Mullah, military and the masses

mtgondal · #1 Tuesday, May 29, 2007

Mullah, military and the masses by M Ismail Khan

As the lawyers' protest against the removal of the chief justice continues to hyperboles into mass agitation seeking change of government, the debate, has once again moved to the very basic question of who should run the country and how it should be run.

In a normal country and under normal circumstances people would prefer familiar difficulties to the possible benefit of the unknown. They would rather try to solve problems within the existing framework than confront a new system and new chain of command. But in Pakistan's political history this proclivity has been challenged over and over again. During the last nearly sixty years, the country has had civilian rule for exactly half of its life. The frequency of change of civilian set ups has been much faster than the period involving transition from military to civilian governments, which has averaged a healthy ten years cycle.

How can one diagnose this prolonged crisis of the state? It is indeed easy to jump on words like 'feudalism', 'institutional failure', 'colonial mindset', 'army' etc but then which country does not have a ruling elite? Where do institutions, sometimes big monopolies, not fail? Which country is devoid of any historical legacy and of strong armies? It is not just institutions that fail, it is the failing relationship between institutions which cause failures.

It is obvious that the relationship between institutions has to operate under a framework, known as the constitution. The quality of relationship among various institutions of the state is reflective of the intellectual and moral quality of the people responsible to manage affairs of the respective organs of the state. And among the people leading various organs of the state it is the executive who according to the constitution enjoys the larger share of the state power – hence it holds the bigger responsibility towards the people and the state.

Over the years, many factors have had direct bearing on the health of the constitutional structure of the country such as the over all socio-economic conditions of the people, ethnic and religious strife and the security environment around the country particularly its relation with India and Afghanistan. On the other hand, corruption, failure of political leaders, lack of commitment, vision and democratic culture, as well as disregard for rule of law has left deep scares on the eventual outlook of the country's dispensation of governance.

Unfortunately, Pakistan's political climate has always been polarised between various political and non-political groups competing for power, with the balance of political fortunes tilting in favour of one or the other, from time to time. In the process, the groups did not only cause irreparable damage to the constitution but also used Islam as a pretext to gain control of or perpetuate state power. Setting aside Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah's vision of Pakistan, who made it clear that 'religion has nothing to do with the business of the state', both religious, mainstream parties and the military used the religious card as a convenient escape from difficult but important reforms needed to foster a state of law.

After independence, the interference or utility of the clergy in politics has been enhanced in many ways by the ruling elite on whom the responsibility of shaping Pakistan's political future rested. The dichotomy can be judged by the fact that the other day when President Musharraf was warning the world that 'Pakistan's progress is being threatened by terrorism and extremism that may force the country to revert to backwardness, and that young people are being "misguided and brainwashed'' to become bombers in violation of the teachings of Islam', at around the same time Chaudhry Shujaat Hussian was striking a deal with the administrators of Lal Masjid, where armed brigades have been mocking the write of the state in the heart of the capital city.

There is no doubt that the military has become the most dominating and powerful institution overshadowing every other organ of the state, and given the state of polarisation between religious and mainstream parties it is difficult to foresee a purely civilian government in Islamabad any soon. However, the intensity of public craving for rule of the law means that ultimately the military will have to abdicate a fair share of its power, if not all, in favour of the true interest and inspirations of the 160 million people.

Who should then govern the country, what should be the qualities of a ruler? One's instant response to the question would be that he or she should be a good person. But what do we actually mean by a good ruler? Let us consult the world's leading political scientists. To Machiavelli, 'the good ruler is the strong and unscrupulous despot who can attain and maintain national unity'; to Plato 'it was the wise men, the philosopher king who knows better then others what ought to be done and how to do it'; to the religious clerics 'the good ruler is the godly man, and his selection must be approved by the mosque or the church'; to the Germen Nazis 'he is the natural leader who survived and forged his way to the top in the competitive struggle to which all men are subjected to'; and to the democrat a 'good ruler is the one who best serves the interest of the majority of the people to whom he is responsible'.

Nonetheless, at the end the key to prosperous and stable Pakistan lies in redefining the relationship between citizens and the state and developing institutions that promote merit, justice and fair play. Institutions which produce leadership which shuns religious bigotry, ethnic factionalism, leaders who believe in intellectual and moral responsibility towards the masses -- then, it will not matter who runs the country.

The writer is based in Islamabad and has a background in media, public policy and development. Email: ismail.k2@gmail.com

mtgondal · #2 Wednesday, June 06, 2007

Law of the militants
Wednesday,JUNE 06,2007

THE real issues can be lost in the maelstrom of politics. Big names and their utterances naturally dominate the headlines but sometimes the smaller print is of greater import in terms of where the country is headed. Take, for instance, what is happening in Bara in Khyber Agency and in Darra Adamkhel in Frontier Region (FR), Kohat, due south of the NWFP capital. In Bara, which nudges Peshawar, a woman and three men were executed on Monday on charges of adultery — by order of a committee, not a court of law. Vigilantes, acting on a tip-off, ‘arrested’ the four and hauled them up before a jirga which decreed that they should be mowed down with kalashnikovs. The quartet was luckier than the two men and a woman who were stoned to within an inch of their lives on similar charges in Khyber Agency in March, and were finally put to death in a hail of gunfire. Crowds watched and cheered on both occasions. In Darra Adamkhel, the local Taliban have introduced a 10pm curfew, announced that they will shoot the driver of any vehicle that does not stop at their checkposts, made it the law that reporting on the militants’ activities is ‘unpardonable’ and have promised an armed campaign against ‘indecency’ starting July 1. What we have in place here is a parallel administration with the powers of judge, jury and executioner. The Taliban are now an institution, not just a band of extremists.

The outlook is bleak. The situation has spun out of the control of a government that is concerned first and foremost with self-preservation. It seems unable to establish the writ of the law even in the federal capital, let alone at distant places in the NWFP. Tank, a ‘settled’ district in the NWFP, is completely at the mercy of militants who launch audacious attacks against civilians and government installations at will. The noises emanating from the National Security Council notwithstanding, it is clear that the state is helpless. All the deals and other acts of omission have not worked. Firm action is the need of the hour.

http://www.dawn.com/2007/06/06/ed.htm#2

mtgondal · #3 Wednesday, June 06, 2007

Saviours or commanders?

AAMER RAZA A. KHAN
Wednesday, JUNE 06, 2007
An analysis of the political scenario over the past sixty years, clearly brings out the extent of involvement of non-political intruders, who by the stranglehold they acquired over State institutions, distorted and dismantled the democratic political framework, inherited from the Founders of Pakistan.
It all began very early, in 1951, when Ghulam Mohammad occupied the Governor General’s House in Karachi. He was later joined by the defence secretary, Col Iskander Mirza and the commander in chief, General Ayub Khan. None of them had any political background, or experience, but they assumed control of our destiny, and in 1953 imposed the First Martial Law, in the city of Lahore, which whetted the appetite of the army and instilled in it the culture of exercising authority over civilian governments.
Emboldened, it maneuvered the removal of six successive civilian Prime Ministers of Pakistan, the establishment of One-Unit by the amalgamation of the four western provinces, deprived the people of East Pakistan of their population advantage by introducing parity between the eastern and western provinces and also enabled the “appointment” of two non-political Prime Ministers, (Mohammad Ali Bogra and Ch Mohammad Ali). This would hardly have been possible, in a free democratic set up. Allowed by the judiciary, all this was forced down the throats of unwilling citizens.
The 1956 Constitution of Pakistan was got approved by a Constituent Assembly that had lost its representative status, after nine long years of inaction. Elections under the newly adopted constitution were delayed by over two years, for they would have deprived the coterie of its hold on power. As elections drew near, generating intense political activity, the constitution was abrogated and the Second Martial Law was imposed in 1958 by the commander in chief, General Ayub Khan.
This initiated the now continuous cycle of military interventions in the democratic political system. The armed forces believe in, the concept of “unity of command”, and dissent is not tolerated. Accordingly, all authority came to be concentrated in the commander in chief. Power flowed out of the barrel of the gun and the ink of the commander’s pen – both at the federal and provincial levels. Pakistan was virtually transformed from a federation into a unitary state, and the provinces were deprived of their political, legislative and executive authority. Parallel judicial systems were established and the public was denied participation in the affairs of the State. The judiciary once again validated the intervention. This state of affairs gave birth to an acute sense of deprivation in the minds of the people of East Pakistan, Sindh and Balochistan. Had there been a representative democratic set up, things would have not been so.
Lifting Martial Law in 1962, the self-appointed Field Marshall, condescended to give Pakistan “his Constitution”. Advised by Generals like Azam, Burki, Musa, K M Sheikh and Sher Ali, and bureaucrats like Aziz Ahmed, Shoaib, Shahab, N A Farooqi, Muzaffar Ahmed, Altaf Gohar and Fida Hasan, he disenfranchised political stalwarts like Nazimuddin, Tamizuddin, Suhrawardy, Chundrigar, Mamdot and Nishtar. In order to strengthen his hold on power, he enforced a Presidential form of government, deprived citizens of their fundamental rights, established the system of “basic democracy”, which was also made the electoral college for indirect elections to the office of the President and Members of the National and Provincial Assemblies, thus depriving the citizens their basic right to directly elect their representatives.
It was virtual martial law, with a façade of constitutionality. The rigged presidential election of 1962 generated public revolt, to overcome which, the 1965 War with India was started. Feelings of separation took birth in the hearts and minds of the people of East Pakistan, who felt completely left out of the power structure. To sustain himself, Ayub conjured up the “Convention Muslim League”, but when it was put to test, during the 1968-69 agitation against him, it collapsed, sweeping the Field Marshall out of power.
The result was the 1969 overthrow of the government by the commander in chief, General Yahya Khan, who declared the Third Martial Law, abrogated the 1962 Constitution and mismanaged the affairs of the state, surrounded and advised by bevy of non-political hangers on. He pushed the army into action against the civil population of East Pakistan, leading to a war and surrender to India and the break up of Pakistan. The basic causes of this tragedy were the total lack of political input in state management, an adamant disciplinary mindset and refusal to negotiate with and cater to the concerns of the civil society.
Sadly, however, the succeeding civilian setup also exhibited somewhat similar traits. Bhutto was the first civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan. No doubt he came in at a very difficult period of our history, and also succeeded in enacting the 1973 Constitution with the consent of almost all the political parties, but he continued the state of emergency, suspended fundamental rights, and did not tolerate political dissent. He dismissed two elected provincial governments, emasculated the courts, manipulated the 1977 elections, then declared martial law in Lahore and Karachi, incarcerated his political opponents and unnecessarily prolonged the ensuing political parleys, for the resolution of the political crisis. This led to his overthrow by the chief of the army staff.
The Fourth Martial Law was imposed by the commander in chief, General Ziaul Haq in 1977, and it garnered support of Bhutto’s opponents. The general decimated the constitution, and later removed 11 superior court judges. He also created a façade of democracy by, setting up a nominated “Majlis-I-Shoora”. After 8 years of military rule, a civilian prime minister was installed, but the general could not tolerate an assertive Junejo, and dismissed him. Soon thereafter, he flew to his eternal abode in 1988.
The two civilian prime ministers that followed, instead of respecting each other’s political mandate, fought it out to the very end and self-destructed.
The Commander in Chief, General Musharaf descended from the skies, to impose the Fifth Martial Law in 1999. He surrounded himself with a horde of non-political advisors, banished the top political leadership, introduced “real democracy” and created the Q(uisling) Muslim League. Over the past eight years Musharraf first imprisoned his prime minister, then removed his president, and appointed himself President, mutilated the constitution, set up the National Security Council, assumed dual office, got rid of two CJPs and several other judges, reduced parliament to a rump assembly, and has upto now installed three prime ministers, who matter not.
The judiciary sanctified it all, and is now finally being put to test. Faced with the consequences of thoughtless mishandling of the CJP affair, instead of adopting a political approach, as is expected of, in a democratic society, the government has adopted a confrontational attitude. Worst of all, aligning itself with an ethnic outfit, had reopened old wounds in Karachi, and alienated a vast majority of citizens. Now weakened help is being sought from the corps commanders and from Allah through the Imam-e-Kaaba. Against whom?
Every commander has hacked and chopped away at the constitutions and the democratic political system, and was allowed to do so, by judicial in-activism. Every time, the aroused and resilient citizens clawed their way back, only to be let down by those for whom they fought. It is very clear that denial of the right of the people to participate in the process of decision-making in the affairs of the state, has always backfired. Involvement of non-political personnel in high positions of governance, has invariably been counter-productive and detrimental to the interests and security of the state. Politics is too serious a business to be left to the generals, and such matters can best be dealt within a democratic political environment.
Even now it is not too late for the President General to reconsider and respond positively to defuse the ballooning current crisis, and to be different. Let things not be taken to the stage in which the Field Marshall found himself in February 1969, when the battered political leadership refused to sit and talk with him, and clueless, he had to go, leaving a mess behind. The political leadership should also realise the gravity of the situation and unitedly, regardless of personal ambitions, guide the ship of the state to safety and anchor.
The writer is former president, Lahore High Court Bar Association and a former judge of the Lahore High Court.

E-mail: aamertasnim@gmail.com

http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/jun-2007/6/columns3.php