May 1, 2012
By Waheed Hussain

The entire Afghanistan peace process is hanging between the optimism and pessimism!

Whenever there is a bilateral, trilateral or multi-lateral negotiation process aimed at achieve a lasting peace and stability in the war-hit Afghanistan, hopes seem to be running high. Optimism is an objective approach for finding a brighter future for Afghans; however, one has to keep in mind the ground realities of the Afghan conflict and uncounted difficulties connected to it.

The recent trilateral core group meeting of Pakistan-US-Afghanistan ended with lot of optimism in Islamabad last week. The member countries of the core group agreed to establish two sub-groups with an idea for achieving peace and security through the reconciliation process.

According to the details, the first group comprising of experts will arrange a “safe passage” for those Taliban who are willing to be engaged in the negotiation process and like to travel through Pakistan to other countries and within Afghanistan.

All the three dignitaries representing their respective countries – Foreign Secretary of Pakistan Jalil Abbas Jilani, Deputy Foreign Minister of Afghnaistan Jawed Luden, and US Special Representative for Afghanistan Marc Grossman – in their joint press conference declared the agreement a great accomplishment.

In the diplomatic circles, the new proposal might be a mighty achievement, but in reality there are many ifs and buts attached to the so-called ‘safe passage’ proposal. Initially, nothing has been elaborated so far as to what really the ‘safe passage’ means? Is it to provide security to those Taliban who are willing to enter into any kind of negotiation? Or, is it to facilitate their travelling within and outside Afghanistan, facilitating in acquiring visa and other traveling documents? Or, is it only the facilitation or also influencing and convincing various factions of Taliban, ethnic groups, war lords and hardcore militants to participate in the talks?

The Afghan junior minister Jawed said, “We really welcome this initiative of ‘safe passage’ which will mean our experts can meet and take this process further, we need to be able to find them, those who are willing to talk.” There are certain serious and confusing questions about the phrase ‘our experts.’

Naturally, Mr Jawed was referring to Afghans but who those experts would be? Representatives from the Afghan government, members of the High Piece Council, an Afghan government sponsored body, politicians of different ethnic/nationalists’ groups? What would be the mandate of that expert group? What would be the fundamentals for negotiations?

By introducing new linguistic terminologies like ‘safe passage’, neither the safety nor the passage would be ensured. Those who are well-versed with the Afghan conflict know that the basic issue in Afghanistan is the persisting trust deficit among the various stakeholders including Taliban, Afghan government, United States and Pakistan. None of them have full confidence in each other; everyone believes that the other is working against its interest.

This environment of distrust has remained the biggest hurdle in the path of finding a viable solution to the Afghan conflict. That’s why the Afghan Taliban, within 24 hours of the declaration of ‘safe passage’ agreement, refused to accept any such proposal which they feel is tantamount to dividing the Taliban.

The fate of the second sub-group proposed to be established at the United Nations with the three countries, Pakistan, Afghanistan, US, as members remains unclear too. What mandate the said group would have? Will the US agree to delist the names of Taliban form the self created terrorist list? On what grounds the Taliban would be convinced to respect the initiative?

Basically, the fact of the matter is that Americans have miserably failed to achieve their peace dream in Afghanistan. All the five centres of powers in the United States, including the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA and the Congress are confused and divided over the Afghan conflict’s solution.

President Obama is in a hurry regarding the ‘Afghan War’ because of his aspiration to stay in the White House after 2012. In this state, he looks completely confused and does not know what policy or the strategy should be adopted to bring some kind of workable peace initiative in Afghanistan.

At the same time, so far the US administration’s diplomatic efforts have also failed to re-engage Pakistan after unprovoked Salala attack by its troops from across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border last year. The US is not willing to tender apology to Pakistan and find out some kind of mechanism regarding the most castigated drone attacks in the FATA area killing more civilians than the terrorists. The egoistic and stubborn attitude adopted by the US will not pave way for early NATO supplies’ resumption as there is a lot of pressure on the PPP government from within and outside the parliament.

In wake of American troops’ barbaric night assaults on the innocent civilians, the public opinion in Afghanistan about the US and President Karzai’s government is not in their favour as well. The world witnessed large scale street protests after the desecration of Holy Quran, urinating the dead afghan bodies, killing of 17 civilians by a marine and setting them on fire are some of the hated actions being committed by the US troops in the recent months, which make all peace efforts difficult rather impossible to succeed.

The recent attack on the Kabul along with four other Afghanistan provinces by the Taliban was a clear message to the US that the Taliban were still not willing to join the peace negotiation from a weaker position and would not participate in any US or Afghan government sponsored reconciliation process.

Zalmay Khalilzad, the former US Ambassador to Kabul, in an article published in the Foreign Policy magazine recently, has acknowledge the fact that “US leverage in Afghanistan is likely to decline in the coming years. The key challenge in the next year is working with the Afghan government on talking corruption, integrating the Taliban and reaching an understanding with Pakistan. After a decade-long military campaign, prudent diplomacy could allow the United States to wind down the mission with its core interests secured.” But, Mr Zalmay did not spell out what that diplomacy was?

Finally, under these circumstances no core or the sub-groups initiatives could succeed until the US is practically out of its confusion and openly tells Afghanistan, Pakistan and to the rest of the world as to what it actually wants in Afghanistan.

The writer hosts a primetime talk show on a TV channel and can be contacted via email: waheed.h35@gmail.com
-Pakistan Today

May 2, 2012
Zafar Hilaly

The Americans have decided to prolong their occupation of Afghanistan till 2024. So, what difference will another ten years make? What can Washington achieve in the next ten years that it has so comprehensively failed to do in the previous ten?

Better security? How will that happen with only a fraction (15,000-30,000) of the US force level that they presently maintain (140,000). As for the Afghan National Army, Obama’s weapon of choice, it is essentially a band of rustic vagabonds who over the course of the last three months have killed more American soldiers – 25 percent of Americans killed in the past few months were accounted for by rogue ANA soldiers – than have the Taliban. Moreover, the ANA’s desertion rate makes even the Somali army appear like a cohesive unit.

America’s Afghan policy seldom made sense to anybody. For example, America demands that the Taliban emir disarm his forces, agree to share power with the ‘quisling’ Karzai and accept a western styled constitution before he arrives at the peace table. Needless to say, there is as much chance of the Taliban accepting that as the Saudis of incorporating gay rights in their constitution.

But thinking that the Americans don’t know what they are doing would be imprudent and plain wrong. They do and their future plan for Pakistan seems a devilish one.

Consider. The US pre-conditions are only a gambit. Washington knows what has not been won on the battlefield cannot be won on the conference table. It is equally aware that securing Afghanistan and making it safe for the likes of Karzai can never happen without the elimination of Taliban safe havens in Pakistan. Panetta, Petraeus et al, are on record saying that. Hence, Pakistan must be brought to heel.

A pliable Pakistan is doubly advantageous for the US because it fits in snugly with America’s long term global objective which is to maintain US global primacy and thwart the rise of China. Of course, if, in the process of putting the squeeze on Pakistan, through drones, covert operations and, what Americans are particularly good at, false flag operations, like the Gulf of Tonkin affair and sheer lies, like the farce America choreographed at the UNSC before the invasion of Iraq, Pakistan is destabilised or even Balkanizes, then so much the better.

Besides if, during such confused times, the opportunity arises to denuclearise Pakistan, a long and cherished American desire, America would be over the moon.

For all this to happen, therefore, the war in Afghanistan must continue, notwithstanding the drivel about peace talks because only then can the drones continue to wreak their havoc and Islamabad made to yield or, alternatively, take the false step that will justify Obama, very much a war micro manager, to send in his planes, special teams et al.

Lest some think that is being overly alarmist I recall a conversation, a year ago, with an American contractor engaged in the work of building $15 billion worth of fortifications for US forces in Afghanistan (and the billion dollar US embassies in Karachi and Islamabad). I asked him why the need for building bases in Afghanistan if the US intended to drawdown its forces within a couple of years and leave. Looking me straight in the eye, he responded, ‘Mister, we are not building them to hand them over to anyone.’

Consider further. Notwithstanding our vexed relationship with India, Obama has wooed India in a way that seems intended to cause affront here. If he wished to flaunt India’s role as America’s pit-bull in the region and that Pakistan had better watch out, he could not have done a better job. The jihadist parties in Pakistan had a field day. So much so that Pakistan today is an even more formidable redoubt for extremists than before the war. Indeed, if a few more drones miss their targets and innocent lives are lost, the Haqqanis could become an irresistible attraction for all those here who can wield a gun.

All this, of course, hardly bothers Obama. But it should. Because when the smoke from the drone raids clear and the bodies are taken away for burial many more Pakistanis would have rallied to the cries of America’s enemies.

But Obama is too busy fashioning the world in America’s own image. He does not believe that he has bitten off in Afghanistan more than he can reasonably chew. He prefers to go on adventuring and hanging around protecting the likes of Karzai and chasing Pollyanna-ish ideas about democracy perhaps because he is doing so in pursuit of a larger plan. He probably does not believe his tactical reverses matter as long as the strategic situation moves in America’s favour. In short, he is determined to fulfil America’s ambitions.

Whether the Zardari government is up to what the Americans are into, is not clear, at least, judging by Islamabad’s response. There was no point, for example, of suggesting that all cooperation with the US was predicated on receiving an apology for the Salala slayings. That apology is now worthless, much like any apology that is obtained under duress or in expectation of some return. It’s hollow, in fact counter-productive. The public has already formed an impression of Obama’s humanity and it’s the right one. Why try and change that?

It would have been far better for our side to say frankly why it is impossible for Pakistan to go after the Haqqanis and that we do not have the resources, the equipment or, frankly, the political will, especially after Salala. And that any such move would dangerously exacerbate domestic political differences. Just restoring the Nato supply route will cause us enough problems. Presumably some such reason is also why the Americans are unwilling to prevent cross border raids by the TTP from Nuristan, where thousands of them have taken shelter. We have not made a song and dance about that. Nor have we sent our planes to bomb them.

The trouble with Obama, like most men who hold an office far above their competence and experience, is the exaggerated stress they lay on not changing their minds lest they appear weak and inexperienced. Given some introspection Mr Zardari would have discovered that he too suffers from the same fault, and for precisely the same reason, as when, for instance, he foolishly and stubbornly refused to restore the chief justice till he was forced to so by Kayani.

The problem is that Pakistan is isolated today and, weaker in many respects than at any time of our history. Actually, we are seen as a country in the throes of an economic meltdown, governed by thieves and one which could implode momentarily. Admittedly, that’s not the case in reality but the Americans are taking advantage of it to drive a hard bargain. What makes matters worse for Pakistan is the belief among some here in key posts that the longer the US hangs on in Afghanistan, the more it will need Pakistan’s cooperation and hence the greater the benefit we will be able to derive from them. That betrays woeful ignorance.

It’s time to wake up and smell the coffee. The days, when the US looked on us with special favour are over; mutual distrust is now palpable. And trust, like a fine Chinese vase, once broken can never be properly repaired. The blemish remains as a distracting reminder of a better past. Worse, it compounds our own confusion when dealing with the US.

There is really no need for sordid compromises and shameful secret pacts. We must learn to do without the US, and we can. And we should begin this process now. As someone said, ‘allowing ourselves to be seduced by America was bad enough but getting raped on its account is intolerable’.

Email: charles123it@hotmail.com
-The News

May 3, 2012
By Javid Ahmad

The exit sign is blinking in Afghanistan. Yesterday, President Obama secretly traveled to Kabul and signed a pact outlining US support for Afghanistan after the troop pullout in 2014. He also spoke to Americans about the war in a prime-time address. The US focus is, and has been, primarily on security support for Afghanistan. But what about Afghanistan’s political transition? The Afghan presidential election is also slated for 2014, but the buzz is that it may be moved up to 2013 to avoid overlap with the planned NATO troop drawdown.

Yet there is still no practical plan for a smooth transfer of political power. Policymakers should be asking what the Afghan and US governments could do to ensure a smooth transfer without leaving behind a looming political vacuum and potential civil strife.

While Afghanistan has traditionally lacked effective national leadership, the Afghan and US governments over the years have failed to develop a mature political class from which the Afghan people can democratically select its leaders.

This failure extends to the civil service, which is largely corrupt and inept and operates under a vast network of political patronage and nepotism. Ten years and counting since the US invaded Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and wipe out its support for al Qaeda, the Afghan civil service is still incapable of delivering basic services to the Afghan people.

Meanwhile, concern is growing in Kabul that Mr. Karzai may attempt to “pull a Putin” at the next election.

As with Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2008, Karzai is not eligible to run for a third term. However, it is now speculated that he will hand pick a successor who will serve as president while Karzai retains his strongman status and runs the show from behind the scenes – keeping the seat warm until Karzai’s return.

Depending on whom Karzai might pick as his successor, such a move would spark outrage among many in Afghanistan, specifically among members of the opposition group, the erstwhile Northern Alliance.

Several names are in play, including Qayum Karzai, the president’s multimillionaire older brother, influential in Afghan politics and security.

However, President Karzai’s personal favorite may be Farooq Wardak, the current minister of education. Like Karzai, Mr. Wardak is a Pashtun. The two have a close relationship. If Karzai chooses to publicly announce his support for a potential Wardak candidacy, that could garner widespread public support among Pashtun voters who would likely rally to get him elected. Despite his lack of charisma, Wardak is regarded as one of Karzai’s most competent cabinet ministers.

Members such as Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, a Republican from California, seem aligned with Afghanistan’s opposition figures who want to radically revamp the state and decentralize it. Mr. Rohrabacher’s disdain for Karzai is well known, and US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton personally asked him not to join a congressional delegation in Kabul in April. He did not travel to Kabul, but other members did, and met with opposition figures.

The Obama administration itself does not support decentralization. Such an Afghanistan could involve, among other things, granting the provincial councils legislative power and having provincial governors elected rather than appointed by the president. The elected governors would have considerable power, including the ability to levy their own taxes and make all key provincial appointments.

This may work in America, but Afghanistan is not America.

Giving provincial governors the authority to hire and fire civil servants, and levy their own taxes with no input or control from Kabul risks creating and supporting local “strongmen” and parallel power structures that could be potentially destabilizing.

Such an arrangement also risks turning up the heat on already simmering ethnic tensions. It could create a Pashtun-dominated “Pashtunistan” separated from a confederation of provinces dominated by ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras.

Such a strategy of soft partition would open the door for ethnic cleansing. A cursory look at history, including that of India, Bosnia, Palestine, and Cyprus, suggests that the partition of mixed political entities has almost always been accompanied or preceded by ethnic cleansing and/or colossal ethnic violence.

US support in Afghanistan over the past decade has been invaluable and American officials have the right to criticize the Afghan government, but any move toward decentralization or support for one faction over another amounts to meddling in Afghanistan’s domestic affairs and must be avoided.

What the Obama administration and Congress can and must do is to begin pivoting from an emphasis on security to one that builds Afghanistan’s political and governing capabilities.

Rather than cozying up to insatiable warlords, former jihadi leaders, and other insalubrious characters that the US has supported in the past, America must do all it can to assist the development of moderate leaders in each of the factions – without “taking sides.”

Through education and leadership training of young Afghans, as well as foreign exposure, especially in the United States, America must nurture the next generation of dynamic young leaders. Afghanistan and the US have a valuable opportunity to support technocrats, visionary leaders, and capable civil servants who will lead the country into a positive future.

The 2014 election is of crucial significance. Real and tangible steps must be taken toward a smooth and responsible transition of power. Time is running out.

Javid Ahmad, a native of Kabul, is program coordinator with the Asia Program of the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. The views reflected here are his own.

Source: Christian Science Monitor

May 5, 2012
By Javid Ahmad

The exit sign is blinking in Afghanistan. On May 1, US President Obama secretly travelled to Kabul and signed a pact outlining US support for Afghanistan after the troop pullout in 2014. He also spoke to Americans about the war in a prime-time address.

The US focus is, and has been, primarily on security support for Afghanistan. But what about Afghanistan’s political transition? The Afghan presidential election is also slated for 2014, but the buzz is that it may be moved up to 2013 to avoid overlap with the planned Nato troop drawdown.

Yet there is still no practical plan for a smooth transfer of political power. Policymakers should be asking what the Afghan and US governments could do to ensure a smooth transfer without leaving behind a looming political vacuum and potential civil strife. While Afghanistan has traditionally lacked effective national leadership, the Afghan and US governments over the years have failed to develop a mature political class from which the Afghan people can democratically select its leaders.

This failure extends to the civil service, which is largely corrupt and inept and operates under a vast network of political patronage and nepotism. Ten years and counting since the US invaded Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and wipe out its support for Al Qaida, the Afghan civil service is still incapable of delivering basic services to the Afghan people. Meanwhile, concern is growing in Kabul that President Hamid Karzai may attempt to “pull a Putin” at the next election. As with Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2008, Karzai is not eligible to run for a third term. Depending on whom Karzai might pick as his successor, such a move would spark outrage among many in Afghanistan, specifically among members of the opposition group, the erstwhile Northern Alliance. Several names are in play, including Qayum Karzai, the president’s multimillionaire older brother, influential in Afghan politics and security.

However, Karzai’s personal favourite may be Farooq Wardak, the current minister of education. Like Karzai, Wardak is a Pashtun. The two have a close relationship. If Karzai chooses to publicly announce his support for a potential Wardak candidacy, that could garner widespread public support among Pashtun voters. Despite his lack of charisma, Wardak is regarded as one of Karzai’s most competent cabinet ministers.

True or not, there is a growing perception in Afghanistan that the US is trying to be a political kingmaker in domestic politics. Recent outreach to Afghan political figures by several members of Congress has emboldened this perception. Members such as Representative Dana Rohrabacher, a Republican from California, seem aligned with Afghanistan’s opposition figures who want to radically revamp the state and decentralise it.

The Obama administration itself does not support decentralisation. Such an Afghanistan could involve, among other things, granting the provincial councils legislative power and having provincial governors elected rather than appointed by the president. The elected governors would have considerable power, including the ability to levy their own taxes and make all key provincial appointments.

Soft-partition strategy

Giving provincial governors the authority to hire and fire civil servants, and levy their own taxes with no input or control from Kabul risks creating and supporting local ‘strongmen’ and parallel power structures that could be potentially destabilising. It could create a Pashtun-dominated ‘Pashtunistan’ separated from a confederation of provinces dominated by ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras.

Such a strategy of soft partition would open the door for ethnic cleansing. A cursory look at history, including that of India, Bosnia, Palestine, and Cyprus, suggests that the partition of mixed political entities has almost always been accompanied or preceded by ethnic cleansing and/or colossal ethnic violence. US support in Afghanistan over the past decade has been invaluable and American officials have the right to criticise the Afghan government, but any move toward decentralisation or support for one faction over another amounts to meddling in Afghanistan’s domestic affairs and must be avoided.

What the Obama administration and Congress can and must do is to begin pivoting from an emphasis on security to one that builds Afghanistan’s political and governing capabilities.

Rather than cozying up to insatiable warlords and other insalubrious characters that the US has supported in the past, America must do all it can to assist the development of moderate leaders in each of the factions — without ‘taking sides.’

Through education and leadership training of young Afghans, as well as foreign exposure, especially in the US, America must nurture the next generation of dynamic young leaders. Afghanistan and the US have a valuable opportunity to support technocrats, visionary leaders, and capable civil servants who will lead the country to a positive future.

The 2014 election is of crucial significance. Real and tangible steps must be taken toward a smooth and responsible transition of power. Time is running out.

Javid Ahmad, a native of Kabul, is programme coordinator with the Asia Programme of the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C.
Courtesy: Christian Science Monitor

May 6, 2012
By Peter Symonds

President Obama billed his secretive, fly-in, fly-out trip to Afghanistan in the early hours of Wednesday morning as marking a new dawn—the withdrawal of American troops and an end to more than a decade of war. In reality, the visit has set the stage for an open-ended US military presence in Afghanistan in line with Washington’s aims to transform the country into a permanent base of operations in Central Asia.

Obama’s unannounced trip to Afghanistan on the anniversary of the assassination of Osama bin Laden was also pitched towards his re-election campaign. He took the opportunity once again to glorify his role in ordering bin Laden’s murder and to posture as the leader who had successfully ended the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Obama met briefly with Afghan President Hamid Karzai to sign an “Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement” between the two countries. While the plan is to withdraw the bulk of US troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 and shift responsibility for security operations to the Afghan army and police, US special forces and trainers will remain, ostensibly in a support role, for at least a decade.

In a speech from the huge Bagram military complex, Obama declared that the US did not seek permanent bases inside Afghanistan. However, as well as the continued presence of US troops, the US military will have access to and use of Afghan facilities beyond 2014. A new bilateral security agreement will be negotiated over the next year to supersede the current Status of Forces Agreement giving US troops unfettered access throughout the country.

Obama claimed that the agreement marked the beginning of “an equal partnership between two sovereign states”, but the terms of the arrangement were clearly dictated by the US to its puppet regime in Kabul. Karzai remains completely dependent economically and militarily on Washington. Afghan security forces, which are due to peak at 352,000 in October before dropping to 230,000 in 2017, will be almost completely funded by Washington and its allies.

The timing of the visit was bound up with a NATO meeting due to take place in Chicago on May 20 to discuss the withdrawal of NATO combat troops. A number of US allies, facing widespread hostility to the war at home, have announced the pull-out of troops prior to the 2014 deadline. The Obama administration will use the meeting to pressure other NATO countries to commit to funding the Afghan security forces and providing other financial aid.

In his speech, Obama claimed that the US had reached its main goal, declaring that the defeat of Al Qaeda “is now within our reach.” Whatever the exact state of the Al Qaeda network, more than a decade of brutal neo-colonial war has embittered the Afghan population, providing a ready stream of recruits for anti-occupation militias such as the Taliban and the Haqqani network.

Just hours after Obama flew out of Afghanistan, Taliban fighters attacked a heavily-fortified residential compound in Kabul housing foreigners including American military contractors and defence employees. Suicide bombers detonated their explosives, blowing open the main gate. Fighting continued for hours before Afghan forces and private guards finally silenced the attackers, leaving at least seven Afghans and a guard dead.

The ability of the Taliban to mount high-profile attacks in the heavily-guarded capital underscores the tenuous character of the US-led occupation. While Obama claimed that “the tide had turned” against the Taliban insurgency, most analysts are pessimistic about the future of the Karzai regime once most US forces leave the country.

In an essay published on Tuesday, Anthony Cordesman from the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies wrote: “The broader problems in creating effective Afghan forces is increasingly questionable, the insurgents are clearly committed to going on with the fight, and relations with Pakistan seem to take two steps backward for every apparent step forward.”

Despite tactical reversals, Cordesman explained, the Taliban and other insurgents were not defeated. The present US strategy “will almost certainly fail to secure the south and east of Afghanistan” prior to 2014. Given this bleak picture, Cordesman advocated concentrating on shoring up areas still under Afghan government control and boosting pro-government local militias and warlords, despite their corruption and brutality.

Obama claimed that the strategic agreement signed yesterday will help “strengthen democratic institutions”, “advance development and dignity” for the Afghan people, and protect human rights. But this is belied by the corrupt and autocratic character of the Karzai regime and the social crisis confronting the vast majority of the Afghan people.

After more than a decade of American occupation, 70 percent of Afghans struggle to survive on less than $US2 a day. Unemployment is rampant and will certainly worsen as sectors of the economy dependent on the occupation decline or collapse. Food prices are rocketing due to drought. According to a report in the Independent earlier this year, more than 30,000 children die every year in Afghanistan due to the lack of nutritious food, leaving them vulnerable to diseases such as pneumonia or diarrhoea.

Far from ending a decade of war, Obama’s drawdown of US troops from Afghanistan is the preparation for new military adventures. The NATO war to oust the Gaddafi regime in Libya is being followed by escalating threats of intervention in Syria. At the same time, the US, together with its ally Israel, is threatening to attack Iran.

Even more recklessly, the Obama administration is refocussing the American military in the Asia Pacific region as part of its diplomatic/strategic efforts to undercut Chinese influence. By deliberately raising tensions with China, the US is increasing the danger of a slide towards a catastrophic conflict between two nuclear-armed countries.

Source: Countercurrents

By Khaled Ahmed
Published: May 5, 2012

The writer is Director South Asian Media School, Lahore khaled.ahmed@tribune.com.pk

Pakistan is about to face the second ‘withdrawal’ blowback from Afghanistan. The first, after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, came under General Ziaul Haq, whose policies metamorphosed Pakistan into an adventurist, fundamentalist nation with its face turned to the past. The second is upon us now, as the US Army gets ready to withdraw. Both events will coalesce to cause severe existential disorder in Pakistan.

In General Zia’s war, the blowback for Moscow was in the shape of the break-up of the Soviet Union. The US became the sole superpower after that. The blowback for it was silently taking shape within the Islamic warriors it had mustered in Pakistan. The post-Soviet euphoria was expressed through the term ‘New World Order’. Pakistan, sunk under its own Ziaist legacy, delivered the 2001 punch to the US in the shape of the al Qaeda attack.

Iran defeated the US in Iraq, and its people are paying a price for this victory with their freedoms. Pakistan’s non-state actors (Taliban, etc.) and foreign warriors have defeated the US in Afghanistan under Pakistan’s doctrine of ‘strategic depth’ — and the people of Pakistan should get ready to pay a price for this victory too. General Zia spawned madrassas and tried to create a pattern of governance resembling the khilafat. Pakistan became a Machiavelli’s nightmare — who had warned the Medici of Florence not to employ mercenaries to fight their wars — crawling with “civilian warriors” sharing internal sovereignty with the state.

As it gets ready for the blowback from the American defeat in Afghanistan, ‘victor’ Pakistan’s parliament is presiding over a state without internal control, while protesting external sovereignty against American drones. Almost 60 per cent of its territory is controlled by terrorists and insurgents. The terrorists are led by al Qaeda, whose certified capacity to control the behaviour of Pakistan’s large madrassa network is paralleled by its growing penetration into the army rank and file. Violence and its corollary, intimidation, persuade the population — the rich and the poor alike — to embrace al Qaeda’s ‘nation-building’.

What Iran did not face because of its oil and totalitarianism is economic collapse and loss of internal sovereignty. In Pakistan, the masses can no longer bear the burden of ‘victory’ and are increasingly willing to overthrow the current system of governance — not through another takeover by a general but by anyone who would give them the capacity to survive. No one who would win their support can even think of governing without first swearing hatred of the US and acceptance of the terrorists as “our brothers”.

The winds that blow from the Muslim world are not reassuring after the chastening experience of the Arab Spring. Olivier Roy says that the youth that gathered at the Tahrir Square lacked the will to take over Egypt when it was ripe for the plucking and let it be snapped up by the Islamists. Irfan Husain in his book Fatal Faultlines: Pakistan, Islam and the West (Harper Collins India 2012) says that when he googled ‘rightwing militant groups’ on his computer he got 392,000 websites spewing plans to “remake the world in their own vision of utopia, and never mind the collateral damage”.

Implosion caused by an outdated Pakistani mind, or collateral damage caused by the West trying to survive against Islamic aggression, may doom Pakistan in its present shape. It may ape Afghanistan and survive by giving up its internal writ, some of it already given up in preparation. A path-dependent, economically damaged Islamic state threatens its neighbourhood with jihad because its vision for the future is untenable.

-The Express Tribune

May 8, 2012
Dr Maleeha Lodhi

The timing of President Obama’s recent trip to Afghanistan – coinciding with the one-year anniversary of Osama bin Laden’s killing – may have been driven by election politics, but its purpose went beyond that.

His televised speech from Bagram base was designed to send several important messages to different audiences. For his war-fatigued nation he held out the assurance that an end to the war was in sight. To Afghans he signalled that America would not rush for the exits or abandon them but remain committed to the country after most Nato combat forces leave Afghanistan in 2014. Pakistan’s cooperation was sought as an “equal partner” to build regional peace and stability.

Most significantly, President Obama offered an open door for dialogue to the Taliban. Many members of the Taliban, he said, “have indicated an interest in reconciliation”. “A path of peace is now set before them.”

The speech elicited no comment from Islamabad. Obama’s call for a “negotiated peace” in Afghanistan is what Pakistan has long urged, even if Washington has taken a decade to reach this conclusion. The acknowledgement that his administration is in “direct discussions” with the Taliban marked the first time that the president took public ownership of last year’s secret contacts with Taliban representatives aimed at establishing a peace process.

This aligns the US approach more closely with what Pakistan has for years been advocating. But this potential convergence is overshadowed by the persisting impasse between Pakistan and the US over the terms of re-engagement, and what should be its starting point. This explains Islamabad’s silence over elements of Obama’s speech that it would otherwise concur with.

The most significant message that President Obama’s visit to Afghanistan aimed to convey ahead of the Nato summit in Chicago, was that he had a credible and ‘responsible’ plan to wind down America’s longest and increasingly unpopular war. And that he was on course to accomplish this. The goal he had set – “to defeat Al-Qaeda and deny it a chance to rebuild – was now within reach.”

Before the prime-time speech, Obama signed the ‘strategic partnership agreement’ with President Hamid Karzai in Kabul. This endorsed the transfer of security responsibility to the Afghan government in 2014, while committing the US to military and economic support for a decade after 2014.

Forged after twenty months of on-off negotiations, the agreement seeks to define the post 2014 relationship between the two countries. But it contains few specifics other than the offer to provide military training and equipment and development assistance till 2024. It refrains from spelling out the level of funding or troop numbers – leaving this and a status-of-forces agreement to negotiate over the next year as part of a more detailed accord.

A residual force comprising military advisers, special operations and counter terrorism personnel will stay on in the country after 2014 but the agreement provided no details. President Obama’s claim in the Bagram speech that the US did not seek permanent bases sidestepped the fact that Washington will have access to several Afghan bases as ‘joint facilities’. The agreement was silent on this as well as the number of forces that will stay on as part of a long-term US military presence.

Predictably the agreement evoked opposition from Taliban leaders. Taliban statements denounced the agreement for giving “legitimacy to the occupation of Afghanistan” and warned this would lead to “further insecurity and political instability”. A Taliban spokesman also cast an armed attack on Kabul that occurred hours after the president left the capital as a “clear message to Obama not to think about permanent bases in Afghanistan”.

The vagueness of the strategic partnership agreement means that difficult issues have been postponed for later resolution. The imprecision may be deliberate so as not to over commit resources or ignite controversy and produce problems in a shifting strategic landscape in Afghanistan and changing national mood in America. Whatever the reasons, the ambiguity might turn out to be useful, as it leaves open diplomatic space for negotiations in the Afghan ‘reconciliation’ process. Leaving much content to be determined later holds an opportunity to modify some of the terms when and if this figures in serious peace talks.

For now the agreement gives President Obama something to showcase at Chicago as a ‘tangible’ indicator of progress. But it hardly addresses the confusion in US strategy for the next, decisive phase of the Afghan endgame, which is expected to be more complex and challenging. It certainly does not add up to a credible game plan to wind down the war. Instead the pillars on which a viable plan should rest remain clouded in uncertainty.

Any plausible strategy to ‘responsibly’ end the war hinge on four factors: 1) progress towards what President Obama now calls a “negotiated peace”; 2) regional support for such a settlement; 3) Afghan governance capacity and 4) the ability of Afghan forces to hold their own and carry out security duties independently of their Nato patrons.

The unknowns on all four counts are far more than the knowns at this point. For all the recent Pentagon claims about Afghan forces operating effectively and being able to thwart the coordinated Taliban assaults on Kabul and other provinces on April 15, the integrity and coherence of the ANSF remains in deep doubt. So do questions about their professional and representative character.

Uncertainties also abound about the Afghan political transition that will coincide with the 2014 withdrawal deadline. The constitutionally prescribed two-term limit means Karzai cannot run in the presidential elections due in 2014. There is speculation that elections might be brought forward to 2013 and that Karzai is positioning himself as the ‘king-maker’ to install a pliant nominee. None of this offers any assurance of a smooth transfer of political power, and even less of avoiding controversies like those over ballot fraud that marred the last presidential election. Hopes of enhanced governance capacity remain just that – hopes.

Meanwhile Washington’s troubled relations with Teheran and unresolved obstacles in normalising ties with Islamabad have complicated the building of a firm regional consensus for a tidy Afghan endgame as well as a stable post-2014 order.

But lack of headway towards what many American officials acknowledge as the “most important pillar” – Afghan reconciliation – poses the biggest challenge to American plans for a smooth transition and peaceful end to the war.

Washington should have focused all its diplomatic energy to move this process forward. The opening bid depended on the administration showing clarity, resolve and accommodation to put a full-fledged peace process in place. Instead its inability to settle in-house rifts, override the Pentagon’s objections and reluctance to use its political capital to release five detainees from Guantanamo – earlier accepted as the first step of a confidence building package – triggered developments that resulted in the suspension of talks by the Taliban.

If recent indications are correct that the White House is encouraged by the American public’s approval of President Obama’s Bagram narrative to end the war and pursue a “negotiated peace”, this should spur a renewed bid to revive the talks rather then prevarication and waiting until the presidential election is over. By then valuable time would be lost and an opportunity squandered. The lack of domestic traction for Republican criticism of ‘talking to the Taliban’ should persuade the administration to see progress on reconciliation as a winning political proposition.

Without expeditious movement to resume the talks and make meaningful progress, the dynamics of the coming fighting season will take over, blighting prospects for a “negotiated peace”. More fighting will imperil the reconciliation goal and dwindle chances of a political end to the war. If progress in peace talks is not accomplished well before 2014, the various actors will have diminished ability to control events in Afghanistan. This could confront the country with the spectre of chaos.

-The News

May 8, 2012
Musa Khan Jalalzai

The long awaited strategic partnership agreement between the United States and Afghanistan signed in May 2012 sparked a reaction in neighbouring states like Pakistan and China, demanding the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. This agreement will widen distances between Afghanistan and its neighbours, as they understand that the US could use Afghanistan for creating instability in their states. “Today, we are agreeing to be long-term partners in combating terrorism with the Afghan security forces, strengthening democratic institutions, supporting development and protecting human rights of all Afghans,” President Obama said.

Afghans from all walks of life termed this agreement as a long-term enslavement of Afghans, because the US and its allies neither strengthened democratic institutions, nor trained the Afghan army or protected human rights. The Obama administration and the CIA killed, humiliated and severely tortured innocent Afghans, destroyed their country, and sectarianised and ethnicised state institutions, specifically the army and police. The US and NATO failed to bring peace and stability to the country while distrust between the Afghan National Army (ANA) and their foreign partners may further create problems in the days to come as the Taliban have already infiltrated into the rank and file of the security forces and the police.

Recently, segments of Afghan society criticised the US policy of strengthening war criminals and militias in the Uruzgan province. The US’s military commanders and Australian generals have signed a contract with Matiullah Khan (commander of a 2,000-strong militia) to provide security to their military convoys. Matiullah Khan receives $ 340,000 per month ($ 4.1 million annually). Without the consent of the ANA, this contract created a lot of misunderstandings between the NATO allies and the Afghan security forces. The Afghan army views the process of rearming private militias and Mujahideen as controversial and counterproductive.

Recently, four US senators have demanded the downsizing of the Afghan security forces after 2014. Mr Obama and his Pentagon friends want to heavily downsize the ANA to reduce the burden of military expenses on the US and the NATO allies. Prominent Pakistani military analyst Brigadier Asif Haroon Raja in his recent article warned, “The US military supported by the armies of 48 countries, including 27 of NATO, swooped upon heavily sanctioned, impoverished Afghanistan, devoid of regular armed forces, technical and technological means.”

Afghans ask which security forces the US wants to train if it does not trust the ANA military command and its intelligence reports. During the Panjwai incident, the Afghan army chief, Sher Muhammad Karimi, severely criticised the US for the killing of 17 innocent Afghan villagers and complained that the US forces did not allow the ANA investigation team to enter the village until the evidence was covered up. Sher Muhammad said that the killing of 17 Afghan civilians, including nine children in Kandahar, was a premeditated murder plan.

The Afghans complain that NATO and the US are struggling to establish their own rogue, private militias, instead of strengthening the Afghan security forces, while NATO and the US complain about Taliban infiltration within the ANA. Consequently, the process of the establishment of a strong ANA remained in limbo. Different affiliations, inclinations and associations within the Afghan security forces and intelligence infrastructure created many suspicions about their loyalties to the state and the government.

As we understand, the deepening distrust between the NATO allies and Afghan security forces jeopardised efforts in the war on terror. The latter have started viewing NATO and the US forces as occupying forces. In their comprehension, the way NATO is tackling the insurgency in Afghanistan is ultimately wrong because they kill innocent civilians instead of terrorist Taliban militias. Experts and analysts understand that there is little chance things would work out as per the US’s plans.

The recent Pentagon China-phobia policy, its containment of China, the emergence of a new military intelligence agency and the US hegemonic designs in South and Southeast Asia have become a hot debate in the electronic and print media in Europe. The increasing Chinese influence in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia, its capture of European and African markets, together with the improvement of the Russian economy and military have caused unending torment for the US. The Pentagon authorities did not sleep a wink since the commencement of the recent joint Russia-China naval exercise in the Yellow Sea, between the east coast of China and the Korean Peninsula, and their stance on the Arab Spring.

These new developments and the recent US policy in Afghanistan, negotiations with Taliban insurgents and the deterioration of Pak-US relations signal new military challenges for China, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The clouds of a new war are about to spread, while either Afghanistan or Pakistan might become the battlefield of this intelligence game in the near future. This is the beginning of a new economic war as the US Defence Secretary, Leon Panetta declared that his country was at a strategic turning point after a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. Having realised the sensitivity of the recent political and military developments in the region, the Pentagon established a new military intelligence agency to strengthen its control over the region.

The writer is the author of Policing in Multicultural Britain and can be reached at zai.musakhan222@gmail.com
-Daily Times

May 9, 2012
Mahir Ali

DURING his unannounced visit to Kabul last week, President Barack Obama sought to invest the murkiness of the moment with some sort of significance.

“In the pre-dawn darkness of Afghanistan,” he declared in an address to Americans from the US base at Bagram, “we can see the light of new day on the horizon.”

That light is not visible to everyone. During Obama’s visit, he signed an agreement with Hamid Karzai that supposedly lays out the parameters of the relationship between the US and Afghanistan for a decade following the pullout of most foreign troops in 2014.

It’s a vague pact, intended to signal that the military withdrawal will not be tantamount to abandonment, but with all too many specifics yet to be worked out.

What it will mean — in fact, whether it will mean anything — is uncertain. The propaganda value of the visit was underlined by its deliberate coincidence with the first anniversary of Osama bin Laden’s extrajudicial execution in Pakistan, and Obama underlined the fact that the operation was launched from a base in Afghanistan.

His verbiage also focused more on Al Qaeda than on the Taliban, given the former’s presence in Afghanistan is now believed to be minuscule while efforts at negotiations with the latter have stalled but not been given up.

That Obama arrived under cover of darkness suggests the security situation even in the Afghan capital isn’t exactly rosy, a point underlined by Taliban attacks in Kabul shortly after the US president’s departure. It’s gratifying that they were taken by surprise, but the same cannot be said about their continuing ability to infiltrate the capital more or less at will.

Much was made last month of the improved ability of Afghan special forces after concerted Taliban strikes — possibly an attempt to replicate the 1968 Tet offensive that decisively turned the tide in Vietnam — were repelled.

More broadly, however, the capacity of troops supposedly loyal to Karzai to hold out against the Taliban without western assistance is far from clear. In theory, negotiations that could lead to the Taliban, or sections thereof, being brought into the tent make sense, but whether they can lead anywhere remains indeterminate.

An intriguing report in The Washington Post on Monday, meanwhile, offered some details of a clandestine project whereby “high-level detainees” have sporadically been released from the Parwan detention centre in Afghanistan in an attempt “to quell violence in concentrated areas where Nato is unable to ensure security”.

The report cites one case relating to a Hezb-i-Islami commander whose release led to the Hezb “providing useful intelligence on the whereabouts of Taliban fighters”. Quoting a senior US officer, the report goes on to say: “Before long, the US troops and Hezb-i-Islami fighters were conducting joint operations, travelling in the same vehicles and sleeping on the same bases.”

The Hezb-i-Islami — a key component of the Mujahideen alliance during the 1980s, when the faction led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was particularly favoured by both the CIA and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) — has also been known to collaborate with the Taliban. The so-called endgame makes for interesting bedfellows.

There are striking parallels, incidentally, between the present circumstances and the period of the drawn-out Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in the late 1980s.

At that time, the occupation forces were keen to strike local deals in the interests of security — notably with the forces of Ahmed Shah Massoud, who was perceived by elements in the Soviet hierarchy as more of a nationalist than a religious fanatic, and a worthy opponent who could potentially be persuaded to join a non-communist coalition in Kabul.

Najibullah, however, was dead set against any deals with Massoud; he was more keen on working out a modus vivendi with fellow Pakhtun elements of the Mujahideen. He failed — and, according to Massoud, declined an offer of safe passage out of Kabul when the Mujahideen regime retreated to make way for the Taliban takeover.

That Najibullah defied predictions by holding out for three years after the Soviet troop withdrawal may bring some consolation to Karzai, although he can ill-afford to shut out the grotesque images of the last Soviet-sponsored leader’s ultimate fate.

The Red Army’s pullout followed an agreement under United Nations auspices, but Moscow’s efforts to convene a regional conference with the aim of persuading Afghanistan’s neighbours to play a constructive role in the nation’s future came to naught.

There are no such initiatives at the moment. The vacuous US-Afghan agreement preceded a Nato conference in Obama’s political home ground of Chicago, where more empty promises are likely to be made.

Perhaps the biggest parallel between the Soviet and the US-led occupations of Afghanistan is the eventual dismal failure. The Soviet intervention, intended to prop up an unsustainable regime, was a monumental error — and influential individuals in Moscow began to realise this within a couple of years, but undoing the misdeed took far longer than anticipated.

The US would have been better off pursuing police action rather than military invasion in the wake of the Sept 11 terrorist attacks. The Al Qaeda threat deserved to be taken seriously, but it was neither existential nor apocalyptic.

The tiny fraction of documents released from the cache captured at Bin Laden’s hideout near Abbottabad hardly conveys the impression of a once-formidable organisation in its death throes.

There’s cause for mild amusement rather than alarm in discussions over PR efforts, and perhaps the same could be said about Bin Laden’s determination to put Joe Biden in the White House by assassinating “the head of infidelity” — a description of Obama with which loonies on the fringes of the American right would surely concur — as a means of sparking a crisis in the US.

Deal or no deal, what lies ahead in Afghanistan remains hard to predict in the face of innumerable uncertainties and imponderables.

In the quest for symptoms, however, one could do worse than focus for a moment on the $80m the US spent on building a compound in Mazar-i-Sharif, “envisioned”, according to American press reports, as the nation’s “diplomatic hub in northern Afghanistan”. The plan has now been abandoned because the location was deemed “too dangerous”.

mahir.dawn@gmail.com
-Dawn

May 14, 2012
Dr Moeed Pirzada

Will Pakistan be able to attend the NATO summit in Chicago? And if yes, then on what terms and conditions? Monday morning in Islamabad will begin with considerable feverish anxiety around these two questions.

A tripartite commission consisting of NATO’s commander in Afghanistan, General Allen, and the military chiefs of Pakistan and Afghanistan kept on meeting in Rawalpindi on Saturday and Sunday to brainstorm the border control measures and how untoward incidents like the Salala tragedy of November 26 can be avoided. It is expected that the Defence Cabinet Committee (DCC) will meet, with PM Gilani in the chair on May15 and 16 and some analysts predict that Pakistan will be announcing opening the NATO supply route on May 17.

The public argument shaped by the US interlocutors, diplomats and media, and something that has been wholeheartedly bought by many in the Pakistani government and the opinion making circles is that Pakistan overplayed its hand, ended up using its trump card, i.e. ‘NATO supplies’, and has not gained anything in return and is now forced to resume what is described as GLOC’s under NATO’s ultimatum because missing the Chicago summit means being kicked out of the important decision making in the endgame of Afghanistan. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s press briefing of last Friday has added to this gloomy interpretation. Many are also worried for the imminent shortfalls in the forthcoming budget and point out that the ministry of finance has already added CSF reimbursements into its calculations. The much calculated posturing by the US House of Representatives that recommends various kinds of sanctions against Pakistan, including those involving preferential imports, certainly focuses minds on the forthcoming challenges if the impasse is not resolved before Chicago.

Since the approval of the parliamentary committee’s recommendations, the whole media discourse is built around two main points only: the US apology for Salala and end of drone strikes. Going by this, it appears that these are the only two sticking points. However, sometimes it is important to revisit the fundamentals of a problem before you could be sure of the solutions.

So let’s take a step back. Why is the Salala tragedy that led to the closure of the NATO supply routes so nerve wracking for Pakistanis? No doubt, the chilling details of the incident that appeared like an orgy of blood played with the lives of Pakistani soldiers jolted an already traumatised nation. But coming in the climate shaped by the US attack of May 2 to kill Osama bin Laden, it convinced many that the US or perhaps more specifically, the Pentagon in its desperation in Afghanistan, and the way it builds its public narrative, has reached a stage where it sees a certain kind of solution in punishing Pakistan. Arguments like the one advanced by Professor Stephen Krasner of Stanford only confirm this mood.

It’s true that the US side explains Salala as a horrible outcome of mistakes in procedures and communication, but to most Pakistanis, Salala was a deliberate act of ‘punishment’ meted out by the Pentagon for failing to cooperate or playing ‘double games’ as it is repeatedly alleged by US officials and media. Pakistan’s robust decision to close NATO supplies was to jolt the US and its allies into a rethink. The US may or may not realise that its actions are adding to societal meltdown and collapse in Pakistan. This resultant chaos may or may not hurt the US and its regional allies like India, but will definitely destroy the equilibrium of a political and social order where the majority sees the ruling elite kowtowing to US dictation and where the military establishment has lost much of its moral authority since the events of 9/11 when it unwillingly became a partner in the US-led war against terrorism. From the US narrative, it is obvious that, in their singular obsession with the endgame in Afghanistan, they have either no realisation of how their actions are adding to a societal meltdown in Pakistan or they don’t care. But for Pakistanis it matters.

It is in this scenario that the discussions of this tripartite commission on Saturday and Sunday and the understandings reached and conveyed between General Allen, General Kayani and General Karimi become supremely important.

‘Apology’ started to loom large after the parliamentary committee’s recommendations. But before that Pakistan’s foreign minister and foreign secretary were on record insisting, in the most unambiguous terms, that we were not seeking an apology; what we want is the US to understand Pakistan’s red lines and to respect them. By now, we also know for sure that by the beginning of February, some sort of apology was being offered and the Pakistani foreign ministry wanted this to be postponed until the end of the parliamentary review.

The test for the DCC to which General Kayani will report his findings after his meetings will be to assess if Pakistan and the US agree to the wording of a joint statement where the latter affirms that it understands Pakistani concerns arising from the tragedy of Salala; that it respects Pakistani sovereignty and that both sides are determined to work with procedures and communication protocols that will ensure that incidents like Salala do not recur. Pakistan, in the same statement, will need to ensure that it understands the US concerns in FATA and will do everything possible to reduce the misuse of its territory against US troops.

But this assurance is impossible without coming to some sort of understanding on the issue of drone strikes with the US for its narrative describes Pakistan as either unwilling or unable to control the action against its troops from FATA. The US military and administration, now victims of their narratives, will not be able to sell at home a total cessation of drone strikes, especially in an election year.

In the last few weeks, the US has tried, for the first time, accepting responsibility for the drone strikes. First, President Obama made an admission and then his national security adviser, John Brennan, attempted adding moral justifications to the policy in his presentation at the Woodrow Wilson Centre. The sheer ugliness and perhaps immorality of the drone policy requires several doctoral theses from different perspectives, but in a real politic framework, it compels Pakistan to come forward and accept responsibility for permitting limited drone strikes.

Without such an admission, it cannot ask for a framework of mutual intelligence sharing and a modicum of control on this policy. A jointly agreed framework may ensure fewer strikes, a more defined focus on al Qaeda, and can work towards a cessation timetable since Obama has defined his goal as the end of al Qaeda, which he again repeated at his speech from Bagram Airbase on May 2, 2012. After all, in the ever raging debate on drone strikes, no one has raised this question so far that irrespective of all sorts of arguments for and against, could this continue till eternity? However, this vexing question and what kind of language is needed on this issue, will confront the DCC with its biggest nightmare, especially given parliament’s reaffirmed position.

But any understanding to make any sense on this tricky and emotive issue will be incomplete without tying it with the Afghanistan endgame. How do we interpret what President Obama described for the first time as “negotiated peace” and how will this be supported by neighbours, including Pakistan? After all, isn’t the summit in Chicago about Afghanistan and its endgame?

Without any clarity on these issues, the optics of Chicago may become meaningless for Pakistan. Though in a mood of desperation no one dares to ask the common sense question: will in our absence the Chicago summit not have a hole as large as the size of Pakistan in terms of the final solutions related to the withdrawal from Afghanistan?
But while the DCC grapples with these difficult questions, intractable solutions and their inevitable political fallout, it may benefit tremendously from keeping this common sense question in mind. Options never end; you have to keep finding them.

The writer is Director World Affairs and Content Head English with Pakistan Television. His website is www.facebook.com/MoeedPirzada
-Daily Times