A Tainted Legacy

[Muskan Ghuman]

A tainted legacy

By Dr Iffat Idris

In less than a decade, Anwar Sadat had traveled the tortuous journey from being the hero who had dared to take on the military might of Israel, to the traitor who sold the dream of pan-Arabism at Camp David. The 25th anniversary this year of his assassination remained virtually unmarked, and not without reason

THE year 2006 marks the 25th anniversary of the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. The day of that gory event, October 6, happens to be a double anniversary; the other event being the 1973 Egyptian attack on Israel, which is also known as the Yom Kippur War. It is an irony of some dimension that while the war had made Sadat a hero in the eyes of Egyptians, Arabs and Muslims across the world, it was many of these very people who celebrated the assassination as well. Taking place in the space of less than ten years, the transformation from one to the other was marked and dramatic. The impact of Sadat's policies during that period is being felt in Egypt to this day.

The third President of Egypt, Anwar el-Sadat, hailed from humble stock: half-Egyptian, half-Sudanese, he was one of thirteen siblings. His father was a clerk in a military hospital. Sadat's break came with entry to the military academy, followed by a posting where he met Gamal Abdul Nasser. Sadat's association with Nasser eventually led to him becoming vice-president under Nasser and, following the latter's death in 1970, to the presidency.

Gamal Abdul Nasser's rule was anything but uneventful. Nasser's personal charisma made him a natural leader. His nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 and success in foiling Israeli-European attempts to retake it raised him to hero status. Internationally, Nasser took Egypt close to the Soviet Union and the Non-Aligned Movement. At home he practised socialism and secularism. Ultimately, however, the 1967 Six Day War in which Israel was able to inflict a terrible revenge on Egypt became his legacy.

Sadat inherited an Egypt utterly crushed by the military might of Israel, still in control of the Suez, but having lost the Sinai Peninsula. It was a humiliated country by all means. Socialism had failed to deliver economic well-being for all; and enforced secularism was encountering strong resistance from the conservative masses. Sadat's response was to steadily move the country in another direction. He ditched socialism in favour of capitalism; abandoned secularism and courted Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood to win popular support. Abroad, Moscow's failure to acknowledge, let alone accede, to Egyptian requests for military assistance caused Sadat to turn away from the communist superpower.

As with Nasser, however, it was a war with Israel that led to Sadat being lauded across Egypt and the wider Arab and Muslim worlds. Upon becoming President, Sadat had openly offered Israel a peace treaty if it returned the Sinai. When the Israelis didn't take up the offer, he opted to take it back by force. On October 6, 1973, Egypt carried out a daring and effective attack on Israeli troops in the Sinai, pushing them back and recapturing part of the peninsula. The Israelis were subsequently able to rally and retake some land, at which point a ceasefire was agreed, but the initial coup was enough to make Sadat a hero.

Having lost three wars to Israel, in most cases resoundingly, there was a widespread perception in the Arab world that Israel was invincible. The 1973 war shattered that image and made people realize that Israel could be defeated. For Egyptians, Arabs and Muslims, Sadat's success replaced pessimism and fear with hope and a new morale; it replaced humiliation with pride. The importance of October 1973 thus stretched far beyond military achievements and territorial conquests.

Within a few years, however, Sadat had changed his tune. Faced with economic problems at home, unrest and riots, he saw peace with Israel and the consequent 'peace dividend' as the solution to his problems. It would also turn international concern about Egypt's domestic situation into strong support for his 'peace-making' government. As a prelude to his shift to the US-Israel camp, Sadat ended Egypt's Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union.

In 1977 he declared he would be willing even to address the Israeli Knesset (parliament) if this could bring peace. Menachim Begin invited him to do just that, and in November 1977 Anwar Sadat made history by being the first Arab leader to speak in the Knesset. Thereafter the momentum for peace rapidly gathered pace. In 1978 Sadat, Begin and US president Jimmy Carter agreed on the Camp David Accords, and in 1979 Egypt signed its historic peace treaty with Israel, formally recognizing the Jewish state.

