Articles by Shaikh Aziz :A leaf from political and constitutional history of Pakistan
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: Zia’s referendum[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

In the aftermath of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), there was unrelenting pressure on Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) General Ziaul Haq to relinquish and transfer power. By the beginning of 1984, even the general’s friends in the army began pressing him to adopt certain measures which could help the country return to normalcy. It was time to act.

There were two schools of thought: the first favoured seeking legitimacy from the people for Gen Zia, and towards this end they wanted him to hold a referendum. The second opinion was to hold elections and hand over power to the elected representatives.

As always, Gen Zia was averse to holding elections; the general had made it abundantly clear that were his administration to go down that route, he favoured non-party elections. But before any polls, he insisted on holding a referendum to elicit people’s will.

When it was time to secure another five years for the general, his team tied his continuation in power to the salvation of Islam and the preservation of Pakistan
Political circles immediately opposed this suggestion, and reminded the general that it was him and his friends in the army who had opposed Bhutto’s decision to conduct a referendum during the PNA agitation. But elsewhere, there was growing support for the referendum option.

In a meeting of martial law administrators (MLAs) on Nov 6, 1984, it was resolved that the referendum would be held on Dec 19, 1984. Gen Zia announced the decision on Dec 1 to the general populace.

Now came the most crucial phase of the process: crafting the question that was to be put before the public.

This process required a tricky question, asking the voter whether they wanted to support Islamisation and, therefore, want Gen Zia to continue for another five years after Martial Law was lifted. What was eventually crafted linked the general to the salvation of Islam and preservation of Pakistan: “Do you endorse the process initiated by the President of Pakistan, General Mohammad Ziaul Haq, for bringing the laws of Pakistan in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and for the preservation of the ideology of Pakistan, and are you in favour of continuation and further consolidation of that process and for the smooth and orderly transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people.”

The question sought a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer — affirmative replies would mean support for Gen Zia to continue as president till 1990.

The martial law administrators all knew that if arrangements were not undertaken to get a ‘Yes’ vote, the scheme might backfire. The governors were therefore asked to do everything in their control to prop support for the general. Meanwhile, Gen Zia would undertake visits to all provincial capitals and also address the nation on radio and television.

In his address, Gen Zia announced that national identity cards would be a must for voting. But due to flawed policies, not all citizens possessed identity cards. The issue was re-examined by the officials concerned, and two days before polling, the condition of producing a national identity card to vote in the referendum was waived.

The MRD and other parties boycotted the referendum. Polling stations on the day wore a deserted look but when the results were announced, it was claimed that the general had bagged more than 60 per cent votes and was thus elected for another five years after the lifting of martial law.
The MRD and other parties boycotted the referendum. Polling stations on the day wore a deserted look but when the results were announced, it was claimed that the general had bagged more than 60 per cent votes and was thus elected for another five years after the lifting of martial law.

With his power seemingly reinforced, the general was now confronted by another promise he had made during the MRD campaign on Aug 12, 1983: conducting general elections in February 1985. Towards this end, began an exercise aimed at reducing the vote bank of the PPP and other leftist parties. He did not want any move which diluted his political philosophy.

[B]Source:[/B][URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1197376/a-leaf-from-history-zias-referendum"][B]A leaf from history: Zia’s referendum[/B][/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, August 2nd, 2015[/B]

August 9th, 2015
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]Elections held on non-party basis[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

In the early 1980 General Ziaul Haq was under pressure from his Western supporters to deal with human rights violation issues, including the cases of political activists.

The pressure had mounted since first Nusrat Bhutto in 1982 and then Benazir Bhutto in 1984 were released from detention and allowed to go abroad. Visiting London and the United States, Benazir talked to the media, human rights activists and politicians there about human rights violations by the military regime and stated that Gen Zia was not prepared to restore democracy in the country.

As she travelled through Western capitals, Gen Zia discussed with his team and some legal experts about the future political set-up of the country. After holding local bodies elections on non-party basis he thought that a similar experiment in the national politics would also bring change in the country.

Time proved him wrong.

The MRD movement had created in him a latent fear about his future. Though the movement had been crushed brutally, its force left Gen Zia with the feeling that one day this passion could outclass his wits and as Ayub Khan could not withstand the people’s wrath, he could also become its victim. This was another reason for him to think about restoring democracy in some weak and dubious form. The referendum had assured him of his rule for five years; now he could share some power with politicians and landed aristocrats.

He had indirectly agreed, in August 1983, to hold the elections on non-party basis, with an approximate date of March 1985. Perhaps he wanted to buy time to think of some ways to clamp restrictions on taking part in elections so that only new and inexperienced people could come to the parliament who would act as his yes men; he wanted a house which would need his leadership.

Such amendments to the Political Parties Act, 1962 are introduced that are obviously meant to keep the PPP and liberals away from polls
The PNA parties except Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and the PPP had refused to contest the polls, while the Muslim league faction led by Pir Sahib Pagara had decided to take part. The JI leadership had decided to participate in elections as its leader Tufail Ahmad was closely associated with the general. There was also a chance that Pir Pagara’s Muslim League would win sufficient number of seats to form a government. Gen Zia had a special regard for Pir Pagara, as in 1980 he had offered the general the platform of his faction of the Muslim League. But the general was not ready to make any compromises in a party set up.

On Jan 8, 1985, the Chief Martial Law Administer (CMLA) promulgated a Martial Law Order No 65 by which it was notified that the government could disqualify any person from taking part in politics; this was meant as a warning that the government was prepared to restrain any person whom it thought undesirable.

Two lawyers in his team, A.K. Brohi and Sharifuddin Pirzada, had been assigned the task of ensuring Zia’s continuation in power. They drew a long list of amendments which would disqualify almost all candidates belonging to the PPP and other liberal groups, who would like to contest despite their party’s decision to boycott.

The elections were held on Feb 25, 1985 on non-party basis, though some political parties allowed their members to contest the elections as independent candidates.
Such amendments in the Political Parties Act, 1962 were introduced that PPP leaders and activists, including former members or ministers, stood disqualified. For instance, the amended Political Parties Act implied that any person who had at any time after Dec 1, 1971, been an office-bearer or a member of the executive committee at the national or provincial setup of a party which had not been registered nor declared eligible to participate in elections by the Election Commission by Oct 11, 1979 stood disqualified for seven years to be elected as member of the National Assembly or a Provincial assembly.

Further, any person who had been a federal minister, minister of state, an adviser or provincial minister between Dec 1, 1971 and July 5, 1977 stood disqualified for seven years from participating in the elections. The very amendments provided guarantees to Gen Zia that no PPP supporter would reach any assembly.

The elections were held on Feb 25, 1985 on non-party basis, though some political parties allowed their members to contest the elections as independent candidates; after the elections some parties claimed winning a number of seats as the candidate had won due to their support. The election brought new faces belonging to the landed aristocracy and business tycoons.

There were different claims about the turnout of voters: official figures claimed a voter turnout at 53.71 per cent, while the political parties said it was not more than15pc. Four days later, elections to the provincial assemblies were also held. The elections brought hope that a house of politically elected members could also be hoped in future, and that the House could be tamed democratically.

With a separate electorate system, Gen Zia presumed that perhaps the minorities, especially the Hindus, supported the PPP and might have helped in bringing a few PPP supporters in the National Assembly. This would create a serious issue for Gen Zia.

[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, August 9th, 2015[/B]
[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1199038/elections-held-on-non-party-basis"]Elections held on non-party basis[/URL]

August 16th, 2015
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: Defacing the constitution[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

The results of the 1985 elections were not what General Ziaul Haq expected — a number of liberals managed to make it to the parliament, while many of his Shura members and ministers were defeated, indicating non-approval of his policies by his friends.

The next step was to find a prime minister in a parliament elected on non-party basis.

Accepting the outcome of the elections but not wanting to loosen his grip over the house, Gen Zia decided to seek legal help. His talented legal advisers, A.K. Brohi and Sharifuddin Pirzada, recommended undertaking a number of constitutional amendments to give him an umbrella. Gen Zia was bent on changing the character of the Constitution from parliamentarian to presidential. For this purpose, a long list of amendments was prepared and without going into details Gen Zia informed his Martial Law Administrators (MLAs) to authorise him to bring the required changes in the constitution for which, according to him, the Supreme Court had empowered him — a reference to the SC verdict in Nusrat Bhutto case on Nov 10, 1977.

On March 2, 1985, he issued The Revival of Constitution of 1973 Order (RCO). It changed 67 clauses and sections of 280 articles of the Constitution — largest number of amendments carried out in one day in the history of Pakistan. The purpose of the amendments was obviously to tailor the Constitution to suit Gen Zia and make him an all powerful president, by concentrating all powers of the parliament in one person.

To strengthen his rule and consolidate power in himself, Gen Zia amended the Constitution through the RCO and introduced the Eighth Amendment
Changing the basic character of the Constitution, the amendments altered the form of political set up from parliamentarian to presidential. Another change was the induction of Islamic provisions which he had pointed to on various occasions and were pronounced as Supreme Law. The most significant was the change of Preamble which reasserted sovereignty of Allah the Almighty in the body of the constitution. Addition of a new article (Article 2) in the Constitution gave Sharia Court the authority to strike out any law which it considered not in conformity with the basic tenets of Islam.

Under the 1973 Constitution the country had a parliamentary form of government with most powers vested in the Prime Minister, while the president was the constitutional head of the state; and that’s what Gen Zia disliked the most. By amendments in the Constitution he gave most of the executive powers to the president who could appoint and remove the prime minister, chiefs of the armed forces, provincial governors, judges of the superior courts, as well as authorised the president to dissolve the National Assembly without consulting the prime minister. The RCO also incorporated the referendum of 1984 which gave Gen Zia legitimacy to continue as president till 1990.

A glance at the amendments reveals the motive behind them. For instance, under the headline “Duties of Prime Minister in relation to President” it said: “It shall be the duty of the Prime Minister to communicate to the President all decisions of the cabinet relating to the administration of the affairs of the Federation and proposal for legislation; to furnish such information relating to the administration of the affairs of the Federation and proposals for legislation as the President may call for. At the commencement of each session of the Parliament the President shall address both houses assembled together.”

Under the headline “Exercise of executive authority of the Federation” it pronounced: the executive authority of the Federation shall vest in the President and shall be executed by him, either directly or through officers according to the Constitution. On the status of ministers and prime minister it said: “There shall be a cabinet of ministers with the Prime Minister at its head to aid and advice the President in the exercise of his powers. The Prime Minister shall hold office during the pleasure of the President.” About the conduct of business of federal government it said that all executive actions of the government shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the president. The president shall make rules for the allocation of and transaction of the Federal government.

The RCO also outlined the powers and limits of the chief ministers and governors. According to it the governor will pick a chief minister from among the members of the assembly, which will be approved by the president. Regarding the duties of chief ministers, the RCO mentioned similar duties for the CMs as were mentioned for the prime minister in relation to the president.

Gen Zia also thought it wise to draw clear lines for legislation — the basic function of the National Assembly. To ensure the continuation of his rule, he had amended the Constitution through the RCO but it needed a proper constitutional protection which was brought about in the form of the Eighth Amendment.

As advised by his legal consultants, Gen Zia sought constitutional cover for the decisions he took after he became Chief Martial Law Administrator and President; the RCO gave constitutional protection to all his presidential orders, martial law regulations and other actions taken by martial law authorities from July 5, 1977.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1200292/a-leaf-from-history-defacing-the-constitution"]A leaf from history: Defacing the constitution[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, August 16th, 2015[/B]

August 23rd, 2015
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: The battle for supremacy begins
[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]
Two days after the promulgation of the RCO (Revival of Constitution 1973 Order) on March 2, 1985, President General Ziaul Haq held a meeting with Martial Law Administrators (MLAs) to review the post-election situation and select a prime minister. Till then the names of Abdul Ghafoor Hoti, Mohammad Aslam Khattak, Mir Zafarullah Jamali, Illahi Bakhsh Soomro, Makhdoom Hassan Mahmood and Hamid Raza Gillani were being speculated on. The general told the meeting that initially the system would run under the umbrella of martial law and when it was lifted in December it would become part of the political administration.

According to the amendments in the Constitution, the president was to nominate a prime minister from the elected members.

The MLAs were of the opinion that since the last deposed prime minister (Z.A. Bhutto) was a Sindhi the new prime minister should also be from Sindh to remove the sense of persecustion. After discussion, the names of Illahi Bakhsh Soomro and Mohammad Khan Junejo were short-listed. The MLAs were of the view that Illahi Bakhsh Soomro bore more political weight than Junejo hence they would prefer him as the next prime minister. Before taking a final decision Gen Zia consulted Pir Sahib Pagara, whom he considered as his political mentor. Pir sahib said that if there was to be a prime minister from Sindh, he would be his man and suggested the name of Mohammad Khan Junejo. Thus the name of Illahi Bakhsh Soomro was dropped. When it became clear that Junejo was the next man, the MLAs were not happy; they wanted the general to have consulted them before changing their collective decision.

With an elected prime minister in office, Gen Zia tries to retain an upper hand
Mr Junejo was called at the President House on March 20, 1985 for a meeting where some senior military officers were also present. According to Gen Khalid Mahmud Arif, the meeting began on a sour note as Mr Junejo neither expressed his happiness nor thanked Gen Zia when the general enthusiastically told him: “I have decided to nominate you as Prime Minister of Pakistan.” A calm Junejo softly but resolutely asked: “Mr President, when do you plan to lift the martial law?” This apparently shocked the general who, keeping his cool, said in a casual way, “Martial Law is now in your support. It will help you to settle down in your high appointment. I will lift it whenever you are in control of the situation.” Junejo was a calm person who never showed any high ambitious when he was the communications minister with Gen Ayub Khan in the late 1950s and 1960s. But this time he thought of becoming a real prime minister, and from the moment Junejo questioned Zia about lifting the martial law he began thinking about his own future.

After taking oath, Mohammad Khan Junejo began to take control of affairs. The general too, grew wary and began to consider ways to keep his PM in check.

To block such moves which could possibly loosen his grip, Gen Zia once again sought the support of legal trickery. This time Law Minister Iqbal Ahmad Khan, perhaps in consultation with Attorney-General Aziz A. Munshi, on Sept 10, 1985 presented a bill before the House that aimed at reducing the parliament to Gen Zia’s rubber stamp. He had miscalculated the sense of law of the MNAs who threw away the bill, not wanting to even discuss or hear about it.

The Speaker found himself in a quandary. Some members were of the opinion that the bill should be sent back to the law minister with a note to reword it and present it in an objective manner keeping all democratic norms and respect for the elected house. The bill was reworded and presented again, though it was still not acceptable to the MNAs. The point of disagreement was its essence — that the president would have powers to dismiss the prime minister, dissolve the National Assembly at any time he felt that the government had lost confidence and there was a need of going back to the electorate.

The Eighth Amendment or Article 58 2(B) was a constitutional amendment which aimed at strengthening the authority of the president to dismiss the elected prime minister and dissolve the National Assembly and provincial assemblies “… if in his / her opinion, a situation has arisen in which the government of the federation cannot be carried on [out] in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and an appeal to the electorate is necessary.”

After taking oath, Mohammad Khan Junejo began to take control of affairs. The general too, grew wary and began to consider ways to keep his PM in check.
During Zia’s lifetime and after, the Amendment served the purpose of many individuals. The general himself was the first to use it for dismissing Junejo’s government on May 29, 1988 because Junejo wanted to act as an empowered prime minister. President Ghulam Ishaq used it to dismiss Benazir Bhutto’s government on Aug 6, 1990 and Nawaz Sharif’s government on April 18, 1993. The Supreme Court reinstated Nawaz Sharif but the political stalemate came to an end when both Ghulam Ishaq and prime minister Nawaz Sharif resigned.

Again in 1996 the Eighth Amendment was used to dismiss the government of Benazir Bhutto by president Farooq Ahmad Leghari who was from her own party.

Finally, in 1997 another constitutional amendment called the 13th Amendment gave the prime minister the power to repeal the Eighth Amendment. By the introduction of the 17th Amendment in 2003, the power to dissolve the National Assembly and check the misdeeds of the prime minister is now subject to the Supreme Court.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1201712/a-leaf-from-history-the-battle-for-supremacy-begins"]A leaf from history: The battle for supremacy begins[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, August 23rd, 2015[/B]

August 30, 2015
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: Battle of nerves[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

To take credit for restoring democracy, General Ziaul Haq decided to address the first session of the National Assembly that opened on March 23, 1985. The session was important on two counts: Gen Zia in his speech, while outlining his wishes and plans, drew limits for the new parliament with regard to legislation. He declared in clear terms that this was not a transfer of power from the military government to a civilian government, but was in fact a power-sharing arrangement where some powers of the military government would be shared with the civilian government. He also advised the members to retain their non-party identity.

However Mr Junejo in his speech also did not miss the chance to convey his intentions, saying categorically that martial law and democracy could not co-exist. This again was not liked by Gen Zia, though the National Assembly gave Prime Minister Junejo a unanimous vote of confidence. Junejo fired another salvo in his address to the Senate on July 6, saying that the civilian government cannot work properly under martial law and that it would not become a partner in prolonging martial law.

In the provinces, army-backed politicians were appointed as chief ministers. Mohammad Nawaz Sharif was named as Chief Minister Punjab and the general lent him full support, which led to him being labelled a remnant of martial law by opposition leaders after the complete restoration of democracy. Arbab Jahangir Khan, Ghaus Ali Shah and Mir Ghulam Qadir Alliani were elected as chief ministers in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then NWFP), Sindh and Balochistan respectively.

General Zia and Prime Minister Junejo engage in a power struggle
From his actions it was clear that Junejo was not content with ceremonial office and wanted to exercise all powers of the executive. Famed as a thorough gentleman he spent much time on administrative and financial issues and with time learnt how to deal with them without creating any hassles. His prime worry was to remove incompetent people from important positions of the government, improve the output of the administration and to curtail government expenses. To achieve this latter goal he even stopped offering food during cabinet meetings.

There were differences between Gen Zia and Prime Minister Junejo from day one but they were not the talk of the town, though the secretaries often faced an odd situation when they received two opposing orders on one subject from the President and the Prime Minister.

The election of the Speaker of the National Assembly was another occasion where Gen Zia thought he could prove his mettle. Among the members of the National Assembly there appeared to be three groups: one that supported Prime Minister Junejo; the other lending support to Gen Zia’s nominee and the third trying to remain independent. However, despite the house being elected on non-party basis a presence of Muslim League (Pagara, later Functional) could be felt. Junejo was trying to settle and prove that the elected house could act on its own and would never take dictation.

For Speaker, Gen Zia nominated Khwaja Mohammad Safdar who had earlier been nominated as chairman of the handpicked Majils-i-Shura. To gather support for his candidate, Gen Zia himself began meeting the MNAs and pressed them for getting Khwaja Safdar elected.

A small group of independent MNAs did not want Khwaja Safdar to be elected unopposed and began consultations among themselves. In fact, Syeda Abida Hussain was interested in contesting for Speaker but many members did not want to be presided over by a woman; finally they settled on the candidature of her husband Syed Fakhr Imam. The general, through Abdul Ghafoor Hoti, tried to make Syed Fakhr Imam withdraw and when just before the election Hoti made Fakhr Imam talk to Gen Zia on telephone, the general told him to desist from contesting the election and instead be content with some juicy ministry. Fakhr Imam simply refused to oblige.

After a few hours, Syed Fakhr Imam was elected as Speaker of the National Assembly.

This came as a shock to the general; nonetheless, he did not lose hope and decided to bring some kind of discipline in the National Assembly. The man who did not believe in party politics now thought of making some compromises and enter into some kind of political grouping, knowing that this was going to be a very queer experience for him. Journalist-author Azhar Suhail was of the opinion that the general was even prepared to form a kind of political group in consultation with Prime Minister Junejo which would be an official group within the assembly and would be obliged to support the prime minister and his policies, and prove to be a means to facilitate the system to resolve various problems. In actuality, Gen Zia wanted to form a group that was controlled by him, despite having the support of Junejo, the prime minister he disliked.

It was a strange situation; Junejo had to deal with a man who had dug himself deep during the past eight years and was still vying to continue as an unchallenged ruler. At the same time, the general decided to tame the man who entered politics in 1950s with another general, Ayub Khan, who had appointed him as communication minister, and now he was with an army chief who had enjoyed power for the past eight years.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1203154/a-leaf-from-history-battle-of-nerves"]A leaf from history: Battle of nerves[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, August 30th, 2015[/B]

September 6th, 2015
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: Junejo runs into the baboo brigade[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

As any prime minister worth his salt would do, Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo too began efforts to evolve a programme aimed at improving the country’s economy and social order — increasing the literacy ratio, enacting judicial reforms to dispense speedy justice, and bringing about an end to corruption, among other reforms.

To achieve this ambitious task, Junejo needed an honest bureaucracy and an apolitical administration on his side. But he was shocked to find both inimical to him; in an irony of sorts, this situation was created partly by him.

From the moment Junejo was sworn in as the premier, General Ziaul Haq had decided to keep him subservient. Even when making some amendments to the constitution, the general merely informed his colleagues of the changes that he deemed necessary to run the new democratic government smoothly. Then, in a meeting of martial law administrators on March 4, 1985, he revealed the names of ministers to be included in the federal cabinet, many of them his nominees. They included Dr Mahboobul Haq, Hamid Nasir Chathha, Aslam Khatak, Haji Hanif Tayyab, Prince Mohiyuddin Baloch, Khaqan Abbasi, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, Balakh Sher Mazari, Mir Ahmad Nawaz Bugti, General (rtd) Majid Malik, Qazi Abdul Majid Abid and Sardar Ghulam Mohammad Mahar.

Gen Zia unmoved by Parliamentary resolution to lift martial law
Junejo was a soft-spoken and cooperative person, and he decided to adopt peaceful means to run his administration. He believed that members of the parliament and federal ministers had a natural propensity of getting permits, plots and other personal gains. He, therefore, thought that keeping an eye over them would help him achieve his goals.

He was wrong.

Junejo had asked officers of the administration to keep a watchful eye on MNAs and ministers, and report their activities to him. But what transpired was that the bureaucracy exploited the prime minister at will. Along with actual follies members and ministers did commit, they also fed the prime minister fabricated stories, thereby creating a wedge between the MNAs and the prime minister.

The bureaucracy, of course, used this practice for personal gain; these machinations grew stronger by the day until the bureaucracy finally succeeded in its objective to prevail over Junejo. He began losing friendly ties with the parliamentarians, a folly no prime minister would commit in the backdrop of events he had been facing.

Meanwhile, with the restoration of the National Assembly, many MNAs wanted martial law to be lifted. Various attempts were made to convince Gen Zia to do so, but he was not prepared to relent. His only reply was that it would be lifted at its appropriate time.

Later, when Junejo informed the general about the apprehensions of the House, he assured the prime minister that he believed in the supremacy of the parliament. Gen Zia then addressed a joint press conference with the prime minister and reaffirmed his belief in the supremacy of the parliament.
On many occasions, Junejo spoke to Gen Zia about a timeframe for complete restoration of democracy, but the latter would only reply that he had already announced that martial law would be lifted when necessary. In a public meeting in Lahore, Junejo announced that martial law would be lifted before the new year set in, but he had not spoken to Gen Zia beforehand.

Later, when Junejo informed the general about the apprehensions of the House, he assured the prime minister that he believed in the supremacy of the parliament. Gen Zia then addressed a joint press conference with the prime minister and reaffirmed his belief in the supremacy of the parliament.

With the passage of time, there grew more than one group of MNAS who began meeting among themselves to discuss how to evolve a mechanism by which Gen Zia could be forced to lift the martial law. Maulana Gohar Rahman (Mansehra) was among them. He convinced other MNAs in forming two other groups to move the NA and pass a resolution demanding the military authorities to bring an end to the martial law.

After many long meetings and discussions, on May 26, 1985, three identical resolutions were placed before the National Assembly. The movers made long speeches in support of their resolutions and asserted that when the civilian rule had been restored there was no need of continuing martial law. After reading them, the house unanimously passed a resolution demanding an end to martial law.

It was generally believed that after the passage of the resolution, Gen Zia would be obliged to follow the house’s consensus. But it was later learnt that he had chalked out a schedule way back in 1983, when he announced on Aug 12 that after the elections he would lift the martial law before the end of the year. Four days later, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then NWFP) and the Punjab assemblies also passed similar resolutions calling upon the army to bring an end to martial law and return to the barracks.

Despite the resolutions, the general did not budge. In fact, he had long ago decided to assert himself as a powerful president while Mohammad Khan Junejo was also trying to settle down as an elected prime minister and make sure that he gets all privileges and powers that he deserved as prime minister. By temperament, Junejo was not a man to raise quarrels. He knew it was a hard task and could only be achieved by a slow process. Gen Zia too played the matter diplomatically, and waited till an appropriate moment to keep his upper hand and go unchallenged.

By promulgation of Revival of the Constitution (RCO), Gen Zia had already exercised his domination over the prime minister and the federal cabinet. He wanted to act in the style of a ruler with all imperial powers, which he had enjoyed for the past eight years. He was never bothered about the parliament’s will, either through a resolution or any other act.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1204714/a-leaf-from-history-junejo-runs-into-the-baboo-brigade"]A leaf from history: Junejo runs into the baboo brigade[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, September 6th, 2015[/B]

Sep 13, 2015
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: Junejo’s actions cause ripples[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

The National Assembly had come into being on non-party basis and no political activity or creation of political blocs was supposed to take place. However, after the election of Mohammed Khan Junejo as prime minister, it was being felt that the Muslim League was the ruling party. It was reported that as many as 40 members of the National Assembly joined the Muslim League to show support for the prime minister.

This was not acceptable to General Ziaul Haq who had, in his first address to the National Assembly, pressed the MNAs not to join any party and retain their independent identity. Some members such as Abdul Hamid Jatoi wanted to remain neutral; on the other hand since a treasury bench had been formed some members wanted to create an opposition bench, led by Jamaat-i-Islami which wanted to be officially assigned the role of opposition.

In the midst of this activity Dr Sher Afgan Niazi sent a reference to the Speaker to seek verdict regarding the members including Prime Minister Junejo, who had by then joined Muslim League led by Pir sahib Pagara. The Speaker sent the reference to the Chief Election Commissioner for his decision. Dr Sher Afgan, a medical doctor by profession and a simple man by nature perhaps did not weigh the significance of the reference which could have led to the disqualification of the members including Prime Minister Junejo. When Junejo came to know of this he informed Gen Zia who was already against the Speaker, Fakhr Imam. The general assured the prime minister that he would thwart any action by the CEC.

In order to exert his authority, prime minister Junejo takes certain actions that shock Gen Zia
Unhappy with the Speaker’s action, Junejo decided to replace him; in this regard he had Gen Zia’s support. At the same time Junejo was aware that Dr Mahboobul Haq, the finance minister, Iqbal Ahmad Khan, minister for law and parliamentary affairs, Mir Zafarullah Jamali and Aslam Khatak were ‘general’s men’ who would not support him at any cost, so he decided to relieve them as well.

Dr Mahboobul Haq was the first to go. He was a key person in the cabinet and at that time was pushing for normalisation of ties with India on equal terms. When Gen Zia visited India in December 1985 he was in favour of normalisation of ties with India as he thought it would boost Pakistan’s trade and economy, but India took a hard stand and placed its own agenda on the table. Dr Mahboobul Haq was also for closer ties but did not insist on the terms of agenda, which meant normalisation without touching the core issue of Kashmir. Prime Minister Junejo asked India that instead of treating Pakistan like a junior partner, it should treat it equally. He even got a resolution passed by the National Assembly in support of Kashmir. Dr Haq’s removal shocked Gen Zia.

Junejo also refused to grant extension in service to Vice Chief of Staff General K.M. Arif and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Rahimuddin. Though Gen Arif himself did not desire an extension, Gen Zia wanted him to stay as he trusted him the most; after all he was the master executioner of the July 5, 1977 coup. During his service Gen Arif had received quick promotions and had soon become a four-star general and now wanted to lead a quiet life focussing on his poetry.

Given Junejo’s background, his current actions created a storm. Soft-spoken Junejo was known for his calm temperament and non-violent nature, and had a clean political life. Hailing from the small town of Sindhri in eastern Sindh, Junejo had stepped into politics at a young age. During the Ayub Khan era he was elected as member of the National Assembly and held various positions including minister of health, local government, communications and railways. From the days of his railways ministry, his spiritual leader Pir Sahib Pagara used to call Junejo Railway Babu.

Supported by his spiritual leader, he thought of bringing decency in politics and restoring democracy in the country. It was a challenging task due to the constitutional amendments brought in by Gen Zia which had reduced the power of the prime minister. Junejo had set his mind to seek powers for an elected prime minister, though it finally cost him his government and dissolution of the five assemblies.

During his visit to the United States in July 1986 he was extended full support by the US. Reassured, on his return he removed many army and civilian officers who had been placed by Gen Zia at important positions. This came as a shock to Gen Zia, especially the removal of Secretary Information Ministry General Mujeebur Rahman.

Another serious shock suffered by Gen Zia was the removal of Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan as foreign minister, whom he had convinced to join the foreign ministry after the departure of Agha Shahi.

On Dec 31, 1985 Gen Zia lifted martial law and allowed political parties to function, but it made no change as Gen Zia had already dug deep and through various amendments made such constitutional changes that Junejo could hardly make any effect.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1206307/a-leaf-from-history-junejos-actions-cause-ripples"]A leaf from history: Junejo’s actions cause ripples[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, September 13th, 2015[/B]

Sep 20, 2015
 

[B][CENTER]A leaf from history: Bushra Zaidi’s killing and the riots in Karachi[/CENTER][/B]

The morning of April 15, 1985, seemed like any other... only that by the end of the day, Karachi had ground to a halt.

Two sisters, Najma and Bushra Zaidi, were travelling in a mini-bus that morning in Karachi. When the mini-bus reached Nazimabad Chowrangi, both decided to get off near the Sir Syed Girls College bus stop. Despite the bus being still in motion, the bus conductor asked the girls to hop off as the bus won’t come to a complete halt.

But as the women skipped off, they were hit by another bus that was travelling in the same lane. Najma fell and fainted but Bushra was overrun by the bus. The sisters were rushed to the nearby Abbasi Shaheed Hospital, where Najma was admitted to the hospital for medical treatment. But her 20-year-old sister, Bushra, was pronounced dead.

A single spark can start a fire — in Karachi, identity politics and squeezed resources take centre stage as the city grinds to a standstill
Meanwhile, their college mates rushed to the scene a few paces away from their college’s main gate. Students from the Nazimabad Boys College also reached there and began protesting. Soon, things turned ugly as students pelted stones at passing vehicular transport. Many mini-buses were torched too. By the time the police reached the spot, traffic had thinned while many buses had already been damaged. A number of students were injured and arrested.

As news of the rioting broke, the protest spread to the rest of the city, particularly in main city centres. The thrust of protests was on Golimar Chowrangi, Nazimabad, North Nazimabad and Liaquatabad, but protests were also being staged in Orangi and Banaras Colony. Many people from these vicinities had moved temporarily to their relatives in other areas of the town.

The army was soon summoned to restore order, with many areas of the city put under curfew. The next morning, as curfew restrictions relaxed, the protests resumed and spread to new areas of the city. Since reports said that the driver of the mini-bus which overran Bushra Zaidi was a Pashto-speaking driver, there were great apprehensions that rioting might take an ethnic turn.

Reports later confirmed that rioting had taken place in almost all localities inhabited by various ethnicities, including Pashto-speaking and Urdu-speaking people. Arson also claimed its toll on property. This trend was dangerous and the provincial administration faced a great dilemma in trying to protect the life and property of the citizens. The city had come to a standstill; business activity was left completely paralysed too.

In fact, the whole country had been left shaken by the effects of the riots. Long curfew hours had created shortage of foodstuff and medicines in affected areas. All educational institutions stayed shut for many days but rioting did not stop. The provincial government led by Syed Ghaus Ali Shah, a nominee of General Ziaul Haq, tried restoring peace but to no avail.

Protests in Karachi were not a new phenomenon, but this time, ethnic difference became a point of very sharp conflict. This sentiment was exploited by leaders of all communities. This meant that the government struggled to bring peace since it was difficult to bring all stakeholders to the table.
Protests in Karachi were not a new phenomenon, but this time, ethnic difference became a point of very sharp conflict. This sentiment was exploited by leaders of all communities. This meant that the government struggled to bring peace since it was difficult to bring all stakeholders to the table. The city had seen language rioting in 1972 but this time it had shown deeper ill-will.

With the number of casualties mounted, political leaders spoke their minds about bringing peace to the embattled city. Some saw the violence philosophically, but others wanted to identify fault lines in the city. A political party termed the incident a traffic accident like any other.

But very seldom was the issue seen in its true context. In fact, the phenomenon was rooted deep in the socio-economic milieu accumulated during the past three decades. The city had grown a serious kind of economic imbalance. The sentiment of diminishing economic resources had made things simmer.

The political leadership of the time knew that some day, these fault lines were going to blow up out of proportion. There was the need of evolving of a mechanism by which no such tragedy occurred in futire. Altaf Hussain, who had transformed All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organisation (APMSO) into Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), wanted a permanent solution to the issue.

The Federal government led by Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo could not fathom the gravity of the situation. Junejo was struggling to establish himself as a prime minister with powers, and could not guide the Sindh Chief Minister Syed Ghaus Ali Shah in resolving the grim situation.

With the chief minister overseeing efforts to broker peace, contact was finally established with various stakeholders. After agreeing on broad outlines of restoring peace, some trivial points were also heard. For example, the government had announced to pay remuneration for the dead and the injured, but some transporters wanted compensation for the damaged vehicles made earlier.

When the city finally ambled to normalcy, the official death toll stood at 50 while more than 300 had been injured.

Unofficial figures put the number of dead at 200. But Bushra’s death and the violence that ensued had brought many realities out in the open.

There were apprehensions though that below the surface, things were simmering again and could flare up again. A collective mistrust and fear for the unknown gripped the city. Some fears proved true, and a few ugly violent tragedies broke out again.

The temporary truce that had been brokered was exactly that: temporary. But for a long-term solution of Karachi, a group of socio-economists, sociologists and economic planners should have been formed to study the social fissures of Karachi and evolve a viable mechanism to create amity between Karachi’s ethnic communities again.


[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1207836/a-leaf-from-history-bushra-zaidis-killing-and-the-riots-in-karachi"]A leaf from history: Bushra Zaidi’s killing and the riots in Karachi[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, September 20th, 2015[/B]

September 25, 2015
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: Power shift: Eighth Amendment gives Zia complete clout[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

On Sept 10, 1985, Law and Parliamentary Affairs Minister Iqbal Ahmad Khan tabled a draft bill which elicited an unprecedented uproar in the parliament. This was the draft of the bill called the Eighth Amendment.

On the face of it, this amendment was aimed at bringing about a ‘balance of power’ by empowering the President to dissolve the National Assembly, dismiss the prime minister and provincial governments, and order them to seek a fresh mandate.

But it did much more: the amendment changed the system of governance from parliamentary democracy to presidential and made the prime minister subservient to the president.

It aimed at minimising the status of the parliament, office of the prime minister, cabinet and other institutions. Without the president’s permission, the prime minister could not do anything. And in case of any disagreement, the president could dismiss the prime minister and his government and dissolve the assemblies.

All actions of the martial law government since July 5, 1977 takeover indemnified through an act of Parliament
These changes weren’t ceremonial either. Three years later, on May 29, 1988, General Ziaul Haq proved that he had intended to deploy the amendment when he developed a disagreement with the prime minister. Junejo’s government was summarily dismissed and the assemblies dissolved.

Other anomalies in the draft bill included the act of approving all actions of the martial law government taken from July 5, 1977, including the July 5 proclamation under which the civilian government was overthrown and martial law was promulgated. Similarly, all ordinances and martial law orders issued by the general over the past eight years as well as decisions of the military courts were to be legalised.

When the bill was tabled, it created uproar within the National Assembly. Members of the Assembly were not prepared even to talk about it, and termed the proposed amendment as tantamount to signing their death warrants.

This opposition shocked the presidential camp. Having assessed the mood of the MNAs, they began making efforts to hold meetings with a number of them to chalk out some way forward. Were the bill to not go through, there was a possibility that the general might have dissolved the National Assembly and sent everything packing.

With a conflict brewing, some senior politicians warned the sitting MNAs about what they could face at the hands of the general. Now the whole fiasco centred around a possible ‘give-and-take’ proposition. More meetings were held but they too ended without conclusion. Prime Minister Junejo then formed a committee with both liberal and right-wing elements, but they too could not settle on an acceptable solution.

When the bill was tabled, it created uproar within the National Assembly. Members of the Assembly were not prepared even to talk about it, and termed the proposed amendment as tantamount to signing their death warrants.
The situation on Independence Day also reinforced misgivings.

Gen Zia wanted to celebrate the day with extra fanfare. He announced that the Independence Day parade would be held at the capital, and he’d be taking the salute. PM Junejo also wanted to be there but he immediately got a message that according to the amended Constitution, only the head of the state (Gen Zia) was entitled to take the salute while the chief executive was not entitled. To pacify himself, Junejo asked his party to hold a public meeting in Lahore, where he would address the audience as the chief guest.

With a stalemate having developed, Gen Zia discussed the situation with his ministers who had told him about the MNAs’ mood, and advised them to withdraw the draft bill and replace it with a new one. After a week, the first draft bill was withdrawn and another draft bill was tabled before the House.

Although no significant changes were made in the second draft, it had a softer tone. It took many days to debate the second draft, however, it was passed on Oct 17, 1985, after some reports of ‘special messages’ to the groups of active members.

The Amendment changed, amended and revoked 19 clauses of the supreme law of the land. Through the amendment the status of prime minister was relegated to the lowest ebb. In simple words he had become a subordinate to the president.

The president was given the power to nominate the prime minister, provincial governors, judges of the high courts and Supreme Court, as well as the chiefs of armed forces. The prime minister now needed to inform the president about administrative affairs decisions and any suggestions for legislation. The president was authorised to ask the prime minister to seek a vote of confidence, promulgate ordinances and take other administrative measures. He could also ask the prime minister to hold a referendum on some thorny issues. The number of members in the National Assembly was also increased from 200 to 207.

The most important act of the Eighth Amendment was that the parliament indemnified all orders, ordinances and martial law regulations issued by the President, ratified the referendum, and the orders issued from July 5, 1977 (including the proclamation of martial law) to Sept 13, 1985. This was the main result Gen Zia wanted to attain.

The spectre of this Amendment loomed long after Zia’s death, as four successive democratic governments were dissolved under Article 58-2B. In April 1997, the Mian Nawaz Sharif government got the 13th Amendment passed unanimously by the parliament and scrapped the Article 58-2B, thereby restoring the supremacy and status of prime minister and the parliament.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1209067/a-leaf-from-history-power-shift-eighth-amendment-gives-zia-complete-clout"]A leaf from history: Power shift: Eighth Amendment gives Zia complete clout[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, September 25th, 2015[/B]

October 4th, 2015
 

[CENTER][B][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: Benazir returns from exile[/SIZE][/B][/CENTER]

For the jiyalas of Lahore, April 10, 1986 was a celebration: after over two years in exile, having left Pakistan on January 10, 1984, Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) Chairperson Benazir Bhutto was returning to Pakistan and landing in their city. Amidst the tussle between President General Ziaul Haq and Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, an old foe was back.

Before departing London for Lahore, Benazir had already sent a message to the Pakistani leadership through a statement issued in the Times of London. She said that she did not believe in the politics of revenge; rather, she was returning to have democracy restored and to work towards building the country afresh.

But her arrival in Lahore drew a huge crowd of PPP supporters to receive her. After staying in Lahore for a day, she travelled to various towns in Punjab and addressed large gatherings. This sent a clear message to Gen Zia, who did not want any political activity at that point since he had already held polls on non-party basis and was locked in a battle with PM Junejo over the restoration of political parties.

Soon enough, the general began consulting colleagues on how to deal with two opponents at the same time: PM Junejo and PPP chairperson Benazir Bhutto.

A month after arriving in Lahore, Benazir arrived in Karachi on May 3, 1986 to a rapturous response. Her reception procession took eight hours to reach the public meeting venue near Quaid-i-Azam mausoleum from Karachi airport. The general did not waste any time and issued a statement warning the PPP leadership that if any confrontation took place, he would clamp down with another martial law that would be stiffer than the previous one.

Soon enough, the general began consulting colleagues on how to deal with two opponents at the same time: PM Junejo and PPP chairperson Benazir Bhutto.
From the next day, Benazir began meeting party leaders. It appeared that she wanted to reorganise the PPP on a pattern that met the demands of the new political atmosphere and infused people with a sense of confidence in democracy. She knew that her workers were the asset of the party, but she was also aware of the ‘uncles’ who wanted her to toe their line.

Nonetheless, this was a changed Benazir, who knew perfectly what to do and which end to meet. The trials and tribulations of the past decade had taught her much. She knew the way to struggle and how to survive.

Benazir decided to celebrate Independence Day on August 13 and 14 in a befitting manner. The Sindh government received reports that she might undertake a detailed tour of the province, and it subsequently banned her movement while she was still in Karachi.

Nonetheless, Benazir had made alternative plans to address a public meeting on August 14 at the Kikri Ground in Lyari. That too was banned under Section 144; in fact, any meeting of more than five people was prohibited in Karachi and many other districts of Sindh.

Meanwhile, PM Junejo was making his efforts to manage various government departments. He sought details of the ongoing talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan through United Nations. Till then, the Afghanistan issue was being handled solely by Gen Zia, who considered it a great personal service to Islam.

On the insistence of the United States (US), the United Nations (UN) had passed a resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and return of democracy. In June 1982, Diego Cordovez was appointed as the personal representative of the UN secretary-general, with the sole purpose of pushing through talks about Afghanistan.

Discussions began the same month in Geneva. Indirect talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan were also held at various intervals. To facilitate the talks, an office of the UN was established, called the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP).

During the process, the more serious elements of the talks were handled by Nawabzadah Yaqoob Ali Khan. But after Junejo took over as prime minister, he was relieved and Zain Noorani was appointed the minister of state for external affairs. Since Junejo wanted to have his hold on defence and foreign ministries, he took complete charge of both.

Before Junejo’s entry, the general had made Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief Lieutenant-General Akhtar Abdur Rahman as the head of the Afghan issue. But Junejo did not try to interfere in technical issues such as guerrilla training to Afghan Mujahideen or arms supply from the US and other sources — these matters continued to be handled by the ISI chief. The prime minister, however, kept himself abreast of all developments and the flow of financial assistance received for waging armed struggle against the Soviet Union.

Till the end of 1986, talks were moving in the right direction. Junejo wanted a quick withdrawal of Soviet troops, as he hoped that it would satisfy the US and its allies, Saudi Arabia, and other friendly countries. During the process, he had developed a kind of confidence that if he succeeded in brokering Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, it would also grant him support to continue in power for another term.

Gen Zia could read Junejo well, but he also wanted his name to be written in the annals of history if the accord was reached at according to his wishes. The general believed that any Soviet exodus would lead to him being remembered as a true mujahid.

In late 1987, a year before Junejo’s dismissal, Junejo was informed by the Soviet Union that they wanted to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan and complete the process in the next year. Similar information was also received from the US.

This was a welcome development and all stakeholders began preparations to finalise the terms and conditions of withdrawing that were to be placed before the Soviet Union. This is where Gen Zia and PM Junejo held opposing views— not on the very point of withdrawing all troops, but on what measures should be taken next to ensure that a peaceful Afghanistan emerged out of a devastating war.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1210249/a-leaf-from-history-benazir-returns-from-exile"]A leaf from history: Benazir returns from exile[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, October 4th, 2015[/B]

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: Junejo’s austerity in vain[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

After Benazir Bhutto’s return from exile, General Ziaul Haq had assigned Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo the task of facing the PPP chief in her tirade against the government. But Junejo could not accomplish the assignment, and the general thought that perhaps Junejo too had joined forces with Benazir.

In truth, Junejo was struggling to assert himself as an elected prime minister — his mission to strengthen the roots of democracy was being compromised by the sheer disregard shown by the bureaucracy and military officers.

In the budget for 1987-88, for example, Junejo sought to introduce austerity in governance. He scrapped the head of purchasing new, big and imported cars for official use and for officers who had been entitled to them. Under the scheme of austerity, he ordered that all officers who were entitled to use cars would now use locally-assembled Suzuki cars instead of imported cars.

No doubt this decision brought huge savings to the national exchequer, but it angered the officers group. The army officers, showing disregard for Junejo’s wishes, preferred to use old jeeps instead. This summed up Junejo’s travails: a prime minister whose wings had been clipped by the Eighth Amendment.

With the Prime minister desperately trying to assert his authority, parliament too is rebuffed in its efforts to debate Gen Zia’s extension of tenure
Junejo came from a modest feudal family of Sanghar, Having experienced local politics for some time, he joined the mainstream in 1958 when the former military ruler General Ayub Khan appointed him as the federal communications minister. A thorough gentleman, he possessed a reputation of unquestionable integrity. A true disciplinarian, he retained this credit throughout his political career. A follower of Pir Pagara, he had no illusion about his ability to rid society of corruption.

Pir Pagara’ advice to appoint him as prime minister was based on Junejo’s past record, but unfortunately, Gen Zia did not subscribe to the PM’s views on restoring political parties within the house. Certain actions undertaken by Junejo had pointed to his intention of working independently, which in turn, earned him the general’s annoyance.

But Junejo was resolute on trying, again and again.

For the PM, the arrival of Benazir Bhutto was a political development that could be helpful in advancing the effort to restore democracy. But in the backdrop of the prevailing situation, it required concerted efforts else many feared that Gen Zia would send the parliament packing. Unfortunately for Junejo, his hope to secure Benazir’s support was also shattered as there were clear ideological differences between the two.

Meanwhile, Benazir continued meeting with political party leaders and some like-minded figures who wanted to exchange views about a future course of action. Most PPP workers poured in to extend their condolences on Bhutto’s demise, but simultaneously, they also rededicated their efforts to evolve a workable strategy in the changed political environment.

Junejo came from a modest feudal family of Sanghar, Having experienced local politics for some time, he joined the mainstream in 1958 when the former military ruler General Ayub Khan appointed him as the federal communications minister. A thorough gentleman, he possessed a reputation of unquestionable integrity.
On Aug 10, 1986, nine leaders of the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) called on Benazir at her Clifton residence. It was a meeting held after six years and there was enough to discuss. The foremost point on the agenda was national elections. They decided that whenever polls were held, the opposition would take part in them. It appeared that Benazir was prepared to extend her cooperation to other political forces in the form of a larger alliance if it became possible.

On Aug 14, Benazir slipped into Lyari, a bastion of PPP, for Independence Day celebrations. Her supporters thronged her from all over, and soon, a huge crowd turned into a public meeting. A large contingent of police interrupted the gathering and baton charged those present. Many were injured and over 1,000 arrested.

After the meeting was over, Benazir Bhutto was detained for one month. Rallies were immediately banned including in Sindh towns.

On the same day, PPP supporters also staged protest processions in Lahore and some towns of Sindh. After some pitched battles with the police, six protesters died in Lahore while another 16 lost their lives in Sindh. This turned the situation very ugly; as more deaths and injuries were reported in Sindh following protests in towns large and small.

On Aug 23, the government ordered registering a sedition case against her and nine other activists. However, she was released on Sept 9, 1986, after there was no letting up in protests.

Meanwhile, in the National Assembly, the Independent Political Group pushed a bill for debate in the house about the reported extension of the service of Gen Zia as army chief. But it was ruled out of order, as according to the 1984 referendum, the President had been elected for five years, till 1990, which included his service as chief of the army staff.

If it wasn’t clear before, it became patently obvious that since provincial chief ministers were direct nominees of the President, he was de facto master of the entire governance team. This is how the federation became subservient to one person; it took two decades to redress the balance.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1211933/a-leaf-from-history-junejos-austerity-in-vain"]A leaf from history: Junejo’s austerity in vain[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, October 11th, 2015[/B]

October 18, 2015
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: The botched Pan Am plane hijacking at Karachi airport[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

On the calm, humid early morning of Sept 6, 1986, a division of Pakistani commandoes stormed a hijacked Pan Am aircraft at the Karachi airport. Six hijackers were arrested, all of whom belonged to Abu Nidal, a Palestinian group struggling to create an independent Palestinian state.

The five hijackers — Zayed Hassan Abdul Latif Safarini (leader), Wadoud Mohammad Hafiz Alturki, Jamal Saeed, Mohammad Abdullah Khalil Hassan Rahayat and Mohammad Ahmad Al-Munawar — were arrested and later awarded life sentenced.

The aircraft was a regular Pan American World Airways 747-121, which had left India’s Sahar airport near Mumbai a day earlier for an onwards journey to Frankfurt, Germany and was to culminate at the John F. Kennedy Airport, New York. Carrying some 360 passengers, it had landed flawlessly at the Karachi airport to pick up some passengers, and now, the aircraft crew was preparing to take off.

Palestinian militant group Abu Nidal attempts to capture an aircraft to attack the Israeli defence ministry
Before the flight could take off, at around 6.00am, a van seemingly belonging to the airport’s security guards was parked besides the plane. Four men dressed in security guards uniform frisked out and stormed into the plane. They were armed with assault rifles and after entering, immediately began firing at passengers who were busy locating their seats and placing their luggage.

Someone from the cabin crew became suspicious and informed the cockpit crew, who fled without wasting a second, leaving the passengers and other crew members at the mercy of hijackers. Those who escaped included the pilot, co-pilot and flight engineer.

Upon hearing that the cockpit team had managed to flee, the ring leader flew into a rage. All his plans had dashed. In that state, he summoned a young man at random, later known as Rajesh Kumar, spoke to him, shot him dead and threw his body on the tarmac.

Out in the main building of the airport, some officers were busy in chalking out the strategy of how to handle the situation. They soon sent an SOS to the respective quarters, and within no time, the Shaheen Contingent of the 1st Battalion of the Army’s SS Group was dispatched to take care of the matter.

As Safarini continued to find a way out, much time was wasted. As night began to fall, all hijackers became confused and jittery. During the unmanageable movement of passengers, someone even tried to open an emergency exit of the aircraft in an attempt to escape. But there was no way out.

Safarini started collecting passengers’ passports so that American and British citizens could be ascertained. While sifting through the passports, Safarini called out the name of John Thexton, an Englishman, who had arrived in Pakistan on a mountaineering expedition. His brother, Pete, had also arrived with him but while climbing Broad peak, he died and was buried there.

For a long time, Thexton was asked to lie at the feet of his captors. He thought at the time that perhaps he was the next to be killed and thrown on the tarmac. It was only when Pakistani troops took control of the plane that he could get up.

Meanwhile, Safarini had become even more unsettled. At one stage, in a bid to blow up the plane, he also shot at an ammunition bag that the hijackers had brought along with them, but he missed his target. In the midst of this mess, the aircraft lost electric power, plunging the plane into darkness. This infuriated Safarini even more, and he began throwing grenades into the passengers’ seating area.

Amidst the commotion, one flight attendant managed to open an exit that had a slide shoot already rolled out. Passengers began escaping through it. Safarini began wildly shooting at passengers to stop them, but a flight attendant, Neerja Bhanot, became a human shield to three children whom Safarini wanted to target. She died while saving the children. The captors did not want to kill any more passengers on the runway but demanded that they be provided with cockpit crew so that they could accomplish their objectives. Obviously, this was a ridiculously foolish demand.

While passengers were fleeing through the slide shoot, Pakistani commandos rushed in. Seeing no chance to escape, all five hijackers surrendered. As the dust settled, it was learnt that in all 20 passengers were killed, including 12 Indians, the rest from USA, Mexico and Pakistan. Out of a total 380 passengers, 150 were wounded while the rest stayed safe.

“I do not like this killing,” said Safarini in a brief talk after being arrested. “I would like to go out dancing, go out with women, but the Americans and Israelis have stolen my country and without my country, these things are no good.”

During investigations, Safarini confessed that he belonged to the Abu Nidal group and their botched attempt was to take the aircraft and attack the Israeli defence ministry using the plane as bomb.

On July 6, 1988, a Pakistani court sentenced all of them to life imprisonment. After completing their jail terms, they were released but Safarini was later arrested in Bangkok by the FBI and taken to New York, where on May 13, 2005 he was sentenced to 160 years in jail.

While the group leader Safarini was recaptured by the United States, the four others could not be traced down after they were released on the completion of their punishment. Out of the four, Jamal Saeed Abdur Rahim is said to have been killed in a drone attack on tribal areas of Pakistan in 2010, but Abu Nidal organisation did not confirm him as its member.

Abu Nidal was formed in 1974 after a split appeared in Yaser Arafat’s Palestinian Liberation Front (PLO). The creation of the group was due to the Arafat’s policy of reconciliation, whereas Abu Nidal believed in military struggle against Israel.

Following this policy, the group made several attacks on its mother organistaion, the PLO. It is believed that PLO leader Abu Iyad and Abu Hul were killed in Tunis in 1991. It also claimed to have killed a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon in 1994. The group also failed to attack and kill Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas. In all, they are said to have undertaken attacks in 20 countries, killing some 900 people. Sabri Khalil al-Banna or Abu Nidal, the chief of the organisation, returned to Iraq in 2002, where he died during an exchange of fire with Iraqi intelligence officers.

[B]Source:[/B][URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1213529/a-leaf-from-history-the-botched-pan-am-plane-hijacking-at-karachi-airport"] A leaf from history: The botched Pan Am plane hijacking at Karachi airport[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, October 18th, 2015[/B]

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: Ghaus’ Karachi operation stokes more violence[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

Karachi was living a tetchy peace since the April 1985 rioting after Bushra Zaidi was killed in a road accident. A year later, it dawned upon Sindh Chief Minister Syed Ghaus Ali Shah and provincial authorities that they needed to cleanse the metropolis of narcotics and gun-running business. In theory, it was a good idea; but its timing was wrong and the absence of planning abominable.

On December 12, 1986, Sindh Governor Lieutenant-General Jahandad Khan ordered a police operation against suspected narcotic dens and gun-running houses in the metropolis. The centre of action was Sohrab Goth, one of the two vital gateways of the town.

The raiding team initiated the task under Deputy Commissioner Sardar Ahmad, Sindh IGP, Karachi DIG, and Karachi Corps Commander Lieutenant-General Ahmad Shamim Khan besides a number of officials belonging to anti-land-encroachment department.

During the police action, a number of houses were demolished. The government believed that these houses served as centres of production and sale of heroin and other drugs. Many alleged that it was from here that the distribution for retail of these commodities was being undertaken. Encroachers were asked to vacate the occupied land from around Al-Asif Square and move to a new plot on National Highway.

Coloured by accusations of ethnic bias, an anti-encroachment drive turns the city into a raging battlefield again
When the raiding team reached the venue for action, they were reportedly received with bullets. However, the raiding team which had brought bulldozers with them demolished the structures. Occupants were asked to shift to some other space, which would be legalised later.

After the action, the team claimed moderate success. “One Kalashnikov, 2,000 rounds of ammunition and 65kg of heroin were recovered from what is considered to be one of the most important transit posts in the international heroin trade. A high level leak is suspected to be the cause for the failure,” reported Dawn on December 13, 1986.

Since Afghan refugees also stayed in this area, there arose some anguish among them. The Pakhtun community too developed a feeling that the unsuccessful raid over Sohrab Goth had been instigated by Urdu-speaking residents of these settlements. On, the next day, December 13, 1986, announcements were made from mosques in the Pakhtun-populated areas that the raid was, in fact, an attack on Pakhtuns.

Protests by Pakhtuns had already begun and to quell any violent uprising, the army’s support was sought. Patrolling intensified and to meet any eventuality army units were deployed in all sensitive areas with special attention on Aligarh and Qasba colonies.

On December 14, ethnic violence erupted between Pakhtun settlers and Urdu-speaking residents in Aligarh and Qasba colonies, near the Orangi Township area. Many houses were set on fire. Similar tragedy happened in parts of Orangi Town. The firing continued for many hours. This was among the most horrifying acts of terror in Karachi’s history.

As in the case of Bushra Zaidi’s killing, rioting soon spread to all parts of Karachi within no time, bringing the city to a standstill. Reports brought forth many inhuman details of savagery while the government could hardly do anything as casualties and loss of property simply mounted. These gory events drew the deployment of army units in the city and curfew was imposed in almost two-thirds of the metropolis.

Encroachers were asked to vacate the occupied land from around Al-Asif Square and move to a new plot on National Highway. When the raiding team reached the venue for action, they were reportedly received with bullets. However, the raiding team which had brought bulldozers with them demolished the structures.
Prolonged curfew created chaos and fear to such levels that people began fleeing to safer places and temporarily taking refuge with relatives and friends. The city faced shortage of food and medicines. Curfew breaks were used by the stranded people to fetch food items and medicines. The worst-affected were children whose essential supplies had exhausted. Political and social welfare bodies made appeals to the authorities to give longer breaks in the curfew so that food and medicines could be re-stocked.

On December 20, after a reported death toll of 166 people (some sources put the toll at 400), Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo asked his cabinet to quit and allow him to take action aimed at bringing peace to the metropolitan. All 22 federal ministers and 12 ministers of state resigned. An inquiry committee headed by former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Justice Sajjad Ali Shah termed it “the worst kind of massacre,” and laid the blame at the feet of the government.

For Karachi, this was more than brutality causing death and misery to innocent people — ethnic friction that had been simmering for quite some time now rose to the fore. Many observers believed that after the Bushra Zaidi violence, its recurrence could have been prevented by getting all opinion leaders together, ponder over the situation, find out the causes and take remedial measures.

As time passed and law-enforcement agencies kept a close watch, some leaders callously claimed that this episode too was an issue of law and order. They were absolutely mistaken. The rulers still knew nothing of what to do next. Prime Minister Junejo could not do much either.

In the backdrop of these grave barbaric events, some saner elements came out with the advice that it was not a question of rage against the killers of Bushra Zaidi; it was essentially a question of economic disparity and the uneven distribution of Karachi’s resources vis-a-vis the rest of Sindh that bred violence in Karachi. Tragically, nobody in power took the advice seriously.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1215093/a-leaf-from-history-ghaus-karachi-operation-stokes-more-violence"]A leaf from history: Ghaus’ Karachi operation stokes more violence[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, October 25th, 2015[/B]

November 1st, 2015
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: Junejo satisfied over US response[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

Mohammed Khan Junejo taking oath as prime minister on March 23, 1985 soothed some anxieties in the minds of the democratic forces, yet martial law was not lifted for which they had to wait till December 30 — the date proposed by General Ziaul Haq for lifting martial law — which was by then the longest in the country’s history. Though the general had pledged 90 days, it took him more than eight years to fulfil his promise. On Dec 30, the president addressed the Assembly and announced the lifting of martial law. This was the only fulfilled promise out of the many that the general had made.

In the background of events of the last eight years, lifting of martial law and return to democracy (in whatever form it was restored) was a welcome development, but doubts persisted in the House and outside: Gen Zia was still the President and Chief of Army Staff, armed with a draconian law i.e. Article 58 (2) b. The fears proved to be true when Junejo’s government was dismissed later. In his address, Gen Zia spoke about various aspects of governance he had learnt during his dictatorial rule, and asked the members to retain their independent character. Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo in his address called upon the members to create unity so that a democratic system could take firm roots.

Many had thought that Mohammad Khan Junejo, after being appointed prime minster, would act in a manner typical of a feudal lord as he belonged to the feudal class. However, Junejo’s approach and dignified attitude proved them wrong.

He was a man of integrity and clean politics, and a democratic person; he had entered politics at the age of 22, influenced by his family which had been in local politics for long. As a young man, Mohammad Khan Junejo had a broader vision and, unlike politicians belonging to the feudal class, he wanted to be a reformer and pioneer of social change. He had joined Pakistan Muslim League, a party to which he continued his association till his last. In the 1960s he had held important portfolios under Ayub Khan and served with honesty — a virtue rarely found in Pakistan’s political culture.

Washington secures assurance on nuclear arms and Afghan issue
Much later, when Gen Zia visited Pir Pagara, whom he considered his spiritual mentor, to discuss the future premier, Junejo’s name was on his list along with one other name. Pir Sahib frankly told the general that if the prime minister had to be from Sindh, it would be his man, thus Junejo became his final choice.

From the first handshake Gen Zia felt the difference. Mohammad Khan Junejo asked for everything he felt was for a prime minister, including the Falcon, the aircraft Bhutto used for his official visits. By taking over ministries of defence and foreign affairs, Junejo made it clear to the president that he wanted to make democracy a functional mode of governance. He even made it clear to the foreign office that foreign visits were not the task of the president but the prime minister and virtually had many foreign visits cancelled which were to be undertaken by Gen Zia.

In this regard, the US visit presented Junejo a great opportunity to prove his statesmanship. The US government was looking forward to new vistas of talks and mutual cooperation for its own agenda. On July 14, 1986 Junejo led a team of officials and experts on various subjects to the US.

After receiving a state welcome, Prime Minister Junejo and President Reagan had a detailed discussion. At the State reception in the White House, Reagan announced that his conversation with Junejo was upbeat, cordial and productive.

The US government wanted an understanding on two other important issues which were accomplished as desired. Junejo made it clear that Pakistan did not have any nuclear devices but wanted to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. More pertinent expression came at the State dinner where Prime Minister Junejo said that Pakistan had offered many ideas to solve this issue. Most important being that Pakistan was prepared to renounce all nuclear weapons in the region if India also did the same. Since the US was aware the Indian stance on nuclear issues therefore Junejo’s approach was appreciated.

His week-long visit was quite hectic. Talks were held on important issues, including Afghanistan and Pakistan’s role in ousting the Russians being of the central importance; perhaps the US government wanted to show that its first priority was the establishment of a civilian government in Pakistan. In a diplomatic manner Junejo made it clear to President Reagan that the ties needed two-way system which was accepted without reservation. In the light of past experience, the US wanted an assurance that Junejo government would not take any such decision which could hurt US-Pakistan ties. The most important achievement was the US support for Junejo government and emphasis on strengthening of ties even after the anti-Russian operation, including economic assistance that had been affected by war in Afghanistan and the expenses to retain millions of Afghan refugees.

Apart from a major meeting between Junejo and Reagan, many other meetings were held by officials from both sides to sort out development programmes and assistance, and the drug route through Pakistan, which he clarified, was the result of the Afghanistan issue and Pakistan was the worst victim.

On its return, the Pakistani team appeared satisfied. Gen Zia who was following the visit in detail was not happy to find Junejo triumphant and could not help making a sarcastic remark: “Ye daura kahin us ka sar na ghumaday.” (Hopefully this visit would not get to his head). No doubt Junejo had made a calculated visit for political gains but perhaps he had forgotten the Eighth Amendment which was still there. And the general’s reaction was evident when he remarked that someone should tell him that he could no longer stay as prime minister till he earned the generals’ support.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1216431/a-leaf-from-history-junejo-satisfied-over-us-response"]A leaf from history: Junejo satisfied over US response[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, November 1st, 2015[/B]

08-11-2015
 

[CENTER][SIZE="4"][B]A leaf from history: Target: Pakistani nukes[/B][/SIZE][/CENTER]

In the middle of 1986, when Pakistan was heavily occupied in internal matters, reports from across the border emerged that India was organising a major military exercise in Rajasthan, adjacent to the border with Pakistan. In Islamabad, the alarm bells began sounding off — was Pakistan in danger? ‹ The war exercise, named Operation Brasstacks, was being led by General Krishnaswamy Sundarji, an officer who had led an infantry division in the 1971 war. Apart from the Indian army, the navy and air force were also taking part in the war exercise. According to the plan, the exercise was to begin in 1986 and end in 1987. While India claimed that these war games were merely to test and experiment with new concepts in warfare, about 600,000 troops had been amassed near the border, along with a large number of equipment and ammunition. These exercises were later described as “bigger than any NATO exercise and the biggest since World War II.” In his memoirs, veteran Indian soldier Lt Gen P.N. Hoon, who fought against Pakistan in the 1965 war, described the war games as having a larger objective. “[Operation] Brasstacks was no military exercise. It was a plan to build up the situation for a fourth war with Pakistan,” he wrote.

This perspective is lent weight in a report compiled by Global Security Inc: “Operation Brasstacks was tasked with two objectives: the initial goal was the deployment of ground troops. The other objective was to conduct a series of assault exercises by the Indian navy near the Pakistan naval base ... An amphibious assault group formed from Indian naval forces was planned and deployed near the Korangi Creek of Karachi Division of Pakistan. However, the most important aim of these war alert simulations was to determine tactical nuclear strategy overseen by the Indian Army.”

In the backdrop of historical Pakistan-India ties, the Indian military exercise was deemed as alarming for Pakistan. Some considered these war game as a threatening show of force at a very critical juncture in Pakistan-India relations. Independent observers viewed these war games as a psychological move to convey to Pakistan the superior strength of Indian nuclear capability. Some also considered it a plan to infiltrate densely populated areas inside Pakistani territory. “General Sunderji’s strategy was to provoke Pakistan’s response, and this would provide India with an excuse to implement existing contingency plans to go on an offensive against Pakistan and take out its nuclear bomb projects in a preventive strike,” said Robert Art, an international observer, in 2009.

Military tensions had, of course, been simmering between the two countries since the 1970s. India had begun special efforts to make its armed forces an indomitable force ever since the Pokhran nuclear tests in 1974. In response, Pakistan, too, had redoubled efforts to procure modern arms, ammunition and equipment in an attempt to retain strategic power balance in the region. In 1979, Gen Zia was provided intelligence information that India wanted to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. He immediately relayed this information to Air Chief Marshal Anwar Shamim, his closest confidant and also the deputy chief martial law administrator. Shamim was among a few four-star officers who had played a key role in developing Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear arms programme. Air Marshal Shamim responded with the plea that it was necessary to procure very fast fighter jets to keep the Indian planes at bay. The air chief told Gen Zia that since Kahuta was in close proximity to the Indian border, the Indian air force had the benefit of time. “Indian aircraft can reach [Kahuta] in three minutes whereas PAF can reach it in eight minutes, thereby allowing the Indians to attack the facility and return before the PAF can could defend it,” Air Marshal Shamim told Gen Zia. It was therefore decided to expedite efforts to acquire F 16s, for which talks with the United States were in an advanced stage. After two years of strong lobbying and exploiting the Afghanistan issue, the United States agreed to supply the F-16 jets. The first batch of F-16s reached Pakistan in 1983. “We are now in a position to confirm that India will not attack Kahuta because it is amply clear to them that we will retaliate and launch an attack on their nuclear facility in Trombay. Knowing that they will suffer much more devastation than us, they will desist taking any unwise action,” wrote Air Marshal Shamim in a letter to Gen Zia. As reports of Operation Brasstacks began pouring in, Pakistan too responded at great pace. While reiterating that the exercises were a threat against Pakistan’s integrity, almost all strategic resources were mobilised. By mid-January, 1987, both troops stood face-to-face. At this stage, the Pakistani Foreign Office summoned the Indian ambassador to Pakistan, S.K. Singh, at midnight to meet Foreign Affairs Minister of State Zain Noorani, who had just returned from an emergency meeting with Gen Zia Haq. According to general Hoon in his book, The Untold Truth, Noorani related the president’s message, to Ambassador Singh that in the event of any violation of Pakistani sovereignty and territorial integrity, Pakistan was capable of inflicting great damage on India. When Singh asked Noorani whether this implied a nuclear attack on Bombay, Noorani replied in the affirmative.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1218098/a-leaf-from-history-target-pakistani-nukes"]A leaf from history: Target: Pakistani nukes[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, November 8th, 2015[/B]

November 15th, 2015
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: Cricket diplomacy checks war pitch[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

With Indian troops am*a*ssed along the Pakistani border in early 1987, the morning of Feb 21, 1987, presented an altogether different surprise: a Pakistan Air Force jet landed at Delhi airport, with the visitor none other than Pakistan President General Ziaul Haq.

The general had flown to Delhi on the pretext of watching a test match between Pakistan and India in Jaipur, with his arrival putting Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in a spot of bother. In an article published by India Today, Behramnam, special adviser to Rajiv Gandhi, claimed that the Indian prime minister was not prepared to receive the General at the airport but had to be convinced by his associates to do so. With the match being played in Jaipur, Behramnam was deputed by Rajiv to accompany Gen Zia and tend to him.

As quoted in the India Today article, Behramnam states: “Before departure for Chennai, General Ziaul Haq, while saying goodbye to Gandhi said, ‘Mr Rajiv, you want to attack Pakistan, do it. But keep in mind that this world will forget Halaku Khan and Changez Khan and will remember only Ziaul Haq and Rajiv Gandhi, because this will not be a conventional war but a nuclear war. In this situation, Pakistan might be completely destroyed, but Muslims will still be there in the world; but with the destruction of India, Hinduism will vanish from the face of this earth.’”

Gen Zia had left Rajiv shaken.

Gen Zia’s unannounced arrival in New Delhi paves the way for peace, but only after another threat of absolute destruction in South Asia is delivered to PM Rajiv Gandhi
“These were only few minutes, but Gen Zia seemed to us a very dangerous man. With a stern-face, Gen Zia’s eyes showed that he meant business. I was astonished, that after this stern warning, in a flash, Gen Zia started smiling as if nothing happened and warmly shook hands with other hosts. Except Rajiv Gandhi and myself, [nobody knew] that Gen Zia had created problems for the Indian PM by threatening him with nuclear war,” said Behramnam.

Wisdom ultimately prevailed, and the next day, Rajiv met Gen Zia for dinner. They spoke briefly but with definite intention of reducing tensions at the border. They agreed that in the first phase, both countries would withdraw 80,000 troops from each side. To discuss the mechanics of further withdrawals, an Indian team would visit Pakistan and carry talks.

Why had the general decided to deliver his viewpoint to the Indian leadership directly?

It so happened that the US had warned Pakistan in 1984 that India was planning to attack its nuclear installations in a fashion similar to how the Israelis attacked Iraq’s Osiraq facility. This information was conveyed to Gen Zia in a confidential letter written by President Ronald Reagan on Sept 12, 1984, delivered by Ambassador Hinton, US ambassador to Islamabad.

Details about this exchange were disclosed in the recently declassified US State Department documents. Both the “Talking points for use in delivering letter to General Zia” (a four-page undated secret document) and President Reagan’s letter to General Zia (a three-page secret and sensitive document) were only revealed recently; neither had been revealed or published before.

Reagan’s fear was based on a CIA analysis, which noted in July 1984 that some sections of the Indian government viewed a Pakistani nuclear threat as imminent. The CIA analysis also noted that “an Indian attack on Pakistani nuclear facilities would almost certainly prompt retaliatory strikes against Indian nuclear facilities and probably lead to a full scale war.” The US also wanted Pakistan to restrict its uranium enrichment to a maximum of five per cent, a breach of which would trigger sanctions on Pakistan.

In reply to Reagan’s letter of November 7, 1984, Gen Zia did not mention Reagan’s request to limit uranium enrichment. Instead, he flatly denied Pakistan having uranium enrichment capability. “Pakistan has no intention whatsoever to manufacture or detonate a nuclear device,” the general told the American president.

Meanwhile, off the cricket field, Gen Zia told media personnel, “Cricket for peace is my mission, and I have come with that spirit.”

By March 1987, tensions between the two countries had diminished appreciably. They reached an agreement to withdraw 150,000 troops in Kashmir followed by withdrawal of more troops from Rajashthan desert. India stuck to its decision of holding military exercises, telling Pakistan that it had nothing to worry about. India delayed the last phase of the exercise to communicate the same message.

In the context of Pakistan and India, cricket diplomacy has a special place. After Gen Zia’s visit, General Pervez Musharraf also visited India on the pretext of watching a cricket match, and ultimately led to more dialogue and better friendly ties between the two neighbouring countries. In 2011, after democracy returned to Pakistan, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh invited his Pakistani counterpart to visit India and witness a cricket match between the two countries. PM Yousuf Raza Gilani accepted the invite, and went to Mohali which helped defuse tense situation between the two countries after the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1219397/a-leaf-from-history-cricket-diplomacy-checks-war-pitch"]A leaf from history: Cricket diplomacy checks war pitch[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, November 15th, 2015[/B]

November 22, 2015
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]Makhdoom Amin Fahim — a dedicated leader and poet[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

MAKHDOOM Amin Fahim, spiritual leader of the Sarwari Jamaat and an eminent leader of the Peoples Party who passed away in the early hours of Saturday, was also a distinguished poet of the Sindhi language.

He left two widows. He also married Dina Laila, sister of famous singer Roona Laila. He had six sons, two of them twins Makhdoom Naimat and Makhdoom Habibullah. One of his daughters, Maliha Makhdoom, was given a diplomatic position in Ireland in 2008 soon after the PPP formed its government in the centre.

The eldest son of Makhdoom Mohammad Zaman Talibul Maula, an illustrious politician and a revered figure in the world of Sindhi literature, Makhdoom Amin was born on Aug 6, 1939, in Hala, Sindh, the ancestral town of the Makhdoom family. He received his early schooling at the Ghulam Haider High School, Hala, and later attended the Sarwari Islamia College, Hala.

Subsequently, he earned a post-graduation degree in law and a master’s from the University of Sindh. In January 1993, he took over the spiritual leadership of the shrine of Makhdoom Nooh Sarwari.

Mr Fahim grew up in a fascinating atmosphere where literature, politics and learning existed side by side. He joined politics in 1970 when his father joined the PPP and formed a lasting association with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the party. After the death of Z.A. Bhutto, Mr Fahim remained an unfaltering supporter of the party.

When in 1977 Gen Ziaul Haq wanted political parties to be registered, the PPP created a new faction called the Pakistan Peoples’ Party Parliamentarians to evade any action by Gen Zia. Mr Fahim was appointed its chairman. Unlike Maulana Kausar Niazi and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi who were prepared to reconcile with Gen Zia, Mr Fahim refused to even consider it.

He won his first National Assembly seat in 1970 and in all was elected to the National Assembly eight times. After the death of Z.A. Bhutto and the exile of Benazir Bhutto, the party felt the pinch of being leaderless and it was feared that splinter groups may arise.

It was Mr Fahim who blocked the scheme and stood as an unwavering supporter of the party.

During the tenure of the PPP government formed in 1988, he was appointed the federal minister for commerce. In later years, when the demand for leadership grew louder, Gen Pervez Musharraf was believed to offer him the office of the prime minister; Mr Fahim refused flatly.

On the literary side, when he was young, Mr Fahim was influenced by the literary organisation Bazm-i-Talibul Maula, branches of which had been established all over Sindh for the promotion of literature. The Sarwari Jamaat also published a number of books and anthologies (and continues to do so). The young Amin began composing poetry at the age of 14, initially using the pen-name Amin and later adding Fahim. He composed ghazals and kafi, and also worked in other poetic genres. His poetry shows him to be overwhelmed by mixed feelings of personal joy, fear and loneliness. He used very fluent and popular diction, and his work has been sung by many vocalists.

In recent years, Mr Fahim was accused of graft, and the investigation was still under way when he fell ill. He went to London for medical treatment and then stayed in Dubai for a few weeks. On Oct 26, he flew back to Pakistan and was staying at his Karachi residence till his demise.

An example of Mr Fahim’s poetry, composed in 1970:

Ajj nethh vyas gulshan mein halio kahin jazba-i-dil khan bekhud thi, Chho moonkhe disi the runo shabnam kujh yad atham kujh visri viyo, Aye Fahim toon moonkhe budhai khanni ta haqiqat keaan aghaz mein huee, Moon khanyo ya nathe khaniyo pahinjo qadam, kujh yaad atham kujh visri viyo.

[Today I went to the beloved’s dwelling becoming so desperate, why did the dew weep, I remember some and forgot some; Fahim, you tell me what was the reality in the beginning; did I take steps or not; I remember some and forgot some.]

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/authors/876/shaikh-aziz"]Makhdoom Amin Fahim — a dedicated leader and poet[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, November 22nd, 2015[/B]

November 29, 2015
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: Benazir ends exile[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

General Ziaul Haq had imposed a number of ‘unacceptable’ conditions on the functioning of the National Assembly formed after the 1986 elections and it seemed the members had accepted these in exchange for the lifting of martial law and return of democracy. Gen Zia had evolved a political formula which was democratic in appearance and dictatorial in practice. However, despite undesirable political atmosphere Mohammed Khan Junejo provided a ray of hope as he tried to bring respectability to the parliament, to the extent that he even put his career at stake.

The absence of opposition from the Assembly was quite noticeable, though opposition is essential for any democratic forum; and nonexistence of opposition did not give the parliament a democratic look. With Junejo’s nomination as prime minister it was being felt that Muslim League was the ruling party and hence a few members who belonged to other parties assumed the role of opposition. The politicians felt satisfied that democracy had returned, though it was in the form of a sugar-coated martial law aimed at deceiving the world and reaping its fruit.

The resurgence of the MRD (Movement for the Restoration of Democracy) which tended to act as a leftwing political alliance since its formation in 1983 had put up little show in 1986. In April 1986 Benazir Bhutto returned from self-imposed exile to launch a fresh campaign with greater intensity to force the general to either restore real democracy or leave.

Benazir returns to Pakistan to find a softer Zia in comparison to when she had left
The general was moving in a planned manner towards 1990, when his tenure obtained through the sham referendum was to end. He had also retained the post of COAS and used it as leverage and his main source of authority.

It was also being said that it was not only internal influence that forced Gen Zia to hold elections and silence the democratic voices till certain objectives were achieved, like a breakthrough in Afghanistan talks and the ouster of Soviet forces. Since the formation of the national government, political parties had almost given up the effort for a change. The reason for non-action on the part of political parties was not the absence of cohesion but it is believed that they had an idea of the whole plan.

It was also being said that Benazir’s exile came to an end (in 1986) as a result of some pressure from the US.

After her release from detention in 1984, Benazir had visited her mother in Switzerland where she was under treatment and after two days went to London where she met political leaders and media persons. In an interview with the BBC she refuted allegations that she would live in exile forever. She reiterated that her difference with Gen Zia was not on the grounds of Bhutto’s hanging but on restoring democracy. She underwent ear surgery which was, according to her, the reason for her visit. While in the UK she met various political groups in Birmingham, Glasgow, London School of Economics, Lincoln’s Inn, Berlin (Germany), European Union and Frankfurt and told them about the political victimisation and dictatorial rule.

Later she travelled to the US and met various political figures and influential groups, and spoke to the media and architects of foreign policy; she retained her ties with the US think tanks even after her return to Pakistan. This was the basis of the rumours that she had sought help from the US for her return, though her objective of meeting them was just to communicate the position of the country.

On the day of Benazir’s return from exile at Karachi (May 3, 1986) the general sent a simple but stern warning that there should be no disturbance of any kind or he would clamp another martial law, much stricter than the previous one. He even did not show a sharp reaction in retaliation to Benazir’s sharp criticsm.

The international media reported the situation in many ways. The Economic and Political Review, Delhi, on Sept 5, 1987 reported that after coming back to Pakistan, Benazir had been in contact with top US hierarchy and was told what to do. Political observers take this attitude as a close observation of the affairs of Pakistan. As part of the plan, it was said that Gen Zia was also being monitored and informed of every development and future actions. This was not averse to Zia’s plans. A report said: “In 1986, Zia permitted Bhutto to return to Pakistan . . . The elections held on non-party basis was also a gimmick by the general and he ignored all the political parties and ended up with a front behind which the general and his coterie could deal with more important matters rather than face the abuses of the people, the press and political parties. For that there was Junejo.” (weekly E&P, Delhi, Sept 5, 1987). It is generally believed that at this juncture, the United States leadership reposed more confidence in Gen Zia than Benazir as a mature and professional man who had the ability to handle political issues quite as the need of the hour demanded. Perhaps Benazir had received the message and stuck to the advice to wait till 1990 polls — ending Gen Zia’s 5-year post ‘referendum’ term as President.

With a near-firm assurance from the sources riding the events, Benazir found time to attend to other issues especially family problems after the hanging of her father. A daughter of a political genius Z.A. Bhutto, Benazir knew what awaited her. She waited while she struggled, drawing people close to her to listen to the smallest whisper and responded. She also used the respite to solve the non-political issues that had accumulated for quite some time. Not an easy task but she made it. She steadily found a way to practical life, in the family and in the world.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1223086/"]A leaf from history: Benazir ends exile[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, November 29th, 2015[/B]

December 13th, 2015
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: The marriage that shook the political scenario[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

On July 29, 1987, a few members of the Bhutto family and some of their friends assembled at the London apartment of Sanam Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto’s sister. Despite the unfortunate events the family had braved, Begun Nusrat Bhutto appeared calm and composed. Among the guests were Hakim Ali Zardari, father of Asif Zardari, and his wife. A photographer was in attendance too.

After some time, Benazir Bhutto broke the silence. “This is Asif Zardari, my fiancé.”

The next day, a picture of the ceremony and an accompanying news item appeared in the media. Since she grew up in a liberal environment, her friends wondered why her marriage had been arranged. Many columnists conjectured that perhaps Benazir would retire from politics altogether after the wedding.

Much to the surprise of many, Benazir accepts an arranged marriage proposal. While some expected her to be sidelined thereafter, the marriage strengthened her hand in politics
As per the press release issued from London by the PPP, Benazir said: “Conscious of my religious obligations and duty to my family, I am pleased to proceed with the marriage proposal accepted by my mother, Nusrat Bhutto. The impending marriage will not in any way affect my political commitment to my country, my people or the trail blazed by Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for a free, federal democratic and egalitarian Pakistan.

“I stand as one with my countrymen in repudiating tyranny and its terrible heritage. The people of Pakistan deserve a better, more secure future and I shall be with them in seeking it. ... In view of the carnage caused by the car bombs and the sectarian killings the ceremonies are being postponed. We cannot celebrate when our people suffer. Your suffering is our suffering. Our bond is beyond the vindictive grips of the tyrants. I shall be returning to Karachi shortly.”

On Feb 17, 1987, a huge marriage ceremony was organised in Karachi that bound the two influential families of the country into a relationship. Benazir Bhutto had married Asif Ali Zardari, son of Hakim Ali Zradari, a businessman and landowner. It was an arranged marriage, something stunning for Oxford and Harvard graduate Benazir but she had her reasons for that. According to her, she was introduced to Asif Ali Zardari only five days before agreeing to the proposal.

Whether Zardari’s family knew or not, there were many proposals for Benazir Bhutto while she was still a student at Oxford in 1986. And yet, Hakim Ali Zardari, an old companion of Z.A. Bhutto and a cinema owner in Karachi, proceeded with the proposal.

“His (Asif’s) only apparent vice, if it could be called that, was a passion for polo,” Benazir told Shyam Bhatia, an Indian journalist and long-time friend in her biographical work Goodbye Shahzadi.

It all began in London almost a year before the marriage. On July 29, 1987, Begum Nusrat Bhutto received a formal proposal by Zardari for Benazir Bhutto led by Zardari’s stepmother, Begum Zarin. Asif Ali was studying at the London School of Economics and intended to take up a housing business after completing his studies.

While in London, he occasionally visited Begum Nusrat Bhutto during Benazir’s exile days; during these visits, Asif earned Begum Bhutto’s confidence.

Reconciling herself with choosing an arranged marriage, especially in a society where she had studied and developed her sense of life, was a difficult task. Talking to American newspaper the Los Angeles Times before her wedding, she said: “I don’t really expect people in the West to understand. Every mother wants her daughter married and I felt obligations to my family and my religion.”

Begum Bhutto clearly told the Zardari family that since Benazir was in politics, she would continue doing so and no hurdles should ever be created for her. Once the proposal was accepted, there was no hassle for the ceremony. She asked her mother not to arrange dowry. When the probable date for marriage was fixed, Benazir asked to postpone it because of violence in Karachi. The date was then fixed to Dec 17, 1987.

Before the main occasion, Benazir published a brochure explaining the cultural customs and traditions like Mehendi, Mayoon and finally Rukhsati. Some Western journalists, who had become Benazir’s friends, came to Karachi to witness the marriage ceremony.

Benazir wanted to make it a historic event. That is why she refused to make it an occasion of a few people gathered in a five-star hotel. Kikri Ground in the heart of Karachi’s PPP stronghold of Lyari was selected. There were no formal invitations while members from both families as well as party supporters attended the occasion in their numbers.

Benazir was clad in a white silk tunic with gold embroidery and Asif wore a traditional Baloch turban and cream-colour traditional trousers. The Nikah ceremony took place amidst a huge crowd; it could easily be mistaken for a huge public meeting. Asif’s gift for Benazir was a heart-shaped ring, studded with diamonds and sapphires.

Beyond public scenes, both families held a number of private celebrations, but the change in the political life of the couple was immense. Asif quickly developed a taste for politics. After the 1988 elections, he played a crucial role in defeating Nawaz Sharif when he wanted to force a vote of no-confidence against Benazir.

Shyam Bhatia recalls his frank conversation with Benazir Bhutto before her wedding about an interested paramour. “There was, of course, no dearth of other Pakistani men who saw her as a great prize and would queue up for her hand. One was the son of a senior party functionary, but he was believed to have a drinking problem. Another party loyalist was also turned down by her because he came across as an opportunist, although he did win favour in a different way some years later when he was brought into the cabinet.”

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1225627/a-leaf-from-history-the-marriage-that-shook-the-political-scenario"]A leaf from history: The marriage that shook the political scenario[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, December 13th, 2015[/B]

December 27, 2015.
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: Last moment overture[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

The year 1987 saw General Ziaul Haq completing 10 years as president in uniform. Despite completing a decade in power, he was still grappling with political issues at home, and at the same time, struggling to resolve the Afghan issue which appeared to be inching toward its conclusion.

During all these years, the general, with the support of anti-Soviet expansionist forces, had been supporting the jihad waged for the expulsion of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) troops. The USSR had some excuses which it was using to defer the issue for some time, but 1987 was the year when this objective was set to be realised.

Anti-occupation forces did not want to hand the USSR a safe passage to leave without helping to clear the mess first. This in turn led to a moot in Washington between US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, where Afghanistan would also come under the spotlight.

Back in Pakistan, Gen Zia too was anxious about the agenda of this meeting. He wanted to communicate his thoughts on the resolution of the Afghanistan issue to President Reagan, particularly some terms and conditions regarding the future set-up of Afghanistan. He wanted these clauses to be worked in the finer details of any accord that might be reached at between American and Soviet delegations.

With the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan drawing to a close, which of General Ziaul Haq and Mohammad Khan Junejo will bag the credit for resolving the issue?
The first of Zia’s three points was that were an agreement on ceasefire to be reached or some ad hoc truce agreed upon between the US and the USSR, no assurances should be extended on the part of freedom fighters.

The second point called for the departure of Soviet troops to be unconditional.

And third, Gen Zia asked for any future government in Afghanistan to be formed before the dissolution of the Najeebullah government and by having the Afghan people exercise their democratic will. He argued that no external party — not even Pakistan or the US — should decide or be involved in this matter as such interference would be resisted by the Mujahideen.

The US president is reported to have responded that these points would be taken into consideration.

On Dec 8, when the American and Soviet leaders met, they had a vast agenda for discussion before them, including Afghanistan, Central America, southern Africa, arms, control of chemical weapons and conventional weapons, strategic arms and Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF).

In fact, the two superpowers had been working on this agenda since the Moscow Summit. Reagan’s team included former president Richard Nixon and former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, who had worked a lot on the proposed treaty. Gorbachev’s side was weaker in comparison, as only two months back Boris Yeltsin had denounced the proposed treaty. Nevertheless, there were some experts in the delegation, including the former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

The moot began with deliberations on human rights; on the second day, it picked up Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war. Finally, when the joint declaration was announced on Dec 10, there was no specific mention of the Soviet stand on Afghanistan. However, it extended support to popular movements for attaining the right to self determination in South Asia, which meant that Pakistan’s position had appropriately been upheld.

In February 1988, Gorbachev unilaterally announced that the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan irrespective of whether an accord is reached in Geneva or not.
In February 1988, Gorbachev unilaterally announced that the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan irrespective of whether an accord is reached in Geneva or not. The time stipulated for the withdrawal of troops was May 1988. This move perplexed the entire world leadership but to many it was an attempt to save the Soviet Union from more humiliation.

In Pakistan, the reaction of Gen Zia was very different. In Lahore’s Governor House, he told a gathering of army corps that there must be some reason in the background for this announcement to have been made. When asked why the joint declaration did not specifically include the Afghanistan issue, Gen Zia said that perhaps the United States had its own priorities and interests.

After the declaration in Washington, Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo began preparations for any accord which might be reached at in Geneva. The pattern of things in Geneva was that there would be a pact between Pakistan and Afghanistan regarding the departure of Soviet troops, but the United States and the USSR would serve as guarantors of the accord.

Gen Zia, of course, had wanted to emerge as a hero of the Islamic world by freeing Afghanistan of Soviet troops. But he was also acutely aware that with his plans and suggestions, Junejo would gain more prominence since he was the prime minister. For all practical reasons, Junejo had been handling the Afghanistan issue at all stages since he had become the prime minister; but he was unaware of Gen Zia’s actions and wanted to become the architect of purging Soviet Union from Afghanistan.

When the world leadership became conscious of Afghanistan’s situation, Pakistan became the frontline state to undertake a very difficult task of fighting Russian troops. Gen Zia did not want unskilled Afghan nationals to be pushed in the throes of modern war machines, and instead, he encouraged those who were willing to become warriors to get formal training. Many of these men were then trained under the guidance of General Akhtar Abdur Rahman, who lent Pakistan’s war expertise to not only fight the Russians but eventually, to drive them out.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1228614/a-leaf-fromhistory-last-moment-overture"]A leaf from history: Last moment overture[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine December 27th, 2015[/B]

January 10th, 2016
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: Zia’s standpoint delays Afghan accord[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

The final round of Afghan talks was not just a question of expatriation of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; it had, in a way, turned out to be a battle of nerves between president General Ziaul Haq and prime minister Mohammad Khan Junejo. The general wanted to show his military craftsmanship and bring an accord according to his plan so he could become a Mujahid of Islam, while Junejo wanted to resolve the issue quickly to allow him to concentrate on domestic issues. Obliquely opposed to each other, both stuck to their guns. In fact, political circles expected that the final accord on Afghanistan might be signed on March 15; hence, all involved in the issue wanted to shape it in a way that it would become acceptable to all parties concerned.

Technically, Gen Zia had the upper hand as being president in uniform he had manoeuvred constitutional changes to enable him to act as the master of the show. The condition that Afghans be allowed to choose their own government was supported by both Pakistan and the US, but internationally it could not fetch the required support, although in principle Gorbachev had agreed in a vague manner.

When Gen Zia saw that Junejo was adamant to reach an accord without informing him (Zia), he decided to make his opinion loud and clear. But Junejo also decided to browbeat Zia’s plan.

Zain Noorani was warned that if he did not follow what he was being told he would be lynched on the road
To execute his plan, prime minister Junejo removed Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan and appointed Zain Noorani as the minister of state for foreign affairs which was part of his original scheme to keep foreign and defence affairs in his own hands and to deal with issues of both ministries using different men. Sahibzada’s closeness to Gen Zia was known. Now it became easier for Junejo to defuse Zia’s move. On Feb 25, 1988 Junejo convened a cabinet meeting at which he placed the Afghan issue for open discussion. His point of view was that though Afghanistan was an international issue since it consumed much of Pakistan’s economy and human resources, the Pakistani government had the right to consult its political leaders and people of opinion to evolve a wider consensus. It was a wise and diplomatic move and was approved. It was decided to convene an All Parties Conference (APC).

Gen Zia was not unaware of Junejo’s movements. As the news of the APC became public many names of the expectant participants were disputed. The rightists did not want the leftists to join the talks while the major parties did not agree to all the “non-functional” parties to sit along with them. PPP chairperson Benazir Bhutto made it clear that she would not attend the APC if Gen Zia was there, which was agreed on. The APC was scheduled to be held on March 5, 1988, for which Nawabzadah Nasrullah Khan and Pir Sahib Pagara along with Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi worked hard. Benazir Bhutto also didn’t want Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, an ‘uncle’ of the Bhutto era, to attend the APC; however, she was told that to create a consensus it was necessary to have him on board.

The holding of the APC was a difficult task, given the backdrop of developments, but Junejo’s team handled it intelligently and all expected participants agreed except Gen Zia, who, because of reservations about the possible outcome, opted otherwise.

The conference was scheduled to continue for two days i.e., March 5 and 6. On the evening of the first day’s session, when the day’s proceedings were being reviewed, Gen Zia unexpectedly arrived there. After a few minutes when he was told that the APC would continue the next day, he satirically said: “It means that another week would be spent on the APC.”

When Gen Zia saw that Junejo was adamant to reach an accord without informing him (Zia), he decided to make his opinion loud and clear. But Junejo also decided to browbeat Zia’s plan.
On the night of March 13, when Zain Noorani was about to fly to Geneva, and a meeting of the cabinet was in progress at the PM House, prime minister Junejo received a phone call from Gen Zia. The general asked Junejo about the meeting to which he replied that the meeting was over and he was about to visit him to brief him about the deliberations, “… but if you want to come, who is going to stop you,” he said. The call ended. A few moments later the door opened with a bang and the general walked in.

After some preliminary discussion Gen Zia began to talk about the possible Afghan solution and the suggestions that the cabinet had prepared for talks at Geneva.

It took him over an hour outlining the Afghan policy Pakistan wanted to follow. At the end, he told Zain Noorani not to sign anything except what he was being told. “Mr Noorani, if you signed the accord with your eyes closed and without undertaking the country’s interest, mind it people would lynch you … Let me tell you clearly that if you signed the accord without considering the future of the Afghan people and the country, people would lynch you on the roads.” At that moment Gen Zia appeared in a serious mood and spoke in a coarse voice.

He asked Noorani to take notes very carefully about what he had to say at Geneva and what to do. He was told that there could be no solution except the formation of a national government in Kabul with the consent of all parties. He was told in clear terms that if they did not agree to accept this, then he should not sign the accord and the talks be postponed. Poor Noorani wound up the notebook, placed it in the briefcase and straightaway drove to the airport.

He left for Geneva a dejected person. He did not attend the meeting; instead the hosts were told that Mr Noorani had fallen ill. After staying in his hotel room he came back the following day. Zia, Junejo and everyone in Pakistan waited for the news which never came.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1231740/a-leaf-from-history-zias-standpoint-delays-afghan-accord"]A leaf from history: Zia’s standpoint delays Afghan accord[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, January 10th, 2016[/B]

January 24th, 2016
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: Junejo gets through the Geneva Accord[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

After the all-party conference and the cabinet meeting, the prime minister, Mohammed Khan Junejo, was sure that he would succeed in having his way against Gen Zia’s wishes. On the other hand, Zain Noorani kept both of them guessing as to what was happening at Geneva, and in the end both found themselves bluffed. On his return to Islamabad, he explained his position, communicating to both that the international stakeholders wanted some more time to think.

During his stay at Geneva, Noorani faced all kinds of pressures to sign the accord without insisting upon the formation of an interim government after the removal of the Najeebullah administration.

The Soviet Union wanted to resolve the issue without meeting the condition of forming a consensus government. The United States too was interested in that perception and supported the USSR — perhaps it was more interested in the ouster of Russian troops than a stable government in Kabul, because the US did not want Gorbachev to claim the credit of vacating Afghanistan as a unilateral act.

Gen Zia wanted his proposal to be adopted as part of the final accord, but the US continued to dissuade him
All the powers seemed to be overactive in resolving the issue in a way that was more suitable for them. Gen Zia seriously wanted his proposal to be adopted as part of the final accord, while the US continued to dissuade him. When it became difficult for the US to influence Gen Zia it imposed a 120-day ban on aid to Pakistan. The US wanted to show its anger; it feared that perhaps Gen Zia wanted to make Afghanistan a laboratory for his fundamentalism and might lead to the formation of a new fundamentalist bloc in the Central Asia.

Efforts were still afoot in various directions and at different levels when on the morning of April 10, Islamabad and the garrison town Rawalpindi experienced a dreadful tragedy. It all began with two huge explosions; and in a couple of minutes missiles, rockets and all kinds of projectiles were raining on the twin cities. It was revealed that the storehouse of Ojhri near Rawalpindi, meant for storing arms and ammunition for the Mujahideen, had exploded sending missiles and bombs raining down. While more than 100 people had been killed and many more injured, the extent of damage to the property was incalculable; the military sheds were completely gutted. The magnitude of loss was still to be ascertained. The armed forces were shocked but they had to ascertain the causes, the magnitude of loss and, finallythe responsibility.

The nation was in a state of complete confusion, with no clue as to how it happened and who could be held responsible for the colossal loss. While Junejo and his administration diverted their attention towards minimising the damage and finding out the causes of the Ojhri disaster, Noorani continued to sift through the huge pile of papers and documents to meet the deadline as the peace planners were busy figuring out an agreeable solution to the Afghan issue.

World leaders were unable to reach a decision as to what could be done in a situation of chaos and confusion, utter disillusion and hopelessness. All parties were already busy to evolve an acceptable accord since the talks were postponed in March, and a series of meetings and parleys had already taken place. A new round of talks that was initiated by the UN secretary general Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, won a popular support. With this development someone thought of moving things further. Finally, a draft of the accord was finalised, duly helped by the UN secretary general, and copies were distributed to all countries concerned including Pakistan, though Gen Zia didn’t like it.

The draft accord was accepted by most parties and finally it was ready by the evening of April 13, 1988. All parties were optimistic. The historic Geneva Accord was signed at Geneva the next morning, witnessed by the US Foreign Minister George Schulz, the UN diplomat Diego Cordovez and Zain Noorani of Pakistan. On April 15, when the news broke, Gen Zia reacted before his companions in a terse and happy mood. He continued slaying the exclusion of his proposal about the Najeebullah government and feared a worst series of battles in Afghanistan. But for the record, he issued a statement, welcomed the signing of the accord, and termed the return of Russian troops a miracle of the 20th century. He remarked that the Najeebullah government should have gone earlier as its presence could reignite another flare-up.

The draft accord was accepted by most parties and finally it was ready by the evening of April 13, 1988. All were optimist. The historic Geneva Accord was signed at Geneva the next morning, witnessed by US foreign minister George Schulz, UN diplomat Diego Cordovez and Zain Noorani of Pakistan.
The world was satisfied to have witnessed an accord which brought an end to the war. However, the destruction and misery left behind remained a stark reminder of the war for decades to come. Pakistan became the worst affected country, with the introduction of narcotics, arms trade and factionalism; besides its economy was heavily burdened by having to feed about four million Afghan refugees for nine years.

The accord mainly emphasised non-interference in Afghan policies, with international guarantees, and voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees and their rehabilitation. In all, the accord included several instruments and a bilateral agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the principles of mutual relations. An agreement was also signed on the inter-relationships for the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan, signed by Pakistan and Afghanistan and witnessed by the Soviet Union and the United States.

The agreements also contained provisions for the timetable of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. It officially began on May 15, 1988 and ended by Feb 15, 1989, thus ending a nine-year-long Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1234661/a-leaf-from-history-junejo-gets-through-the-geneva-accord"]A leaf from history: Junejo gets through the Geneva Accord[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, January 24th, 2016[/B]

Feb 7, 2017
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]The Ojhri Camp disaster — Who's to blame?
[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]
April 10, 1988, would be remembered as a day of mass mourning; it was the day when in the early morning the twin cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi received a dreadful shock. It all began with a low-density explosion, followed by a huge one, after which all kinds of missiles, rockets and projectiles started raining down in all directions.

This was something similar to the Lydia earthquake over 2,000 years ago in Italy. It created a lot of panic and fear; rumours of every kind gripped the capital — ranging from an Indian attack to a disaster at the Kahuta nuclear facility.

For many hours, no one could be found who could tell what had happened.

Also read: 20 years on, Ojhri Camp truth remains locked up

At that time Gen Ziaul Haq was attending a meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in Kuwait and had to rush back home. The officials assured the people that there was no reason for fear and that it was just an accidental explosion at the arms and ammunition depot at Ojhri, located between Rawalpindi and Islamabad.

But since the national psyche had been tormented with many mythical lies and unfounded stories, no one believed the official explanation.

Over a 100 people were killed and many more injured.

Zia wanted to save his men
Ojhri, an old-fashioned, World War II storage of arms and ammunition, was mainly made of brick barracks with thatched roofs. Previously used as temporary army units, after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the influx of arms increased manifold and in 1979 the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate chose the Ojhri Camp for temporary storage and disposal of weapons, as and when required.

Though not congested, the Camp certainly needed management. Gen Khalid Mahmud Arif, in his book Working with Zia mentions that on the ill-fated morning when some ammunition was being shifted from one place to another by a rather untrained team, an accident took place.

“At about 09:30am, a box containing 122mm Rocket fell from the top of the stack while the men were trying to slide it down. It hit the ground with a thud and exploded on impact, starting a fire which panicked the workmen ... It was fitted with an inbuilt percussion fuse, which, the experts claimed, could be activated by strong impact. In simpler language, this fuse had a point-detonating mechanism without an inbuilt safety device,” he wrote.

The chain reaction in the dump played the worst part.

Also read: Islamabad`s children of the mist

The prime minister was on a brief visit to Sindh; when he learnt of the disaster he immediately rushed to the capital. After initial inquiries he issued special orders for the rescue and rehabilitation of victims.

The most important question was to identify what caused the disaster and initiate an inquiry. On April 12, Junejo appointed a five-member inquiry commission headed by Gen Imranullah, corps commander of Rawalpindi, besides a five-member ministerial committee to conduct an inquiry into the tragedy.

This committee was to inquire into the matter and present a report to the prime minister who, after studying the findings, would, in turn, prepare his report for the National Assembly. The committee comprised Qazi Abdul Majid Abid, Mir Ibrahim Baloch and Malik Naeem Ahmad Khan, while Mohammad Aslam Khattak was to act as chairman.

Also read: Defacing the constitution

While taking all these actions, Junejo did not communicate with Gen Zia, creating tension between the two which led to the dismissal of the Junejo government and the dissolution of the assemblies.

Gen Zia wanted an inquiry by men of his choice, ostensibly if it was the fault of “his men” they would have to be spared.
Junejo knew it and perhaps that is the reason why he formed the committees before Gen Zia’s arrival. It is said that Gen Imranullah had held the director general (DG) ISI responsible for the tragedy and suggested appropriate action.

This was meant to hurt Gen Zia. Aslam Khattak’s report said that in war-like conditions that the nation was in, accidents can occur and should be considered as a token of martyrdom in the path of a noble cause; therefore, the four junior employees should be punished according to law and the rest be forgiven, to end the fiasco.

As the inquiry row continued, the National Assembly demanded the parliamentary committee report to be made public immediately and those found responsible be taken to task.

The defence minister, Rana Naeem Ahmed, wanted to get the report edited so that it could become more unanimous and acceptable. This ensued into an exchange of hot words and Aslam Khattak clarified that the report cannot be altered at any cost.

The defence minister started working on a new report. When Gen Imranullah was questioned, he blamed the director general of the ISI. After some re-investigation Rana Naeem wrote the report in which he clearly held the ISI responsible.

He wrote that since the Camp was under the DG ISI, action should be taken against the former DG ISI Gen Akhtar Abdur Rahman and the present DG ISI Gen Hamid Gul. The report once again saw hectic vetting and in early May 1988, prime minister Junejo handed over these reports, bearing signatures of the rest of the members, to Gen Zia. Junejo informed him that he would discuss the issue after his return from South Korea and the Philippines.

When the reports were presented, there was a lot of confusion in the presidential house and the general wanted to solve the issue in a manner that could spare his close associates.

Gen Zia’s biggest worry was Gen Akhtar Abdur Rahman, the man he trusted most.

[B]Source: [/B][URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1237794/the-ojhri-camp-disaster-whos-to-blame"]The Ojhri Camp disaster — Who's to blame?[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, February 7th, 2016[/B]

Feb 21st, 2016
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: Junejo’s government sacked[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

Ever since Mohammad Khan Junejo took over as prime minister, reports of differences between him and president Gen Ziaul Haq trickled in. On the very first introduction, on March 20, both had a brief but bitter argument when Gen Zia said: “I have decided to appoint you as prime minister of the country,” to which Junejo replied: “When are you going to lift martial law, Mr President?”

This caused the first crack and the differences increased with the passage of time.

Donning the army chief’s uniform and armed with Article 58 2(b), Gen Zia enjoyed a strong position. It is not known when the general decided to send the prime minister packing, whether it was an instantaneous decision taken on May 29, 1988, or had been in the general’s mind for quite some time.

“Rafaqat, this is it, but may I tell you that I have decided to pack them up”
There were many factors for Gen Zia being displeased with Junejo; the most important among them was the removal of three ministers: Dr Mahboobul Haq, Dr Attiya Inayatullah and Dr Asadullah, who were especially summoned from the United States. Even more pertinent was Junejo’s refusal to give an extension to Gen Arif and Gen Rahimuddin. Junejo’s intention to act as an independent prime minister could be seen in the fact that the day he relieved Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan, he also issued formal instructions to the foreign ministry that in future no file regarding the Foreign Office should be sent to the President House.

Ziaul Islam Ansari, a journalist who was close to and admired the general, summed up his opinion in General Ziaul Haq: shakhsiyat aur karnamay (1998). According to him, “… the people knew well that … there were no major differences between them; the only thing was that Gen Zia wanted all powers in his hands.”

It is said that serious differences existed between Junejo and the Punjab chief minister, Nawaz Sharif, who was pampered by Gen Zia. Ansari mentions that while on his visit abroad, Gen Zia had asked the editor of an Urdu newspaper to speak to the prime minister about sorting out their differences. Subsequently, the editor spoke to Junejo in Manila but the latter denied having any differences with the general or with Nawaz Sharif. Junejo believed that his differences with Sharif were of an insignificant nature. However, a meeting between the two was arranged at Manila but no reconciliation came through. After the meeting, Nawaz Sharif telephoned Gen Zia from Manila which perhaps set the final course.

On May 29, when the prime ministerial entourage was preparing to return to Islamabad, Gen Zia pondered over his future relationship with Junejo and his team. In the afternoon, he summoned his staff officer, Gen Rafaqat, who brought some files with him, which were to be sent to the prime minister’s office after being signed. After signing the files, Gen Zia asked for some writing paper and a pen and wrote the dismissal order for Junejo’s government and the dissolution of the assemblies. In a brief conversation between them, Gen Zia said: “Rafaqat, this is it, but may I tell you that I have decided to pack them up.”

After landing, the prime minister held a brief press conference in the VIP room at the Islamabad airport, about the expected result of the visit and then drove straight to PM House. Until then, there were rumours among the reporters about an important press conference at President House. A small press room had been quickly set up at President House where during the introduction, a reporter commented: “Janab aaj to lambi daurr lag gayee,” (Today we had a hectic day). To this Gen Zia replied, “Daur to abb lage gi, main aap ko bahut barri khabar de raha hoon” (Little do you how hectic the day is going to become, as I am now giving you a huge story.)

It is not known when the general decided to send the prime minister packing, whether it was an instantaneous decision taken on May 29, 1988, or had been in the general’s mind for quite sometime.
In his introductory remarks Gen Zia emphasised that he had given much freedom to the democratic team which had failed to run the business. “It appears that they are not capable of running the administration. I had been repeatedly telling them but either they do not want to take anything seriously or they do not intend to do anything. They have failed to implement the Islamic system and control the law and order situation. Despite my constant efforts, they have failed to bring improvement. I have therefore decided to use my constitutional powers, dismiss the prime minister and his cabinet, and dissolve the assemblies.” He then read out the text of the proclamation, which was as follows:

“Whereas the objects and purposes for which the National Assembly was elected have not been fulfilled.

“And whereas the law and order in the country have broken down to an alarming extent resulting in tragic loss of innumerable valuable lives as well as loss of property.

“And whereas the life, property, honour and security of the citizens of Pakistan have been rendered totally unsafe and the integrity and ideology of Pakistan have been seriously endangered.

“And whereas public morality has deteriorated to unprecedented levels.

“And whereas in my opinion a situation has arisen in which the government of the federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and an appeal to the electorate is necessary.

“Now, therefore, I Gen Ziaul Haq, President of Pakistan in exercise of the powers conferred on me by Clause (2) (b), of Article 58 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan hereby dissolve the National Assembly with immediate effect and in consequence thereof the cabinet also stands dissolved forthwith.

General,

(M. Ziaul-Haq).

May 29, 1988.”

The order was moved at 06.30pm. Ignorant of this development, Junejo was in his study when his ADC sought permission to visit him. He was asked if there was anything special. To this he told Junejo that his government had been dissolved and he was no more the prime minister. This was immediately confirmed by his personal secretary, Capt Issani. When he tried to contact some friends Junejo was told that all offices of the PM House had been sealed.

For some time there were rumours that some kind of action was in the process but it appeared that Junejo could not understand the importance of the Eighth Amendment. Initially unmoved, Junejo was not shocked. He knew that Gen Zia was not in a hurry to use the powers he was armed with. Zia had made up his mind when the members of the assembly persistently demanded an inquiry report of the Ojhri disaster and to punish those found responsible for the tragedy.

Junejo spent the next two days bidding farewell to all who came to see him. He appeared prepared to spend the last night at the official residence peacefully.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1240769/a-leaf-from-history-junejos-government-sacked"]A leaf from history: Junejo’s government sacked[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, February 21st, 2016[/B]

Feb 29, 2016
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]Bashir Moriani — a trendsetter[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

BASHIR Ahmad Moriani, a short story writer of eminence and poet passed away in Karachi on Feb 26. His departure marks the end of an era that heralded modern Sindhi literature.

He was 81.

Born on March 10, 1935 to a family of moderate means in Shikarpur, he acquired his early education from his native town and graduated with a master’s degree from Sindh University, Jamshoro, in 1958. He took keen interest in literature particularly contemporary Sindhi literature which at the time was undergoing fundamental transformation.

A new notion of social realism was taking over. Sindhi literature was moving away from the influences of Persian and Arabic which had crept into its diction over a span of many centuries. Deeply influenced by these changes Moriani wrote short stories and composed poetry that were published by leading literary magazines.

He joined the civil services in 1958. For a while he also worked as a teacher. His career in bureaucracy helped him climb up the ladder in various administrative departments but that put an end to his literary pursuits.

His short stories differed from other writers in terms of technique and plot execution. Stories such as Tukri, Chuhri and Zindagi Jo Rog illustrated the acute class divisions and exploitation that exist in society. Some of his stories were also translated in other languages.

He also composed poetry in various genres such as doha, free verse and ghazal. His first poetry anthology Asnam-i-Khayali appeared in 1955 before he joined the civil services. It was followed by a novel Ajanabi (1957). His short story collections include Zindagi Ji Raah Tay (1953), Choond Turki Kahaniyoon and Adhoori Udam (1984).

After retirement he settled in Karachi. He is survived by his children and grandchildren.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1242537/bashir-moriani-a-trendsetter"]Bashir Moriani — a trendsetter[/URL]
[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]Published in Dawn, February 29th, 2016[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

March 6, 2016
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: Zia’s fears not unfounded[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

After removal from office as prime minister, Mohammed Khan Junejo did not leave the PM House immediately, nor did he express his anguish. He remained calm, as though he was aware of what was transpiring while a number of friends and associates called on him.

On May 30, Junejo called a meeting of his former ministers and close friends who expressed profound regret. He recalled all the advice that he had received from them as the former premier. As he sat quietly, his mind raced over matters of the past and he couldn’t decide where exactly he had gone wrong.

Apparently, there were many factors for his dismissal. Some people close to Gen Zia believed that Junejo would have struck if Gen Zia had not hit first. At the same time there were indications that Gen Zia had planned to dismiss Junejo as early as February, much before the Ojhri Camp disaster, since Junejo had become unbearable for him.

It may have been on the general’s mind for some time, but the final decision came in the wake of the Ojhri camp explosion. Before leaving for Philippines and South Korea — his last official visits — Junejo had presented the report prepared by Aslam Khattak to Gen Zia saying: “Saeen, keep the report. We can take a decision after my return.” Gen Zia had actually received the report even before it was presented to the prime minister, a fact that was never discussed during assessment of the causes of Junejo’s dismissal.

Junejo became the first prime minister of Pakistan to leave the capital in an honourable manner post dismissal
Besides the above mentioned report, Junejo had also remarked that the Ojhri camp had been unlawfully used as a passage of arms and ammunition although there was a system to record where the arms and ammunition needed to be used. There had been reports in the press that Stinger missiles were being used by Iran then at war with Iraq, and since Iran did not have any channel for receiving them it was suspected that the missiles had been stolen or sold to Iran from the Ojhri camp.

Another factor for Gen Zia’s action is said to have been his own behaviour in the final deal on Afghanistan in Geneva. Gen Zia wanted an interim government that represented all factions of Afghanistan after removal of Najibullah’s government. Suspecting that Gen Zia wanted a fundamentalist pro-Islamic government reflecting his own political perception, the US considered it to be a dangerous move and thought it necessary to go ahead with the removal without accepting Gen Zia’s demand. Ziaul Islam Ansari says that in mid-April, the general had told a group of his men that the US wanted to replace him for not toeing American policies anymore.

Many close observers believe that Gen Zia also wanted to teach Junejo a lesson for his ‘austerity campaign’ that prohibited the use of big cars by civilian and military officials, forcing them to use small local cars which, many believe, was humiliating for the military commanders.

Junejo’s dismissal was also attributed to a more pertinent domestic move. Some National Assembly members had been pressing Junejo to present the Ojhri camp inquiry report for debate in the house. Zia’s supporters later claimed it was planned that when Gen Zia would proceed on his US visit in June, the report would be presented to the National Assembly with the aim of approving a resolution by calling upon Gen Zia to: a) punish those found responsible for the tragedy and, b) calling upon Gen Zia to step down as chief of army staff (COAS). The general had already been voted through a (farcical) referendum to stay as president till 1990. Moreover, stepping down as COAS would have brought an unsung end to his career.

However, Junejo did not accept this charge. In the midst of claims and counterclaims, he said it was the brainchild of Gen Rafaqat, Gen Zia’s staff officer, and Gen Akhtar Abdur Rahman to save himself from the criticism in the National Assembly against him. Of course, Gen Zia was there to outplay Junejo and save Gen Akhtar Abdur Rahman, at all costs.

All these reports, mostly contributed by Zia’s intelligence, put the general in a defensive position, and he decided to take a quick pre-emptive shot at the Prime Minister House.

In the capital, political circles were trying to visualise the new situation while the general wanted to clarify things with the prime minister. After addressing the nation on May 30, the general went to Junejo’s residence and told him that the caretaker government should include Muslim League workers. To this Junejo said that they should be staunch supporters of the Muslim League.

Meetings with various political leaders, including Hamid Nasir Chattha followed, with the aim to make Junejo quit as Pakistan Muslim League president and hand over the party to some appropriate person. Chattha also told Junejo that Pir Pagara had agreed to visit Islamabad the following week where he would probably hold talks with Gen Zia and other important people.

While efforts were being made to make Pakistan Muslim League a functional party, at Gen Zia’s insistence, Nawaz Sharif took the responsibility to try to make the party an active political force. Before Pir Pagara’s arrival in the capital, Mian Nawaz Sharif announced that the PML would think about joining the government at an appropriate time.

Meanwhile, on June 1, Junejo finally bid farewell to friends and staff members. He was allowed to use the VVIP room at the airport for the last time. There was a rush of his friends but the VVIP attendants did not allow anybody to enter. In Pakistan’s history he was the first prime minister to have been allowed to leave the capital in an honourable manner after dismissal.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1243505/a-leaf-from-history-zias-fears-not-unfounded"]A leaf from history: Zia’s fears not unfounded[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, March 6th, 2016[/B]

March 20th, 2016
 

[CENTER][B][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: Zia’s mysterious ‘off-the-record’ answer[/SIZE][/B][/CENTER]

The Aug 17, 1988, air crash near Bahawalpur resulting in the death of the president, Gen Ziaul Haq, the country’s top military brass and the US ambassador Robin Raphael was a tragedy which had a deep impact on the region. However, it left many questions unanswered. People continue to wonder if Gen Zia had had an idea of what lay ahead. Perhaps by analysing the developments that he had witnessed, he might have had some inkling that something was going to happen, but where, when and in what manner, it was uncertain and unclear.

A series of developments began after the dismissal of prime minister Mohammed Khan Junejo, on May 29, 1988. The next day, Junejo held a meeting with his former ministers and friends and discussed the future strategy, including the formation of the caretaker government. In the evening, Gen Zia addressed the nation, repeating all what he had said earlier, in his press conference. He also called on Junejo at the Prime Minister House for an informal but important meeting. The general made an attempt to justify his action but at the same time he wanted the Muslim League leadership to be handed over to someone else. Junejo did not support the general’s desire and said that the new leader must be a firm believer in Muslim League policies. Gen Zia told Junejo that he had already spoken to Pir Sahib Pagara who had pledged to visit the capital in a week.

The dismissal affected Gen Zia’s work and behaviour, as it appeared from his formal schedule. The first thing he did was to reverse any and all administrative changes carried out by Junejo. The bureaucracy had become accustomed to this so they showed no reaction.

Confining himself mostly to his office and home, the general expedited the process of Islamisation. In this regard, he began working on a new ordinance called the Sharia ordinance which he thought would be delayed if not implemented soon enough. Therfore, on June 15, 1988, he promulgated the ordinance which he considered the cornerstone of his policy.

Did Gen Zia have a clue that something catastrophic was about to happen?
Incidentally, the ordinance did not receive the appreciation that he expected; the reason being that it did not satisfy every school of thought, even the Jamaat-i-Islami which had stood by his side for quite some time, differed bitterly. Most of the political parties differed on the very perception of the ordinance as its philosophy was based on a central leadership i.e., presidential form of government as against a parliamentary democracy which the majority of parties wanted.

On July 21, Gen Zia announced that general elections would be held in November, as announced previously, but these would be held on a non-party basis. This ignited a new debate and the political parties began making plans to strongly resist. On Aug 1, 1988, Benazir Bhutto filed a petition in the Supreme Court against the proposed elections on a non-party basis.

As other political parties also took an interest in Benazir’s petition, the ‘too faithful bureaucracy’ did not show much interest in the election arrangements, as they felt that this time the situation might turn grimmer than feared. They began holding meetings, especially in the Foreign Office, which sent a message of urgency.

One of Zia’s supporters, journalist Ziaul Islam Ansari, mentions some events such as Gen’s Zia’s meetings with newsmen between Aug 8 and 10, covering a variety of questions of an important nature. In one such meeting, on Aug 10, with selected newsmen mostly from the National Press Trust, the general specifically spoke of two things. He said that a conspiracy had been hatched by Russia to increase Indian influence in Kabul with the objective of punishing Pakistan. But, the general said, Pakistan would not allow this to happen. He said a few words that created anxiety.

He said that when everything had been settled in Afghanistan, his efforts to bring in a consensus government in Kabul were being opposed by some countries and they wanted to punish him. He said, “They want to sort out Pakistan and to achieve that they want to sort me out,” but immediately asked the reporters to treat it as “off the record” and not publish it. When one journalist asked what he meant by “they want to sort out”, the general replied that he meant that these countries were interpreting the consensus government in Kabul as a hard-line Islamic government which would export fundamentalism to the rest of the world.

That day the journalists found Gen Zia in a rather strange disposition. The man who would always share the best moments with newsmen, did not appear in spirits. It was quite surprising to see a man who spoke highly about jihad against Russian occupation, narrate all events leading to the settlement of a major issue. His demand for forming a caretaker government before signing the Geneva Accord appeared painful for him. When he referred to some powers without naming them, it appeared that either he had been conveyed a message or he had sensed it.

The next day, Aug 11, 1988, saw unusual activities at the President House. The Supreme Court gave its verdict on Benazir Bhutto’s petition regarding theholding of elections on a non-party basis. It proclaimed that holding elections on non-party basis did not have any legal support and that the government’s standpoint was not justified. When the general was contacted for comments he appeared adamant about holding elections on a non-party basis and said that the formulation of electoral rules was the task of the government and, if needed, these laws would be formulated in a manner in which the polls could be held on non-party basis.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1246250/a-leaf-from-history-zias-mysterious-off-the-record-answer"]A leaf from history: Zia’s mysterious ‘off-the-record’ answer[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, March 20th, 2016[/B]

April 3rd, 2016
 

[B][CENTER]A leaf from history: The Bahawalpur tragedy[/CENTER][/B]

It was little past 3 pm on Aug 17, 1988. The plane, a Cessna, had completed its routine check around Bahawalpur. The pilot, Wing Commander Mashhood Hassan arrived along with his co-pilot, navigator and engineer for a pre-flight check. Half-an-hour later Gen Zia arrived with his guests, after witnessing the operation of the new American battle tank, Abrams M-1/A-1, accompanied by some top generals of Pakistan, the US ambassador Arnold Raphel and Brigadier Gen Herbert Wassom, head of the US military aid mission to Pakistan. Two crates of mangoes had been loaded just moments before the flight took off. Before boarding the plane on his way back to Islamabad, the general said goodbye to the vice chief of army staff Gen Aslam Baig and others.

Gen Baig had declined Gen Zia’s invitation to accompany him as he had some work to attend to in Lahore. At 3.46 pm, with its normal roaring sound, the C-130 Hercules, nicknamed Pak-1, took off. As Pak-1 took off for the return journey, Gen Aslam Baig watched it gain altitude. A couple of minutes later the Cessna pilot informed Gen Baig that Pak-I was tumbling and after some erratic movement near the Sutlej, the plane began to descend. No distress call was heard from the pilot as communication came to a halt. In no time, the plane crashed and a fireball rose bringing an end to the lives of all those travelling in the plane.

Gen Zia’s tragic death in a plane crash changed the course of events
Gen Khalid Mahmud in his work Working with Zia records that the take-off was perfectly smooth. He notes:

“… For two minutes and 30 seconds, the aircraft kept gaining height and the pilot remained in contact with the Bahawalpur control tower. Then the disaster happened. This was a surprising development because the aircraft was flown by a highly experienced cockpit crew. The sturdy turbo-prop, reputed for its reliability and safety record, remained airborne for another two minutes. Those agonising 120 seconds took Zia and others travelling with him to their rendezvous with death. Eyewitnesses on the ground saw the erratic behaviour of the aircraft, bouncing up and down before it hit the ground violently, nose down. So tremendous was the velocity that the engines ploughed several feet into the ground. The disintegrated aircraft carrying 20,000 pounds of fuel burnt fiercely for hours and the burning pieces of wreckage were widely spread. Thirty-one persons on board also burnt to death. Barring a few badly charred mutilated corpses, the rest were cut to small pieces of bones and flesh, beyond recognition. The human remains retrieved after an extensive search operation posed considerable identification issues.”

To add to the tragedy, except for the airport control tower, there were no means to inform the relevant quarters. Gen Aslam Baig had seen the president’s plane take off but a minute later the pilot informed him that the control tower had lost contact with the president’s plane and the plane had gone down. On learning this Gen Baig asked that his plane be diverted to Islamabad; the military officers travelling with him decided to go to the capital as the situation made it imperative for Baig to be present there.

The loss of communication with the C-130 created fears. Defence minister Mahmood A. Haroon was in Karachi and while leaving for Islamabad a few minutes past 4.00 pm, he sent a message regarding the president’s plane to the Dawn newsroom. In the absence of any authentic information, the country was in the grip of all kinds of speculation. People called up newspaper offices eager to find out about the situation.

After the disaster, there was no word from any government quarter for several hours till a decision was taken about how to tackle the situation. Security measures had been tightened in preparation for any untoward situation while communication was strictly guarded. Amid such a situation rumours of promulgating martial law were getting stronger. However, in a few hours, a system was agreed upon according to which senate chairman Ghulam Ishaq Khan was to go on air and address the nation, break the news of the tragedy and announce a new system to run the affairs of the government. A state of emergency was declared with special security arrangements made in Karachi, Rawalpindi and Lahore.

With confirmation of the tragic happening, speculation arose as to the possible cause of the disaster. People knew that Gen Zia took extraordinary caution in travel as well as other activities. He would take several senior army generals along with him, and never disclose which plane he would use. Even for the daily commute between his office and residence he would not disclose what route he would take. For the Bahawalpur visit, too, two C-130 planes were available at the Chaklala air base but the staff did not know which plane the general would use. Just a little before his departure he chose Pak-I while the other, Pak-II, was to follow as a cover-up plane. After getting the nod, the ground staff quickly fixed the 21-foot-long VIP passenger capsule and installed it. When the Pak-I took off from the Chaklala air base, the second plane Pak-II followed it and after Pak-I landed at the Bahawalpur air base, the second plane flew to Sargodha — half-an-hour’s flight from Bahawalpur as there was no space for the second plane at the Bahawalpur airstrip.

The eight-seater Cessna used by Gen Aslam Baig had flown to Bahawalpur earlier as he had to receive Gen Zia and other dignitaries. The jet plane of the US officials — ambassador Arnold Raphel and Brigadier Gen Herbert Wassom, the head of the US military aid mission to Pakistan — was parked at the Multan air base as Gen Zia had requested them to accompany him in his C-130.

There was no immediate reaction from politicians. The tragedy shocked the world and it was an occurrence that was bound to change the course of history. A team of investigators was sent to the crash site, while the US offered to send a forensic team and aviation experts from the Federal Bureau of Investigation to help the Pakistan probe team. As the official machinery began making arrangements for the funeral, people waited for some news regarding the cause of the disaster.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1249291/a-leaf-from-history-the-bahawalpur-tragedy"]A leaf from history: The Bahawalpur tragedy[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, April 3rd, 2016[/B]

April 13, 2016
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]Noted Sindhi writer Agha Saleem passes away[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

KARACHI: Noted Sindhi fiction writer Agha Khalid Saleem passed away on Tuesday. He had been under treatment for the past two months before he suffered a stroke and died. He was 81.

Popularly known as Agha Saleem, he contributed significantly to Sindhi short story, novel and drama and also composed poetry and translated Sindhi poetry into Urdu.

Born into a Shikarpur Pathan family, his elders had settled in Sindh during Ahmad Shah Durrani’s rule of Sindh in the 18th century. He began his schooling at his hometown and when his family moved to Hyderabad in 1948, he resumed his education there. During his college days in association with Sirajul Haq Memon, Tanvir Abbasi and Murad Ali Mirza he began writing short stories. Written in 1952, his first short story was titled Aah ay zalim samaj. After graduating from Sindh University, he joined Radio Pakistan, a job that afforded him an opportunity to satisfy his urge to write. There he wrote some wonderful plays. He ventured into the realm of novel and also composed some poetry, but soon devoted himself to writing fiction.

Whether short story or novel, he depicted the world in which reality turns into suffering and becomes the cause of ethical and moral degradation. In Oondahee dharti roshan hath, he narrates history in the form of a dancer from the Moenjodaro of 5,000 years ago. In his novelette and short stories, he dwells upon cultural values, the loss of identity and ethical values.

In 1978 he was arrested with two colleagues of Radio Pakistan, Hyderabad, for allegedly showing disrespect for the Founder of the Nation. He was prosecuted under martial law, but on the intervention of a politician, Kazi Mohammad Akbar, he was pardoned.

Agha was also among the first writers who wrote radio plays in Sindhi. His first radio play, Wapsi, was received with appreciation. It was followed by Roop Bahroop, Gulan jahera ghava and Gul chhino Girnar jo. His play Dodo Chanesar was staged also and it met with acclaim. After retirement he continued to write and his autobiography was published just last month. His short stories are a commendable contribution to literature. He also composed poetry but later concentrated on translating Shah Latif’s poetry into Urdu.

His works include: Chand ja tamanayee (short stories, 1967), Dharti roshan aahe (short stories, 1985), Roshni ji talash (novelette, 1985), Oondahee dharti roshan hath (novel), Hama-i-oost (novel, 1985), Falsafay ji kahani (translation), Gunah (short stories) Annpooro insaan (short stories), Urdu translation of Shah jo risalo (1985). His poetic anthology Pann chhan aeen chand appeared in 1986.

Four days ago he celebrated his 81st birthday. In a recent interview, he said he wrote because he wanted to satisfy his ‘latent beloved’.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1251775/noted-sindhi-writer-agha-saleem-passes-away"]Noted Sindhi writer Agha Saleem passes away[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, April 13th, 2016[/B]

April 17th, 2016
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: The significance of number eight[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

At 9 pm on Aug 17, 1988, the time for the main news bulletin on state-owned radio and television, then Senate Chairman Ghulam Ishaq Khan addressed the nation. This most important speech was preceded by the national anthem, and a recitation from the Holy Quran, as is the norm prior to all official appearances of the prime minister or the head of the state.

Ishaq Khan began by breaking the news of Zia’s death, confirming that there were no survivors, and that he as the Senate chairman had automatically taken over as acting president until an elected government took over, as per the Constitution of the country.

He said that Gen Aslam Baig, the vice chief of the army staff had been appointed chief of the army staff and would be performing duties according to the Constitution. The issue of appointments of other service chiefs had been deferred.

A national emergency followed Zia’s helicopter crash, amidst steps to restore democracy
Without getting into details he announced that since Gen Zia had announced elections would be held on Nov 16, polls would be held as scheduled, for which arrangements were being made by the election commission. For ensuring a peaceful atmosphere, an emergency had been declared throughout the country. He also said this announcement should bring an end to all rumours.

After the address, the civil and military administration began sorting things out at an emergency level.

Everybody had waited for the announcement, which came after a delay of over five hours; however, those with political knack were interested to know what had actually happened behind the scenes.

There was not much to tell. The delay was due to the arduous task of getting everyone together to make the decisions. At the time of the disaster, Gen Baig was still in Bahawalpur, but upon realising that nobody had survived, he had rushed back to the capital. On his arrival, he discussed the situation with Gen Jehangir Karamat, the director-general of operations at the time; and called in Gen Imranullah, corps commander of Rawalpindi; Gen Hamid Gul, director general of intelligence; and a few others at the GHQ.

There were only two plausible options: the army could take over and promulgate another martial law till elections were held, or follow the constitutional path and allow the Senate Chairman Ghulam Ishaq Khan to take over as president and run the affairs until elections were held.

Ghulam Ishaq Khan was summoned, but was made to wait in a separate room, where he sat wondering why he had been called at that hour, although he knew about the crash and the arising situation. After the three service chiefs decided to follow the constitutional path, they entered the room where Ghulam Ishaq was sitting. When he was told about the crash Ghulam Ishaq replied: “What do you gentlemen want me to do?” “Sir, we want you to take over the presidency,” said Gen Baig in a composed tone. “Oh bhai, agar aap logon nay das din kay baad takeover karna hai to abhi kar lo,” replied Ishaq Khan.

All three chiefs assured him that they had no intention of imposing martial law. At this assurance, Ishaq Khan asked for some time to think. After about three minutes, he called the three chiefs in and expressed his willingness. Meanwhile, Gen Rafaqat, Gen Zia’s former staff chief, had already made arrangements to send for the chief justice. Since the chief justice was out of the country, the acting chief justice arrived and Ghulam Ishaq Khan took the oath to assume the post of president of Pakistan. Thus a situation which may have pushed the country into another undemocratic system, for an unspecified period, was handled smoothly.

While the crash inquiry was underway, a number of theories circulated among the public. The majority were puzzled about whose conspiracy it might be. It was up to the government to establish trust among the people by conveying that the actions they took bore no any ill-will and was only taken for the restoration of democracy. Public apprehension and concern was not unjustified — they had been living on Gen Zia’s false promises for the past 11 years.

The administrative machinery on its part had begun efforts to compile evidence to find the cause of the tragedy, but it was a lengthy and difficult task. Reflecting on the crash, one could imagine the effort neccessary to achieve a flawless disaster.

Newspapers used their space to highlight the death, with definite fallout for Pakistan’s foreign policy; economic conditions that had been under pressure for the last eight years; hosting more than three million Afghan refugees; and facing repercussions of the war, in the form of drugs, illegal arms, and increasing lawlessness. But with the government’s declaration of moving towards the restoration of democracy, hoping for better was the only solace the public had. Questions like ‘what were the probable causes of the tragedy?’ or, in case of a sabotage, ‘who was the master planner?’, appeared in the national media — but no one was able to reach any reliable conclusions.

While political gatherings and the public continued to debate various aspects of the crash, star-gazers and fortune-tellers were keen to speculate about movements of the stars, to explain the disaster. Many recalled that in early August, Gen Zia had convened a mashaikh conference at Islamabad, as well as a khawateen conference on the same subject. On the sidelines, he had spoken about numerology, and in a light tone said that he believed in the ‘figure of eight’, and pointed out that the year 1988 was passing and that the month was also August (the eighth month of the year). He also said that people were making predictions about what might happen as a result of this numerical alignment. He did not believe in such things, but after his death, someone in his family remarked: “But why didn’t he think that in the number 17, one and seven added together to become eight — a reference to Aug 17, the day of the crash.”

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1252036/a-leaf-from-history-the-significance-of-number-eight"]A leaf from history: The significance of number eight[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, April 17th, 2016[/B]

May 1st, 2016
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]Sabotage in plane blow-up[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

A disaster that killed the country’s president and chief of army staff, and other military top brass, the plane crash on Aug 17, 1988, could easily have created chaos in the country, dragging it into the worst political crisis. Some even feared that a bitter civil war could have ensued involving many political groups which had militant wings. Everybody appeared keen to fill the political vacuum caused by the utter confusion. In such a situation, the role of services chiefs was integral. Making an intelligent move, they dropped the option of promulgating martial law. Instead, they declared a state of emergency to contain any possible unrest. For the first time in the chequered history of Pakistan, sanity prevailed. While administrative arrangements were being made by the civil set up, relevant institutions began their inquiries into the causes of the crash.

Gen Zia’s remarks, made a few days before the crash about the existence of a conspiracy, were already doing the rounds, as were many theories such as the Delhi-Moscow axis, the Delhi-Tel Aviv alignment and the RAW plan which were being discussed at all levels. The acting president had already declared that the elections would be held according to the schedule announced by Gen Zia. This prompted all political parties to prepare for the ballot which was considered the most important opportunity towards the restoration of democracy that had been forfeited for almost half the country’s existence as an independent state.

On Sept 10, 1988, the acting president appointed a committee headed by the secretary of frontier territories, Fateh Khan Bandial, to hold an inquiry into the crash and present the report to him. For two years, the body reached no conclusion, nor did it mention any cause of the inordinate delay. During this period, no government official was ever asked about the possible causes of the crash. Later, there were a number of news reports in the press about the inquiry but nothing came out and finally the federal minister for defence, Mohammad Sarwar Cheema, told the newsmen that this chapter was closed.

Investigations post plane crash suggest sabotage but leave a number of questions unanswered
Acting independently, the Pakistan Air force appointed its own board for conducting an investigation into the technical causes of the C-130 crash. The PAF board, headed by Air Commodore Abbas Mirza with Air Commodore Muzamil Saeed, Group Captain Zaheer Zaidi, Wing Commander Sabahat Ali Mufti, along with six air force technicians from the US, was given the task of inquiring into the circumstances under which the crash took place, apportionment of the responsibility and to make recommendations to avoid a recurrence.

The board interviewed a large number of people, visited the crash site, examined the wreckage and sought expert advice from Lockheed Company, the makers of the plane. It also sought expert advice from professionals in the field of forensic medicine, flame patterns, aircraft structures and explosives. After conducting the inquiry into all aspects of the crash, the board presented 26 findings, spread over 350 pages. The report also made some recommendations; but this was a secret document meant for official use.

As one of the probable causes, the board examined the possible malfunction of the hydraulics of the elevator boost package, which was then sent to the US for a thorough analysis. The report in response said that high levels of contamination by non-organic matter consisting of aluminium and brass were found, either due to maintenance or failure of the pump. After investigating, the board found the contamination due to excessive wear but it was not marked as the cause of the disaster.

After extensively examining all evidence, the board said: “In the absence of technical reasons to explain the causes of the mishap, the board believes that the accident was most probably caused through the perpetuation of a criminal act or sabotage.” It concluded with the opinion that “… a low intensity detonation inside the cockpit could have caused the bursting of some innocuous container, apparently filled with air fresheners or soft drinks but, in fact, containing some poisonous gas which incapacitated the passengers and instantly paralysed the highly experienced cockpit crew members of Pak One, not giving them a chance to even give the signal. … some parts of the aircraft’s wreckage were found to be contaminated with strong traces of antimony, potassium, sulphur, phosphorus and, most significantly, pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN), an explosive commonly used in sabotage operations.”

“For inexplicable reasons, the inquiry report was leaked to the American press before it was released by the government of Pakistan,” said Gen Khalid Mahmud Arif, as an American team of experts was associated with the board of inquiry and the US was aware of its findings all along.

This created confusion among the people who understood the importance of the inquiry, while news items and commentaries in the domestic and international press added to the bewilderment, somewhat hampering the probe in finding the actual cause of the crash. The report indicated that it was not an accident as the “the use of ultra-sophisticated techniques would necessitate the involvement of a specialist organisation, well-versed with carrying out such tasks and possessing all the means and abilities for its execution.”

The findings of the board, no doubt, made a pertinent point that the crash was sabotage activity but could not ascertain the kind of sabotage that destroyed the plane. However, in an annexure titled “recommendations” the board made nine recommendations for further inquiry; which included an investigation to determine the perpetrators of the criminal act or sabotage, and that “either digital flight data recorders (FDRs) or simple flight recorders (FDRs) be provided for VIP aircraft”.

Although the charred bodies of all 31 victims were recovered from the wreckage, there were speculations about no autopsies having been conducted that might have provided some clues. Another point some experts raised was that in the case of the deaths of American citizens, an FBI inquiry should also have been conducted.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1254947/sabotage-in-plane-blow-up"]Sabotage in plane blow-up[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine May 1st, 2016[/B]

May 15th, 2015
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: Friends and enemies[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

Benazir Bhutto, Naseerullah Babar and Hameed Gul -Courtesy Hamid Mir
Benazir Bhutto, Naseerullah Babar and Hameed Gul -Courtesy Hamid Mir
One evening in September 1988, the Mall in Lahore witnessed a number of people arriving at a bungalow, apparently to attend a meeting. They were eagerly received and led to their respective seats, where they sat listening to lofty speeches sketching out the political scenario of the country.

For Lahore this was not unusual. But this particular gathering was however different, as there were no roaring slogans or heated speeches, nor did it culminate into a rally.

After a dozen or so speeches, the formation of Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), or Islamic Democratic Alliance was announced. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi — a former PPP stalwart and the chief of National People’s Party (NPP), a breakaway of PPP — was elected as the IJI chief. Interestingly, the man behind him was Nawaz Sharif, who had been Gen Zia’s man previously.

Though the main components of the alliance were Muslim League-Junejo and Jatoi’s NPP, there was a conscious effort to bring more right-wing parties in order to reach the figure of nine; equating the number of parties in the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) of 1977, which launched an agitation against Zulifikar Ali Bhutto resulting in the overthrow of his government, promulgation of martial law and takeover by Gen Zia. For the following 11 years Gen Zia ruled the country in the name of religion and false promises, punishing the politicians for their past corrupt deeds.

A political alliance was formed to confront the PPP, which enjoyed a substantial sympathy vote bank
After Gen Zia’s death, the establishment covertly took upon itself the responsibility of implementing his vision of governance. With PML and NPP in the forefront, the other parties brought to the IJI fold were Jamaat Islami, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, Nizam-i-Mustafa group, Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith (Lakhvi group), Jamiat-i-Mashaikh Pakistan, Azad Group and Hizbullah Jihad. Other mainstream religious parties, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Fazl and Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan Noorani, stayed away from the alliance, as did some nationalist parties like Awami National Party and Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party, opting to contest polls from their own platforms.

Since the first post-Zia polls were only a few weeks away this was a pre-election exercise. Those who were aware of the major actors behind the scenes also knew of what was going on in the background. The alliance was the brainchild of Gen Hamid Gul, the then director general of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). He was not in favour of the left-leaning PPP, then led by Benazir Bhutto, daughter of Z.A. Bhutto, winning the elections. Instead, he preferred Nawaz Sharif, a businessman-turned-politician, who was mollycoddled by Gen Zia for his political ends, and who had by now grown into a politician, acceptable to the establishment.

As the intelligence reports indicated that an increase in the PPP’s sympathy vote threatened to push it into power, the top military leadership decided to bring forth the alliance of rightist parties and Gen Hamid Gul ensured that all went well. With little pursuance, the acting president Ghulam Ishaq Khan also fell in line with them and allowed IJI to establish a cell at the Presidency to monitor and assist the alliance with their plan. The flag of the alliance was designed to match the PNA (Pakistan National Alliance) flag of 1977.

Whether this kind of interference had ethical or legal support was a question to be decided by the people at the top; however, it was disliked by all democratic elements. Many years later when, after retirement, Gen Hamid Gul faced severe criticism over this overture, he proved too rigid and had no regret about it; instead he proudly stated that he would readily face any prosecution in this regard. On Oct 11, 2012 while being criticised for his role Dawn News, he said that the politicians in Pakistan were corrupt and if they continued to tread on the same path, the military would continue to intervene in affairs of the state. Admitting that he was responsibility for creating IJI, he said that he was not afraid of any case filed against him. During the interview, he said that he didn’t do anything against his conscious nor did he have any regrets. He was very vocal about the military’s role and said: “The army cannot be controlled by politicians as it has complete control on itself.”

Sharp criticism followed the airing of his interview. Two days later, the minister for information and broadcasting, Qamar Zaman Kaira (PPP), asked for a report of his activities during his time as a serving general. “If his office, home and institution were used in the formation of IJI, then he is responsible to the nation ... no one has the right to become the security adviser of the nation himself. This is the job of the state.” Kaira added that IJI was formed to steal the mandate of the people through ulterior motives that prevented PPP from winning the elections.

The election schedule was tight. Almost all parties began canvassing in their own way, refreshing old contacts. PPP leader Benazir Bhutto did not pay any attention to Sindh, as its provincial leadership claimed that they were well aware of what they had to do; however, she made quick visits to the rest of the country and at times addressed public meetings, while PML chief Nawaz Sharif, too, tried to match her speed. Foreign monitors and media observers who had come to Pakistan to watch the important elections marked the indicators which showed an unclear picture, as there were still some legal handicaps for both parties that had to be removed before going to the polls on Nov 16, 1988.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1257904/a-leaf-from-history-friends-and-enemies"]A leaf from history: Friends and enemies[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, May 15th, 2016[/B]

May 29th, 2016
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: The polls of strained nerves[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

Since its inception in September, 1988, the nine-party right-leaning alliance, Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), had been insisting on holding elections and allowing all parties to participate. While there was great fervour around elections, the uncertainty regarding which party the people were going to vote for also generated much pre-poll trepidation throughout the country.

All possible players were canvassing in their style. In Punjab, Nawaz Sharif, the businessman-turned-politician who had served as chief minister during Gen Ziaul Haq’s era, now wanted to reap the dividends. Nawaz had been prompted by Gen Zia to create his constituency to ensure the continuation of his vision of governance.

For the PPP, it was time to woo people again and earn sympathy votes. But Benazir Bhutto, who had been waiting for the past 11 years for such an electoral contest, was troubled by two factors: first, holding of elections on non-party basis; and second, the requirement of showing national identity cards (NIC) at the time of casting votes.

As PPP party workers activated the camp offices, Bhutto assured them that both issues would be resolved before the voters actually went to poll. Both these conditions had been planned by Gen Zia with the intention of keeping away the PPP — led by the daughter of the man whom he had hanged. Even after his death, both conditions stayed in place as acting president Ghulam Ishaq Khan decided to hold elections in a way that suited him.

Amid great uncertainty after the Bahawalpur crash, Gen Zia’s proxies went up against the force that was Benazir Bhutto
Senior PPP leaders wondered why Bhutto was so confident while launching her party’s election campaign. Before the Bahawalpur air crash, she had discussed various political possibilities — whether Gen Zia was honest this time around about holding polls or if he’d go back on his word again.

There was also the matter of meeting some of Gen Zia’s conditions. The first was the registration of the party with the Election Commission (EC). Bhutto told her aides that she was prepared to meet this condition, as it was only a question of filling a form before the EC. “There is no harm in it, on the contrary it would show our commitment to democracy,” she had argued.

To a query by one of her party leaders about whether she was prepared to work with the Gen Zia if he continued as president and she became the prime minister, she replied in the affirmative. Her rationale was that if Junejo could work with him and find his way, why couldn’t she.

“We want to move step-by-step. Our first objective is to restore the 1973 Constitution,” Bhutto had asserted. Her party leaders had no objection as many of them had also been waiting for the past 11 years to return to power. During this period, her uncles such as Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Ghulam Mustafa Khar and Jam Sadiq Ali, had all deserted her and the party.

Gen Zia, too, was not ill-informed and had other ideas. In an attempt to block the PPP’s entry into governance and to prevent a situation where he might have to work with Bhutto as prime minister, he convened a meeting of some religious men and sought their opinion regarding a woman being the head of the state in a Muslim country.

The clerics initially supported Gen Zia, saying there was no room for a woman to head a Muslim state. But soon, they realised that they may be accused of having mala fide intentions and dropped their stance.

Once this ploy failed, it was planned to enforce a law to make it compulsory for the prime minister to be at least 40 years of age; this was intended to disqualify Bhutto as she was only 35 at the time. However, the Aug 17 crash in Bahawalpur completely changed the political landscape.

Although Ghulam Ishaq Khan and some other players were there to act as Gen Zia’s proxy, they faced successive defeats in their attempts to prevent Bhutto’s rise.

On Sept 16, for example, exactly two months before the polls, the Supreme Court handed a verdict in favour of holding elections on party basis. Ghulam Ishaq and his supporters saw the first failure of their workmanship.

The second obstacle, of presenting NICs at the time of casting votes, was a little more problematic. Electoral rolls had been prepared in 1987 by the EC under the instructions of Gen Zia. They contained the names of voters prepared for the 1985 elections and did not include about 40pc voters who had reached voting age by that time but did not possess the ID cards.

These rolls contained 32.5 million votes as compared to the revised rolls in 1987 with 47.9m votes, which meant that 15.4m genuine voters were not included as voters. In the presence of the ordinance on ID cards these voters would have been deprived of the right to vote.

This ordinance had caused much hopelessness among the political parties and constituents, as not all voters had been able to obtain their ID cards. Again Bhutto challenged the ordinance and the Supreme Court ruled it as illegal on Nov 12, only four days before the poll date, paving way for a large number of voters to join the elections process.

Electioneering began on a slow note but soon gained momentum. It was quite smooth except some scattered incidents of violence. The IJI candidates, particularly those backed by Nawaz Sharif and the Jamaat-i-Islami, enjoyed smooth sailing while PPP supporters did not have to make sturdy efforts as the force of Bhutto’s personality weaved its magic. Electioneering also brought many underdogs into the limelight who benefited from the laborious campaigns of Sharif and Bhutto.

This was undeniably a phase of strained nerves that had to pass without any unpleasant incident. This time, though, there was renewed enthusiasm — in the politics of the country and indeed its future.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1261036/a-leaf-from-history-the-polls-of-strained-nerves"]A leaf from history: The polls of strained nerves[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, May 29th, 2016[/B]

June 12th, 2016
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: Democracy returns to the driving seat[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

Despite knowing that it would get sympathy votes, the PPP had to work hard to plug the cracks that had appeared in the 11-year alienation period. Benazir Bhutto took the bull by its horns. She chartered a small plane and visited the entire country, addressing election rallies — sometimes four to five in a day.

In her speeches, she spoke about the losses that society had suffered during the dictatorial era of Gen Zia. Many analysts expected her to exploit her father’s hanging, but she vowed that her party did not believe in revenge; instead she pledged that democracy would be her party’s guiding principle. Her approach evoked a positive reaction from the public. Seemingly, unfatigued, she utilised as much time as was possible in canvassing and when the day finally came to an end, her election staff and the crew of the chartered aircraft would be relieved to go home.

Nawaz Sharif, too, was making a lot of effort and likewise chartered a plane. However, he could not match Benazir’s speed and often remarked: “Iss de dandaan wich peer naeen pendi; boli jandi, ay boli jandi ay” (Why doesn’t she feel the pain in her teeth as she speaks on and on). No matter how busy he was, he did not change his routine. Before embarking on the plane, he would make sure that his supply of cold milk bottles had been loaded. He would sit at the front seat of the small plane, where a small wooden plank served as a table. He wanted the party workers and members accompanying him to occupy the narrow aisle between the seats so that more workers could be accommodated on the plane, but alas, the captain did not allow it. After addressing the rallies, he would often be late for the return journey, with the captain sending him reminders that the late flight would make landing difficult and dangerous.

Since these elections were supposed to be a turning phase in the country’s history, all newspapers were diligently assessing the situation. Being associated with the daily Dawn and monthly Herald, I was assigned the task of monitoring the voting trends in Sindh, especially in Nawabshah, Khairpur and Larkana districts. Here, former PPP stalwart and NPP chief Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, PPP chairperson Benazir Bhutto and the spiritual leader of the Hur Jamaat, Pir Sahib Pagara were contesting. After evaluating the trends there, I reported that Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi contesting on an IJI ticket had no chance of winning. When the report appeared in the Herald’s special election issue, acting president Ghulam Ishaq Khan called Sabhago Khan Jatoi, the then deputy commissioner (DC) of Nawabshah district, inquiring about Jatoi’s position. Though he was assured that the NPP leader would win with a big margin, the DC was asked to work hard and ensure Jatoi’s victory in the light of the report published in the newsmagazine. Sabhago Khan Jatoi had been transferred to Nawabshah district in a bid to secure the former chief minister’s home seat. Despite all efforts, when the results came Jatoi was wiped out as predicted. Similar was the fate of other heavyweights, including Mumtaz Bhutto (Z.A. Bhutto’s talented cousin), Pir Sahib Pagara and former prime minister Mohammad Khan Junejo.

Promising to comply with three conditions set by GIK, Benazir takes oath as prime minister
The PPP came out as the single largest party securing 94 seats, while the official alliance, the IJI, bagged 54 seats. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) boycotted but took part as observers, bagging 13 seats.

In the final countdown PPP bagged 94 seats, while IJI got 55, the Independents 37 and other parties 19 seats. Among other parties JUI-F secured seven seats, ANP got two seats. The breakdown was for 237 seats (207 general, 20 seats for women and 10 for minorities).

The election results shocked the acting president, who began exploring a way out for the IJI to form the government by manoeuvring a coalition. He even asked the splinter groups to join the IJI, an attempt that went in vain. Even if all the 39 Independents would have supported the IJI, the total number of seats would have been much less than the required majority for forming the government. Instead of calling for the election of the leader of the house, Ishaq Khan thought of requisitioning the National Assembly session and call for the election of the speaker, which would indicate the majority; but the idea was dropped for fear of a political fallout. After a lapse of 14 days, Ishaq Khan finally asked Benazir Bhutto to take oath as prime minister; of course, after arriving at an agreement.

Many observers claimed that it was a deliberate attempt on the part of Ishaq Khan to delay transfer of power. No doubt Ishaq Khan delayed it, but it was the Revival of the Constitutional Order (RCO) enacted by Gen Zia which empowered the president to appoint, at his discretion, any member of the National Assembly as prime minister. He had no intention of offering power to the PPP chief but the RCO offered him a chance to play a trick.

For this purpose, Ishaq Khan laid down three conditions, and the task was awarded to Mirza Aslam Baig, the COAS, to approach Benazir. The first condition was: Ishaq Khan would stay; so would Sahibzada Yaqoob Ali Khan as foreign minister; and she would neither cut the defence budget unilaterally nor would interfere in defence matters. BB accepted all three conditions.

To form the government was easy but to run it was difficult. She did not want strained relations, but it was unavoidable. Just a few minutes before the oath taking, as BB entered the room for the ceremony, Ishaq Khan, who was to receive her at the rostrum, went up to her and politely asked Ms Bhutto to proceed ahead by saying: “Beti, after you.” “I am not Beti. I am the prime minister of Pakistan,” was the quick retort by the would-be prime minister. This baffled Ishaq Khan and he proceeded before her. Clad in a green shalwar kameez, her head covered, she took oath as the Muslim world’s first woman prime minister. After the oath, she was led to the official car by Ishaq Khan, the president who had the power to dismiss her government, and which he did, 20 months later.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1263730/a-leaf-from-history-democracy-returns-to-the-driving-seat"]Democracy returns to the driving seat[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, June 12th, 2016[/B]

June 26th, 2016
 

[CENTER][B][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: ‘We, the people …’[/SIZE][/B][/CENTER]

After taking the oath of office on Dec 2, 1988, Benazir Bhutto addressed the crowd at the prime minister’s secretariat. “We gather to celebrate freedom, to celebrate democracy, to celebrate the three most beautiful words in the English language: ‘We, the people’.”

Both joyous and traumatic memories,of the time she had spent as ‘Pinky’ with her father, haunted her. Despite her solitary years in jails and in exile, Benazir Bhutto appeared calm and sombre, reflecting that she had perhaps changed as a person.

Undoubtedly, the oath-taking was a milestone in her life as well as for Pakistan, as it marked the end of Gen Zia’s 11-year military rule. At the time, in the 41 years of the country’s existence, democracy had prevailed for only 17 years; out of which most of the time went towards developing the Constitution. Despite the struggle made by liberal forces for the restoration of democracy, Benazir assuming post of the prime minister led to a debate within the PPP about her accepting premiership with certain conditions.

Despite Gen Beg’s hostile attitude, another Bhutto takes oath as PM
But she had reasons for it — the most compelling being that she believed she had no option. If she had refused, then there might have been a long, unpredictable wait. Likewise, the establishment had no choice either, as after Bhutto’s hanging and the dismissal of Junejo’s government, there had to be a prime minister from Sindh, as per the decision by the military leadership after the Bahawalpur aircraft crash.

After assuming power, Benazir was repeatedly reminded by Gen Aslam Baig that it was because of him, he claimed, that Benazir had become the prime minister, and that if he had set forth stricter conditions Benazir could not have become the prime minister. There were some comments in the press as well about the army hijacking foreign policy. Gen Baig did not deny this and said that they could have hijacked much more if they so desired.

When Zia found himself pressured from all quarters to restore democracy, he chalked out a plan to keep the PPP out of governance even if it won the polls. To ensure the success of that objective, Gen Zia decided to carve out a niche for himself and let governance matters revolve around him, no matter who became the prime minister, as in the case of Mohammad Khan Junejo. But on second thought about the possible re-entry of Benazir in the political scenario, he improvised his earlier plan.

Gen Zia had considered the holding of 1985 general elections on non-party basis a fruitful experience and he wanted the 1988 elections to also be held on a non-party basis, but Benazir had managed to get this move annulled by the Supreme Court. Equally important was the issue of presentation of NIC at polling booths. However, this hindrance was also removed by the court, adding considerable voting strength to the election.

Following the Bahawalpur crash, a shaky and indecisive environment prevailed at the Presidency. There was a possibility of promulgating Martial Law and putting political activities on hold. Since the top brass had been wiped out in the crash, leaving only Gen Aslam Baig as the senior-most officer in the army, he could have done away with the constitutional process. He decided to follow the Constitution, but ensured that liberal forces were kept out of the power race. His intention was to restore the democratic process and at the same time restore the army’s prestige.

Contemporary historians would record that the transfer of power in 1988 was part of a bigger plan set into action since Gen Zia had decided to keep liberal elements away from power. Perhaps he feared that if the PPP came to power again, it would avenge Bhutto’s hanging. He believed that a segment of armed forces subscribed to his political perception. The overthrow of July 5, 1977, was part of the plan which was to be followed by a personal dictatorship extending beyond a decade.

After consulting with his colleagues, Gen Zia decided to dispel the common feeling in regard to the army’s continued intervention in political administration. With Pakistan’s crumbling economy and a society plagued by ills, it was believed that democracy could bring stability and revive economic reforms. Pakistan’s action as a front state to defeat the (now defunct) Soviet Union had brought an influx of 7m Afghan refugees to an already ailing economy, plus a drug and Kalashnikov culture.

The selection of a prime minister from Sindh was a commendable idea, and since other contenders for the position, like Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi and Illahi Bakhsh Soomro were rejected at the ballot box, Benazir was the best option.

Another compelling factor was the upcoming presidential election. On Aug 17, the armed forces chiefs had decided to name the Senate chairman as acting president, in accordance with the Constitution. This was part of a process to get him elected as president after the election of a prime minister. The PPP did not have absolute majority to get the premiership outright, but it had the strength, without which Ghulam Ishaq Khan could not have been elected. Considering all these realities, the establishment decided to redo its roadmap.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1266921/a-leaf-from-history-we-the-people"]A leaf from history: ‘We, the people …’[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, June 26th, 2016[/B]

June 28th, 2016
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]Jamal Faqir — the last of the Soung singers[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

In the death of Jamal Faqir, Sindh’s music culture has lost a great exponent of the Soung school of music.

Among music lovers and mystics he was an exponent of peace, love and brotherhood as reflected in the Sufic poetry he sang for nearly five decades.

The contribution of Jamal Faqir will be long remembered, for, he was an eminent and popular group leader of the Soung school of music, which is considered an indigenous form of Sufic music in the Indus valley.

Historically, Soung style was established with the rise of Sufic music in Sindh, in which a group sings collectively like in a chorus. As in other parts of the world, Soung music is being practised for many hundreds of years. During all these years a number of Sufis have been associated with this phenomenon known for its piety that binds human being with his creator.

Sound and music are the two most effective modes of expression for the Sufis to get closer to God and seek his blessings. Music to Sufis is the medium that transcends the dedication the subject owes to the Lord. It has been the most popular medium for the Sufis as a mode of prayer to invoke the compassion of God, irrespective of the religion, caste and creed.

Since he was born in the vicinity of the shrine of Mahmood Faqir Khatyan he took to loving Faqir Khatyan’s poetry. The other mystic poets whose poetry is sung by Soung faqirs are; Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai, Sachal Sarmast and Shah Inayat Shaheed.

Soung music, which literally means The Song of Togetherness, is the sense underlying the inspiration the singers gather for being attributed closely to the nature and from there they draw His energy and ecstasy.

Singing with the traditional musical instruments such as chappar (castanets), yaktaro (one-stringed lute) and dando (the stick bearing bells), it transcends a deep sense of togetherness induced by music and the yearning for love and dedication.

The singers essentially singing in unison generally choose waee (a poetical genre similar to kafi) for singing. In the contemporary singers, the kafis and waees of Shah Latif, Sachal Sarmast, Roohal Faqir and Mahmood Faqir Khatyan are the main attraction for the Soung singers.

Sometimes, out of exaltation, the singers who sing while standing, swirl around in a simple dance form. This action, it is said is a derivation of dedication to the love and affinity expressed in the poetry they sing.

The Soung school of singing generally involves a group of singers led by some eminent artists.

In the second half of the 20th century, Faqir Abdul Ghafoor, Dhol Faqir, Faqir Yar Ali, and Inayat Faqir had been very popular Soung faqirs. Suhrab Faqir (Khairpur, 1934-2009) had been a very popular figure and sung for almost four decades before he died.

Jamal Faqir also sung with Suhrab Faqir and travelled extensively as a member of the cultural troupes that performed in different parts of the world and won acclaim from the world connoisseurs.

Born in 1952 to a Manganhar family, a troubadour scion of Sindh involved in music and musical arts of Bobi, a small sleepy town of Sanghar district in southern Sindh.

His native area being adjacent to Rajasthan it has rich traditions of music, he grew up in rural culture and got early education. He developed a taste for Sufic music from the childhood.

Singing in various Soung groups, Jamal Faqir finally joined Suhrab Faqirs and sang at almost all shrines and earned laurels. He also became part of musical troupes which travelled various countries of the world and won praise.

After the death of Suhrab Faqir he continued singing till he was rendered indisposed by the disease that eventually led to his death on Saturday.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1267665/jamal-faqir-the-last-of-the-soung-singers"]Jamal Faqir — the last of the Soung singers[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, June 28th, 2016[/B]

July 10, 2016
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: Slaves to Ghulam[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

Despite the return of democracy, Benazir Bhutto wasn’t too pleased about the fact that she did not have complete executive power as the prime minister. Since the moment she became prime minister, she had been telling her associates to be very cautious. It was only later that her inexperience, negligence and self-centred approach proved to be disastrous for her premiership.

On the other hand, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, armed with draconian laws including the Eighth Amendment, came across as politically impotent, did not want to be (soft?) like Fazl Ilahi Chaudhry, president in the PPP’s first government. He conveyed his concern through various channels, which was actually a message to Benazir that she did not have a free hand. Under the Constitution, Khan had taken oath as acting president the day Gen Zia’s plane crashed but the Constitution required a permanent president. However, the strained relations between the president and prime minister meant that an election for a new president were on hold.

Ishaq Khan enjoyed the support of Nawaz Sharif, the businessman-turned politician from Punjab. Shocked at the election results and the PPP’s victory, Sharif began campaigning for Ishaq Khan. In order to run a hassle-free administration, Benazir had to mend fences with Ishaq Khan.

She therefore had accepted the proposition of working alongside Ishaq Khan, after obtaining a pledge from him, that he too would reciprocate with his support. In the same manner, she agreed to extend her party’s support to him for the presidential election.

Benazir’s second premiership began with presidential polls and ended with dismissal of her government
It might have been an easy victory for Ishaq Khan, but Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, a senior politician and a former opposition leader who was not in favour of Ishaq Khan being elected unopposed, decided to contest for the august office.

The presidential polls were scheduled for December. Nawabzada was a highly respected political leader committed to democracy and would never let anti-democratic forces go unchallenged. Earlier, during Ayub Khan’s era, he had opposed the creation of the National Assembly through indirect elections (the Basic Democracy system) in 1962. It was during these days when there was a lull on the political horizon that he began his speech in the National Assembly with the couplet Har shakh pe oloo betha hai, anjam-i-gulistan kiya hoga, applauded greatly following the pin drop silence.

Similarly, he had persuaded Fatima Jinnah to contest presidential elections in 1964 and expose the tactics played by Ayub Khan to win the presidential race. In 1969, he successfully formed the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), a five-party alliance which became instrumental in the removal of Ayub Khan. In 1977, too, he played a significant role in forming the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) which finally led to the ousting of Z.A. Bhutto’s government.

Nawabzada had hoped that smaller parties and groups in the National Assembly would support him outright but they were so few that he could bag only 91 votes, while Khan with the support of two major parties secured 348 votes.

In the centre, Benazir formed a coalition with Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) and the Awami National Party (ANP). However, in the provinces too, the results were not favourable for her. In the NWFP, the IJI won 28 seats, the PPP 20 and the NAP 12 out of 77 seats. In Balochistan’s 34-seat house, the PPP won three seats while IJI and JUI-F won eight seats each, while the rest went to independent candidates.

The governor of Balochistan, Lt-Gen (rtd) Musa Khan dismissed the assembly even before a provincial government could be formed. However, in January 1989, Balochistan High Court restored the assembly. The dissolution of the Balochistan Assembly did not augur well and needed careful handling.

The worst show of politics was seen in the Punjab, where Muslim League-Nawaz emerged as the largest party with 108 seats in a house of 260 members. The PPP lagged behind with 93 seats. In a strange manner of voting in Punjab, 41 members were elected as independents.

In Sindh, the home province of Benazir, the PPP won 67 seats in a house of 114 members, with the MQM bagging 26 seats followed by 16 independent members. Since the IJI had not found a footing in the province till then, it could only secure one seat.

Although the PPP could have formed an independent government in Sindh, the situation there was quite different from the rest of Pakistan. With the MQM having won 26 seats in urban Sindh, it was the obligation of the majority party to include the MQM in the government. After a number of consultative meetings, the PPP and MQM agreed on a long charter of cooperation with the latter pledging support to PPP in both federal and provincial governments.

The agreement resolved that the coalition government would protect and safeguard the interests of all the people of Sindh, irrespective of language, religion or origin of birth as well as stamp out violence and support the rule of law. However, the coalition moved with certain difficulties which affected the overall administration in Sindh.

Urdu-speaking students had begun taking part in activities under the banner of All Pakistan Muhajir Students Organisation in 1984. They contested local politics in 1987 a and after the 1988 elections, their party became a part of the PPP-led coalition government. Reports of continued violence from Karachi and other parts of Sindh put pressure on the leadership of both parties. With no end in sight to the violence, the coalition government came to an end on May 1,1989 —just six months into the partnership. Three MQM ministers resigned but the party leadership decided that it would continue to support the PPP in the centre. The cooperation continued till Aug 6, 1990 when the PPP government was dismissed by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan on charges of misgovernance and corruption.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1269385/a-leaf-from-history-slaves-to-ghulam"]A leaf from history: Slaves to Ghulam[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, July 10th, 2016[/B]

July 24th, 2016
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]A leaf from history: A taste of defeat[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

From the very beginning of her term, Benazir Bhutto was aware that she had been elected in an unfriendly environment and would have to sail through rough waters. Just three weeks into the Prime Minister House, she was confronted by the election of the chairman of the Senate, scheduled for Dec 24, 12 days after the presidential vote on Dec 12.

The election to the prestigious office, which had fallen vacant when Senate chairman Ghulam Ishaq Khan had assumed the responsibility of acting president after Gen Zia’s crash, had become a point of prestige for Benazir Bhutto and the opposition leader Nawaz Sharif.

Bhutto did not have enough seats in the Senate to enable her to elect a Senate chairman of her choice without support from any other party or group. While she was still looking for a perfect candidate, Senator Tariq Chaudhry, a PPP supporter at the time, despite having no support in the house decided to contest the election.

Senator Wasim Sajjad however stood a better chance as he enjoyed support of other leaders and was a popular person. He belonged to a respectable family from Jalandhar, India. His father Justice Sajjad Ahmad Jan was a jurist and had served as chief election commissioner for the 1977 elections. Wasim Sajjad was well-educated and had served as federal minister for interior in Mohammad Khan Junejo’s government. He had been elected member of the Senate in 1980 during Gen Zia’s dictatorial regime.

Wasim Sajjad’s victory in the Senate elections came as Benazir’s first defeat in the early days of her premiership
In 1988, supported by President Ghulam Ishaq, the opposition leader Nawaz Sharif and other IJI component parties, Sajjad was ready to contest election for the Senate chairman.

Benazir did not want Tariq Chaudhry to contest the election because Wasim Sajjad had a better chance of winning but Chaudhary took a decision without her approval. Consequently, Wasim Sajjad bagged 53 votes while Tariq Chaudhry got 24 votes — Bhutto’s first defeat in her nascent political career.

As chairman, Wasim Sajjad played a positive role in the house, consolidating his position. He was elected four times till 1999, and with 12 years in the office he became the longest serving chairman of the Senate.

Meanwhile, Benazir Bhutto was trying to tackle the issues confronting her as best as she could. She hoped that more democratic elements would come to the assemblies after the next elections so that it would be possible to scrap the Eighth Amendment.

The situation in Punjab was most challenging for Benazir. As she waited for a favourable time, rumours spread that the PM was going to introduce a new strategy that would give her government a fresh boost. Before the ruling party could confirm or reject it, Chief of Army Staff Gen Aslam Baig called on her and advised her to make a broad-based government by inducting some members of the opposition parties in order to come out of political instability. Apparently, this advice had some sinister undercurrents. Benazir Bhutto took the advice, along with additional recommendation from the COAS to invite the opposition party leaders to nominate their members, instead of picking them out by herself. This was aimed at stopping Benazir’s attempts to woo members of the opposition to her government so that she could form a multi-party government.

On the other hand, it had become quite obvious that Nawaz Sharif was persistently trying to end the PPP government through a mid-term elections and had been meeting with leaders of various parties in this regard. In response, Benazir Bhutto initiated a move to destabilise Nawaz Sharif in Punjab, where he had formed a provincial government without any external help. It was purely a numbers game and to dislodge Nawaz Sharif in Punjab was not as simple as she thought.

The result of the Senate chairman election was no surprise for Benazir Bhutto and she was more concerned by reports of other moves being contemplated by Nawaz Sharif, presumably supported by President Ishaq Khan and the COAS Gen Aslam Baig. There were rumours that President Ghulam Ishaq might ask Benazir Bhutto to seek a vote of confidence. This was the brainchild of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, once a PPP stalwart and now head of a faction supported by his allies Nawaz Sharif and Ishaq Khan.

Benazir was surrounded by a political mess that could only be dealt with shrewd political skills. She wanted to create a smooth, working atmosphere.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1272448/a-leaf-from-history-a-taste-of-defeat"]A leaf from history: A taste of defeat[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, July 24th, 2016[/B]

August 7th, 2016
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]Leaf from History: Politics and lies[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

Even before she took over the reins of leadership on Dec 2, 1988, Benazir Bhutto was aware of the problems — political or otherwise — that lay ahead. Though her party, the PPP, had secured more seats than any other party and she had managed to form the government in the centre, in the provinces the situation was different. In Sindh, her home province, despite having bagged 67 seats in the house of 114, Bhutto had to join hands with MQM, which had 26 seats.

However, the situation was not favourable for the PPP in Balochistan, Punjab and NWFP (now KP). Led by Nawaz Sharif, the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) gained popularity in Punjab and NWFP.

But what was most disconcerting was the result from Punjab where, in a house of 240 members, the IJI had captured 108 seats. This was a fairly good position but it could not form the government on its own. With 94 seats, the PPP had emerged as the second largest party, defeating Bhutto’s ambition of making a government in the province which was once PPP’s stronghold. In this situation, the 41 independents assumed a decisive factor in forming the government

In Balochistan’s 42-member house, the PPP had bagged three seats, IJI eight seats, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (Fazal) 11 seats, while seven members were independent. The Balochistan National Alliance (BNA), led by Baloch nationalist Akbar Bugti, rose as a new force by gaining six seats. Post elections, Bhutto let Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, the caretaker chief minister of Balochistan to continue as head of the coalition government.

Much manoeuvring and manipulation continued in NWFP and Balochistan in the first few months of Benazir Bhutto’s premiership
Since Sharif did not want Bhutto to form the government in Balochistan, he disapproved of this move and asked the governor, Gen (Retired) Musa Khan, to dissolve the provincial assembly under Article 1 (112). Subsequently on Dec 15, 1988 — just 12 days after Bhutto had taken over as PM, the provincial assembly was dissolved.

Although the dissolution was carried out on the pretext of the assembly not functioning according to the Constitution, the governor had not consulted the prime minister before using the particular constitutional clause. The dissolution disappointed Bhutto, but she resolved to make a comeback and form a coalition government in Balochistan once again with the help of the independents.

On Jan 22, 1989, the Balochistan High Court restored the Balochistan Assembly, terming the dissolution as illegal. Zafarullah Jamali, who had been appointed caretaker chief minister after the dissolution had to resign and a new game of political manoeuverings began.

In the meantime, Sharif brought about an accord among BNA, IJI and JUI and a coalition was formed. Nawab Akbar Bugti was elected as chief minister of Balochistan on Feb 5, 1989. This was another loss for the PPP.

Sharif now began to eye NWFP, where in the house of 77 members, the IJI had secured 28 seats, the ANP 12 seats and the PPP trailed behind the IJI with 20 seats. The PPP had formed a coalition with the ANP in the centre and the MQM in Sindh, and it wanted a coalition with the ANP in NWFP as well. Bhutto reached an agreement with ANP chief Wali Khan according to which the provincial government would be led by PPP, while the governorship would go to the ANP. As a result of the alliance, Aftab Ahmad Sherpao was elected as NWFP chief minister, while Amir Gulistan Janjua was appointed as governor. But soon differences arose between them and the PPP-ANP coalition fell apart.

Bhutto manoeuvred the situation so that 10 members from the IJI left their alliance with the PML-N on Jan 19, 1989 to join the PPP-led coalition, thereby preventing a collapse of the PPP-led government. However, the final blow to the alliance with the ANP came in April 1989, when a row was sparked with the PPP after a tough US stance on Pakistan which had a direct bearing on NWFP politics.

The US at the time was negotiating on three major policies with Pakistan, and had put forth demands for continuing close cooperation. These included capping the nuclear programme, and a crackdown on the narcotics trade which was reportedly being run on a high scale from NWFP. It was also demanded that drugs smugglers be handed over to the US or be tried in Pakistan.

Bhutto’s forthcoming scheduled visit to the US was only weeks away and she wanted to complete a few tasks before her visit. She ordered Aitzaz Ahsan, the federal interior minister, to undertake an operation against drug trafficking being run by some influential people in NWFP. The arrest of some of these powerful people during the operation infuriated the drug barons. Despite attempts made by the ANP leadership to justify the operation, it bitterly failed. Finally, on April 27, 1989, the enraged ANP leadership withdrew its cabinet members, bringing an end to the PPP-ANP coalition.

This left the NWFP open to Sharif who was desirous of making inroads there. After much politicking, he finally succeeded in being able to woo ANP chief Wali Khan, convincing him to join the Muslim League in a coalition government in the province. In June 1989, the ANP entered into an alliance with PML-N which survived till 1998, only to break down again on differences regarding the Kalabagh dam and renaming of the frontier province.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1275386/leaf-from-history-politics-and-lies"]Leaf from History: Politics and lies[/URL]
[B]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, August 7th, 2016[/B]

August 21st, 2016
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"]The ‘dawn of a new era’ that remained a dream[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

For over 28 years, no Indian premier had visited Pakistan — a situation underscored by recent hostilities between the South Asian neighbours. On December 29, 1988, the status quo changed: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi set foot in Islamabad in an attempt to usher in a new, more peaceful era for Indo-Pak relations.

Gandhi arrived in the capital on the morning of the 29th, seemingly to attend the fourth summit meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc) which was to be held the December 29 to the 31.

But behind the scenes, both the Indian and Pakistani governments had been working overtime to ensure that the visit did indeed take place.

For Benazir, who had assumed the office of prime minister only four weeks ago, this was the first opportunity to host leaders from across the region and liaise with them. After she had been sworn in, Rajiv had sent her a message of felicitation and expressed hope that their mutual efforts could bring about peace and prosperity to both countries and the region at large.

Indeed, the last Indian premier to visit Pakistan was Rajiv’s grandfather, Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru, who had arrived in 1960 to pen the historic Indus Basin Water Treaty between the two countries. The treaty had cooled political temperatures back then, and diplomatic circles were hopeful that Rajiv’s visit would thaw the ice in bilateral relations ever since.

Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Pakistan in 1988 was heralded by Benazir Bhutto as a historic departure from over 40 years of hostility
The Saarc moot therefore was an opportunity that couldn’t be squandered by either leader. Security of the presidents and prime ministers of Saarc countries was paramount and appropriate arrangements were therefore being made in the fortnight leading up to the Saarc moot.

Five days before the conference was to begin, a special messenger of Rajiv Gandhi arrived in Islamabad to review security details being made for the Indian premier’s visit. He also called on the prime minister and spoke to her about the extent of normalisation of relationship and the issues she would bring up in the meeting with Gandhi.

On behalf of Rajiv, an invitation was also extended to Benazir to visit India. She duly accepted the request but was advised to delay announcing her decision till the meeting between the two leaders was held; the announcement would be made by her later on.

On the first morning of the moot, December 29, the Indian prime minister and his team arrived. The delegation included Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, his wife Sonia, son Rahul and daughter Priyanka. A reception chamber had been set up at the airport to welcome them; the reception party included President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, various political leaders, as well as high-ranking military and civilian officials.

Within two hours of their arrival, Rajiv and Benazir had the first of their meetings. Held in a cordial atmosphere, this meeting would set the tone for their respective teams to iron things out.

In the evening, while other guests were being hosted by other high officials, Rajiv and his family enjoyed Benazir’s hospitality at a dinner hosted at the PM House. Bhutto’s spouse, Asif Zardari, and mother, Begum Nusrat Bhutto, were also present.

This dinner paved the way for the normalisation of bilateral relations as Bhutto later remarked: “I am sure each of us will give our best and I hope the time would come when historians would point to your time in India and my time in Pakistan for heralding the dawn of a new era.” The Indian negotiating team beamed at this comment.

At the Saarc meeting, attended by leaders from India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives, discussions were held as per the agenda that had been agreed upon. All leaders emphasised the need for such meetings and called for action on the decisions taken.

Some speeches, however, somewhat embarrassed Benazir Bhutto. For instance, General Irshad Hussain of Bangladesh and President J.R. Jayawardene of Sri Lankan paid tributes to Pakistani despot Gen Ziaul Haq and expressed their condolences on his death. Gen Irshad went on to say that Gen Zia was the founder of the Saarc.

Being the host, it was not easy for Bhutto to sit there and hear praise for the man who hanged her father. When she rose to deliver her address, she ignored the remarks about Gen Zia and paid rich tributes to Shaikh Mujibur Rahman of Bangladesh and former Sri Lankan leader Bandaranaike. The first day ended on a positive and encouraging note.

On the second day of the moot, after attending regular business, Benazir and Rajiv met separately and were later joined by their respective foreign ministers. During the two-hour meeting, they discussed many issues including Kashmir.

Rajiv did not budge from the traditional Indian stand on the disputed territory; however, he emphasised that they should talk openly on the subject. But as the meeting progressed, he did not find much to support or concede in the Pakistani viewpoint on Kashmir. Rajiv concluded the discussion by calling the Kashmir issue a “dead horse.”

Besides general agreements on various issues, the two leaders inked the Nuclear Non-aggression Agreement between the two countries. Both India and Pakistan suffered a great sense of insecurity about their nuclear plants, and with this accord, both prime ministers pledged not to attack or assist foreign powers to attack either country’s nuclear installations and facilities.

On December 31, the last day of the Saarc summit moot, the two prime ministers met without aides. Later, they held a joint press conference to inform the press that two key issues had not been brought up during discussions: namely, India’s withdrawal from Siachen and Pakistan’s alleged support to the Khalistan movement.

Despite some disappointments, it was widely believed that Rajiv-Benazir meetings held on the sidelines of the Saarc summit were the dawn of a new era in Pakistan-India ties.

Almost 28 years later, we still wait for that new era.

[B]Source:[/B] [URL="http://www.dawn.com/news/1278747/the-dawn-of-a-new-era-that-remained-a-dream"]The ‘dawn of a new era’ that remained a dream[/URL]
[B][I]Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine August 21st, 2016[/I][/B]