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Ahsan Riaz
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http://berkeleyjournalofsocialsciences.com/August2.pdf

The US is the new India

April 16, 2012
Cyril Almeida

IF there were a Sigmund Freud of international relations, he’d probably ask, ‘What does Pakistan want?’

The trajectories of Pakistan’s two critical relationships — with India and the US — in recent months suggest that we like to keep things complicated, very complicated.

For just as we start to approach the relationship with India more rationally, the US becomes the new India and we plunge that relationship into yet more incoherence and uncertainty.

It’s the same set of principals here, so why are they producing such different outcomes?

The army still dominates the national security and foreign policy domains but there is also the political government, the Foreign Office and a loose-knit group of security and foreign-policy experts who help shape policy.

What’s causing them to collectively choose such different paths, where the decades-old Enemy No 1 gets deepening trade and investment ties while a damaging clash over red lines with the US — on drones, for example — leaves everyone wondering where a vital trade and security relationship is headed?

There’s no Freud to help out here, so guesswork will have to suffice.

Start with India. The security establishment hasn’t suddenly unlearned all that it believed to be true about Indian policymakers and warriors for decades.

But the series of crises that rocked the army leadership last year created a small window of opportunity here. Uncertain and unsure, the army was more amenable to being convinced to do things it may have been reluctant to green-light before.

There have been similar moments in the past, but nobody to take advantage of them. This time, there was a tenacious and committed commerce secretary and a political government eager to improve ties with India.

So they pushed hard and it started to yield results. Notice how virtually every other subject in the ‘full-spectrum dialogue’ has meandered along without much progress. Trade and investment got a bigger, more concerted push and hence the breakthroughs.

It helped that the army’s own security prism was changing. Realising that Pakistan had fallen significantly behind India in economic terms and that strategic competition with India will be more and more expensive in the years and decades ahead, the army is also more amenable to new ideas.

Perhaps key to it all is that India is a well-understood problem. It’s such an old adversary, the contours of disagreement and avenues for conflict so well understood, that Pakistan can be confident there are few surprises in store. If India tries anything funny, Pakistan can quickly respond, the thinking would be.

Contrast this with the relationship with the US, where there’s so much more room for uncertainty and doubt.

Take the drones. The Americans themselves are figuring out the potential of the rapidly evolving technology. The first strike in 2004 already seems like another era. By 2008, the system’s capacity was up to nearly a dozen strikes a month and didn’t have to rely as much on Pakistani intelligence input.

An acceptance here behind the scenes of the inevitability of some strikes combined with frequent public denunciation of the strikes is an approach borne out of fear and uncertainty. What if a strike every other day became the norm? The Americans could then press to expand the area of operation. To date, an overwhelming majority of the strikes have occurred in the Waziristan agencies.

From there, they could expand to include the other tribal agencies more regularly, then to the settled districts adjoining the tribal areas and before you know it, the outskirts of Quetta or the sprawling shantytowns of Karachi could be targeted.

So opposing the inevitable — intermittent drone strikes in Fata — could help prevent the unknown — the raining down of missiles all over Pakistani territory.

And because drones are politically unpopular, there’s no one in the other policy camps to try and placate the army’s fears and convince them to try a different tack, as has happened on trade with India.

Another example: the future of Afghanistan. There are increasing signs that the Pakistan Army understands that it can’t dominate Afghanistan via Pakhtun proxies and keep that country isolated from the outside world like it did in the 1990s.

A nominal centre with the present configuration of power in the regions more or less adhered to and semi-guaranteed by outside powers, that makes the most sense for Afghanistan.

But the security establishment here believes that the main work needs to be done in Afghanistan first. Without a workable framework for a post-war future in Afghanistan, it doesn’t make sense for Pakistan to put its cards on the table or to make any concessions at this point.

Unlike the relationship with India, the relationship with the US is characterised by too many unknowns and too much uncertainty about what will happen even two or three years down the road.

Uncertainty causes the security establishment here to go into a defensive position and treat with great suspicion anything that could blow up in their face. The India problem is well understood. Nobody can claim for sure what Afghanistan will look like several years from now.

The army may not be thrilled about trade with India but has assessed that it will not undermine Pakistan’s position on ‘core issues’ and that it could be beneficial for our sluggish economy. So the push by the civilian apparatus, bureaucratic and political, is yielding results.