In the West, Sadat's peace initiative won him lavish praise and, along with Begin, the Nobel Prize for Peace. It also led to the return of the Sinai, and to massive US military and other aid for Egypt. Indeed, between 1979 and 2003, Egypt was the second largest recipient of US military aid, with only Israel getting more.

In the Muslim world, however, reaction could not have been more different. Sadat's actions were seen as total betrayal of the Arab world, and particularly of the Palestinian people. Sadat had recognized a state created out of land stolen from the Palestinians. He had made peace with those responsible for the deaths of thousands of Arabs, and for turning thousands more into refugees. By signing a treaty with Israel, Sadat implicitly condoned those actions.

Furthermore, he had abandoned the pan-Arabism and united Arab front promoted by Nasser, in favour of unilateral negotiations and agreement. While the US rewarded Egypt for recognizing Israel, the other Arab countries were left high and dry. Without Egypt's military power they lacked the clout to force Israel to make concessions to the Palestinians. The fact that Sadat had only sought concessions for Egypt, notably the return of Sinai, and nothing for the Palestinians also fuelled rage. The Arab League showed its anger by suspending Egypt's membership, and moving its offices from Cairo to Tunis. [Egypt was not re-admitted until 1989.]

If Sadat had hoped peace with Israel would solve his domestic problems, he was proven very wrong. Despite a government-run referendum that showed 99.5 per cent support for the peace deal, the reality was that most Egyptians shared the sentiments of their Arab and Muslim brothers abroad. Furthermore, most didn't see any of the promised economic benefits. Sadat fostered a culture of corruption and poor governance that meant foreign aid went into the hands of the rich. As the rich-poor gap widened, discontent increased.

Opposition came from all parts of the political spectrum and all social groups: the left, the right, the Christians, the Islamists, the academics, the journalists, the students, the workers and so on. Sadat was almost universally loathed. His response was repression: thousands were arrested and tortured, freedom of expression was curtailed, and sham referendums were held purporting to show massive support for the regime. In September 1981 some 1,600 people were arrested, leading to widespread international condemnation.

Not surprisingly, the Islamists that Sadat had patronized in the early days of his rule became among the most vocal critics of his government. They were angry both at Sadat's betrayal of the Arab-Palestinian cause by recognizing Israel, and at his neglect of the needs of ordinary Egyptians. Sadat targeted the Muslim Brotherhood in his arrests and repression. But, in a desperate attempt to win back Islamist support, he also announced Shariah rule in Egypt.

The total failure of this strategy became clear on October 6, 1981, at the official commemoration of the Yom Kippur War. As Sadat reviewed a military parade, flanked by members of his government, senior army personnel and foreign diplomats, a group of soldiers launched grenades and opened fire on the presidential stand. One of the soldiers, Khalid Islambouli apparently shouted 'Death to Pharaoh' as he ran towards Sadat and fired on him. The death toll in the ensuing gunfight came to seven. Among the dead were the Cuban ambassador, a Coptic bishop and the Egyptian president; 28 others were wounded.

Sadat had been killed by the Islamists. Some 300 were indicted in the trial of Islambouli, among them a doctor called Ayman Al-Zawahiri. Islambouli was executed in April 1982; Al-Zawahiri was released in 1984. He traveled to Afghanistan, joined Osama bin Laden and the rest, as they say, is history.

Maybe a little beside the point but relevant to the overall discussion is the fact that Sadat's initial patronage of Islamic groups to garner popular support, only to belatedly realise that he had let the genie out of the bottle, has since been repeated by others. The United States, for instance, patronized the mujahideen in Afghanistan to defeat the Soviet Union, only to find itself two decades later facing Al-Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks.

Anwar Sadat's funeral showed just how much the complexions of public sentiment towards him had changed since he assumed power. Three former American presidents, Ford, Carter and Nixon, were present: Reagan only stayed away because of security fears. Such a strong US representation was a testimony to Sadat's elevated standing in the West. By contrast, in the Arab-Muslim world he had gone from being the hero of 1973 to the traitor who did a deal with Israel. With the exception of Sudan's Gaafer Nimery, not a single Arab leader attended Sadat's funeral. On the streets of Cairo life went on as normal: people prepared for the forthcoming Eid festival as if nothing had happened. Those who had seen the tumultuous crowds at Nasser's funeral could really appreciate the contrast. In many parts of the Muslim world, Sadat's death was actually celebrated with distribution of sweets.

Looking at Egypt today, 25 years on, the impact of Sadat's policies and decisions is still very apparent. Sadat was succeeded by his vice-president, Hosni Mubarak. He has managed to win every single presidential election since 1981 and rule uninterrupted for a quarter century. The key to his success is not brilliant governance and overwhelming popular support, but a continuation of the political control and repression practised by Sadat. Egyptian democracy could at best be described as very flawed: a less generous description would be sham.

Sadat's dramatic swing away from the left and socialism produced "an anomalous form of capitalism ruled by corruption, speculation, the plunder of public money and the absence of accountability, not least among the apparatuses of the state". [Al-Ahram Weekly, October 5-11, 2006]. Economic development, administration and government in Egypt continue to follow the same pattern: corruption is endemic, no questions are asked, the rich grow richer, the masses poorer and more desperate.

Public disillusionment with government and opposition political parties is rife, leading many to turn towards the Muslim Brotherhood. The Islamists represent an outlet for those angry at Egypt's relations with the US and Israel and frustrated by their socio-economic situation. Like Sadat, Mubarak has made Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood particular targets. Thousands of Islamists have been arrested, detained and tortured on Mubarak's watch. The fact that they are Islamists, as opposed to secular political opponents, has muted international - basically Western - criticism of his actions.

Little, if anything, has changed within Egypt then, but what of the Middle East? Has time proven Sadat to be a visionary, a self-serving traitor or a fool?

Those who would answer 'visionary' would cite the peace process embarked on by the Palestinians under Yasser Arafat, which eventually led to the Palestinian Authority recognizing the state of Israel, and Arafat, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres being awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace. Jordan is the other Middle Eastern player that has since signed a peace treaty with Israel. There have even been rumours of Pakistan thinking about recognizing the Jewish state. With so many following in Sadat's footsteps, surely he was right to make peace with Israel, or was he?

The counter-argument to this, of course, is that Sadat's action so weakened the Arab front against Israel that they were incapable of forcing concessions from Tel Aviv. The only pragmatic option left was to make peace and try to negotiate something that way. The other argument is that recognizing Israel has yielded at best very limited dividends - especially when it comes to securing a permanent homeland for the Palestinians. One after the other Israeli governments continue to use peace processes as a front to expand settlements in the Occupied Territories, and limit the land they will return IF a permanent agreement is ever reached with the Palestinians. More disturbing, they continue to oppress and violate the human rights of the Palestinian people.

Armed struggle against Israel might not be the answer, but experience to date suggests that making peace with the Jewish state isn't either. So far it is a failed strategy.

Pan-Arabism has never recovered from the blow dealt by Sadat. Again, in his defence, one could argue that Arab unity was a transient phenomenon even at its peak, with countries more motivated by their individual interests than the wider Arab/Palestinian cause. The case for the prosecution would be that pan-Arabism at least had a chance of success. However small, there was a possibility that the Arab countries would be able to forge a united stance against Israel (not necessarily military: political and economic) which, given their oil trump card, might have forced Tel Aviv to be accommodating instead of being belligerent. Thanks to Sadat's unilateral deal with Israel, this became impossible.

The irony is that, even in Egypt, over a quarter-century after the Camp David Accords, Israel is still not accepted by the people of the country. Anti-Israel demonstrations on the streets of Cairo during the recent Lebanese war provided ample proof of the depth of anger and resentment towards the Jewish state. Sadat's 'peace legacy' has not even survived in his own country, let alone the wider Middle East.

Whether he was motivated by a genuine belief that his treaty with Israel was the way to permanent peace in the Middle East, or whether he saw it as a means to reap a bonanza for Egypt and bring prosperity to its people, the fact is that it yielded neither. Anwar Sadat's legacy is a culture of political repression and corruption within Egypt; outside, a strengthened Israel and continued conflict in the Middle East. Little wonder his death anniversary remained virtually unmarked.