March 11, 2012
By Farhan Bokhari

Pakistan’s long awaited decision on Friday to appoint a new Director General to head the country’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy network, carries some pitfalls, though it has set the pace for greater stability.

The move precedes the scheduled retirement of Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha on March 18 this year. Though not necessarily always acknowledged, the ISI plays a key role in Pakistan’s vital foreign relations, notably with the US.

After Pakistan’s relations with Washington dipped into a cooling-off period in recent months following the killing of 26 Pakistan army soldiers on the Afghan border in a western helicopter attack from Afghanistan, it was hardly surprising that the ISI became involved with advising the government over how best to proceed. In the aftermath of this attack, Pakistan immediately banned the use of a land supply route through the country for western military cargo heading to Afghanistan.

Though the matter is currently being discussed and debated by the Pakistani parliament’s committee on national security, institutions like the ISI have played a key role in these discussions. But going forward, Pakistan needs to evolve a broad consensus on future ties with the US.

Almost four years after the present civilian government took charge of the country and ended the rule of military dictator General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan however remains surrounded by many challenges. Many of these challenges are indeed of the government’s own making, driven mainly by its failure to improve the management of politics and the country’s economic outlook.

For instance, events leading to the change at the top-level of the ISI themselves adequately demonstrate the gaps in the way Pakistan is run. For weeks prior to the change, Pakistan witnessed widespread speculation over how the country’s premier spy agency will function in the future.

Some even speculated that a delay in the announcement of the parliament’s national security committee’s findings may have in part been driven by the delay in the appointment of a new head of the ISI.

Rather than rely on an army-run agency to conceive a vital element of foreign policy, Pakistan needs to instead focus on strengthening its key political institutions. Instead of an agency like the ISI guiding the government and the parliament, the country needs to be guided by its elected representatives.

The upside of the change at the ISI may however be that it has finally taken place. Not too long ago, Pakistan was surrounded by speculation that Gen Pasha, already the beneficiary of his term of office being extended twice, may get another extension. His departure now at least creates the hope of establishing fixed tenures for individuals in high places.

Unstructured approach

As for future relations with the US, Pakistan now needs to focus on promoting its best national interests. This must be done with the parliament firmly taking charge of a process to adequately review not just events of the past few months since the killing of the 26 Pakistani soldiers. Indeed, there must be a consideration of the history of US-Pakistan relations and the best way forward.

The lack of an institutional approach and the recurring imposition of the military’s rule over Pakistan has meant that the country has been locked periodically in phases of adhocism. This has ultimately meant that an unstructured approach has prevailed over ties with the US. The most glaring example of this lack of structure surrounding Pakistan’s ties with the US came in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Within hours of those attacks, Musharraf, Pakistan’s military dictator at the time, jumped in the fray and offered his country’s support to the US-led “war on terror”.

The downside of that choice, which continues to haunt Pakistan to this day, was the failure to document the terms under which the relationship was to be built. It is hardly surprising that on matters like the use of pilotless drones by the CIA to target suspected militants on Pakistani soil, there is still no document that outlines the terms agreed to by Pakistan.

In the absence of a structure surrounding Pakistan’s relations with the US, it is hardly surprising that the helicopter attack of last November immediately froze the relationship. Taking forward Pakistan’s relations with the US is not just about repairing the damage. More vitally, it must be about how the relationship must now be conducted in the country’s best interests.

Farhan Bokhari is a Pakistan-based commentator who writes on political and economic matters.
Source: Gulf News

March 16, 2012
Aasim Sajjad Akhtar

AMONG the many unfathomable adages that abound in Pakistan is that of our unbreakable bond with China. If India-bashing is our national pastime, then extolling the virtues of our great friend to the north comes to us almost as naturally.

Every few years the China rhetoric reaches fever pitch, typically when relations with patron-in-chief Washington start to fray at the edges. It seems to matter little whether or not China does actually bestow great favours upon us; what matters is that China continues to be, as tautologies go, China.

The initial love affair was initiated by Gen Ayub Khan in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Till that point, Ayub had left no stone unturned to be designated Washington’s lapdog in the region, but Delhi’s fallout with Beijing induced John F.

Kennedy to put together a health/military aid package for the Indians. Cue the field marshal’s courting of the Chinese.

As it turned out, over the next decade Pakistan was to become the conduit for the US-China détente that changed the whole course of the Cold War. This role was more conspicuous than any major tangible gains that may have been garnered from unconditional friendship with China, the Karakorum Highway a notable exception.

Today too it can be argued that China is contributing in some measure to economic development in the form of big infrastructural projects with big capital outlays (even if some of these projects exacerbate an already untenable conflict in Balochistan).

But today there is also the small matter of Chinese goods and services flooding Pakistani markets and further enfeebling our already emaciated industrial bourgeoisie. And China is no longer committed to the model of socialist internationalism that informed its investments in the past.

Whatever the Chinese now put into Pakistan — or any other country for that matter — they almost inevitably take out more.

China has become the world’s economic powerhouse on the back of a huge reserve army of labour and while it may see eye to eye with Islamabad (read: GHQ) on certain geopolitical imperatives, its first and foremost priority remains economic expansion.

In fact, as the reported decision (denied by the Pakistani ministry concerned) of a Chinese bank to pull out of the long-in-gestation Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project indicates, the Chinese may not be necessarily willing to antagonise Washington and
assert themselves as an alternative geopolitical pole to the Americans.

Notwithstanding the exhortations of right-wingers in the media, academia and within the political mainstream, the Chinese will not soon replace the Americans as our primary benefactors in terms of military hardware and training. In fact, China has never
offered substantial support in this regard and, to the extent that military cooperation between ourselves and Beijing is increasing, the Pentagon’s special relationship with GHQ is in no danger of being superseded.

So why then does China continue to be held in such high esteem in the ‘public’ eye in this country? For that matter, why do we harbour such wildly varying attitudes towards major external powers with high stakes in the Pakistani polity, economy and society?

China is not the only example of a ‘friend’ that can do no wrong. The case of Saudi Arabia is even more curious. Saudi influence within this country is second to none. Yet public debate, let alone criticism, of Saudi interventionism in Pakistan is unheard of.

Since its inception, the state has inculcated highly polarised and totalising conceptions of ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ in the Pakistani mind. These conceptions of the ‘other’ have parallels in the conceptions of ‘patriots’ and ‘traitors’ within our own borders.

These simplistic notions have provided a fillip to xenophobic politics and to conflicted understandings of the world more generally. So until two decades ago, Americans were ‘ahl-i-kitaab’ and great friends in the fight against godless communism.

Now the same Americans are the biggest kafirs of them all, and principled resistance to their hegemonic designs is now incumbent upon all of us. Needless to say, a distinction between Americans as people and the American state as an imperialist
power is glossed over.

The relatively small number of Pakistanis who have disputed these crude binaries has grown steadily over time. But an ordinary Pakistani is still unlikely to be exposed to informed public debate about ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ of the state.

A more sophisticated level of debate can be evinced on pages of newspapers such as this one, and within the Sindhi press, for example. But Urdu newspapers and the TV media, public schools, and muezzins and imams reinforce all the hackneyed
half-truths — sometime outright lies — that have been part and parcel of the public discourse since the very beginning.

Perhaps as if not more important is the role of political forces in reinforcing these myths. The Difaa-i-Pakistan Council has recently emerged from the ashes to remind us all of the existential threat posed to all of us by evil India. The Jamaat-i-Islami has been organising ‘Go America Go’ rallies across the country for two years or so now (thereby reversing its ‘Come America Come’ policy of the 1970s and 1980s).

In the final analysis, I have no gripe with any Pakistani government choosing to befriend China per se. But an informed foreign policy choice requires recognition of both potential advantages and disadvantages in the adoption of the proposed policy
framework.

It is not by chance that debate about foreign policy options — including a prospective non-aligned, anti-imperialist policy — remains conspicuous by its absence. Foreign policy in Pakistan today remains the preserve of the men in khaki, and their
lackeys in the federal bureaucracy.

To date, the National Assembly has not moved beyond broad, sweeping condemnations of ‘enemies’ or endorsement of ‘friends’ when foreign policy issues are taken up on its floor. The Senate has engaged in such matters with slightly more gusto and
erudition. But there is a long way to go.

Chinese, Americans, Indians or any of the world’s many peoples are not inherently pro- or anti-Pakistan. The sooner we realise that the world does not work this way the better.

The writer teaches at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
-Dawn

March 29, 2012
Rahimullah Yusufzai

Tough-talking politicians are at it again as parliament prepared to debate the guidelines set forth by the all-party Parliamentary Committee on National Security for the revised terms of engagement with the US, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) and the International Security Assistance Force (Isaf).

Those on the treasury benches have been assuring that the parliament’s decisions would be honoured even though their track record on this score is far from reassuring. The government policy to date has been to go along with the opposition to ensure the passage of unanimous resolutions in parliament and then forget about it. And the politicians on the opposition benches are declaring that they would not let the government hijack the parliament to rubber-stamp decisions that serve its own interests instead of those of all the stakeholders.

In view of its past performance, the opposition also doesn’t inspire hope as it failed to put enough pressure to seek implementation of previous resolutions of parliament with regard to the relations and cooperation with the US in pursuing the objectives of the so-called ‘war on terror.’

The parliament’s debate on the 16-member parliamentary committee’s 40 recommendations has been delayed twice, first to give time to the legislators to study the report, which is only eight pages and could be studied fairly quickly, and then due to the opposition’s demand that the far more pressing issue of power outages be discussed before anything else.

It was obvious nobody was in a hurry to discuss the recommendations that the Senator Raza Rabbani-led committee had finalised by January 11. The incident that prompted the government and parliament to review ties with the US took place four months ago in Mohmand Agency at Salala on the border with Afghanistan on the night of November 25-26. That was a while ago and the US has been waiting rather impatiently for the parliamentary committee to come up with its recommendations.

It is another matter if the US government through its own sources already knew the recommendations.

Some opposition figures even alleged that the committee’s confidential report had reached the US embassy before it was tabled in parliament. True or false, this explains the difficulties in having a transparent relationship with the US owing to the strong belief in Pakistan that the Americans have scores of people working for them in every Pakistani institution. The distrust between the two sides is so deep that every move is looked at with suspicion.

Apart from demanding an end to the US drone strikes and seeking apology for the Salala incident, both of which may not happen the way Pakistan would want, the most important issue that got greater consideration in the parliamentary committee’s guidelines pertained to the supplies passing through Pakistan for Nato forces in Afghanistan. The term used is “reopening” of Nato supply routes, which betrays the understanding among the committee members that the ban imposed by Pakistan on November 26 last year would be eventually lifted. This is reinforced by the proposal that 50 percent of the containers transporting Nato supplies may be handled by the ailing Pakistan Railways and that all the goods should be taxed.

The ruling coalition, guided by the foreign ministry and perhaps also the military, appears keen to reopen the Nato supply routes after revision of the terms and conditions. Getting it approved from parliament won’t be a problem as the PPP-led government’s majority in parliament has increased after the recent Senate polls.

It seems not much consideration is being given to the possibility of a rise in attacks on Nato supply vehicles in case the ban is lifted and the increased polarisation in the country. Pakistan has already angered the US by banning Nato supplies and reopening the route won’t impress it much as the Americans have made alternate arrangements through the Northern Distribution Network via Russia and its neighbours even if those routes are six times costlier.

Having been described as an unreliable partner, Pakistan is unlikely to regain the trust of the US and its allies by any amount of appeasement. Therefore, it would be better to continue the ban on Nato supplies in line with the aspirations of most Pakistanis instead of lifting it and risking resumption of the campaign of attacks by militants on the supply vehicles and more bloodshed.

Regarding the recommendations, various analysts have pointed out certain shortcomings. Some felt the guidelines were short-term and military-oriented and won’t be valid beyond 2014 when the Nato forces would have withdrawn from Afghanistan. However, there may not be complete withdrawal as the US is negotiating a strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan to be able to deploy several thousand American troops for counter-terrorism operations and training of Afghan security forces beyond 2014 at four or five military airbases.

In case of continued presence of US forces in Afghanistan, there would be no political settlement involving the Taliban, who won’t give up fighting. This in turn would mean a destabilised Afghanistan with Pakistan being blamed for the lack of success of the US military strategy against the Taliban and other resistance groups.

The recommendations made no reference to certain vital challenges facing Pakistan for which it needs cooperation from the US and its allies. These include creation of jobs, improvements in the education, energy and water sectors, rebuilding of infrastructure damaged due to militancy and military operations and floods and transfer of technology. The stress in the parliamentary document is on security and terrorism issues, thereby reinforcing the US standpoint of focusing on its one-dimension relationship with Pakistan by seeking its help in fighting Al-Qaeda and Taliban-linked militants.

The recommendations have been hailed for proposing deepening the strategic partnership with China, strengthening relationship with Russia, actively pursuing the gas pipeline project with Iran, and continuing the dialogue with India, including efforts for the solution of the Jammu & Kashmir dispute in accordance with the UN resolutions.

While the strategic partnership with China has been pursued by every government in Pakistan, the wish to strengthen ties with Russia and earlier with the USSR couldn’t materialise. Half-hearted efforts were made in the past to make this happen, though India’s growing friendship with the US has opened a window of opportunity for Pakistan to win Russia’s trust and strengthen its relations with it by using forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

The recommendation for actively pursuing the gas pipeline project with Iran is important as support from the parliament would strengthen the government’s hands to deflect US pressure on the issue. Friendly relations with neighbouring Iran ought to be a cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy and no amount of US pressure should dissuade Islamabad from honouring its agreement with Tehran to meet the rising gas demand at home.

The recommendations could also have specifically mentioned Saudi Arabia and Turkey, two very dear friends of Pakistan, instead of lumping them with rest of the Islamic world or the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC).

Another omission is the European Union, which happens to be Pakistan’s biggest trade partner and deliverer of aid. Not mentioning it is strange in view of Pakistan’s request for concluding a five-year strategic partnership agreement with the European Union. The lack of reference to Japan and certain other developed countries in the recommendations has also been pinpointed, though the primary task of the parliamentary committee was to provide the guidelines for ‘resetting’ the uncertain relations with the US in the backdrop of three major incidents last year including the Salala airstrikes by Nato forces killing 24 Pakistani soldiers, the CIA operative Raymond Davis affair after he shot dead two Pakistanis in Lahore and the raid by US commandoes to kill Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad on May 2.

Moreover, these are guidelines for revised terms of engagements with the US that could be debated, altered, reinforced and even rejected by parliament. It is up to the parliamentarians to firm up doable and realistic recommendations in line with the aspirations of the people of Pakistan and take ownership of the country’s foreign policy, in particular the emotional issue of the relationship with the US.

The writer is resident editor of The News in Peshawar. Email: rahim yusufzai@yahoo.com

-The News

March 29, 2012
Saleem Safi

The greatest achievements of the present government are indeed 18th and 20th Amendments to the constitution. These amendments will impact democracy and institutionalisation in the coming decades. The hero of this great endeavour was Sen Raza Rabbani. However, the recommendations presented by the National Security Committee (NSC) headed by Raza Rabbani are an altogether different story.

It appears as if the committee has been dictated to and it worked in accordance with external directions. It dealt with issues that were allowed and avoided issues that “the establishment” wished to avoid.

The first gaffe about these recommendations is their delay. In the last four months Afghanistan saw changes. But Pakistan for the most part remains aloof from all these changes as the NSC was at work.

The ministry of foreign affairs also missed a few opportunities as the policy direction was not clear. If any party to the Afghan issue contacted it, Pakistan refrained from a response on the basis that it was waiting for the recommendations. And when the much-awaited recommendations were prepared, the government took two months to summon the joint session of parliament for the purpose.

Another blunder over the recommendations is their disclosure. The nation, parliament and the media were uninformed about the contents while the real decision-makers in the US and the Pakistani establishment were negotiating over the leaked draft of the recommendations. Each member of the NSC was bound not to inform even the leader of his party before presenting the recommendations on the floor of parliament.

Two days before the joint session on the issue, the prime minister and the president wished to see the recommendations but as always Raza Rabbani replied that the recommendations could not be revealed before their presentation to parliament. During the preparation the US ambassador requested many times an appointment with Raza Rabbani but he avoided one. Despite all this, the recommendations reached Washington and US-Pakistani key players were busy in negotiations over this framework. Common Pakistanis were aware of its salient features.

Now the language and order of the recommendations show that all issues that were agreed in other places are presented in same way. Controversial matters like the drone attacks are presented in harsh language and a hard stance was taken. However, these are mere recommendations and have to be discussed in parliament. At this stage, some vital questions and considerations must be taken into account.

The major drawback of these recommendations is lack of truth. The Pakistani nation is in the dark about the true nature of Pakistan-US ties before the Salala check-post incident. New terms are recommended for the reopening of Nato supply routes, but it is silent over the nature of the previous terms.

It is recommended that Pakistan should review its terms with Nato through the UK and with the US through its defence ministry. A transparent procedure for operations of private security contractors are also recommended without shedding light over the previous non-transparent procedures. Each Pakistani has a right to know the real number of operators, procedures, and actors that helped private security contractors in the past to operate in Pakistan. Either the NSC is uninformed about these facts or is trying to keep the nation in the dark about these vital questions.

The recommendations also fail to settle the historic confusion of our national security policy. Is the US our top ally or our foe? The Afghan government is a friend or an enemy? Are extremists an assets or a menace? Alas, the committee recommendations do not remove these confusions.

The NSC being concerned with security has not touched any aspect of internal security issues. All its recommendations are concerned with foreign affairs. It is evident that Pakistan’s relations with the US and Afghanistan are based on its internal situation. Even issues like the drone attacks and the Salala check-post Incident are mere manifestations of the lack of government writ the in tribal areas.

Yet another important issue that is the cause of many policy blunders remained untouched – coordination among state organs and the proper role of the security establishment in Pakistan’s security policy. Due to uncoordinated efforts the nation is faced with complex internal and external issues. Unfortunately the NSC again failed on this front.

Because of the constitutional amendments Raza Rabbani and the committee members were on high moral ground and have a sense of achievement. The NSC recommendations have produced no confidence, which indicates that there is something fishy. Asked why the recommendations do not speak about internal security, a committee member replied that the committee’s mandate was limited to issues related to Nato and the US. When I again asked why then China, India and Russia were discussed, there was silence in response.

The recommendations discuss issues related to the US and Nato, and the Salala check-post Incident, but are silent about the May 2 Abbottabad operation. The committee demands an apology over Salala but does not require an apology for the drone attacks. This shows that the drone attacks were permitted by Pakistan. Otherwise, why was an apology not demanded? And if the drone attacks are continuing with the permission of Pakistan, then why this condemnation?

The writer works for Geo TV. Email: saleem. safi@janggroup.com.pk
-The News

September 2010

It is often argued that Pakistan’s post 9/11 shift in foreign policy was an impulsive decision that precluded a comprehensive forethought before extending an unconditional cooperation with the US and making a U-Turn in our approach towards the Taliban’s Government. The purpose of this article is to establish that the decision to join the War on Terror (WOT) was the most appropriate among the available options and was generally, if not entirely, in National Interest. However, how we could have utilized the available opportunities to maximize our win-set is open for further debate and intellectual research.

“The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre & the Pentagon”, argued Mr. Abdul Sattar, the then Foreign Minister, in his book ‘Pakistan’s Foreign Policy’ “triggered a transformation of world Politics.” Those never-imagined and devastating attacks on the US mainland traumatized the entire country and filled her with anger and urge for revenge. Within no time, almost all the countries of the world condemned the despicable acts of terrorism, including Pakistan. This event restructured international politics because terrorism was unanimously identified as the biggest threat to humanity and thereafter it occupied a centre-stage in conducting interstate relations.
Due to its geo-strategic location, its contiguity with Afghanistan, and one of the three countries having diplomatic ties with her, who was immediately labelled as a sanctuary of the terrorists headed by Osama bin laden, Pakistan was bound to be frazzled in days ahead. Within few days, the clairvoyance of Pakistani foreign policy and security experts was justified when it was given a proverbial Hobson’s choice in the words of President Bush:
“Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists”
Since there was no middle way, therefore Pakistan had to choose either of the following two choices:
1. To exigently Join the US in Principle and workout the modalities later on
2. To refuse to submit in clear defiance and be ready for a war
In his book, In The Line Of Fire, Former President Musharraf mentions that his first reaction after being threatened to ‘be sent back to the stone-age’ was to order our valiant armed forces to war-game the U.S but later on, when better sense prevailed and the overwhelming disproportionateness of power difference was calculated, it was decided to toe-in-line with the onerous demands of the U.S. Those demands were as follow:
1. To stop Al Qaeda operations at its border
2. To give blanket overflight and landing rights for military operations
3. To provide Intelligence information
4. To provide territorial access to allied forces
5. To continue to publicly condemn the terrorists acts
6. To sever ties with the Taliban, if the refuse to cooperate
7. To cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop recruits from going to Afghanistan
Before calculating, the costs and the benefits of any decision, keep in mind the following details:
1. Within 24 hrs of the attacks, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1368 that authorized the use of force against the perpetrators, organizers and the sponsors of those terrorist strikes.
2. NATO, for the first time in its history, invoked Art 5 (Joint defence).
3. Pakistan’s economy was in shambles and it was on the verge of being declared, a failed state.
4. Different sanctions were already imposed on Pakistan such as:

a. Pressler Ammendment: Enacted in 1985 and imposed in 1990. The president had the power to ease the sanctions and for that, he had to testify each year before giving aid, in front of congress, that Pakistan was not pursing the Nuclear Weapons which he did till 1990 (until the Afghan-war was ended).
b. Glenn Amendment: it was for those Non-Nuclear member states that detonate nuclear devices; a modern version of Pressler Ammendent.
c. Democracy Sanctions: For the Military coup in 1999
Now in this context, let us estimate the impact in case we had gone for the second option i.e. the cost of non-cooperation. In that case, we had to pay the following price:
1. The U.S might have bracketed Pakistan with the Taliban while declaring Pakistan a terrorist state.
2. Our territory would have surely been subjected to furious onslaughts and airstrikes to neutralize resistance under the pretext of eliminating terrorist bases.
3. The Kashmiri freedom struggle might (read ‘surely’) have been labelled as a terrorist insurgency.
4. India would have been given a green signal to attack kahuta (KRL) as it had pondered such an attack in 1980s.
5. Even, despite all odds that were stacked against us, if we had managed to put up a descent resistance and offered awe-inspiring sacrifices, what would have been the net result? Was that a justified cost of a decision based on idealism and not on the principles of international law, exigencies of time, and pragmatism?
Before saying an obvious ‘No’ to this lopsided option that was fraught with suicidal course, let us also examine the path that was selected. As far as the compliance of the demands of the U.S is concerned, Pakistan did not have to make substantial concessions to the USA, as a couple of requests required no actions:
Pakistan had already condemned the terrorist attacks and it had not provided logistic access to Bin Laden. Some misguided Imams in the border areas misled the fragile youth, in the name or Religion, to join the Taliban but that was never approved or encouraged by the Government.
Therefore, Pakistan had to make only a few concessions such as providing logistics etc that it gleefully did.
The then president successfully adopted public diplomacy by addressing the nation on 19th October in which he stated that he was taking this decision to forestall the possibility of earlier mentioned threats. In this way he managed to contract the win-set of US because he excluded the Missile and nuclear assets, and the Kashmir cause, from the agenda of impending negotiations and included safe guard against the ‘external’ threat (read ‘Indian’) in it.
“Pakistan comes first, everything else is secondary”
-President Musharraf
19th Sep 2001
The main benefits that this decision accrued were:
1. On 22 September, the Military and the Economic sanctions were lifted that were imposed under Pressler, Symington and Glenn amendments and under Sec 508 of Foreign Assistance ACT.
2. All the outstanding debts were rescheduled and inflow of fresh economic aid, started which reinvigorated the economy.
3. Pakistan started receiving new military hardware including the F-16’s.
4. U.S generously donated during the post-quake crisis.
5. Pakistan’s standing at international forum was improved and its role as a ‘Front line state in the WOT’ received wide spread accolades and kudos. After that enlightened decision, Pakistan was visited by numerous Leaders of international stature like UK’s Premier Mr. Tony Blair, Netherlands Premier Mr. Wim Kokj, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and Belgium Premier Mr. Guy Verhofstadt and many others, one on the heel of the other.
6. Bilateral relations with the U.S improved tremendously and on long term basis unlike on-again, off-again like relations in the past.
7. The world became aware of the sufferings of the people of Afghanistan.
“Appreciating Pakistan’s key role as a ‘frontline State’ in the war on terrorism, the U.S, the EU and Japan dismantled nuclear and democracy sanctions and resumed assistance to Pakistan.”
-Dr. Abdul Sattar
Former Foreign Minister in “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy”

Therefore, after critically analyzing the pros and cons of the decision it is clear that Pakistan had timely made an apropos decision. Though in our short but tremulous history, our country has swerved from one crisis to another mostly due to unavoidable circumstances but it has never faced such a more excruciating dilemma. In retrospective analysis, it can be argued that had there been a mature and stable political setup in Pakistan at that time, it would have enabled Pakistan to broaden its win-set. The delay that is inherent in the decision making process in a political setup would have worked in favour of Pakistan and would have improved its bargaining chips. Moreover, anfractuous events do happen but the most important thing is to wisely elicit the lessons from such crises. It has almost become a fashion to vociferously deplore an ‘external factor’ (read ‘Amreeka’) for our own shortcomings. It doesn’t mean that the cost that we are paying as a nation in this war is equivalent to the benefits that we have reaped. Of course, the cost far outweighs the benefits but instead of bursting into pointless polemics, we have to seek the reasons in visceral introspection.

Intelligent1pk@hotmail.com

Muhammad Azmat Farooq (CSP)
Source: JWT

By Syed Talat Hussain
March 30, 2012

It always had the ingredients of a farce. It looked perilously close to becoming a tragedy. However, the swiftness with which the report of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS) has become irrelevant in parliament, has surprised even the hardest cynics. The media debate on the subject, despite its many loose ends and a tendency towards extreme superficiality, has kept the focus sharp and steady on this urgent matter before parliament. But the public representatives have lost little sleep over the document. Indeed, in the last few days, they have made it look like a useless stack of papers that neither deserves their time or attention for any significant duration.

Cold statistics tell the story of this parliamentary mistreatment of the PCNS’s supposed hard labour, which the government has been trying to portray as the starting point of a new era in Pakistan’s foreign relations. According to the Free and Fair Election Network, which monitors the procedure and substance of the debate in both houses of parliament and creates daily performance sheets at the end of each day, the joint sitting has been disjointed in its discussion and disinterested in the subject.

The day foreign policy review proposals were presented, the session started 45 minutes late, and lasted for an-hour-and-two minutes. On the scale of enthusiasm to thoroughly analyse the report, the opening session fared poorly: of the 430 odd members, just 172 were there at the start and 185 when it ended. The speaker was absent. The prime minister was there for only 36 minutes. Leader of the opposition did slightly better: he stuck around in the half-empty house for 57 minutes.

Following adjournment and a long weekend, the joint session resumed on March 26. And what a woeful resumption it was! Most of the members strolled in an-hour-and-fifty minutes late. Just five members spoke on the PCNS’ report for a duration of 84 minutes. A barrage of points of order — a dozen to be precise — ate into almost half of a three-hour long session. The prime minister was absent. The ANP and the MQM walked out of the house over Karachi’s law and order situation and also for the late start to the session. A total of 182 legislators were there in the beginning with only 46 lasting till the end.

The following day saw no improvement in the lacklustre show. It began two hours and twenty minutes behind schedule. Twenty-six points of order consumed 81 per cent of the time. The 168 legislators at the start, dwindled to 67 upon closing and adjournment. The prime minister was missing in action, while the leader of the opposition lost interest after 29 minutes and left. On the third day of the week, of the 246 legislators present only four dwelled on the report for 47 minutes.

These are truthful statistics but do not capture the fact that even the sparse debate on the report has been pathetic. Rhetoric flowed like mud and the gaping holes in the report’s content have been left completely unaddressed. The short attention to the report became shorter on account of the killings in Karachi and the loadshedding riots in Punjab.

We all know that foreign and defence matters are too serious to remain in the custody of the generals, but so far, the parliamentarians’ conduct shows that they have not the slightest clue about national priorities. Immersed in the politics of derailing each other, they are millions of miles away from the point where the challenges of foreign policy would be of real value to them. Most of them do not read, and those who do read, do so about their constituencies only. And as for those without constituencies, the more detached group, they are too busy reading the lips of their leaders to throw even a glance at how fast the globe is spinning for Pakistan.

They may learn in the end, but that does not take care of the present-day task of giving Pakistan a brand new foreign policy, resetting relations with the US and devising a booklet of answers to the questions regarding the future of our ties with India, Afghanistan, Iran, China and the rest of the world. So far all we have is the prime minister, the foreign minister and the foreign secretary churning out stale ideas through statements and press releases in the desperate attempt to pretend like they know what they are talking about. The parliament is just not ready to come up with a viable foreign policy blueprint. It may change in the coming days —I dearly hope it does — but for now its record is disturbingly poor.

The Express Tribune

In our day, the evolved state has only one interest - that related to the economy

Analysis By Khaled Ahmed

The Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS) has recommended that foreign policy should be run by Pakistan on the basis of national interest and, in particular, relations with the US should be refashioned to reflect the public opinion as embodied in the elected parliament regardless of who has majority there.

The government has taken foreign policy to parliament because it has sensed that it has no control over it, which is actually run by the Army and that Foreign Office, constitutionally subordinated to its cabinet, is traditionally responsive to the Army and not to the government, as demonstrated by the conduct of the last incumbent foreign minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi.


PCNS Chairman Senator Raza Rabbani read out the recommendations during a joint session of parliament and presented a plan of action carrying a mixture of emotion and pragmatism. To satisfy emotion, it demanded an unconditional apology from the US for the Nato attack on Salala checkpost which killed 24 Pakistani soldiers on November 26, 2011.

Pragmatically, it put forth conditions for the resumption of the Nato supply route through Pakistan. The first depends on how the US feels about the 'package' deal contained in the parliamentary guideline after the joint session of parliament in Islamabad has endorsed it. The opposition has already decided to reject the resumption of the Nato supply route, the pragmatic content of the PCNS report; the US might not apologise if it is not given back the supply route.

Early signs don't look too promising. The PNCS report has this to say about the Salala attack: 'The attack was a breach of international law and constitutes blatant violation of Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity; the Pakistani government should not only seek an apology but those behind the attack must also be brought to justice'. For starters, the US has already decided not to prosecute the perpetrators of the Salala attack. The opposition in parliament will make this the basis of their rejectionist amendments to the PNCS report.


The PNCS also wants the US to put a stop to drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas. This is a repetition of earlier guidelines laid down by two earlier unanimous joint parliamentary sessions, already proved unpractical because the US will not stop the drones and will rely on them more in the coming days when the bulk of the Nato-US troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan. Pakistan's claim of legality behind this demand is not internationally accepted and is often countered by accusation that Pakistan Army maintains safe havens of terrorists on its territory who attack across the Durand Line and kill the Nato-US troops.

Pakistan has also not banned the terrorist organisations earlier banned by the UN for crossborder terrorism, and the drones are seen by the world as future defence against these organisations. Pakistan Army has been able to enlist nationalist passions behind the drones issue; but the real intent may be to preserve its nonstate actors from damage from drones in the future. One more demand seems to support this intent further: no hot pursuit or 'boots on Pakistani territory'.

The pragmatic aspects of the report regarding the supply route are negotiable and will be supported by all foreign policy experts: Any consideration of the reopening of Nato, ISAF, US containers must be contingent on a thorough revision of terms and conditions of the past agreement, including regulation and control on movement of goods. New taxes will be levied and fees charged as per international practice to compensate for damage to Pakistan's infrastructure, including the partial use of railways.

Foreign policy belongs in the realm of the possible and varies with the variation in the nature of the state. Big powers will have an assertive policy but there will be exceptions there too, like China. Big powers will have the power to implement policy that is not just and is violative of what is believed to be the international norm, but sometimes even a big power will come to grief acting in violation of international law.

The factual position is that there is no international law, and the International Court of Justice respects 'state sovereignty' by giving the option - through the 'optional clause' - to avoid being judged. This respect for state sovereignty favours the powerful states by shifting international law into the UN Security Council where justice is subject to the veto of five states.

Foreign policy must be flexible to enable the state to respond to challenges as they arise from outside its frontiers. Weak states must have a foreign policy which is maximally flexible because the state lacks the capacity to project its power outside its borders. Yet a fixed foreign policy at times does not suit even a big power as it curtails options of domination at the global level. The weak state must therefore retain fixity of policy only when it has certified bargaining power emanating from prevailing circumstances with no long-term adverse fallout.

In our day the evolved state has only one interest - that related to the economy. It seems that there is no other national interest apart from the wellbeing of the people. While the strong state may have non-economic national interest, the weak state may suffer if it has national interest other than that related to the national economy. Ideology and nationalism defeat this maxim and contribute to the formulation of unrealistic national interests.

Honour-based foreign policies are often called unrealistic. Yet it is the weak who will be easily aroused by perceived breach of honour, inclining them to prefer death to a flexible response. But some small states after adopting trade as their main national pursuit show remarkable flexibility in foreign policy, thus enhancing their capacity to survive while silently asserting their economic power too. (Current international system favours such state behaviour.)

Fixity of non-economic national interest in Pakistan is a gift of the Army. Democracy is based on the will of the people but the acceptable version of democracy is indirect democracy because people are untrustworthy while directly deciding national issues. (Referendums, as a hangover from the ancient city-state governance, are not desirable, but when unavoidable, as in European Union, they tend to undermine rational projects.)

The parliament in Pakistan is based on indirect democracy but foreign policy is protected from whatever may remain of public passions by the majority principle as embodied in the cabinet of the elected government. Only the national budget is required to be presented to parliament but here too the majority principle - not unanimity - prevails to prevent the economy from being paralysed by a deadlock.

The PPP government, humbled by the Army, the opposition and the judiciary working in tandem, has brought foreign policy to parliament, cleverly subjecting the dominance of the Army to its consent. Starting 2008 when it spoke in unison against the drones, etc, the parliament has chosen to side with the Army rather than the elected government enjoying a majority.

But in 2012 the opposition has seen through Zardari's plan to avoid making the tough but realistic decisions in foreign policy. However, the big paradox here is that the opposition is all set to condemn the 'pragmatic' PCNS recommendations as vetted by the Army. This means that the 'unanimous' consensus of yore in favour of the Army now stands broken.

The opposition will now rely on the nonstate actors in the Defence of Pakistan Council to equip its rejection of the PCNS report with teeth to stop the resumption of the Nato supply route with force. Since the nonstate actors are created by the Army to fight proxy wars - they will be used again against the 400.000 strong Afghan army and police after the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan - it will be forced to retreat even from a minimal flexibility of response while dealing with America.

An economically 'failing' state of Pakistan is standing on the brink, clutching its honour in its fist, with no guarantee that foreign policy it wants to pursue will save it from collapse.

http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/index.php

National honour and foreign policy

April 1, 2012
By Khaled Ahmed

It was bound to happen sooner or later. Our foreign policy is now being handled by our parliament after the elected government couldn’t wrest its control from the army. The parliament is dying to agree with the army but has no clue about how foreign policy should be shaped and is being led by the nose by the GHQ.

We live under representative democracy, so we are saved from ‘direct democracy’ where passions compel citizens to commit blunders. But parliament is still close to popular passions routinely considered anathema to foreign policy.

The direct democracy of Athens was dismissed by Aristotle as the worst kind of government because it was ruled by passions and controlled by moneylenders. (Aristotle’s abomination of moneylending predates Islam’s own). It was the directly participating public of Athens that killed Socrates and made democracy a cuss word. Aristotle also dismisses timocracy.

Timocracy (from Greek ‘time’ pronounced ‘teemay’ meaning ‘honour’) is rule by the military. Timocracy comes about when people, instead of concerning themselves with virtue, get obsessed with the seeking of honour. The primary means of attaining honour is on the battlefield.

In their internal behaviour, states have governance in accordance with laws, judicial institutions and enforcement mechanisms. In international affairs there is no governance. States, therefore, formulate ‘policy’ to engage outside their borders. Governance and policy are the two differentiating markers.

Because there is no fixed law and no enforcement mechanism, international affairs remain amoral. It is an arena where states pursue their self-interest and refuse to be challenged on the basis of morality. Treaty law which could be seen as a parallel of national statutes cannot be enforced except through ‘realpolitik’.

‘Governance’ is inflexible by reason of its fixation in the legal codes; ‘policy’ is flexible because of its operation in an essentially ‘lawless’ environment. The best foreign policy — in absolute terms — is endlessly flexible and manoeuvrable. But elements of inflexibility are introduced into it by nationalism and ideology. For this reason, there is always a gap between what the people want and what the state needs to do in the realm of international affairs.

People seek moral answers and want the state to behave with honour; the state would prefer to seek its self-interest without reference to morality and honour. The people want a static policy; the state wants to keep it flexible to the point of ‘unprincipledness’.

States that follow nationalism and ideology have elements of fixity in foreign policy. If foreign policy is allowed to become completely subservient to inflexible principles of nationalism, it begins to incline to isolationism. Nationalism is ‘delusional’ because it is created out of a rewriting of history in order to invoke a collective sense of honour and dignity.

Nationalism is highly emotive and cannot bear analysis. In moments of high collective emotion, states deprive themselves of flexibility of response in foreign policy.

After 2001, Pakistan’s pursuit of wisdom rather than honour can be called a ‘save-your-ass’ policy. It has not found favour with the people but its consequences were positive in economic terms. Based on opportunism rather than honour, the economy threw up indicators that couldn’t be matched in the past.

The elected governments in Pakistan have favoured a ‘flexible’ foreign policy. The army has judged acts of ‘pragmatism’ of the elected governments on the criterion of nationalism and ideology and punished them. Now when the army seeks to change the honour-based paradigm to a wisdom-based one — in respect of the Nato supply route — the public opinion leans on nationalism and opposes it by siding with non-state actors.

The Express Tribune

MAK Lodhi
Tuesday, April 03, 2012

The heterogeneous political elements present in the Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS) are just one set of the problems in efforts for a workable and effective foreign policy for the country. The thinking of the GHQ, its own agenda and approaches and requirements will be another unknown region. In erecting the foundational pillars and contours of the foreign policy, the policymakers will either have to circumvent this problem or take pains to correlate to it.

Even if the PCNS is able to yoke together the sections of political leadership through reasoning, persuasion and arguments, it won’t be able to take the establishment on board with regard to Pakistan’s foreign policy. One may suppose the establishment’s input can also be incorporated, but where will the PCNS find the makers and implementers of foreign policy, the foreign office experts employed and nurtured with fat salaries and posted as diplomats world to implement the country’s foreign policy? The sitting government may claim that officials of the foreign ministry will also brief parliamentarians in evolving a policy. However, the PCNS will still remain short of pundits and experts in the field who spent their entire careers in acquiring insight and vast knowledge and skill of diplomacy to further international relations, especially when the situation is that of a weaker state, Pakistan, against the most powerful state, the US.

There have been experts like Agha Shahi facing, say, Henry Kissinger, who had mastered “the art of the possible” in negotiations and deals, in hiding weaknesses and taking imaginary stances, in keeping real motives close to the chest and demonstrating casual interest in the most cherished goals, in making the best of the offers in hand and yielding practically nothing, in opening new avenues of foreign policy and closing ill-conceived and failed initiatives.

It is a tall order for the handpicked representatives of political parties who are holding informal sessions to give a vision of the foreign policy. Let us take one burning issue – the drone attacks – as a topic of discussion. What sort of responses will come from participants in discussions on it?

From an American viewpoint, the Obama administration has achieved tremendous success through drone attacks in its terror fight. Many Al-Qaeda kingpins have been eliminated through precision killing. Yes, there has been collateral damage and Pakistan has kept denouncing the attacks. Will the US abandon the drone policy if the PCNS, in which Maulana Fazlul Rehman is also present, asks for that?

Gen Pervez Musharraf had often stated that Pakistan will catch terrorists when it is provided intelligence about their whereabouts. Until 2007, Pakistan caught only those Al-Qaeda elements about whom intelligence was provided by the CIA. Pakistan’s intelligence agencies either arrested or killed only those elements who appeared on US radar.

In case of arrests, the US government faced the task of keeping them at Guantanamo Bay and collecting evidence to try them. It was almost an impossible task. Many persons arrested from Pakistan on terrorism charges are in Guantanamo Bay despite the fact that there is no sufficient evidence to try them on terrorism charges.

The US was thus left with the ugly choice of seeking intelligence about their presence and then killing them through drone attacks. After Musharraf’s departure from the scene, the Pakistani army continued opposing drone attacks, without actually doing anything about them. Instead of acknowledging a terrorist as a terrorist, Pakistan’s security apparatus dubbed the individuals as pro-Pakistan and anti-Pakistan Taliban. The situation remains unchanged. There are assets which Pakistani intelligence agencies don’t want to kill or be killed. The danger of collateral damage remains potent as unmanned drones can’t differentiate between the innocent and the terrorist. There is therefore every likelihood that people who provide them cover and hospitality can also be hit, even when they do not know that the guest is a terrorist. When people who are wittingly or unwittingly accomplices get killed emotions run high, and a hue and cry is raised and public opinion goes against the US.

After the killing of soldiers in Salala in November, there was some respite from drone attacks because of nationwide condemnation. But the US continues this policy, and the drones still hover and attack. This is because for the US, drone attacks provide a convenient shortcut.

This is the scenario. Pakistan must realise that the world is not going to accept the excuse that these are non-state actors and they cannot be controlled. The bitter fact is that in most of the incidents of terrorism that took place worldwide during the last decade somehow had some connection with Pakistan, including training of terrorists in its badlands.

In devising a realistic foreign policy, the Parliamentary Committee for National Policy will have to check that Pakistan’s tribal areas are completely purged of terrorists. This has to be done sooner or later for the benefit of Pakistan itself. Once the area has been cleared, the US and coalition forces will have no reason to violate Pakistan’s airspace or send drones in hot pursuit of terrorists. This is the only possible solution and the US is not likely to stop drone attacks if Pakistan falls short of it and continues to feign inability.

Sri Lanka fought with a much bigger “internal foe” without much outside help and was successful. It did it when India realised that backing Tamils wasn’t a good policy. The situation is almost the same on the Pak-Afghan border. Why can’t Pakistan end the situation? The world is sick and tired of hearing that the border is porous. But why Pakistan lets its badlands be infested with extremists, in the first place?

The PCNS will have to make a paradigm shift after holding successful parleys with the security apparatus of the country. The Pakistani army and its intelligence agencies have to be on board for any foreign policy to success. Without this basic conceptual change, any policy formulation by parliamentarians is just paperwork, having no impact within or without.

Pakistan should also be aware of the fact the US policy on drone attacks has the backing of Pakistan’s two neighbours who share the longest borders with this country. India will be too glad to learn that more nurseries of terrorism have been substantially, if not completely, destroyed, courtesy the drone attacks. On the other side of the border, the government of Afghanistan cannot be stabilised unless Pakistan completely abandons the game of proxy wars in other countries and eliminates its assets with its own hands.

The PCNS is still at the preliminary stage of its discussions. Unless Pakistan removes the pinching pebble from its shoe, the US will not bother about any parliamentary policy formulation. But if the PCNS achieves this Herculean task, the whole region can benefit from Pakistan’s aboveboard, clear-headed and principled foreign policy followed and implemented by its security forces in letter and spirit. Pakistan direly requires that both India and Afghanistan become good friends for the sake of peace in the region, trade and people-to-people contacts. This is one of the trickiest issues that need to be resolved after huge losses and long suffering.

Pakistan has long been demanding that the US stop drone attacks, without removing irritants which jeopardise the security of the not only the neighboring countries but far off regions also. This is what US president Barrack Obama meant when he told Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani: “Protect your sovereignty by all means, but don’t undermine US national security interests.”

Email: lodhi.mak@gmail.com
-The News

Maximising our options

April 4, 2012
By Tariq Fatemi

While the rest of the world is engaged in strengthening relations even with distant countries and establishing new economic partnerships, we remain mired in historic rivalries that are often nourished by historic memories and unrealistic estimations of our own strength.

This is evident from the unprecedented isolation in which we find ourselves, thanks to our long association with extremists and militants. Consequently, Pakistan arouses unfavourable responses even in traditionally friendly countries, such as China and Saudi Arabia. This has had its inevitable fall-out leaving us bereft of truly committed friends, while reducing meaningful foreign investment that is so essential to shore up a faltering economy. If diplomacy is the art of maximising options, then we have certainly achieved the very opposite!

On the other hand, countries with conflicting interests have set aside tactical differences for strategic gains. Among the lesser known but increasingly relevant is BRICS, a group of five developing countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) that have little in common other than powerful ambitions, propelled by rapid economic growth. Ever since its first summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia in 2009, at a time when most of Europe and the US were convulsed in deep recession, BRICS provided member states an influential platform to enhance their global profiles.

Not everyone, however, is convinced about its importance. Some point to historic Sino-Indian and Sino-Russian suspicions as factors impeding initial ambitious projections. Others point to the contradiction inherent in two of the five countries having to go a long way before being considered democratic.

Last week’s summit meeting in Delhi came amidst fresh questions about its role and relevance. The leaders pledged to expand trade, urged faster reforms in the Western dominated global financial system and also endorsed the Group of 20 major economies as being the “premier forum” for addressing global financial issues. They, however, failed to agree on the modalities of creating a new development bank to rival the World Bank, though they did sign agreements that will enable greater use of local currencies in trade within the group, rather than the dollar. On both Iran and Syria, they called for dialogue, not military intervention.

Of course, there are detractors of BRICS in the West who do not favour the emergence of another pole of global influence. Within India as well, some point to its failure to come up with agreed objectives and a common vision, which encourages them to advocate that India not get distracted by initiatives about a “new global architecture” and instead continue to “play” within existing Western-led institutions. In fact, some observers claim that it is the vigour with which the US is nudging India towards strengthening its political and military cooperation with Australia, Japan and South Korea –– ostensibly as partners of the US in the latter’s China containment policy –– that has stymied the group’s progress. These same lobbies suspect that given the strength and vibrancy of the Chinese economy, BRICS could end up becoming an instrument of Chinese foreign policy.

India also has differing views from those of China and Russia on Iran and Afghanistan. It does not necessarily see eye to eye with other countries on Pakistan. The countries also have differences on Security Council reforms. Nevertheless, they all favour closer cooperation and coordination, particularly on economic issues.

Moreover, a grouping that brings together almost half of the world’s population and a fifth of its GDP –– with combined economies worth almost $13 trillion and expected to double in the coming decade –– cannot but be seen as an important factor in global economic matters.

This is where Pakistan has failed to leverage its geostrategic location, by not taking advantage of its membership in either of the two regional organisations — the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and the Economic Cooperation Organisation. We have to move beyond pious hopes and instead focus on concrete actions.

The Express Tribune