March 30, 2012
By: khawaja Rahat Latif

There is no oil and gas in Pakistan. The water issue is becoming more pronounced. About 40 percent of population is living below the poverty line. Likewise, 40 percent of the population is uneducated. While some of our parliamentarians have fake degrees, the Chief Minister of Balochistan has remarked that a “degree is a degree, irrespective of its genuineness”. But, with so many setbacks, why is the US so interested in Pakistan?

At the time of independence in 1947, the world was ruled by two blocks: Western and Eastern. The Eastern Bloc comprised communist countries with unified command of armed forces maintained as Warsaw Pact. The Western consisted of capitalist countries with the unified command of Nato. Pakistan became part of the Western Bloc. Being a newly-born country, it became a source of attraction for the USA, who was in the lead in the power struggle against the Soviet Union that led the Eastern Bloc. The Americans set their goal to strengthen Pakistan so as to fight against the communists.

The Americans were sure that Pakistan being an Islamic country would get into battle with it, purely on the grounds of faith, believers vs. non-believers. Thus, Baghdad Pact – later known as Cento and Seato – was signed by Pakistan as Military Pact; for which it received military aid from the US. World War II vintage equipment was replaced and needs of the armed forces were modernised. The Kashmir dispute led to the Indo-Pak war in 1965 after which the Americans imposed sanctions on Pakistan for using these weapons in self-defence. They took the plea that the military aid was meant to be used against the Soviet Union and not India. This was the first setback in our relationship with the US. It made us look towards China, who replaced all equipment destroyed or damaged in 1965 war, free of cost. Pakistan did not learn from the experience and again fell into USA’s lap.

The US continued to gain ground in its relationship with India and supported it, when in 1971 India attacked East Pakistan in support of Mukti Bahini, thus dismembering Pakistan. In spite of being our allies, the US did not help us.

The Soviets attacked Afghanistan in 1979. In order to defend our borders Pakistan helped Afghanistan by raising a sizeable force of mujahideen. Finding advantage in it, the US again started to provide military aid to Pakistan. Thus, came in military equipment to the ISI, who was controlling the war. All supplies, including funds for the war in Afghanistan, were handed over to the ISI; a firm policy by General Zia! The US was not allowed to establish direct contact with the mujahideen.

When India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, Bhutto pledged to go nuclear. By the time the Soviets withdrew, Pakistan had become a nuclear power. Long live Dr A.Q. Khan and his team of scientists!

The crucial question is: Why did the US allow Pakistan to make the bomb? Possibly, because it did not expect that Pakistan could make it. When India exploded nuclear device on May 11 and 13, 1998, Mian Nawaz Sharif, in spite of immense international pressure, boldly went ahead and exploded nuclear device on May 28 and 30, 1998. Our atomic wizards pursued the missile programme and today, no target worth the name in India is out of their range. We have well defined and well defended nuclear assets. Our command system has ensured that they remain in safe hands.

To make India powerful to contain China, it wants to denuclearise Pakistan. And the only way to do it is to weaken our army and ISI. After remaining our ally for so long, the US is hitting us in the back. Our leadership must remain firm in guarding our interests. The 18 million people of Pakistan will firmly stand behind it.

The writer is a retired major general and managing director of Pakistan Education Network (A Project of Ministry of Education).
-The Nation

March 31, 2012
By: Inayatullah

The US-Pakistan relations, to quite an extent, kept on hold till Parliament makes up its mind on the report submitted by its Committee on National Security, have suddenly hit centre stage. Highest level meetings between the US and Pakistan military commanders have taken place. General James Matts, Chief of Staff US Central Command, and General John R. Allen, the top commander in Afghanistan, met General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani in Islamabad for the first time since the US war planes killed 24 Pakistani soldiers last November at the Salalah military post. US President Barack Obama met Pakistan Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani in South Korea and exchanged notes about mutual concerns. Also, the US Special Envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Marc Grossman, called on President Asif Zardari at Dushane in Tajikistan during a regional heads of state conference. A statement has also come from the US Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin E. Dempsey, who said: “We want to rebuild the trust and confidence between our two militaries.”

President Obama wants a “balanced” review of relations between the two countries based on an approach that respects Pakistan’s sovereignty and takes care of American security interests. Washington is keen to see the Nato supply line restored in Pakistan and is also bent on continuing with the unmanned drone strikes. The latest from our Foreign Office, too, emphasises the crucial importance of good relations between USA and Pakistan. Stated the Foreign Office spokesperson, Abdul Basit, the other day: “We attach immense importance to meeting in Dushanbe (Zardari-Grossman) and at the highest level in Seoul (Gilani-Obama). These meetings reflect very clearly that Pakistan and USA care about their bilateral relations. So, we are looking for the resumption of normal relations following the completion of the parliamentary process, which is currently underway. On the issues of drone attacks and reopening of the Nato supply routes, I think we should better wait as to what policy directions Parliament finally gives us.”

Soon after his return from South Korea, the Prime Minister has held an important meeting with the top civil and military leadership, including General Kayani and DG ISI Zaheerul Islam. Also present in the meeting were Maulana Fazalur Rehman and the PML-N leaders in the Senate and National Assembly, Ishaq Dar and Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan. The meeting is reported to have sought to incorporate some of the opposition’s reservations and suggestions voiced by them on the floor of Parliament and outside in press conferences.

On March 29, a White House official told reporters that the Obama-Gilani meeting was “positive” in both tone and substance. He said: “The tone was one of mutual respect and a sincere intent in gaining a better understanding of each other’s respective positions.”

While Washington has been patiently waiting for the Pakistani Parliament’s debate and recommendations, a joint session of the two houses has been treating the matter rather casually. According to newspapers reports, the security committee had finalised its task by mid-January. Of course, there was a need for taking a serious notice of the restarting of target killings in Karachi and violent protests, and also against prolonged loadshedding, the delay in reviewing and finalising the recommendations of the Raza Rabbani Committee betrays a deliberate design to drag feet and mark time. It may well have something to do with the unrelenting and widespread anti-American public sentiment.

