April 15, 2012
By:Arif Nizami

After a period of almost five months of tensions, finally a consensus has been reached on relations with the US and a conditional resumption of Nato supply routes through Pakistan. A unanimous agreement by all political parties in the Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS) is no mean feat. Full marks to the chairperson of the committee Senator Raza Rabbani and his political bosses to achieve unanimity in a divided house.

Credit is also due to Nawaz Sharif for once again rising above narrow party interests for the sake of national consensus. In an overheated atmosphere of personal recriminations and attacks being hurled at each other between the PPP and the PML(N) during the past week, this is nothing short of a miracle.

The JUI(F) chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman also came around after a lengthy meeting with the president. Interestingly enough, the US ambassador to Pakistan Cameron Munter became so desperate for an agreement that he had to meet Nawaz and the Maulana rather than continuing to engage them in behind-the-scenes diplomacy.

The unanimous resolution adopted by the joint sitting of the parliament albeit full of platitudes is the most comprehensive document on foreign policy ever produced by a parliament of the country. Previously, it was only Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who as prime minister of a humiliated and dismembered Pakistan had the unanimous endorsement of the parliament to go to Simla in 1972for a peace deal with Indira Gandhi and engineer the return of 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war (POWs).

Prime Minister Gilani, the quintessential consensus builder, addressing the joint session has proudly proclaimed that the sovereignty of Pakistan will not be violated by the US from now on. He disclosed that President Obama had assured him – when PM Gilani met him on the sidelines of the nuclear summit in Seoul last month – that the sovereignty and independence of Pakistan will be respected.

Whether the US President will be able to walk the talk and Pakistan will be in a position to implement the resolution in ‘letter and spirit’ is a conundrum facing most analysts. For instance, the resolution states that there will be no more drone attacks on our soil and this is good to placate the opposition but might be difficult to achieve in practical terms.

Drone attacks since the Salala incident have become fewer and far in between. But despite flawed rules of engagement resulting in scores of innocent civilian casualties, they still remain the most potent weapon in the hands of the US to kill high profile Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda targets in our badlands.

Given the Pakistani military’s understandable reluctance to launch a putsch in North Waziristan and a strict no-boots-on-the-ground policy, Washington entirely ruling out drone attacks sounds too good to be true. On the basis of credible human and electronic intel, the trigger-happy boys belonging to CIA’s Special Activities Division based in Orlando are bound to press the fire button.

According to secret diplomatic cables leaked by WikiLeaks last year, the COAS General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani not only tacitly agreed to drone flights but also requested the Americans to increase them in 2008. That was then. With the new rules of engagement and the Shamsi airbase vacated by the US after the Salala incident, it will be interesting to observe how the chips will fall now. With the stakes so high for the US in Afghanistan it is difficult too imagine that it will refrain from using this potent weapon in light of credible intel and the Pak military’s inaction.

A watershed in Islamabad’s relations with Washington was the killing of Osama bin Laden in his Abbottabad abode on May 2nd last year. This was the ultimate humiliation of the military and its premier intelligence agency the ISI as well as a serious breach of sovereignty by an ally.

It demonstrated the state of complete distrust between the US and its so-called major ally in the war on terror. Has anything changed in the past year? Probably relations have deteriorated on all counts. Merely resumption of humanitarian Nato supplies will not be able to repair the fractured relationship.

The PCNS has urged that Pakistan should actively pursue gas pipeline projects with Iran and Turkmenistan. Unfortunately, these projects will remain a pipedreams without Washington’s blessings. With Iran increasingly coming under more stringent sanctions, where is the money to build the pipeline going to come from? Under the threat of sanctions being applied, no foreign donor or even a consortium of Pakistani banks would touch the Iran-Pakistan gas project.

In the committee’s view, the US-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement, reached during George W Bush’s Republican administration, has significantly altered the strategic balance in the region. Therefore, it has urged that Pakistan should seek similar treatment from the US.

Judging by the budding strategic relationship between New Delhi and Washington, this is likely to remain a forlorn wish. India is fast acquiring the status of a mini-superpower being increasingly viewed as a counterweight to China’s growing military muscle in the region, both by Moscow and Washington. Recent acquisition of a nuclear powered submarine appropriately named Chakra from Moscow and America’s increased presence in Australia are meant to keep China at bay in the Indian Ocean.

Islamabad cannot expect to have the cake and eat it too. Frayed relations with Washington will require a lot of time to repair. Without changing our strategic paradigm, it might not be possible at all.

Expressing its anger at the US incursion in Bajaur earlier this year, Pakistan boycotted the Bonn conference. In the changed circumstances, Islamabad would expect to be invited to the Chicago summit on Afghanistan due next month. Hence coming weeks will determine whether Islamabad gets a place on the table determining the future of post-withdrawal.

The domestic fallout of the resolution of intent on foreign policy is not difficult to predict. The self styled Difa-e-Pakistan Council and its cohorts in the media are bound to cry ‘sellout’.

However, the hardliners in the PML(N) and JUI(F) will have a tough time criticising an agreement to which their party heads are signatories. The militants unhappy over a deal with Washington can step up their terrorist activities

Even the government might have bitten off more than it can chew. The military has got what it had wanted in order to do business with the US. However, it will be difficult to conduct day-to-day foreign policy and also keep the parliament completely on board. In order for such a regime to work, some kind of multi-party parliamentary overseeing system will have to be evolved.

The writer is Editor, Pakistan Today
-Pakistan Today

April 16, 2012
By Tanvir Ahmad Khan

Since the turn of the century, a huge swath of the world extending from the Maghreb to Pakistan has contended with the projection of American power. Amongst its major manifestations are deadly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, destabilisation of Pakistan, marginalisation of Palestinians and unforeseen complexities in the working out of the Arab Spring.

In a memorable piece published in November 2011, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, stated that those in the West who say that the United States could no longer afford to engage with the world have it backward. She, then, went on to spell out the rationale of a massive shift of American military and diplomatic power to the Pacific basin. “Open markets in Asia,” she declared, “provide the US with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting-edge technology. Our economic recovery at home will depend on exports and the ability of American firms to tap into the vast and growing consumer base of Asia.” She also underlined the strategic objectives of defending freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, countering the proliferation efforts of North Korea, and transparency in the military activities of the region’s key players. This is clearly a new phase in the containment of Chinese influence in the region and beyond.

