March 26, 2012
By Dr Raja Muhammad Khan
Exclusive Article

Western analysts believe that, “Afghanistan was Obama`s war of choice. He picked it in preference to Iraq, ordered up a Petraeus-patented surge, went after the bad guys in Helmand and Kandahar, and now, like George Bush before him, is preparing to declare a victory, whatever the uncomfortable facts of the matter.” Indeed, U.S was able to secure its interests in Iraq, pulled out its combat forces, while leaving behind oil companies and contractors. US declared victory in that country, after having caused instability and division among various ethnic and sectarian groups of that country. After a decade, it has not been able to control even 50% area of Afghanistan. In the wordings of renowned US writer Steve Coll, US “policy was disintegrating under the weight of its own wrong assumptions and would not last until 2014.”

In the recent past, three gruesome incidents committed by US forces in Afghanistan indicate its imperial mindset. The first incident was urinating on the bodies of the Taliban by US soldiers. While committing this callous act, US soldiers appear to be amusing themselves and as if they have done something of pride, as video indicates. Another act was the burning the Holy Quran by US soldiers in a US Military Base in Afghanistan. By doing that U.S uniformed persons gave an impression that they wilfully disrespect the Muslim belief and their religion, in a country whose inhabitants are very strict followers of the religion. The third incident was killing of sixteen innocent civilians by a US Sergeant mercilessly and burning them too. Most of those targeted were women and children.

These incidents were deliberate, thus cannot be treated as isolated ones, as US media and officials portray. Just as an example, it was a group of U.S marines, who urinated on the bodies, not a single individual. Someone out of those could have stopped occurring the incident. Nevertheless, all gave the impression as if they have done something worth appreciating, and as a mark of triumph. Burning of the Holy Quran at a US Base in Afghanistan was not an individual act. A military base after all is always well guarded and soldiers do not live in single rooms like peacetime in ones own cantonments.

In the third incident, leaving the base and getting inside the houses to kill innocent cannot be an individual act. After all the exit and entrance of the base must have been guarded by a certain number of security personnel. Why did they allow him to leave the base in the dark hours of the morning, while being heavily armed and all alone? Can US afford its soldiers wandering individually in any part of Afghanistan even in broad day hours? More over, as President Karazai suspects, this killing cannot be one man’s job, therefore, let us be fair in accepting that. For the US and its marines, all these incidents might have been fun and mark of victory, but for the Afghans, all these events and many others are humiliations and loss of precious lives. How can they pull on with these daily happenings? After over a decade of the occupation, they were not expecting such a humiliating treatment, but a fair handling.

Probably, US policy makers are in a strange miasma. Economic disaster back home compels the US to wrap-up as soon as possible through a strategy, “how to get out fast without appearing to get out fast.” This strategy was even focused in the meeting between President Obama and Prime Minister David Cameron on March 14/15 in Washington. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta has already signalled the likely US wrapping up by end of 2013. Even the American and European analysts feels that, “As they watch these moves, Afghans, the Taliban and neighbours such as Pakistan can reasonably conclude that the United States, rather than trying to win the war, is racing to implement an exit strategy in which the interests of Afghans and their government are slighted.”

Nevertheless, such a scenario does not mean that, US would not leave its footprints in Afghanistan after 2013 or as agreed in Lisbon Summit of a drawdown by 2014. After all US has made lot of investment in the Afghanistan and must have a foresight to reap the fruits. Tussle between Pentagon and White House over the drawdown plan is not new. While Obama Administration would like to reduce the overseas defence expenditures by ending military engagements, the Pentagon is sticking to the continuation of military engagement indefinitely. What to talk of 2014, the Pentagon would like to continue even after that; a period from ‘transition to transformation’ 2015-2024). With these opposing poles, there are two more actors; the American masses and the US soldiers on Afghan soil. While majority of US masses sees the military engagement as non-productive, would thus like US soldiers to leave that country without anymore-economic expenditures and investments made there. The US soldiers themselves are tired and indeed sick-of the hostile environment in Afghanistan, are more than willing to leave Afghanistan as soon as possible. Soldiers of US and other coalition partners are indeed compelled to stay in these environments, thus at time commit acts which embarrasses the super power and EU partners. According to a Guardian writer, Simon Tisdall, “in Afghanistan, it`s time to swallow pride and wise up, before it really is too late.” Even now, there is a time; US should buy this sincere advice.

Even after having analysed and acknowledged the difficulties on ground, the areas which NATO and U.S failed to invest, is the Afghan society and political integration. So far, the billion of dollars NATO and US have spent are on making the military bases to secure their own forces and military equipment and establishing a shaky Afghan National Army and Police. Would this rickety and raw ANA and ANP be able to integrate the Afghan society, or bring the political harmony among the Afghan society? Whether deliberate or otherwise, this non-productive US investment is now harming its own long-term objectives in the region. Today, a common Afghan has no regard for the US and NATO forces. Except the US rewarded class, Afghan masses take US military presence as an occupying power, exploitative in nature and humiliating and degrading Afghan traditions and culture, besides driving wedges among various Afghan factions and ethnic groups.

