May 16, 2012
Najmuddin A Shaikh

SUNDAY was the day on which President Karzai and his team had hoped the focus of media attention would be on the progress Afghanistan had made in developing its security forces.

Ashraf Ghani, the head of the transition process, announced, as expected, the third phase of the takeover of security responsibilities by the Afghan National Security Forces. This entails the transfer of 230 districts and the centres of all provincial capitals to Afghan control with the Isaf forces in these areas being withdrawn or moved to their camps, leaving the Afghans responsible for security in 75 per cent of the country. Messages of felicitations from President Obama and the Nato secretary general should have dominated the headlines.

Instead, the focus was on the assassination in Kabul on that fateful morning of Mullah Arsala Rehmani, a former Taliban cabinet minister who had been appointed a senator by President Karzai and a senior member of the High Peace Council.

Mullah Rahmani whom I had met at Track II events in Kabul was an impressive politician. He revealed in the short exchanges I had with him a sharp mind and a pragmatic bent seeking, it seemed to me, like all good politicians, solutions that all parties could subscribe to with minimum loss of face and that involved acceptable compromises on ideological positions.

He believed, or so it appeared from his remarks that, absent external pressures, the Taliban leadership would be flexible. He had, if I recall correctly, made specific mention of the Mullah Omar Eid message in which he had acknowledged in veiled words the need to share power with other ethnic groups in Afghanistan.

It is significant that the acknowledged spokesman for the Taliban, Zabiullah Mujahid has denied that the Taliban were responsible for the assassination. It could suggest that the Taliban did regard Rehmani as someone who could have been helpful.

What is ominous is a claim made in a telephonic message to a Pakistani newspaper from a group calling itself the Mullah Dadullah Mahaz claiming responsibility for the killing.

While this is the first time that such a group has been mentioned publicly, there has been, for some time, strong evidence that there are splinter groups within the Taliban movement who have been opposed to the embryonic and now stalled peace talks in Qatar. It would be appropriate for any such group to name itself after Mullah Dadullah, one of the most feared and ruthless of Taliban commanders and whose killing by Isaf forces was probably facilitated by the Taliban leadership, which believed he was getting too big for his boots and becoming a liability.

Two interviews by Agha Jan Motasim to Newsweek and more recently after the Rehmani assassination to AP from his sanctuary in Turkey, lend credence to the belief that the hardliners who may be in a minority and who may not have the ear of the supreme leader, Mullah Omar, are prepared to take ruthless steps to sabotage the prospects for peace talks.

Motasim, a former member of the Quetta Shura and a son-in-law of Mullah Omar, was apparently a member of the Taliban team that went to Qatar early in 2011 to conduct negotiations with the Americans. Motasim says that the majority of the Taliban and the Taliban leadership want a broad-based government for all Afghan people and an Islamic system like other Islamic countries.

Motasim was almost killed in August last year when he was attacked in Karachi and while he says this may have been the result of the violence that prevailed in the city at that time it is probable that this was the handiwork of the same hardliners that have now eliminated Rehmani.

Where does this leave the prospect for peace talks and reconciliation? Even if the Taliban are convinced, as US ambassador to Afghanistan Ryan Crocker believes they should be, that the Americans are in Afghanistan for the long haul can the peacemakers among the Taliban take the inherent risks when no palpable advance can be perceived and when the hardliners, albeit a minority, remain a powerful disruptive force?

Other news that also cast a shadow on the announcement of the transfer of security responsibilities was the new ‘green on blue’ incidents. The killing of two British soldiers by members of the Afghan local police brought the total of fatalities in such incidents during 2012 alone to 18. Investigative media reporting suggested that this was an understatement since Nato did not issue any reports on incidents in which there were no fatalities, and even in fatal incidents the number of wounded was usually not mentioned.

While Nato maintains that most of these incidents relate to “personal differences” and were not insurgency-driven an Isaf study entitled A Crisis of Trust and Cultural Incompatibility had concluded that “Such fratricide-murder incidents are no longer isolated; they reflect a growing systemic threat”. Will the Americans stay for a training mission when most of these incidents are occurring at training sites?

Importantly, while care is taken to avoid mentioning the ethnicity of the perpetrators of such incidents it is evident that in every case a Pakhtun has been involved. The ANSF has been built to almost its full strength, and according to authentic reports, less than three per cent of the members come from the Taliban and Pakhtun-dominated south and east. As a vetting process gets under way to prevent further ‘green on blue’ incidents, it is almost certain that more Pakhtuns will be pushed out skewing further the current ethnic imbalance in the forces and providing further recruits for the Taliban.

On the economic front, there is no news from Afghanistan that can generate optimism. On the contrary, it seems that factories opened to provide supplies to the Afghan forces under American contracts are closing since the Afghans now in charge are buying supplies from China which are cheaper but which reduce employment in Afghanistan.

What this portends for Pakistan and for the currently fraught US-Pakistan relationship will be discussed later.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.
-Dawn

May 16, 2012
By Asad Munir

A 10-year strategic partnership agreement between the US and Afghanistan has been signed recently which will shape long-term Nato involvement in Afghanistan. After signing the agreement, President Barack Obama addressed US citizens from Bagram base in Kabul highlighting the road-map for the process of transition in Afghanistan. He also referred to Pakistan saying that it should be an equal partner in this process in a way that respects Pakistan’s “sovereignty, interests and democratic institutions. The US has no other design beyond respecting Afghan sovereignty and ending al Qaeda safe havens”.

Between the lines, some messages have been conveyed. Pakistan should assist the Afghan government in negotiations with the Taliban and become an equal partner in the process. Respect for Afghan sovereignty implies that terrorists entering Afghanistan from our soil should not be encouraged and interference in internal Afghan affairs should be avoided. President Obama mentioned the al Qaeda’s safe havens but did not touch upon the presence of the Haqqani Network in North Waziristan.

The US wants to exit Afghanistan but would like to leave with a stable government in place in Kabul, which is acceptable to all Afghan factions, including the Taliban. In order for that to happen, suitable measures are being planned to prevent the country from plunging into chaos and a possible civil war upon withdrawal of Nato Forces.

Pakistan has two major security concerns related to Afghanistan, the Durand Line and the perceived presence and influence of India. The Durand Line and Pashtunistan issues have been raised by different Afghan regimes in the past. However, it may no longer be a concern. Pashtuns are now so well integrated in Pakistani society that the majority will never opt for Pashtunistan or Afghanistan. Afghan-Pashtun refugees have been staying in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa for more than 30 years.Threat perceptions about Afghanistan need re-evaluation so that suitable changes are made in our Afghan policy. The current one, used for over the last three decades, has only resulted in greater violence and instability in both countries. Instead of creating goodwill by sheltering millions of Afghan refugees, we have only gained the hatred of common Afghans due to our policy.

The ability of Pakistani terrorists to strike has been diluted to a great extent through army operations but they are not yet finished. Insisting on having a government of our choice in Afghanistan may not be a feasible option in the prevailing environment. A government in Kabul, not hostile to Pakistan and which does not interfere in our internal affairs, should be acceptable. Threat perceptions about Indian presence in Afghanistan should also be re-evaluated; it may not be such a serious threat to our security as perceived.

Nato supplies should be resumed as per recommendations of the parliament. Pakistan should participate in the Chicago Summit and extend all possible help to the Afghan government. The government should not succumb to pressures and threats of other political parties, not representing the will of the people.

The Express Tribune

May 17, 2012
Jan Assakzai

As TV studios in Washington and London discuss whether to ‘precipitously’ withdraw NATO forces from Afghanistan or stick to the scheduled 2014 deadline, they largely ignore the predicted decline in aid to Afghanistan’s economy once the transition of security to Afghan forces is completed. The dire prediction comes from none other than the World Bank itself.

However, before the negative effects of the coming decline in financial assistance are discussed, a cursory look at what has been achieved over the past decade in the economy, following NATO’s intervention, is warranted. The best gauge is perhaps the state of the reconstruction effort. On the positive side, ring roads have been constructed linking the country’s major cities (around $ 8 billion was spent on these infrastructure projects). All the big cities now have electricity. A rail service has been started linking Uzbekistan with Afghanistan’s Mazar-e-Sharif city — no small feat given Afghanistan’s poor infrastructure. Around $ 2 billion has been privately invested in Afghanistan’s telecom industry — an act of faith by investors given the precarious security environment.

Chinese, Canadian and Indian companies have promised billions of dollars worth of investment in the mining of minerals, higher education, transport, food security, railway links and employment-generation projects. But much can go wrong between now and the honouring of these pledges. Although these efforts have begun to improve significantly the poor infrastructure of the country, ruined by decades of civil war, they will be insufficient to solve Afghanistan’s medium- and long-term problems.

The 95 percent of the development budget financed by foreign aid presents the main challenge. With the deadline for NATO to hand over security to Afghan forces fast approaching, and the recession-hit economies of western donors struggling to recover, the predicted reduction in aid could be catastrophic. No wonder then that owing to financial constraints, the number of Afghan security forces have already been quietly reduced from 375,000 to 220,000.

As the NATO forces withdraw, the accompanying decrease in aid will hack into government and development budgets. According to the World Bank, Afghanistan’s total budget, both for development and government’s expenditures, was around $ 17 billion for the years 2010 and 2011; nearly 60 percent of the total amount was spent on the Afghan security forces, including the police (Source: World Bank, Afghanistan, Beyond 2014).

For the coming decade, the World Bank grimly projects a financing gap of around 25 percent of GDP ($ 7.2 billion) a year. It forecasts a decline in the growth rate to 5.5 present by 2018 and to 3.3 percent in the longer term. Against this backdrop, Afghanistan not only needs a yearly commitment of $ 4-5 billion for its security forces but also at least $ 25-30 billion over the whole next ten years in order to ensure a growth rate at modest levels, i.e. around six percent, as against the phenomenal 9.1 percent average rate over the last ten years (thanks to donors’ aid money and nearly $ 3.5 billion average yearly remittances from the Afghan diaspora).

The ability to launch mega projects and create job opportunities in post-2014 Afghanistan will be stifled by donor fatigue; but it is the demographics that raise the stakes, as 60 percent of the population is under 25. Unemployment, currently a massive 40 percent and if left to continue, will fuel poverty, social unrest and vulnerability — especially amongst the young — to the influence of violent and extremist groups. No wonder more and more unemployed youth will likely take all sorts of travel risks ending up on the shores of Europe and the UK, exacerbating the already controversial immigration issue.

The World Bank’s predictions for the national economy beyond 2014 also point to the relationship between declining aid money and the growing share of the opium trade; this threatens, effectively, to turn Afghanistan into a ‘narco-state’. According to a study by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes in its 2011 report, funds earned, even now, from opium cultivation are around $ 70 billion and $ 500 million go to Afghan farmers. The middlemen get another $ 2.5 billion. The big barons in Asia and the west get the rest of the money. No wonder opium cultivation has a correlation with other dynamics like overall insecurity, loss of accessible areas and harmful outside interference in the country. The money obtained feeds the insurgency, drawing on the unemployed youth.

President Karzai knows that if a political solution to the insurgency is not found and found quickly and a regional consensus on post-2014 Afghanistan is not hammered out, the resulting negative security environment will further cripple the national economy.

The World Bank’s warnings for post-2014 are likely to add further to the disillusionment of Afghans and suggest — as the troops leave — the coming of a failed state, home to abject poverty, mass unemployment and social misery. These are the perfect conditions for breeding and recruiting al Qaeda-linked jihadists. This threatens the future not just of Afghans but all of us here in Pakistan and the west alike.

The writer is a London-based Afghan affairs analyst with vast experience in financial reporting. He has also worked with the BBC World Service’s Afghan Stream in London from 1999-2007
-Daily Times

May 19, 2012
A.G Noorani

THE Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between Afghanistan and the United States, which Presidents Barack Obama and Hamid Karzai signed at Kabul on May 2, follows established precedent in its main objective but is unprecedented in the intrusive powers it confers on the powerful partner.

It reduces Afghanistan to a vassal of the US, undermines prospects of conciliation with its neighbours and with the Taliban, and will have baleful consequences for regional peace.

On its details the US Afghan pact sets new records of intrusion. Its preamble repeatedly affirms respect for Afghanistan’s constitution, which was “drafted by a Frenchman and imposed by an American, that was (and is) out of sync with Afghan political realties” Sherard Cowper-Coles, the UK’s former ambassador to Kabul, notes in his book Cables from Kabul. It is sought to be imposed on the people and on the Taliban who are sworn to reject it. Bilateral commitments are a licence to interfere. They cover respect for human rights, and much else besides. “Afghanistan shall strengthen and improve its electoral process.” The US will monitor its conduct.

A bilateral security agreement will be negotiated. The US will designate Afghanistan a “major non-Nato ally” while, “assistance to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) shall have the goal of being consistent with Nato standards and promote interoperability with Nato forces”.

Can Kabul accept military aid from any other country? All doubt is dispelled by this provision: “Afghanistan shall provide US forces continued access to and use of Afghan facilities through 2014, and beyond as may be agreed in the Bilateral Security Agreement, for the purposes of combating Al Qaeda and its affiliates, training the Afghan National Security Forces, and other mutually determined missions to advance shared security interests.”

The US “reaffirms that it does not seek permanent military facilities in Afghanistan, or a presence that is a threat to Afghanistan’s neighbours. The United States further pledges not to use Afghan territory or facilities as a launching point for attacks against other countries”.

Will this cover the drone attacks? The pact adds: “the nature and scope of the future presence and operations of US forces in Afghanistan, and the related obligations of Afghanistan and the United States, shall be addressed in the Bilateral Security Agreement.”

The broad outlines emerge from this guarantee: “the United States affirms that it shall regard with grave concern any external aggression against Afghanistan. Were this to occur, the parties shall hold consultations on an urgent basis to develop and implement an appropriate response, including, as may be mutually determined, political, diplomatic, economic, or military measures, in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures”. This establishes firmly America’s presence and its role as protector of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan pledges with a foreign power to “pursue consolidation and growth of a market economy”, build a “strong financial system which is needed to sustain private investment”; “fight decisively against all forms of corruption”; devise with the US “mechanisms to enhance aid effectiveness and avoid corruption through improved procurement practices, transparency and accountability”.

America’s commitments on aid are “contingent upon the Afghan government establishing mechanisms and demonstrating agreed-upon progress to ensure financial transparency and accountability, increasing budget expenditures, improving revenue collection, enhancing public financial management systems, and other mutually determined measures of performance and progress.…” The US will monitor the conduct.

Particularly harmful are the provisions on negotiations. “The necessary outcomes of any peace and reconciliation process are for individuals and entities to break ties with Al Qaeda; renounce violence; and abide by the Afghan constitution.”

Such surrender terms the Taliban are sure to reject. Conciliation is the need of the hour; internally, with the Taliban and externally with regional stakeholders among whom, second only to Afghanistan, Pakistan has suffered the most.

Cowper-Coles realistically points out that “nor could Afghanistan be stabilised without engaging the neighbours, Pakistan above all, but also India, Iran, China and Russia, seriously and collectively. The serial bilateralism which had marked American diplomacy on Afghanistan would not be enough”. The pact is an example of America’s “serial bilateralism” which effectively bars regional cooperation.

No one wants permanent US presence in Afghanistan. The pact says “the parties shall further cooperate in restoring Afghanistan’s historic role as a bridge connecting Central and South Asia and the Middle East by….” Specific steps are mentioned. This is a matter of greater interest to Afghanistan’s neighbours. The US comes in only to play its silly games vis-à-vis Russia and China.

Afghanistan is made a US protectorate. Read this pledge. “Afghanistan shall improve governance by increasing the responsiveness, and transparency of Afghan executive, legislative, and judicial institutions so that they better meet the civil and economic needs of the Afghan people.” The pact has teeth. “To advance cooperation and monitor progress towards implementing this agreement, the parties shall establish an Afghanistan-United States Bilateral Commission and associated implementation mechanisms.”

Dependent on US money, separated from its neighbours as it watches the US parley with the Taliban — which Obama confirmed on May 2 — Karzai signed on the dotted line. In doing so, he has put the esteem of his proud people in peril.

The writer is an author and a lawyer based in Mumbai.
-Dawn

May 20, 2012
By Arif Ansar

Most of the debate on evaluating the resolution of NATO Afghan supply lines in Pakistan has been confined to matters related to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the status of reconciliation with Taliban. While some debaters have extended the parameters of their assessment by including the improving Pakistan-India relations, majority have the skipped the fast changing situation of Middle East and the imploding European Union, and how that impacts the global affairs. Whether one is an optimist or a pessimist, clearly, the world stands at the precipice of a major political and economic upheaval.

The media has not helped either; it has framed the argument in to a simplistic framework that by opening the supply routes, and thus securing an invitation to the Chicago summit, somehow Pakistan will be in a position to influence the outcome in Afghanistan. While if the country fails to open the critical passage it faces castration from the world, and speaking metaphorically, the state will be secluded as a modern day ‘Kala Pani’. The argument is not merely to open or close the supply lines, but to debate a right set of questions that provide the appropriate context first. The critical strategic question to answer is how did the country arrive at the present predicament.

Engagement is by far is the key principle for the conduct of diplomacy, especially in these times. It is easier to make enemies, but it takes persistent efforts to develop and maintain friends. Pakistan’s policy since 9/11 was premised on this pragmatism. Any rational player would have arrived at the same turnaround in the aftermath of the attacks on US. Nonetheless, Pakistan sought to retain its leverage in Afghanistan, knowing that NATO will ultimately burn itself out, as every power has in history. On the other hand, the US was applying every lesson in the book, and the best minds the world has to offer, to prevent such an outcome. The disclosed American goal in Afghanistan was to get rid of the Al-Qaeda sanctuaries there. However, over the years a number of other objectives have also been mentioned in the media and think tank communities. These include containing Pakistan and Iran and their nuclear programs while encircling China.

The Americans realised soon after arriving in Afghanistan that progress there was dependent on disturbing the safe havens in Pakistan. US continued to pressure the country to act aggressively against these sanctuaries, especially in North Waziristan. While the slow pace of nation’s campaign against extremism was criticised, nonetheless, Pakistan paid dearly in blood and economically for its involvement in the war against terror.

Facing Pakistan’s passivity, US took matters in its own hands to go after the safe havens, exploiting technology and every other venue available. While the hypothesis and suspicions US had about the country were proving true one by one, the conspiracy theories hatched in Pakistan regarding NATO’s role in Afghanistan, were equally being validated.

For example, after a decade of warfare, the goal of eradicating extremism is nowhere in sight. On the other hand, extremist sanctuaries have now expanded to many fronts in the Middle East and North Africa. There is a growing threat that extremist militants are exploiting the vacuum created by the Arab revolts. The more one attempts to eradicate radicals using purely kinetics tactics, the more it appears to spread, creating civil war situations in many countries.

The Salala incident and subsequent closing of the NATO supply lines point to the continued mistrust between the two players regarding their strategic intent. There is a reason the strategic dialogue between the two countries collapsed while the US-India tract has made considerable progress. One of those reasons is that US does not want to the balance of power in Afghanistan to revert to its pre 9/11 position. Pakistan has repeatedly proven that it has a dual personality, one is liberally oriented, but the other has a pan Islamic tilt.

Soon after trouble started to brew in Yemen and Bahrain in April 2011, increased level of activity was seen between officials from Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. As a broad bloc of Sunni Muslim nations lined up against a growing Shiite uprising in the Middle East, nuclear-armed and Sunni-majority Pakistan appeared to be positioning itself to play a key role. According to unconfirmed media reports that appeared at the time, Pakistan had reserved two of its army divisions for deployment in Saudi Arabia in case of crisis there. Secretary General of Saudi Arabia’s National Security Council, Prince Bandar also visited Pakistan during this timeframe. Previously, Pakistani Fauji Foundation, had arranged the recruitment of more than1,000 ex-military personnel to join the Bahrain National Guard.

PoliTact had noted at the time that this activity must have alarmed the US as it had wanted Pakistan to focus on FATA and the extremists in its own backyard, than on the troubles of the Middle East. The Osama operation in May 2011, and what has followed ever since, has entirely shifted the focus of the country on its internal matters. Meanwhile, two types of alliance have emerged in the Middle East; GCC, NATO and Turkey against Syria and GCC, Israel and NATO directed towards Iran.

It is this streak of Pakistan’s personality that is most worrisome and it comes out at the rarest of times. It inflicted liberals like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who involved the Arabs in to an oil embargo of 1973 and in developing the Islamic bomb. It is this tendency that often causes Pakistan to emotionally reach beyond its means. And, it is the same duality that then causes it to retreat. The US wants Pakistan to make a decisive passage from this personality disorder and it appears it will not rest until it does so.

The writer is the chief analyst for PoliTact (www.PoliTact.com and http:twitter.com/politact) and can be reached at aansar@politact.com
-Pakistan Today

May 21, 2012
By Tanvir Ahmad Khan

In May 2012, all roads lead to Chicago except the one that President Vladimir Putin did not take. Nato is history’s mightiest military alliance but some four weeks before its largest ever summit — some 60 allies, partners and international organisations — Chicago also hosted the 12th conference of Nobel Peace Laureates who this year highlighted the role of youth in building universal peace. Yet another road has brought Occupy Chicago and a two-day Peoples’ Summit to challenge Nato. Putin has stayed away because there was no prospect of a meaningful Nato-Russian dialogue; Russia will be represented by its special envoy on Afghanistan.

Of Nato’s many concerns, three stand out at Chicago: its future role and capabilities, Afghanistan, and relations with Russia. America’s expectations were set out in a testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on April 24. The centrepiece will be the announcement of the next phase of transition in Afghanistan; second, how to ensure critical defence capability, greater burden-sharing and what Nato’s secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, calls “smart defence”; and third, develop Nato’s role as “a global hub for security partnerships”.

At Chicago, we may have the first glimpse into the thinking of France’s new socialist leader, Francois Hollande. The much-hyped military success in Libya that France and the UK led from the front and the US from behind took no less than seven months at the end of which Muammar Qaddafi was dead and gone but the country became more disjointed and unstable than ever before.

Chicago would endorse the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review with its “appropriate mix of conventional, and missile defence capabilities” in the midst of economic austerity in Europe. Incidentally, Greece, which has been one of the three states with the largest percentage of GDP committed to Nato, faces the worst economic crisis that may culminate in its departure from the Eurozone. On the eve of the Chicago summit, The Economist, a journal that would refuse to visualise a world without Nato, reached a conclusion much less optimistic than what the US hopes to achieve: a future of reduced means and more modest ambitions; it listed America’s “strategic pivot towards the Western Pacific” amongst the causes of European anxieties and feared that doing less may rapidly become a catastrophic “doing nothing”. The Chicago summit will be judged by how it mediated between the maximal American expectations and the constrained European capabilities, particularly as France once again comes into its own with a more realistic semantics of power.

On Afghanistan, Washington hopes for three ‘deliverables’: an agreement on an interim milestone in 2013, for the shift of combat to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), sustaining the huge ANSF and a ‘roadmap for Nato’s post-2014 role’ in Afghanistan. Contrary to the pre-summit rhetoric, Afghanistan’s ground realities are worse than at the time of the Lisbon summit. France may stand firm on disengaging itself two years ahead of the Americans, increasing public pressure on other Nato governments to get out of Afghanistan. Washington’s chronic inability to actually readjust policy between the reigning military policy and a nascent diplomatic quest for an inclusive political settlement prolongs the conflict, raises the spectre of a post-2014 civil war, creates problems for an already insecure President Hamid Karzai and vitiates relations with Pakistan.

Pakistan’s best hope at Chicago is for conversations with Barack President Obama and President Karzai on the sidelines of the summit serving as a reality check that leads to the main warrior nations of Nato moderating their ‘endgame’ strategy and thus avoiding a conflict without end between a foreign-funded (at least for now) and Nato-driven Afghan army and assorted insurgents. Given the realities — economic stringency and renewed calls for social justice in the West, diffusion of power across the globe, Russia’s resolve to respond strongly to Nato’s provocations such as in Georgia and occasionally Ukraine, and Moscow’s pursuit of its own projects such as a ‘union’ of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan and the very limited success of military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Nato may eventually embrace more realistic objectives and focus substantially on its own trans-Atlantic treaty area in the days to come.

The Express Tribune

May 21, 2012
Stephane Abrial

In his valedictory speech last year, then-US Defence Secretary Robert Gates argued that the partnership between the North American and European sides of the NATO alliance needed a new impulse.

At the Chicago summit meeting (today), leaders of the 28 NATO members will tackle that precise challenge and set the alliance on a new course to acquire the capabilities it will need to deal with an increasingly complex security environment.

It will do so by endorsing a defence package that sets forth a vision for the future NATO forces and identifies the means to achieve this objective in a time of austerity: the Smart Defence and the Connected Forces initiatives.

As NATO’s strategic commander responsible for transformation, I am confident that the decisions taken at Chicago will enable the alliance to acquire and maintain the capabilities needed to confront an uncertain future.

My command is entrusted with learning from past operations to provide effective solutions for the future. How do we prepare for the unexpected? How can we protect ourselves from increasingly complex threats?

The tumultuous events that unfolded last year in the Arab world demonstrated just how unpredictable the global environment remains. Operation Unified Protector in Libya also reaffirmed that American and European interests remain convergent and that military action by NATO in response to a crisis, backed up by a United Nations mandate and regional support, is not only possible but effective. Although NATO’s action in Libya was a success, it highlighted a number of structural issues. Chief among these was the disproportionate reliance on the United States to provide the enablers — for example, air-to-air refueling and persistent surveillance — critical for a swift conclusion of the operation.

The Libya engagement once again raised concerns that the Europeans were counting too heavily on the United States for their security at a time when Americans were increasingly preoccupied with advancing their strategic interests in Asia and the Pacific. In short, the perception grew that the trans-Atlantic link was weakening. This assessment is neither an accurate description of current reality nor an inevitable trend. First, the American strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific are shared by European nations that have equal stake in the region’s peace, prosperity and stability. East Asia accounts for more than a quarter of the European Union’s global trade, while China is now its second trading partner – after the United States.

Second, while short-term pressure on defence budgets on both sides of the Atlantic may contribute to deepening the capabilities’ gap, promising steps are being taken to mitigate the effects of fiscal austerity on defence budgets.

Within the European Union, the Pooling and Sharing initiative seeks to build European capabilities through multinational cooperation. This is a complementary approach to what we are doing at NATO. The Smart Defence initiative involves aligning NATO’s capability priorities with those of states; emphasising multinational cooperation in the development, acquisition and deployment of military capabilities across the full range; and, proposing paths for specialisation by design in areas where nations have comparative strengths.

The Connected Forces Initiative aims to preserve the interoperability and enhance shared abilities that have resulted from years of operations in the field. It reinforces Smart Defence through greater collaboration in military education, training and exercises, and application of new technologies.

Multinational harmonisation of this scale is undoubtedly a challenge, since defence is tightly bound with national sovereignty. Nonetheless, it is incumbent on my command and all NATO structures to implement the political commitments that will be taken at Chicago and put the alliance firmly on this new path. The result will be a more cohesive and stronger trans-Atlantic alliance, adapted to the 21st century.

Ultimately, the goal our leaders will set in Chicago is to fundamentally change the way allied nations think about developing our capabilities in the long run. This objective must be sustained by strong political commitments to deepen cooperation necessary for the alliance to be prepared for current and future challenges.

NATO’s operations in Afghanistan, Libya, Kosovo and in the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean all demonstrate that, more than 60 years after its ratification, the Washington Treaty remains relevant – an essential guarantor of peace and security.
Stephane Abrial, a general in the French Air Force, is the NATO Supreme Allied Commander ?Transformation

Source: Khaleej Times

May 21, 2012
By Con Coughlin

The murder of two British servicemen last week shows just how seriously the Taliban is taking the prospect of peace talks to end Afghanistan’s decade-long civil war. A Royal Air Force airman and a soldier from the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards died when militants dressed as Afghan policemen shot them while they were providing protection for British officers holding a meeting with local Afghans at their patrol base at Lashkar Gar.

Meetings such as this are part and parcel of the painstaking process of building trust between tribal chiefs and Nato in the run-up to the end of its combat mission in 2014. If all the hard work and sacrifice of the past decade is not to be thrown away the minute Nato forces head for home, then it is essential that the Afghans are fully involved in the decisions that will decide their future wellbeing.

Another crucial feature of the Nato strategy for bringing stability is the training of Afghan army and police recruits to a level where they can take control of their country’s security.

While the United States and its Nato allies have spent billions of dollars on training programmes, it appears the Taliban have found a way to turn the schemes to their advantage by getting their fighters to sign up and infiltrate the fledgling security forces.

Nato officials insist that all recruits undergo thorough vetting before enrolment. But the recent sharp increase in “green-on-blue” killings (in Nato-speak the Afghans are “green”, and Nato soldiers “blue”) suggests otherwise.

In 2011, 35 Nato soldiers were killed in 21 such incidents: this year the total has reached 22 dead in 16 separate attacks, and the Taliban’s annual spring offensive has only just got underway.

Quite apart from the damage “green-on-blue” attacks do to the trust between Afghan recruits and their Nato mentors, the Taliban’s increasing reliance on the tactic suggests that they have little interest in complying with another key element of Nato’s strategic objective — political reconciliation.

Frontline fighting

The Nato summit in Chicago, which concludes today, is supposed to secure a deal to continue supporting the Afghan government after the combat mission ends. Rather than British and American soldiers risking their lives against the Taliban, by next summer the plan is for the Afghans to be doing all the frontline fighting, with the West simply providing financial support. Instead of spending in excess of $100 billion (Dh367 billion) a year, the current cost of the Nato mission, the Chicago plan is to contribute just $4 billion a year post-2014.

The corruption of the Karzai regime, whose officials have diverted billions of dollars of aid for their own ends, is one reason Nato leaders are disinclined to sign any more blank cheques. Of more concern, though, is the sense of defeatism that seems to have overcome all those governments — including Britain — that enthusiastically backed the Nato mission when it first deployed in the summer of 2006, but now want to bring their troops home as soon as possible.

The Taliban’s determination to maintain the momentum of attacks against Nato forces in Afghanistan contrast sharply with attempts at the Chicago summit to find the most dignified formula for withdrawing troops.

Even though political reconciliation between the Taliban and the government of President Hamid Karzai is supposed to be the centrepiece of Nato’s strategy, the issue hardly features on the summit agenda, for the simple reason that, as matters stand, there is little prospect of it taking place.

The suite of offices in Qatar that was set up at the start of the year to facilitate talks between Karzai’s delegates and the more moderate elements of the Taliban movement stands empty and unused. Instead, hardline Taliban commanders have launched a murderous campaign to silence those who have expressed an interest in exploring the possibility of doing a deal with Karzai.

The more hardline Taliban leaders, who have set themselves a goal of regaining total control of Afghanistan by 2020, believe all they have to do is wait for Nato to complete its withdrawal. As the old Taliban fighting refrain goes, the West might have all the watches, but we have all the time.

Upper hand

The murder this month of the Taliban’s former military chief, Mullah Mohammad Esmail, suggests that the “irreconcilable” Taliban leaders, as Nato calls them, currently have the upper hand, and will continue fighting until the last Nato soldier is gone.

The big question then is whether the newly-formed Afghan security forces will be able to hold their own against a determined and resourceful foe like the Taliban. Certainly, after the recent surge in attacks on Nato soldiers, we have no guarantee that all Afghan forces will be fighting in defence of the West’s long-term interests.

Courtesy: The Telegraph Group Limited,London, 2012

May 22, 2012
Azizullah Khan

In Afghanistan, India has tactfully intertwined her interests with the interests of Afghans, thereby making it costlier for other states to strike at it. India is expanding her influence in Afghanistan through taking part in its reconstruction and rehabilitation, which is at present the prime need of Afghans. Doing so, she not only won their hearts and minds but also made them feel obliged to show deep concern with her reconstruction projects. Any state that might attempt to stop India from expanding her influence through reconstruction can do so only at the risk of antagonising Afghans and pushing them more strongly in her camp.

India’s policy towards Afghanistan is the embodiment of the ‘soft power approach’. Soft power, in the crude sense, is the capacity of a state to influence others without twisting arms, threatening or compelling; in other words, it is the capacity to attract the target people and make them do your bidding. India is quite successful in this regard. She has carved a niche for herself in the minds of Afghans, which is allowing her influence in the war-torn country. She is perhaps the most-favoured state among Afghans, who view her as a state that is truly positive regarding them. Due to their destructive interference in Afghanistan, other regional states have a bad name with Afghans. India’s good reputation is also justified by the history of Indo-Afghan relations. With the exception of the Taliban era, both the states have had cordial relations, partly because of their hostility towards Pakistan. (The Taliban were hostile towards India due to her tacit support to the Northern Alliance, which was fighting against them.) As the Taliban are considered pariahs of Afghan society, therefore the exception has added trust to the relationship.

India has generously embroiled herself in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. She is building dams, colleges, schools, hospitals and drilling tube wells. Besides that, she is training soldiers of the Afghan National Army (ANA), and giving scholarships to almost a thousand Afghan students every year. The most important of all the construction projects are the 220 km (135 miles) road linking landlocked Afghanistan with a port in Iran and the Salma Dam Power Project, which will generate 42 MW in Herat province. India has also built the new Afghan Parliament. Overall, she has pledged $ two billion for the reconstruction, which has earned India the deep gratitude of Afghans.

India is not investing money in Afghanistan out of altruistic sentiment; she sees Afghanistan as a passage and gateway to Central Asia, which is not only sitting on a sea of oil (which India needs for its economy), but have a large market that India would like for her goods. Along with that, she can potentially challenge presumably expansionist China, and tame Pakistan from Afghanistan, being contiguous with both. India shares these interests with the US, which is the main reason behind the close Indian-US collaboration in Afghanistan.

What would happen to the Indian achievements if the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan? This question would be certainly looming large in India’s calculations but she has good reason to remain confident. First, observers of Afghanistan believe that the Taliban are now transformed. Having been dealing with the issues of war and peace for a decade, they have now developed diplomatic and strategic sense. They have relieved themselves of tribal simplicity like believing that a guest is a guest — be it Osama bin Laden, Gul Khan or Allah Ditta. Secondly, if this belief is right, then the recent US-Afghan Strategic Partnership (SPA) must have made the Taliban realize that they cannot come to power militarily. Were they to come to power, they could only do so through an all-inclusive political arrangement. Leaders from all strata of Afghan society will be given equitable representation, in which case the Taliban will not be Taliban but bearded politicians of Afghanistan. In both cases, there is a greater possibility that India will maintain and build on her achievements in Afghanistan.

It is widely believed (in Pakistan) that India will create troubles from across Afghanistan in Pakistan. However, I think, not necessarily. At present, India’s main objective is economic progress, and she is projecting herself as a responsible regional power so she will not be so silly as to attract potential obstacles to her objectives by creating troubles for Pakistan. There is a possibility that once gone forward, she will not look back towards Pakistan.

But Pakistan, like every other state of the world, cannot leave its security at the mercy of its opponent. Pakistan has to adjust its sails for the potential storm. As an independent and sovereign state, it can adopt any policy, any strategy, subject to passing the cost-benefit analysis test. The US, due to its long ten-year stay in Afghanistan, cannot be kept out of the equation. Owing to the negativities associated with Pakistan, it has been continuously ignoring its (Pakistan’s) genuine interests at stake in Afghanistan. If she keeps up with this policy, there is a possibility that Pakistan will veto the whole process of rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. Lest it happen, the US should satisfactorily address all genuine interests of Pakistan.

What can be the best strategy or policy for Pakistan to counter India in Afghanistan? To do what India is doing in Afghanistan. To take a leaf from the Indian policy book for Afghanistan. All other options are outdated, counterproductive and undesirable.

The writer is a freelance columnist. He can be contacted at khetranazk@gmail.com
-Daily Times

May 22, 2012
By Talat Masood

The summit in Chicago is primarily meant to focus on issues related to Nato matters. It is expected to provide President Barack Obama an opportunity to show his people how he has handled relations with allies. With the US and Nato forces drawdown in Afghanistan planned for 2014, Pakistani presence at the conference became relevant as Afghanistan’s security and stability have a direct bearing on the former’s security.

But several questions come to mind as Nato and US forces withdraw. What is the likely scenario that will emerge once Nato and the US withdraw? Can the Afghan forces hold up to the Taliban onslaught and are there any chances of a negotiated settlement? What role, if any, should Pakistan play to facilitate an orderly withdrawal?

The prognosis is that once the US forces leave, Afghanistan could lapse into civil strife because though the Afghan National Army has come a long way, it has yet to gel into an effective national force to counter the Taliban and warlords opposed to the government. Moreover, President Hamid Karzai’s government has not been able to win the confidence of the people due to pervasive corruption, poor governance and failing security. Capitalising on these weaknesses, Afghan Taliban enjoy local support, at least, in the eastern and southern parts of the country.

Pakistan faces a huge dilemma. Immediately after 9/11, president George W Bush addressed Pakistan in his famous remarks “either you are with us or against us”. General Pervez Musharraf took no time to be on the side of the US and to become a frontline state. For if we had not allied ourselves with the US and Nato, India would have played the key role in Afghanistan and extended maximum facilities for transit and enhanced its regional influence. Paradoxically, since then, Pakistan has been an ally of the US but also sided with forces against the US.

On the one hand, it supports the US in its policies in Afghanistan, but it can also not ignore the Taliban with whom it has maintained functional, if not friendly, relations. Further, Washington itself has been engaging the Taliban leadership, albeit not with much success. These conflicting demands make Pakistan — in the eyes of the US and Nato countries — an unreliable partner and part of the problem rather than the solution.

The irony is that the military leadership now realises the inherent dangers for Pakistan in an allout victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan. It will inspire the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to intensify their insurgency and it is also possible that the Afghan Taliban may turn their sights on Pakistan — the strategic depth in reverse.

The question, then, is, how are Pakistan’s interests best served in this complex situation? The ideal approach would be to leave it to the Afghans to decide in an ‘Afghan-led, Afghan-owned process’, but that does not seem feasible in the current scenario. Islamabad finds itself trapped and is unable to navigate the political and diplomatic conundrum. The period from now until the end of 2014, however, provides a narrow window of opportunity to work with Nato and the US to develop a shared strategy that protects our national interests.

But a major impediment lies in taking this course. If India remains the main enemy in Pakistan’s security paradigm, Islamabad will continue the policy of co-opting militants, including the Afghan Taliban. By pursuing the same old policy of looking at every security problem through the Indian prism — while facing declining resources, internal turmoil and international isolation — it will result in increased reliance of Pakistan on militant proxies.

We are at the cusp of a situation where the moment of truth has arrived. This moment requires that we decide how the interests of our country can best be served. The militants with their pseudo religious-militaristic ideology and resources, generated through illegal means, continue to gain strength while the state is weakening. Any further indecisiveness on the government’s part and military leadership on how to deal with the Afghan, the TTP and other militant groups will only worsen the present situation.

The Express Tribune