Great Powers have historically acted so majestically while on their ascending trajectory. The middle and smaller powers have generally adjusted their postures as best as they could. What is different and what makes this new era of international politics more perilous is that the US is asserting its unrivalled military power when in comprehensive national terms, it is on a downward trajectory; other nations such as China, Russia, Brazil and India are also staking a claim to global influence.

In a remarkable essay published recently in the International Herald Tribune, Charles A. Kupchan pointed out that the rising nations, rather than following the West’s path of development and obediently accepting their place in the liberal international order, are fashioning their own versions of modernity. Interestingly, Kupchan’s short list included the “state capitalism” of the Gulf states. He cautioned American leaders — present and future — against trumpeting a new American Century and against toppling governments in the name of spreading western values.

Pakistan provides an excellent example — in fact, a cautionary tale — of how difficult is the process of dealing with a superpower reluctant to admit that it has lost a decade-long military campaign in neighbouring Afghanistan.

Pakistan had signed on in 2001 without settling terms of engagement. Failure of the Nato-Isaf mission in Afghanistan and its horrific backlash against Pakistan that has all but ripped the country apart made Pakistan’s civil and military leaders to seek some say in the formulation of American strategy in the region, largely to shift a purely militaristic policy to negotiations with all the parties to the conflict. The fundamental American response was to subject Pakistan to increased diplomatic, military and economic pressure to secure its blind compliance with Washington’s policy that had included an Obama-sanctioned surge of troops. The coercive approach to Pakistan ran into a major crisis when a Nato air attack on the Pakistani border post of Salala killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. The pro-western government in Islamabad tried to stem the tide of nationwide anger by closing down Nato’s virtually indispensable overland supply route and by asking parliament to write guidelines to re-set relations with the US.

Pakistan is not the best case from which to generalise about relations between middle level states and Great Powers. But its experience has an indicative value. Parliament produced an initial report that was met with derision from the people — lay as well as informed — and vigorous moves by the American embassy to influence its outcome. It went back to the drawing board and wrote a much better report that upholds national sovereignty, opens the door for an arms-free transit of Nato supplies and tasks the executive with bringing to an end the highly controversial drone attacks on Pakistan. The government got an opportunity to meet an almost undeniable American demand for overland transit; important now and even more when a 100,000 troops are evacuated from Afghanistan with billions of dollars worth of military hardware. In the same breath, however, it faced the daunting task of achieving other goals present in parliament’s resolution in spirit, if not the literal text. These include cessation of drone attacks, end of covert American operations, drastic curtailment of the US footprint in Pakistan, a political settlement in Afghanistan and proactive pursuit of gas pipelines from Iran and Turkmenistan. The Pakistan government has only a limited capacity to pursue these objectives.

From a Chinese or Indian viewpoint, the increasing vulnerabilities of the US in its aggregate national power make for greater space for independent action. For Pakistan that willingly slipped into a tight embrace with Washington, current efforts to regain some freedom of manoeuvring have a touch of pathos. What makes it even poignant is the fact that Pakistan is a considerable nuclear weapons power.

Tanvir Ahmad Khan is a former ambassador and foreign secretary of Pakistan.
Source: Gulf News

April 17, 2012
By Zahid Hussain

AFTER weeks of contentious negotiations, parliament has finally approved a guidelines for resetting ties with the US. The broad cross-party backing to the framework allows the government to start negotiations with Washington, but there are still many sticky issues which have to be resolved before this fractured relationship can move forward.

It is a long list of stringent demands that the government has now to negotiate with the United States. There are still major gaps which have to be filled in order to devise a clear and viable policy, determining the parameters of future cooperation between the two nations. The relationship between nations is not based on demands, but on the convergence of interests. Therefore, firstly, it should be clearly defined why it is important for Pakistan to maintain even a transactional if not a strategic partnership with the United States.

The parliamentary resolution has cleared the way for reopening the Nato supply line which is critical for the US-led allied forces in Afghanistan. The only restriction is on the transportation of arms and ammunition, which according to US officials are rarely sent through Pakistan. It may also help in the release of $1.18bn in coalition support fund payments to Pakistan.

Yet, there are some other matters which do not have an easy solution. Parliament was unequivocal in demanding the immediate cessation of CIA drone strikes in the tribal region. But for the Obama administration the operations are critical for eliminating the insurgent sanctuaries used for attacking the American troops in Afghanistan. The US officials have made it very clear that they have no intention to end CIA drone strikes against militant targets in Pakistani territory.

Less than 24 hours after parliament’s resolution, senior US officials were quoted by the international press as saying that they would work to find common ground with Pakistan, but they would take a shot if a suspected insurgent target comes into the sight of the CIA drones’ Hellfire missiles.

It is not for the first time that the US has ignored Pakistan’s call for ending drone strikes. In 2008, parliament also passed a resolution, only for the CIA to intensify the operation. But this time the situation is very different as the resetting of the relationship is directly linked to the cessation of the drone campaign.

This presents a huge dilemma for both Washington and Islamabad as they negotiate the new terms of engagement. What will happen if another drone strike is carried out during this period? How would the government or, more importantly, parliament react to it? The restoration of ties with Washington depend on answers to these questions.

Similarly, there is huge ambiguity on how Pakistan would implement its resolution not to allow private US security contractors and an unauthorised intelligence network in the country. The future relationship would depend on how the two estranged partners accommodate each other’s national security concerns.

There are some other sources of tension straining the troubled relationship. Washington’s decision to place a bounty of $10m on Hafiz Saeed has triggered a new wave of anti-American protests. Political leaders have denounced the US move as an attempt to browbeat Pakistan. Many commentators see a deep conspiracy in this rather bizarre announcement made by a senior Obama administration official while on a visit to New Delhi.

Indeed, some of the criticism particularly pertaining to the legality of bounty on a man who is not a fugitive from the law may be valid. There is also a question of the timing of the controversial announcement when the two countries are engaged in a delicate process of redefining their fractured relationship. The move could not have come at a worse time.