With the US, while everyone in policymaking circles agrees that the relationship cannot be allowed to break down, the army is filled with uncertainty about how to proceed; there are too many variables in play at the moment; and the civilians neither have the resolve nor the understanding to push for potentially game-changing options.

So that’s the difference. What Pakistan wants is to feel like it knows what it’s agreeing to.

The writer is a member of staff.

cyril.a@gmail.com

twitter: @cyalm
-Dawn

May 17, 2012
By Shumaila Raja
Exclusive Article

The all time high increase in the US military aid to its strategic partners in Asia like India, Israel and for example Philippines and the massive hike in the defense budgets of these countries indicate towards a new push to the superpower designs in the Indian ocean region, as well as part of the new world order ahead of presidential elections in the United States of America. Pakistan amongst the world community is considered the so-called front-line ally in its war against terrorism, and in the process during the last one decade has sacrificed over 37,000 people’s lives and around $1 trillion worth economy besides chaos on political, educational and societal fronts, has not only been ignored in the past but at the height of this war is not being provided the basic weapons, even intelligence surveillance gadgets, which could help it eliminate terrorists from FATA region along the Afghan border.
According to reports Israel will receive a record $4bn in military aid in 2013; following a decision by the US House of Representatives Defense Appropriations Subcommittee which just approved over $948m in funding for Israel’s anti-missile defense programs. This is reportedly part of the USA’s final move against Iran. A $679m of the funding will go to the Iron Dome, the remaining $269m will go to Israel’s other anti-missile initiatives: the short-range David’s Sling ($149.7m), and the current long-range Arrow anti-ballistic missile system and its successor the Arrow 3 ($119.3m). These projects, unlike the Iron Dome, are joint Israel-US projects. While the increase in funding for the Iron Dome was expected, the funding for the other projects represents an increase of $169m over the Obama administration’s proposed number.
But how Israel is facing opposition from inside against its anti-Iran moves under the US pressure is evident from no other than a former Israeli army’s chief of staff’s statement. In a single week, the former head of internal security and the former head of external security have all publicly questioned Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu’s judgment on Iran. While the current army chief spoke narrowly about the Iranian government, the former security officials directed their fire at Israeli politicians. On Friday, May 6, the former internal security chief told an Israeli audience, “I don’t believe in a leadership that makes decisions based on messianic feelings” – and he was speaking not of Iran, but of Israel.

Another report by AFP said the US will nearly triple its military funding for the Philippines this year as tensions rise with China over disputed islands and Washington bolsters its alliance with Manila. The Philippines accounted for over 70% of total FMF allocation for East Asia in 2006, compared to 35% this year. Washington agreed to provide $30m in FMF this year, up from an initial 2012 allocation of $15m and from $11.9m last year. In 2003, funding amounted to $50m as Washington sent forces to help the Philippines battle al Qaeda-linked militants. The Philippines is offering the US greater access to its airfields and may open new areas for US soldiers to use as it seeks stronger military ties with its ally and faces rising tensions with China in the maritime dispute. The US also agreed at the meeting to share “real-time” data on the South China Sea, suggesting it will give Manila more of its surveillance data on naval activity. The State Department also promised to explore “creative funding streams” to help the Philippine military. Since 2002, the Philippines has received nearly $500m in military aid from the US. The amount does not include the transfer of 20 reconditioned helicopters, a Cyclone-class ship and a Hamilton-class cutter. A second Hamilton-class cutter will be transferred later this month and the two sides are discussing the possibility of a third Hamilton-class ship and a squadron of second-hand F-16 fighters.