The PML-N’s apprehensions as voiced by Chaudhry Nisar relate to the government’s doubtful credentials with regard to previous parliamentary resolutions. The government appears to be inclined to reopen the Nato supply lines and also let the drone attacks continue, subject to certain conditions. The crucial question, however, is: Will Parliament be able to come to an agreed basis on these two counts? The Prime Minister’s meeting with the civil and military high-ups appears to be an attempt to prepare the ground for arriving at some sort of consensus.

Another point that needs to be resolved is the reference in the parliamentary report about the operations of private American contractors in Pakistan. The very fact that this matter has been included in the report implying acceptance of such activities by foreign agents indicates an unacceptable and compromising mindset. How can a sovereign country agree to such objectionable covert activities by outsiders? Whatever is finally decided, it is of the imperative that the resetting of the terms of engagement must be in the form of written agreements. The process of cart blanche given by Musharraf and its continuation by a weak-kneed NRO-tainted and vulnerable government, must give place to a firm and clearly worded set of commitments on both sides that should be open to review periodically. The opposition’s fears as indicated by Chaudhry Nisar are well taken. It would be desirable also to have a joint government and opposition standing committee charged with the task of monitoring the way the new terms of engagement are implemented.

The basis of the rebuilding of ties between the two countries should not be the monetary gain for the weaker party (Pakistan), but a clear recognition of mutual interests. As Imran Khan puts it: “We can no longer afford to have a master-client (slave) relationship. We, of course, can have friendly ties and respect for each other’s concerns.” Indeed, the complex end game in Afghanistan cannot be successfully played out without taking care of Pakistan’s interests. The US has, to a considerable extent, been treating Pakistan shabbily. The very idea of hyphenating Pakistan with Afghanistan was based on downgrading the status of Pakistan coining the odd title for it as AfPak. The fact of the matter is that Pakistan has been used roughly and even callously. It has suffered heavily in terms of human and financial cost. Its economy has been ruined and society weakened and destabilised. There is much sense in what Imran Khan has been saying for a long time. Yes, the anti-state faction of the Taliban and the foreign elements must be dealt with firmly, but we cannot afford to continue fighting with our own erstwhile patriotic Pakistanis living in the tribal areas. The whole question of fighting terrorism needs to be reviewed in depth in a statesmanlike manner with the aim of safeguarding our own national interests. It is time we make the international community recognise our concerns and constraints.

At the same time, we cannot afford to isolate ourselves in an increasingly interdependent world. What is needed is a clear-eyed and balanced approach to our numerous external and internal challenges. The political opposition has its job cut out to intelligently act as a watchful monitor to keep a weak, wayward and unpredictable government on course.

The writer is an ex-federal secretary and ambassador, and political and international relations analyst.

Email: pacade@brain.net.pk
-The Nation

March 31, 2012
Zafar Hilaly

Opposition to restoring Nato’s supply route within the country is so widespread that it seems to transcend party and province, young and old, rich or poor. The handful in favor hardly counts. And, clearly, if the transit facility is restored there will be hell to pay and far beyond what the beleaguered Zardari government or the military can withstand, which is why the matter landed up in parliament in the first place.

The fact is that Pakistanis have had it up to their gills with slurs, US hectoring, drones, civilian deaths, Raymand Davis, ‘do more’, Osama, Dyne corporation, Blackwater, Special Ops, CIA spies in various garbs, renditions, Guantanamo, Bagram, Balochistan, Salala, Shakil Afridi, Afia Siddiqa, etc, etc. And rather than continue being robbed of their self -respect and, if you like, their own vanity, they seem to feel enough is enough. Better, therefore, they believe, to admit that the Pak-US relationship has suffered an irretrievable breakdown than to beat about the bush trying to revive what is already dead.

Public anger in Pakistan is not merely a reflection of the anti-Americanism so widely prevalent here, but is as much, if not more, directed at the craven attitude of successive governments when dealing with Washington. And, equally, the double-dealing in which both Washington and Islamabad have indulged when interacting with each other. In the public’s view it’s better for both to make a clean breast of things. And, if the relationship is to continue, then it must be done on an entirely new footing.

It’s all thanks to Obama that matters have reached such a pass. A quick apology and generous compensation after Salala would have cost him little. We would have accepted it and both sides could have moved on. He got it wrong and read us wrong; and now both sides must face the consequences.

Some will say that a rupture in US-Pak relations was bound to happen anyway because there was already such a lot of pent up ill will, reinforced by duplicity and an inexcusable disregard for the other’s sensibilities. Perhaps, but the two countries had somehow managed to stave that off and, with the endgame in sight in Afghanistan, they might have just been able to trudge along for the two years or so that are left before the US withdrawal. But all that is water under the bridge.

Of course, there are those who will point out that notwithstanding the gauche and crude displays of muscle power by the US, Pakistan cannot afford to take on the Americans and, hence, we have no alternative but to muddle along somehow – swallowing insults and, at the same time, safeguarding our interests as best we can. But that’s a tactic that has been tried all too often and failed. Besides, as we Pakistanis have discovered, the meek do not always inherit the earth not unless they are prepared to fight notwithstanding meekness.

Parliament may not have thought through the impact on relations of denying the US the land transit route (if indeed it does) or how America may react but this government (both the Foreign Office and the military) has had plenty of time to do so. They should therefore have a plan B.

What could that be? America’s need of Pakistan’s cooperation both to get out of Afghanistan and/or to stay on in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s need of American goodwill and assistance, most of all economic help to get out of the morass in which it has landed itself – that’s reason enough to continue the relationship and chart a mutually acceptable course of action for the future.

And lest we forget, we need the Americans (on a re-set basis) also for the Afghan endgame. No amount of aid, fiscal or monetary trickery will save us from the economic consequences of a political and military collapse in Afghanistan. Pakistanis in general get carried away without realising the consequences of their action until it is too late. That’s how we got into the Afghan mess in the first place. We must not make the same mistake again.

As to what the US can do to teach us a lesson for being so difficult? Short of an invasion of Pakistan there is little it can do. Sanctions won’t work; they never did in our case. The pittance that Kerry-Lugar offers in contrast to the $60 billion the American led war has cost us is small change. Even unleashing American drones against the Haqqanis et al won’t help while it would play into the hands of the Taliban with sinister consequences for the security of both countries.

In the circumstances, it’s better for the US to call off drone strikes under a moratorium while both sides reset and test out a revised relationship for the year ahead, as election campaigns pick up pace on both sides. They can revisit their ties early next year. Politically it will greatly strengthen the hands of our military and those who want to maintain ties with the US, which are going to be important for the Afghan endgame talks and also as the US winds down its combat role.