While talking to Taliban, US did not take into confidence its own handpicked President Karazai. Now after these incidents, Karazai demanded US to vacate the villages and move the forces to bases. Indeed, as per British reporter Sandy Gall, “Mr Obama and his aides have done much to damage the relationship between the two countries and public morale on both sides.” These incidents and US arrogance over these have brought the Qatar dialogue between Taliban and US to a grinding halt.

The issue is not of the US failure in Afghanistan, but leaving it in a lurch. “Afghans already feel that electoral considerations are more important to the west than the key question of whether the raw, new Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police will be up to the task of guaranteeing the country`s security.” After so many years of civil wars and invasions, Afghans cannot afford another civil war and factional fighting. Therefore, it would be rather in the interests of either party if U.S recognises that its current policies have failed, thus should not persist on those. Rather, along with other partners, it “considers, for example, paying greater attention to the broad political goals enunciated by Afghan leaders, and not just by Karzai.” This all has to be done before, it is too late.

The writer is an analyst of international relations. He is also a regular contributor to pkarticleshub.com Email; drmk_edu@yahoo.com

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March 26, 2012
By Pervez Hoodbhoy

Ever since US Sergeant Robert Bales surrendered after calmly massacring Afghan women and children, he has been depicted as a man under unusual personal circumstances. A high-ranking US official told the New York Times: “When it all comes out, it will be a combination of stress, alcohol and domestic issues – he just snapped”. Unlike those sentenced to death by drones flying high over Waziristan, Bales will enjoy a thorough investigation. Whisked out of Afghanistan, he may or may not ever be convicted. If convicted, the penalty is unlikely to exceed a few prison years; “good behaviour” may qualify him for an early parole.

Although President Obama and Secretary Clinton habitually apologise to the Afghan people after every such atrocity — of which there is a long list — the fact that they happen is inevitable. Indian troops in Kashmir, and Pakistani soldiers in Balochistan, have not behaved any differently. At the core, the problem is the forcible occupation by an army of another country or people.

The Bales case has added one more reason for cash-strapped Americans to leave, speeding up the endgame. President Obama has announced plans to shift US forces to a supporting role next year and pull out most of the 90,000 U.S. troops in the country by late 2014, with 23,000 gone by this October. US Republicans — strong enthusiasts for overseas wars and interventions — are now criticising Obama for being too slow! Rick Santorum, a leading presidential candidate, said last week “We have to either make the decision to make a full commitment, which this president has not done, or we have to decide to get out, and probably get out sooner.” A day earlier, Newt Gingrich declared in even more direct terms that it was time to leave the country.

America’s “good war” — to be distinguished from the Iraq war — is rapidly collapsing and becoming more unpopular by the day. But it once had support across the world and military success had been almost instant. Weeks after 9/11 and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, al Qaeda was chased out and, eventually, bin Laden was killed. With time the earlier support evaporated. Except for Marine Gen. John Allen and a few others, the pretence that the US can win is almost over. It has been unable to create a stable, non-hostile Afghan government that could stop extremist groups from using Afghan territory once again. The Taliban are smelling victory.

But, much as one welcomes the US exit, America’s defeat will not be Afghanistan’s victory. The crimes of foreign occupation pale in front of the enormous crimes committed by the Taliban government, 1996-2001. Although the outside world knew the Taliban largely for having blown up the 2000-year old Bamiyan Buddha statues and their cruel treatment of women, their atrocities were far more widespread. Going from door to door, they had executed thousands in Mazar-i-Sharif after ascertaining that they were ethnic Hazaras or Shias. A 55-page UN report says that Mullah Omar’s men, while trying to consolidate control over northern and western Afghanistan, committed systematic massacres against civilians.Fifteen such massacres were committed during the period of the Taliban government until it was mercifully removed by the US invasion.

Eqbal Ahmed, who worked for Muslim causes from Palestine to Algeria, was by far the most perceptive and knowledgeable social activist and intellectual I have known. We had occasional disagreements but he too saw the Taliban as a social cancer that, if unchecked, would reduce Muslim society to medieval primitivism.

In 1998 — a year before he died — Eqbal had visited two cities under Taliban rule, Qandahar and Jalalabad. Soon after visiting a “land without music”, he wrote: “I have seen the future as envisioned by contemporary Islamists. It horrifies.” The Taliban had proscribed the pursuit of happiness: “Music is banned in historic Qandahar which had once been famous for its bards and story tellers. Play is forbidden.”

Eqbal tells of a boy he saw paraded through the bazaar; a rope around his neck, hands on his shaven head. This unlucky lad had broken the Taliban’s law. “He had been caught red handed, I was told — playing ball. Football is forbidden under Taliban rule as are basketball, volleyball and other games involving the movement of body. Boys playing ball can constitute undue temptation to men.”

Walking through the bazaars, Eqbal observed: “They are stacked with small electronic products, including transistor radios. Yet, none is playing. These bazaars are devoid of music which is banned in Qandahar, in homes no less than in public. Television is similarly banned. Homes are regularly raided, and people are harshly punished for listening to music. The chowkidar in the house next door to mine was caught in the act, and badly mauled. He misses his recorder and the tapes of ‘sweet Afghan naghma.’”

But if the Taliban are a social cancer then what cocktail of chemotherapies can work to prevent a second recurrence? There is zero chance of a secular, pluralistic democracy. Tribal Afghan society, locked into primitive concepts of honour and revenge, is likely to remain unenlightened and torn apart by internal conflicts well into the distant future. So the real question is: what could be the least bad outcome? Since we Pakistanis must live with a theocracy next door, then one can only wish for a relatively enlightened version rather than a barbaric one.

A relatively peaceful future will require that power in post-withdrawal Afghanistan be pluralistically shared by the country’s diverse ethnic groups: Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, etc. Else there will be civil war. Regional actors can and must prevent this, as well as prevent a repeat of earlier Taliban horrors. To this end, Pakistan should give up its craving for ‘strategic depth’, Iran should be brought in to the picture by the US as a helpful ally, India should refrain from intrusions into Afghanistan that might antagonise Pakistan, and China must not signal the Taliban that it can fund them in exchange for mining rights. None of this is likely but, still, why not ask for the moon. What else to do?

The Express Tribune

Roedad Khan
Tuesday, March 27, 2012

On March 11, 2012, a US army sergeant, without any provocation, methodically killed 16 unarmed civilians, nine of them children, in three villages in the Panjwai district of Kandahar province. Some of the bodies had single, execution-style bullet wounds in the head. The villagers had barricaded themselves in their homes, blocking the doors with odd pieces of furniture in a vain attempt to protect themselves and their womenfolk from the attacker. According to reports, US soldiers, often under the influence of drink, roam the streets and nobody feels safe. Afghan women are paralysed with the all too justified fear of being raped.

The deadly rampage of a heavily armed US soldier, in the wake of other similar provoking incidents like the desecration and burning of the Holy Quran at Bagram air base and a video showing US marines urinating on a dead Taliban fighter provoked countrywide outrage, an outpouring of revulsion against the US army and a threat of vengeance from the Afghans.

It was another country in another time but the actions was similar. On March 16, 1968, soldiers of US “Charlie” Company of 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 11th Brigade of the American Division murdered between 347 to 504 unarmed civilians in South Vietnam which later came to be known as the M? Lai Massacre. Most of the victims were women, children (including babies), and elderly people. Some of the bodies were later found to be mutilated. While 26 US soldiers were initially charged with criminal offenses for their actions at M? Lai, only Second Lieutenant William Calley, a platoon leader in the Charlie Company, was convicted. Found guilty of killing 22 villagers, he was originally given a life sentence, but only served three and a half years under house arrest! Anyone who thinks that the perpetrator of the Kandahar massacre would be brought to justice and executed must have his head examined.

Afghans are no strangers to foreign military interventions in their country. After nine years of occupation, the last Soviet soldier left Afghan territory on Wednesday, February 15, 1989 at 11:55 A.M. local time. General Boris V Gromov, a hero of the Soviet Union and commander of all Soviet forces in Afghanistan, walked across the Steel Friendship Bridge to the border city of Termez in Uzbekistan. “There is not a single soldier or officer left behind me”, General Gromov told a television reporter waiting on the bridge. “Our nine-year stay ends with this”.

“The United Nations negotiated the Russian exit,” said the Times of London on April 27. “Its job is now done. The world has no business in that country’s tribal disputes and blood feuds”. Americans too walked away from Afghanistan. The rest of the world also forgot Afghanistan and abandoned the Afghans to their fate. Afghanistan was plunged into a bloody civil war.

The Taliban capture of Kabul in 1996 virtually terminated the civil war in which over 50,000 people had lost their lives. Now, after more than thirty years of foreign occupation Afghanistan is a country of demolished cities, disabled war veterans, amputees, young widows, orphaned children, torn-up roads and hungry people.

Afghans are helpless victims of a war foisted upon them by the US that has only brought misery and produced a catastrophe. “Fighting beyond one’s border”, Chairman Mao famously said, “is criminal”. The US war in Afghanistan now in its 11th year is a war of choice. Not a war of necessity. The overwhelming desire of the Afghans is to see the war end along with the fervent wish to see the back of the US army. It has hardened their determination to fight for their country, to defend their homeland against what they view as an alien, repugnant and inhumane enemy.

The Americans are sinking more and more deeply into the fetid quagmire of Afghanistan and neither the president nor General Petraeus nor anyone else has the slightest clue about how to get out. The counterinsurgency zealots in the military want the president to completely scrap his already shaky timetable for the beginning of a withdrawal. Getting into a war is generally a piece of cake. Getting out tends to be another matter altogether – especially when the commander in chief and his commanders in the field disagree on the advisability of doing so.

How long is it going to take for the US to recognise that the war it so foolishly started is a fiasco – tragic, deeply dehumanising and ultimately un-winnable? How much more time, how much more money and how many more wasted lives is it going to take? One thing is clear. Peace and stability will never resume as long as aggression continues and US soldiers remain on Afghan soil. Instead of enacting a charade, the US should turn the country over to a genuine international coalition headed by the United Nations and get out. Playing the world’s policeman is not the answer to the catastrophe in New York in 2001. Playing the world’s policeman is what led to it.

Until the turn of the 20th century, US foreign policy was basically quite simple: to fulfil the country’s manifest destiny, and to remain free of entanglements overseas. The US favoured democratic governments wherever possible, but abjured action to vindicate its preferences. John Quincey Adams, then secretary of state, summed up this attitude in 1821. “Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled there will her (America’s) heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own”. Today, contrary to John Adam’s advice, US stalks the world alone in search of monsters to destroy.

Washington wants to retain bases, special forces and military advisors in Afghanistan until at least 2024. It wants to keep sufficient forces on the ground that can both continue to hunt Al-Qaeda and prop up a corrupt administration in Kabul. One thing is clear that the Afghans will never accept this. The continued presence of US forces will make agreement with the Taliban impossible, so the war will continue.

“A democracy”, General George C Marshall once said, “cannot fight a seven years war”. The US war in Afghanistan has been going on for eleven long years and victory is nowhere in sight. President Obama will be well advised to follow the first rule of holes, stop digging and extricate his troops from the “Graveyard of Empires?”

The writer is a former federal secretary. Email: roedad@comsats.net.pk, www.roedadkhan.com
The News

March 28, 2012
Jonathan Power

After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and got totally bogged down there was a joke circulating in Moscow. “Why are we still in Afghanistan? Answer: We are still looking for the people who invited us”.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, architect of US policy in Afghanistan when he was president Jimmy Carter’s national security advisor, was convinced Afghanistan would become the Soviet Union’s Vietnam. In fact the Soviet Union’s Vietnam has become America’s Afghanistan.

There is truth in both these cynical observations. And there are lies, distortions and self-delusion built into the narrative. Only Russia has been more or less honest. Under president Mikhail Gorbachev it decided to cut its losses and withdraw, and was open about the reason it did so.

Today the debate in the US is contorted. The White House cannot come to terms with the fact that unlike the Soviet Union, the US and Nato are effectively defeated — the Soviets were always militarily on top but it was the attrition waged by the mujahideen that made them decide to go.

Vietnam did not go to the dogs or lead an advance of communism right through Southeast Asia as many policy-makers argued would happen. The “domino effect” the White House called it. Vietnam, after the communists of the north overcame the US-orientated south, is now a capitalist economic dynamo, gradually liberalising on human rights.

Afghanistan without the US and Nato would also evolve, but not in the same way. The Taleban —the dominant mujahideen movement — would be socially regressive, especially with women (but not as severely as many say), but there would be, more or less, peace- the most important factor in everyone’s life. It would be capitalist and open to Western investment.

After Obama’s three fruitless years of waging war (how he reconciles this with his Nobel Prize speech only God knows) there is now a plan to end US engagement by 2014. However, the US will keep hundreds of troops in Afghanistan as advisers and trainers. As veteran Guardian newspaperman, Jonathan Steele, writes in his new book, ‘Ghosts of Vietnam’: “Although US troops would be quartered on nominally Afghan bases, these plans undermine the prospect of Afghan independence and threaten to make a peace deal with the Taleban impossible. Neither the resistance nor regional neighbours would accept this. Washington should plan for a complete withdrawal. If Washington rushes ahead to negotiate a bilateral document on long-term strategic agreement with the government of President Hamid Karzai before trying to negotiate with the Taleban and other resistance groups, it will be sabotaging the chance for a comprehensive peace.”

A powerful statement of the case for political settlement was made a year ago by former high State Department official Thomas Pickering and Lakhdar Brahimi, a sophisticated UN negotiator. They argued that the war was a stalemate. They poured cold water on the US and UK policy of reintegration that tries to get Taleban leaders and commanders to defect. They suggested that the Taleban were becoming more willing to talk as they realised they could not regain total control over Afghanistan.

In an important departure from the usual top-down approach the Brahimi-Pickering report recommended local ceasefires, as part of a confidence-building process that could start before full-scale talks got under way. They suggested a trade-off in which the US ended its assassination of Taleban leaders and the militia ended its placing of roadside bombs and the assassination of government officials. Other confidence-building measures would be the release of Taleban and other insurgent detainees and the removal of sanctions list.

In other words, as Winston Churchill once said, “Jaw, jaw not war, war”.
Jonathan Power is a veteran foreign affairs commentator
Source: Khaleej Times

March 28, 2012
By: Sami ur Rahman

First, it was the incident of the US marines’ urinating on the dead bodies of the alleged Taliban fighters. Then it was the burning of the copies of the Holy Quran that sparked massive demonstrations and killings in Kabul and elsewhere. And now the wanton killing of 16 innocent Afghans, including women and children, by a serving US soldier.

Tragically enough, he did not stop at that. When he had killed his targets, he collected the bodies, lit a match, and set them on fire. Bravo, young soldier! Your country is proud of you -the country that is dubbed as land of the free and home of the brave. What a bravado and what a nonsense.

The drone attacks on the Pak-Afghan border and the regular midnight Special Forces operations in the volatile Afghan provinces are only routine news items now, that both the media and masses take for granted. The official reaction to this incident was also a routine one. The refugee-turned-businessman-turned-puppet, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, called it as an “assassination” and “furiously” demanded an explanation from Washington. The man in the Oval House, on the other hand, phoned Karzai and expressed his “shock and sadness at the killing and wounding of Afghan civilians.” How convenient!

Initially, the name and rank of the said sergeant was kept secret due to “safety reasons”. In fact, he was “safely” flown out of Afghanistan to his home country. And why not? He is, after all, a serving US soldier. What if the somnambulate GI killed a handful of Afghan civilians? It is a war. People do get killed in a war. Yes, they do. But not like that. You cannot even call it a collateral damage. It is just one beastly act of barbarism and butchery.

Questions are raised whether it was an individual act or a teamwork. It seems a bit immaterial. One is enough, when he has got a gun and other lethal weaponry in his armour gear – and especially, when the targets are fast asleep. A death squad of the US soldiers in Afghanistan has, nonetheless, been uncovered a few months back, which was found guilty of killing at least three pedestrians.

The sergeant is said to have served thrice in the Iraq war. God knows how many “terrorists” he would have killed there in his attempt to “liberate” Iraq out of the clutches of the ruthless, Saddam Hussein, and to introduce his country’s demonic brand of democracy. They say he was drunk; that he had a row with his wife on the night; that he had domestic problems; that he was suffering from stress; and that he simply snapped. That is to say, he was a perfect example of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). That must be so!

He must be having nightmares about his past. No question about his derangement and dementia either. Uncle Sam is just so good at producing such invertebrate nephews. Every time it indulges in war, it generates a fresh breed of PTSD patients – right from the Korean War in 1950 to the wars in Formosa, Vietnam, Haiti, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Panama and so on and so forth.

Overall, there seems no prospects for an immediate solution to the Afghan problem. Just the other day, the Taliban announced its withdrawal from the negotiations due to its snail-paced progress. Also, there seems a strange paradox to the Afghan conundrum.

Karzai and his coterie just cannot survive without the US help. While insofar as there is the US presence in the country, there will continue to be the Taliban resistance. That is to say, unless the US withdraws its combat forces, there won’t be any peace. One can take a cue from the Iraq war. As soon as the US withdrew its forces from the country, a palpable decrease in violence was witnessed.

In a sense, the US, which deems itself part of the solution, is more like part of the problem now. And that is only natural for a country that is harbouring pro-Muslim sentiments on paper and anti-Muslim ambitions on the ground.

As for the Pak-US relations, they are at the all-time low. The supply line is still closed. The Shamsi Airbase is evacuated. There is no US aid to our armed forces anymore. The drone attacks were stopped for a while, but they are again gaining momentum. However, if there has been some tacit understanding between the two governments, one just does not know. We also do not see the frequent visits of the US army generals and CIA top guns to our GHQ, since the retirement of Admiral Mike Mullen.

As for the Pak-Afghan relations, they are hanging in the balance as always. We have, perhaps, never had any good relations with Afghanistan during our entire history. Or if we had, it was only during the rule of the Taliban, when no one really recognised the country, except the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. There have always been rows over the border – the Durand Line – killings, crossings, the Pakhtunkhwa issue, accusations of meddling in each other’s affairs and suchlike matters.

War, strife and mutual bickering are not a solution to any problem. It does not profit anybody – not the US, Afghanistan, Pakistan or even the Taliban. Whenever there is a war, there is a tragedy – the like of which we just witnessed on March 11, when the US soldier massacred 16 innocent civilians. Either the leaders of the three countries lack imagination and are incapable of coming up with a practical solution. Or they simply don’t want to solve the problem, but only to maintain the status quo. Either way, the tragedy goes on unabated!

The writer is a freelance columnist.
Email: samiurn@yahoo.com
-The Nation

March 28, 2012
Najmuddin A. Shaikh

MEETING his Iranian, Afghan and Tajik counterparts in Dushanbe President Zardari made all the right noises.
A stable Afghanistan was in Pakistan’s interest; the nexus between militancy and drug trafficking needed to be curbed; non-state actors wanted to destabilise Afghanistan and, implicitly, they should not be allowed to do so; cooperation in all spheres among the four countries would assume added significance after the withdrawal of foreign forces in 2014; etc.

Separately, all four leaders agreed that terrorism and militancy needed to be tackled jointly. This clichéd repetition of public stances adopted earlier should not be the only thing to emerge from the quadrilateral summit. They must have discussed the implications of the following developments and raised the following questions:

One development has been the increase in ‘green on blue’ incidents, the latest example being the killing of two British soldiers by an Afghan at a military base in Helmand and the confirmation that the man was from the Afghan army. Separately, an Afghan policeman shot an American soldier. These brought the number of such incidents in 2012 to 10.

The US commander in Afghanistan, Gen Allen, has conceded that these incidents have led to an erosion of trust between allied and Afghan forces, though earlier he had suggested “we should expect that this will occur in counter-insurgency operations”.
Yesterday 16 people were arrested from the Afghan Ministry of Defence, at least some of them Afghan soldiers intending to use suicide jackets stored in the ministry itself to blow up buses bringing workers. Where then will trust come from?

In a New York Times poll conducted before the latest incidents, more than two-thirds of those surveyed think that the US should not be at war in Afghanistan when four months ago only 53 per cent felt that way. As regards the state of the war, 68 per cent thought the fighting was going “somewhat badly” or “very badly”, compared with 42 per cent who had those impressions in November 2011. Will there be any support, in the face of these polls and the green on blue incidents, for a continued, albeit reduced, presence of American troops at jointly operated Afghan bases?

Did the participants seek confirmation from Karzai that even if the US agreed to halt night raids he would only sign off on a general strategic partnership document and that the question of basing rights for the Americans would need another year of negotiations? Or was this not raised because of the known Iranian opposition to continued US presence?

Earlier, Gen Allen in his testimony before Congress said that the build-up of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to 352,000 would be completed by the end of 2012 and that these forces would be maintained at that level until 2017. It has been estimated that at present pay and maintenance levels such a force would cost $7-8bn annually.

On the other hand, it appears that Ambassador Grossman had difficulties in securing firm commitments from European allies for a contribution to the $4.1bn annually, post 2014, to support a reduced ANSF force of 230,000. Even if the $4bn target is met who will plug the gap for the three years that the ANSF will remain at its present level?

Certainly, Congress would have no appetite for this in the face of the opinion polls cited earlier and the general weariness with the decade-long conflict. What would be the consequences for stability if the forced demobilisation of lethally trained soldiers added to the ranks of the unemployed in an economy strained by the massive drop in foreign aid?

The Taliban have suspended talks with the US ostensibly because of the latter’s vague and erratic stance. Is this the real reason or is it because the Taliban do not want to publicly renounce ties with Al Qaeda or its affiliates — among the latter would be large sections of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan — or because hard-liners in their ranks believe that they can resist regional pressures, wait for Nato forces to withdraw and then restore the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan? If the hard-liners prevail in Taliban ranks will the result be anything other than a civil war for which the minority ethnicities are now better prepared than ever before?

Could the participants in the summit take the initiative to seek the appointment of a UN special representative along the lines of the Cuellar/Cordovez mission of the 1980s to bring together the government and ‘armed opposition’, the only precondition being the renunciation by the armed opposition of ties with terrorist organisations?

Could the participants call for a meeting of all regional countries for a reiteration of the 2002 Kabul declaration on good-neighbourly relations and ensure that this time pledges of non-interference would be honoured? Would something along these lines work when vested drug trafficker and warlord interests within Afghanistan actively seek to subvert it? Can the government and opposition in that country, unlikely as it may seem, work together to eliminate this threat?

The quadrilateral summit in Dushanbe coincided with the fifth Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan. As against the 11 countries that attended the first conference in Kabul and the 24 that attended the third in Islamabad more than 80 countries and a host of international organisations are present in Dushanbe.

International interest in working for a stable Afghanistan after the Nato withdrawal is obviously at its peak. Any worthwhile initiative by the summit participants and other regional countries will win international support. Pakistan must take the lead because it is Pakistan, as I have shown in earlier columns, that would be most affected by continued instability in Afghanistan.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.
-Dawn

Ayaz Wazir
March 30, 2012

Winning the war in Afghanistan was never an easy proposition. After the Americans’ decade-long stay in that country, discovery of a way out which is acceptable to the US is almost an impossibility. Nevertheless, the US seems bent upon proving all the negative indicators wrong.

The declared objective at the time of invasion of Afghanistan was overthrow of the Taliban and destruction of Al-Qaeda. Bringing democracy was not part of the stated policy, nor was development despite the long stay ahead.

The real cause for this long-drawn-out war seems to be something other than the stated objectives. If that were not the case, the US troops could have been withdrawn immediately after the Taliban’s removal from authority and Al-Qaeda’s defeat. On the contrary, the US is engaged in a war whose end is not within sight and the course uncertain. Many believe it in reality to be what President Bush once said, which was later covered up as a slip of the tongue—i.e., a “Crusade.” Or, reportedly, as a “clash of civilizations, a clash of religions and a clash of the whole way of life.” Indications from across our western border certainly point in that direction.

While the Taliban have been dislodged from government they certainly are not defeated. Their resilience in fighting the war, and that too against the world’s sole superpower and its allies, has been tremendously effective and has worn out the occupying forces. In turn, in their frustration these forces have resorted to brutalities which can indisputably be called war crimes.

We recently saw a horrifying example of the consistently bestial behaviour of American troops when 17 civilians, including women and children asleep in different houses, were woken up and butchered. There have been innumerable incidents of brutal killings of innocent civilians in the past as well but were invariably swept under the carpet, after some inane US expression of regret, with the collusion of the government in Kabul which appeased relatives of the dead by sending them for Hajj, allocating houses in posh area in Kandahar, or financial compensations.

Such actions expose them thoroughly, bringing to the fore their hatred for Islam and the cultural values of the Afghans. Cutting off fingers of dead Taliban as trophies, urinating on corpses and killing innocent people in night raids in their homes are just a few incidents in a long list of atrocities committed by them. But the abhorrent incident at Bagram airbase when US soldiers burnt copies of the Holy Quran inflamed passions. The violent reaction that followed was but natural. Every Muslim worth the name would have reacted that way, to say nothing of the Afghans who have always upheld Islamic values above everything else. It also led to a security cleared Afghan worker, not a Taliban, losing control of himself and killing two American advisors in the ministry of interior whom he was supposed to protect. It was only after learning the lesson the hard way that the US made it mandatory for troops to undergo a short course to familiarise themselves with the religious and cultural values of the Afghans.

Anti-American feelings over the burning of the Quran had barely cooled when the Kandahar killing of the 17 took place. This butchery has infuriated Afghans so much that they react against foreign troops whenever and wherever they can. The attack by a young Afghan interpreter at an airport in Helmand province last week is a case in point. He tried to run over and kill a top US commander, Maj Gen Mark Gurganus, with his vehicle last week. The general, along with his British deputy and other senior military officers, was at the air strip to greet visiting US secretary of defence, Leon Panetta. The Afghan, it is believed, was not aware of the expected arrival of Panetta. He would have caused a disaster had he crashed his speeding vehicle a few minutes later into the path of Panetta’s landing aircraft.

Such incidents, on the one hand, fuel concern about a surge in attacks on foreign troops and on the other lend support to the resistance of the Taliban whose movement has now turned into a national war for every Afghan, whether he admits that or not.

A decade is a long-enough period of firing on mosques, wedding parties and funeral processions and riding roughshod over not just the bodies of innocent Afghans but also Afghan values and sensibilities. During this period the Americans should have learnt to respect the religious and cultural values of their Afghan allies if they were really serious about winning their hearts and minds.

Another important lesson they should have learnt long ago but do not want to is to find a workable, durable and permanent solution to the problems in Afghanistan. They should have entered into serious negotiations with all the stakeholders by now but the situation that exists is to the contrary. The Taliban have called off the dialogue process for which they had opened an office in Doha, Qatar. With Iran they are not on talking terms and with Pakistan their relations are on the lowest ebb. It is another matter that the government wants to restore them to the previous level, at least, by setting new rules of engagement with the US, while sheltering behind parliamentary action to this end.

In short, the war in Afghanistan has been lost and so is the case with their stay after 2014 in that country. The patience of the Afghan is worn out and their anger mounting high. It will only be prudent for the US to give up on military pursuit of resolving the problem there. It should concentrate on finding a political solution before it becomes a distant reality and they are forced to leave in haste and abandon Afghanistan like other great powers before them.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Email: waziruk@hotmail.com
The News

April 3, 2012
Dr Maleeha Lodhi

A series of recent developments have renewed doubts about America’s Afghan strategy even though the US officials insist their plans are “on track” and the strategy warrants no change. These statements mask the growing disconnect between Afghan realities and Nato’s transition deadline of 2014, when all foreign combat troops are to leave the country.

There is rising concern across the region that the situation in Afghanistan is in danger of spinning out of everyone’s control. Two key planks of the US strategy aimed at securing an orderly transition are clouded in uncertainty: partnering with Afghan forces as they assume charge of security and persuading the Taliban to join a peace process. This calls into question the viability of the present exit plan.

To avoid an unravelling, Washington needs to review its approach and revise its strategy by aligning its military mission to the stated goal of finding a political resolution of the war. This means transitioning from a fight-talk strategy to a talk-talk one.

Last month’s violent backlash in Afghanistan following the burning of copies of the Holy Quran by US servicemen and the massacre of 16 Afghan civilians by an American soldier has been a telling indicator of growing public resentment against foreign occupation. Rising incidents of Afghan soldiers turning their guns on Nato personnel signalled how deep that resentment is.

Far from being isolated, these incidents reflect intensifying animosity between Western and Afghan forces. According to figures released in February by the Pentagon 80 Western servicemen have been killed by Afghan soldiers since 2007, mostly in the past two years. “The longer we stay”, admitted on American official to me, “the greater the risk of such incidents”. Intensifying public anger has already urged President Karzai to demand that Nato forces immediately leave Afghan villages.

On the heels of these incidents came the Taliban’s withdrawal from talks with American interlocutors. Although US officials see the suspension as a negotiating tactic rather than abandonment of talks, the blow to the nascent peace dialogue came at a delicate juncture in the approaching endgame.

Washington’s mounting regional difficulties are of course not limited to Afghanistan. Relations with Pakistan have yet to normalise. With the Nato supply route closed for the past four months and parliament taking its time over defining the new terms of engagement, America’s regional strategy is in flux.

The prolonged diplomatic impasse with Pakistan and the setbacks in Afghanistan have already led to a scaling back of US expectations from the Nato summit. Scheduled for May 20-21 in Chicago, the summit had been cast by US officials as a landmark event that would unveil a comprehensive plan to achieve the 2014 transition, as well as announce the start of a formal Afghan peace process. Now more modest aims are being set for the conference. Announcement of peace talks and formal opening of a Taliban office in Qatar are likely to again be postponed.

Although there are other reasons too behind an informal American offer to Pakistan to participate in the Chicago summit this is also being proposed as an “incentive” for Islamabad to expeditiously reopen the ground lines of communication (or GLOCs). The top US military officer General Martin Dempsey said recently that the restoration of GLOCs was being “urgently” sought before May. This was necessary, he explained, not just to ensure military supplies for the spring fighting season, but the departure of equipment from Afghanistan when the drawdown gets underway. In the next 18 months thousands of Nato forces will pull out including 22,000 “surge” forces this September; removal of military hardware will accompany this.

For Obama a summit that lays out a credible plan to ‘responsibly’ wind down the war is especially important in an election year. This will be his last big international event before the election campaign takes over. He might also announce an accelerated withdrawal. While the US military commanders would disapprove, his public would welcome this.

Recent setbacks have already shifted American public opinion decisively against the war. The latest New York Times/CBS poll found that 69 percent of the Americans did not support the war, reinforcing other poll findings that show majorities want the US troops out of Afghanistan as soon as possible.

Meanwhile with the Chicago summit approaching, American efforts have intensified to conclude a strategic partnership agreement with Kabul. This would allow the US a longer-term military presence after 2014, including access to Afghan bases. News reports suggest frenetic attempts to reach an agreement before May.

Given the Taliban’s opposition to the presence of any foreign forces, the agreement is seen by American officials as another way to press them to resume talks and regain the diplomatic leverage they have steadily lost as the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated. Whether this agreement can be a negotiating lever and not a deal-breaker with the Taliban is yet to be determined.

Such an agreement is certain to erode the already fraying regional consensus. All of Afghanistan’s neighbours and key regional powers oppose an undefined, indefinite US military presence, irrespective of its size or configuration. Even Kabul has now sought answers from Washington on bases and the nature of the residual force.

As for the stalled peace talks, the Taliban have kept the door open for future negotiations. Their resumption however will require the Obama Administration to expend greater political capital than it has been prepared to do. The tardiness of its opening diplomatic move has much to do with Washington’s concern with the political fallout of talking to those it has been fighting for ten years. But it is also characteristic of President Obama’s modus operandi – a reluctance to remain consistently engaged and put his weight behind his own policy.

The Taliban have insisted on the transfer of five prisoners from Guantanamo Bay to Qatar before the start of formal negotiations. Unwilling to use political capital to overcome Congressional opposition, the Obama Administration has procrastinated and insisted that the Taliban agree to a number of ‘confidence-building measures’ including joining a political process with “other Afghans” (i e the Karzai government).

Taliban representatives have thus far rejected what they describe as new conditions, citing these and Washington’s “inexplicable delay” on the prisoners’ transfer as the reason for last month’s halt to the talks. Taliban spokesman also cited vitiation of the atmosphere by a string of “brutal actions” as another reason to break off talks.

Unless the US is prepared to focus more energy and political capital on the diplomatic process and set realistic terms it will be difficult to swiftly put talks back on track. Washington may calculate this is at present politically costly and prefer to wait until after the presidential elections. But delay and making peace negotiations hostage to the election calendar will imperil the 2014 transition because that rests principally on progress towards a negotiated settlement. The closer the 2014 timeline draws without diplomatic headway the less the Taliban’s incentive to negotiate.

The question that Washington has yet to squarely address – which has far reaching regional implications – is whether it simply wants to head for the exits with an ‘appropriate’ face saver or genuinely search for a peace settlement, and be ready to make strategy adjustments and compromises to achieve this.

If the latter, then more important than assembling a showpiece Nato summit are the changes Washington makes to its strategy. This means directing efforts to secure the mutual de-escalation of violence and negotiating regional ceasefires to wind down the fighting. More fighting will not just delay but compromise chances of a peaceful end to the war. A strategic pause in the fighting will create conditions for meaningful negotiations and accelerate the peace process. This can start with an end to night raids in return for the Taliban ceasing its campaign of assassinations.

The Obama Administration says there is no military solution in Afghanistan. The time to turn these words into strategy is now. This will align the US objectives with those of the region, as well as make the reset with Pakistan easier and perhaps more lasting.
-The News