) was assassinated. But then and now, the most dangerous aspect of the violence is that much of it is arbitrary. We refer to them as “targeted killings” but most of them are not. Gunmen open fire on buses suspected to be driven by or carrying Pashtun passengers. Indiscriminate fire is opened on a marketplace because the stores may be run by Muhajirs. People are killed because of their ethnicity and appearance, yet the distinction between both sides has become so weak that anyone in the wrong place at the wrong time can be killed for wearing a Pashtun shalwar kurta, or on the other side the Muhajir staple “pant-shirt.” The majority of those killed in the last four days have been civilians caught in the crossfire or those targeted for their ethnicity alone. This wanton carnage works well for the respective political parties, as it perpetuates the propaganda that the other ethnic group is a threat to their existence and helps to establish the party’s writ in the neighborhood. The animosity between the communities increases, further entrenching the political parties within their strongholds. Local elections and the local government system have also been a source of great tension, adding fuel to the turf war.

And violence in Karachi isn’t restricted to killing. It also works as a form of economic oppression. People in Orangi Town have been rushing out of the area when they have an opportunity, as many businesses are closed, and the area’s residents have trouble acquiring basic necessities. This indirect pressure works to drive people out of an area, “cleansing” it, if you will. The financial losses suffered during violence and strikes in Karachi is staggering. Both ethnic groups are affected by this kind of economic warfare, and find themselves pushed out of their respective areas.

The use of violent acts such as the burning of vehicles, stoning of cars, and the destruction of other property has become an accepted form of protest in this city. Violence is used as a political tool, and no party has made a serious effort to remove it from their repertoire. The MQM is commonly blamed as the dominant perpetrator of violence and extortion in the city, and it has become clear that in order to compete, other parties feel that they have to play the same game. Every major party in Karachi has militant tendencies, and the city is armed to the teeth. From the top politicians, landowners and industrialists to the foot-soldiers of the underworld, guns are more visible than the national flag.

The de-weaponization program that was drawn up by the provocative former Home Minister Zulfiqar Mirza was shelved along with his post in April this year. A Deputy Superintendent of the police (DSP) told me that he has yet to see a government in Karachi that is willing to initiate such a program. Before the city can be disarmed, the assumption that one’s political party can police it’s own stronghold must disappear. In a city of approximately 15-20 million people, a force of thirty-thousand underpaid and ill-equipped police are expected to keep the peace, while a substantial amount of them are tasked specifically with protecting VIPs. Yet the police force has at the same time become politicized, because political parties don’t allow the police to function in an independent capacity. The veteran DSP I mentioned earlier told me that he can only recall one Inspector General of Sindh province, Jahangir Mirza, who was not appointed on a purely political basis and was willing to stand up to powerful, landed, politicians.

The one question that eludes many is how much direct control the upper echelons of the political parties have over the lower cadres. When it is time for a strike, the top leadership has the power to mobilize the entire party to observe and carry out the strike. Is it logical, then, to assume that the control over political violence is the same? Probably not, as so much of the violence is arbitrary, and unrest often provides an excuse to settle many personal and very localized enmities or disputes. Amidst the fog of this particular war, the answer remains elusive.

This spate of violence has revolved around ethnic and political tensions. A week earlier the clashes were of a more sectarian nature. But even though the vast majority of people in Karachi, regardless of their religious sect or ethnicity don’t have an interest in the conflict, they are beholden to the interests of the powerful. And Karachi residents have grown tired of having their productivity brought to a halt every few weeks. This year a stunning 490 people have been killed in targeted killings, according to the Human Rights Commission for Pakistan (the BBC reported this week that 1,100 people had been killed this year in Karachi).