Hence both sides should gravitate towards a truce on drones this year as a tentative first and see how the ties proceed. The US does not lose much on the ground (Al-Qaeda has been hit hard already) while it would make it easier on Pakistan to reset ties-on a trial basis, of course.

The Nato supply line can also be reworked to facilitate US military hardware withdrawal, which is mainly why they need a land route, apart from fuel supplies. So a hybrid temporary stop-gap solution should be found to tide over 2012. Then both sides, after emerging from their respective elections, can explore a longer relationship if that’s possible or needed by then.

A moratorium by the US on drone strikes could be a quid pro quo for more Pak cooperation on the ground and land access to facilitate Isaf withdrawal. The anti-American lobby can’t have it both ways especially if land access to facilitate withdrawal of heavy equipment is the main reason for allowing access.

April, especially its second half, is going to be an important time, when a flock of senior American officials are expected to descend on Pakistan for detailed talks after the parliamentary review is over.

America can hurt us if we act too tough or play hard ball out of spite or over play our cards. And it is not as if we stand to benefit from the chaos that will follow after a breakdown of ties-hardly. But that will be the reality if both sides are unable to reset even on a temporary basis the current impasse in their relationship.

So a moratorium on drones in return for limited land access to Isaf mainly for the withdrawal of its heavy combat equipment from Afghanistan might be a way out this year. Otherwise we may well end up with a more complicated crisis. That’s too serious a matter to be taken lightly by both sides.

In any case, it should by now be self-evident that American and Pak strategic interests are no longer congruent and that the sooner we recognise this and shape the course of our respective foreign policies accordingly, the less room there will be for misunderstandings and heartburning in the future.

In this regard it is not America that has lingered or tarried but we, and in particular the military, that seems as ever infatuated with the American alliance. But that so called alliance has worked itself out to the dismay and disgust of both sides. Only a new relationship, based on hard ground realities, will make sense.

The writer is a former ambassador. Email: charles123it@hotmail.com

-The News

A wobbly begining

Babar Sattar
March 31, 2012

The writer is a lawyer based in Islamabad.

Parliament’s oversight of Pakistan’s relationship with the US bodes well for democracy and civilian control of the military. But to ensure that this epochal initiative is potent and consequential, the report of the parliamentary committee headed by the able Sen Raza Rabbani must be subjected to constructive scrutiny. Such review elicits at least four sets of observations: no effective mechanism is prescribed to give effect to parliament’s will in relation to national security and foreign policy; the proposed procedure for approving agreements related to national security falls foul of our constitutional scheme of separation of powers; solicitation of non-government expert advice by the committee could have added to the rigor of its consultation process; and the substance of the recommendations seems fluffy on the one hand and self-conflicting on the other.

Once bitten twice shy, they say, and rightly so. Every time the ruling civilian regime or the military high command is in trouble it takes refuge behind parliament’s will. There is a pattern here. The parliament earnestly considers the matter amidst a wider national debate and passes resolutions reflecting public opinion. The executive uses such resolutions only to acquire negotiation leverage in dealing with the US and other international counterparts, cuts its own deal and then disregards the collective will of the parliament. This practice undermines the authority and relevance of the parliament, disregards the will of the people and is turn breeds cynicism against democracy.

When nothing became of the many resolutions passed by the parliament identifying the contours of the internal and external aspects of a desirable national security policy, can you blame one for being skeptical about the utility of this latest exercise? Parliament must begin to distinguish between occasions that call for resolutions and those that require legislation. No parliamentary resolution will prevent a desperate ruling regime from cutting secret deals when arm-twisted by powerful international actors.

A carefully drafted and deliberated law that provides a permanent mechanism to approve and validate Pakistan’s international commitments might. Most mature democracies have such legal procedures in place. Our parliament needs to write such a law to regulate and control the ability of the executive branch to enter into secret deals with foreign powers, not just in relation to national security but all international commitments.

But the proposed mechanism for approval of national security-related agreements outlined in the parliamentary committee report is inappropriate as it falls foul of our scheme of separation of powers. It provides that such agreements will be circulated to the foreign ministry and other ministries concerned for their views, vetted by the law ministry, and then sent to the parliamentary committee for national security for its recommendations (to be made in consultation with stakeholders), before being forwarded to the cabinet for approval.

This mechanism allows a parliamentary committee to wade into the policymaking domain of the executive, while rendering the parliament subservient to the cabinet. It would be preferable to provide through statute the consultative process that must be followed by the executive that leads to the consideration of an international agreement and its approval by the cabinet prior to being presented before the parliament for endorsement or ex post facto validation, depending on the nature of the matter involved and the urgency attached to it.

Finally, the content of the parliamentary committee recommendations seems indecisive and conflicted. To start with it is disappointing that the committee doesn’t even touch the issue of conducting an inquiry and holding to account holders of public office who abused state authority by entering into harmful secret deals with the US, handing over airbases and allowing foreign security operatives a free rein in Pakistan. Even if the committee only wished to look to the future it seems to equivocate and then toss the ball back into the court of the executive in relation to the two key burning issues of the day: drone attacks and Nato supplies.

Ronald Dworkin, a leading US jurist, identifies two different kinds of arguments that seek to justify any political decision: arguments of principle and arguments of policy. He explains arguments of policy to be “goal-based” arguments that are desirable or otherwise based on their impact on the community as a whole. Arguments of principle, on the contrary, are “right-based” arguments, and such rights ought not be compromised, even if it is arguable that upholding them might render the community as a whole slightly worse off. In other words, political expediency and incremental benefits must not defeat right-based arguments.

In our context, opposition to drone attacks is an argument of principle. Drones might have their benefits in taking out the most evil terrorists. But they breach the fundamental rights to life, security and due process of the citizens of Pakistan living in Fata and cannot be justified, even if they have the support of the wider local community, as some argue controversially, or even that of the federal government. The position of the federal government and our parliament has been that drones are illegal under national and international law and a breach of Pakistan’s territorial sanctity.

The only relevant question then is what the government should do when the US doesn’t desist from drone strikes. And here the parliamentary committee is mum. It doesn’t ask if our national defence and security agencies coordinate with the CIA in directing drones against the Pakistani Taliban. It doesn’t ask why the drones remained suspended for a while after Salala and then restarted. It limits itself to regurgitating the rhetoric against drones. In contrast to the drone issue, the matter of Nato supplies is one of policy. The question to be determined here is not of breach of rights, but what policy will best serve the interests of the wider community.

The parliamentary committee states on the one hand that peace and stability in Afghanistan is the bedrock of our foreign policy, there can be no military solution to the Afghan conflict, and that dialogue and reconciliation should replace fighting; and on the other that Pakistan has suffered colossal losses due to the war on terror that the international community should recognise. But it simultaneously insinuates that Nato supply routes can be reopened by charging a higher tariff, and even gets into mechanics by advising that the Railways should handle half of such supplies. It is inexplicable how such policy is in sync with the identified goals of our foreign policy or benefits our community as a whole.

The two-pronged argument in favour of reopening Nato supplies is this: it might give our cash-starved economy a breather and keep the US dependent on us in some way. This argument has two fundamental flaws. One, in overstating the immediate-term economic benefit arising out of transit tariffs, it ignores the long-term social, political and economic costs inflicted on the country due to our association with the US war in Afghanistan (also asserted by our government). Two, it creates a conflict of interest for Pakistan, where on the one hand we wish the US war in Afghanistan to end quickly and on the other we create a financial incentive for ourselves to seek prolongation of the war.

As the parliamentary debate is still underway, the desirable outcome would be the following: a law regulating the approval and validation of Pakistan’s international agreements; a law regulating the authority and conduct of intelligence agencies to provide a means to ensure that our jihadi project is shut down for good and our territory is never used for attacks on foreign countries; a clear direction that all forms of tactical engagement with the US should promote the defined goal of encouraging US withdrawal from Afghanistan and finding a non-military solution to the conflict in our neighbourhood; and a direction to the federal government to pursue international legal remedies should the US not discontinue drone strikes within Pakistan.

Email: sattar@post.harvard.edu

April 1, 2012
By:Arif Nizami

The top military and civilian leadership is striving to develop a consensus on our foreign policy, primarily on frayed Pakistan-US relations. It is heartening to note that apart from the coalition members, the opposition leaders in the National Assembly and the Senate also attended the top-level meeting chaired by the prime minister. But apart from the political parties, the military and the civilian leadership have not been on the same page on the issue.

Outside the parliament, a newly created pressure group largely composed of out-of-job politicians and mualanas of different ilk, the so-called Difa-e-Pakistan (Defence of Pakistan) Council is playing a rejectionist role, ready to sabotage any deal.

Nonetheless Prime Minister Gilani meeting President Obama in Seoul, President Zardari meeting Washington’s special envoy on Afghanistan Marc Grossman in Dushanbe and the military leaderships of the US and Pakistan having consultations, all in the last three days, underscores a sense of urgency on both sides to restore ties.

According to the White House and he US State Department, the top-level talks have led to a better understanding between the two countries. Similarly, Islamabad has put a positive gloss on the high profile engagements. Despite the bonhomie, intractable problems remain to be resolved.

The past one-year or so has been the most turbulent period in the chequered history of Pakistan-US relations. Starting from the Raymond Davis affair last January to the Abbottabad raid by US Navy SEALs in May killing Osama bin Laden and the Salala incident in November, relations have gone consistently downhill.

The chimerical relations between the two allies have seen many ups and downs in the past. Even at the best of times American pundits aptly coined the term ‘frenemy’ to describe the roller coaster nature of US-Pakistan relations.

In the past year, relations have hit an all time low. Recently, Hollywood star George Clooney revealed to Rolling Stone magazine that President Obama had told him that one place which gives him sleepless nights is Pakistan.

As of now NATO supplies to Afghanistan through Pakistan remain suspended. And despite the high level contacts between Washington and Islamabad, the long-awaited apology from the US on the Salala incident is not forthcoming. It is not even clear now whether Islamabad is still insisting on the apology to restore ties.

Indications are that most outstanding issues between the US and Pakistan have been sewn up in a broad framework of mutual understanding. Since neither side can afford a clean break, there is a sense of urgency to restore a modicum of normalcy as soon as possible.

The foreign office has claimed that no verbal agreement would be made in the future with Washington and there would be complete transparency in relations with the US. According to the recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PNCS), every agreement shall be written down and formalised.

In a country where the approval rating of the US is one of the lowest in the world, this makes fine reading. The parliament can lay down broad policy framework and its committees can scrutinise all aspects of foreign and security policy. But speaking practically, the conduct of day-to-day policy will be rendered virtually impossible if the new guidelines are followed in letter and spirit.

It is indeed ironic that despite the anxiety to rein in relations with the US, issues like details of the defence budget as well the conduct and working of the intelligence establishment remain beyond the pale of the parliament or its committees. Like in all democratic countries, these matters should also be brought under the domain of the parliament.

Apart from the Salala incident (for which the US military has decided not to charge its soldiers), the use of drones – ostensibly to flush out militants – remains a flashpoint between Washington and Islamabad. Although drone attacks have been reduced quite a lot in the past few months, they remain the key weapon to kill and destroy the Al-Qaeda network in the badlands of Pakistan.

The US has reportedly agreed to fewer but more targeted drone attacks. And they are continuing while both sides are talking. These attacks from the US military’s standpoint have their utility as they have helped in weakening if not actually destroying the Al-Qaeda network in N. Waziristan.

Admittedly, there has been respite from terrorist activities in most urban centres of the country in the past year or so. These attacks have become fewer and far apart, and less lethal in their intensity. Nevertheless, the militant network is still active mostly in Balochistan, KP and the tribal areas.

Targeted killings of the Shias, FC and the police in Balochistan and some other areas of the country are adequate testimony to the fact that the hydra-headed monster of terrorism might have been scorched but not destroyed. It can easily raise its head again and strike with full might and fury.

It is obvious that despite the fulminations of the leader of the oppositions Nisar Ali Khan and Mualana FazlurRehman in the parliament, a modicum of agreement has been reached on ties with the US. Prime Minister Gilani before his departure for China will make a last ditch attempt at building a consensus. Hopefully, he will succeed.

Some kind of framework has already been evolved which will be clinched when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton arrives in Islamabad in a few weeks. But this does not mean relations between the US and Pakistan will be hunky dory again. The US does not trust the ISI. The US Congress is loath to approve more military aid for Islamabad.

The US Commander in Afghanistan General John Allen just before coming to Pakistan accused the Pakistani spy agency of maintaining ties with the Taliban and the Haqqani network. Similarly, the report that the just-retired controversial head of the ISI General Shuja Pasha rejected an offer by the US for advance notice of drone attacks does not help.

The ISI has not denied its ties with the militant networks proscribed by the US. It has maintained that it has to keep contacts with all sides like any efficient intelligence apparatus. What is to be seen is whether, under its new head, the ISI is able to carve a key role for itself in initiating talks with the Afghan Taliban for an eventual exit strategy for the US and NATO forces.

The writer is Editor, Pakistan Today
-Pakistan Today

April 2, 2012
By Tanvir Ahmad Khan

Pakistan’s relations with the United States are not only important for the country but also for the entire region. Even as it waxes and wanes, the relationship has been a major determinant of the regional history since the Soviet Union’s fateful invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Pakistani and American re-engagement in 2001 paved the way for the decade-long US-led Nato-International Security Force’s (Isaf) military intervention in Afghanistan that brought down the Taliban and launched the so-called global war on terrorism. And yet, defining bilateral relations has become a highly contested exercise in the midst of glaring contradictions.

In Pakistan, it is no longer clear as to which forum would ‘re-set’ the relationship undermined by various American actions that outraged public opinion and forced the government to block overland transit of supplies for Nato-Isaf forces. President Asif Ali Zardari’s elected government is as, if not more, ‘pro-American’ as that of General Pervez Musharraf and yet it now evades direct executive decisions and declares that future relations with the United States would be decided by parliament.

On its part, parliament has before it, since March 20, a report written by the Parliamentary Committee on National Security on Guidelines for Revised Terms of Engagement with USA/Nato/Isaf (PCNS). The report not only seeks to provide a framework for future cooperation with the US but also makes recommendations for strengthening relations with some other states including China, Russia and Iran with a view to re-balancing Pakistan’s foreign policy. A conspicuous lack of consensus in the joint session of the two houses of parliament convened to consider it has led to procrastination and there has been no substantive parliamentary debate so far.

An extraordinary meeting of various political and military leaders has now tried to identify ideas that would break the logjam in parliament. Following this conference in which the opposition parties reportedly took a hard line with an eye on the next general election — anti-Americanism gets votes — the Committee has gone back to the drawing board to reconsider some of the initial recommendations; the result may be a tightening of conditionalities under which full scale collaboration with foreign forces could be resumed.

Populism apart, the opposition, especially from the right wing, is being driven by two factors: one, scepticism about government motives in referring Pakistan-US relations to parliament and, two, suspicion that recent high level meetings between the two countries — Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani’s consultations with President Barack Obama in Seoul and Pakistan army chief, General Pervez Kayani’s long deliberations with Centcom’s leader, General James Mattis and Isaf commander, General John Allen in Islamabad — were an attempt to settle issues at the executive level while using parliament for political legitimacy. Then there is the pressure of media leaks from Washington that it would turn to India and the northern route states — Russia and Central Asia — if Pakistan fails to deliver. The tipping point will be parliament making cessation of lethal drone attacks a precondition to restoration of overland transit routes.

Government leaders in Islamabad deflect criticism with rhetorical declarations that the president and prime minister have effectively transferred their powers to parliament. In reality, Pakistan’s governance continues to be a personality-centred affair with a very narrow base of authority. Pakistani parliaments have seldom taken a proactive interest in the formulation and conduct of external relations; they have, as a rule, lacked information, expertise and the resolve to address highly complex issues of international relations. Matters concerning the US have particularly been settled in secret civil and military conclaves; the process reaching a climax with Musharraf concluding secret agreements that parliament is now belatedly demanding to see. There is much clamour that the armed forces and the allied foreign policy establishment do not allow the elected institutions to play a significant role in the realm of foreign and security policy.

The executive has probably gone to parliament not because of a revolutionary re-think but because collaboration with the US has become extremely unpopular after certain events. Prominent among them are the following: departure with impunity of the CIA killer of two Pakistani citizens in Lahore; the unprovoked destruction by Nato aircraft of the Pakistani border post, Salala, in which 24 Pakistani soldiers perished; information that transit rights given to foreign forces in Afghanistan have depreciated Pakistan’s infrastructure to the tune of Rs80 billion and above all, speculative reports that Zardari’s government has facilitated an influx of “thousands” of American intelligence operatives and special forces personnel into Pakistan. As things stand today, political and military leaders seem to have narrowed their differences vis-a-vis Washington and favour a hard-headed pragmatic re-setting of cooperative relations. Parliament is expected to give it a broad ownership but, anticipating early elections, politicians wish to act as custodians of Pakistan’s sovereignty. The government has not been able to control parliament’s proceedings and foreign policy has got caught up in the cross-currents of Pakistani politics. It is yet to be seen how the civil and military leaders re-engage with the US without a prohibitive cost for the political class.

Tanvir Ahmad Khan is a former ambassador and foreign secretary of Pakistan.
Source: Gulf News

April 3, 2012
By Mohammad Jamil
Exclusive Article

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar said that an apology by the US administration for the Nato air strike at Salalah would not satisfy the Pakistani government, but it requires a reassessment of Islamabad’s partnership with Washington. “This did require a complete relook at the terms of engagement with the US,” she said. On March 18, PM Gilani had also expressed similar views, when he stated that Pakistan was not seeking an apology from the US on the Salalah incident, but looking for new directions in relations with Washington on key issues. The new terms of engagement are before our law-makers to debate and vote upon these terms, among other things include charging fees for Nato goods transported through Pakistan, an end to US drone strikes on Pakistani soil, and an unconditional apology for the deadly Nato air strike.

But America has not tendered an apology to give a soothing effect to the sufferers. Meanwhile, the decision of US military not to take action against the officials involved in attack at Salalah has added fuel to the fire, and such arrogance would not help in improving the Pak-US relationship already at its lowest ebb. But knowing the superpower, it is not surprising at all; not infrequently but many a time, the American soldiers have been caught for committing the most heinous war crimes. Their military commanders and political leaders are always stubbornly loath to put their delinquent personnel through their own justice system, let alone the international criminal law, to face the consequences of their criminal acts.

Therefore, the publication of the second report placing blame on Pakistani soldiers for having resorted to firing first, after the first one was rejected by Pakistan, has made it difficult for the government to reopen the Nato supply routes and resume cooperation in the war on terror. It is a well known fact that US troops in Afghanistan have several times violated international conventions; the latest one to add to their list of criminal acts is the massacre of Afghan civilians in Kandahar. Of course, the Staff Sergeant soldier, Robert Bales, has been formally charged for killing 16 people in a pre-dawn shooting rampage that further eroded US-Afghan relations already frayed by a decade of war. Premeditated murder is a capital offence under the US military justice code, so Bales could face the death penalty if convicted; but there is a perception that he could be given life sentence or shorter. For instance, the horrific cold-blooded massacre of innocent South Vietnamese in March 1968 is a case in point. Scores of US soldiers, who had descended on helicopters on a village of about 700 people on the fateful day, had killed 500 innocent children, women and elderly persons with savage gunfire. The US commanders and the political leaders were at first in total denial of this mass slaughter. But after incontrovertible evidence started coming to the fore, both the military and political bosses presented all sorts of excuses. Under the heat of global outrage and some domestic pressure, the US administration had to institute an investigation and a trial was held albeit for form’s sake. Almost all the 26 soldiers put on trial were exonerated from the charge and released. Only a second lieutenant was convicted. And although he was found guilty of slaughtering 29 Vietnamese villagers, including several toddlers, his life sentence was reduced to three and a half years imprisonment by the then President, which he spent not in jail but his own home with his family. So, it could be an incorrigible optimist in Islamabad who thought it was going to be any different with Salalah holocaust from what it was with the My Lai massacre by the trigger-happy American soldiers?

Having all said, Pakistan seems to have adopted a pragmatic policy that Parliament would decide about the future of Pak-US relations, and national interest would be safeguarded. The Parliamentary Committee in its recommendations covered many points, but it ought to have mentioned Pakistan army’s response in case the US/Nato forces trample our sovereignty again. Certainly, Salalah is not going to be the first and last naked aggression on a Pakistani military post.

The writer is a senior journalist and freelance columnist. He is also a regular contributor to pkarticleshub.com. Email: mjamil1938@hotmail.com

April 3, 2012
By: Javid Husain

The current crisis in Pakistan-US relations is caused by a clash of assumptions, expectations and interests of the two countries in their dealings with each other. Keeping in view Pakistan’s heavy dependence on the US in economic and security fields, Washington, without saying so, treats Pakistan as a client state in handling bilateral, regional and global issues. On the other hand, Pakistan, it seems, suffers from split personality. It readily walks into the US embrace like a client state whenever the latter opens its arms, without learning from the history of its relations with the US. However, despite its heavy dependence on the US, it expects to be treated by Washington on equal terms. This clash of assumptions and expectations exacerbated by the clash of national interests has been the root cause of the repeated crises in Pakistan-US relations.

The current crisis is no different. The so-called strategic dialogue between the two countries is expected by Pakistan to resolve all its major issues, whether it is the energy crisis, its sick economy, its weaknesses in the military field, its need for the US aid and investment, its acute water shortage and the need for new water reservoirs. We even expect Washington to help resolve the Kashmir issue for us in total disregard of the fact that in the current unfolding strategic scenario in Asia, the US neither has the capability nor the willingness to do so.

In fact, we see in the Pakistan-US strategic dialogue the panacea for all our ills and problems ignoring the harsh reality that we must resolve our economic and security problems through our own efforts. Not only that, we also hold the view that America should do all this and more for altruistic motives, forgetting that the US foreign, economic and military assistance is an important instrument of its foreign policy and not charity to be doled out to needy countries.

The US may have been ready to extend help to us in overcoming some of our economic problems, but, in return, it expected Pakistan to fall in line with its strategic objectives in the region. It was here that the real problem started. Whereas Pakistan was more than willing to act like a client state in obtaining economic and security assistance from the US like that promised under the Kerry-Lugar Bill, it wanted to be treated on equal terms in the handling of strategic issues. This was impossible especially when those issues were of vital interest to the US security. An independent foreign policy and heavy dependence on external economic and military assistance simply do not go together. So, it was just a question of time before these contradictions would come to the fore and cause a breakdown in Pakistan-US relations. This is precisely what happened last year through a series of events starting with the Raymond Davis affair, continuing with the Abbottabad operation by the US to get Osama bin Laden, and culminating with the attack on a Pakistani checkpost in November last year killing 24 Pakistani soldiers. The strong reaction of the military establishment to the US attack on the Salalah checkpost and the public hue and cry left the government with no choice, but to ask for the evacuation of the Shamsi Airbase by the Americans and suspend the Nato supplies to its forces in Afghanistan via the land route. It also ordered a review of the Pakistan-US relations.

The current crisis has been aggravated by the divergence of the strategic objectives and national interests of the two countries in Afghanistan. There is a degree of convergence of the positions of the two countries in the fight against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. To that extent, cooperation between them is considered mutually beneficial by both sides. However, it is also true that the US views Pakistan both as an asset and a problem in the fight against international terrorism for two reasons: Its suspicion that some elements in Pakistan in the conduct of relations with India may still be prepared to use groups and tactics which are considered “terrorist” by the US and Pakistan’s unwillingness to extend total support to the US in its war against the Afghan Taliban.

Pakistan rightly distinguishes between Al-Qaeda as a terrorist organisation and the Afghan Taliban, who despite their retrogressive ideology constitute a legitimate part of the Afghan body politic. In fact, the restoration of durable peace and stability in Afghanistan is inconceivable without national reconciliation and the establishment of a broad-based government, including the Taliban/Pashtuns and the Northern Alliance/non-Pashtuns. The US government is gradually waking up to the necessity of a dialogue with the Afghan Taliban. However, it is still to work out the full implication of this realisation in its Afghan strategy. Till it does so, the divergence in the US and Pakistani positions concerning the Afghan Taliban would continue to cause problems in their relationship.

Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership and Parliament are currently engaged in a serious debate on the desired contours of the future Pakistan-US relationship. The focus is on the consideration of the recommendations presented by the Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS) in a joint session of the National Assembly and the Senate on March 20. These recommendations basically link the reopening of the land supply route for the Nato forces in Afghanistan to a number of demands, including, inter alia, respect for Pakistan’s sovereignty, unconditional apology for the US attack on Pakistan’s border posts, cessation of drone attacks, and levying of taxes and other charges on supplies transiting through Pakistan for the Nato forces. While these recommendations currently are being fine-tuned by the PCNS in the light of initial reactions from various quarters, President Barack Obama told Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani in Seoul on the sidelines of the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit that a balance must be achieved between respect for Pakistan’s sovereignty and the US national security.

Ideally, the current review of our relations with the US must reset them at a level which is sustainable and must lead to an arrangement which is mutually beneficial keeping in view the strategic, security and economic interests of the two countries. We must be conscious of both the potential and the limitations of Pakistan-US relations. While there is a great deal of convergence of the interests of Pakistan and the US, there is also divergence in matters relating to China, Iran, Palestine, India and Afghanistan, just to name a few. Therefore, both sides have to be realistic in their expectations from each other.

We cannot and should not expect the US to solve all our economic and security problems. This is a job that we have to do ourselves through our own efforts primarily. External help, at best, can play only a marginal role in this regard. Secondly, the nature of our relationship should be such as safeguards our sovereignty, security and economic well being. Such a dignified relationship with the US is possible only if, instead of relying on it for all our economic and security needs, we pursue a policy of self-reliance internally and diversify our relations with other countries in the external field.

Until we learn to live within our resources, the US and others will continue to exploit us for their own ends. The question is: Whether our nation as a whole, particularly our civil and military leadership, has the courage and sense of honour to live within our resources? Those who claim that this is not practical need to learn a lesson or two from the Chinese experience of the past three decades.

The writer is a retired ambassador.

Email: javid.husain@gamil.com
-The Nation

April 6, 2012
By Zahid Hussain

THE proposal to link the reopening of the Nato supply route to the US stopping the drone strikes in the northwest ups the stakes on the revival of relations between Washington and Islamabad.

The terms of engagement seem to be getting tougher as the government tries to reach a national consensus on restoring ties with the United States. Predictably, the entire policy review process has descended into chaos, making it increasingly difficult to get the parliamentary approval sooner on a viable policy framework.

For the Obama administration, the proposed linkage presents a serious dilemma as it struggles to come up with a viable Afghan exit plan. While the reopening of the Pakistani supply route remains important for allied forces in Afghanistan, the drone campaign against militant sanctuaries in the tribal region is a critical component of the US counterinsurgency strategy. It is a tough deal to negotiate for both Washington and Islamabad.

To be sure the linkage is the strongest leverage Pakistan can use to force the Obama administration to re-examine its drone campaign, which has become the major source of tension between the two estranged allies. But it is not certain whether it can work. There is also a danger that the toughening of Pakistan’s stance could push matters to a point of rupture, which both countries have been trying to avoid.

The recent meeting between President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani on the sidelines of the nuclear summit in Seoul signalled the resumption of contacts between the two countries at the highest level.

Meanwhile, military-to-military links suspended for the past four months were also revived following the visit last week of Gen James Mattis, Centcom chief, and Gen Allen, the commander of Nato and US forces in Afghanistan. But any further progress
towards restoration of the relationship awaits the conclusion of the parliamentary review.

Some US officials dismiss the criticality of the Pakistani supply route as a ‘myth’, arguing that the closure would not affect the military campaign in Afghanistan. But others agree that the cost of alternative routes has been very high and their reliability is
questionable. This is perhaps the reason why the Obama administration has been insisting on the reopening of the routes before the start of any substantive talks on the future of the relationship between the two countries. Until two years ago, almost 90 per
cent of Nato’s non-military supplies to Afghanistan were routed through the port city of Karachi. But since 2009 the alliance has increasingly been using northern routes, through Russia and the Central Asian states as the supply convoys came under frequent attacks by militants in Pakistani border areas. Though costing twice as much, the shift significantly reduced US reliance on Pakistan.

As much as 40 per cent of the total logistic supplies to the US military in Afghanistan is now routed through the Northern Distribution Network. According to US media reports, the Pentagon plans to shift 75 per cent of the overall traffic to this route by the end of the year. The process could be speeded up with the continuing stalemate with Pakistan. Though costing twice as much as the Pakistani route, the northern route is still cheaper than airdrops.

But there are many problems with this route, which involves a number of former Soviet states besides Russia. It relies on a complex network where the cargo after landing at various sea ports is loaded onto trucks and railway wagons to be carried thousands of miles into Afghanistan. There is also the question of reliability. Last November, Russia threatened to stop Nato using its territory to supply troops in Afghanistan over its objection to a US missile shield for Europe. Although the situation
seems to have normalised for now, the threat still looms large.

Furthermore, the military surge and the drawdown of forces in Afghanistan have increased America’s logistical needs which could not be fully met by a hugely stretched northern route. That makes the Pakistan route still more favourable to the US and Nato as they need to ship home military equipment after the withdrawal of their troops from Afghanistan in 2014. But the proposed linkage seems to have made the issue more complicated.

There is no indication yet that the US will halt drone strikes in return for reopening of the supply route. In fact, the attacks have intensified while the Pakistani civil and military leadership struggles to conclude the review.

The Obama administration, however, may agree to limit the strikes and conduct them in coordination with the Pakistani intelligence services. Given the volatility of the situation, it would be extremely difficult for the government to allow even a limited operation on its territory.

Instead, Pakistan has suggested that it could use F-16 jets to target the militant hideouts on intelligence provided by the US.

There is also a proposal for joint ownership of the drone campaign. But all that is not likely to break the stalemate.

It is quite apparent that the review process has spiralled out of the government’s control. It is still likely that the parliamentary committee may reach a compromise on a new and tougher policy framework. But a major question is how Pakistan can negotiate those terms of engagement with the US. Do we have any clear policy if the stalemate continues over the drone strikes?

The government seems to have got trapped in its own populist rhetoric. The dragging on of the review process has given huge space to elements opposed to any ties with the US. That has made it more difficult to pursue a more rational path which can serve not only Pakistan’s national interests but also the cause of regional peace.

The writer is a scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre, Washington DC.

zhussain100@yahoo.com
-Dawn

Asif Ezdi
Monday, April 09, 2012

The writer is a former member of the Foreign Service

During an informal conversation with media personnel last Monday on board the plane taking him back home after attending the Boao Forum, Gilani said that Pakistan was in no hurry to reopen Nato supply routes to Afghanistan and that a decision would be taken only after evolution of a consensus in the Parliamentary Committee on National Security. But the prime minister did not say what the government would do if that consensus could not be achieved. A member of the Gilani’s delegation was more forthcoming. “If you ask me ...,” he said, “we are virtually caught between the devil and the deep blue sea.” The devil, he did not have to explain, is the mounting US pressure on Pakistan to open the supply lines without further delay; and political pressure and public sentiment at home against such a decision is the deep blue sea.

Finding a course which accommodates both the US demands and domestic political exigencies has not been easy. The government would clearly like to reopen the supply routes in return for a token apology from Washington for the Mohmand raid and a better financial return for Pakistan’s support to the US war in Afghanistan. But the government is afraid that any such deal could be exploited by the opposition parties and could prove costly at the next parliamentary elections.

The problem is twofold. First, while Washington seems willing to pay more for Pakistan’s services, it is not quite prepared to forego its freedom to carry out drone strikes against targets of its choice in Pakistan. Second, the opposition parties would not like to share in the responsibility for giving parliamentary endorsement to an unpopular alliance with the US and so risk being branded as pro-America.

The result is a standoff. On March 20, the committee presented its report to parliament but debate in the house on the recommendations of the committee has been postponed repeatedly because a text that could be adopted by consensus has not been worked out yet. The PML-N and the JUI-F have declared their opposition to the key recommendation that NATO supply routes should be reopened.

While Raza Rabbani, whose comprehension of national security issues is about as deep as his vaunted expertise in matters constitutional, wrestles with the task of evolving a consensus within the committee, progress is being made in talks at various levels between Pakistani and American officials, both civilian and military, in working out a framework agreement that would tax NATO convoys transiting to Afghanistan and resume payments to Pakistan under the Coalition Support Funds programme.

While the Pakistan side has been reticent, American officials have been quite upbeat. Following the visit of James Mattis, head of the US Central Command, to Islamabad two weeks ago, Martin Dempsey, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed confidence that Pakistan would agree to reopen the supply routes before the Nato Summit in May. Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Nides was similarly upbeat on his visit to Islamabad last week, saying he had been heartened that the two sides were working through their differences “very constructively.”

The question of supply routes seems in fact to have been largely settled in the bilateral talks. This is Washington’s main concern. Although the US has been expanding the northern supply lines-the latest addition being the opening of an airfield at Ulyanovsk in the heart of European Russia as a hub for Nato’s air bridge to Afghanistan-the closure of the Pakistan route still hurts. Moreover, as US begins to withdraw the bulk of its forces in 2014, the transit routes including that through Pakistan would be needed also to get troops and equipment out of Afghanistan. The northern route is not only two-to-three times costlier, it also increases American dependence on Russia at a time when the two countries have differences over important issues like Syria and Washington’s plans for a Europe-based missile defence system.

On the tricky question of drone strikes, the Americans are showing some flexibility, though not yet enough to make a deal that the Pakistani government could sell domestically. In January, Obama had publicly defended the use of drone attacks, saying a “pinpoint strike” was “less intrusive” on other countries’ sovereignty than other ways to target Al-Qaeda. Although Obama gave no indication at that time that the policy would change, Washington has offered to curtail these strikes to accommodate Pakistani concerns.

Under the proposed new policy, US would reportedly give Pakistan advance notice of future strikes and limits the types of targets that would be hit. Such raids would continue against high-value targets and against mid-level Taliban leaders but no longer against all large groups of armed men as until recently. The question of drone strikes also came up in Gilani’s meeting with Obama in Seoul two weeks ago and discussions on the issue have continued since then between the two sides.

Although Pakistan-US talks on the resettlement of their ties are making headway, Washington is clearly getting frustrated at the slow pace of the parliamentary review which has to be completed before the new framework of bilateral relationship can be put in place. The US is keen that this process should be over before the NATO summit that Obama will be hosting in his hometown of Chicago on May 20-21. Leaders of more than 50 countries are expected to attend the conference and announce further steps for ending the war in Afghanistan. Washington would not like the event to be overshadowed by the question of supply routes.

The US announcement last week of a $10 million bounty on Hafiz Saeed for allegedly masterminding the terrorist attack in Bombay in November 2008 seems to have been made to win favour with India and to generate additional pressure on Pakistan to open the transit routes. There are several peculiarities in the announcement which make it suspect.

First, the timing is odd. The carnage in Bombay took place more than three years ago. WikiLeaks cables from those days indicate that India did not have any solid evidence linking Saeed to that atrocity. US officials have said now that the decision to offer the reward had been in the works for months and was not related to Saeed’s recent public appearances. That may be true, but the claim that the timing was coincidental is difficult to accept.

The bounty announcement is particularly disquieting, because it shows that Washington is preparing to target a Pakistani citizen who has not been indicted or convicted of any offence. In fact, his detention by the government after the carnage in Bombay was set aside by a Pakistani court for lack of evidence. Besides, Pakistani courts have also cleared Jamaat-ud-Dawah, the organisation that Hafiz Saeed heads.

Second, the Indian government was informed beforehand of a decision affecting two Pakistani nationals, and the public announcement was made by Under-Secretary for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman in Delhi to an Indian audience, in a speech on strengthening the India-US partnership in the 21st century. It was only later that day that the reward offer was posted on the State Department website. Pakistan was not informed and learnt about it from the Indian media.

Third, as the deputy spokesman of the State Department has said, US authorities do not have any information that could be used in a court of law to convict Saeed. In the deputy spokesman’s words, they would like to see Hafiz Saeed behind bars but are still “looking for information to lead to his conviction in any US or foreign court of law.”

Fourth, since Pakistan and the US do not have any extradition treaty, the question arises what action Washington would take if it comes in possession of the information it is seeking. Would it then take unilateral action to seize Hafiz Saeed in Pakistani territory?

Email: asifezdi@yahoo.com
-The News