Yet, however flawed and controversial Washington’s decision may be, it cannot justify the attempts by some political leaders and TV anchors to project as a hero the founder and a former head of a militant group whose members, according to Pakistan’s own investigations, have been involved in 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. Hafiz Saeed’s own role in the bloody assault that almost imposed a war on Pakistan is also being questioned.

Beyond reacting to Washington’s bounty offer and speculate motives behind it, we need to see where we have gone wrong. It is time for retrospection rather than hiding behind conspiracy theories. The fact is that the concern of the international community about Pakistan becoming the hub of terrorism is not entirely wrong.

It is an undeniable fact that most of the terrorist attacks in the West and other parts of the world over the past decade have had some connection to Pakistan. Osama bin Laden could not have been able to hide in Pakistan for over 10 years without a strong support network among the local militants. Many senior Al Qaeda leaders were captured from the houses of activists belonging to various militant and radical Islamic parties.

The inability of the state to curb the activities of the militants on its soil means loss of sovereignty. The international community will feel justified in taking any action if the state itself fails to stop its soil being used for the export of terrorism.

Many extremist groups responsible for the sectarian and militant violence in the country have now gathered under the banner of the so-called Difaa-i-Pakistan Council (Defence of Pakistan Council), threatening to impose their retrogressive agenda through force. These preachers of hatred and violence want to push Pakistan towards international isolation and turn it into a pariah state.

The blood-curdling speeches and violent rhetoric are aimed at sabotaging any attempt to achieve peace and stability in the region. Given the violent record of its leaders it is appropriate to rename the group as the ‘Destruction of Pakistan Council’.

The writer is a scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre, Washington DC.

zhussain100@yahoo.com
-Dawn

April 20, 2012
By: A. R. Jerral

The Pak-US bilateral activities taking place upfront and behind-the-scenes indicate that the stoppage of Nato supply routes through Pakistan is taking its toll. The claims made that there will be no or little effect on the conduct of operations in Afghanistan were hollow; aerial supply though manageable is not cost effective, not on long-term basis. The flurry of diplomatic and military activity indicates that the US wants a quick and ‘beneficial’ solution. It seems that we are witnessing a carrot and stick game again. Along with the diplomatic and military contacts, the US government has embarked upon classic arm-twisting tactics against Pakistan.

The US Deputy Secretary of State, Thomas Nides, was in Pakistan and met all those who matter here. He wanted – “Pakistan ‘must respect’ US security needs.” The US military brass was also engaged in parleys with their Pakistani counterparts at the GHQs. As usual what was discussed and decided at the GHQs will not be made public. The discussions conducted at the Foreign Office and with other leaders will also remain classified; press releases were coated in agreeable diplomatic clichés indicating all went well and mutual concerns were respected.

The intensified bilateral activity was initiated at a very sensitive time. The incumbent government is fast approaching its crucial time when it has to put together its budget for the next financial year. With the prevailing financial conditions, it will need large-scale resource inputs to come up with a budget that can be claimed people-friendly. Traditionally, Pakistan has relied on IMF loans to shore up its resources. The much trumpeted Kerry-Lugar assistance agreement is almost held in abeyance; the compensations promised for our efforts to support the war on terror, reportedly, are not coming Pakistan’s way as promised. The US realises that Pakistan is going to be in a desperate position soon. The pressure is well timed, mutual give and take can be managed.

The PIA has been put under additional sanctions by the USA. Its carriers and passengers going to the USA are put under additional scrutiny and pat down at Manchester Airport, which will take extra six hours. Besides the insult and ridicule that it will cause to the passengers, the PIA will be financially burdened as it will pay extra and additional parking and allied costs putting the national airlines under immense financial stress. This move by the US administration is indicative of the anger that Uncle Sam has on the closure of Nato supply routes.

Suddenly, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed has become a prime person on American hit list with a $10 million bounty on his head. Whatever his past, he is being targeted because he is the leading figure, who is opposing the reopening of Nato supply routes through Pakistan. His role in the Defence of Pakistan Council (DPC) that opposes the provision of supply routes to the American troops irks the US government. The US Deputy Secretary had raised the issue of Hafiz Saeed with Pakistani officials during his meetings, while Hafiz Saeed has dared the Americans to provide the evidence for allegations levelled against him. The manner the Hafiz Saeed affair is being managed shows that the US stands behind India on this which may cause double pressure on Pakistan. It is ironical that some reporters play to the American gallery when they opine that Hafiz Saeed “taunted” the Americans from the Flashman’s Hotel Rawalpindi situated opposite the GHQ gate. His presence in the “red zone” and linking it to the terrorist attack on GHQ a year ago leaves one with many speculations. The American effort seemingly is aimed to curtail activities of the DPC that it is mounting to raise public opinion against the reopening of supply routes. Linking him to official patronage has obvious consequences.

These two events are pointers towards the tip of the proverbial stick; however, there may be more to it behind the diplomatic smokescreen. On the carrot side, we are reading about the usual utterances cloaked in diplomatic verbiage. Mr Nides admits that both countries have different perspectives, but solutions will be found that ‘respect each other’s interests’. There is a desire to have relationships that are mutually beneficial to both countries; the US ‘fully’ respects Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and it attaches a lot of importance to the parliamentary review of the Pak-US relationship that is underway. On the surface, these appear very pleasant observations, but the firm declaration that “Pakistan ‘must respect’ US security needs” also speaks volumes about the nature of talks going on.

As noted above, this is a critical moment in the Pak-US relationship, especially with reference to the ongoing Afghan war. The Nato supplies have been suspended for almost five months. The American troops under the Nato umbrella are fighting an elusive enemy that strikes at the place and time of its choice. To fight such an enemy, one has to be prepared at all times. More so, the suspension of essential war material for long duration affects the efficacy to fight effectively. This is becoming evident on ground. America will go to any limits to have this embargo lifted. On the Pakistani side, we are also at a critical point. This is the time when our financial spin masters cobble together our annual budget for which they need financial transfusions from the IMF and the World Bank to keep the country afloat. The Americans understand our predicament and diplomatic bargaining has commenced.

