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  #21  
Old Wednesday, October 05, 2016
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Default September 25th, 2016

CPEC and looking northwest


PAKISTAN is under constant diplomatic stress, and needs to come up with some effective responses to counter Indian diplomatic coercion. The country is not lacking in policy and intellectual strength. However, there is a very simple reason for its defensive diplomatic posture: the presence of non-state actors on its soil. These entities have become a strategic burden for Pakistan and consume a considerable amount of its diplomatic and political energies at the regional and global levels. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s speech at the United Nations General Assembly could have been more potent and effective had the attack on the Uri military camp not taken place. Though nothing has been proven yet as to who was responsible, India has reacted as usual by blaming Pakistan.

The recent stand-off with India over the violence in India-held Kashmir, and China’s support for Pakistan’s stance on the issue were also expected. However, China is also concerned about non-state actors based in Pakistan and considers them a major threat to the security of the economic corridor. The role of these elements in fanning extremist tendencies in the country is also viewed with disquiet by our CPEC partner. The impression that a few banned organisations are as happy about CPEC as the average Pakistani does not please Beijing’s intelligentsia. It was irritating for them when the head of a banned organisation announced that his group would provide security to the corridor.

Afghanistan and Iran are not just our neighbours but can also become partners in the economic corridor.
In the stressful environment created by India’s coercive diplomacy, what could be a source of optimism for Pakistan? The answer is simple: CPEC. The security and political establishments are both obsessed with CPEC for different reasons. While the security establishment is calculating the strategic advantages it will offer, the ruling party is trying to extract maximum electoral campaign leverage from it. Both are treating CPEC as the ultimate solution to most of the country’s problems, mainly in the economic sphere. But is it too simplistic to view it as a ‘game changer’?

CPEC could indeed be a game changer, but a comprehensive review of internal and regional policies is a prerequisite to enjoy all of CPEC’s perceived advantages. Internally, apart from squeezing the space for violent non-state actors, political consensus is an important factor. Continuous political dialogue among all stakeholders, an active Council of Common Interests, and functional parliamentary and bilateral oversight bodies are imperative for CPEC’s potential to materialise. However, a review of regional policies is equally critical.

No doubt, India’s ‘Act East’ diplomatic strategy is obsessively becoming Pakistan-centric, in which it considers Afghanistan and Iran as vital partners to hurt Pakistan. Meanwhile, although the latter has been struggling to acquire strategic depth in Afghanistan for many decades, its reactive responses in that country have instead given India the advantage. What Pakistan needs is a new ‘north-western policy’ to reduce the strategic stress in its northwest as well as to secure CPEC and increase its geoeconomic potential. The policy should focus not only on the relationship with Afghanistan and Iran but also beyond.

There should be no doubt that regional stability linked with peace in Afghanistan and Iran has an important role in consolidating such gains. Afghanistan and Iran are not merely neighbours of Pakistan but can also become partners in CPEC. Many experts in Beijing believe in such a scenario and its potential to guarantee regional stability.

The Pakistan-Iran relationship should now move beyond memorandums of understanding. Both countries have signed hundreds of MoUs for energy, economic, military and cultural cooperation since the 1980s but very few have materialised. On paper, both countries enjoy friendly and brotherly relations but practically speaking, irritants continue to bedevil their relations. Iran has enormous potential to become a functional partner in CPEC as it is already part of the Chinese Silk Road Economic Belt. The Silk Road train, which connects China’s coastal Zhejiang province with Iran, is a manifestation of the two nations’ shared aspirations. The first Silk Road train arrived in Tehran on Feb 15 this year after travelling over 10,000km. As per calculated assessments, Iran’s involvement in the initiative will boost Pakistan’s economic potential and it was hoped that the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline could become a reality with Chinese funding.

Iranian partnership in CPEC does not require much diplomatic effort, as the country has already shown its willingness to join the project. A statement earlier by the Iranian ambassador to Pakistan was significant, for in it he indicated that the Chabahar port agreement between Iran, India and Afghanistan was “not finished” and “not limited” to these three countries. He also revealed that the offer to build Chabahar port had first been extended to Pakistan and China, but neither had expressed an interest. The Iranian partnership in CPEC could also make it a partner in securing the corridor from non-state actors in Pakistani Balochistan. To achieve this, however, Islamabad has to review its Middle East policy. Pakistan’s relations with Saudi Arabia should not affect its relations with its neighbours and vice versa.

It is important that voices calling for normalising relations with Afghanistan are increasing in Pakistan. The political parties, civil society, and intelligentsia have become vocal supporters of a complete review of bilateral relations between the two neighbours. It cannot yet be said with certainty how the security establishment will look at this growing internal consensus, but this is the time to evolve a realistic framework of engagement with Afghanistan. Islamabad will have to take the initiative.

Certainly, winning the hearts and minds of Afghans would not be an easy task because of historical baggage and multiple other factors. Even though the internal situation in Afghanistan would be quite frustrating, this engagement is essential for improving Pakistan’s internal security, enhancing the potential of CPEC, denying space to hostile countries in Afghanistan and, most importantly, for improving its own international image. Afghanistan is the key to Pakistan’s better relations with the West. Pakistan can capitalise on a long-term friendship treaty with Afghanistan.

Although reconciliation with its north-western neighbours would not be easy, Pakistan will be a major beneficiary of the process. It will enhance its internal security and economic growth, especially at a time when trilateral, quadrilateral and multilateral initiatives have failed to bring stability to the region.

The writer is a security analyst.


Source: CPEC and looking northwest
Published in Dawn September 25th, 2016
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  #22  
Old Sunday, October 09, 2016
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Default October 9th, 2016

Between the intervals


BIG news can trigger a big debate, which is always a healthy process in itself. A well-articulated exchange of ideas has the potential to change our perceptions and positively contribute to the national discourse.

At the joint parliamentary session this week, lawmakers spoke their mind and a few of them asked blunt questions about the continued presence and functioning of some banned militant groups in the country. Probably the most interesting comment on the lawmakers’ criticism of the state’s inaction against these groups that appeared on social media read: “the news [we have] waited for too long.”

Some media reports suggested that the state plans to mainstream banned militant organisations. Many, however, doubt the possibility of such an action and deem it merely distractive rhetoric. Notwithstanding the civilian government’s concerns, growing diplomatic stress and fears of isolation, they do not believe the state actually has a plan to get rid of the banned organisations. Even if such a course of action is adopted, it will take more than a decade to dilute the effect that banned groups have had on society. Some are sceptical the establishment is changing its approach or that it believes these groups can be mainstreamed. Most analysts nevertheless agree that there is now an opportunity to completely neutralise such regressive forces.

These are important views in the debate about the future of non-state actors in Pakistan. Most of them are based on a very simplistic view of the militant groups. There is a common perception that these proxies of the state can be rolled back easily. The fact is, many other states have nurtured militant movements as strategic assets, but they later discovered it was a fallacy to assume they would continue to serve as proxies.

Militant groups in Pakistan have been allowed to restructure the national identity.
The issue of non-state actors is extremely complex in the Pakistani context. Many groups tagged as proxies not only caused diplomatic problems for the country, but gradually they also took control of state narratives to emerge as a new far right that is not only interfering in ‘strategic affairs’ but also shrinking the space for mainstream politics. In fact, sometimes it becomes difficult to conceive of them within the narrow framework of a ‘proxy’.

These militant groups were not merely used as foreign policy tools, but were also allowed to restructure the national identity. Some militant groups reoriented existing nationalism and further narrowed it to religio-nationalism and generated hyper religio-nationalism. This happened so slowly that the risks were not assessed until the damage was done. Religious nationalism is similar to ‘purification’ — it moves towards religious extremes to attain enriching ‘self-righteousness’.

It is an exclusionary process that does not shape or follow the course of traditional nationalism. Instead, as it becomes more exclusionary, elements of religious sectarianism and socio-political hate narratives become part of its defining characteristics. Many religious nationalists become more faith-centric and ‘nationalism’ becomes meaningless for them. Al Qaeda and the militant Islamic State group would be examples of such extreme entities.

As far as the probability of mainstreaming or reintegrating non-state actors is concerned, the characteristics of non-state actors in Pakistan first need to be identified. There are five types of militant groups existing in the country; foreign, tribal, sectarian, new urban militants, and conventional militant groups. All these have many commonalities, but it is the conventional militant groups that are considered the proxies once used in Afghanistan and India-held Kashmir.

If the state is really considering the reintegration of the conventional militant groups, a three-fold strategy contingent on one important condition must be adopted. The condition is the complete disengagement between the conventional militant actors and the state institutions because no reintegration strategy can work otherwise.

As the first step of the strategy, the government can offer amnesty to banned groups that agree to abide by the Constitution; quit and denounce all kinds of violence and militant activities inside and outside the country; shun all criminal activities, including the propagation of hate material; and most importantly, register themselves with the relevant authorities/departments. A separate mechanism for their registration and monitoring can be evolved at the federal or provincial level.

The second step would be the monitoring phase in which the groups’ activities would be restricted and monitored. They would not be allowed to issue press releases or publish any kind of material. Those among their leaders and members found to have been involved, in their individual capacity, in any act of terrorism, hate speech and other unlawful activities, should be made to face a court of law. This phase can last between three to five years depending on the group’s profile.

The risk of attrition always remains high in these groups and many individuals and small factions continue to break away and join other militant groups. A rehabilitation programme for splintering members should also be created. The army is running rehabilitation centres for militant detainees, but rehabilitation requirements for conventional militants are different. They need ideological and political rehabilitation as well. This is the real challenge. Does the state have the politico-ideological resources to neutralise violent ideological tendencies among the conventional militant groups?

No doubt the reintegration of militants should be a priority for the state but it should not be the only one. Comprehensively implementing the National Action Plan would serve to reduce the space for them further. These groups camouflage themselves in national narratives. They seek legitimacy from national crisis situations, such as earthquakes or floods, but regional hostilities remain their primary source of strength. Tensions between Pakistan and India in particular provide them the means to justify their existence. The result is massive confusion among the people as to who is the real custodian of the national interest.

Nevertheless, all this is for later. The first requirement is the absolute resolve of the state. When Gen Musharraf banned such groups in January 2002, it had triggered a similar kind of optimism. It was big news at that time, but with the benefit of hindsight, we know what transpired between then and now.

The writer is a security analyst.

Source: Between the intervals
Published in Dawn, October 9th, 2016
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