India on the other end is the largest weapon importer as per the study made by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Over the past five years, Asia and Oceania accounted for 44% in volume of conventional arms imports. That compared with 19% for Europe, 17% for the Middle East, 11% for North and South America, and 9% for Africa. India was the first world importer over the period, accounting for 10% in weapons volume. It was followed by South Korea (6%), China and Pakistan (both 5%), and Singapore (4%), according to the independent institute, which specializes in arms control and disarmament matters. These five countries accounted for 30% of the volume of international arms imports. “India’s imports of major weapons increased by 38% between 2002-2006 and 2007-11. Notable deliveries of combat aircraft during 2007-11 included 120 Su-30MKs and 16 MiG-29Ks from Russia and 20 Jaguar Ss from the UK.”
India raised its defense budget this year 17% and announced to purchase heavy and sophisticated weapons, aircraft, navy ships worth billions of dollars. The world community this time took serious note of it and defense analysts across America and Europe proved that China that shares billions of dollars trade with India is not a threat for India and therefore such a huge arms buildup is meaningless and certainly seems to be Pakistan-specific. Another point is noteworthy that the diplomats, State Department officials and even the news agencies which report the hike in aid clearly play with the words and the impression of “arms sale to continue running their war industry” is tactfully diverted to “US military aid”, which is not at all the military aid. There is no military “aid” but military “sales” only. The US will nearly triple its military funding for the Philippines this year means the USA will arrange the American Bank loans that will increase threefold the sale of American weapons to the Philippines and will increase threefold the Philippines external debt. The aim of this “aid” is to make Philippines a much poorer and deeply indebted country, so that the only way of paying back is by offering USA more land, both for exploitation as well as for more military bases. Same is the case with Pakistan and if India is unaware of this “exploitation”, then it is mistaken that for sake of a temporary benefit, it is putting at stake the future of this region and helping make the generations hostage to others, like they did in the past.

The article is contributed to pkarticleshub.com

Arshad Mahmood

With approximately 3.2 per cent of the total world area and 28 per cent of world population the geostrategic architecture of South Asia has always attracted the great global players including the U.S. Pakistan and India - two core regional actors - have historically been vital to Washington in meeting its strategic objectives. Ever since demise of former Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S regional policies have, however, been varying but generally remained Indian centric.

Contrarily, the history of Pak-US relations has seen many ups and downs. Pakistan’s geostrategic location - where the interests of the great global players coincide - makes it a key factor in the regional and international politics. But despite its tremendous sacrifices Islamabad could not bridge the trust deficit gap with White House. The account of Pak-US relations provokes an important question in the mind of every Pakistani: ‘Is Pakistan an all time strategic partner of the U.S. or just a friend in (their) need?’
Weighing significance of both the states in meeting the U.S. long term strategic interests in South Asia, one can clearly observe a visible tilt in Washington’s policies towards India. In order to establish its root-cause, it’s rather imperative to conduct a philosophical debate of Pak-US relations in comparison with Indo-US bilateral ties in a realist paradigm.

With the end of Cold War in 1991 the U.S. suddenly disengaged itself - to a larger extent - from the politics of South Asia. Later various regional and international dynamics drove Washington’s policymakers back to this region. During Cold War the only hitch in Indo-US relation was Indian relations with the Soviet Union which automatically got removed with the fall of communist empire. Contrarily, the vital role of Pakistan in beating Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan and its importance for the US. towards containment of USSR suddenly vanished.

Though the U.S. administration remained aloof from South Asia after the fall of Kremlin Empire but the dramatic developments of May 1998 - Indo-Pak nuclear explosions - and the Kargil-1999 conflict suddenly transformed the low profile of South Asian region as the focus of the world attention especially the U.S. Due to personal intervention of President Clinton the danger of war was, though, averted but from Pakistan’s perspective the Kargil war was a complete failure. The conflict diplomatically isolated Pakistan as the world community believed that Pakistani forces were on the “wrong side of LoC” and made the U.S. to play its role in the regional politics. This changed scenario went in Indian favour.

In May 2000, President Clinton paid a historic visit to the sub-continent. The visit was a formal U.S. strategic signal of its policy on South Asia. It was also the Washington’s proclamation of “discovery of India” as its long term strategic partner. Four points would reinforce these arguments: Firstly, he was the first American president to visit India and Pakistan in 22 and 30 years respectively; Secondly, he visited India for five days whereas had a just five hours stop-over in Pakistan; Thirdly, there was also a mark difference in his body language both toward India and Pakistan. With Vajpayee smiles, warmth and cordiality were visible symbols which ware replaced with grimace, cold and official posture in Pakistan; and, finally, the Washington agenda in India was vast ranging from transformation of bilateral socio-political and economic ties to cooperation regionally and internationally. In Pakistan, however, President Clinton just urged Musharraf to chalk out a roadmap for restoring democracy.

Later, the event of 9/11 proved to be the most influential as regard to the US policy shift to whole of the world in general and South Asia in particular. Before September 11, 2011, Pakistan was a marginalized country having low priority on U.S. agenda whereas India was centre of its policy in South Asia. In the words of Stephen P Cohen, “The Bush administration built upon Clinton’s “discovery of India” and set out to create a comprehensive and positive relationship with New Delhi.” But the 9/11 brought dramatic change in the whole scenario. As stated by President Bush, “9/11 changed America”, the situation brought Pakistan back to centre stage - putting parts of the US-India agenda on hold - nevertheless only temporarily!

Pakistan today is a frontline ally of the U.S. but both the states have several conflicting interests. Following the events of Raymond Davis, 2nd May 2011 and Salala attack, misperceptions between the two have tapped the extreme ends. The fiasco of Pak-US relations encompasses two key questions: how does the U.S. views his interests in Pakistan and what are the major challenges in the relationship of both the countries?

Stephen P. Cohen during a seminar in Islamabad in 2003 identifies some U.S. areas of concern which include terrorism / extremism, nuclear programme, democratization and relations with India. As regard to the challenges: the broad nature of them include the prevalence of trust deficit, the U.S. perception considering Pakistan as part of problem rather than the solution, the tangent approaches which both the allies have adopted in the WOT, and the US-Indian friendly policy on Kashmir.

Finally, with 2014 knocking at the door, the White House policy indicators - emerged from the declarations of Bonn Conference, launching of New Silk Initiative and the U.S. urge to talk to Taliban - suggest that the Obama administration is following the strategy of initially minimizing and ultimately edging out Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan. As regards to post - 2014 scenario, the U.S. proclaims to focus on economic uplift of the country through New Silk Initiative which is not only an effort of keeping China, Russia and Iran out of the game but also draw a dividing line in the time-tested Pak-China friendship.

As regards to Indo-U.S. relations; Henry Kissinger had observed a decade ago that the United States and India have “no conflicting interest in the traditional and fundamental sense.” For last ten years the Indo-US relations have transformed from bilateral to multilateral dimension.

The Indian bustling democracy and growing economy are the main converging points in their bilateral ties. India is the world largest democracy and has grown economically at an average of 7.7 percent in real terms over the last decade. It is not only the largest market for the U.S. but also possesses the potentials of becoming the global economic powerhouse in the next two decades.

The salient contours of New Delhi and Washington areas of cooperation were spelled out by Robert O. Blake, the U.S. Assistant Secretary on South and Central Asian Affairs during a press briefing on the U.S. Policy Priorities in South and Central Asia on 23 September, 2011. He said, “President Obama has called (Indo-U.S. relations as) one of our defining partnerships for the 21st century.” The areas of cooperation between two embrace counter terrorism, trade and investment, economic partnership, job opportunities, infrastructure development, energy, clean water, and cold chain systems. Furthermore, they are also working on establishing Investment Forum, Foreign Direct Investment and state-to-state and city-to-city relationships through their respective Chambers of Commerce. With Pakistan there are no such arrangements.

Furthermore, India has transformed from “estranged democracy” during Cold War to “engaged democracy” in the post-Cold War eras and with its record economic growth of 7.7 per cent over the last decade is an attractive market and investment partner for the U.S. That is why, on regional power political canvas, the U.S. views India as a potential counterweight to balance a rising China. Contrarily, Pakistan possesses a weak economy which survives on foreign aid and is conceived by New York as almost a failed state with unstable and corrupt democratic structure.

Above all, the increasing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean, - connecting the oil-rich Persian Gulf with growing energy markets in East Asia - grants a clear edge to India over Pakistan in Washington’s Asia-Pacific strategy.

In way forward to decide future relationship with the U.S. it’s imperative for Pakistan to ensure safeguarding its national interests. The neo-realists and neo-liberalists in this regard have conflicting views. Waltz argue that states pursue for ‘relative gains’- in comparison with their adversaries, whereas, the neo-liberals believe that nations are concerned for maximizing their ‘absolute gains’ - independent of their rivals. Moreover, in international arena states’ relations are not a zero-sum game and mutual benefits through cooperation are possible.

The nature of future Pak-U.S relationship is suggested to be on neo-liberalist philosophy of “absolute gains” - focusing on own interests and not what India gains from the U.S. Last but not the least, both must work together in bridging the trust deficit, image building and identifying commonality of interests.

http://www.thefrontierpost.com/article/1867/