GOOD governance, human rights and individual freedoms, and rule of law are among the main features of democracy. A democratic state cannot choose one, or some, of these and reject others. Common citizens may see good governance as a priority because this is directly linked to their daily life needs. But the significance of freedom and other attributes of democracy cannot be discounted; they are equally important to fulfil one’s physical and emotional needs. Denying emotional, spiritual and aesthetic needs to people does not mean these cease to exist. This is as simple as it is evident.

Complexities arise when certain state institutions or groups of people start to believe that people need only what the power elites think they need. Eventually, the power elites start seeing the people as their subjects who have only physical needs; other needs, in their eyes, fall in the domain of religion. At the same time, these elites try to also regulate religion because they fear ‘miscreants’ can exploit it and create trouble in the way of good governance.

Although the Muslim world on the whole is facing this dilemma, the Arab world is a chronic example of this model of governance that looks after only the physical needs of the people. The Arab Spring epitomised the fact that people are not merely subjects; nor are their needs merely physical. In some cases, power elites provided more space to their people to resolve the crisis. In others, power elites refused to do so thus plunging their states into turmoil. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult for power elites in these countries to use this model of governance as a tool to suppress freedom and democracy.

Ironically, Muslim countries including Pakistan, which are in a process of democratic transition, still seek inspiration from failed models. One’s interaction with power elites in Islamabad would suggest that the concepts of democracy and freedom do not figure in the latter’s ideas of statebuilding. For instance, Middle Eastern controlled-regime models continue to inspire many retired military top officials and some of them even talk about replicating these models in Pakistan. In their case, it is understandable because they come from a disciplined background, but when former diplomats and bureaucrats also start advocating the same, it surprises many. Pakistani political elites, too, have similar views: many politicians see Turkey and Malaysia as model states in terms of governance, democracy and freedom of expression.

Interestingly, an overwhelming majority of former civil and military officials and politicians also admire Chinese political and governance models even though they know that despite many commonalities, they cannot be fully adopted in Pakistan. Dig deep into their mind and sources of inspiration and you will find one common thing: desire for a controlled regime in Pakistan. Political leaders, however, favour controlled freedom through the power of the vote.

Another important common factor in their thought processes is that they conceive of democracy only in the electoral perspective. They hardly believe in other democratic values. Here they use religion as a crutch to argue that the people already have a socio-political code of life provided by religion. This dichotomy exists in other parts of the Muslim world as well. A debate on the compatibility between Islam and democracy still consumes the intellectual energy of Muslim scholars.
In Pakistan’s context, this discourse provides an opening for the partnership between the religious clergy and security and political power elites. In many instances in the past, the first segment became a beneficiary in the power-sharing mechanism and developed a comfortable working relationship with both civilian and military rulers. The religious elite’s ability to manipulate street power and provide ideological narratives in support of power elites has furthered their own religious-ideological cause as well.

The sustainability and legitimacy of regimes also depends on two institutions: judiciary and media, which limit the absolute power of the state. Both institutions address the need for justice and freedom and enjoy comparatively more freedom in democratic regimes, but controlling these institutions is a desire that remains alive among states in democratic transition. No doubt the process of democratisation takes time, but the media and judiciary are major instruments in this process. If these institutions are not functioning well, that means a blockage has occurred in the transition process.
Many scholars maintain that the true spirit of pluralistic and secular democracy has never been followed in the country. For instance, renowned scholar Kamran Tahir believes that the Objectives Resolution of 1949 allowed undue space to religious elements in the country’s social and political set-up. As a consequence, political instability and authoritarianism became an abiding feature. Other scholars see democracy from the perspective of governance and advocate that democracy is not the final or only form of governance. Among them, a few argue in the socio-political context and assert that it is only the elites who rule in the name of democracy. Others bring in the religious argument to advocate that justice should be the ultimate objective of any form of governance.

The latter point of view is closely aligned to that of religious scholars who also believe only in the electoral process. Non-democratic tendencies among the religious clergy are very common in Pakistan. Religiously inspired militants also borrow this argument from the clergy that democracy is contrary to Islam. All shades of religious clergy have strong belief in religious identity and value it above democratic norms. The authoritarian power elites see no problem in these views and narratives but are against violent struggle for achieving the objectives. The power elites believe that non-violent clerics should help the state build counter-narratives against violence.

Pakistan is not part of the Gulf or Middle East region. Nor is it located in Central Asia or North Africa. It cannot pull itself out from the South Asian region. Though the state of democracy, good governance and freedom of expression is not satisfactory in the region, its fate is nevertheless linked with democratic institutionalisation.
What else could be the counter-narrative to extremism than democracy, good governance and freedom of expression?

Published in Dawn, October 11th, 2015
www.dawn.com

THE rising profile of the self-styled Islamic State (IS) terrorist group among Islamist militant and extremist outfits and also factions of Muslim populations has become an international issue. In Pakistan, while the media and security analysts have been hinting at the group’s growing influence, particularly since September last year, different government departments and agencies have come up with contradictory assessments. After almost every terrorist attack, speculation starts about the presence and involvement of IS in terrorist activities in Pakistan. But the law-enforcement agencies have so far not found any clear proofs of the IS connection in particular incidents of terrorism. However, the IS’s announcement of its Khorasan chapter early this year — which also includes Pakistan and Afghanistan — and some Pakistani militant groups’ and commanders’ pledges of allegiance or support to the group indicates the looming threat. The situation requires a comprehensive assessment of the nature of the threat.

The influence and inspiration of the Islamic State had started to become visible in Pakistan last year in the form of some militant groups’ expression of support and allegiance to IS as well as the appearance of graffiti and pamphlets in support of the extremist outfit. The appreciation for IS among Pakistani militants is neither new nor recent. Reports about Pakistani militants joining insurgents fighting the Assad regime in Syria appeared in 2013. Ideologically, it was the anti-Shia appeal that attracted Pakistani militants mainly having a sectarian orientation such as the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and factions of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan.

Although there is minimal likelihood of IS itself coming to Pakistan or Afghanistan, the region does run the danger of IS-inspired groups forging alliances and carrying out attacks or trying to capture certain areas, mainly in the Pak-Afghan border region. Secondly, IS will be more than ready to exploit its influence among militants in the region to get more human resources, which it badly needs to sustain control of the areas it occupies in Iraq and Syria. Apart from Pakistani and Afghan militants, IS would also be interested in developing relationships with militant organisations that are active in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchestan province and have a presence in the Pakistan-Iran border region, such as Jundullah and Jaishul Adl.

Currently, most of the Pakistani Taliban militants who pledged allegiance to IS, have crossed into Afghanistan due to the ongoing military operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas. The smaller groups and individuals, which are inspired by IS, are trying to develop linkages directly with the outfit in Iraq and Syria or its so-called Khorasan chapter. There are three main factors which will determine the future trends of IS influence in Pakistan. The first factor is linked to the Pakistani state’s efforts to achieve security, eliminate militant groups and reduce the appeal of extremist ideologies. In the short to medium term, that is contingent upon how the ongoing security operations — mainly in Fata and Karachi — proceed and conclude, and how the National Action Plan is implemented by the federal and provincial governments. In the long term, too, a lot will depend on the state’s political and military willingness to sustain its counter-militancy and counterextremism efforts. The second factor will be related to the emerging security situation and IS influence in Afghanistan, and how Pakistan and Afghanistan develop and implement border security and counter-militancy cooperation. Thirdly, the IS influence in Pakistan will also be linked to the fate of the outfit and conflicts in the Middle East, mainly in Iraq and Syria.

The Islamic State’s foothold and influence are stronger in Afghanistan than in Pakistan. Despite the group’s apparent growing inspiration and influence in the eastern and southern provinces of Afghanistan, in the beginning the Afghan National Directorate of Security continuously denied the emerging threat and denounced IS as “Haqqani or Taliban militants”. That was partly true, because those raising the IS flag were either local fighters from Afghan Taliban factions or foreign militants of Central Asian origin, but it did not make the threat any less grave. However, Pakistan would not be able to counter the threat alone if the protracted conflict in Afghanistan worsens and Pakistani and Afghan militants inspired by IS try to capture territory along the Pak-Afghan border area for establishing an Islamic ‘caliphate’. The Pak-Afghan border is porous with limited control over cross-border movements. A worsening situation in Afghanistan will eventually affect Pakistan, particularly if both countries fail to develop an effective joint border security and counter-militancy mechanism, or at least cooperation. At the same time, a lot will depend on how IS sustains its momentum in Iraq and Syria and succeeds in maintaining its control over the territories it has captured. If IS remains relevant and successful for a longer period of time — which currently appears probable — it can also cause frustration in the cadres of groups and the student wings of religious-political parties in Pakistan that believe in non-violent struggle for the establishment of a caliphate.

From Afghanistan’s perspective, failure of the Afghan government and security forces to effectively respond to the threat, or an escalation of conflict in the country, could allow the IS-inspired militants operating in Afghanistan to forge alliances and try to capture some area and announce a ‘caliphate’. If Kabul achieves some sort of reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban — currently efforts are under way for this purpose — hard-line factions or commanders among the Afghan Taliban who do not believe in political reconciliation could support the IS, strengthening the ISinspired groups already operating in the country. At the same time, the Afghan Taliban may not be able to grab hold of the reins of power but by following the IS model; in case they do not achieve reconciliation with the government in Kabul, they could carve out a part of Afghan territory and proclaim an Islamic ‘caliphate’.
Published in Dawn, August 23rd, 2015
http://www.dawn.com/news/1202210/ass...-the-is-threat

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"The greatest glory in living lies not in never falling ,but in rising every time we fall". (Nelson Mandela)

RENOWNED American scholar Jessica Stern along with J.M. Berger has tried to understand the evolution of the selfstyled Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS) in their recently published book, ISIS: The State of Terror. The book provides a comprehensive account of factors which have contributed to the genesis and transformation of the IS. Stern is a leading expert on terrorism and has authored many books on the subject. Berger has similar credentials, but his focus has largely remained on the US. Their collaborative effort provides an analysis of the emerging threats in Iraq and Syria, where Islamist ‘jihadists’ have not only captured certain territories but are also front runners on the social media. The IS has expanded the war from physical to virtual spaces, which has made the challenge of terrorism more complex.
The Jihadist movements have evolved to a level where establishing a state does not seem like an ambitious goal, at least for some of them. The IS is an advanced-level jihadist movement. The group has crossed all limits of brutality by using the act of beheading as a means of marketing, manipulation, and recruitment. The initial chapters focus on the circumstances which provided a favourable environment to jihadists in Iraq to form the terrorist group. The IS was the brainchild of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jorda-nian thug-turned-terrorist. The 2003 invasion of Iraq provided him the reason to establish the group. The book provides a background of the events which nurtured the character of Zarqawi and his movement. However, the US and its Western allies, who continued to downplay the role of the upstart jihadists for months, are also blamed. According to the authors, this downplay came as most Americans and other Westerners were disillusioned and exhausted by more than 10 years of a costly ‘war on terror’. ‹ Paul Bremer, the former head of the coalition provisional authority in Iraq, was the man behind the assessment of the Iraqi situation after the eruption of civil war and policy decisions complicated the scenario. The initiatives taken in the name of state-building proved fatal and widened the sectarian divide in Iraq, which was exploited by Zarqawi. The authors believe that Bremer’s decisions of disbanding the military and firing all members of Saddam Hussein’s ruling Ba’ath Party from civil service positions proved counter-productive. More than 100,000 Sunni Ba’athists were removed from the government and military, leaving them unemployed, angry, and in the case of military personnel, armed.

These policies triggered sectarian tensions, which were intensely mixed with local and regional politics. Post-war Iraq was a recipe for sectarian conflict and Zarqawi wasted little time in exploiting the situation and intensifying these tensions. Later, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi exploited the same tendencies in Syria. The second factor which contributed to the formation of the IS was the growing ideological radicalisation in Iraqi prisons. The prisons facilitated radicalisation among the prisoners, many among whom were not jihadists but were unemployed citizens and were either paid or coerced into the resistance movement. The head of the IS, Baghdadi, exploited the situation when he was in Camp Bucca prison. The prison also proved to be a key transformative agent for Zarqawi. The book also discusses the factors which contributed in developing the ideological perspective of Zarqawi: a Jordanian jihadist scholar, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, shaped the mindset of the ter-rorist. Maqdisi was the “bookish fatwah monk, and Zarqawi was the man who tested his theories in real time and a real war”. Apart from Maqdisi, two other jihadist ideologues had contributed in developing the contours of the IS: Abu Bakr Naji and Abu Musab al-Suri. Naji’s book The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage through Which the Umma Will Pass was a compilation of lessons learned from previous jihadist failures, as well as advancement in thinking about the movement’s future direction. Written in 2004, the book outlined the following stages of the jihadist struggle:

"Disruption and exhaustion: in which terrorist attacks damage the economy of the enemy power and demoralise their population; Management of savagery: a phase of violent resistance with an em-phasis on carrying out acts of highly visible violence, intended to send a message to both allies and enemies and; Empowerment: the establishment of regions controlled by jihadists that can subse-quently grow and unite towards the goal of recreation of the ‘Caliphate’.”

The IS has adopted the same strategy for the future. Suri’s 1,600-page book The Call to a Global Islamic Resistance was the second book which influenced Zarqawi. In this book, Suri advocates leaderless jihad and strategies such as the use of the so-called lone-wolf attacks. The book describes the background of the differences between Al Qaeda and Zarqawi, which later caused a permanent division between two camps. Al Qaeda top leaders were never happy with Zarqawi’s ‘ultra radical’ views, but ironically, it was the invasion of Iraq that pushed Zarqawi into an alliance with Osama bin Laden and led to Al Qaeda’s enduring presence in Iraq. The alliance could not be converted into a long-term relationship and cracks appeared again when Zarqawi announced the establishment of the IS.
While describing the cognitive relationship between Al Qaeda and the IS, the authors see Al Qaeda as the intellectual side of the jihadist movement, which was the spark, and the IS provided gaso-line to give the flame. The Al Qaeda model is based on a framework of attracting fighters first and radicalising them later, but the IS sought recruits and supporters who are further down the path toward ideological radicalisation or more inclined by personal disposition towards violence. “Al Qaeda’s vision is — often explicitly — nihilistic. The IS, for all its barbarity, is both more pragmatic and more utopian,” the book says. The authors see differences between the two jihadist movements as the conflict of visions and their assessment is that the winner of the war between Al Qaeda and the IS will wield tremendous influence over the tactics and goals of the next generation of jihadists. In fact, Al Qaeda itself was the beneficiary of the resistance and separatist movements of Muslim countries and territories, from Philippines to Kashmir and Palestine to Bosnia. These movements were ‘Islamised’ in Afghanistan, and Al Qaeda had absorbed the human resources while connecting them in a brotherhood relationship. The IS has further transformed the jihadist movements and provided a new model, which is broad in ideological and political perspectives and diverse in its war and communication strategies and tactics. The authors argue that the IS’s accomplishments will have long-term ramifications for jihadists and other extremist movements that may learn from its tactics. The most important part of the book is about the propaganda wars which the IS is fighting in virtual spaces, getting results in physical form. The IS has learned from the ineffective communication struggles of Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups. Al Qaeda chapters and affiliates had very loose and unreliable communication networks and the group was following Suri’s strategy of leaderless resistance. A few chapters of the book are devoted to analysing the communication and propaganda strategies of the IS. The chapter titled ‘From Vanguard to Smart Mob’ describes how Al Qaeda affiliates were trying to convey their messages to their top leadership; successful attempts nurtured well-crafted communication strategies focused on the use of the social media. The authors say: “Offline, ISIS followed the model of a functional-if-limited government. Online, it played a different game. It amassed and empowered a ‘smart mob’ of thousands of individuals, which shared its ideology and cheered its success.” Since the war against the Soviets, jihadists have been using video and print media in sophisticated ways, but the IS has successfully managed to enter the burgeoning world of the social media. The writers say that killing civilians and destroying infrastructure are not typically a terrorist organisation’s end goals. Rather, they are a means to provoke a political reaction; the social media, too, help achieve that purpose. In this perspective, the book also refers to a study conducted by Google Ideas which estimated that at least 45,000 pro-IS accounts were online between September and November 2014, along with thousands more pro-IS bot and spam accounts.

A chapter is devoted to psychological warfare. The authors state: “Terror can make us strike back at the wrong enemy, for the wrong reasons or both”. The perceptions matter in risk assessments and the IS, through its brutal acts, has expanded the limits of risks. The authors raise the question: “Is ISIS deliberately trying to create a society with an appetite for violent aggression?” And they come up with the answer: “It is impossible to know ISIS’s conscious intentions in this regard, but either way, the result of its rule in Syria and Iraq will no doubt be a deeply traumatised generation and a host of new challenges from within.” There are some solutions and strategies suggested on developing counter-narratives. Most of these suggestions are already known. Different nations are trying to respond in their own way, but what is missing is a collective response. In this context, the book recommends a conference be dedicated to airing IS strategies publically, with participation from both the public and private sector, with an eye towards establishing some consistent, reasonable practices and clearly defined areas that require more study on the resolution of more complicated questions. The Summit on Countering Violent Extremism early this year in the White House was an attempt in this direction, but nothing concrete was achieved. It seems the international community is still underplaying the threat. Overall the book provides a good narration and explanation of events from 2003 onwards to the inception of the IS. This is an essential read for those who deal with security issues; the book also has a lot to offer to students of religious studies and radical movements.

http://www.dawn.com/news/1212163/cov...tate-of-terror

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"The greatest glory in living lies not in never falling ,but in rising every time we fall". (Nelson Mandela)

NO state can stay isolated or afford isolation in this age of globalisation. One recent example of this has been the crisis of the self-styled Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. The West tried to avoid it but it has reached its doorsteps. Afghanistan can be seen as another example of treading the Iraqi path. Though US President Barack Obama has announced some adjustments to his exit plan, it remains to be seen if Afghanistan gets due world attention before the situation gets worse and matters slide to a point where it becomes another Iraq. As far as the European countries are concerned, they have already enough to deal with because of the severe Syrian refugee crisis that has gripped them. According to the human rights body Amnesty International, only five countries — Turkey, Lebano Jordan, Iraq and Egypt — host 95pc of the Syrian refugees. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), some 150,000 Syrian refugees have taken asylum in the European Union, largely in Germany.

The Gulf states have also accommodated a large number of the refugees. They, however, claim that the refugees come to their countries with passports and go to the European nations without this travel document. According to official claims, in the Gulf countries, those fleeing Syria get a residential work visa, but the confirmed number of refugees accommodated is as yet not known.*There is no doubt that networks of human smugglers have played a key role in changing the refugees’ direction towards Europe and they are still diverting their movements in the Mediterranean countries, from where they flee in the direction of other states of Europe. It is interesting that after the crisis erupted in Syria, the rich and upper middle-income groups started migration in different directions including the Mediterranean countries and North America. These countries have seen an opportunity in their displacement as many of the migrants bring with them financial and intellectual capital. The recent waves of migrants belonging to middle-income groups are looking for better economic opportunities and cannot provide immediate benefit to the countries where they seek refuge.

This is a globalised world and the impact of such a crisis cannot be confined to a single state or region. Even Afghanistan and Pakistan are suffering because of the refugee crisis. According to UNHCR web sources, Pakistan is still on top when it comes to hosting the largest refugee population in the world. It has almost 1.5 million registered Afghan refugees. After the crisis in Syria, UNHCR has curtailed funds for their rehabilitation, which will affect the return of the Afghan refugees to their homeland.
Tragedies worsen when nations start ‘avoiding’ a crisis because of their respective political and strategic interests. But their sense of politics can be completely misplaced. As an example consider the situation in Yemen. The international community is ignoring the human tragedy in Yemen, where thousands of people have been killed and millions are living in miserable conditions. Even the tragic images coming from Yemen have failed to draw the international community’s attention towards the war-torn country. This is a looming crisis. If avoided, it will not remain confined to Yemen and will spill over the latter’s boundaries. Europe has its own economic complexities. But it also sees the influx of the refugees in a broader socio-cultural, religious and political perspective. Though most European nations are welcoming refugees, dissenting voices are not weak in those countries. There is a consensus in the international community that unless the issues in Iraq, Syria and Libya are resolved, the migrant crisis will continue.

However, Nato countries are reluctant to fix these issues through direct military interventions. Their experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya have proved to them that removing regimes is not impossible but dealing with postregime change is very difficult, especially because it involves the rebuilding of post-conflict states from scratch. This is one of the major reasons that they are tolerating Russian strikes against the self-styled Islamic State in Syria. There are no easy answers to the Middle Eastern conflicts, especially when regional actors and their global allies have divergent strategic and political ambitions. These divergent interests also impact the managing of religious and cultural diversities. In a conflict, societies lose the essence of celebrating their religious and cultural diversities. The options left for the world is to evolve a long-term, economic framework for the resolution of this problem from a religious and cultural perspective. The international community, especially the West, is trying to evolve an approach that engages states and civil societies, mainly religious communities, for interfaith, inter-sectarian and cultural harmony, to help secure vulnerable religious and cultural minorities living in conflict zones and also persuade migrants from these lands to adopt a more expansive approach.

Recently, an international conference on religious and cultural pluralism and peaceful coexistence in the Middle East was organised by the Greek foreign ministry and attended by political, diplomatic and religious leaders as well as academicians from Europe and the Middle East. The conference reaffirmed that there is a need for enhancing dialogues within and among religions and cultures. The conference also sought to contribute to raising awareness of these pressing issues and enhancing international efforts for the immediate humanitarian relief of these communities. ‹ Such initiatives are indeed ambitious and depend on the active participation of civil society. Certainly, civil society in the Middle East is not strong enough to take up the task. However, it was interesting to note that despite increasing direct and indirect cyber interactions within communities and individuals, a real understanding of each other is still missing, which is the essence of peaceful coexistence. Perhaps that is because of the weak institutions of dialogue in the world.

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"The greatest glory in living lies not in never falling ,but in rising every time we fall". (Nelson Mandela)

DEALING with militancy might be easy, but dealing with militant groups is not. At least this seems true in Pakistan. The country has achieved significant successes in its war against terrorism, but is still confused on how to deal with banned militant groups. The recent notification issued by the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Pemra), banning the media coverage of proscribed organisations, has triggered a controversy within different government departments. While this controversy has exposed the policy-level ambiguity about the status of different extremist organisations, it has also provided groups such as Jamaatud Dawa (JuD) and its charity wing an opportunity to once again dismiss the government action as part of the Western and Indian campaign against them.

At the same time, the Pemra notice has also exposed the differences between the information and interior ministries over the implementation of the National Action Plan. Just a few hours after the issuance of the notice, the federal interior ministry came up with a response; later it was known that the notice was issued on the instructions of the information ministry. The information ministry appeared to know little about militant organisations in Pakistan, as apparently no official list of banned groups was provided to it. The status of the list of banned organisations attached with the Pemra notification has become dubious after the rebuttal from the interior ministry.

In August this year, Federal Interior Minister Nisar Ali Khan had proudly announced that a comprehensive list of 62 proscribed organisations had been compiled. But very little is known about these banned outfits as no official list is available. The National Counter-Terrorism Authority, which is supposed to disseminate such information, was also reluctant to release the list of banned organisations. It is interesting to note that Nacta’s website was shut down after a list of banned organisations posted on it had generated controversy. It was claimed that the list was not official and since then the website of the counterterrorism body has been ‘under construction’.

The media reports claim that the Pemra notification was in line with the joint communiqué issued by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and US President Barack Obama during the former’s recent trip to Washington D.C., and obligations under UN Resolution 1267. If this is the case, why did the interior ministry issue a rebuttal? Notwithstanding bureaucratic excuses for failure to check the activities of militant groups, let’s take a candid and broader view of the issue. Are the extremist groups needed in Pakistan to balance the extremist and ultranationalist groups in India? Is a Pakistani Shiv Sena necessary to respond to anti-Pakistan rhetoric in India? And above all, do we need competition with India in the field of extremism as well? Pakistan has made significant gains against terrorists, while the state and society are in the process of finding solutions to the growing extremist tendencies in the country. We cannot afford to derail our journey to a more moderate mindset — the journey has come after long sufferings and sacrifices — just to remain ‘relevant’ to India’s so-called start of the slide on the slope of extremism. It is also important to note that in Pakistan many conventional militant groups have taken refuge behind anti-Indian rhetoric. This is happening at a time when mainstream political and even leading religious parties see no political and public advantage in encouraging active anti-India propaganda. This is a positive change in Pakistan, but it also provides the opportunity to groups such as the JuD to exploit the situation in their favour. But the militant credentials of these groups are a major obstacle in the way of achieving legitimacy and public support. Would it not be enough for the common man in Pakistan to take pride in not indulging in negative competition with India? Another issue in dealing with the banned groups may be the lack of a strategy on part of the government. The argument that the militant groups were nurtured in the country for many decades and reversing the phenomenon will take time could be valid only if the government was taking some initiatives to control them. It’s hard to deny the charity role of certain groups — mainly the JuD — but the government has not taken any steps for their proper reintegration. To address this problem, a multipronged reintegration framework is needed in order to neutralise the existing violent extremist tendencies among the conventional militant groups and remove them from the terrorism landscape. Under this scheme, the government can offer amnesty to banned groups that agree to give an undertaking that they will obey the Constitution of Pakistan, quit and denounce all kinds of violence and militant activities, shun all criminal activities including spreading hate messages, and most importantly will register themselves with the relevant authorities/departments.

A separate mechanism for their registration and monitoring can be evolved at the federal or provincial level. The registration of such militant groups should not be a problem for the interior ministry, as it has now acquired sufficient relevant experience through registering the international non-governmental organisations. The JuD’s case is complex as it claims that it does not have any direct link with the banned Lashkar-e-Taiba. But the Pemra notification said that the JuD and Falah-i-Insaniyat Foundation are also reincarnations of the banned LeT. However, it is the responsibility of the JuD leadership to prove that it does not have any links to terrorism and terrorist groups. A public declaration should be acceptable for the people and the international community only when its publications stop projecting the activities of LeT and glorifying militancy. The JuD leadership should realise that the world is neither blind nor deaf.
Published in Dawn, November 8th, 2015
http://www.dawn.com/news/1218265/dea...-banned-groups

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"The greatest glory in living lies not in never falling ,but in rising every time we fall". (Nelson Mandela)

THE wounds of last year’s terrorist attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar are still fresh and cause for renewing our resolve to finish the job of securing Pakistan’s future. In just one year, since the APS attack, it appears that Pakistani state and society have successfully constructed a narrative of zero tolerance against terrorism. However, the perception that the government woke up only after the APS attack is not true. Some fragmented responses already existed but these were not connected with a broader counterterrorism framework. The National Action Plan was an attempt to fill this void.

Since then, there has been a decline in terrorist attacks in the country, which is the result of the efforts put in by both military and civilian institutions. However, the state’s responses still face structural issues, out of which a few are linked to the capacity of institutions. Most such capacity issues can be addressed with proper attention and providing the required resources to the relevant sectors.

An important issue has been the flaws in the criminal justice system, which needed to be removed. But with the military courts coming to the fore, reforms in the criminal justice system have taken a back seat. Despite some on and off measures to expedite pending cases, the criminal justice system requires a meaningful overhaul.

Meanwhile, confusion continues to mar the functioning of the National Counter Terrorism Authority, the country’s central CT body. For example, does it fall under the prime minister or interior minister? Moreover, without any board meeting held so far, the organisation’s staff lack strategic guidance. Another issue is terror financing, a subject that stays untouched because of the government’s lack of understanding of the web of the militant economy.

The operational and technical assistance and capacitybuilding of police is another important area that needs attention. Training programmes need to be focused on technology-led policing along with attention to management, intelligence-gathering, mobility, and connectivity. At the same time, NAP should prioritise the de-politicisation of the police, which is key to making it a professional force.

There are, however, some areas where the government has made some gains, but with a little more clarity these responses can be made more effective. The country’s existing laws are sufficient for cracking down on hate speech, provided law-enforcement agencies are trained and equipped for this. Instead of having any national strategy to counter hate, the government has opted to regulate public order and check systemic dissemination of hate material. Several militant outfits continue to publish and post material online, which is another challenge. At the same time, the government has to take a closer look at the sectarian mindset, which, supported by discriminatory laws, is a source of religious persecution. The military operations in Fata have weakened terrorist networks, and hampered militants’ capacity to operate freely. But these operations have not completely dismantled such networks. On the other hand, border insecurity has increased due to militants’ crossing over to Afghanistan. Two things are imperative in this perspective: first, political and administrative reforms are needed in the tribal areas, which will not only deny militants a support base but also improve local security structures; and secondly, efforts are required to evolve some broader joint-security mechanism with Afghanistan.

In certain areas, the government’s responses are based on weak perceptions. As a result, measures taken in that regard are not contributing enough in countering terrorism. For one, contrary to the government’s perception, no direct relation between the decline in terror attacks and the resumption of death penalty was found. Such grey areas in responses not only undermine government efforts to eradicate terrorism, they actually are counterproductive.

For instance, NAP stresses on taking action against all sorts of armed groups, including those involved in attacks across the country’s borders. Despite tall claims made by the government, it has not yet released any list of banned outfits in public; it is, therefore, questionable how the government can stop the emergence of such outfits.

The government has taken some measures on the madressah front also, such as by geo-tagging them and asking them to register afresh. Such moves, however, have largely faced resistance from some religious educational boards and clergy. Lately, it was decided in a meeting of the country’s political and military leaders with representatives of madressah educational boards to form a committee for preparing forms to register madressahs and to evolve a mechanism for registering their accounts. However, the fate of this committee is not known as nothing significant has come out of it. The government had also constituted a committee to construct counter-narratives comprising the heads of the madressah educational boards. It is interesting to note that many of the members of this counter-narrative committee have been part of constructing the militants’ narratives in the country. Though the outcome of their revisions has yet to be seen, the committee has not met after its inception. The importance of religious counter- or alternative narratives cannot be denied, but at the same time there is a dire need to reconstruct cultural, social and political narratives. Militant movements here are largely religious in their outlook and have ideological motives but exploit political and social arguments to infiltrate society and create a support base of sympathisers.

One area where the government is completely blank is extremism. It believes that NAP is enough to deal with all security challenges. The intensity of the extremism issue requires a multifold approach with a broader focus on both violent and non-violent individuals and groups. Apart from the educational and curriculum reforms, a creative multipronged reintegration framework is also needed. The government also needs to be vigilant about the newly emerging threats, including the militant Islamic State group. A lot will depend on the Pakistani state’s sustained efforts and will to achieve security and eliminate militant groups and ideologies.

http://www.dawn.com/news/1224473/gaps-in-responses

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"The greatest glory in living lies not in never falling ,but in rising every time we fall". (Nelson Mandela)

CHINA cannot afford a neighbourhood in chaos because that would greatly affect its geo-economic engagements and priorities in the region. China is also worried that if any of its neighbours is caught in turmoil, it could become China’s strategic, political and economic liability.

Apparently, this is a major factor behind China’s growing involvement in Afghanistan’s reconciliation process. This is also linked to China’s geo-economic approach. Conflicts always invite international attention, and in some cases international interventions, which slow down the pace of economic development.

The global and regional situation is changing rapidly and requires an honest and frank review of bilateral relations between Pakistan and China. China sees Pakistan as an important player in the resolution of regional issues. Both are partners in the process of political reconciliation in Afghanistan.

China and Pakistan share a common geopolitical and strategic vision, which provides ground for mutual cooperation in regional and international affairs. However, there are few divergences which hinder them from maximising their strategic, geopolitical and diplomatic gains.

In the Chinese perspective, there are four areas that need review. First is regional peace. The Chinese see Pakistan as holding the key to peace in the region. They believe that the soaring geopolitical temperatures in South Asia cannot lead towards stability in the region, mainly in Afghanistan. Therefore, they think Pakistan can focus on its internal security and economic stability without compromising on its position on disputes with India.

Second, China wants to expand security cooperation with Pakistan. Both countries already have established extensive defence and security ties, but a review is needed of the emerging global and regional dynamics. Pakistan’s internal security matrix has been improving since the launch of military operations against militants in the tribal areas. But the war against terrorism is still on and security threats are changing shape. For instance, the militant Islamic State group has transformed the militant landscape both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Understanding the emerging threat is important and both sides can enhance cooperation in this regard.

The security of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Chinese nationals working in Pakistan is another area of review. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif recently assured Prime Minister Li Keqiang at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit that Pakistan will not compromise on the security of Chinese nationals inside Pakistan. He also briefed him about the initiatives Pakistan has taken thus far to achieve this.


The third area is related to the economic and development cooperation between the two countries. China sees that the Pakistani vision of becoming an ‘Asian Tiger’ is compatible with its ‘one road, one belt’ dream. CPEC is an apt example of that compatibility. However, bureaucratic hurdles and the lack of political consensus delaying the implementation of CPEC-linked projects, are worrying China. For China, this is a flagship project and it wants to see rapid development on that front. It is also viewed in China that a strong and economically vibrant Pakistan would be in a better position to contribute in regional and global stability to secure its strategic interests. The fourth aspect is the importance of people-to-people contacts, which can, for instance, enhance mutual sociocultural understanding. Also, there is plenty of room for mutual cooperation in science, culture, and economic fields where China can help Pakistan build human capital.

China is ready to help Pakistan become economically viable and self-reliant. The current exchanges between China and Pakistan are mainly confined to government officials, public and military institutions, which should be expanded to include representatives of the media and civil society because these two segments can largely contribute towards enhancing mutual understanding. Apparently, a review of the basics of bilateral engagements of the two countries does not seem a hard task, but when one tries to put it in a functional framework certain divergences appear. The major irritant is the conceptual approaches applied by the two countries to resolve certain issues. For instance, from a regional perspective, the Chinese framework of engagement is structured around geo-economics where it wants to evolve economic cooperation without compromising on its position on regional disputes.

However, Pakistan’s approach is to ‘resolve’ disputes before evolving cooperation in nondisputed areas. Pakistan may have legitimate and moral reasons, but this view is hindering it from becoming fully engaged in the emerging regional geo-economics.

Both sides also realise that terrorism is a major challenge to internal and regional security and stability, but here, too, they do not have largely convergent threat perceptions. China is concerned about newly emerging terrorist groups, mainly IS, but Pakistan is in a state of denial about the presence of IS on its soil. For China, the reconciliation process in Afghanistan is important to provide a conducive environment for regional cooperation in economic and trade projects, but Pakistan prioritises its strategic interest in Afghanistan and wants a friendly regime on its western border.

These are a few examples of the divergent views held by China and Pakistan. This is not unusual, and countries do have the right to construct and follow their own frameworks of engagement. Certainly, it is different historical and cultural perspectives which have made the Chinese regional view geo-economic and Pakistan’s geostrategic in orientation. Pakistani officials and scholars are very fond of using the term ‘strategic’ and try to see strategic implications in any local or regional development. An overemphasis on this term can make one blind to other perspectives or prove misleading. However, that does not mean that both sides cannot address those divergent tendencies. Treating China as a partner may provide the common ground for that. So far, Pakistan’s view of China is quite simplistic; it sees China’s friendship in the light of achieving a strategic balance in the region.
The economic advantages are considered a by-product of bilateral relations with China. Regional instability is a nightmare for China. It can play a role in collaborative efforts. The challenge is for Pakistan to make collaborative efforts more productive.

Published in Dawn, December 20th, 2015
http://www.dawn.com/news/1227493/fra...-of-engagement

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"The greatest glory in living lies not in never falling ,but in rising every time we fall". (Nelson Mandela)

THE year gone by was a landmark in the history of Pakistan: militant violence took a steep downward turn. However, the last two weeks of December exposed a new terror fault line — the growing footprint of the militant Islamic State group, or IS, in Pakistan. Apparently, the group has been silently making inroads into the religious segments of Pakistani society.

The unearthing of the reported IS-inspired or affiliated cells in Karachi, Daska and Lahore, many of whose members had apparently travelled to Syria to join the group, and the arrest of two Pakistanis in Turkey suspected of being members of IS brought to the fore some symptoms of the deep-rooted problem of religious extremism in society.

Nonetheless, after encroaching on cyberspace, IS’s Khorasan chapter in Afghanistan is now expanding its outreach through radio transmissions to Fata and the settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The militant groups in Pakistan have also felt the growing influence of IS, because a faction of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan has rejected Baghdadi’s claim of being caliph. Such groups are taking IS as an existential threat to their survival.

IS does not need to do much to become relevant in Pakistan and Afghanistan, as the two countries offer fertile grounds in terms of their pervasive religious-ideological and militant orientations. The group’s inspiration is enough to catalyse existing extremist tendencies in the direction of ultra-extremism, and provide an advanced model to other terrorist groups.

A comparative study of the recently busted IS cells in Pakistan reveals that these were operating for similar causes and had many commonalities in their campaigns, notwithstanding variations in their structures and the profiles of their members. A more detailed study can help us better understand the challenge.

A factor common to the Karachi, Daska and Lahore cells was that these were personal initiatives of their respective members, who consciously decided to join IS.

Another common factor was shared religious-ideological and militant viewpoints and also the backgrounds of the members of these cells, who were found to be against democracy and the Constitution. They considered the Pakistan Army as the custodian of a colonial system and police as the guards of the power elite. There is nothing new in their religious and political views, as all militant and radical forces use the same argument to justify their cause, but they were greatly inspired by the IS approach to achieving the ultimate objective.

Militant strategies play an important role in transforming the landscape, as their operational success attracts the human resource of other organisations working for similar objectives.

The territorial aspect of the IS approach, which focuses on territorial control and the physical presence of a caliphate, holds great attraction for those who believe in the concept. Apparently, the same idea inspired the families of Lahore to travel to a land, where they could practise a complete code of religion.

The educational profiles of the members of all these cells were also similar and their social backgrounds had little variation. They belonged to varying income groups of the middle class but shared the same religious and social values. Like the normal middle class, they had dreams of a better life but their dreams had a religious orientation.

The members of the Daska cell originally belonged to Jamaatud Dawa, but they revolted and joined IS. At least two families of the Lahore cells had been associated with the same group, suggesting that the JuD is losing its members to IS. This may be due to two reasons: first, the Salafi credentials of both groups; and second, the ideological and political dilemma that the JuD is facing. Originally, the JuD was a militant group that contributed to the construction of jihadi culture and narratives in the country. But now it is struggling to put its concept of jihad in a regional domain and at the same time is developing a profile as a charity organisation. This dichotomy is alienating its members.

Even before the emergence of IS, the prime destination of JuD’s alienated members was Al Qaeda. One critical aspect of the JuD is its urban organisational structure in Punjab. This mainly focuses on engaging families, compared to other religious and militant groups that operate primarily in the ‘male’ domain. However the women belonging to the Lahore cells did not get involved in any operational activities inside Pakistan as they sought to travel to Syria. The Karachi and Daska cells had operational tasks as well. The Karachi cell had a connection with the Safoora Goth terrorist incident, and the Daska cell was operating a training camp in a nearby village.

Little is known about the families’ involvement in the Daska cell, but the Karachi cell was advanced, had a complete family syndicate, and its members were not in search of pure lands but eager to perform the obligation of ‘jihad’ inside Pakistan. Their techniques for raising funds and recruitment were quite advanced. The female members were active and, according to media reports, sent requests to well-off women seeking donations for IS through sophisticated messaging. They were also tasked with arranging the marriages of their operatives.

The Daska investigation revealed that a Pakistani national Abu Muavia Salfi was in charge of Pakistani militants in Syria, indicating that there could be more Pakistanis who have interacted with or are members of IS.

These cells, which had no links to each other, contacted IS through social media. However, no one was in touch with the Khorasan chapter in Afghanistan and instead members were directly communicating with their handlers in Syria. The members of these IS cells cannot be called selfradicalised or lone operators as they have been in the past affiliated with radical and militant organisations. The level of engagement of these cells with IS has varied: the Karachi cell was a family syndicate; the women belonging to Lahore cells took the initiative themselves; while the Daska members had not involved their families in the terror business. A giant task awaits us this year.

Published in Dawn, January 3rd, 2016
http://www.dawn.com/news/1230345/the-task-ahead

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"The greatest glory in living lies not in never falling ,but in rising every time we fall". (Nelson Mandela)

Beyond Afghanistan

THE last few weeks have been crucial for Pakistan’s foreign policy. Apparently, the civilian and military leaderships dealt successfully with the challenges thrown up by developments in the region and the Middle East. However, the question remains: is Pakistan’s foreign policy orientation heading towards a major shift, or merely undergoing some adjustments?

Let us have a look at some major highlights of the past few weeks. First, the Saudi foreign and defence ministers’ visits to Islamabad mounted considerable pressure on Pakistan to become a ‘visible’ partner in the Saudi-led 34-state anti-terror military coalition. While Pakistan reassured the kingdom of its resolve to defend the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia, it remained cautious in committing to a clear engagement in the alliance. That was in line with its previous stance in the aftermath of the Yemeni crisis.

Secondly, the first round of the quadrilateral steering committee meeting on reconciliation in Afghanistan concluded on an optimistic note in Islamabad. Representatives of the four nations comprising the committee — Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and the US — agreed to continue efforts for exploring the prospects of reconciliation between the Afghan Taliban and Kabul.

It seems Pakistani foreign policy has been stuck in Afghanistan.
Thirdly, though the talks between the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan have been delayed for a while after the Pathankot incident, the overall optimism remained intact. In a departure from the past, it seems that, at least for the moment, the militants have failed to disrupt bilateral engagement between the two countries.

Fourthly, there was an important development in Quetta; the Balochistan chief minister and the governor of the Iranian province of Sistan-Balochistan agreed to lay a railway track to connect Gwadar with the Iranian port of Chabahar. This may prove a balancing act in the context of developments in the Middle East. Also, from the geo-economic perspective, it could be a major development as Pakistan has remained concerned about Indian engagement in the Chabahar port project.

However, the sizzling debate on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in the country, which forced the Chinese embassy in Islamabad to issue a press note appealing to the government to remove political discord, should also not be overlooked.

Credit goes to Pakistan’s leaders for managing all these diplomatic challenges. However, Pakistan’s responses were largely of a defensive nature. It was quite evident that Islamabad was trying to ease pressure coming from different sides. Would it be depicted as a weakness of Islamabad’s foreign policy, which is seen by many as stagnant in nature and made active only by external factors?

This is happening at a time when Pakistan’s neighbours are pursuing organic and proactive foreign policies while maintaining a fine balance between their geo-economic and strategic interests. For instance, China has adjusted its foreign policy objectives according to its ‘one road, one belt’ dream and is redefining its relations with its neighbours.

India’s ‘neighbourhood first’ policy is yielding results. Iran is successfully pursuing its foreign policy principle of multilateralism both on the regional and international levels.

In Pakistan’s foreign policy, which was based on the core principle of Kashmir, Afghanistan has gradually taken centre stage. It seems our foreign policy has been stuck in Afghanistan. This factor has further transformed the drivers of diplomatic engagement. The international community, including Arab friends, evaluate Pakistan from the perspective of one driver — security.

Pakistan’s strengths are broad in scope and not necessarily confined to security capabilities. The country has huge economic potential, which has not been exploited because of internal and external constraints. Despite structural issues, Pakistan still has the option to realign its diplomatic engagements as opportunities are available to evolve a balance between its economic and strategic priorities.

CPEC is an important avenue, which can help Pakistan transform its economy and dynamics of regional engagement, as well as enhance its international image. But CPEC is facing multiple challenges. However, the prime minister has formed a committee to look into domestic grievances regarding the project.

It is imperative Pakistan work for regional peace that is important for the completion and functioning of CPEC. It is easy to see that internal and regional conflicts and crises invite international attention and interventions, which first hit the economy of the country and region.

The Chinese see in CPEC much potential for regional connectivity, trade and economy. Experts also see Iran as a potential partner in the CPEC initiative and an active contributor in energy, infrastructure, and maritime links. Many believe that Sino-Iran relations will thrive. A few media reports indicate that China has already promised $52 billion in investment to Iran.

Yet these developments should not happen at the cost of Pakistan’s relations with the Arab countries, not only for reasons of faith, but also from the geo-economic and strategic perspectives. Pakistan needs to review its Middle East policy to exploit full potential of economic ties with it. This is also important in the context that, rightly or wrongly, Pakistan is considered part of an extended Middle East.

As far as regional strategic issues are concerned, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation provides an opportunity to Pakistan to safeguard its core strategic and economic interests as well as to readjust its diplomatic priorities. There is a need for a discourse on how Pakistan can optimise its relations with Central Asia. Can Pakistan make it a top diplomatic priority to connect with Central Asia?

No one can ignore South Asia, and Pakistan is after all part of the region. But Pakistan first needs to deal with its Afghanistan approach. An unstable Afghanistan will not benefit the region, including Pakistan. The world sees Pakistan in Afghanistan’s context, and Pakistan has to break this stereotype through fast-tracking the reconciliation process.

Afghanistan has multiple factors of instability, but what hinders Pakistan the most is the perception of its influence on the Taliban. Once Pakistan is able to detach itself from this perception, it can rationalise its regional view and start exploring the world beyond Afghanistan.

The writer is a security analyst.

Source: Beyond Afghanistan
Published in Dawn, January 17th, 2016

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The world is changed by your example, not by your opinion !

REVIEW:Politics of extremism

Deconstructing Terrorist Violence: Faith as a Mask By Ram Puniyani
EXTREMISM is a political phenomenon and extremists have political ambitions and objectives, but they use religion to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the masses. This is the central argument of Ram Puniyani’s book Deconstructing Terrorist Violence: Faith as a Mask that provides a brief account of the deconstruction of terrorist violence.

Most academics appear convinced that politics triggers and transforms certain tendencies of extremism, but how one interprets this process changes the whole perspective. Puniyani is a communal harmony activist in India. The challenge of social harmony facing Indian society needs an interpretation of terrorism and extremism, which should not only provide the basic knowledge about the phenomenon but also pave the way for constructing a healthy relationship among different communities. Apparently Puniyani had both purposes in mind while writing this book — that it can serve as a manual for the activists working for communal and social harmony. The book is also useful for common readers who are interested in alternative viewpoints in global and regional political perspectives. He has tried to cover important aspects of terrorism from definition to its root causes.

The book is divided into four parts and eight chapters. The first part deals with contemporary global perspectives on terrorism and the fourth part is an extension of this part where the author expands his views to cultural and civilisational domains. The second part focuses on Indian terrorism perspectives and discusses theoretical and philosophical aspects of the contemporary issues. The third part is exclusively focused on Al Qaeda and the Mumbai terror attacks. Primarily, he sees a design behind the current wave of terrorism and concludes that a global capitalist establishment is using violence for their gains and to keep the existing hegemony intact.

Though this is not a new perspective — as most of the left-wing intellectuals have the same perception — Puniyani has a firm belief that the ‘war on terror’ is a euphemism for the United States to take political and military control of different areas of the world and hunt for oil. He thinks that religion is a tool in the hands of the puppets of imperialist powers: “Terrorism is a phenomenon which has come up in the guise of religion. It has nothing to do with religion. At the global level, it is the U.S. lust for oil...”, he notes. He quotes left-wing activists and scholars to prove his claim that the US had planned military action against Afghanistan months before 9/11 and that Iraq was the apparent next target. He also quotes Henry Kissinger to strengthen his claim: “Oil is much too important a commodity to be left in the hands of the Arabs”.

He does not only discuss current political discourse, but expands his focus to the history of troubled nations facing extremism and other conflicts. Puniyani argues that the root causes of conflict in the Muslim world can be traced back to their colonial history, when colonial masters kept feudalism intact to govern the masses and never prioritised the development of social structures.

The central parts of the book provide insight into the problem of terrorism facing India. The author sees Hindutva political motives behind the terrorist violence in the country. He provides a chronology of the terrorist attacks managed by the Sangh Parivar groups since 2008 and points towards a gradual rise in their terrorist activities. He argues that “the acts of terror done by those owing allegiance to the notion of Hindu rashtra are rooted in the politics of the Hindutva and Brahmanical streams of Hinduism”. He sees Muslims as victims of Hindutva politics and quotes police officials as saying that “sometimes, even the possession of Urdu literature is taken as a proof of a terrorist link”.

Based on his analysis of the strategies and tactics employed in terrorist attacks in India, Puniyani concludes that the pattern of blasts in India was so diverse that a single description of these blasts is out of the question. He gives the example of police officer, Hemant Karkare, who was investigating the acts of terror in which the involvement of Hindutva groups was beginning to surface, and was killed during the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. Puniyani sees a plot behind his killing and argues that a Hindutva group used the Mumbai terrorist attacks as an opportunity and killed Karkare to divert the attention of law- enforcement agencies. In this context, he cites references from two books on the subject by former IGP Maharashtra S.M. Mushrif. These books raise many questions on poor investigations of the Mumbai terror attacks.

Readers may also find interesting the chapter which deals with the evolution of the Hindutva movement in India. The author clearly sees a difference between Hindu, Hinduism and Hindutva, and contrary to common belief, claims that the terms Hindu and Hinduism originated at different points.

He says, “The construction of Hindutva is to be seen in the backdrop of the emergence of Hinduism as a homogenous religion. The concept of Brahmanical Hinduism, projected as Hinduism, was at the root of multiple religious revivalist movements.” He mentions references from anthropologists and historians to establish his point of view and denies that Hinduism is a religion. He believes that Hinduism and Brahmanism are two sides of the same coin and that the Hindu communities settled abroad look for a comprehensive religion like Christianity. “This is to overcome the sense of inferiority and cultural insecurity, which they experience in their life,” he argues.

Puniyani does not distinguish between Islamist and Hindutva terrorism, and believes that both are politically motivated. He suggests justice and economic development of all communities as the solution for peaceful coexistence.

The reviewer is a security analyst.
Source: REVIEW:Politics of extremism
Published in Dawn, January 24th, 2016

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The world is changed by your example, not by your opinion !