From our side, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani has talked about the transparency and credibility in the terms of engagement in our relationship with the USA. He, too, attaches importance to the parliamentary review of the Pak-US relationship. However, there is a need to understand and outline a clear objective that Pakistan wants achieved. The past experience of mutual relationship has amply demonstrated that the tall promises of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity meant nothing to the USA. We faced attacks on our troops and sustained casualties; we know about the US Senate resolutions on Balochistan and the covert support extended to anti-state elements there. Nevertheless, mutual respect and benefits in American perception run in one way only. This is the opportunity that Pakistan must avail to establish a truly transparent relationship that has mutual respect as its cardinal principle.

At the present juncture, the USA has a one-point agenda. It is engaged in a so-called war on terror in Afghanistan. President Barack Obama has given a timeline for the withdrawal of US troops and this must be achieved as promised. The US needs the supply lines to close this war on a winning note and in time. Our new relationship should have this limited aim foremost and help the USA achieve the withdrawal. The agreement document should have first and foremost defined the war on terror. Pakistan should not accept the definition of terror put forward by the US military. Terrorism and the war on terror is being used as stratagem by the US for global domination and is heavily anti-Muslim; large-scale massacres by non-Muslims are not termed terrorism. Based on this fact, the transparent document should have laid down that Pakistan will facilitate that many supplies that will help and assist the USA to meet it objectives for on-schedule withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan. Beyond that there will be no cooperation in the so-called war on terror. It should have also spelled out in clear terms that the US would not use these supplies for operations against Pakistani territory from ground and air, including the drones. Our Parliament must honour the sentiment expressed by President Asif Zardari that drone attacks are counterproductive. Lastly, the agreement document must lay down that supplies passing through Pakistan will be subjected to custom checks, duties and transportation tariffs.

Pakistan has paid a heavy price for this on-off one-sided relationship; it cannot go on forever. If we want self-respect and dignity as a nation, we need to put forward these conditions for mutual relationship and watch the response. The promises of mutual benefits and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity will be laid bare. Pakistan will know where it stands and can then brace for whatever comes its way.

n The writer is a retired brigadier and political analyst.

Email: arjerral639@hotmail.com
-The Nation

Nasim Ahmed


There were no surprises in the set of 14 recommendations which the joint session of Parliament adopted last week by consensus to provide a new framework for Pakistan's ties with the US. The guidelines given by the Parliamentary Committee on National Security reflected the mood of the nation.

But it remains a moot point whether the government will be able to act on them in letter and spirit.

The PCNS deliberated long and hard to develop new terms of engagement with the US but, at the end of it all, it struck a compromise of sorts: while trying to capture the national mood heavily weighted in favour of an independent foreign policy, it took care to give the government ample room for manoeuvre in the harsh world of realpolitik.

The guidelines approved by the Pakistan Parliament have quite a wide sweep. While reiterating that the sovereignty of Pakistan shall not be compromised and the relationship with the United States should be based on mutual respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of each other, they lay down that the US footprint in Pakistan must be reviewed, putting an immediate end to drone attacks inside Pakistan and cessation of infiltration into Pakistani territory on any pretext including hot pursuit.

While allowing non-lethal NATO supplies, the recommendations call on Pakistan to seek an unconditional apology from the US for the November 26, 2011, unprovoked attack on the Salala check-post and not allow its air space to be used for transportation of weapons into Afghanistan. In this connection, the Ministry of Defense and the Pakistan Air Force have been asked to formulate new flying rules for areas contiguous to the border.

Another postulate put forward in the PCNS document demands that, contrary to past practice, no verbal agreement regarding national security should be entered into by the government or any department or organisation with any foreign government or authority. Other related points are: no overt or covert operation in Pakistan; no private security companies or operatives to be allowed and no establishment of bases by a foreign power on Pakistani soil.

The new foreign policy framework also lays guidelines for the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear assets. It says that the US-India civil nuclear agreement has significantly altered the strategic balance in the region and, therefore, Pakistan should seek from the US and others a similar treatment.
It is a comprehensive wish list, and one that calls for a carefully worked out package of diplomatic skill, economic sinew and military strength which Pakistan lacks. We have an extremely fragile and aid-dependent economy on the verge of collapse; our military strength is dependent on foreign supplies and, as numerous instances show, our diplomatic skill is not something to be proud of. Our foreign policy has been in a state of mess for decades now - lacking vision and a sense of direction. Short-term deals, ad hoc decisions and temporary arrangements have been the staples of our foreign policy.

What will change after Parliament's review of the co-ordinates of our foreign policy? To be sure, drone attacks are not going to stop as US officials have made it clear in their numerous statements that this is a matter that concerns their national security. All that will change now is that, perhaps, there will be a little more information sharing on the scope, methodology and frequency of drone attacks. As for not allowing foreign intelligence operatives, it is stating the obvious. Spies are not diplomats. They don't need the host country's permission to operate there. They are shadowy figures who are past-masters in the art of avoiding the security radars of the target countries.

Despite the US State Department spokesperson's latest re-iteration that Washington seeks enduring and strategic ties with Pakistan, the stark reality is that the US is already in a strategic relationship with India, and Pakistan is out of the loop. Washington has also so far not shown any willingness to conclude a civil nuclear deal with Pakistan as it has done with India.

It is clear that Parliament has set a hard, if not an impossible, task to the government which, given its own incompetence and an unfavourable combination of internal and external circumstances, it seems incapable of handling. As it is, the resumption of NATO supplies has drawn a chorus of protests from various quarters. The country's religious parties have openly and loudly criticized Parliament's decision on NATO supplies. The most vociferous in this connection have been the leaders of the Defence of Pakistan Council who have accused the rulers of being slaves of foreign powers and selling national honour and dignity for a pittance.

According to media reports, the religious parties are getting together to work out a strategy to block the NATO supplies, if and when resumed. This is the immediate challenge that the government faces. How it grapples with the gathering storm remains to be seen.

-CuttingEdge

April 22, 2012
By Khaled Ahmed

Most observers are worried about Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US-Nato forces from there in 2013-2014. It should be interesting to see what would happen to Pakistan once the Americans are gone.

Islamabad’s Jinnah Institute in its briefing (July 25, 2011) spelled out Pakistan’s ‘objectives’ in relation to post-withdrawal Afghanistan. The most outstanding point made in the report pertained to India: “Pakistani foreign policy elite accept that India has a role to play in Afghanistan’s economic reconstruction … but Pakistani security establishment [thinks] a reluctance to address Pakistani misgivings increases the likelihood of a growing Indian footprint, and in turn, New Delhi’s greater ability to manipulate the endgame negotiations and the post-settlement dispensation in Kabul”.

Will India get out of Afghanistan after the American withdrawal? From a statement by the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (“we will support the Afghan people”), it appears that it plans to retain its presence in Afghanistan.

The most likely post-withdrawal scenario is that there will be a civil war in Afghanistan. A parallel war will take place between the Afghan National Army and the non-state actors from Pakistan. The US commander in Afghanistan, General John Allen, has told Congress he thought a future 230,000-strong Afghan force, scaled down from a planned 352,000, was enough after 2017. That will historically be the largest army Afghanistan will ever have.

Ahmed Rashid in his latest book Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of Pakistan and the West (Allen Lane 2012) discusses the Afghan Army: “US recruitment policy includes a strict ratio established in 2003 among all ethnic groups. Thus Tajiks could not be over 25 per cent in the army, but in 2010 they constituted some 41 per cent of soldiers and officers in the army, while Tajik officers commanded 70 per cent of the units (P 87).

The Taliban will have 25,000 men, counting on the basis of the maximum mustered so far. The uneven battlefield will be ‘equalised’ by inserting additional fighters from Pakistan. The Tehreek-e-Taliban will raid across the Durand Line, but the manpower it mobilises may not suffice.

Pakistan expects Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami, ragtag warlords of Fata and Malakand to battle an Afghan Army already inclined to defection. But manpower will still be needed to even the scales and speed up defections. The Taliban will be helped by the Punjabi Taliban, of which the Asian Tigers are already aligned to the Haqqanis. The Defence of Pakistan Council headed by the powerful Jamaatud Dawa (JuD) will oblige with more Punjabi manpower. The JuD leader Hafiz Saeed allegedly says he alone can muster 100,000.

Pakistan is home to the armies that will enter Afghanistan but it hardly controls them. Therefore, the blowback from Afghanistan this time will be transformational for Pakistan. It may not survive the ‘fundraising’ by its non-state actors through kidnappings and bank robberies in its major cities. This trend among the state-supported jihadi outfits has been in evidence.

The Taliban in Pakistan have been criminalised. In affected areas, criminals are in the process of becoming Talibanised. Vendettas are carried out increasingly with suicide bombers because Taliban are busy selling their surplus fedayeen. Karachi and Peshawar are already paralysed by kidnappings for ransom. From the current trend in its Defence Housing Authority, Lahore too, is expected to be targeted in a big away.

Pakistan has sought to appease terrorism by becoming anti-American and pro-Taliban. After the withdrawal, a Talibanised Afghanistan will survive only if Pakistan, too, fulfils its promise of becoming a khilafat.

The policy of appeasement will proceed to its logical end. The remaining attributes of the state will fall off, with religious parties, plus madrassas with jihadi capacity, increasingly exercising authority in its name.

The Express Tribune

Hussain H Zaidi
Monday, April 23, 2012

There is a sense of deja vu when one goes through the recommendations put forward by parliament to the government for “new” terms of engagement with the United States. A great deal of the content of the proposed revised policy framework for relations between Islamabad and Washington was earlier recommended by the same parliament, as well as jointly by the parties represented in it.

The resolution unanimously passed by parliament is a familiar list of do’s and don’ts. It states, inter alia, that national sovereignty must not be compromised; that the relations between the two countries should be based on mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity; that the government should seek an unconditional apology from the US for the Salala attack, the proximate cause of the current stalemate in bilateral relations; that an independent foreign policy needs to be drawn up; that the drone strikes and any other form of infiltration into Pakistani territory should immediately come to a halt; that Nato should not be allowed to use Pakistan as a conduit for supplying arms to its forces in Afghanistan; that the nuclear programme should not be compromised; that the Americans should be asked for a civilian nuclear deal similar to the one they have with India; and that no verbal agreement involving national security may be concluded with any other country, and all such existing agreements must immediately be treated as null and void.

The resolution reaffirms Pakistan’s continuing commitment to combating terrorism, asks the world to acknowledge the colossal human and economic cost of the war on terror that the country is bearing and reciprocate by granting enhanced market access to its exports. The resolution is, however, silent about resumption of supply of goods other than weapons to Nato troops in Afghanistan. As is most often the case, the silence may be regarded as tacit consent.

All this looks nice on paper. Similar recommendations have been made in the past but have proved of little consequence. For instance, parliament in its in-camera session in the wake of the Abbottabad operation in May 2011 in which Osama bin Laden was killed, had warned Americans in so many words that intrusion into the Pakistani territory would no more be allowed, that national independence and territorial integrity would be protected at all cost and that if the US didn’t mend its ways, the government might withdraw transit the facility accorded to Nato forces.

However, within two days of the passage of that “historic” resolution the Predators struck twice, making a mockery of our claims of being a sovereign nation and the parliamentarians’ resolve to safeguard that status. The transit facility continued to be available to the Nato. It was only the killing of Pakistani soldiers deputed on the Salala check-post that that forced the government to stop the facility.

Coming back to the latest parliamentary resolution, it sums up the prevalent mood in Pakistan regarding the US. The widespread view here is that Pakistan has been taken for a ride by the Americans. We have been made to believe, the argument goes, that the war on terror is our own, while in point of fact it is America’s. Despite the horrendous cost of war that we’ve borne, Americans continue to cast aspersions on our sincerity and insist that we do more.

The American view, on the other hand, is that in the war on terror Pakistan is hunting with the hounds and running with the hare, and therefore, it is not a credible ally. “Didn’t we tell Pakistanis so many times,” the Americans would argue, “that Osama bin Laden was hiding in your territory? But they denied that all along until we tracked him down. Aren’t we telling them for quite some time that North Waziristan is the epicentre of terrorism and that they must set things right there, and promptly?”

While such accusations and counter-accusations will go on, some hard facts can hardly be denied. One, as the 2010 National Security Strategy of the Obama administration reiterates, “to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda and its affiliates” remains a key strategic objective of the US, which is to be achieved through a “judicious” use of American power both military and civilian. The military option includes strikes against Pakistan.

During his 2008 presidential election campaign, Mr Obama had declared that he would attack the Taliban and Al-Qaeda sanctuaries inside Pakistan if its government was unwilling or unable to hunt them down. And he has lived up to his promise.

Two, the relationship between Islamabad and Washington is essentially asymmetrical. One of the allies is the globe’s largest military and economic power and a stable democracy, while the other is an aid-addict country characterised by endemic political and economic instability. The engagement in such a relationship, especially when it rests on the bedrock of a fight against terror, can take many forms, ranging from interference in the political developments in the lesser state to military incursions into its territory.

This explains why drone strikes into Pakistani territory are so common. They form an important component of the US counter terrorism strategy. On the face of it, the matter has repeatedly been taken up with Washington at the highest level and on each occasion Americans have assured to respect Pakistan’s sovereignty and our leadership pledged to safeguard the motherland’s territorial integrity come what may. Yet it is unlikely that the strikes will come to a halt. Hence, not surprisingly, just after the passage of the unanimous resolution by the Pakistani parliament, the Americans declared that the predatory raids would continue.

Three, states differ in their capacity and susceptibility to foreign interference. Whereas some states pursue remarkably independent policies, others are sovereign only in name and, in practice, are no more than satellite states. Generally, the more powerful a state, the more sovereign it is. Hence, in practice, state sovereignty is manifested in national power taking all its elements into account. Thus, the US raids on Pakistan are without any justification, morally and legally. International politics is essentially power politics and a nation has to be strong enough to safeguard its sovereignty. Shorn of that strength, a nation can only register its protest with, put diplomatic pressure on, and try to persuade the belligerent nation that the intervention is proving counterproductive.

Four, a few important questions remain unanswered. For instance, are the drone strikes being carried out with or without the permission of the Pakistani government? Are our sovereign lawmakers, let alone the people, aware of any agreement, written or verbal, between the two governments authorising the Americans to strike at will at targets inside our borders? Do the parliamentarians know of our authorities’ capability and the willingness to hit the Predators?

Finally, to Americans it doesn’t matter much whether the warning against intrusion into Pakistani territory comes from the executive or the legislature in Pakistan, whether it is in the form of a unanimous or split decision. Parliament may be our supreme national institution, but it is difficult to see how its recommendations carry weight with the US. The mere fact that the warning against unilateral actions into our territory comes from the legislature, and not merely the executive, can’t halt them, for the simple reason that for the Americans the supreme interest is their own national interest and the supreme institution is their own legislature, and not Pakistan’s.

The writer is a freelance contributor based in Islamabad. Email: hussainhzaidi @gmail.com

April 24, 2012
By: Nighat Imtiaz Rafi

The political and economic outcomes in Pakistan over the last 64 years have been a mixture of paradoxes. It is a fact that economic growth can take place only in the presence of political stability; but in Pakistan, it has been observed as being directly related to the Pak-US relationship. In order to address the impact of this relationship on Pakistani politics and economy, it is necessary to revisit the essential dimensions of the country’s history, which can be divided into six distinct periods

Period I: The Fifties (1947 to 1958), Pakistan aligned with the US: Pakistan started to depend on US aid since its establishment due to many reasons; the primarily being its weak economic structure and security concerns because of its eastern neighbour, India. Right from the early days of the relationship between the USA and Pakistan, the former has defined rules of engagement for the latter in favour of its own interests with foreign assistance serving as bait. It was Pakistan’s geostrategic significance that attracted the American policymakers’ attention during the cold war; they realised that it could play an important role in the containment of Communist Russia. In 1954, large-scale interaction between the US and Pakistani military was initiated that resulted in Pakistan joining Seato and Cento. This, however, affected its diplomatic ties with other countries and did not serve the basic purpose of defence against Indian aggression.

Period II: The Sixties (1958 to 1969), An opportune coup and more aid: The first military coup in Pakistan took place under the command of General Ayub Khan (1958-69). It was widely assumed that it was endorsed by the US to win the support of pro-West Pakistani military in the cold war. During this decade, Pakistan received huge amounts of economic aid from the United States, besides sufficient military assistance. But that aid was only concentrated in West Pakistan not East Pakistan. The 1960s era was, perhaps, the most fond relationships were enjoyed both by the US and Pakistan. GDP growth, in this decade, jumped to an average annual rate of 6.8 percent from 3 percent in the 1950s. The manufacturing sector expanded by 9 percent annually and various new industries were set up. By 1969, Pakistan’s manufactured exports were higher than the exports of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia combined. Karachi was seen as an economic role model around the world; South Korea copied the city’s second “Five-Year Plan” and the World Financial Centre, in Seoul, is designed and modelled after Karachi. But this economically booming period was short lived. The war with India in 1965 cost Pakistan in the form of cut down of US aid. Ayub could not suffer the aftermath of 1965 war and resigned from office after surrendering the presidential power to General Yahya Khan in 1969.

Period III: The Seventies (1971 to 1977), Democracy, Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions and sanctions; As a result of the 1970 election, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became President (1971-1974) and later Prime Minister in 1974. This period is seen as a “quiet cold war” between the US and Pakistan. Under Bhutto, Pakistan focused on the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, and building closer ties with the Soviet Bloc. American aid to Pakistan had already started declining due to Bhutto’s secret pursuit of nuclear technology during the concluding year of his regime. The Carter Administration imposed the Symington Amendment on Pakistan in April 1979, thereby cutting off most of the economic and military aid.

The economic growth rate in the 1970s fell to 4.8 percent per annum from 6.8 percent recorded in the 1960s. Income inequalities rose compared to the previous period, while inflation accelerated, averaging 16 percent from 1971 to 1977, thereby hurting the poor miserably. The large-scale manufacturing sector performed very sluggishly, netting a growth rate of only 3 percent.

Period IV: The Eighties (1977 to 1988), The Islamic fundamentalism: The overthrow of the Bhutto government by a military coup in July 1977 by General Ziaul Haq halted the socialist experiment and Pakistan’s ties with the US improved. Zia used religion to legitimise his takeover and subsequent rule. The roots of present Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan can be traced to this period. In December 1979, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan converted both the US and Pakistan into natural allies. The restrictions under the Symington Amendment on military assistance to Pakistan were waived off by the Congress in 1986 and the two countries further agreed on a multi-year (1988-93) $4 billion economic development and security assistance programme. It is notable that the US aid basically swelled from $60 million in economic and development assistance in 1979 to more than $600 million a year in the mid-1980s, and the military aid was in addition to the $3.1 billion economic assistance for Islamabad. Economic conditions improved due to the inflow of US aid; GDP grew at 6.6 percent annually with agriculture at 4 percent and the manufacturing sector at 9 percent. Fiscal deficits, however, widened to 8 percent of GDP, despite a decline in development expenditure. As a consequence, Pakistan had to approach the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance in 1988.

Period V: The Nineties (1988 to 1999), Democracy and post-cold war coldness: After the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the restoration of democracy in Pakistan, the Pak-US relations quickly deteriorated. Once again Washington started to target Pakistan’s nuclear programme and thus changed its bilateral aid policy towards its former close ally by passing the Pressler Amendment; presenting the civilian regime with a serious economic crisis; and significantly improving relations with India. Pakistan found itself in a state of extremely high insecurity, as tensions mounted with India and Afghanistan’s infighting continued. Within a brief period, all channels of bilateral aid to Pakistan were shutdown. During this period, the US provided negligible economic aid to Pakistan and almost no military assistance. In 1998, Nawaz Sharif ordering the nuclear tests was met with great hostility by the US and President Bill Clinton placed economic embargo on Pakistan. The relations were also strained after the Kargil war with India. A year after the nuclear tests, a military coup was staged against Nawaz Sharif.

The GDP growth rate decelerated to 4 percent. The investment ratio fell to 13.9 percent during 1998-1999 as foreign savings, which formerly bridged the gap between national savings and investment dried up in May 1998. The persistence of above 7 percent of GDP fiscal deficit led to the accumulation of large levels of domestic and external debt throughout the decade. Development expenditures took a major hit and GDP dropped to 3 percent from 8 percent in the first half of the 1980s. Social sector expenditures were squeezed to accommodate higher debt service and defence expenditures. Total external debt levels became unsustainable, rising from $20 billion in 1990 to $43 billion (47.6 percent of GDP) in 1998. Exports stagnated and Pakistan lost its market share in a buoyant world trade environment. The incidence of poverty nearly doubled from 18 percent to 34 percent, and the unemployment rate rose as well.

Period VI: The Twenties (1999 to 2007), 9/11: The Military-led Pakistan at America’s Frontline Again: However, September 11, 2001, once again changed the geostrategic landscape in favour of Pakistan. The US needed Pakistan’s support to invade Afghanistan and dismantle the Taliban regime that was alleged to be hosting Al-Qaeda, the so-called perpetrator of the 9/11 attacks. The Chief of Army Staff and President, General Pervez Musharraf, assured Washington of support from Pakistani government and army. Thus, Pakistan joined the war on terror. The US ignored the lack of democracy and human rights issues in Pakistan, all sanctions were lifted and official aid to Pakistan was not only restored, but also increased.

Pakistan’s economic prospects began to increase significantly, due to the unprecedented inflows of foreign assistance at the end of 2001. In 2002, the US-led Paris Club rescheduled Pakistan’s debt on generous terms, and in April 2003, the Americans reduced Pakistan’s bilateral official debt by $1 billion. Foreign exchange reserves and exports grew to record levels after a sharp decline in the previous decade. The economic growth rate averaged 7 percent in 2002 up from 3.1 percent in 2001. The re-profiling of the stock of debt brought down the debt-to-GDP ratio to 55 percent. The fiscal deficit remained below or slightly above 4 percent of GDP. The investment rate grew to 23 percent of GDP and an estimated $14 billion of foreign private capital inflows financed many sectors of the economy.

With Barack Obama elected as President, the US promised to triple non-military aid to Pakistan with an objective to ensure smooth transition of its troops out of Afghanistan by 2014 with the help of Pak Army. Pakistan’s economy and its military have suffered huge losses in fighting a US war on terror for almost a decade. As compensation, in early 2010, US passed a non-military aid package of $1.5 billion annually for five years, out of which only $300 million was released and remaining has been suspended on the non-fulfilment of their unacceptable terms by Pakistan.

Pak-US relations reinforce the view that every time Washington requires Islamabad’s support to achieve its geopolitical goals in the region; it does not hesitate to embrace military dictators. While the aid has been provided merely to achieve US foreign policy objectives that resulted in higher economic growth, rather than sound economic policies. Therefore, economic accomplishments devoid of political legitimacy, however impressive, prove to be short-lived.

n The writer is a senior banker.

Email: nighat.rashid@gmail.com
-The News

April 25, 2012
Rafia Zakaria

THE pine-topped lush landscape of Seattle, Washington, with its hills and rain-soaked greenery could not be more different from the craggy, burnished plains of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

Yet despite the landscape at which they stare down, the skies above the former will soon be hosting the same wide-winged, aerial vehicles that are known so well on the edges of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

According to the Federal Aviation Authority Modernisation and Reform Act of 2012, signed into law by President Obama this February, all US local law-enforcement authorities will be required to make arrangements for the “safe integration of civilian drones into American airspace” by the year 2015.

The drones could be owned and operated by private individuals as well as law-enforcement. The law does not specify whether it refers only to unarmed drones for surveillance or armed ones for law-enforcement purposes.

The passage of the act has catapulted the drone issue, from a remote distant problem concerning only Afghanistan-Pakistan issues, to one front and centre in the American public sphere.

In its statement, the American Civil Liberties Union insisted that while it saw the utility of unarmed drones to accomplish basic government missions, it was seriously concerned that “the use of drones can really change the relationship of people with the government”.

Disapproving sentiments are not limited to watchdog groups alone. A Rasmussen poll conducted in February, soon after the passage of the act, found that only 30 per cent of American voters approve of any sort of drones flying in American skies.

In the last weekend of April, a drone summit is expected to convene in Washington D.C. bringing together activists, lawyers and citizen groups together to formulate a comprehensive strategy to push back against the government’s use of armed and unarmed drones in the US and elsewhere.

In Pakistan, the debate on armed drones has centred largely on issues of sovereignty and transparency, questions of who flies the drones and who selects the targets being the pivotal concerns. As a consequence, most believe that the problems surrounding drones could be solved if the technology was in Pakistani, as opposed to American, hands.

One story reported by Public Radio International asserted that a Pakistani drone which is to be called ‘Burraq’ is already being developed with the Chinese. According to the report, Pakistani drones have not only begun to be made but also have a long history.

Many have been developed by a private engineer named Raja Sabri Khan. Mr Khan admits to having sold designs to an unnamed company in the US and to the fact that drone design is not a new concept in Pakistan. Both he and retired Pakistani general Talat Masood, also quoted in the story, admit that drones whether American or Pakistani, are part of Pakistan’s future.

It makes sense then to ask whether the problems Pakistanis currently attach to armed drones would simply dissipate if they were controlled by pilots in the Pakistan Air Force. Those holding this position would have to argue that the problem with drones is poised not on technology but strategy, making the foreign nature of the operation more problematic than its unmanned remote aspect.

If armed drones were operated by the Pakistani military against their own population, there would be more care, fewer missing bodies, less collateral damage and greater transparency. That, of course, is what the optimists rooting for Pakistani control of drones would say.

Human rights activists are wary of this solution, less amenable to believing that a controller sitting in a Pakistani airbase instead of an American one would somehow be more careful, less cavalier about pushing the kill button simply by virtue of his or her nationality. Their issue with armed drones is not the nationality of the controller but the inherent disparity of the encounter; the reduction of human beings to moving dots and homes to coordinates.

For the unmanned variety, the problem shifts from the temptation of not looking closely enough, to looking too closely and too intently at things never meant to be seen at all. Like a virtual raid, whose knowledge may never be possessed by anyone but the raiders, the drone that watches everything leaves nothing concealed from the eyes of the state or the vigilante.

The rights issues mentioned above have curious iterations in the Pakistani context where the staunchest opponents of drones seem to have problems not with the technology, its insidious inequality as a killing machine or mockery of individual privacy.
In their vociferous speeches against drones, no one in the Difaa-i-Pakistan Council for example ever mentions these points.

Drones are bad indeed, but only because they are a curse imposed by a foreign power. Armed drones in the service of their own projects, to kill their own enemies, or unarmed ones to enforce strict moral codes on one and all would be quite welcome. A moral police with a fleet of drones that could see anything, anytime might well be every religious conservative’s fantasy force.

Made in Pakistan or the US, fulfilling one political or strategic objective or another, drones are here to stay. Articulating opposition to arming them, and insisting on controls that circumscribe their limits does not consequently mean denying the wrongs that have instigated their use.

The colonisation of the private sphere by terrorists who hide behind women and children, intentionally pushing them in the path of missiles, the use of village homes as safe havens by those guilty of killing hundreds in suicide bombings is one of the most despicable tactics of warfare that the world has ever seen. The challenge in responding to them is not to simply, blindly oppose armed or unarmed drones, but to oppose them for the right reasons.

The writer is an attorney teaching political philosophy and constitutional law.

rafia.zakaria@gmail.com
-Dawn

April 27, 2012
By Shabbir Cheema

On April 12, Pakistan’s parliament unanimously approved a new set of guidelines on relations with the US, an action that could pave the way for the reopening of the critical US and Nato supply lines into Afghanistan. For the past few months, these routes have remained closed as ties between Pakistan and the US plunged to an all-time low in the wake of the US raid inside Pakistani territory in pursuit of Osama bin Laden, the killing of two Pakistanis by a CIA contractor in Lahore and the accidental US attack that killed a dozen Pakistani soldiers at a border military post.

While the US and Nato will welcome the reopening of the supply lines, they are likely to be far less enthusiastic about some other provisions of the framework provided by parliament including an end to drone attacks, no future foreign bases or US troops inside Pakistani territory and a ban on transportation of weapons through Pakistan to Nato forces in Afghanistan.

The drone attacks are hugely unpopular in Pakistan, where they are viewed as being counterproductive. The Obama Administration, however, finds them particularly effective against remote militant safe havens and the US is unlikely to end them readily.

Because of its dependence on US aid, Pakistan is unlikely to make the reopening of the supply lines conditional to an end to drone attacks. However, there may be room for compromise on their scope: during the Bush administration, drones were used only against high-value targets, but their number expanded under Barack Obama.

Parliament’s guidelines also call for the US to apologise unconditionally for the accidental cross-border attack, something which is difficult for the Obama Administration to do in an election year. A compromise is likely, resulting in a declaration of remorse by the US that falls short of a formal apology.

Within Pakistan, the new terms of engagement are significant in several ways. First, the guidelines would introduce domestic transparency in Pakistan-US relations. This is a radical departure from previous military-led governments, which did not take the public into confidence about security and foreign policies.

Second, parliamentary oversight of Pakistani foreign and security policies will promote more accountability and provide more legitimacy to the civilian government. Over the long term, however, it is yet to be seen whether a habitually dominant military will reconcile to playing a subordinate role to parliamentary oversight.

Despite their disagreements, the US and Pakistan are well aware of their interdependence, especially when it comes to the endgame in Afghanistan. President Obama’s meeting with Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani on the sidelines of the recent nuclear disarmament conference in South Korea helped set the stage for a resetting of the relationship, which was followed a week later by a meeting between the countries’ two highest-ranking military officers.

In the short term, the US will be strongly motivated to find a compromise that would enable the reopening of the supply lines to Afghanistan. Officials are hoping the routes can be opened before an important Nato summit in Chicago next month.

The Express Tribune