The endgames in Afghanistan — I
By Humayun Shafi

In December 1979, Brezhnev ordered Soviet troops to enter Afghanistan in support of a bordering client state facing a civil war.

Exit from Afghanistan by the invading empires and superpower has been a rather difficult affair and at times the invaders ended up paying a heavy price. The Anglo-Afghan wars of the 19th century, the Soviet occupation starting 1979 and the manner of retreat of the Soviet army during 1988-89 are being focused and studied again. Many an academic circles are seen drawing parallels between the Soviet and the US retreat. Comparisons might not be the correct thing, but history does teach us lessons and whispers on the mistakes of the past, only to be heard and heeded by the wise. By now entry into Afghanistan by the US-led coalition army has entered its 12th year, even after this prolonged war no end seems to be in view and has only made the US and allies look like countries driven by self interest while entering Afghanistan in 2001.

The public opinion is that withdrawal from Afghanistan must be completed at an early date; the long war has failed to bring any fruitful results. All the factors necessitate a rapid exit of the US and allies from Afghanistan.

Withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan was the subject of a summit organised by NATO in Chicago in May 2012. The summit endorsed an exit strategy from Afghanistan prepared by the US. President Hamid Karzai was also a participant in this Summit. By June 2013 an exit plan was prepared by the US and NATO administration; the main feature of the plan was that 60,000 personnel belonging to the US and allies, comprising of trainers, technicians, consultants and special operation troops, will stay in Afghanistan beyond 2014. In recent developments, President Hamid Karzai has shown dissent on the US and NATO plans for residual troops staying in Afghanistan beyond 2014, the time when the US and NATO withdraw their main combat troops. Consequently, the US has begun preparing a zero option plan, withdrawing all troops and consultants from Afghanistan. Hence, there is no firm or formal US exit strategy from Afghanistan, creating an air of uncertainty in the region. For us living in Pakistan, various options are being weighed and people asking questions about the shape of things to come.

The first batch of troops of the US and allies have been leaving Afghanistan since 2011. The US-led coalition combat troops have handed over almost all combat operations to the Afghan forces; this process of withdrawal was completed by mid-2013.

No further exit strategy or firm commitment of troops, consultants, financial or military aid by the US beyond 2014 seems to have been announced. The situation has become more alarming due to the suspension of the Qatar initiative. Law and order in Pakistan is affected by happenings in Afghanistan and we have reason, more than anyone else, to examine the future possibilities, as historically, Pakistan has been affected by the situation in Afghanistan. For the US and allies time is of the essence if it wants to leave Afghanistan in an orderly manner, which would necessitate, among other things obtaining the budgetary approvals for financing any commitments beyond 2014, and preparing the public opinion for a vast spending beyond 2014. Budgetary approvals are a lengthy process involving a public debate, which might not go in favour of large military aid beyond 2014. In this predicament many academicians have started drawing parallels between the withdrawal of the USSR in 1989 and the present day withdrawal of the US and NATO.

It took Gorbachev more than three years of persistent effort to arrange a retreat for the USSR and reach an accord at Geneva in 1988. Pakistan was considered a significant country in these agreements. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created irresolute problems for the USSR and Afghanistan. Initially, armed intervention into Afghanistan was opposed by many a member of the Politburo including Gromyko, the then Soviet foreign minister. Later, events made the USSR enter into Afghanistan; these events were the failing Afghan government, the growing influence and militant stance of the conservative sections, including the Mujahedeen, all resisting social and economic reforms initiated by the Peoples’ Democratic Party of Afghanistan. There was resistance to the land redistribution reforms too, seen by many as interference in the social and economic life of tribal and rural Afghanistan.

In December 1979, Brezhnev ordered Soviet troops to enter Afghanistan in support of a bordering client state facing a civil war. Afghanistan was being ruled by the Peoples’ Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the Afghan equivalent of the Communist Party. A review of events upon the Soviets entering Afghanistan on December 24, 1979, create an impression of violence and confusion. Hafizullah Amin, the Afghan president, was killed on December 27, 1979, the third day of the Soviet occupation. Blame for his murder was placed on the Soviet troops. Babrak Karmal became the new president of Afghanistan, who was to occupy that position until 1986, a position held by him for most part of the Soviet occupation.

Even in the initial stage the Soviets had a heavy military presence, as about 100,000 troops were deployed in the first month of occupying Afghanistan. In spite of a large military presence throughout the decade-long war, the Soviets were never in any commanding position. Precarious occupation mainly remained confined to a few urban centres and a few routes remained open for movement and supplies for the Soviet army. The Mujahedeen physically controlled almost 80 percent of the country. To gain control of the rural areas, the Soviet army started bombing to depopulate the countryside, leading to a heavy loss of life.

(To be continued)

The writer is a freelance columnist
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The endgames in Afghanistan — II
By Humayun Shafi

The Afghan War is considered to be the most expensive war in history. The US has spent above one trillion dollars, and Britain has spent 37 billion pounds.

In February 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev addressing the 27th Party General Congress, labelled the war in Afghanistan as a “bleeding wound.” Gorbachev announced a planned withdrawal of troops. He wanted to ‘Afghanise’ the conflict and to carry out broad-based negotiations through the Afghan government for an honourable withdrawal. The Soviets wished to have a well-orchestrated withdrawal, hence Babrak Karmal, the then president of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan since 1979, was removed in 1986 to be replaced by Mohammed Najibullah .The Soviets thought that Karmal was unnecessarily prolonging the war and might not be able to have an arranged withdrawal of the Soviet troops. Najibullah, head of the Afghan Secret Service, was installed as the president of Afghanistan in 1986. The Soviets thought Najibullah would be able to bring a compromise between various warring groups and arrange an honourable exit for the USSR army, one of the largest standing armies in the world. These negotiations were thought to ensure a peaceful and orchestrated withdrawal of the Soviet troops and also for ensuring continuous Soviet influence in Afghanistan after their withdrawal. One reason for maintaining this influence was to contain the Mujahedeen whom the Soviets feared might one day penetrate the Central Asian Republics.

On the face of it Najibullah managed to synchronise the instruments of power. Yet his scheme proved to be superficial and without much popular support. The withdrawing Soviet troops faced problems due to resistance from the Mujahedeen. At the time of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, in February 1989, Kabul was surrounded by 30,000 Mujahedeen. A number of Soviet troops were air lifted. However, it was thought necessary that troops should also use the ground route for withdrawal into USSR to dispel the impression of a retreat. The 400-kilometre road from Kabul to the Soviet border on Amu Darya passes through the Hindu Kush Mountains and the Salang Pass. The Soviet forces during retreat suffered further casualties of more than 500 personnel.

During the final stages of withdrawal the Soviets had to use SCUD missiles with conventional warheads to give cover to its withdrawing forces; almost 90 SCUD missiles were fired just in the last quarter of 1988. The last of the Soviet troops withdrew on February 15, 1989, through the Afghan Uzbek Bridge, Col General Boris Kromov being the last of the Soviet soldier to leave Afghanistan. Out of more than 300 Missing-in-Action and POWs, the Soviets could only get back 15 personnel, that too after prolonged informal negotiations with different groups in Afghanistan. The Soviets had to pay millions of dollars as ransom for the release of Colonel Alexander Rutskoi who was captured after his plane was shot down over Afghanistan. Later in 1991, Colonel Rutskoi became the vice president of the USSR.

The Russians, ever since, are carrying the burden of an unfavourable verdict by history as well as a moral burden of causing so many human casualities. Many academicians claim that the moral burden of invading Afghanistan hastened the breakup of the Soviet Union itself. More than one million Afghans lost their lives, while three million Afghans were wounded. Officially, 15,000 Soviet troops died. Three million Afghanis had to take refuge in Pakistan alone. The psychological trauma for the Afghan nation will live on for generations to come.

No group or Najibullah’s own supposedly loyal troops came to his rescue. Before the collapse of his government in April 1992, as a last resort, Najibullah asked Boris Yelstin for help to intervene in Afghanistan, but the request was declined. By 1992, the Mujahedeen were in control of Afghanistan, and the entire structure that Najibullah thought would protect him and keep him in power just disappeared. He had to take refuge in the UN compound in 1992, and was later killed in 1996.

The Soviets before departing had made arrangements for training of the Afghan army, which was also provided with modern weaponry. The Afghan war had an adverse impact on the state of discipline of the Soviet army, exposing the Soviet Union state structure to weakness. There are lessons to be learnt from the Soviet occupation and retreat from Afghanistan.

The ease of entering Afghanistan and the difficulty of leaving it are the words attributed to Alexander the Great as far back as 327 BC. The high imposing mountains, the hills, the windswept plains and the independent Afghan people have always exposed the weakness of the invading nations and their armies. Compounded with these realities, there is little political will in the US and its western allies to continue this war that has now been going on for the last 12 years. The Afghan War is considered to be the most expensive war in history. The US has spent above one trillion dollars, and Britain has spent 37 billion pounds. The war expenditure will not end with the 2014 withdrawal; there are huge pension, medical and disability allowances to be paid to the war veterans and financial costs that are to be paid on money raised to help finance the war effort, thus making the war all the more expensive. The future generations will also be sharing the financial cost of the present war. British economy is in a depression and further financing the war in Afghanistan might be difficult. There is an absence of a political will to carry on a remote unpopular war that has lingered on for 12 years without any results.

(To be continued)

The writer can be reached at humayunshafi@gmail.com
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"Nay! man is evidence against himself. Though he puts forth his excuses." Holy Qur'an (75:14-15)

The endgames in Afghanistan — III
By Humayun Shafi

The US could not accurately read the changes in the Afghan society and the impact those changes were likely to have globally.

The present Afghan government is only in control of the main urban centres. About 70 percent of the population lives in the rural areas, many of which remain inaccessible to the government. Afghan governments without a proper moral mandate will never be able to reach the population living in remote mountains and valleys. It will be a near impossible task for the Afghan government to exert its writ through the Afghan National Security Forces. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is now estimated to be around 350,000 and by end 2014, it will have 400,000 personnel. These estimates are disputed as counting of the security forces is only on the basis of ‘trained and equipped’. There are no accurate estimates of how many personnel are actually performing duty on ground. Some estimates place the ANA available strength to be only 100,000. The discipline of the force is much below the challenges that will be faced after December 2014.

Desertions, theft of weapons and even official vehicles is common. Undermined by such issues, one cannot expect the security forces to establish law and order effectively for a government working in a hostile environment, in a war-torn country. All across, it is commonly believed that there is no likelihood that the ANA can stand up to the Taliban. With the poor state of discipline and lack of fighting spirit in the ANA, the US will not be willing to give an unconditional and firm commitment to finance the ANA beyond 2014. The US must have realised that Afghanistan cannot be governed or managed only by force, as governance that ensures peace and growth is achieved only through a legitimate government, which many analysts believe is lacking in Afghanistan. The Afghan election of 2009 that placed Hamid Karzai in power lacked credibility. After the Soviet withdrawal, Mohammad Najibullah managed to stay in power for about three years, until March 1992, backed by large amounts of USSR’s financial assistance and military equipment. In the present case, the US is considering the ‘zero option’, which stands for no residual troops in Afghanistan beyond December 2014.

Government institutions in Afghanistan are weak or nonexistent, especially in the rural areas as the result of constant civil strife. Here the Soviets and the Americans and allies failed to learn any lessons from the Afghan history. Entering Afghanistan in December 1979 to support a socialist government, the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, leaving behind a chaotic situation with an unpopular and unelected government, with the institutions of governance nonexistent or in disarray. Apparently, the present Afghan government has little or no influence or control over vast areas of the country, a situation similar to the one prevalent at the time of Soviet withdrawal. The events of 1989 and the present US retreat have a similarity worth considering. Many difficulties for a negotiated retreat for the US have surfaced; the difficulties are further compounded by the perception of the Afghan Taliban.

The US should have avoided entering Afghanistan and starting a senseless war that caused much human misery, along with loss of a high moral ground. The events of 9/11 were an intelligence failure, and instead of invading Afghanistan, the US could have weighed other options, among them the creation of a better intelligence collection system. Ahmed Shah Massoud, while addressing the European Parliament in Brussels in April 2011, had warned that the insurgency in Afghanistan was likely to spill beyond the borders of Afghanistan. His caution and words were not given much consideration, and no note-worthy step was taken. This is indicative that prior to 9/11 the US administration had placed Afghanistan as a low priority area. The US could not accurately read the changes in the Afghan society and the impact those changes were likely to have globally.

Prime Minister David Cameron, on a visit to Afghanistan in June 2013 to attend the Armed Forces Day ceremony, stated that 2002 was the correct time to carry negotiations with the Taliban. Moreover, General Nick Carter, Deputy Commander of NATO forces, also stated that negotiations with the Taliban should have been conducted in 2002. A great deal will now depend on the Afghan elections of 2014.The elections must be fair and free, and above all else, all major stakeholders must participate. The elections of 2009 did not have the required credibility.

In March 2009, President Barack Obama declared that there has to be a reconciliation process in Afghanistan. From 2009 to 2013, no tenable plan for withdrawal of US forces has been in view, hence there is no clear picture beyond 2014. In comparison, the Soviet withdrawal strategy along with the reconciliation was well in place in 1987 onwards. The withdrawal plan worked for the Soviets till the exit of its last soldier in February 1989. The Road from Kabul to Soviet Union border is only 400 kilometres, whereas the United States is on the other end of the globe, and as is the case now, the process of the removal of military equipment to be taken back to the US is facing difficulties.

The Afghan economy is another issue. The financial resources at the disposal of the Afghan government are very meager and there is a huge budgetary gap, dimensions of which will only become clear once the US and allies leave Afghanistan. Which countries will be willing to spend at least $10 billion annually for a budgetary support beyond 2014, and even perhaps well beyond 2025, is yet to be decided. As stated earlier, government institutions are in a bad shape; the writ of the state is seldom seen in spite of a huge deployment of troops by the US; the economy is weak and cannot ensure much revenue for the budget; and the discipline of the Afghan national army is far below the requirement. Such are the similarities of the Afghan engagement between the US and the erstwhile USSR. Above everything else, one striking similarity between the US and the former USSR is that both negotiated with groups within Afghanistan that they had entered to vanquish.

Is our region to suffer for another very long period because of the flawed strategies and policies of earlier the former USSR and now the US and its allies? Beyond 2014, it has to be monitored how Afghanistan is going to be different from 1989, the year when the Soviets left Afghanistan.

(Concluded)

The writer is a former Inspector General of Police and can be reached at humayunshafi@gmail.com
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default...-10-2013_pg3_4

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"Nay! man is evidence against himself. Though he puts forth his excuses." Holy Qur'an (75:14-15)