The political violence in the city always dies down, but it is never because a political solution has been achieved. It dies down because pitched battles in the streets are not sustainable, not because political parties have laid down their arms. It only comes to a halt when the parties reach the threshold where their own communities start to question their credibility. The resilient — yet, at times, resigned — residents on the streets and in police stations cynically say, “martial law is the best revenge.” It is tragically ironic that there is already martial law in Karachi; it’s just not the army that is in charge of it.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

According to one alarming estimate, more than 4,000 Pakistanis have died in incidents of sectarian violence in the country in the past two decades. However, there is hope that the violent attacks can still be made to subside if the government becomes more involved in establishing a culture of pluralism and tolerance among Pakistanis, while also encouraging them to bridge the sectarian divides in their society.

Sectarian violence in Pakistan has traditionally been linked to clashes between members of the Shiite and Sunni communities in the country. Shiites account for around 20 percent of Pakistan’s mostly Sunni Muslim population of 180 million. Tensions between the two sects began to surface in the 1980s, partly as a consequence of the grievances held by Sunni peasants against Shiite landowners in the Punjab Province.

This primarily economic divide assumed sectarian dimensions when the supporters of local Sunni cleric Haq Nawaz Jhangvi – who later founded the militant organization Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (Army of the Friends of the Prophet) – emphasized the cultural and ideological differences between the Sunni peasants and the Shiite landowners. Their differences were further accentuated with the formation of both Sunni and Shiite militant groups that claimed to defend their respective brands of Islam by waging an armed struggle against members of the other group. This was especially visible during the years in power of the late Pakistani President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, who brought a strict and conservative interpretation of Islamic law into the Pakistani political system.

Furthermore, flaws in Pakistan’s education system have also helped exacerbate the overall climate of sectarian tension. Unregulated madrasas, or religious schools, preaching sometimes extreme interpretations of Islam, sprouted across the country, with the government doing little to address the situation. The violent conflict in 2007 that developed with the Jamia Hafsa seminary, which was adjacent to the Lal Masjid in Islamabad, and the group’s demand for the imposition of a particular interpretation of Islamic law is a case in point.

But sectarian violence in Pakistan is not confined to the Shiite-Sunni split. Ahmadi Muslims, who believe the second advent of Jesus came in the person of the 19th century Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, have also endured persecution and violence. The worst of this claimed 95 lives in a coordinated attack on two Ahmadi mosques in Lahore on May 28.

But what is peculiar is that the evolving face of sectarian terrorism in the country has not spared the majority of Pakistani Sunnis who follow the Barelvi school of Muslim thought. This is a sub-sect within Sunni Islam that defends long-established cultural practices associated with Sufism.

Blamed mostly on the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Student Movement of Pakistan), the 2010 attacks on Sufi shrines, including Lahore’s Data Darbar shrine, Karachi’s Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine, and later the Baba Farid Shakar Ganj shrine in the city of Pakpattan in Punjab – all of which together claimed the lives of at least 59 people – clearly indicate that the issue of sectarian violence has assumed even more complicated dimensions and requires effective and immediate countermeasures.

While there are various measures that the Pakistani government can take to tackle the issue of sectarian aggression, a clear education policy with a special focus on reforming the curricula in schools is very important in diverting focus from sectarian to inclusive teachings. Any public or religious school textbooks promoting biases or hatred on the basis of religious identity should be reviewed by an independent commission to evaluate whether it is suitable for the promotion of tolerance amongst children.

Moreover, given the fact that religious leaders and clerics enjoy considerable influence over individual Pakistanis, the government should encourage them to play a constructive role in preaching religious tolerance. Religious-based political parties should also be urged to promote religious tolerance and, given Pakistan’s particular scenario of religious diversity, promote harmony between Islam’s sects in particular.

At the same time, the state should recognize the diverse religious communities and ensure their fundamental constitutional rights of equality in all spheres of life. Discriminatory laws such as the blasphemy laws and the law declaring Ahmadis to be non-Muslims have fomented hatred and violence against certain religious communities and should be revisited.

These measures, if adopted, can create a change in the way people view one another, provided the state also offers effective governance. Reforming the country’s education system, employing the services of religious leaders to spread the message of tolerance and restoring equal rights for all Pakistani citizens by repealing discriminatory statutes are some basic steps that can help the government establish a culture of pluralism and tolerance, while also fostering empathy among people with different religious beliefs.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins