April 4, 2012
By: S M Hali

The troubled province of Balochistan is being painted out to be on the verge of dismemberment from Pakistan as East Pakistan in 1971 to become Bangladesh. It is portrayed that the people of Balochistan are totally disenchanted with Pakistan and would rather opt for independence; and there is a fierce war of insurgency raging to achieve this end.

The fact is that, indeed, Balochistan is the largest but the poorest of country’s provinces. Its share of national income has historically ranged between 3.7 percent and 4.9 percent.

Since 1972, Balochistan’s gross income has grown in size by 2.7 times. It is rich in mineral resources; the natural gas fields of Sui supply gas to the whole of Pakistan. Outside Quetta the resource extraction infrastructure of the province is gradually developing, but still lags far behind other parts of Pakistan. There are currently several major exhaustible-resource-extraction related construction projects in progress, including the seaport at Gwadar.

Exhaustible resources trade will be conducted via the port to and from China. There is also Chinese involvement in the nearby Saindak gold and copper mining project. A large gold and copper deposit exists in the Chagai District and has been called the Reko Diq. The main licence (EL5) is held jointly by the Government of Balochistan (25 percent), Antofagasta Minerals (37.5 percent) and Barrick Gold (37.5 percent). These deposits are comparable in size to the nationally-controlled deposits Sarcheshmeh in Iran and Escondida in Chile (which are the second and the third largest proven deposits of copper in the world). Foreign multinationals BHP Billiton and Tethyan entered into a joint venture with the Balochistan government to develop these deposits. The potential annual copper production has been estimated to be 900,000 to 2.2 million tons. The deposits seem to be largely of porphyry rock nature.

Once Balochistan reaches its true potential, it will in fact become the richest of Pakistan’s provinces and will help it sustain economically. However, the atmosphere in Balochistan is tense and exasperating, duly marred with violent acts of killing innocent people/political opponents, looting and kidnapping unarmed fellow citizens for the purposes of getting payoffs and ransom, and challenging the writ of the state through armed attacks against law enforcement agencies/Frontier Constabulary (FC), thereby creating further chaos and disorder in the province.

Unfortunately, the political leadership, both at provincial and federal levels, appears to be oblivious to the consequences. It is being propagated that foreign agencies are increasing their clout to destabilise the province. The conspiracy theory is based on getting control of its rich mineral resources, as well as exploiting its strategic location overlooking the Arabian Sea. Thus, instead of thwarting the evil eye being cast on the province, the political leadership, along with a few drumbeaters in the media, is busy reiterating that the situation in Balochistan has worsened due to the mess created by the army/ISI/FC. This is extremely cynical and contemptuous, as the political government is in place for the last four years and for the first time a civilian government is likely to complete its five years’ term. The media and the public opinion builders show bigotry/prejudice against the army/ISI/FC and blame the previous government/army/FC for their failure to complete any of the developmental projects or to address the problem of law and order situation, political turmoil and foreign interference in the province. It is, however, important to keep in mind that the huge amounts of developmental funds expended by the present political leaders, yet they have failed to provide any relief to the Balochis.

The truth is that a handful of feudal lords are trying to foment trouble and fan separatism. The majority of Balochis neither want separation, nor dissidence. They are interested in peace and prosperity. It is imperative that to silence the rabble-rousers, the media should suggest to all concerned to stop blaming the army/ISI/FC for the failure of the political leadership and give chance to pro-federation majority to express its views on unity of federation, patriotism and loyalty to Pakistan, rejecting the illegal demands of few delinquent separatists and wayward rebels. Majority of people in Balochistan are peace-loving and deserve to have the basic amenities of life, like education, health, communication and employment opportunities. Prosperity can definitely return to the province by sinking the differences and making a concerted effort to uplift the status of the common Baloch.

The writer is a political and defence analyst.

Email: sultanm.hali@gmail.com
-The Nation

April 7, 2012
Sayed G B Shah Bokhari

In his three-part article in The News, titled, ‘The real Balochistan,’ former senator Sana Baloch has mentioned the backwardness and deprivation of the Baloch people. This is looking at the problem in isolation, ignoring the reality that most other parts of the country are also backward and deprived.

If Balochistan is a virtual prison because of “thousands of check-posts dotting the province,” then so are the other provinces of Pakistan, given the threat posed by the extremists. In Peshawar, the capital of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, where I live in the most posh area of the cantonment, I have to leave and enter my house via a military police check-post, which is right in front of my gate, and this has been happening for several years.

Balochistan was never peaceful. The Khan of Qalat, claiming an independent status for his region, revolted against the central government soon after the departure of the British on August 14, 1947. The democratically elected prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto ordered military action in Balochistan in 1974, and so did the government of Gen Ziaul Haq.

The fault lies with the mindset of the local sardars. The British had no interest in Balochistan and had therefore given a free hand to the local sardars to administer the tribes at their own discretion so long as peace was maintained in the region. With the onset of a new Muslim League government, the sardars could not accept receiving directions first from Karachi and then Islamabad, nor could they accept their highly subjugated tribesmen being introduced to democracy.

It is not true that the central government’s policies and actions in Balochistan devastated millions of lives. The truth is that the arrogance and inhuman treatment by the sardars devastated the lives of the Baloch masses. Nawab Akbar Bugti, who developed personal differences with the Kalpars and Masuris, banished the sub-tribes from their ancestral regions and forced them to lead nomadic lives in Sindh and Punjab. They were rehabilitated by the federal government in 2002.

The Baloch sardars also hindered any development schemes or establishment of educational institutions, so that the locals did not become conscious of their own rights. Millions or rupees in the royalty received from the Sui gas fields was squandered on luxury cars and pleasure trips abroad by the tribal chieftains. Not a single paisa was spent on the welfare of tribesmen.

Non-Baloch ethnic groups who have lived in the province for several decades and are engaged in educational and health-sector activities have been mercilessly killed. When Nawab Bugti was made governor of Balochistan, the first action he took was to cleanse the administration of experienced non-Baloch bureaucrats in the province. During his rules as governor and chief minister of Balochistan, Bugti did not initiate a single development project there. Many other Baloch personalities held extremely important offices but started or completed no project worth mentioning.

Gen Mohammad Musa, from the Hazara tribe of Balochistan, served as the second commander-in-chief of the army and governor of what was then West Pakistan in the progressive Ayub era, and was appointed governor of Balochistan during Zia’s regime. Sardar Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali of Balochistan was prime minister of the country.

A major portion of the Balochistan budget is spent on the upkeep of an army of ministers and advisers. Were there genuine concern for the welfare of fellow Baloch, the lawmakers would have voluntarily reduced the size of the cabinet. Balochistan’s home minister Mir Zafarullah Zahri revealed on March 28 that three ministers in the provincial coalition setup are involved in kidnapping for ransom. If Baloch ministers are themselves involved in perpetuation of such heinous crimes, it is difficult to see how the administration can be expected to halt the deterioration of the law-and-order situation. Are Islamabad and the establishment entirely responsible for the crisis?

The cantonments established by our army have always brought development and prosperity to local populations. Kharian in Punjab and Punnu Aqil in Sindh, for instance, were unknown arid places. But they have been turned into model towns when they were converted into cantonments, because they resulted in roaring business in the areas and employment opportunities for the locals.

The 1,700-kilometres Baloch coastline has three modern naval facilities, the Jinnah Naval Base at Ormara, Chaghai and Kharan. It has strategically significant regions like the one where the nuclear test was conducted in 1998. Also, on Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s instructions 10,000 Baloch men have been inducted in the army.

As for the natural wealth of the Balochistan that includes natural gas, coal, copper and gold, the greatest obstacle to the exploitation of this wealth is the disturbed law-and-order situation. For its own lack of expertise and resources, the Baloch population needs to get the help of non-Baloch compatriots to exploit the mineral wealth.

If the Balochistan problem is to be resolved, the lawmakers of the province will have to be more honest in the utilisation of the available funds and resources for the welfare of the masses.

The writer is a retired colonel.

Email: northpole716@gmail.com
-The News

April 11, 2012
Dr Qaisar Rashid

Much has been written on the challenges to the newly appointed DG ISI Lieutenant General Zaheerul Islam but little has been written on the challenges to the perception and the consequent role of the ISI. This write-up tries to address the latter.

The first challenge to the ISI is to comprehend the grounds on which the fidelity of a national can be questioned, and the grounds on which it cannot be. The ancillary challenge is the modus operandi that is supposed to be adopted to bring an alleged person to a court of law to be arraigned for his deeds. The ISI may be following the old manual written perhaps for the Cold War era — how to label a national as a foe to win the war at all costs. Contrarily, the post-Cold War era is quite different. It is tolerant to numerous human aberrations. It is lenient to several human anomalies. It dampens political ultra-nationalism. It discourages religious fanaticism. It values independent human thinking. The readjustments actuated by the absence of the Cold War are still affecting one area or another of society. The ISI needs to keep itself abreast of those changes to appreciate the flexible boundaries of loyalty of citizens, including the Baloch, to their country.

Secondly, the post-Cold War era has redefined the boundaries of human rights and readjusted the margins of dissent. In all societies, both human rights and dissent have now acquired more space to thrive than ever before. Human rights are considered absolute and dissent is regarded as a way of life — and not a matter to be condemned and dispatching a dissenter to a death cell. The ISI needs to understand the concept of human rights afresh and the definition of violation of human rights anew. It will be pathetic if the ISI seeks refuge in the comparison of how many people were rendered missing by the intelligence agencies of other countries with its own performance in doing so. There is no need for any such contest. The comparison is absurd and justification is abominable. Further, a malevolent act carried out by a country does not permit another country to ape the same. The US has already been reviled both at home and abroad for its Guantanamo Bay policy. There is no room for any Guantanamo Bay in Pakistan. To muffle the dissenting voice of Pakistanis, including the Baloch, was not the objective of the constitution of the ISI. To compare the role of the ISI with foreign intelligence agencies, there are available other better areas of performance, which need not be mentioned here.

Thirdly, the post-Cold War era has brought forth a phenomenon (which enfolds a paradox) the understanding of which is another challenge to the ISI. On the one hand, there is happening a trans-continental migratory movement of people while on the other, there is emerging an ethnic nationalism at home. The ISI needs to study the similarities and differences (which are numerous) between both parts of the phenomenon. The ISI should also conduct a study what role grievances and deprivation play in necessitating both sections of the phenomenon. It is a shame that the military gave a guard of honour to General Pervez Musharraf, who abrogated the Constitution of Pakistan on November 3, 2007, but has been dealing with human beings living in Balochistan as if they were animals. Apparently, the abrogation of the constitution is a lesser evil but raising voice for one’s rights is a bigger one. Not ethnic nationalism and its manifestations but the appearance of mutilated dead bodies in Balochistan is an antithesis to the theme of oneness of Pakistan.

Fourthly, the ISI is surrounded by sycophants existing in the domain of politics. They are there with an axe to grind. How come Sheikh Rashid of Awami Muslim League knows the way the military or the ISI works? Is he briefed on that? He seems hell bent on becoming a blue-eyed chap of the Corps Commanders Rawalpindi. Ironically, on any TV talk show, he can speak on Balochistan at length to defend the military and the ISI but he shies away from speaking on the problems of and solutions for the railways as its ex-minister. He does all that obsequiousness not for any altruistic cause but to meet his selfish motive: to persuade the ISI to rig the next elections for him to bring him into power. These sycophants engender more harm than benefit to the ISI and need to be kept at arm’s length.

Fifthly, the ISI seems to have fallen prey to certain defence analysts who now are in abundance around. The other day, one such defence analyst was found proclaiming that the idea of the Dubai model was spawning unrest in Balochistan and unless this idea fizzled out, no peace could be introduced in Balochistan. The answer is very simple: if Balochistan has the potential to become Dubai, Pakistan should take the initiative and make this dream come true. Why is Pakistan faltering on that account? Another defence analyst has been trying to find the path of making another martial law possible. The pathfinder is determined to justify abrogation of the constitution under the trite excuse of ‘national interests’. Perceivably, the worth of a defence analyst is to grasp the seat of a director at some defence institute, deliver lectures at some war college, secure a position in some government-owned organisation including the state-run TV or acquire a piece of land at a nominal price in a DHA. These defence analysts feed on the vulnerabilities of the ISI and promote their own interests.

In fact, the glass of the media is also half-full of ISI’s toadies. It is understandable that in Pakistan to comment as a sycophant on the perceived challenges to the ISI is one thing but to comment on the ISI as a critic is a different ball game, called a risky business — the cost of which may be a critic’s scalp.

The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com
-Daily Times

April 11, 2012
Rafia Zakaria

IT has been a dark spring for the minority Shia Hazara in Balochistan. On Monday, at least six people from this community were killed and three others were injured in a drive-by shooting for which the banned group Lashkar-i-Jhangvi has claimed responsibility.

A group of people had been sitting in a shoe shop when four assailants on motorcycles opened fire on them, and then escaped.
This was the third such incident in the past 10 days.

On March 29, eight people had been killed in separate incidents of firing around Quetta. In the first attack, assailants opened fire on a bus full of passengers travelling from Hazara Town towards Quetta city. They managed to flee even as people lay injured and dying on the street.

The attack on the bus was a grim repetition of another that is etched on the bloody landscape of Balochistan. In September last year, a group of men and women from Quetta’s Shia Hazara community travelling to Iran were stopped by armed assailants. The attackers told the women, children and the driver of the bus, who was not Hazara, to remain inside.

All the men and boys were taken out of the bus, lined up on the road outside and shot. When the bullets stopped flying, 29 lay dead or dying on the highway where the massacre took place. The place was Mastung, near the border with Iran, and it took the attackers half an hour to accomplish their grim mission.

Yet not a single one of the murderers has been caught. Nearly a month later, on Oct 19, a Crimes Investigation Department report submitted before the Balochistan High Court said that while an important clue had been found regarding the massacre, details could not be disclosed because that would affect further investigation.

And still the killings continue. In the months between last September and now, there have been repeated attacks on the Hazara, who can be physically distinguished from the other people of Balochistan because of their resemblance to their Central Asian and Mongol ancestors.

Again and again the Hazara Shia have been targeted, from poor daily-wage labourers living in Hazara Town to former Olympic athletes leaving their workplaces. They have been assassinated in full view of anonymous onlookers as part of the project of exterminating the Shia from the area.

Edicts issued by the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi in Balochistan, and published in local Urdu and Hazara newspapers, label members of the community as wajib-ul-qatl, or deserving of death. The community has been warned that its settlements in Hazara Town and on Alamdar Road will be transformed into graveyards as the war against them continues.

The words are grim and true; the war against the Hazara has continued in the days following the Mastung attack, with the latest set of killings representing just another episode in this macabre saga of death. Unsurprisingly, the Hazara community — that has not aligned itself with either the Baloch nationalists or the more recently settled Pakhtuns in the area — has become increasingly dejected about its future.

Just days before this latest incident of violence, a report issued by the Balochistan Home Department failed to note with any specificity the lethal conditions faced by the community.

Last week, during a hearing conducted by a three-member bench of the Pakistan Supreme Court, Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry expressed his alarm over the silence, asking members of the Balochistan administration to explain why no one suspected of dumping mutilated bodies or shooting down innocent people is ever apprehended.

Undoubtedly, the Shia Hazara are victims of the ineptitude that so incensed the SC justices last week. But there are other specifics that make the Hazara community particularly hapless among the many suffering people of Balochistan.

First, their small numbers and long-standing loyalties to the Pakistani state, displayed in the military service records of community leaders, puts them at odds with the Baloch nationalist movement.

Second, the location of their enclave in Quetta, sitting close to both the southward road to Karachi and the highways leading to Iran, has in recent years become the centre of global strategic interest which has created incentives for others to drive them out.

The extermination of the community, either through targeted attacks or through the massacres, thus accomplishes not just sectarian aims, but also forces scared Hazaras fleeing the area to either abandon property or sell it at low prices to waiting land-grabbers.

The lack of local avenues of recourse for a festering human rights issue is exacerbated further by the complexities faced abroad.
In previous decades, small minorities such as the Hazara, who have few local options for saving themselves in a milieu wracked by conflict, were able to avail the international human rights platform to draw attention to their plight. Even on this count, the Hazara face a particular disadvantage.

In the United States, last February’s introduction of a resolution by Congressman Dana Rohrabacher has promoted the idea that all those fighting for justice in Balochistan are automatically inimical to the Pakistani state. This misperception is particularly harmful to the Hazara cause since it inaccurately conflates a human rights issue — their right to be free of religious persecution — with a nationalist cause that seeks secession rather than accountability as a solution.

All around the world, it is always the smallest, most peace-loving, least politically connected groups that are selected as targets by those seeking to scare the populations they seek to control.

For the Shia Hazara of Balochistan, who are seeking not independence but their rights under the Pakistani constitution, the dearth of local sympathy and the brashness of global generalisations have colluded to produce a landscape where hope seems as elusive as justice.

The writer is an attorney teaching political philosophy and constitutional law.

rafia.zakaria@gmail.com
-Dawn

April 15, 2012
By Imtiaz Gul

Balochistan continues to burn. The federal government remains indifferent to the smouldering fires of militancy, sectarian violence and, above all, the wave of crime that many believe is happening under political patronage. The resignation of Senator Lashkari Raisani reflects the frustration within the Pakistan Peoples Party ranks in Balochistan.

Police officials claim that currently over 70 criminal gangs and numerous insurgent groups are operating in the province. Both of these actors have political supporters. The level of collusion between criminal gangs and politicians is so entrenched that the National Party’s vice-president Senator Mir Hasil Khan Bizenjo and Lashkari Raisani allege that provincial ministers patronise criminal gangs.

A recent report by the Balochistan Home Department stated that 1,493 innocent citizens have been killed and 3,313 injured in 1,718 incidents, mostly of targeted killings and sectarian attacks from 2007 to 2012. The report on the deteriorating law and order situation in the province says that militants are spearheading violent activities. The report categorically underlined that particularly since 2007, the insurgent outfits have developed a nexus with criminal gangs operating in the province for financial and outreach reasons.

The report pointed out that banned militant sectarian outfits are also colluding with the insurgents and criminal gangs to enhance their outreach in the area. The first case of kidnapping by Baloch insurgents surfaced in 2009, when the hitherto unknown Balochistan Liberation United Front abducted an American United Nations official, John Solecki, and kept him hostage for two months.

Though it is difficult to establish any direct link between Baloch insurgents and kidnappings for ransom, plenty of evidence on various proponents of violence and crime is available on how these groups move in tandem to mobilise funding from smuggling, extortions, car hijackings, abductions for ransom, and illegal weapons’ trade, which involves heavy machine guns, rocket launchers and grenades.

Nationalist leaders like Mr Bizenjo and Dr Ishaq Baloch believe that the failure of law and order has emerged as the biggest threat to the province. They claim that people carrying ID cards allegedly belonging to intelligence agencies are abusing their authority for personal, financial and political gains. These intelligence operatives are so entrenched and protected that law-enforcement agencies find it difficult to stop them.

“When state institutions begin patronising crime, how can common citizens feel safe?” Bizenjo asked at a recent public consultation in Islamabad.

While Baloch leaders bemoan the federal govrenment’s indifference to their long-standing grievances, they also begrudge the provincial government for inaction and inability to improve governance in the province. Bizenjo and Ishaq Baloch also pointed out that despite having received 170 billion rupees under the Eighteenth Amendment, the provincial government has failed in building on this realignment of relations between the centre and the province. Stalled projects such as Reko Dek, they say, underscore the total disregard for the future of the province.

The state always adopted a ‘fire-fighting’ approach to address the Balochistan issue and never bothered to look into the real issues undermining the overall security situation in the province. Today, although criminals and insurgents have theoretically different agendas and motives, their close operational collaboration enables each other to achieve their respective objectives. One wonders whether there is any real intent and vision in Islamabad to mollify the grievances of the Baloch.

The Express Tribune

April 20, 2012
Syed Umair Javed

Sometime back, a friend of mine posted on a social media page, asking if anyone believed a solution to the Balochistan problem was still possible. He was referring to Ataullah Mengal’s statement that it was too late to fix things. While many slogans for finding a solution have been raised by mainstream political parties since then, the situation on the ground is getting more precarious with every passing day. In the last fortnight alone, hundreds have suffered at the hands of targeted killing and abductions. There is clearly a law and order situation there.

Yet nothing can be as far from the truth. The problem of Balochistan is not merely a law and order issue. That is merely a symptom of a deeper problem caused by decades of hatred and apathy – I will mince no words – shown by the country’s powerful establishment, supported by incompetent political rulers, of this country towards Balochistan. Since the inception of Pakistan, the civil-military elite, a state within a state, has failed to protect us from outside threats, yet they have constantly frowned upon its own people – they are the very same who pay for their existence.

Their malignance towards Bengal cost us half our body in 1971. Now their hatred of all things Balochistan is on its way to cause another inevitable amputation. For me, this depravity must stem from something other than ethnicity; my ethnic origins teach me humility, not hatred. Instead, it is rooted in the false holier-than-thou complex first created by military servitude under the British and strengthened over decades by constant pampering by corrupt politicians.

The people of Balochistan have clearly had enough. Many of the disenchanted Baloch are now waging an armed rebellion against this status quo which has stolen from them their resources, their rights and their identities. Their elders are done playing the role of fire-fighters. As a result, other ethnicities in the province are facing the wrath, suffering endless pain. The situation is definitely going to attract unwanted foreign interest. And we, as silent spectators, have no right to blame anyone.

My friend asks if there is a solution. I believe there is one option before we loose hope for good. It starts off by us becoming serious about resolving this issue. The government believes that policy statements and constitutional reforms will solve the crisis somehow. It won’t. And the sooner we realise this really, the better it will be for us.

To begin with, all military and paramilitary operations in Balochistan must end. Law enforcement is the responsibility of the police, and the federal and provincial government must realise that. Similarly, the extra-judicial killings must stop, abducted people must be released and all missing people must be recovered. While the judiciary has tried to recover some of the missing people, the outcome itself will be a drop in the ocean unless the executive starts taking interest.

Next, the political leaders and civil-military elites which authorised the extra-judicial killings and abductions in the past decade must be taken to task in courts. For this purpose, Musharraf and his cronies should be brought back to Pakistan as a starting point. Once people see that the country’s legal and judicial system can protect them, acceptability will be created for the political system.

At the same time, a broad cross section of the society, including politicians, bureaucrats and generals, must publicly and unconditionally apologise for the injustices and lapses of the past many decades. This apology must be conveyed to those who have picked up weapons as well. Politicians from mainstream parties must engage Balochistan’s leaders and youth and discuss ways to restart the political process. While a political party’s upcoming political rally is a good initiative, it may not be enough. Dialogue with all political stakeholders in Balochistan is a must, even if it takes years and means accepting a special status for the province. It must be realised that without political acceptance and ownership, no amount of economic and constitutional measures will improve the situation.

Above all, we must realise that being a nation does not mean that everyone is, or has to be, a clone. On the contrary, it means respecting and celebrating differences between people. It means moving past ethnic, linguistic, religious and social divisions and accepting social, economic and legal justice as a norm.

And if we do not become serious, we will most likely recite Munir Naizi’s poetry to our children.

Kisi ko maut say pehlay kisi gham say bachana ho,

Haqeeqat aur thi kuch, usko ja kar yeh batana ho,

Hamesha dair kar deta hon mai!

(Saving someone from misery before death,

Telling him that the reality was different,

I am always late!)

The writer is a lawyer specialising in issues of competition law and economics.

Email: sujaved@gmail.com
-The News

9 April 2012

‘Balochistan’ as a Strategic Issue vs the ‘Baloch’ as a Political Problem

by D Suba Chandran

Immediately after the introduction of the Balochistan resolution in the US Congress, there has been an increased discussion within Pakistan and amongst the Baloch intellectuals/political elite on the problems being faced in Balochistan and its future. Until now, the Baloch have always complained of there not being much of an international interest in their problems. The current debate involved the US Congress listening to the testimony of scholars, activists and human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch. What is the end game of this international interest? Is Balochistan as a geographic territory of international strategic importance? Or is it seen as a political problem, where the Balochis are struggling for autonomy, better governance, and perhaps even independence?

Unfortunately for the people of Balochistan, international interest starting from the 19th century has always primarily remained strategic due to the region’s location, rather than its people or its rights. Balochistan gained international significance primarily in the 19th century, as a part of the larger interests of colonial powers: the British, Russians, and surprisingly even the Germans.

While there is ample discussions and literature on Afghanistan as a part of the Great Game debate, the significance once attached to Balochistan by British India as a part of their efforts to create buffer zones in the north west of the Indian subcontinent has gone under noticed. The summaries of Henry Pottinger (Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde, 1816), Thomas Henry Thornton (Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman: His Life and Work on our Indian Frontier, 1895), Sir Edward Wakefield (Past Imperative: My Life in India, 1927-1947, 1966) and the numerous Administration Reports of the Baluchistan Agency of the British Indian government would highlight that the policies and strategies adopted by the British government vis-à-vis the Khan of Kalat and the various tribal Sardars was primarily aimed at the sole objective of keeping Balochistan as a frontier region and protect the interests of the empire.

Though the Russian empire was primarily concentrated on Afghanistan, the German empire sent few missions (political and intelligence) up to Afghanistan and Balochistan to explore the possibility of exploiting the religious sentiments of the people to revolt against the British empire.

During the Cold War, the US and the former Soviet Union took over the strategic importance of this region from the British and the Russians, and started viewing this region (comprising Afghanistan and Balochistan) with the same perspective: Balochistan would provide an access to sea via Afghanistan. While the former wanted it, the latter aimed to block such an access.

The current interest of the international community should be seen from this perspective. While the resolution in the US Congress has a humanitarian angle to it, the real intentions seem to be strategic. This is especially in the wake of declined US-Pak relations, and the reluctance of Pakistan to reopen the NATO supply lines from Karachi into Afghanistan, which is extremely important for American troops and its efforts in their ‘war against terrorism’. If it a coincidence that the introduction of the resolution in February 2012 on Balochistan follows in the heels of the American failure to reopen the NATO supply route, then it should be a strange one. If the resolution is guided by American philanthropic interests and Washington’s role as a champion of the human rights and defender of democratic values, it would be another coincidence because that the same values did not apply during the last decade when the Balochis were being massacred.

The real intentions of the US could be seen from the writings of Peter Ralphs and his testimony to the US Congress in February 2012. Though the US administration has distanced itself officially from both the resolution initiative and that of Peter Ralph’s idea of redrawing the map of the Middle East with a Greater Balochistan, there is no reason to believe that the administration would fight for the democratic rights and human values of the Balochis in Pakistan.

Unlike the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Kashmiris, the Baloch diaspora is yet to become an effective instrument. Except for a few individuals and journalists, there are very few Balochis who are seriously engaged with the international community. Even in the blogosphere, the Balochi presence is limited. Except for a few websites such as Baloch Unity and online portals such as Baloch Hall, there is a lack of any serious online presence of the Balochis and their problems.

As a result, the Baloch political issue will always been seen as a collateral, rather than the primary issue. The strategic importance of Balochistan will subsume the human and political problems faced by the people. Unless history stops repeating itself. Unless the Balochis garner more interest in their day-to-day problems, rather than the strategic location of their land.


Director, IPCS & Visiting Professor, Pakistan Studies Programme, Jamia Millia Islamia
email: subachandran@gmail.com

__________________
To succeed,look at things not as they are,but as they can be.:)

2012,04,24



Objectively, this is not a situation in Balochistan only; most of the post-colonial states either have faced this sort of a problem or are still facing it
Balochistan is Pakistan's restive province, where a movement for the right to self-determination and independence is going on since 1948. Last month in a hearing of a US Congressional Committee on foreign affairs, focusing on Pakistan, at least five members of the US congress belonging to both the Republican and Democratic parties supported the demands of the Baloch. That led to a war of words between Islamabad and Washington. Pakistani spin-doctors came out to defend the state establishment, blaming the US for interfering in Pakistan's internal matter, which they considered as an attack on its sovereignty. Contrary to the Pakistani state establishment, the Baloch welcomed the attention paid by the US and the international human rights organisations to their plight.

Who is right and who is not and what is happening and what is not, would take pages after pages to discuss, argue and counter-argue, with no conclusion. However, of course, one thing everyone, including the establishment's spin-doctors, has to accept is that the Baloch have tons of real grievances against their state. People from that region have fought five real wars against the Pakistani army and are still at virtual war with the establishment. The separatists' leaders from that region never miss a chance to express anti-Pakistan sentiments from any platform they get. They want to have a sovereign Balochistan by taking the province out of Pakistan.

Objectively, this is not a situation in Balochistan only; most of the post-colonial states either have faced this sort of a problem or are still facing it. The reason for this is what Hamza Alvi said, "Overdeveloped state, underdeveloped civil society." The colonial states after their independence came out with hefty promises but failed to fulfil them, which led people to rise against their ruling elite. Also at that time, the decision to choose people's nationality was forced upon them by the colonial powers and the colonised native elite, without any consideration given to their choices. As independent countries came into being, the responsibility to build a nation fell on the shoulders of the ‘constructed' majority, who took minorities for granted and instead of addressing their grievances, carried out atrocities to silence their voices. A lucky few, after making sacrifices and with the help of outside powers, got independence - erstwhile East Pakistan and now Bangladesh is a good example.

Coming to Balochistan, what options does the Pakistan government have to address the current impasse there? The incumbent government has done the right thing by formulating the 18th amendment to the Pakistani constitution, which has granted provincial autonomy by devolving 39 concurrent subjects to the provinces. Also under the National Finance Commission (NFC) Award, the share of Balochistan in the national resources has been raised to 10 percent from 4.3 percent. These are positive steps but not sufficient to address the decades-old grievances of the Baloch against their ruling elite.

That would require a tremendous amount of psychological and physical redress to the persistent anti-state feelings in the minds and hearts of the Baloch. The crimes carried out by anyone on anyone's instruction must be taken seriously and the guilty must be punished for his crime. The Baloch are still seeking justice for the lady doctor who was raped by an army officer posted in the Sui area. That was just one reported case; many cases remain unreported and unknown, and justice remains elusive.

There is a concept of demographic change to resolve crises like this one - by settling people from the so-called mainland to the disturbed areas. This tactic is used by almost all states to check the growing anti-state feeling in disturbed areas. This should be stopped and let people maintain their uniqueness and enjoy cultural autonomy, without any sort of intervention from outside. They must be granted extra rights and should be protected at every cost by the state establishment. Constitutional arrangements concerning disturbed areas in India can be studied by Pakistan. Although problems have not been fully resolved through those arrangements, they are still useful in addressing and redressing people's grievances to some extent.

The presence of the armed forces in the streets makes the people of that region feel unsafe because they have a psychological fear of men in uniform. The better option is that the armed forces are removed from that area, giving people a sense of relief from having guns pointed at their heads. It is the responsibility of the federal government to provide security to its citizens and not to compel them to leave their homes out of fear.

The onus also lies on the leaders who are heading the secessionist movement to change their political demands. Instead of separation, it makes more sense if they focus on leading people to demand more autonomy and more viable economic packages from the government. They must acknowledge the fact that the last six decades of fighting has given nothing but suffering to their own people. Notwithstanding that ‘self-determination' and ‘independence' are beautiful words to conceptualise and debate, but in reality, they are very difficult to follow up on practically. External forces seldom support the secessionists unless they have their self-interest in doing so. In today's world, it is seemingly impossible to carve out an independent country from a geographically contiguous area. The former Yugoslavia's case is an exception because the US, due to its vested interest and under a cold war hangover, was ready to leave no stone unturned to weaken members of the erstwhile eastern bloc.

To conclude, both the Pakistani state establishment and the separatist forces must sit together and try to resolve this decades-old problem in Pakistan. People's pain needs a soothing balm, not bullets.

The writer is a PhD student at the South Asian Studies School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

amitranjan.jnu@gmail.com


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2012,04,22

Baluchistan: In The Shadow Of The Gun I

by Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur

The state's brutal kill and dump policy seems justified to him. He half-heartedly admits, "No one denies the fact that targeted killings of the Baloch are taking place, that people are being picked up and that state actors are involved in the killing and the disappearances."
During the 1973-1977 army action in conflict zones, thousands of innocent people were killed, tens of thousands were internally displaced

Mr Ikram Sehgal's "Of Empire and Army" (Newsline, March 2012) is a bundle of misinformation and bias against the Baloch. Perturbed that the media holds the security establishment solely responsible for the Balochistan crisis, he claims, "Most of our problems stem from jumping to conclusions that are based on misinformation, and then deliberately distorting those half-truths to suit mass perception." He feels, "Disproportionate media projection of the separatist leaders encourages ethnic divisions and violence." He probably thinks the Baloch struggle and the atrocities by the state are a figment of the media's imagination.

The state's brutal kill and dump policy seems justified to him. He half-heartedly admits, "No one denies the fact that targeted killings of the Baloch are taking place, that people are being picked up and that state actors are involved in the killing and the disappearances." Then he offers a lame justification that "sons of the soil" are killing an equal number of settlers. Balochistan Home Department's recent report said that the majority of the ones killed are ethnic Baloch.

Sehgal tells us that on December 29, 1973, as his son was being born in Karachi, his company came under heavy fire from Marri insurgents near Kahan, after the dismissal of Ataullah's representative government. The Baloch considered them aggressors rightly, and could not be expected to throw a party. He then says, "Throughout that year, many soldiers were martyred and several injured," and adds, "In one instance, the insurgents beheaded 19 of our soldiers."

Well, I too was in the Marri area with the Baloch nationalists then and assuredly, the Marris never indulged in such abhorrent practices. His claim defies reason as no guerilla could possibly have time to ambush and behead soldiers. Ambushes invite response and with helicopters, jets and motorised transportation at the army's disposal, only fools would linger after an ambush.

The columnist adds that the army could have retaliated against the Marris in kind but relented because they understood that their Sardar (tribal chief), who was living comfortably in Kabul, misguided the Marris. Incidentally, Sardar Khair Baksh Marri and other Baloch leaders, including Sardar Ataullah Mengal, were in jail until 1978. He blames the media for misinformation and distortion. During the 1973-1977 army action in conflict zones, thousands of innocent people were killed, tens of thousands were internally displaced, social and economic life was disrupted, flocks were stolen, crops destroyed, and the entire Balochistan was terrorised. Eight persons, whom I knew personally, including my dear friend, Daleep Dass, aka Johnny Dass, went missing, never to be heard of again. Sher Muhammad Aliani - a sept, an elder, a septuagenarian - was picked up because of an ambush in the vicinity of his settlement near Kahan; his brutally tortured corpse was later recovered. Murad Khan Ramkani of Tadri too was similarly killed. The valiant Asadullah Mengal and Ahmed Shah Kurd were abducted and killed in Karachi. The examples of the ‘consideration' shown are too numerous to note.

Talking about population and tribes, Sehgal says that Punjab and Sindh have more Baloch than Balochistan. Let us not forget, Dera Ghazi Khan with its tribal areas was annexed to Punjab in 1950, hence the increase in Baloch population in Punjab. He seems very upset about the discontinuation of appointing of Pashtun governors. The imported ‘Viceroys' only exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions. Owais Ghani reigned when Sardar Akbar Bugti was killed.

Sehgal shows his bias against the Baloch and sardars by repeating a patently fictitious story that some of the proud Baloch sardars of yesteryears carried Colonel Sandeman on a litter on their shoulders for many scores of miles from the Punjab into Balochistan. Oddly, neither a Sardar is named nor the place. The best way to malign someone is to spread unsubstantiated tales knowing that prejudices will do the rest and clearly, any lie about the Baloch is readily believed here. Moreover, this story would make you believe that the British had no horses to transport Sandeman; they were not like Pakistanis who would send a rundown ambulance, without a spare tyre, to bring a terminally sick Jinnah from the airport.

Exposing his ‘prejudice' against the present nationalist leaders, Sehgal says, "It is ironic that a small militant minority, led by descendants of some cruel and despotic Sardars, speak about "democracy and independence". His other grouse is, "The Baloch now protest against the presence of army cantonments but they did not protest when the British built the biggest cantonment in British India after Agra in Quetta in the early 1900s." I wonder what he would say about those who loyally served the British and docilely submitted to a 50-year long Khalsa (Sikh) rule. No one resisted the sacrilege of Badshahi Masjid in Lahore being used as a stable by Ranjit Singh. Syed Ahmed Shaheed had to come from Bareli to resist Sikh rule. Ironically, the stuffed remains of Ranjit Singh's favourite mare Alif Laila, sketched as Laili by Emily Eden, adorns the Lahore Museum. He remembers "cruel and despotic Sardars'" imagined lapses, but forgets the past of present defenders and leaders of the Ummah. He selectively remembers some and overlooks other inconvenient facts.

Sehgal says that the Baloch Sardars submitted to humiliating British terms regarding heirs, but he probably does not know that the Marris defeated the British in the Battle of Sartaaf and Nafusk in 1839; Mir Mehrab Khan, the Khan of Kalat, died defending Kalat. In 1917, the Marris refused recruits for World War I and chose to battle with their flintlocks and swords against British machine guns at Gumbaz and Harab; none except the Marris in the subcontinent refused. The Baloch have an illustrious history of resisting the British, while others except Tipu Sultan, submitted meekly.

‘Submission' of some Sardars to Sandeman is an unpardonable and abhorrent crime for him but meek acquiescence of entire peoples and regions in the subcontinent to Khalsa Raj and British rule do not seem to ruffle his feathers. He alleges that, "There is now a very deliberate attempt to create a perception of non-Baloch hegemony. The fact remains that the present political and administrative leadership comprises of the native Baloch." He fails to realise that this perception has solid reasons. The army and the Frontier Corps (FC) from Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have a complete disregard for Baloch sensitivities, and as far as the corrupt native Baloch political leadership is concerned, they have stated on record, repeatedly, that the FC runs a parallel government in Balochistan.

(To be continued)


2012,04,22

Baluchistan: In The Shadow Of The Gun II
by Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur

The evil nexus between state-sponsored terrorism and corruption is used for depriving the Baloch people of their resources and rights
The Sardars embezzling money meant for development purposes are in league with the government. The evil nexus between state-sponsored terrorism and corruption is used for depriving the Baloch people of their resources and rights

Ikram Sehgal in "Of Empire and Army" says, "There has been a Baloch president and a Baloch prime minister. During their time in office, none of the Baloch nawabs and sardars made any effort to ameliorate the conditions of their own people." He forgets that the establishment ‘accommodates' only those Baloch who connive in denying the Baloch people their rights. The ‘establishment' as a quid pro quo turns a blind eye to excesses and corruption. It now even encourages them to fight a ‘dirty war' against the nationalists. The ordinary Baloch suffers injustices from both the Centre and its local agents; this has reinforced the perception of non-Baloch hegemony. The only representative government of Sardar Ataullah Mengal, which presented the bill to abolish the Sardari system on July 8, 1972, and worked for Baloch rights, was dismissed after nine months. Amelioration of conditions was not tolerated.

Sehgal says ‘the three ‘nawabs' of the Baloch, now agitating for ‘independence', have at one time or the other ‘taken oath of allegiance to Pakistan'. This he thinks obligates their submission to the federation. Mr Jinnah presented Kalat's memorandum supporting its independence to the Cabinet Mission in May 1946, but did not feel honour bound when in March 1948, he ordered troops into Kalat. Incidentally, Sardar Khair Baksh Marri has neither held office nor signed the 1973 constitution; his son Mir Balach Khan swore allegiance to Balochistan in Balochi in the provincial assembly.

"The incongruity of it all is that the military wants democracy for the Baloch people, but has not been able to translate its objectives into practice. This can only be achieved under a democratic dispensation, which must obtain freedom for the Baloch from its cruel depraved rulers, who hold the power of life and death over them and their children," Sehgal pontificates. He seems oblivious to history, for if militaries gave way to democracy, they would have in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s in Latin America. Atrocities in Bangladesh and now in Balochistan would never have happened. Presently the Baloch are being killed, dumped and oppressed by state institutions and it is these institutions that illegally exercise ‘power of life and death' over them and it is from them that the Baloch strive to obtain freedom. Now the Baloch are tired of living in the shadow of the gun.

Another allegation is, "The ‘democracy' that the feudal lords espouse is limited to their own version of despotic rule," but forgets that the same and more holds true for the democracy that the military envisages for the Baloch. He also forgets that these ‘cruel depraved rulers' are not ‘the three ‘nawabs' but are the obsequious Sardars at the beck and call of the establishment, assisting it in its dirty war against the Baloch people. The Sardars embezzling money meant for development purposes are in league with the government. The evil nexus between state-sponsored terrorism and corruption is used for depriving the Baloch people of their resources and rights.

Expressing sympathy and blaming feudalism, the writer says, "The Baloch must be taken out of their life of deprivation and want," but conveniently forgets that mostly the military has been in power in that province. The present situation was precipitated by Musharraf who, recently, brazenly advocated more Baloch repression. He forgets that the precious little that Pakistan receives as aid is devoted to the military. Two years ago, Fakharuddin G Ibrahim said, "During the last 30 years, Rs 178.3 billion had been spent on education and Rs 98 billion on health while, on the other hand, around Rs 2,835 billion had been consumed on defence alone." Interestingly, combined health and education expenditure in three decades is a little more than half of defence expenditure in 2010-11 alone. The remainder is devoured by politicians and bureaucrats. This policy of beg and spend for the military is overlooked as the real reason for backwardness here.

The article claims, "The tribal sardars living in self-imposed exile breathe fire against the state in the media but do not represent the majority of the ethnic Baloch nor the vast majority of the non-Baloch who populate Balochistan today." He is absolutely wrong, for had not the majority of the Baloch supported the ‘fire breathing Sardars' since 1947, the demand for freedom would have petered out long ago. Moreover, the non-tribal areas of Makran would not have become the hotbed of struggle that they are today.

Sehgal says, "Kill and dump, is certainly not the answer to Balochistan's problem. Indeed, such acts should be condemned unequivocally." Then in the same breath he justifies it with: "But what is the Frontier Corps (FC), who are tasked with defending critical socio-economic installations like gas pipelines and electric transmission towers that are regularly being blown up, expected to do when they are attacked violently?" And how does he expect a brave and proud nation to act against those they see as aggressors and the reason for their plight? Certainly, they would not be garlanding FC soldiers and installations.

Demanding exclusion of the Sardars from negotiations, Ikram says, "To negotiate with the hereditary rulers and their hired guns, who represent only a minority of the population, is tantamount to condemning the people to continued slavery. Compromising the basic tenets of society at the point of a gun will prove fatal for the federation." He is more worried about the federation than the Baloch people, who any way are incidental and secondary in his scheme of things. Why should he expect the Baloch to submit to exploitation and negotiations at gunpoint? The Baloch too will not negotiate in the shadow of the gun, and moreover, without the "hereditary rulers and their hired guns", no dialogue is going to be of any use.

Ikram Sehgal should understand that the Baloch struggle represents the political will of the people and is not fuelled by hidden hands. It will continue in spite of ever-increasing brutal repression because the Baloch have understood that their repression and exploitation is not by rogue elements but is a well thought out policy of the state to permanently deprive them of their rights on lame excuses of ‘national interests'. The Baloch struggle to put an end to the reign of the gun certainly is not going to vanish simply because Mr Sehgal or the government does not like it.

(Concluded)



The writer has an association with the Baloch rights movement going back to the early 1970s.

mmatalpur@gmail.com





Source: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp page=2012\04\22\story_22-4-2012_pg3_2




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2012,04,18

Balochistan: Time for a ceasefire and political settlement
By Peter Tatchell, human rights campaigner

Proposals for military de-escalation & a referendum on self-determination
The case for a negotiated political settlement in Pakistani-annexed and occupied Balochistan is overwhelming. The Baloch people have a right to live without persecution and to decide their own destiny. History is on their side.
Much of what now constitutes Balochistan was a self-governing British Protectorate from 1876. The Baloch people secured their independence from Britain in 1947. The following year, they were invaded and incorporated into Pakistan. They did not vote for incorporation. Their consent was neither sought nor given.
For more than six decades, Balochistan has been under Pakistani military occupation. Although all five major nationalist rebellions have been suppressed by Islamabad, this has not extinguished the desire of the Baloch people to determine their own future. On the contrary. Pakistan's ruthless brutality has increased support for outright independence.
This has prompted even greater Pakistani repression. In the last two years, the extra-judicial killing of Baloch activists has intensified, despite public claims by the Pakistani government and security forces that they have been curtailed.
Indeed, a new death squad has emerged, Tehreek-e-Nefaz-e-Aman Balochistan (TNAB); apparently with the collision of Pakistan's intelligence and military agencies.
According to the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), in January this year alone the bullet-riddled bodies of 23 nationalist sympathisers were discovered in Balochistan, with six of these killings being claimed by TNAB.
From August 2011 to January 2012, 56 Baloch activists are known to have been murdered and dumped on roadsides.
The total number of extra-judicial killings since July 2010 is at least 271, reports the AHRC.
These escalating human rights abuses in Balochistan are also independently corroborated by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. These organisations have documented not only extra-judicial killings but also the Pakistani security forces widespread resort to kidnapping, disappearances, torture and detention without trial. They offer strong evidence that the police, army, ISI and Frontier Corps are complicit in atrocities that amount to crimes against humanity, which are illegal under international law.
Some Baloch campaigners are urging the International Criminal Court to issue arrest warrants and put on trial key Pakistani political, intelligence and military leaders, including the former dictator president, Pervez Musharraf, who allegedly authorised indiscriminate air strikes against defenceless Baloch villages.
In the meantime, they want the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, to head a UN fact-finding mission to Balochistan; in order to ensure that the atrocities committed by Pakistan are subject to independent international scrutiny and documentation.
The UN also has a crucial role to play in facilitating a military ceasefire and a negotiated political settlement.
While this is important for the long-suffering people of Balochistan, it is also important for the Pakistani government. The human rights abuses in Balochistan are causing huge damage to Islamabad's international reputation. The military occupation of Balochistan is costing Pakistan millions. It is a financial drain on the economy. The vast sums of money spent on military garrisons and operations would be better spent on health and education.
However, the most fundamental and important issue is the right to self-determination of the Baloch people. This principle of self-determination is enshrined in the UN Charter and has been applied to secure the statehood of new emergent nations, from Slovenia to East Timor and South Sudan. Why not Balochistan?
Pakistan can delay Balochistan's right to self-determination - at great financial, moral, political, military and reputational cost - but the right of the people Balochistan to decide their own future cannot be denied forever. History shows that no amount of repression can hold back a people who yearn to be free. Ultimately, justice will triumph. It is therefore in Islamabad's interest to secure a lasting political solution.
Last month, at the invitation of Baloch nationalists and human rights defenders, I spoke at a forum held at the UN in Geneva during the 19th session of the UN Human Rights Council. My fellow speakers included the Pakistani author Tarek Fatah and the Baloch campaigners Mehran Baluch and Noordin Mengal. I supported their affirmation of the right to self-determination.
The big challenge that Baloch campaigners now face is how to achieve this goal.
While the terms and conditions of a peace deal must be decided by the people of Balochistan, in consultation with Baloch activists I have suggested the following six-point programme to deescalate the conflict and secure a negotiated political settlement:
Ceasefire and the cessation of all military operations, withdrawal of Pakistani troops and paramilitaries to barracks and a halt to the construction of new military bases and outposts - with independent monitoring and supervision by UN observers and peace-keepers.
Release of all political prisoners and a full account of the fate of all disappeared persons.
Open access to all parts of Balochistan for journalists, aid agencies and human rights organisations.
Right of return of displaced refugees, restoration of their property and compensation for losses caused by the conflict.
End inward colonisation of Balochistan by non-Baloch settlers.
UN-supervised referendum on self-determination, including the option of independence.
I reiterate that these are proposals for consideration and debate; with any final decisions being a matter for the people of Balochistan - hopefully with the support of their friends and allies in Pakistan. Six decades of conflict and repression is enough. It's time to talk peace, with justice.


Peter Tatchell is Director of the Peter Tatchell Foundation. For further articles by him about Balochistan: http://www.petertatchell.net/interna...stan/index.htm

Publisher: sr

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To succeed,look at things not as they are,but as they can be.:)

May 8, 2012
Abbas Zaidi

I have just finished reading my good friend Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur’s article, “Platitudes palmed off as justice” (Daily Times, April 29, 2012). After reading the facts he has given and the interpretation he has made of those facts, only a simpleton will say that there will ever be justice for the Baloch people. Talpur has amply shown that from the Supreme Court to the army down to the provincial assembly, no one has the will or intention to give justice to the Baloch. Now the question is: what will happen to Balochistan?

This question is not new, as it has been bandied about in the print, electronic, and social media. Many journalists and commentators have spoken about how East Pakistan ceded from Pakistan because the former were denied their democratic rights. It has been argued that if Balochistan is denied its legitimate rights, it may go the East Pakistan way. Is such a thing possible?

My take on this issue is: no.

However, before I come to this, I have a little observation to make. We often hear about Balochistan, but seldom of the Baloch, or the people of Balochistan. We hear about the Balochistan issue, and not the Baloch issue. If ever we hear about the Baloch, it is in terms of terrorism and being Indian agents. Anyway, this may not be an issue, so I will pass on.

Retired generals who now act as political analysts and civilian political experts have claimed that Balochistan will never go the East Pakistan way because there was a one thousand-mile distance between East Pakistan and West Pakistan. Had there been no distance, East Pakistan would still be “ours”. They also claim that if India had not interfered and “attacked” East Pakistan, “our” army would have crushed the separatists.

They are right. Had there been no powerful consensus built against the Pakistan army’s genocide of the Bengalis, the world would not have allowed India to intervene in the civil war in East Pakistan. It is as simple as that. General Tikka Khan had infamously declared, “I do not want people. I want the land.” Supported by Al-Badar and Al-Shams, he would have done his job, if the Pakistan army had not been stopped by the Indians. No wonder the general is remembered as “the Butcher of Bengal”.

Balochistan cannot cede from Pakistan. The ground realities are in favour of the anti-Baloch forces. First, over the past few years, the Taliban have proliferated in Balochistan. They are armed and backed by the army. The Baloch are no match for the combined Taliban-army power. Second, there are few audible voices in Pakistan condemning the treatment of the Baloch. The Pakistani media has by and large portrayed the Baloch in a binary: the sardars and the masses. The media has been projecting the Baloch sardars as evil and greedy and the Baloch masses as dirt poor only because of their sardars. Third, there is no palpable international outcry over the condition of the Baloch. You cannot switch on your TV and hopping from one (national and international) channel to another, come across a word about the suffering of the Baloch. Fourth, there is no Baloch diaspora in cities like New York and London, which can highlight the plight of their fellow Baloch. Fifth, the persecution of the Baloch has not been documented from the Baloch point of view; if such documentation exists, it is not widely available. And finally, the Baloch leadership does not seem to be standing united.

What are the options for the Baloch, then? They cannot defeat their formidable opponents who possess every weapon in the book, conventional and otherwise. In the course of time, the Baloch will find not one but scores of trigger-happy Tikka Khans. One option one can think of is build internal pressure, i.e. within Pakistan. But it will not get any positive response from the judiciary, the army, and the media. Another option (favoured by Edward Said for the Palestinians) is to go to places like university campuses and tell students and academics about human rights abuses of the Baloch. But I think it will fail too because our academic world is as ideological as our media. If the Baloch leadership can campaign for provincial autonomy as envisaged in Pakistan’s constitution, there might be an opening there. I believe that Balochistan as a part of Pakistan is a better option than an independent Balochistan; an independent Balochistan will become a battleground for the imperial powers of the world. The Baloch can launch an intense campaign at the international level. The power elite of Pakistan do not wish the Baloch to pass from nature to culture. For them, the only good Baloch is the one who is a noble, amorphous savage. No wonder Nawab Aslam Raisani is such a darling!

The writer is the author of Two and a half words and other stories. He can be contacted at hellozaidi@gmail.com
-Daily Times

May 29, 2012
Tahir Mehdi

BALOCHISTAN has listed fewer voters today than it had 15 years ago. Those left out are not missing from their homes nor have they opted to forego their basic political right.

They have simply not been enrolled in the voter lists that will be used in the coming elections. Numerous cases of Balochistan’s missing persons in recent years have worsened relations between the centre and the province which have never been rosy.

The case of the missing voters, however, will lead the situation to further despair as it makes it evident that no democratic and non-violent solution to the continued saga is on the horizon.

Voters in Pakistan are on the increase. The 1998 census had counted 66 million persons aged 18 years or above in the country and the recent draft electoral rolls have listed 81 million voters that also have the same age as eligibility criteria.

The adult population or eligible voters thus have increased by 22 per cent in the past 15 years which sounds reasonable. The breakup of figures, however, reveals some disturbing facts, most importantly in relation to Balochistan.

The province had three million voters in 1997 when the voters’ age limit was set at 21 years. As it was lowered to 18 years by the next elections held in 2002, the province added about a million more voters and this tallied with the adult population figure generated by the census. The number of voters in Balochistan stood at 4.4 million in the now highly controversial lists used in the 2008 elections. In the recently published draft electoral rolls it has fallen to three million — 3,004,464 to be exact.

The decline cannot be explained away by blaming the previous voter registration exercises as erroneous which now supposedly stand corrected thanks to the high-tech wizardry of Nadra. The current figure is almost 200,000 less than even the adult population documented in past censuses. Beyond doubt a large number of adult persons in Balochistan will not be able to exercise their basic political right in the coming elections.

Besides voter lists, other aspects of the election administration too face unique challenges in Balochistan for a variety of reasons. The province is a little bigger in area than Punjab and Sindh put together while it has just 14 of the 272 general seats in the National Assembly. This translates into an average constituency size of 25,000 sq km while the same for the rest of the country is less than 200 sq km.

This in turn leads to a voter density of just nine per square kilometre compared with 175 for the rest of the country. A polling station in Balochistan covers on average an area of 100 sq km while the number stands at five for Punjab, nine for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 11 sq km for Sindh. Add to this the low road density and the rugged terrain and even simple electoral chores become a strenuous exercises.

Geography, however, is something that you do not choose and if it poses some problems one has to devise ways to overcome and solve these and that needs political will and resolve. Erroneous voter lists and a weak electoral administration are a test of that will.

It can be said that Balochistan is no exception as elections in Pakistan have generally not been fair or free. The recent hearings in the Supreme Court of the case concerning the involvement of the security establishment in masterminding the 1990 elections can be cited as an example.

Nevertheless, one also cannot ignore the fact that there have been improvements over the past decade. For example, the 2002 elections did not prove to be a cakewalk for the so-called King’s party despite the fact that these were held under the direct supervision of a military government while an army general occupied the office of president.

But similar signs are nowhere on horizon in Balochistan. Consider for example the previous elections. Nationalist parties boycotted the 2008 elections protesting against the highhandedness of Gen Musharraf; the voter turnout, however, showed a marginal increase of 1.3 percentage points (over 2002) implying that the electors had not heeded the call for a boycott.

But the only urban and thus densely populated constituency of Quetta showed a sharp decline in turnout falling from 24.3 to 17.1 per cent. On the other hand, four of the most sparsely populated and remote constituencies with absolutely no media coverage showed a phenomenal rise of 10 percentage points in turnout. This neutralised the overall turnout figure which implied that the province’s situation is as good or as bad as ever.

In 2008, 190,000 more votes were polled in the province compared with the previous elections and of these new votes 60,000 were cast in just one of the 14 constituencies, NA 263 Loralai. In this constituency, 174 voters exercised their right in 2008 compared with 100 in 2002 which is not tenable by any stretch of the imagination.

In NA 265, however, 43,000 fewer voters appeared in polling stations than had in 2002 and in NA 262, considered the hub of Pakhtun nationalists of Balochistan, who had also boycotted the elections, the turnout remained unchanged despite the fact that voter registration had risen in the constituency by a whopping 48 per cent.

These electoral stats make little sense when put together. There can be only one plausible explanation to these numbers i.e. they have been cooked up by the authorities in the province as they hardly represent political realities. This in fact might be the standard operating procedure (SOP) of the establishment for elections in the province and the current electoral rolls convey the grim message that despite all the rambling over past years the SOP for Balochistan will remain the same for the coming elections.

The writer works with Punjab Lok Sujag, a research and advocacy group that has a primary interest in understanding governance and democracy.

tahir.mehdi@lokpunjab.org
-Dawn