March 16, 2012
By L. Michael Hager

If Israel should launch a unilateral attack on Iran in response to a mere threat to weaponize its nuclear program, should the United States come to Israel’s aid?Before responding affirmatively, American policymakers should consider a word that has rarely appeared in the public debates on Iran or in the media. That word is ‘law’: international law and US law.

During the meeting of the pro-Israel lobbying group, AIPAC, earlier this month, Republican senators and presidential candidates fell over themselves in calling for US solidarity with Israel should it launch a preemptive strike on Iran.

Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell promised to introduce authorization for the use of “overwhelming military force” against Iran if American intelligence shows that Tehran has decided to build a nuclear weapon or it has started to enrich uranium to weapons-grade level. In a March 5 Washington Post op-ed, Mitt Romney hinted that as president he would use military force if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon.

In his remarks to the pro-Israel gathering, President Obama observed that “there is too much loose talk of war” and stated his preference for diplomacy. Yet he felt compelled to declare “I will take no options off the table,” including “a military effort.” Absent from his speech was a clear statement of what it would take to trigger such an effort. What “red line” would have to be crossed?

In his address to AIPAC, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed his impatience with diplomacy and asserted Israel’s right “to defend itself, by itself, against any threat.”

For all the talk in Washington of solidarity with Israel and for all the saber rattling on Iran, jumping to Israel’s aid in a preemptive strike would be a clear violation of international and US law.Article 51 of the United Nations Charter acknowledges the right of a member state to take military action in “self-defense” when responding to “an armed attack.” The charter does not, however, justify preemptive attacks in response to a buildup of military capacity (nuclear or otherwise) or much less a response to mere hostile intent. When the Senate ratified the UN Charter as a treaty in 1945, Article 51 became a part of US law by the terms of Article VI of the US Constitution.

In spite of these legal norms, President George W. Bush launched his shock and awe attack on Iraq in 2003 based on an assumption (later proved wrong) that the country harbored weapons of mass destruction. In doing so, he sent a powerful message that any nation should be allowed to attack another on the ground of presumed military capacity and/or hostile intent. Article 51 suffered a severe blow along with the citizens of Baghdad.

In a recent Los Angeles Times op-ed, Yale Law professor Bruce Ackerman reminds readers that the US joined in a UN Security Council condemnation of Israel’s preemptive strike on an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, and that even the 1962 Cuban missile crisis failed to provoke a preemptive attack by the US.

If American adherence to Article 51 is to be restored, Mr. Obama should refuse to follow the precedent established by his predecessor, Mr. Bush. If the president is to honor his oath-of-office pledge to uphold the Constitution, he should refuse to be drawn into a war on Iran based largely on Israeli fears. Nuclear capacity and hostile intent fall far short of “armed attack.”

Every country has a vital stake in respecting the shared norms of international law. Without legal norms, violence has no limit. An America that okays preemptive strikes today opens itself to such attacks by other countries tomorrow.

Unless Obama clarifies in advance that only Israeli self-defense against an armed attack would trigger American participation, Americans risk being swept into another conflict that would violate both international and domestic law. The Israeli government and the American public should know where the US president draws the line, whatever color he gives it.

L. Michael Hager is the co-founder and former director general of the International Development Law Organization.

Source: Christian Science Monitor

March 23, 2012
by GARETH PORTER

The first detailed account of negotiations between the International Atomic Energy Agency and Iran last month belies earlier statements by unnamed Western officials portraying Iran as refusing to cooperate with the IAEA in allaying concerns about alleged nuclear weaponisation work.

The detailed account given by Iran’s permanent representative to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, shows that the talks in February came close to a final agreement, but were hung up primarily over the IAEA insistence on being able to reopen issues even after Iran had answered questions about them to the organisation’s satisfaction.

It also indicates that the IAEA demand to visit Parchin military base during that trip to Tehran reversed a previous agreement that the visit would come later in the process, and that IAEA Director General Yukia Amano ordered his negotiators to break off the talks and return to Vienna rather than accept Iran’s invitation to stay for a third day.

Soltanieh took the unprecedented step of revealing the details of the incomplete negotiations with the IAEA in an interview with IPS in Vienna last week and in a presentation to a closed session of the IAEA’s Board of Governors Mar. 8, which the Iranian mission has now made public.

The Iranian envoy went public with his account of the talks after a series of anonymous statements to the press by the IAEA Secretariat and member states had portrayed Iran as being uncooperative on Parchin as well as in the negotiations on an agreement on cooperation with the agency.

Those statements now appear to have been aimed at building a case for a resolution by the Board condemning Iran’s intransigence in order to increase diplomatic pressure on Iran in advance of talks between the P5+1 and Iran.

Soltanieh’s account suggests that Amano may have switched signals to the IAEA delegation after consultations with the United States and other powerful member states which wanted to be able to cite the Parchin access issue to condemn Iran for its alleged failure to cooperate with the IAEA.

Parchin had been cited in the November 2011 IAEA report as the location of an alleged explosive containment cylinder, said by one or more IAEA member states to have been used for hydrodynamic testing of nuclear weapons designs.

The detailed Iranian account shows that the IAEA delegation requested a visit to Parchin in the first round of the negotiations in Tehran Jan. 29-31 and that it asked again at the beginning of the three “intercessional” meetings in Vienna for such a visit to take place at a second negotiating round in Tehran Feb. 20-21.

Soltanieh recalled, however, that during three “intercessional” meetings in February with IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards Herman Nackaerts, and Assistant Director General for Political Affairs Rafael Grossi, the two sides had reached agreement that the IAEA request for access to Parchin would be postponed until after the Board of Governors meeting in March.

But when the IAEA delegation arrived Feb. 20, it renewed the demand to visit Parchin, according to Soltanieh’s account.

“At the beginning of the meeting the first day, they said the director general had instructed them to give a message to us that they wanted to go to Parchin today or tomorrow, despite what we had clearly agreed two weeks earlier,” Soltanieh told IPS.

Soltanieh told the Board of Governors that the negotiating text on which the two sides were working at the Feb. 20-21 meeting provided specifically for a visit to Parchin as well as other sites in conjunction with Iran’s actions to clear up the issue of “hydrodynamic experiments” – the allegation by an unnamed member government published in the November 2011 IAEA report.

In response to the renewed request for a visit to Parchin, Soltanieh offered to let the delegation visit the Marivan site, where the same November report said the agency had “credible” evidence Iranian engineers worked on high-explosives testing for a nuclear device.

“We offered Marivan because it was the next priority,” Soltanieh told IPS, referring to the list of priority issues on which Iran was expected to take actions to be specified by the IAEA under the provision of the negotiating text.

But the IAEA delegation rejected the offer, claiming that it had been given too little time.

Soltanieh’s account reveals that the IAEA also turned down a request to stay one additional day to complete the negotiations of the new action plan. “At lunch hour the second day, we wanted them to stay another day,” he told IPS, and the delegation told them it might be possible.

But after consulting with Amano, the IAEA delegation said it could not stay.

Amano’s change of signals on Parchin and refusal to stay for a third day of negotiations were followed by condemnation of Iran as uncooperative by a “senior Western official” shortly before the IAEA Board of Governors meeting.

The official was quoted by Reuters Mar. 2 as saying, “We think there needs to be a resolution that makes clear that Iran needs to do more, a lot more, to comply with the agency’s requests.” The official called Iran’s stance during the talks a “gigantic slap in the face of the IAEA”.

In the end, no resolution was passed by the Board. Instead the P5+1 – the U.S., Britain, France, Russia and China plus Germany – issued a joint statement urging Iran to allow access to Parchin but not blaming Iran for the failure to reach agreement.

The negotiating text as it stood at the end of the February round of talks, which Soltanieh showed IPS, had relatively few handwritten deletions and additions.

A key provision in the draft text, which IPS was allowed to quote, says, “Iran agrees to cooperate with the Agency to facilitate a conclusive technical assessment of all issues of concern to the Agency. This cooperation will include inspections by the Agency, additional meetings, including technical meetings and visits, and access to relevant information, documentation and sites, material and personnel.”

The primary issue standing in the way of final agreement, according to Soltanieh, was whether the IAEA could reopen issues once they had been resolved. The text shown to IPS includes a provision that IAEA “may adjust the order” in which issues were to be resolved and “return” to issues even after they had been resolved.

The Iranians accepted the right of the IAEA to adjust the order but did not agree that it could reopen issues once they were completed satisfactorily, Soltanieh recalled, because Iran feared that giving the IAEA that power would lead to “an endless process”.

The other major issue, according to Soltanieh, was Iran’s demand that the IAEA “deliver” all the intelligence documents alleging that it had carried covert weaponisation activities to Iran before asking it for definitive answers to the allegation. The IAEA delegation said they couldn’t produce all the documents at once, he told IPS.

Iran then agreed that the agency could provide only those documents relevant to each issue when it comes up, the Iranian diplomat recalled. It is not clear, however, whether the IAEA has agreed to that compromise.

The United States has refused in the past to agree to turn over the “alleged studies” documents to Iran – a policy that Amano’s predecessor, Mohamed ElBaradei had argued made it impossible to demand that Iran be held accountable for explaining those documents.

After Soltanieh’s presentation to the Board of Governors, Amano told reporters that some of Soltanieh’s statements had been inaccurate but appeared to confirm the main points of his presentation. “In fact, the February talks initially took place in a constructive spirit,” he said. “Differences between Iran and the Agency appeared to have narrowed.”

On the second day, Amano said, Iran had “sought to re-impose restrictions on our work,” which he said “included obliging the Agency to present a definitive list of questions and denying us the right to revisit issues, or to deal with certain issues in parallel, to name just a few.”

Amano’s spokesperson Gill Tudor declined to comment on the accuracy of Soltanieh’s account for this story, saying “(W)e would prefer to let the director general’s words speak for themselves.”

In response to a request for comment on this story, the U.S. State Department deferred to Amano’s account on the talks but said, “(D)espite the IAEA’s best efforts, Iran was unwilling to reach such an agreement” and had “failed an initial test of its good faith and willingness to cooperate by refusing an IAEA request to visit Parchin….”

GARETH PORTER is an investigative historian and journalist with Inter-Press Service specialising in U.S. national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, “Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam“, was published in 2006.
Source: counterpunch

March 26, 2012
By Adel Safty

The Iranian crisis continues to dominate the news in the US and Israel with Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defence Minister Ehud Barak repeatedly stating that an Israeli assault on Iranian nuclear installations was likely within months. The New York Times described the debate as being dominated by the hawkish elements in Congress and among Israel’s friends in the US.

President Barack Obama’s warning against the unintended consequences of ‘casual talk’ of war was echoed by two respected European figures.

Carl Bildt and Erkki Tuomioja, foreign ministers of Sweden and Finland respectively, wrote on March 20 in the New York Times warning that an attack against Iran would be “a clear violation of the charter of the United Nations.” It could also have “severely negative repercussions” in the region. They urged that diplomacy be recognised as ‘the only alternative’ for a sustainable solution. The other options are, they concluded, “recipes for war.”

At about the same time the New York Times revealed that an American classified war simulation, called Internal Look, had been held earlier this month. It forecasts that an Israeli assault on Iran would lead to a wider regional war and drag the US into the war leaving hundreds of Americans dead.

However the Iranian crisis may ultimately be solved, and I personally subscribe to the view expressed by the two European ministers and quoted above, the Iranian crisis marks a turning point in the history of conflict.

And that is because of the unique nature of the undeclared war of sabotage, subversion and assassination that is being waged against Iran. This covert war includes the cloak and dagger materials of traditional espionage, but it also includes a weapon of sabotage that marks the beginning of a new form of warfare that may very well change the nature of traditional warfare — possibly in more dramatic ways than what the artillery, the aircraft and the submarine did for conventional warfare.

The new weapon of sabotage used against Iran is a most nefarious computer virus named Stuxnet that was programmed to disable specific systems controlling Iranian centrifuges (used to enrich uranium), causing them to malfunction while fooling the Iranian operators into believing that the equipment was functioning well.

Stuxnet may have been the first computer virus to be weaponised in the sense that it was not intended, like other viruses, to deny access or steal information; it was designed to disrupt command and control of industrial or military installations with unforeseen consequences.

The New York Times revealed that Stuxnet was prepared by Israel and the United States — with help from the Germans and the British — and tested in Israel.

Stuxnet caused significant damage to some 3,000 Iranian computers and it is speculated that it set back the Iranian nuclear programme.

If this is confirmed, the implications can be mindboggling. First of all, this is a frontal attack against the sovereign state and its heretofore unchallenged monopoly of the instruments of violence. Since anyone with a computer and the necessary knowledge can wreak havoc on the institutions of the state itself. Or a one-man army can direct its disruptive malice or anger against the institutions of another state.

Second, the traditional army, especially in the industrialised world, will lose much of its relevance unless it continues to function as the guardians of imperial interests — as the American presence in Iraq and Afghanistan testifies. That is because the ability to disrupt may preempt the enemy’s ability to attack and destroy.

Third, the ability to cause massive disruption can be cheaply developed without a huge military that has to be equipped, fed, trained and given a mission. A weaponised computer virus capable of mass disruption requires only readily available computers and readily available knowledge. The conventional army with all its expenses relies on sheer force (lethality of weapons and number of soldiers); a weaponised computer virus relies on brain power.

This brings a sense of equality to all since brain power is readily available and unlike conventional power does not depend on the size of territory, population or level of industrialisation, or sophistication of weapons.

A superpower like the United States may be vulnerable to cyber attacks from a much smaller country. This was in fact confirmed recently. General Keith Alexander, US Cyber Command, was quoted by the Chicago Tribune as having told a Congressional committee that it was only a matter of time before the US was subjected to a cyber attack of the destructive nature of Stuxnet. Alexander called for international agreements to regulate the use of cyber-war technology.

Take the case of the Iranian crisis, for instance. Measured by conventional power, Israel and the United States are undoubtedly far superior to Iran. But the gap narrows when brain power is the measurement.

The level of sophistication and technological development that went into ‘arming’ Stuxnet attests to the high degree of technological sophistication of the US and Israel.

But consider the case of the American stealth drone that was spying on Iran, and the Iranians — to the surprise of the Americans — managed to exploit navigational weaknesses and guide the pilotless plane to land in Iran.

Consider the implications of the Iranians being in possession of classified information about the systems onboard the US President’s Marine One helicopter.

Or consider the ability of groups or even a single individual being able to weaponise a virus and direct it at sensitive installations of another country.

This is what happened when a Saudi hacker, identifying himself as oxOmar, posted the details of more than 20,000 Israeli credit cards, and later disrupted access to the sites of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange and to the Israeli national airline, El Al.

Never since the establishment of Israel in 1948 has an Arab country — let alone an Arab individual — had that kind of disruptive penetrability to the very basic installations of Israeli society, and indeed to the very notion of a fortress armed to the teeth.

Adel Safty is Distinguished Visiting Professor and Special Advisor to the Rector at the Siberian Academy of Public Administration, Russia His book, Might Over Right, is endorsed by Noam Chomsky, and published in England by Garnet, 2009.

Source: Gulf News

March 31, 2012
By As’ad Abdul Rahman

The latest Iranian claim of a ‘major’ nuclear breakthrough was played down by the American government as “an exaggeration to bolster Iranian nationalism amid tighter sanctions rather than a step toward developing an atomic weapon”. Such a claim of “3,000 new-generation of Iranian-made centrifuges for uranium enrichment” activated at Natanz site was dismissed by the United States as “hype for domestic audience”. The State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland informed reporters that the US has indeed ‘opposing assessments’ on this matter.

The US is playing down Iranian ability to enrich uranium which could lead to a grade needed to make atomic weapons while at the same time accusing Iran of secretly seeking to attain atomic weapons. Yet, President Barack Obama, in his speech at American Israel Public Affairs Committee (Aipac) Conference on March 4 reiterated his administration’s stand that while exerting a continuation of US diplomatic and economic pressures to stop the Iranians from developing an atomic bomb, he keeps his other option (military) open. Observers following the Iranian nuclear saga were expecting the US and the European countries to come down on Iran with more aggressive sanctions as a result of the Iranian claim of additional centrifuges. These same observers believe that this ‘cat and mouse’ game between the West and Iran is being played at a time when negotiations with the US, France, Britain, Germany, Russia and China are about to resume.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has said: “the international community wants serious engagement about Iran’s nuclear programme”. Meanwhile, great concern is being expressed by western guarantors that an armed dispute with Iran “will disrupt oil supplies from the Gulf”. The price of oil increased three per cent in the month of February. Iran is Opec’s second biggest producer after Saudi Arabia. Oil for March delivery rose 48 cents to $102.28 (Dh376) on the New York Mercantile Exchange, after media reported that Iran halted crude oil shipments to six European countries before the European Union embargo takes effect on July 1. Michael Lynch, President of Strategic Energy and Economic Research in Winchester, Massachusetts, recently said that “the Iran situation has gone from lukewarm to simmer”. He predicted a major change in the situation “whether that’s an attack by Israel or negotiations have yet to be determined”. US intelligence has just completed an assessment concerning Iran’s nuclear programme.

Enriching uranium
US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta said in his testimony to a House panel in the US Congress that “Iran has not made a decision to proceed with the development of nuclear weapons even as it continues to enrich uranium. We will not allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon”. Indeed, many observers are convinced that in spite of Iran’s insistence that its nuclear programme is for civilian energy and medical research, the US and the European Union say they suspect Iran is “seeking atomic weapons capability”. Nevertheless, the Director of the US National Intelligence, James Clapper told the Senate Armed Services Committee that he doubted Iran eventually will make the political decision to move forward with assembling a nuclear device. “They have put themselves in a position”, he said, “but there are certain things they have not yet done and have not done for some time”. While the US economic growth is rising and improving (in a manner that will benefit Obama’s bid to win a second term) the European Union is facing an economic crisis that may turn into a major catastrophe if a military conflict takes place with Iran. Both the US and the European economies, hang by a thin thread at this time and the last thing the Europeans and the Americans want to see is a major disruption of oil flow from the Gulf region. This is one of the reasons why they are not eager for a military solution against Iran. Yet, over the past four months, the US and the European governments have imposed tough new sanctions restricting petroleum and non-energy trade including financial transactions in an effort to force Iran to abandon its nuclear activities.

These sanctions caused the Iranian currency to lose half its value, so far, on the open market. They are supposed to put pressure on Iran and are considered the best way to avert a military conflict in the Gulf region that holds more than 50 per cent of the world’s oil reserves. Nevertheless, Israel is carrying on a public campaign with a call to bomb the Iranian nuclear facilities.

Most experts in the West believe that Iranian scientists now possess enough technological know-how that neither an air strike nor continuous bombing by US armed forces could destroy Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon someday, should Iran choose to do so. In fact, such atomic know-how in the minds of Iranian scientists cannot be demolished by bombing campaigns. Former CIA director Michael Hayden told a group of foreign policy experts last month in Washington, D.C that “Israel is not capable of inflicting significant damage on Iran’s nuclear sites. The Israelis are not going to attack Iran, he said “They cannot do it, it’s beyond their capacity. They only have the ability to make it worse”.

Professor As’ad Abdul Rahman is the Chairman of the Palestinian Encyclopaedia.
Source: Gulf News

April 9, 2012
By Adel Safty

Just as the drumbeats of war were getting louder and an Israeli military strike against Iran, we were told, was only a matter of months away, a dramatic retreat seems to have occurred. Last week the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that Israeli plans for war against Iran had been put on hold until next year.

Yet, last week Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak declared that 2012 is “the year of the fight against the Iranian nuclear programme.”

Barak said that Israel is prepared to wait for the sanctions and negotiations with Iran to produce results before it decides on a military strike. The time needed is not a matter of weeks, he said, but not of years either, repeating the formula used by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta told his fellow Americans that he expected an Israeli strike sometime between April and June.

How can one explain the postponement of Israeli war plans against Iran? Haaretz reported that Barak was forced to reconsider war plans in light of new information about the cost of a war in American lives.

A secret war simulation was conducted by the American army last month to assess the repercussions of an Israeli-initiated war against Iran. Its forecasts were revealed and given front page prominence by the New York Times.

The exercise forecast that an Israeli strike would lead to a wider regional war, and could draw the US into the war costing hundreds of American lives. Which Israeli leader wants to have American blood on his hands? And who among Israeli leaders is willing to deal with the repercussions of such an outcome on domestic American politics in this election year?

The political damage of drawing America into the war with hundreds of Americans dead would be mostly felt by the incumbent President Barack Obama. But contrary to what his critics would have us believe, Obama is popular among Jewish voters. Over 60 per cent of them say they would re-elect him. So why would Israel take the risk of acting against the interests of a president popular with Jewish Americans?

Moreover, Obama’s approach to the crisis focuses on building an international coalition against Iran, applying severe sanctions, while pursuing a negotiated settlement to the crisis. Although Netanyahu does not find this approach forceful enough, a majority of Americans support it.

Aiding Israel

Under these conditions, starting a war that the international community would likely condemn as illegal, and which the Obama administration fears would prove perilous for America, would likely turn into a public relations disaster in the United States — Israel’s principal benefactor. And this at a time when Obama is increasing American aid to Israel and has just pledged more money for the Iron Dome antimissile system which reportedly intercepted and destroyed 90 per cent of missiles launched from Gaza in the recent Israeli-Palestinian confrontation.

Barak told an Israeli journalist earlier this year that there were three questions that must be answered in the affirmative before a decision about attacking Iran is made. 1. Does Israel have the capacity to inflict severe damage to Iranian nuclear sites? 2. Does Israel have the support of the international community, and especially that of Washington to carry out an attack? And finally, have all other possibilities been exhausted, leaving the military option as the last resort?

Barak stated that for the first time in a long time the answers to all three questions are in the affirmative.

On the contrary the answers are rather in the negative. For example, on the question of Israel’s capacity to carry out a sustained attack, American and Israeli officials and former officials from the defence and intelligence establishments expressed serious doubts and some even said only the United States could carry out such an operation. The New York Times investigated that issue and reported last month that an Israeli attack against Iran would be a highly complex operation involving at least 100 planes flying more than 1,000 kilometres, refuelling in the air, fighting off the Iranian defence system, and conducting multiple attacks against reinforced sites.

Michael V. Hayden, director of the CIA from 2006 to 2009, stated that airstrikes capable of inflicting severe damage on Iranian nuclear installations were “beyond the capacity” of Israel. This assessment is shared by Israeli intelligence officials. For example Meir Dagan, the former head of Mossad, recently told an Israeli journalist that it is not possible for a military attack to halt the Iranian nuclear project (“a foolish idea” he said). “There is no such military capability,” he stated.

On the question whether Israel has support, especially from Washington for an attack, the answer is definitely no. The Americans, the British, the Germans, the Japanese and the Russians have all expressed reservations, and in some cases downright opposition to the Israeli project for an attack.

On the third question about war as the last resort, it most definitely is not at this point. This week Iranian officials and the group of six powers (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: US, Russia, China, England, France plus Germany) will resume negotiations to try to find a diplomatic solution — the only truly lasting solution to this crisis.

By the admission of all parties involved a war would only delay but not eliminate the Iranian project. A war may in fact spur the Iranians on to rebuild with haste and determination.

If the news about postponing the war is confirmed it will benefit Obama who played an important role in resisting Netanyahu’s pressure for aggressive actions against Iran. It will also give ample time for a lasting diplomatic solution that would avert war. The meeting is an opportunity for the Iranians to demonstrate good faith and for their interlocutors to demonstrate peaceful intentions.

Adel Safty is Distinguished Visiting Professor and Special Advisor to the Rector at the Siberian Academy of Public Administration, Russia. His book, Might Over Right, is endorsed by Noam Chomsky, and published in England by Garnet, 2009.

Source: Gulf News

April 12, 2012
Jonathan Schell

On April 13 (tomorrow), Iran is scheduled meet with representatives of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council – plus Germany (the so-called “P5+1”) in an effort to decide the fate of Iran’s nuclear programme. Meanwhile, North Korea is reportedly preparing its third nuclear test, as if to provide a discordant sound track for the talks.

If the talks fail, and military action against Iran becomes more likely, no one should be surprised. Over the past decade, a new kind of war has been invented: a war designed to stop a country from obtaining nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The first “disarmament war” was the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Its goal, spelled out plainly by US President George W. Bush’s administration to the Security Council and the US Congress, was to destroy Iraq’s WMD stockpiles and production facilities. Of course, as it turned out, no such stockpiles or facilities were found, and the war proved to be an exercise in bloody futility.

This experience illustrates one of the great drawbacks of the use of force as a tool of disarmament. An attack must be timed to perfection, and it must be launched after the WMD programmes are in operation and evident, but before they have produced any weapons. If the attack comes too early – or if, as in Iraq, the programmes are not there at all – people will die for nothing. But if the weapons have already been produced, the attack could prompt their use and, possibly, counter-use by the invading party, leading, conceivably, to the world’s first two-sided nuclear war.

Although the invasion of Iraq was a debacle, the policy underlying it has survived. Curiously, that policy may have escaped discredit in part precisely because its target was a mirage. Is a military action a true test of a disarmament war’s efficacy if the arms in question are missing?

Now another disarmament war – this time against Iran – is taking shape. Once again, the intelligence is at best fuzzy. There is much talk of “red lines” – some technical or other step that Iran might take to turn its nuclear-fuel programme into a nuclear-bomb programme – that must not be crossed. But what are these red lines? Would research on an explosive lens suitable for detonating an atomic bomb be a red line? Would further dispersal of Iran’s nuclear facilities be one? Would a report of a “decision” by someone in the Iranian government count?

In short, how can we be sure that a red line has been crossed? No one knows, and no one is saying. But it appears that upon such obscure determinations a decision between war and peace will depend.

The aim of a disarmament war is to prevent proliferation, locally and regionally. Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is one route to proliferation. But a war to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear arms is probably a quicker and surer route to the same destination.

Fortunately, there may still be a way out of the impasse. Obama has called an Iranian atomic arsenal “unacceptable.” Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has repeatedly stated that holding such arms is a sin, as well as “useless, harmful, and dangerous.” So the two leaders agree. In this, there may be the basis for a deal.

The bone of contention is uranium enrichment, which the P5+1 have so far insisted that Iran suspend, at least provisionally. Iran claims the right to enrich under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The P5+1 reply that Iran lost that right by concealing nuclear programmes from the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has declared Iran to be in non-compliance with the NPT. It has been suggested that the US will demand dismantlement of an enrichment facility in the mountain stronghold of Fordow.

But the essence of a deal lies in permitting Iran to continue uranium enrichment for civilian purposes, in exchange for full disclosure of all programmes, including any that were or are devoted to nuclear-weapons research. To facilitate the process, Pierre Goldschmidt, a former IAEA deputy director-general, has proposed “a grace period during which Iran would not be penalised should it voluntarily disclose the existence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, and/or acknowledge any past violations of the NPT or of its safeguards agreement.”

When the cause of peace makes justice impossible, forgiveness is never easy. But, like South Africa’s post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission, or the Catholic sacrament of confession, Goldschmidt’s plan would prevent the perfect from becoming the enemy of the good.
Jonathan Schell is a Fellow at The Nation Institute and is a visiting fellow at Yale University

© Project Syndicate

April 17, 2012
Mustafa Alani

The timing of the recent visit by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the UAE island of Abu Musa, occupied by Iran since 1971, has to be seen in its wider context, as well as in terms of the content and language of the speech before the few hundred Iranian settlers of the occupied island who gathered to listen to him.

The visit and speech were both provocative and unwarranted. However, unquestionably it is one more sign of the state of nervousness gripping the Iranian leadership since the surprise development of the popular uprising in Syria.

The Iranian leadership feels the heat and stands helpless to save its ally in Damascus from the rage of its own people. To understand the cause and the actual degree of this state of panic, one has to appreciate the value of the Syrian regime for Iranian strategic interests. Indeed, the possible collapse of the Syrian regime is a matter of great concern for Iran, as it could be the biggest setback suffered by it on a strategic level since the capitulation in the Iraq-Iran war.

Syria is the only Arab ally of the Iranian regime, it is the ‘crown jewel’ and the cornerstone of the triangular alliance that brings together Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. This strategic alliance, which has been in existence for the past 30 years, has given Iran a unique status and commanding influence in Arab and Middle East politics. Thanks to the Syrian regime, Iran became part of the war and peace process with Israel and became more important than many Arab states in the attempts to settle the Palestinian issue.

Iran is a major player in the internal politics of Lebanon and Iraq, and without Syrian support, Hezbollah could not be created or survive. The Syrian regime has acted as an agent of Iran in providing support to the pro-Iran Shia opposition groups in Bahrain, and in other Arab states. In reality, the Syrian regime is an indispensable and irreplaceable ally, which has served as a vital door that allowed Iran a powerful entry into Arab politics. Yet this door is on the verge of collapse. Even before the events in Syria, the Arab Spring had already produced a negative outcome for Iran, as Islamist groups are today legitimately in control of the governments in a number of key Arab states. Tehran’s difficult position following the events of the Arab Spring was compounded by effective international sanctions imposed on Iran, which have crippled the economy and paralysed its financial system.

In its drive to save the Syrian dictatorship, the Iranian regime has been severely critical of anyone supporting the people’s uprising in Syria. Tehran’s request to move the 5+1 negotiations on the nuclear file from Istanbul to Baghdad was perhaps intended as a punishment of Turkey, as a senior Iranian leader stated that with Ankara’s support of the revolt in Syria, Turkey was no longer trusted or qualified to host the negotiations. The Arab Gulf states became the target of a vicious media campaign of vilification orchestrated by the official Iranian media as well as pro-Iran Arab media. Further, Iranian intelligence is desperately trying to open a front in Bahrain and in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia to destabilise the Gulf States and to divert attention from the deteriorating situation in Syria.

Against this background, the Iranian President made his provocative visit to the occupied Abu Musa Island and delivered an inflammatory speech. Yet, the Iranian regime has to comprehend the fact of human history that no one can save a dictator from the wrath of his own people. Iranian attempts to divert attention and open new fronts in the states supporting the Arab Spring, and in particular the popular Syrian uprising, will not bear fruit. President Ahmadinejad’s visit and speech in the occupied Abu Musa island cannot change legal reality or alter political and historical facts. The UAE islands are illegally occupied territories, as much as the Palestinian territories. Occupation cannot and will not be legalised or legitimised by irresponsible unilateral political acts. If the Iranians are sincere about their call to improve relations with the Arabian Gulf States, a radical change in their attitude toward the occupied UAE islands is the starting and logical point to initiate badly needed confidence-building measures in the Gulf region.
Dr Mustafa Alani is the Director of the Security and Defence Department, at the Geneva-based Gulf Research Center
Source: Khaleej Times

April 19, 2012
By Nima Khorrami Assl

Iran and six world powers have concluded their much-awaited meeting in Istanbul with an agreement to hold yet another meeting in the Iraqi capital on May 23. In a marked contrast to their previous encounters though, this round of talks began in a positive atmosphere as both sides had been signalling a willingness to listen and make compromises on the basis of mutual respect and equality. As such, it was no surprise when lead negotiators from both camps described the occasion as “useful”, “constructive”, and “positive”.

As the two sides appear to be making an “encouraging progress” in bridging their differences, therefore, a temporary agreement between Iran and the international community is highly plausible as each side will likely try to first weigh the other’s intentions, end goals, and indeed steadfastness before reaching a major agreement.

Today, Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is firmly in charge of the majlis, the judiciary, and the armed forces, and thus he is confident that his authority will not be challenged from within even if he was to forgo his anti-Americanism. Put differently, as Khamenei continues to tighten his grip on state apparatuses, Tehran might, rather ironically, soften its stance on the nuclear issue and make some meaningful compromises in return for lifting of some of the sanctions; an issue that was reportedly high on Iran’s agenda in Istanbul. In this way, not only can he ease the public anger and buy his regime legitimacy, but also hope to cause a rift, however minor, in Washington-Tel Aviv relations since Israel will be highly sensitive to any deal that allows Iran to continue with its enrichment activities even at below the 5 per cent threshold.

The key reason behind such assertion is Khamenei’s recent remarks in which he has practically praised US President Barack Obama for managing to warn both Iran and Israel about his intentions, and advocating diplomacy as a solution to Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. In an important sense, his remarks could be interpreted as a sober attempt to create a political cover for an eventual deal with the West, helping his regime to avoid being seen as capitulating to US demands. This becomes all the more likely when one takes into account Khamenei’s decision to extend former Iranian president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s political career by retaining him as the head of the Expediency Discernment Council. In what seems to be a well-thought-out move, Rafsanjani has since been advocating talks with the US, thereby enabling Khamenei to gain an understanding of the elite, if not the public, perception on such eventuality without losing face.
Public uprising

Meanwhile, Western powers’ initial optimism over the possibility of a public uprising and a subsequent regime change in Iran caused by economic privation is gradually but surely eroding. Not only Iran’s internal security forces have successfully suppressed the opposition, but there is also a profound, albeit unspoken, disconnect between Iranian youths’ national and personal hopes.

As the so called “engines of revolution”, a large number of Iranian youth have their eyes fixed on the West, dreaming to leave and live their lives elsewhere. They argue that it takes generations to rebuild Iran, and that why should they suffer for political mistakes of “the revolution generation” many of whom are now living a comfortable life in Europe and North America. Add to these 33 years of aggressive so-called Shiite indoctrination and it then becomes clear why the reign of Ayatollahs may be far from over.

There is also a bitter realisation among Western leaders that although sanctions can slow Iran’s progress in the nuclear field, they are nonetheless unlikely to undo the nuclear know-how which Tehran has accumulated over the years. As Iran’s neighbours and Israel’s patience for a meaningful outcome from sanctions runs thinner, as a result, Western powers have good reasons to seek a deal with the current regime even if it comes at the expense of democracy and human rights in Iran.

Surely, this is not to suggest that a deal is now imminent, and that Iran’s nuclear standoff with the West is reaching its final episode. Far from it, there is still way to go before the two sides can reach a comprehensive agreement. Given Iran’s strategic interest in having a “substantive” nuclear programme as a form of deterrence and a sign of prestige and national power as well as the profound mistrust between Iran and the West, the current momentum can be easily lost. This is not to mention that a transformative decision is likely to be postponed until after US presidential elections.

Yet, given the overall scheme of regional and global developments, and the inevitability of an Israeli strike in the absence of a deal in Baghdad, there are grounds for cautious optimism that a tactical and/or temporary compromise could be arrived at in the next meeting, especially if discussions are framed in the context of “commitments against rights” whereby Iran would be allowed to keep some enrichment activity in return for absolute transparency and unconditional fulfilment of its nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) obligations.

Nima Khorrami Assl is a security analyst at Transnational Crisis Project in London
Source: Gulf News

May 7, 2012
By Adel Safty

At a recent fund-raising dinner for US President Barack Obama’s re-election campaign a woman interrupted the president’s speech and shouted: “No War against Iran.” Obama paused and, retaining his composure, shot back: “No war has been announced, young lady.” The audience erupted in sustained applause. It is true that no conventional war has been announced, but nonetheless, a new form of warfare is being waged, unannounced. And that is cyber warfare.

Although the Iranians seem to be more at the receiving end of cyber attacks, the situation is fluid and changeable, with unpredictable consequences.

Israel and western powers led by the United States have accused Iran of breaching its international obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). They specifically accuse Iran of using nuclear energy to develop nuclear weapons in violation of the NPT. Iran rejects the accusation and claims that its nuclear power plants are developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which is allowed under the NPT.

The dispute grew into an international crisis, partly as a result of the urgency given to it by the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his successful lobbying of Obama. With Netanyahu threatening war, and Obama orchestrating punitive sanctions against Iran, and agreeing not to exclude the use of force to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons, the crisis seemed headed for a bloody confrontation. The drums of war were getting louder every day, and American officials spoke of their expectation that Israel would attack Iran sometime between April and June.

The deadlock was broken earlier this year when Iran suddenly agreed to resume suspended negotiations with the group of 5+1 (USA, Russia, China, France, England, and Germany). The meeting took place last month in Istanbul. By the assessment of the principal participants, the talks went well and the parties are now scheduled to meet later this month in Baghdad. The optimism which enveloped the Istanbul talks was partly caused by an Iranian fatwa (a religious edict) declaring nuclear weapons an evil which Iran would never embrace.

More recently, another encouraging assessment — or possibly a sign from an insider — was given by Hussain Mousavian who served as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator. Mousavian described the forthcoming meeting between Iran and the group of 5+1, as representing a ‘historic opportunity’ to settle the dispute between Iran and the six world powers.

Perhaps even more remarkably, Israel’s military chief, Benjamin Gantz told the Israeli newspaper Haaretz last week, that he did not believe that Iran would develop nuclear weapons. He also stated that the diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran, is beginning to bear fruit. Significantly, Gantz described the Iranian leadership as ‘very rational.’ On all three points Gantz expressed a position at odds with the views publicly expressed by Netanyahu. It is noteworthy, though, that the positive prospect for a diplomatic solution to the crisis has not diminished the pre-occupation of the parties with cyber warfare.

I argued in a previous column that the successful cyber attack mounted against Iranian nuclear installations marked the beginning of a new form of warfare. And that some of the implications of cyber warfare included its ability to reduce gross conventional military inequalities between enemies; and this made the US vulnerable to cyber attacks from smaller countries that otherwise would not have dared to challenge Washington militarily.

Moreover, the success of the cyber attack by a worm named Stuxnet, which damaged and disoriented Iranian nuclear installations, may have given Iran a motivation to intensify its cyber warfare capabilities and a reason to prepare a counter-attack against the USA and Israel, which Iran holds responsible for the cyber attacks.

Such unsettling implications prompted the American congress to hold hearings, last week, titled “Iranian Cyber Threat to the US Homeland.”

Response feared

Representative Dan Lungren (Republican) of California pointed out that a 2008 report by an American security contractor estimated that Iran’s cyber-capability was “among the top five globally.”

On May 1, the Tehran Times reported that on April 22, Iranian oil installations were the subject of another cyber attack. But that the Iranians were able to detect and contain the damage before the computer ‘weapon’ wrecked havoc on the Iranian oil infrastructure.

Moreover, the Iranian Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology said in a statement dated April 29, that it had been the subject of another cyber attack but that it had repelled the attack and no vital information was lost.

The provocative nature of such repeated cyber attacks gave rise to growing concern among American law makers that Iran may have been provoked enough to contemplate a response.

Lungren told the congressional hearing that he hoped that the Iranian leaders would be deterred from launching a cyber attack against the US by the knowledge that the American response would be ‘overwhelming.’

As far as could be determined, deterrence seems to be working, for now. But for how long can the Iranian leadership resist the pressure to respond to cyber attacks against their country’s vital infrastructure?

In his testimony before Congress, the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told the congressional committee that Iranian leaders may have crossed the point of no-return and are now willing to consider a cyber attack against the United States. The most salient question now, he concluded, is to ask if we are ready for an Iranian cyber attack.

In the final analysis, however, only a diplomatic solution to the crisis can avert the disastrous consequences of conventional war and the unpredictable results of cyber war. A diplomatic solution is not only the better option, it is the only option since the alternative, namely various forms of warfare, can only delay, but not remove, the underlying cause of the dispute.

Adel Safty is Distinguished Visiting Professor and Special Advisor to the Rector at the Siberian Academy of Public Administration, Russia. His book, Might Over Right, is endorsed by Noam Chomsky, and published in England by Garnet, 2009.

Source: Gulf News

May 21, 2012
By Adel Safty

I write from Washington. The past two weeks witnessed significant developments in the ongoing Iranian crisis. But you would not know it from the press or watching the countless news networks in the United States. The Iranian crisis seemed such a distant concern. It hardly made any headlines and whatever news there was had no urgency to it and was discretely buried among similar non urgent news items.

The mass media were principally preoccupied with President Barack Obama’s statement that he supported same-sex marriage. Public opinion polls suggested that although support for same-sex marriage has increased among the general public, Obama’s statement, while popular with certain sections of the population, is not likely to have a major impact on his election prospects.

American commitment to preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons, on the other hand, has been defined as a national security issue. How Obama ultimately handles the crisis is likely to have a significant impact on his ability to secure a second mandate.

This interesting state of affairs is one of those quirks of the interaction between the politics of mass media and the politics of election year campaigns. It has to do, among other things, with the issue of how the mass media operate and how its obsession with dramatic and dramatised coverage of certain news, decide what goes on the political agenda nd what priority the public is encouraged to give it.

This can lead to manipulative results and sometimes catastrophic consequences. As for example, when Judith Miller used her influential position with the New York Times to dramatise unsupported statements about the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and in so doing drummed up support for the war in Iraq. With no weapons of mass destruction to be found in Iraq, a sober recognition that the American people had been deceived slowly but inevitably emerged. The New York Times recognised its culpability in allowing itself to be part of the deception. It apologised to its readers and let Miller go.

Or take the example of the Arab Spring. The drama of streets filled with protesters demanding and bringing about revolutionary changes captured the imagination and the attention of the Western media. But the hard work of imagining democracy and building its institutions lacked the drama of upheavals and street revolutions and therefore proved unable to attract and maintain the interest of the Western media, let alone that of the political establishment.

And how does one explain the general indifference towards the bloodshed in Syria, while the Libyan rebels were quickly made to benefit from Nato military might and airpower to defeat Muammar Gaddafi? The latter’s sudden U-turn from a self-styled nationalist to a practical globalist and his readiness to renounce nuclear weapons did not earn him any grace. He died an ignominious death.

Maybe, the neglect with which the influential and the mass media treated the news from and about Iran was instinctive. The American public, after all, has been conditioned to associate Iran with bad news. To the American public, the Iranian state readily brings to mind images of “rogue state”; a “sponsor of terrorism”, and of “fanatical Mullahs” running amok. In the case of Iran, the Western media instinctively reacts with alacrity to bad news. Good news that contradicts these negative images are played down or considered as aberrations.

But the news from and about Iran was indeed rather encouraging. The Istanbul nuclear talks between Iran and the group of 5+1 (USA, Russia, China, England, France plus Germany) were generally considered by the parties as constructive. Only a few days before the next meeting scheduled on Wednesday in Baghdad, the parallel talk, in Vienna, between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency yielded encouraging results. The nuclear negotiators resolved previously deadlocked issues regarding access to Iranian military installations.

Last week, the German government expressed hope that Wednesday’s meeting in Baghdad will result in a “compromise” on the Iranian nuclear issue.

To which Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar responded by telling Fars News that if the same spirit of cooperation that emerged at the Istanbul meeting continues to influence the Baghdad talks, there is good reason to believe that the Baghdad meeting will produce positive results.

And then there is of course Israel, a major player that the Iranians wish to bring under the control, but that the six world powers cannot ignore.

Like the conditioned Western media, the Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahoo is instinctively inclined to reject good news from and about Iran.

It was no surprise, therefore, when the Israeli newspaper, Haaretz, reported that Israel “feared” the forthcoming nuclear talks might produce an agreement and that Israel viewed that prospect “with some bitterness, perhaps even with hope that they will fail completely.”

This view is not shared by the negotiators. Catherine Ashton, European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy stated last week that she hoped the Baghdad talks will mark the “beginning of the end” of the Iranian crisis.

A possible interim agreement will allow Iran to enrich uranium to the level of 20 per cent — approaching the levels for a nuclear weapon — but would force Iran to stop enriching the uranium underground. In return, the six world powers will gradually suspend some of the sanctions already in place; an agreement, which Israel “completely rejects.”

Israel’s position is not surprising. Nothing will satisfy the current Israeli government that fails short of completely denying Iran the military means of challenging the present balance of power in the region crushingly dominated by Israel.

But why the indifference shown by the Western media to the reports of progress? If the Iranian crisis was a ‘good story’ when there were threats of war; surely it ought to be an equally ‘good story’ when there is talk of peace.

Adel Safty is Distinguished Visiting Professor and Special Adviser to the Rector at the Siberian Academy of Public Administration, Russia. His book, Might Over Right, is endorsed by Noam Chomsky and published in England by Garnet, 2009.

Source: Gulf News