Friday, March 29, 2024
01:37 PM (GMT +5)

Go Back   CSS Forums > General > News & Articles

News & Articles Here you can share News and Articles that you consider important for the exam

Reply Share Thread: Submit Thread to Facebook Facebook     Submit Thread to Twitter Twitter     Submit Thread to Google+ Google+    
 
LinkBack Thread Tools Search this Thread
  #61  
Old Monday, May 28, 2012
Roshan wadhwani's Avatar
40th CTP (FSP)
Medal of Appreciation: Awarded to appreciate member's contribution on forum. (Academic and professional achievements do not make you eligible for this medal) - Issue reason: CSP Medal: Awarded to those Members of the forum who are serving CSP Officers - Issue reason: CE 2012 Merit 101
 
Join Date: Mar 2011
Location: Islamabad, MoFA
Posts: 2,322
Thanks: 482
Thanked 1,691 Times in 640 Posts
Roshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of light
Default

A rough passage to Chicago for Pakistan
May 28, 2012
By Tanvir Ahmad Khan

Divergent perspectives on the regional situation and honest differences of opinion on the end-game in Afghanistan have frequently caused strains in Pakistan-U.S relations in recent years. A series of unforeseen events—- CIA agent Raymond Davis’ killing of two Pakistani citizens in Lahore, unilateral American military action on May 2, 2011 to assassinate Osama bin Laden, NATO’s air attack on Pakistani frontier check post of Salala in which 24 Pakistani soldiers perished— put the relationship on a roller coaster. Given the importance of continued cooperation between Islamabad and Washington during the highly delicate phase of winding down the decade-old conflict in Afghanistan, it was a legitimate expectation that the two capitals would rise to the requisite level of statesmanship. Regrettably, both sides have conspicuously failed to do so.

Pakistan’s troubled participation, through a last minute invitation to President Asif Zardari, in the 25th NATO summit in Chicago (20-21 May) that was to take far-ranging decisions on NATO’s military campaign in Afghanistan has left many questions unanswered. In fact, the summit ended with much uncertainty in Pakistan whether there was still a difference of positions on the terms and conditions on which the long suspension, after the Salala incident, of ground lines of communication (GLOCS) —the overland transit routes for supplies to NATO-ISAF forces in Afghanistan— would finally end.

The massacre at Salala created a huge problem for the pro-West government in Islamabad that tried to deflect the popular backlash by seeking guidelines on resetting relations with the United States from Parliament. Two reports by parliament in quick succession sought to pave the way for re-opening the blocked routes only by attaching conditions such as a public apology by the United States and a fairer financial compensation for the wear and tear of the Pakistani infra-structure estimated at billions of dollars over the last decade. Implicit in parliamentary debates was the resentment at the United States using reimbursement of expenditure incurred by Pakistan, known as Coalition Support Funds, as a lever of manipulating Islamabad’s policy. Parliament had deliberated better ties with the United States under a dark cloud of public anger at greatly increased drone attacks on targets inside Pakistan during the Obama presidency. So it also asked for their termination. Periodic leaks from Washington that these attacks had often been mounted with complicity of Islamabad made things worse for the Pakistani government.

In retrospect, Pakistan government’s decision to follow parliament’s recommendations appears to have been bold but difficult to sustain. If Islamabad expected face-saving gestures from Washington, it met disappointment as the United States ruled out an apology for Salala deaths, refused to pay the much higher transit fee demanded by Islamabad and, above all, initially linked an invitation to Asif Zardari to the summit to a prior re-opening of the blocked routes. Islamabad had doubtless raised hopes of an imminent re-opening of GLOCS but then deferred it for reasons not yet explained. President Obama received President Karzai but not President Zardari; the American media projected it as a deliberate “snub”.

Pakistan had stayed away from the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan held on 5 December 2011 because of the Salala tragedy. Unfortunately, it was prevented from playing any significant role at the Chicago summit. It does not augur well for peace in Afghanistan because NATO put its seal of approval on various elements of the plan to wind down the conflict with only a highly dysfunctional peace process in hand: namely, combat operations end by mid-2013; the NATO-led combat mission closes by the end of 2014; a new post-2014 non-combat mission to train, advise and assist the ANSF takes over end-2014. France will, however, pull out by the end of this year increasing pressure on other Europeans to rush for the exits.

Transferring security and counter-insurgency operations to the Afghan army so soon may be an illusion as battle-hardened Taliban and assorted war lords still dominate large territories. A likely scenario is that of a chequered landscape dotted with a few well -defended cities and impregnable NATO fortresses surrounded by a turbulent countryside. If this situation degenerates into one or more sub-regional civil wars, Pakistan would face a grave security threat.

President Zardari has had no reservations about assisting the United States in developing a credible peace process; the real obstacle is the divided counsel in Washington. From the very beginning, Zardari has endeavoured to establish a relationship of trust with President Karzai promising strong economic cooperation with post-conflict Afghanistan. Quintessentially, President Zardari’s current dilemma springs from his failure to persuade Washington that Pakistan should be an autonomous partner and that Washington should respect its reading of the regional situation and its national interest while disposing the fate of its war-ravaged neighbour. Pakistan has a 2500-kilometre long border with Afghanistan straddled by the same tribes and ethnic and linguistic groups. Islamabad should be able to re-open the supply routes soon and also settle the transit fees but its ability to help shape events in Afghanistan favourably for the concerned parties seems to have received a body blow.

Tanvir Ahmad Khan is a former foreign secretary of Pakistan.
Source: Gulf News
Reply With Quote
  #62  
Old Tuesday, May 29, 2012
Roshan wadhwani's Avatar
40th CTP (FSP)
Medal of Appreciation: Awarded to appreciate member's contribution on forum. (Academic and professional achievements do not make you eligible for this medal) - Issue reason: CSP Medal: Awarded to those Members of the forum who are serving CSP Officers - Issue reason: CE 2012 Merit 101
 
Join Date: Mar 2011
Location: Islamabad, MoFA
Posts: 2,322
Thanks: 482
Thanked 1,691 Times in 640 Posts
Roshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of light
Default

Exit plan but no strategy
May 29, 2012
Dr Maleeha Lodhi

Despite the carefully orchestrated pageantry, the Chicago summit failed to answer the most fundamental questions about Nato’s plan to ‘transition’ out of Afghanistan and the country’s post-2014 stability. Declarations to end the war were not matched by any strategy to achieve peace.

The summit was unable to credibly explain how a peaceful withdrawal and handover of security to Afghan authorities would be achieved without a political settlement among combatants. Also glossed over was the fact that a regional consensus to support the post-2014 Afghan order was still challenged by unresolved problems. As the fraught Pakistan-US relationship was further aggravated during the summit, another unanswered question was how Nato’s exit plan would be implemented without Pakistan’s security cooperation.

A western correspondent pithily described the summit’s contradictions. Nato was declaring a winding down of its mission when “the insurgents remain undefeated, corruption runs rife and the peace process is stuck in the sand”.

The summit did not strike a triumphal tone, for good reason. But it claimed sufficient progress – after lowering the bar – to justify pulling out most of the 130,000 foreign troops by the end of 2014. The conference endorsed the decision to transfer control of Afghanistan to its own security forces by the middle of 2013. The transition was described as “irreversible” with President Barack Obama declaring that the 2014 deadline signified that “the war as we understand it is over”.

These pronouncements were meant to demonstrate to a war weary American electorate that Obama was on course to end a costly and unpopular conflict – a theme reverberating in Obama’s re-election campaign. For the international audience especially Afghans, the summit offered the assurance that the country would not be abandoned after 2014.

But assurances were matched by few commitments. Nor was attention given to governance and development. The transition was envisioned mostly in military terms – building the capacity of Afghan security forces.

If a principal objective of the summit was to secure commitments to finance Afghan forces after 2014, this was not accomplished. Of the $4.1 billion needed annually, the US offered to fund half (subject to annual Congressional approval) while Afghanistan agreed to pay $500 million. Other than contributions from some western nations it was unclear where the rest of the money would come from.

The communiqué blithely declared that the “success of the transition has been enabled by the substantial improvement of the ANSF in terms of capability and professionalism”. This self-serving rationale overlooked the serious problems that continue to afflict Afghan forces, as indeed rising tensions with foreign mentors reflected in incidents of Afghan soldiers attacking Nato personnel. This casts doubt on the plausibility of Nato’s post-2014 ‘advisory’ role and more importantly the ability of the Afghan army to survive the departure of foreign troops as a unified and coherent force.

The most telling gap between summit plans and reality lay in the lack of a political strategy. The communiqué and conference speeches made no mention of seeking a “negotiated peace” – the expression Obama used in his address from Bagram earlier this month. Instead the commander of US forces in Afghanistan warned of more fighting until 2014. There was only a passing reference in the communiqué to “a political process involving successful reconciliation and reintegration” as the “key to a peaceful and stable Afghanistan”.

What should have been the centre piece of a summit announcing the winding down of war – a strategy for a negotiated settlement – was conspicuous by its absence. Talks between American and Taliban interlocutors that took place intermittently in 2011 have remained suspended since last March when the Taliban accused Washington of going back on its promises. Whether mention of plans to revive these talks was ruled out by Obama’s election constraints or because of their bleak near term prospects, the result was a glaring omission at Chicago.

Plans were also abandoned to hold a core group meeting between American, Pakistani and Afghan leaders to signal public commitment to the Afghan ‘reconciliation’ process. The reasons for this remained unclear but the message sent to the Pakistani authorities was that this would only happen if Islamabad re-opened the ground lines of communications (GLOCs) for Nato supplies that have been shut for the past six months.

An earlier American plan to announce the launch of a formal Afghan peace process at the Nato conference failed to materialise. Again, whether this was because of election year politics or the persisting lack of consensus within the Obama administration, it denuded the 2014 withdrawal plan of its most essential ingredient. This called into question the viability of the Chicago plan.

Also clouding future plans was the downward spiral or near-breakdown in US-Pakistan relations, symbolised by the closure of the Nato ground supply route. For all the rhetoric from President Obama and others at Chicago of Pakistan being “part of the solution” to Afghanistan, this did not signal a departure from Washington’s heavy-handed treatment of Pakistan. To the contrary, the invitation for President Asif Ali Zardari to attend the Nato summit was viewed as ‘transactional’ by Washington, in return for which he was expected to promptly announce the reopening of GLOCs.

Rather than moderate its stance towards Pakistan, an environment of pressure and coercion was built by the Obama administration in the days leading up to the summit. The Pentagon chief for example accused Islamabad of price ‘gouging’ in demanding increased fees for the supply route, ruling out a deal on these terms. The White House refused a meeting between Obama and Zardari. President Obama later made it a point to say he only met Pakistan’s president for a few minutes on his way to the conference hall. In background briefings US officials made it plain that the diplomatic slight was intended to send Pakistan a “public message”.

This snub and the pressure mounted to force Pakistan’s hand on GLOCs proved to be counterproductive and injected more strains in relations. Why Pakistan’s authorities brought this humiliation upon themselves is another matter. It merits sober assessment of why such egregious American conduct was not anticipated so as to avert what became a diplomatic embarrassment for Islamabad.

It is likely that the government’s desperation to get an invitation to Chicago encouraged the Americans to think that Pakistan was willing to settle the GLOCs issue on Washington’s timing and terms. This turned out to be a miscalculation. Another tactical blunder Islamabad made was to mix moral principle and financial transaction by engaging in negotiations on transit fees before resolution of more fundamental issues. This might have sent an inadvertent signal of Pakistan’s readiness to do business so long as the price was right.

The Obama administration’s unseemly conduct at Chicago was compounded by the summit’s lack of acknowledgement of Pakistan sacrifices during the decade of the US intervention in Afghanistan and the campaign against terrorism. In his speech Obama gratuitously excluded Pakistan from a list of countries he thanked for assisting the international mission. By using the summit to cold shoulder Pakistan rather than positively engage it, Washington squandered an opportunity to put relations back on track.

If a viable Afghan transition plan depends in large part on Islamabad’s cooperation – as Washington acknowledges – the dismissive approach the US has adopted is now paralysing the relationship. If this paralysis continues it will complicate prospects for a peaceful Nato withdrawal and stable Afghan outcome in 2014.

The summit’s failure to map out a path for a ‘negotiated peace’ together with the lack of serious effort to mend ties with Pakistan strengthens the impression that the US is more interested in an exit plan than a strategy to secure a peace settlement. Even so the withdrawal of Nato troops and military equipment over the next two years will be a massive logistical operation that will require Islamabad’s cooperation. It is also in Pakistan’s interest to help in the withdrawal of all foreign forces from its neighbourhood. This should urge both countries to resolve their differences on a mutually acceptable basis which respects Pakistan’s sovereign red lines.
-The News
Reply With Quote
  #63  
Old Wednesday, May 30, 2012
Roshan wadhwani's Avatar
40th CTP (FSP)
Medal of Appreciation: Awarded to appreciate member's contribution on forum. (Academic and professional achievements do not make you eligible for this medal) - Issue reason: CSP Medal: Awarded to those Members of the forum who are serving CSP Officers - Issue reason: CE 2012 Merit 101
 
Join Date: Mar 2011
Location: Islamabad, MoFA
Posts: 2,322
Thanks: 482
Thanked 1,691 Times in 640 Posts
Roshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of light
Default

Unending Wars against Mankind: Afghanistan and Iraq
May 29, 2012
Mahboob A. Khawaja, PhD
Exclusive Article

(Democracy at Work: To re-visit the wounds of the Abu Ghraib)

“Savaged by dogs, Electrocuted with Cattle Prods, Burned by Toxic Chemicals, Does such barbaric abuse inside U.S. jails explain the horrors that were committed in Iraq? They are just some of the victims of wholesale torture taking place inside the U.S. prison system that we uncovered during a four-month investigation for BBC Channel 4 . It’s terrible to watch some of the videos and realise that you’re not only seeing torture in action but, in the most extreme cases, you are witnessing young men dying.
The prison guards stand over their captives with electric cattle prods, stun guns, and dogs. Many of the prisoners have been ordered to strip naked. The guards are yelling abuse at them, ordering them to lie on the ground and crawl. ‘Crawl, motherf*****s, crawl.’
If a prisoner doesn’t drop to the ground fast enough, a guard kicks him or stamps on his back. There’s a high-pitched scream from one man as a dog clamps its teeth onto his lower leg. Another prisoner has a broken ankle. He can’t crawl fast enough so a guard jabs a stun gun onto his buttocks. The jolt of electricity zaps through his naked flesh and genitals. For hours afterwards his whole body shakes.

Lines of men are now slithering across the floor of the cellblock while the guards stand over them shouting, prodding and kicking. Second by second, their humiliation is captured on a video camera by one of the guards.

The images of abuse and brutality he records are horrifyingly familiar. These were exactly the kind of pictures from inside Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad that shocked the world this time last year. (Deborah Davies, “Torture Inc. Americas Brutal Prisons” 03/28/2005)

Linked to the US Presidential election campaigns, the hurriedly called this week’s Chicago Conference of the sixty or so participating leaders is no joke but had its spill-over reasoning to view:

• That President Obama is actively politicking about the recalls of the troops from the war zones something he promised to do four years earlier,
• Accelerating the number game like the stock markets that counts in an election campaign – Obama’s standing in public perception to be converted by the hourly paid American opinion experts
• Deflect on negative imagery that Mitt Romney- the Republican candidate is creating to beat Obama
• To enlarge Obama’s failing image into worldview that he is actively engaging the global leaders to find amicable solutions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran and lot more – the stage acting – the fuzzy pretension of doing something for the global audience.
• Nothing concrete could have emerged because America, its leaders, its economy and not to talk of the most powerful military-industrial complex making difference in the election campaigns, all are for continuous warfare, not for peace
• Some of the dummy global leaders more so from Europe and Asia, got opportunity to divert public attention from the home-grown financial disasters and austerity measures for being non-productive and incompetent to deal with any major issues facing their people – much unemployed and raising voices of REASON against the transitory leadership. Pictures with Obama could make them see different games in varied perspectives – all linked to opinion making at home and abroad. Opinions are not the facts or truth but simple ideas without substance of reality.
• At least, Obama and his invited colleagues wanted to be seen politically active not sitting dummies like the Arab-Muslim leaders, consuming fatty dinners and unable to talk anything worth of moral or intellectual reasoning and most authoritarians specialize in doing nothing for their own people
• The staged drama – tragedy spells out its own rationale that none of these conferences will contribute to address the real world problems in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan and Iran as they were not intended to tackle any problems except uttering lies, deceptions and pretensions and making bogus statements to mislead the global citizenry. After all, it is an election year in America – the former superpower now financially defunct country under the austerity measures of 14 trillion dollars or more (borrowed and used from the unknown future) that does not know what is next in waiting in all the crises situation, it engineered to support its war economy and including its replacement in global politics by another nation or group of productive Asian nations.
• The unraveling impacts and tragic consequences of wars do not end with paper declarations or political statements as to when the invading armies are to be withdrawn. Wars leave scars for generations to be victimized emotionally, politically, intellectually and anything else that can be imagined in human terms of unknown disasters. Long after sixty years of the 2nd World War, the Europeans and others have not recovered its dehumanized consequences of their own perpetuated insanity and barbarity for no obvious purpose of rationality except borders, flags and a primitive sense of pride and nationalism. In the 21st century politics, America is leading in all of these stone-aged qualities to be the lost Empire without being an Empire.

Wars are planned and orchestrated by the few, the privileged ruling elite; the humanity becomes the targeted victims of the few for global hegemonic governance. Throughout the ages, the conscientious mankind searched for ways to undo the war and strive for peace, the real aim for the establishments of international institutions. But now the global institutional capacity to deal with peace and conflict management appears in ruin with the continued onslaught of the American led so called War on Terrorism in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Realizing the eminent defeats by the handful forces of Talaban, the allies are gathered to make their presence known for propaganda purposes to the beleaguered people of Afghanistan and global audience. Talaban fighting the intruders are not the foreigners but people of the land. The US, British and others paid agents are foreigner mercenaries fighting in a foreign land, culturally unknown and unconquerable by their armed forces. Piety and peacemaking vis-à-vis aggression and wickedness cannot be combined as credible attributes in ones mindset and one human character. Now, the issue is, how conveniently, the aggressors want to redefine their strategic role and ambitions in Afghanistan as peacemakers as if they have achieved the goals of their aggression. Imagine, Adolph Hitler while occupying France and continuing bombing of London, wanted to organize a peace conference. Would it have been a logical discourse for the French and British people to talk peacemaking with the aggressor? Bush and Hitler had lot in common as both claimed to have the divine support for their mission. Both tried to destroy the living humanity but fell in disgrace and met ultimate defeats.

A week earlier, Talaban spokesman while talking to the BBC reporter in the Arab world, made it clear that they believe in peacemaking but all the foreign forces must leave Afghanistan. The same logic that French and British politicians would have implied to Hitler. Could the facts of human life be changed, be it Iraq, Afghanistan or the occurrences of the 2nd World War?

The people of Iraq and Afghanistan need change for peace and normalcy. The change can only happen if the US led occupying forces after the withdrawal would compensate the victim nations and rebuild their essential social-economic and humanitarian infrastructures destroyed by the ferocious wars. The same formula used at the end of the WW2. The same legal principle is needed that the aggressors be brought to legal and political accountability in an international war tribunal such as Nuremberg tribunal after the end of the WW2. E. H Carr, the famous historian, had emphasized that history has learning role for the future. Those who defy the logic of learning were lost without a trace.

The aggressors have succumbed to public opposition and will withdraw most of their combat forces by 2014. In other words, the invading armies have been defeated by the mujahideens and are unable to carry out any further brutality in those regions. Would the aggressors tell the humanity, when would they end the continued wars? So that the victims could think openly and plan for change and peaceful transfer to making of their own future. This is the issue that the current gathering of the sixty or so nations at Chicago avoided to discuss. The assembly was not for peacemaking but for prolonging the failing war efforts. The leaders wanted to discuss aftermath of the 2014 withdrawals and strategic arrangements with the Afghan government for training and rebuilding, a typical western materialistic scenario to help the impoverished nations. Recall that Karazi shall end his presidency in 2014, so what is the legitimacy of talking beyond that time span? The aid gimmick is an attractive illusion to entrap the needy nations and exploit their resources for the good of the occupying forces. The US and Britain survive on borrowed money from the future generations as their own financial institutions have collapsed and so are the political powerhouses and working agencies. But the aid’s long term purpose is to create more beggars and poverty and dependent nations asking for external aid and to survive on borrowed future and resources. The discussion developmental aid and withdrawal of the foreign forces from Afghanistan sends a clear signal of defeat and prospective surrender to the Talaban fighting for the freedom of their homeland.

Future must be anew, not the repetition of the past. Future making does not lie with the aggressors nor with the failed international institutions, it is with the will and resolve of the people of Iraq and Afghanistan to oust the aggressors and recover their homes and habitats for rebuilding their lives and human dignity. Taken at their face value what Commander Bush claimed at the time that the US led forces went to Iraq and Afghanistan in pursuit of freedom, liberty and justice for the people. Instead they planned and developed the institutions of Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and Belgraham prison in Afghanistan. Facts speak for themselves. All you need to do is to see the outcomes, the triumphs of the American version of liberty, human rights and justice, the horrifying photos of the prisoners are easily available through the internet, speaking their own language of the American-British civilized achievements in the Arab-Islamic world. Mr. Karzai, the self-made president of Afghanistan does not have any vision or sense of reality that he will not be the president after 2014. So what nonsense he is talking about to have strategic alliance with the US forces beyond the 2014? Mr. Karzai or others in attendance, the Arab-Muslim staged puppets do not represent the interests and priorities of the Muslim Ummah. The people of the Islamic world view them all as pan on the global political chessboard being financed, supported and kept in office to undermine the future of the people of Afghanistan and the Muslim world. They are seen as part of the problem, not part of any workable solution.

Afghan landscape tells its own story with millions uprooted from ancestral homes and forced to go to foreign countries in search of protection and mere human survival. The aggressors do not wish to see the problem, that they are the real problem, not otherwise. How soon the aggressors would leave Afghanistan, nobody can tell. The ancient and civilized people of Iraq and Afghanistan know it well who are the peacemakers and who are the aggressors. The aggressors appear desperate to quit but the Chicago conference seems to indicate that urgent necessity but intellectually confused, morally corrupt and with high rates of self-suicidal deaths US-British militarily apparatus exhausted, and not sure how best to get out of the terrible mess they have created for the people of Iraq and Afghanistan and the whole of the humanity. At the Chicago gathering, Obama stated “a responsible end to the war”, but failed to define what he meant after being in office for four years and failing to honor all of his previous election promises and now killings of several thousands of innocents in Pakistan by drone attacks and displacing millions in Afghanistan’s continued warfare. Does President Obama enjoy the credibility to be taken seriously for any statements or promises for the future? Recently, a Malaysian international legal tribunal has issued the judgment and declared George Bush and Tony Blair as responsible for crimes against the humanity in Iraq and Afghanistan. Would the Western world’s responsible legal authorities take the necessary action to implement the verdict of the international tribunal? A century earlier C.E, M. Joad (Guide to Modern Wickedness), captioned the human tragedy in these words:

“….Human nature is at least in part wicked and in part foolish, how can human beings be prevented from suffering from the results of their wickedness and folly? ….Men simply do not see that war is foolish and useless and wicked. They think on occasion that it is necessary and wise and honourable, for war is not the work of bad men knowing themselves to be wrong, but of good men passionately convinced that they are right.”

(Dr. Mahboob A. Khawaja shares interests and expertise in global security, peace and conflict resolution and in Islamic-Western comparative cultures and civilizations, and author of several publications including the latest: Global Peace and Conflict Management: Man and Humanity in Search of New Thinking, Lambert Publishing, Germany, 5/2012).

The article is contributed to pkarticleshub.com
Reply With Quote
  #64  
Old Wednesday, May 30, 2012
Roshan wadhwani's Avatar
40th CTP (FSP)
Medal of Appreciation: Awarded to appreciate member's contribution on forum. (Academic and professional achievements do not make you eligible for this medal) - Issue reason: CSP Medal: Awarded to those Members of the forum who are serving CSP Officers - Issue reason: CE 2012 Merit 101
 
Join Date: Mar 2011
Location: Islamabad, MoFA
Posts: 2,322
Thanks: 482
Thanked 1,691 Times in 640 Posts
Roshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of light
Default

Chicago and beyond

Nasim Ahmed


The slow diplomatic minuet that Islamabad and Washington have danced in the last six months over the reopening of the NATO supply routes to Afghanistan was expected to come to an end at the NATO summit in Chicago. But it did not. It now seems it will take a few more swings before the two sides get exhausted and call it a day to bring the matter to a solution.

The Chicago invite to Pakistan came at the last moment. It was carefully timed to keep Pakistan in a state of agitated tension for as long as possible and rub its nose in the dust. Only a week before the important moot, the NATO Secretary General had announced that Pakistan was not among the invitees to convey the displeasure of the United States over unnecessary foot-dragging by the Pakistani establishment on the supply route issue.
But Washington did not want to stretch the point of public humiliation of Pakistan to the breaking point and decided to extend an invitation at the last moment. Another factor in the US decision was that it would be an incomplete summit without Pakistan which has a crucial role to play in ensuring stability and peace in Afghanistan.

The US decision was also in no small measure influenced by the partial success of the ongoing negotiations between the representatives of Pakistan and America on the new terms of operating the supply routes to Afghanistan. Just a day before the Chicago moot, NATO spokeswoman Oana Lungescu said that Pakistan had "an important role" to play in the future of Afghanistan and pointed out that "We're working very closely with Pakistan to allow the opening of the transit line because obviously this is in everybody's interest."
According to media reports, as a result of painstaking negotiations during the past few weeks the two sides have reached a broad agreement on logistics for the fuel and other non-lethal supplies to Afghanistan. An indication of this came when just a day before the summit kicked off, Pakistan in a symbolic gesture lifted the six-month ban on the supply route and allowed four containers of office supplies for the US embassy in Kabul to pass through the Torkham border.

However, to keep Pakistan under pressure, after President Zardari had reached Chicago a scheduled meeting with the NATO Secretary General was cancelled on the flimsy pretext of a flight delay. President Obama also reportedly refused to meet Zardari without a prior agreement on the contentious issue.

Talks in the meantime continued and a declaration issued on the first day of the summit meeting noted that Pakistan had an important role to play in ensuring peace and security in Afghanistan and NATO was working with Islamabad to reopen the supply route. However, on the second day of the meeting, NATO leaders called on Pakistan to reopen the supply route into Afghanistan "as soon as possible", indicating that the issue had not yet be resolved to the satisfaction of the parties concerned.

Pakistan's participation in the Chicago summit was as much a face saving diplomatic exercise as it was a lever used by Washington to expose it to international pressure on the supply route issue. Islamabad was given the honour of being taken in the loop in framing a new policy for the future of Afghanistan, but it also learned in the process that the international community wants the supply route ban lifted at the earliest possible. By ruminating over the matter for far too long and sending confusing signals, Pakistan has not only damaged its credibility but also exposed itself to the threat of trade sanctions and aid cuts which would cause serious damage to its economy.

Pakistan had set two conditions for reopening the NATO supply route - a US apology for the NATO forces attack on the Salala border check-post, and a halt to drone attacks. Washington has refused to apologize and drone attacks have not yet ceased. It is no longer debatable that the decision to block NATO supply route was taken without due deliberation and consideration of its likely consequences.

Now that reality has hit us in the face with full force, we find ourselves between a rock and a hard place.

If the supply route is not reopened soon, aid and trade sanctions will follow, sending our weak economy in a tailspin. And if we lift the ban the rightist parties and religious groups will take to the streets opposing the decision this is a situation of our own creation from which we can extricate ourselves only by taking a bold stand on the issue, not by bowing to the pressure tactics of forces who raise emotional slogans of national honour and whip up popular sentiments for their own narrow ends. The public needs to be educated on the pros and cons of the decision. As things stand, we have already agreed to partially reopen the NATO supply route. There should be no more dithering on the issue and a clear-cut decision in the matter should be taken in keeping with our economic needs and diplomatic interests.

-cuttingedge
Reply With Quote
  #65  
Old Friday, June 08, 2012
Roshan wadhwani's Avatar
40th CTP (FSP)
Medal of Appreciation: Awarded to appreciate member's contribution on forum. (Academic and professional achievements do not make you eligible for this medal) - Issue reason: CSP Medal: Awarded to those Members of the forum who are serving CSP Officers - Issue reason: CE 2012 Merit 101
 
Join Date: Mar 2011
Location: Islamabad, MoFA
Posts: 2,322
Thanks: 482
Thanked 1,691 Times in 640 Posts
Roshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of light
Default

A perilous endgame
June 5, 2012
Tanvir Ahmad Khan

THE Nato summit in Chicago would be a landmark in the history of the military alliance less because of the decisions taken about its future role, described by Washington as being the hub of global security, and more because of its endorsement of the American plan by which Nato-Isaf would end their combat role in 2013 and disengage very substantially from Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

Beyond that date, Nato would optimistically delegate Afghanistan’s security and stability to a large Afghan National Security Force to be raised, trained and sustained with foreign, largely American, money. The trumpet of success at the summit was so loud as to drown such voices as might have warned that decisions taken without a credible peace process already in place would have inherent vulnerabilities. Not surprisingly, independent observers have expressed fears that
Afghanistan may be on the verge of being abandoned again. Given the fragility of the planned endgame, such misgivings
must be taken seriously particularly by Pakistan that would share its consequences for good or bad.

Understandably, commentaries on the Chicago summit abound. This newspaper alone has run several of them. Ironically, the central theme of Afghanistan has often been eclipsed by apprehensions about the state of Pakistan-US relations confirming the perception that Afghanistan is at the heart of the current impasse in this relationship. Notably, most analysts have used the summit as a peg on which to hang their all-too-familiar views.

Consider the following from one commentary: “If we work sincerely using the levers we have to promote this intra-Afghan dialogue — one lever being the expulsion of those seeking to destabilise Afghanistan — we can succeed” (Dawn, May 23). If it is a clarion call to launch a military campaign in North Waziristan that will certainly last well beyond the magic year 2014, then it has to be sidestepped as unrealistic and dangerous.

More likely, what it seeks is an expulsion of individuals or groups of individuals whose mission is to destabilise Afghanistan.

Given that no conduit for this particular ‘rendition’ exists, the recommendation remains equally impracticable. The individuals or groups would insist that they are engaged in a holy war of national liberation and train their guns ferociously on Pakistan as a long-term enemy.

Consider again the other end of the spectrum. From a highly respected source comes an apocalyptic vision of war between the United States and Pakistan with nuclear weapons thrown in for good measure. It sent a shudder down my spine; I could not but conclude that the scenario was sketched only to revive another old message: Pakistanis are mad enough to unleash the Armageddon in the region. The intervening space has mostly been taken by a lobby that includes retired diplomats and generals, media people and academics who probably genuinely believe that Pakistan has no option but to stay the course with the United States, whatever it may cost.

Another article (Dawn, May 28) advocated a policy of placating a furious America: “If public sentiment is truly driving Pakistan’s recent stances towards the US, then it is forcing the world’s sole superpower to lose patience with Islamabad…”

Some of the ideas in this analysis were stated more bluntly by columnist Sadanand Dhume in the Wall Street Journal :

“Pakistan’s dismal favourability rating in America means there’s no real political cost to bringing Islamabad to heel by stepping up drone strikes, giving it a diplomatic cold shoulder and withholding financial support — all at the same time.”

It is an oversimplification to think that Pakistan’s policy is being driven by uninformed public sentiment; a more pertinent cause is a paralysing frustration with and incomprehension of the US policies in the region. Islamabad faces isolation partly because, overburdened with the war on terror, it has simply not invested enough diplomatic capital and energy in diversifying its international relations.

The Chicago summit left Pakistan bruised and diminished. The protracted disconnect with the United States of which this was a consequence happened because of acts of omission and commission by both the countries. Enduring rifts in Washington and the progressive unravelling of its strategic vision for this region had Pakistan reeling with uncertainty.

Ironically, Pakistan heard of the Qatar experiment from a European power and not from the United States. Washington had simply not bothered to hold out any credible assurances to Pakistan about its strategic concerns. Islamabad made things worse with conflicting messages to Washington reflecting its perennial disarray. Pakistani leadership has been singularly inept at anticipating Washington’s responses accurately. The American media harped on the toughness with which Hillary Clinton handled President Zardari in Chicago. According to well-placed western diplomatic sources, he was so taken aback that he offered to take the Pakistan-US file away from his own foreign office and entrust it to a minister who sails close to Washington because of the compulsions of his job.

Pakistan would find it difficult to re-enter a US-sponsored peace process, even if it is revived at all. Nevertheless it should not rush to the judgment that the United States has decided to permanently lock it out of the Afghan endgame. Pakistan would also have to undertake contingency planning for the eventuality that Afghanistan ends up as a checkerboard of a few relatively secure cities and foreign bases and large swathes of countryside torn apart by many mini conflicts or even a real ethnic, tribal and ideological mega civil war. Since Pakistani armed forces would bear the brunt if the Nato-approved plan collapses, they should take a more proactive and transparent interest in formulating this contingency plan.

Pakistan is morally bound to assist Washington in implementing its exit strategy but only in ways that are affordable. A superpower is about to lose one of its biggest gambles in Afghanistan’s treacherous terrain. There are limits to which Pakistan can help salvage the situation for it. For a rational and viable policy, neither the appeasement bandwagon nor the chariot of nuke-toting hawks provides a safe vehicle.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.
-Dawn
Reply With Quote
  #66  
Old Friday, June 08, 2012
Roshan wadhwani's Avatar
40th CTP (FSP)
Medal of Appreciation: Awarded to appreciate member's contribution on forum. (Academic and professional achievements do not make you eligible for this medal) - Issue reason: CSP Medal: Awarded to those Members of the forum who are serving CSP Officers - Issue reason: CE 2012 Merit 101
 
Join Date: Mar 2011
Location: Islamabad, MoFA
Posts: 2,322
Thanks: 482
Thanked 1,691 Times in 640 Posts
Roshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of light
Default

Afghanistan: Religion is the most important

Knox Thames


This month's NATO summit in Chicago has provided many writers and analysts a moment to debate possible outcomes of the US endeavor in Afghanistan.
Commentary ranges from David Ignatius "thinking the unthinkable" about the
Taliban returning to Kabul, to former First Lady Laura Bush urging the international community to remember the women of Afghanistan. The meeting provides a timely inflection point about the price paid in blood and treasure, and the future return on this costly investment.

Yet there is a glaring gap in this conversation, one that ignores the on-the-ground reality of Afghanistan. It is the role of religion and its influence on the trajectory of the Afghan government. By paying it little or no heed, the United States is omitting a key piece of the complex jigsaw puzzle that is Afghanistan's future.

My meeting with Afghan Minister of Justice HabibullahGhalib in Kabul drove home the importance of religion and its influence on matters of state. Our conversation in December 2010 quickly turned to the application of Islamic religious law to the affairs of men and women, especially the issue of apostasy, a topic which places core freedoms of religion and conscience at the center of government policy. At the time, a convert to Christianity was being detained, but similar cases had arisen where Muslims were charged with "criminal" activity considered blasphemous. He justified government actions on
Islamic law, brushing aside my counterarguments for freedom of religion and belief based on international standards, the Afghan constitution, and even Qur'anic references. It wasn't surprising that the Minister was unmoved in his view that apostasy and blasphemy were crimes to be punished by the state.
However, it underscored the cost of not addressing the role of religious tenets in law and governance. Afghanistan's legal system is a big part of the problem, despite Article 7 of the Afghan constitution stating that the Afghan government "shall abide by" the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. In practice, Afghanistan has established a restrictive interpretation of Islamic law through the vague repugnancy clause in Article 3 that states that "no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam."
David Ignatius' "unthinkable" thought of a Taliban return to Kabul could happen, but perhaps even faster than he imagines. The Afghan constitution's provisions referencing undefined notions of Islamic law give Taliban sympathizers legal cover to apply their religious interpretations through laws.

Religion matters in Afghanistan, and promoting religious freedom and tolerance can help achieve human rights and security goals. Repression of religious freedom strengthens the hand of violent religious extremists. As I've written elsewhere, conditions of full religious freedom allows for the peaceful sharing of differing views and interpretations. This openness can displace extremist influences from social and religious networks, thereby limiting their ability to influence populations of concern and turn them towards violence. Recent studies and research are building an empirical case that limitations on religious freedom lead to more, not less, societal instability.

The US Commission on International Religious Freedom -- where I work -- has documented Afghanistan's poor religious freedom record and placed Afghanistan on our Watch List. USCIRF has described the situation as "exceedingly poor for dissenting members of the majority faith and for minority religious communities. Even the much larger minority Hazara Shi'a community, which has experienced greater freedoms, was targeted by suicide bombers in late 2011.

A string of events in recent months bears further witness to religion's unmistakable role in Afghanistan:

Taliban response to Strategic Partnership Agreement - There were two Taliban responses to this agreement, one violent, but the other focused on religion. The violent response received much greater attention, since this was the attack on Bagram Airbase after President Obama left the country.
However, the Taliban also issued a statement in April, immediately after the announcement of a deal, outlining five ways the Karzai government was caving. Four of the five focused on issues relating to Islam - preventing a true Islamic government; bringing in secularism and liberalism; creating an army hostile to Islam; and being a continuous threat to Muslim countries in the region. The Taliban believe this issue to be relevant to the Afghan populace.

Qur'an burnings - The accidental destruction of Qur'ans and other Islamic materials triggered a nationwide backlash, attacks on US and ISAF personnel, and an apology from President Obama. Dozens were killed and scores more wounded. Sensing a public relations bonanza, the Taliban pressed to exploit the situation to their advantage, issuing statements urging violence and offering this as further evidence of America's supposed war against Islam.

Ulema Council statement and Karzai response - The Ulema Council, an influential body of clerics sponsored by the Afghan government, issued a "code of conduct" for women that permits husbands to beat their wives and promotes gender segregation. If that wasn't alarming enough for human rights and women's rights advocates, President Karzai endorsed the statement. He had other options, such as refuting the findings or at least ignoring them, but Karzai felt the need to endorse them, saying they were in line with Islamic principles. Why?Because the role of religion in politics and governance has a great influence in Afghanistan.

-Cuttingedge
Reply With Quote
  #67  
Old Saturday, March 09, 2013
Roshan wadhwani's Avatar
40th CTP (FSP)
Medal of Appreciation: Awarded to appreciate member's contribution on forum. (Academic and professional achievements do not make you eligible for this medal) - Issue reason: CSP Medal: Awarded to those Members of the forum who are serving CSP Officers - Issue reason: CE 2012 Merit 101
 
Join Date: Mar 2011
Location: Islamabad, MoFA
Posts: 2,322
Thanks: 482
Thanked 1,691 Times in 640 Posts
Roshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of light
Default

The ides of Pakistan

By: Samson Simon Sharaf | March 09, 2013 .

If all goes as planned, the caretakers will assume office and the challenges to handle a plethora of complicated, unresolved domestic and international issues seeking immediate attention. These include structural deformities precipitated by the present government through opportunism and bad governance. It will also take charge of issues of international significance that the present government will callously palm off to the incumbents at the twilight of its tenure. The composition of any caretaker government is likely to be in the nature of an interim government with acumen and willingness to handle critical issues of international implications. This means that its mandate will be far beyond the 90 days stipulated period to conduct free, fair and transparent elections for the next political transition, which must pick the threads and continue. It seems that the interims will have to work overtime to clear the backlog and set a definite course for the next political government. This is not possible without the consensus of countries that have a stake in Pakistan.

Enough has been written in these columns about the onerous impossibilities that the caretakers will have to undertake like the yawning budget deficits, negotiations with IMF for fresh loans and halting the economic recession. This article of enduring significance will be restricted to Pakistan’s internal issues with international implications like the growing waves of militancy, gas pipelines from Iran and the handing over the operations of Gwadar Port to a Chinese company, in the backdrop of the US-led Isaf withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The planned US withdrawal from Afghanistan is a tactical retreat with no change in objectives. Though President Barack Obama has announced quashing al-Qaeda, he has not announced an end to the war. By May this year, the force levels may decrease to around 60,000, but the military commanders on ground will continue to have a say on the minimal maintainable force ratios. Afghanistan is not likely to have an effective air force till 2017, which means that some of the US-Isaf air bases will continue to function in support of the Afghan National Army and Police and with them the allied protective arrangements.

At the thinnest, provided the Afghan security forces are successful, stay behind parties varying from 9,000-20,000 US-Isaf troops would at best facilitate a tactical withdrawal and yet maintain some pivots leaving options for raising the force levels. This composition is too small to ensure a peaceful transition; rather hold its own against the Afghan ferocity and, therefore, improbable.

Concurrently, peace talks have remained inconclusive and, hence, an overhang on the historic potential of Afghan warring factions to resolve issues amicably. At the heart of the problem are the diverse and competing objectives of these factions to do anything but national consensus.

As the withdrawal begins to take shape, so would the fissures between these COIN influenced coalitions. Without Nato’s support, it is questionable that the Afghan security forces would be able to stand ground for long. Due to its short life and having grown as underlings to US-Isaf, they lack the military tradition and revolutionary professionalism.

It also appears that like Pakistan’s influence over the TTP, its sway over the Afghan Taliban could ultimately turn out to be illusionary. It is most likely to spill over with greater fury inside Pakistan. In such a scenario, Pakistan will be left to contend with the chaos astride the Durand Line. Targeted drone strikes between far and few will necessitate ground combat with a high rate of attrition. Pakistan’s reluctance and inability to handle waves of militancy inside its heartland will aggravate insecurities. As a last resort, the armed forces and law enforcement agencies will have to be inducted in Aid of Civil Power under Article 245 of the Constitution meaning urban counterterrorism operations. The tone and allegations of Mr Rehman Malik implying Punjab to be the hideout of sectarian terrorist groups is an indicator of the events to come.

In a most dangerous situation, Pakistan along with Afghanistan could be mired in the worst form of violence from Karachi to Quetta, Fata, Kabul and Kandhar akin to a civil war. Much of the blame for such a scenario must fall squarely on the shoulders of the military establishment and the government. Both could never reach a consensus on formulating and implementing a national counterterrorism policy, despite involvement in a war for over 10 years with no objectives and high casualties.

But the blame for such a situation must also be shared by the US and its Isaf allies. In the rush to capitalise an opportunity, they played into the domain of Pakistan’s sensitivities. Their alliance with the non-Pashtun north, insensitivity to Pashtun traditions, most unethical use of munitions of mass destruction like daisy cutters, C-130 gunships, cruise missiles and drones led to the alienation of populations on both sides of the divide springing a reaction and hate that coalesced around the TTP.

For Pakistan, it will be a mammoth task to change these perceptions clouded by feelings of revenge and hate. Hence, in the interim, though the USA and its coalitions could withdraw tactically, Pakistan will be left to deal with the genie it helped create at a very high cost; a situation worse than the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in the 80s.

Had all parties involved in the conflict picked up the threads of the 1996 Benazir Initiative with Taliban, under General Naseerullah Babar, her Interior Minister or under her auspices, the Taliban offer to hand over Osama bin Laden to a neutral Muslim country post-9/11, events could have been different. It appears that some segments of this plan will form part of the Afghan reconciliation process, 18 years too late. Perhaps, the contours of such a plan were worked out during a trilateral summit in the UK giving Pakistan the space to handle the situation, at its own and the region’s interests.

One could pose certain pertinent questions: in a hopeless scenario such as this, a country gone bankrupt, economy not performing and citizens resigned to their plight, why must Pakistan conclude a deal with Iran on the gas pipeline that can invoke American and international sanctions adding to the misery? Given the rise of foreign sponsored violence in Balochistan, how would the government ensure the protection of the project? How will Pakistan under international and US sanctions fight an internal strife fuelled by bases inside Afghanistan? Perhaps, the answers can be found in the explanation that some level of US withdrawal is crucial to President Obama’s credibility, and as a quid pro quo, the USA will look the other way as long as Pakistan facilitates it.

It appears that USA is also prepared to give a similar concession to Pakistan on Gwadar. Knowing that it will take decades for the new economic corridor to be effective and before that, years to restore normalcy in the region, the US in the short term is prepared to accede to Pakistan’s position with hanging Swords of Damocles.

On the positive side, the huge economic benefits for both Pakistan and China could eclipse Pakistan’s traditional paradigm of a security state and ultimately, like China, an economics dominated security policy. Suffice to say that these two concessions could never be possible without a nod from two major regional actors, China and Iran.

We must stub out sectarian violence; for otherwise, Pakistan will have to pay a very heavy price. Come the ides and all will be clear.

The writer is a retired army officer, current affairs host

on television and political economist.

Email and Twitter: samson.sharaf@gmail.com

http://www.nation.com.pk
Reply With Quote
  #68  
Old Friday, March 15, 2013
Roshan wadhwani's Avatar
40th CTP (FSP)
Medal of Appreciation: Awarded to appreciate member's contribution on forum. (Academic and professional achievements do not make you eligible for this medal) - Issue reason: CSP Medal: Awarded to those Members of the forum who are serving CSP Officers - Issue reason: CE 2012 Merit 101
 
Join Date: Mar 2011
Location: Islamabad, MoFA
Posts: 2,322
Thanks: 482
Thanked 1,691 Times in 640 Posts
Roshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of light
Default

Afghan endgame options
By: S M Hali | March 13, 2013 . 31

As the 2014 foreign troops’ drawdown deadline approaches closer, the Afghan endgame no longer appears ephemeral.

The US military, having spent more than $517 billion, sacrificing 3,258 foreign troops and incurring a loss of over 30,000 Afghans in an effort to secure Afghanistan, has little to show in terms of achievement. The major faux pas, like diverting resources from the Afghan theatre into Iraq, provided respite to the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

Resultantly, the US administration had to gradually downgrade its Afghan policy stipulation. Barack Obama’s pronouncement of “disrupt, dismantle and defeat” al-Qaeda replaced George W. Bush’s vague “global war on terror”, but his infamous surge to support counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Afghanistan ended in failure, like the disastrous COIN precedence in the Vietnam campaign that incurred enormous costs in lives and resources, achieving little.

President Obama continued changing horses in midstream: General David D. McKiernan gave way to Stanley McChrystal, whose sacking brought in David Petraeus. Obama’s star-studded team, which included Joe Biden, Robert Gates, Hillary Clinton, Richard Holbrooke and Ambassador Eikenberry, failed to click as the Afghanistan theatre’s incessant stream of body bags and continuous dumping of scarce financial resources into the Afghan quagmire caused major domestic furore.

The US State Department’s scheme of replacing Hamid Karzai as President in the 2009 elections with Dr Ashraf Ghani, a technocrat, former World Bank executive and author of “Fixing Failed States”, flopped. He was rejected by his countrymen, who perceived him as more American than Afghan.

Abdullah Abdullah, the Tajik, put up a good fight leading to a runoff, but withdrew in Karzai’s favour, fearing the second round would be neither free nor fair, leaving the US and the world to bear the consequences of a repeat term of the temperamental Karzai.

Obama’s new Afghan strategy of “escalate and exit” caused a major rethink and by late 2009, Gates manifested: “We don’t need to defeat the Taliban; we only need to degrade them. The ‘clear, hold, build and transfer’ concept, which was endeavoured with great pomp and publicity at Marja, was deemed by General McChrystal himself as a “bleeding ulcer” three months after the operation.

By the November 2010 Summit at Lisbon, all talk of “conditions-based” withdrawal had been relegated to just a withdrawal by 2014. John Brennan, the new CIA Director, in his earlier capacity as Chief Counterterrorism Advisor to Obama, has been advocating beyond 2014 drawdown, keeping just enough of an “enduring presence” in Afghanistan to assure that the “counterterrorism architecture” remained in place.

David Sanger in his book “Confront and Conceal” exposes the method in the madness of “enduring presence”, stating: “The American forces in Afghanistan had a role as a ‘break the glass’ emergency force if Pakistan and its (nuclear) arsenal, appeared to be coming apart at the seams” (p. 46).

At the 2011 Bonn Conference on Afghanistan, the White House’s goals narrowed even further, organising a committee labelled “Afghan Good Enough”. Its path of reversal included a change of plan from “changing the way Afghanistan is wired” to “how to do as little wiring as possible.” “Pakistan Good Enough”, therefore, became inevitable.

Epoch 2014 will not only mark the drawdown, but also the next Afghan presidential election. The Taliban may become a part of the balloting, but are not likely to sweep them although Obama’s military surge failed to even degrade them. The military stalemate is perceived as a victory by the Taliban.
After fits and starts and false premises, since the reconciliation efforts are no longer from a position of strength, it became imperative to drop the preconditions making them end objectives. The changes in perception and slogans are reminiscing of George Orwell’s “Animal Farm” slogans taught to the “sheep.”

The transition from “there are no good or bad Taliban; only good Taliban are dead Taliban” to “there are only irreconcilable or reconcilable Taliban”, and Joe Biden’s nadir declaring “the Taliban are not our enemy”, depicts the desperate policy adjustment.

Analysts recommend the US to tread carefully and patiently. Military operations must become subordinate to the political process. Besides negotiating with the Taliban, an intra-Afghan dialogue is essential to secure peace. Weaning away the Taliban leadership too rapidly towards reconciliation may isolate the Taliban rank and file, who may seek alternative leadership, thus the process has to be top-down. Donor fatigue will affect Afghanistan’s development projects and, more importantly, the training and equipping of the Afghan National Army.

Pakistan continues to have relevance in the peace process, but the US should avoid pushing it towards a direction the US itself will not take.

The writer is a former group captain of PAF, who also served as air and naval attaché at Riyadh. Currently, he is a columnist, analyst and host of programme Defence & Diplomacy on PTV.
Email: sultanm.hali@gmail.com
Twitter@nairangezamana

http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-ne...ndgame-options
Reply With Quote
  #69  
Old Saturday, March 16, 2013
Roshan wadhwani's Avatar
40th CTP (FSP)
Medal of Appreciation: Awarded to appreciate member's contribution on forum. (Academic and professional achievements do not make you eligible for this medal) - Issue reason: CSP Medal: Awarded to those Members of the forum who are serving CSP Officers - Issue reason: CE 2012 Merit 101
 
Join Date: Mar 2011
Location: Islamabad, MoFA
Posts: 2,322
Thanks: 482
Thanked 1,691 Times in 640 Posts
Roshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of light
Default

Karzai tries to spread blame
March 12, 2013 . 1

Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s has accused the USA and Taliban of colluding to convince Afghans that foreign forces were needed to maintain peace in the country beyond next year, when most foreign combat troops are due to leave. President Karzai’s remarks are being given significance because of the presence in the country of US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel, on his first visit to Afghanistan after taking office. While Secretary Hagel is primarily there to meet the US troops stationed there, he is also supposed to take up the issue of US troop levels, after the withdrawal, with President Karzai. President Karzai should not be surprised if his remarks, made on Sunday at an International Women’s Day function in Kabul, fail to convince anyone of his nationalist credentials, or that the Taliban are collaborators. He should also not be surprised if he earns a reputation for inconsistency, for he had earlier argued for the USA to retain as many troops as possible after the formal withdrawal. He made this demand in the knowledge that, without the support of American troops, his regime would not last. The Taliban have a certain repute in the Afghan population precisely because of the resistance they have shown to foreign occupation. Though President Karzai will not change this, his remarks do indicate he is struggling to escape the collaborationist label that bedevils him.

Another reason why President Karzai is trying this is probably to get a better negotiating position with the USA. At the same time, the statement is yet more evidence that the USA itself has not reached a consensus on this issue. However, it does not show directly the reality that cannot be ignored about the Afghan situation, no matter how much the USA and President Karzai try: Afghanistan will remain unstable as long as the USA maintains any troops there.

Pakistan, which is not just Afghanistan’s neighbour but also shares with it a whole web of ethnic and cultural linkages and has an inherent interest in Afghanistan achieving the kind of stability that US occupation cannot provide. It should use the opening provided by President Karzai, no matter how narrow, in order to persuade the USA that it will have to leave the area if it hopes for the region to experience the kind of stability that the US occupation is now depriving it of.

http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-ne...o-spread-blame
Reply With Quote
  #70  
Old Thursday, March 21, 2013
Roshan wadhwani's Avatar
40th CTP (FSP)
Medal of Appreciation: Awarded to appreciate member's contribution on forum. (Academic and professional achievements do not make you eligible for this medal) - Issue reason: CSP Medal: Awarded to those Members of the forum who are serving CSP Officers - Issue reason: CE 2012 Merit 101
 
Join Date: Mar 2011
Location: Islamabad, MoFA
Posts: 2,322
Thanks: 482
Thanked 1,691 Times in 640 Posts
Roshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of lightRoshan wadhwani is a glorious beacon of light
Default

Kabul’s somersault
March 21, 2013 .

It is unsurprising that the Afghan presidential spokesman’s saying that the NATO war on terror was unwise and aimless. It may appear a response to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, when he rejected Kabul’s allegations that NATO was collaborating with the Taliban to prolong its stay. The Afghan government has been a faithful ally for over a decade now, with Afghan President Hamid Karzai having been a loyal protégé of the USA and its allies ever since he was selected in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. This is one more sign that President Karzai is preparing for life after the withdrawal foreign forces from Afghanistan in 2014. It is also an implicit acknowledgement that the occupation has been unpopular, and President Karzai, whose own term as President also expires, finds that the only way to be politically effective is to appear anti-occupation.

It seems that this conclusion has not been reached by a British Defence Ministry spokesman who described the war in Afghanistan as unwinnable. The reason given is that the UK troops are part of an occupation force trying to impose a foreign ideology on Afghanistan, something which cannot succeed. A British think-tank has also said that the allied forces had failed to provide security to the ordinary citizens from Taliban depredations. It should have also mentioned the allies’ own actions, which have gone so far to make the allies unpopular, and which have forced the Karzai regime to take notice of, as it did by banning US Special Forces from Wardak province, and by forbidding local forces from calling in US air support. It does not seem that Mr Karzai is destined for a much better fate than that of any nominee of a foreign occupier. His attempts to play the patriot are not likely to erase memories of how he was installed, but also kept on a short leash and accused of corruption when it was suitable.

The next government in Pakistan will have to deal with the consequences of the allies’ failure in Afghanistan, and it should use British support in pressing the USA to wind up its presence in Afghanistan, which is not only destabilizing for the whole region, but cannot stop even protégés like President Karzai from criticizing it.

http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-ne...l-s-somersault
Reply With Quote
Reply

Thread Tools Search this Thread
Search this Thread:

Advanced Search

Posting Rules
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts

BB code is On
Smilies are On
[IMG] code is On
HTML code is Off
Trackbacks are On
Pingbacks are On
Refbacks are On


Similar Threads
Thread Thread Starter Forum Replies Last Post
Pak-Affairs Notes Predator Pakistan Affairs 68 Friday, December 23, 2022 07:27 PM
Required VU sociology Notes by Dr. Anwar shrd Sociology 6 Saturday, February 23, 2013 11:40 AM
Afghanistan Issue Asad ullah Current Affairs Notes 0 Friday, February 26, 2010 11:38 AM
India–afghanistan Relations: Post-9/11 Muskan Ghuman Current Affairs Notes 0 Thursday, November 08, 2007 05:11 PM
The Globalization of World Politics: Revision guide 3eBaylis & Smith: hellowahab International Relations 0 Wednesday, October 17, 2007 03:13 PM


CSS Forum on Facebook Follow CSS Forum on Twitter

Disclaimer: All messages made available as part of this discussion group (including any bulletin boards and chat rooms) and any opinions, advice, statements or other information contained in any messages posted or transmitted by any third party are the responsibility of the author of that message and not of CSSForum.com.pk (unless CSSForum.com.pk is specifically identified as the author of the message). The fact that a particular message is posted on or transmitted using this web site does not mean that CSSForum has endorsed that message in any way or verified the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of any message. We encourage visitors to the forum to report any objectionable message in site feedback. This forum is not monitored 24/7.

Sponsors: ArgusVision   vBulletin, Copyright ©2000 - 2024, Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd.