A stake in the system

By Hajrah Mumtaz

LAST week, the area where I live suffered a 16-hour electricity breakdown. Pacing up and down a candlelit house, listening to the ubiquitous roar of generators, I kept myself distracted with daydreams about what I would say (and do) to KESC managers if I ever came face to face with them.
I didn’t know at that time but barely a mile from my place, people were out on the main road in the middle of the night, burning tyres in protest. Had I known, I would probably more than briefly have entertained the notion of joining them.

Everything in Pakistan is battle, from the simple act of crossing a road or driving a car, to paying a bill or having access to water, electricity or gas. The only way you can escape the misery is by being well-heeled enough to provide back-ups: private security, generators, bottled water, minions to do all the dirty work. Such is life for the upper classes; looking at the circumstances under which the overwhelming majority of the population must live its life, one has to shudder. The state of the country’s poor is plain to see. For the middle and upper classes, it is rapidly getting worse.

In failing to provide citizens with essential services, the state is failing to live up to the primary reason for its existence. Why should people wish the state well when they have no stake in it? This is a question that ought to be deeply and seriously considered by the elites that call themselves the administrators of the country.

Time and again, it has been pointed out that one of the significant reasons behind the escalating militancy problem is sheer need. In a situation where the current system is providing nothing — no opportunity, no healthcare, no prospective employment and barely anything else — it is only logical that people would desire change. Anything may be better than what we currently have, would be the reasoning. In many cases, as demonstrated by the experience of Swat under the Taliban administration, that ‘anything’ may be worse; but that doesn’t stop people from wanting change. And when people are pushed to that point, the writ of the state is lost.

For most of Pakistan’s citizens, not least in the northwestern parts of the country and in Balochistan, the current situation is becoming untenable. The realities of most people’s lives, the care and attention towards their welfare displayed by their representatives, are such that they are recognising that far from being the centre around which the state operates, they are in fact entirely peripheral. That is the lesson one walks away with when one considers the state administration’s ineffectiveness and apparent lack of commitment. The basic reason for the existence of a state and its government is the citizenry’s welfare. When that is demonstrably not the case, why should we be surprised when people either pick up arms against the state, or display increasingly anarchic and/or criminal characteristics?

Does the average Pakistani have access to fundamentals such as physical safety, housing, education, healthcare and opportunity? No. Does he have the right to be able to speak freely, practise his religion without fear, carry out his work without being harassed or intimidated? Similarly, no.

Frighteningly, the levels of malnutrition in Sindh were recently likened to those in Chad and Niger. One in every four children in the country is severely malnourished. Of the entire world’s out-ofschool children, one in 10 is Pakistani, as the Education Emergency report found.

According to data gathered by the UN World Food Programme and supported by research conducted by other international and local agencies, the poorest households in the country are now forced to spend over 70 per cent of their incomes on food alone, even after having cut down caloric intakes. Meanwhile, the state of inter-class disparities, sectarian rivalries and provincial imbalances is plain to see.

The social contract between the state and the citizenry is collapsing; some would say that it has already broken down. When people do not have much to invite them to stay loyal to the state, the whole edifice begins to collapse. To many, the process has already started.

What sticks most in the maw is, perhaps, the fact that in addition to everything else that we don’t have, we also don’t have the information with which to understand why things are the way they are.

Over the past month alone, two debacles have shaken us: the presence of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad and the attack on PNS Mehran. Inquiries have been ordered, but past experience dictates that we, the public, are unlikely to ever find out the truth. Similarly, there is the murder of Saleem Shahzad. The ISI feels that it is sufficient to merely deny its own involvement; no need to conduct any sort of inquiry. On all matters of import, the citizens (in many cases their representatives too) are kept in the dark.

And, indeed, the average citizen, running from pillar to post as he is to just keep the ball rolling, has barely the time to ponder such questions. The levels of desperation in the country are rising rapidly, and that desperation is reflected in growing crime, terrorism and militancy. It is manifested in lynchings and violence. It is that which is feeding the breakdown of the rule of law.

As citizens lose faith in the state’s desire and ability to protect them or to prioritise their welfare, defiance of the law is inevitable. For most Pakistanis, after all, life really is nasty, brutish and short. ¦ The writer is a member of staff.

EMAIL
hajrahmumtaz@gmail.com

Source: A stake in the system

North Waziristan issue

Should an operation be launched without taking the public into confidence, the contradictions will inevitably raise suspicions; people are less likely to support the campaign.

By Moeed Yusuf

THE Pakistani and interna tional media have been report ing an imminent military opera tion in North Waziristan. The Peshawar corps commander has since come out and denied this. As always, speculation and con spiracy theories are rife.
This is hardly surprising given that yet again, there is complete lack of trans parency on just what the US and Pakistan have agreed to in the flurry of diplomacy since the Osama bin Laden episode.

On North Waziristan, nothing seems to add up.

In a nutshell, reports pointing to the imminence of the operation provided the following information: after meetings with US officials, the Pakistan military has agreed to launch an operation in North Waziristan; aid agencies have been tipped to prepare for a 350,000-strong displacement; the operation being planned is a limited one unlike the one in South Waziristan and is likely to be focused on the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and ‘foreign fighters’, minus the Haqqani network.

Piecing these together, one comes up with more questions than answers.

First, what is the Pakistani decision based on? The Pakistan military has maintained for months that it is already overstretched and thus cannot afford to open up another major active front. So what has changed? How is the capacity factor being accounted for now?

One plausible response could be that while the capacity remains a concern, the US pressure to act simply became too strong to resist after the Abbottabad episode. If so, then one also has to acknowledge that this would evoke a tremendous emotional backlash from the nationalist elements who are already charged up on the sovereignty issue.

And thus the next question: why would the military itself continue whipping up the sovereignty issue, as it has done consistently since Bin Laden’s killing, when it is certain to haunt it as soon as it goes into North Waziristan. Certainly, the military has nothing to gain from being seen as having buckled under US pressure again.

Next, what does one make of the reports that the operation will principally target the TTP? One conspiracy theory of sorts could be that these are planted stories to offset the backlash mentioned above, i.e. the military wants to argue that even though the US pressure did send us in, we chose to act only against Pakistan’s enemies, the TTP.

First of all, the average Pakistani is not so naïve. But more importantly, why would the US agree to anything like this? What is Washington’s interest in seeing an operation in North Waziristan that leaves the Haqqani network untouched? At least in Washington, the optimism associated with this operation flows only from the belief that sanctuaries of Afghan militant groups will be targeted.

Also, if it really is a ‘limited’ operation, why are aid agencies being asked to prepare for the displacement of nearly the entire population of the agency? To put it simply, the notion of a limited operation against TTP does not gel.

Let us take the other side of the argu ment and try to construct a logical case. Perhaps there never was any capacity issue and the excuse simply used to blunt the international pressure regarding the sanctuaries. The real reason then would have been the strategic benefit of maintaining leverage with the various Taliban factions. If so, why has that connection become unimportant overnight? What happened to the argument that targeting these groups so close to the reconciliation phase would be a major mistake?

An ever wilder proposition: has Pakistan decided to alter its strategic calculus? Why would it? Nothing has changed on the India front and Pakistan’s fear of a hostile government in Afghanistan remains intact. To presume that its fears have vanished would be nothing short of absurd.

But what if the US has assured Pakistan of a seat on the table in the Afghan reconciliation and promised that its concerns would be assuaged as long as it acts against the Afghan Taliban factions on its territory.

This can’t fly for two reasons: first, the mistrust between Pakistanis and Americans who make decisions behind closed doors is so immense that Pakistani officials would never accept such an offer on face value; and second, as the situation stands now, Pakistan has already ensured for itself a ringside seat in the negotiations. Why then, fall for an offer that doesn’t add much?

Finally, what about Pakistan military’s long-standing fear that targeting the Afghan groups may push them to put their weight behind the TTP as they look to up the ante? It seems unlikely that the military would overlook this aspect given how concerned it has been about it in the past. And if it hasn’t overlooked it, how does it plan to absorb the internal backlash? Or why does it now think it will be better able to now?

OK, if a military offensive in North Waziristan does not seem to fit the puzzle, might it be true that the press reports about the imminence of the operation were indeed ‘hype’ and the offensive will not take place after all.

In this case, the reverse question becomes pertinent: what did the US walk away with after putting pressure on Pakistan? It is hard to imagine that it extracted nothing from Pakistan’s moment of weakness post Bin Laden. Its number one interest is targeting the militant sanctuaries; why would it back off, especially when there is very little patience left with Pakistan and when the prevalent view in Washington is that Pakistan’s inaction in North Waziristan is a strategic choice, not a compulsion? And even if it did back off, what did it settle for as a quid pro quo?

There are too many questions and too few answers. The problem of lack of transparency is all too apparent yet again. And as always, it is certain to backfire.

Should an operation be launched without taking the public into confidence, the contradictions highlighted above will inevitably raise suspicions; people are less likely to support the campaign. And even if no operation is coming, there is still a need to explain just what has been agreed upon between Pakistan and the US post Bin Laden. Else, conspiracy theorists are set to have a busy time in the coming days. ¦ The writer is South Asia adviser at the US Institute of Peace, Washington, DC.

Source: Dawn ePaper
North Waziristan issue

__________________
A successful person is one who can lay a firm foundation with the bricks that other throw at him. (David Brinkley)

Sanctuaries and safe havens-II Dealing with the problem

We need a realistic policy on the issue of safe havens and sanctuaries.

By Syed Talat Hussain

THERE are several problems with the way Pakistan’s security establishment has chosen to handle the issue of safe havens and sanctuaries.
The most obvious problem is that the response to whether or not terrorists operate from Pakistani soil has been varied. This speaks either of slippery conduct or policy confusion.

We have never tried to find a logical and coherent answer, backed by analysis and wider reasoning, to explain our case to the world.

The second problem is that many of the responses we have given contradict one another: ‘no, we don’t have sanctuaries’ versus ‘we need more capability to eliminate them’. These contradictions, and there are several more, have undermined our credibility.

The third problem is that dozens of small and big operations in and around Fata have yielded enough empirical evidence to establish that militants do operate from our side of the border because if they did not we would not have 140,000 troops stationed here. Moreover, after Osama bin Laden’s death, denial is not an option.

The fourth problem is that with intelligence, reconnaissance and satellite assets being used so widely in this area, by not just one country but several countries which mostly share these with each other, it is virtually impossible to maintain ambiguity over the sanctuaries’ issue.

The fifth problem is that within our own set-up, both military and political, there is a considerable body of opinion that there are large sanctuaries inside these areas from where militants move and operate freely.

All of this calls for a comprehensive and realistic poli cy on the issue of safe havens and sanctuaries. A useful start would be to define precisely in accordance with international law terms such as ‘sanctuaries’, ‘safe havens’, ‘hideouts’, ‘hiding places’ and ‘refuge’.

In international legal opinion, there is considerable difference between these terms and the responsibility that these entail for the states concerned also varies. What is happening now is that ‘sanctuary’ is so loosely used that any place where even a suspicion exists that a suspected terrorist has passed is categorised as a ‘sanctuary’.

This means that practically the whole of Pakistan’s territory can be declared a sanctuary on the mere suspicion that certain types of terrorists might have used them for any purpose.

Parallel to this attempt at engaging with the world on defining what ‘sanctuary’ actually means, we need to genuinely move against some of these sanctuaries on our own. If we don’t want to do it militarily, we have to do it administratively or politically. But we have to show results in neutralising them.

Our reluctance or inability to do so does not gel with our international commitments of not allowing our territory to be used for terrorist actions, nor does this support our rhetoric that we are in control of our own territory.

In these actions against sanctuaries, the quantum of international cooperation and input needs to be determined and, it is strongly recommended, made public. If international cooperation replaces international intrusion and the goals and purposes of this cooperation are made public, fewer eyebrows will be raised in Pakistan.

The admission of international cooperation (as per our own requirement) to address the issue of sanctuaries should become acceptable domestically if the nation sees the results in the shape of less domestic terrorism and suicide bombings.

To create effective public support for this cooperation, genuine evidence of real cases of sanctuaries must be provided so that a more informed debate about the problem can take place. If the recovery of caches of arms from ordinary criminals can be splashed across the media, those hiding international terrorists deserve the same limelight.

All these components (and there can be many more) need to be fitted into a serious and well-thought-out review of the issue of safe havens and sanctuaries on our soil. The aim of the review should be to a) develop convincing explanations (not defence) of how and why these sanctuaries exist, and b) to discard the useless theories that we have employed as reflex riposte every time a charge is made that terrorists come and go freely from Pakistani soil.

In the wake of the Osama bin Laden episode, the issue has become fundamental to how the world would now see our performance on the counter-terror front. It is the chief concern around which Washington and Delhi can both campaign for global pressure and even sanctions on Pakistan.

This makes the sanctuaries’ issue crucial to our international image, besides, arguably, being one of the most daunting defence policy challenges the country is faced with today. But the most significant of all, without addressing the issue, domestic peace and stability shall remain elusive.

All efforts to dismantle the local jihadi industry would be in vain without first dealing with the hideouts where global terrorists break bread with local recidivists and militant missionaries and plan attacks both inside and outside Pakistan.

Our old policy (if we ever really had one) on the safe havens’ and sanctuaries’ issue is dead. We should find a new one soon, before the UN Security Council creates one for us. ¦ — Concluded The writer is a senior journalist at DawnNews.

Source: Dawn ePaper
Sanctuaries and safe havens-II Dealing with the problem

__________________
A successful person is one who can lay a firm foundation with the bricks that other throw at him. (David Brinkley)

Myths and make-believe

By Ardeshir Cowasjee


THIS nation is past master at myth-making and befooling itself. It lives in make-believe land — in our particular and peculiar case a dangerous habit as it distorts truth, reality and fact.
This national indulgence in flights of fancy has warped and mangled history. Even the reasoning for the creation of the country has been turned around to suit different leaderships and religious elements, as have the beliefs and intentions of its maker.

However, elsewhere there are happy myths that do no harm, but simply boost morale. Two spring to mind, both from the Achaemenid era, over 2,500 years ago. Cyrus the Great (576-530BC), often referred to as the first Achaemenid emperor, founded the Persian empire which under his rule covered all the civilised states of the Near East, expanding to southwest Asia, much of Central Asia and parts of Europe and the Caucasus — the largest empire the world had then yet seen.

Discovered in 1879 during excavations in Babylon was what is known as the Cyrus Cylinder dating back to 539BC. It lies in the British Museum which describes it as “an instrument of ancient Mesopotamian propaganda”. It has, however, been hailed by the UN as “an ancient declaration of human rights” and is regarded by modern Iran as a political symbol and “the first human rights charter in history”.

Now, human rights as we know them surfaced during the 18th and 19th centuries in the West and could not be said to be operative until the ending of slavery and human bondage in the civilised world. Way back in Cyrus’s time, they could not possibly have existed in a world that accepted slavery and human bondage as a right of man. But let the Iranians dream on harmlessly.

Nobel Peace Prize winner, Shirin Ebadi, in her 2003 acceptance speech referred to the Cylinder: “I am an Iranian, a descendant of Cyrus the Great. The emperor proclaimed at the pinnacle of power 2,500 years ago that he ‘would not reign over people if they did not wish it’. He promised not to force any person to change his religion and faith and guaranteed freedom for all. The Charter of Cyrus the Great should be studied in the history of human rights.” The actual text of the charter, a document in the form of a clay cylinder, inscribed in Akkadian, denounces the king of Babylon deposed by Cyrus, portrays Cyrus as being pleasing to the god Marduk, describes how he improved the lives of the citizens of Babylonia, how he repatriated displaced persons and restored temples and religious sanctuaries.

We move on to Cyrus’s descendant, Darius the Great (522-486BC), the fourth Achaemenid emperor. An apocryphal story has it that on his deathbed he had recorded for posterity his advice to his son Xerxes. This advice, though possibly historically not proven, contains many useful lessons and could well be digested, emulated and practised by all who aspire to lead or rule the nations of the world:

“Now that I am passing from this world, there are 25 countries within the Persian empire ... you must try to keep these countries as I have done. This can be accomplished by not intervening in their internal affairs and by respecting their religions and cultures. ...

“Never appoint your friends and butlers to government posts, as your friendship alone should suffice them. If you appoint them and they do injustice to people and take advantage of resources, you will not be able to punish them. This is so because they are your friends and you have to, unwillingly or otherwise, observe that friendship. … “My other advice to you, never let liars or flatterers near you as both tarnish your dynasty. Abandon the liars without mercy. Never let your ministers dominate people. I have created laws to prevent their dominance in taxation of people. The ministers and the people will be kept apart if you follow these laws. … “Continue the educational programmes that I started. Let everyone read and write to improve their understanding. As people comprehend more, you will be able to rule with more confidence. Do not impose religion; always keep in mind that everyone should be free to follow his preferred faith. … “Never be judge and plaintiff at the same time. If you have a grievance arrange for an unbiased third party to judge the case. The case will not be judged fairly if the plaintiff serves as the judge.

“Do not forget generosity. Second to justice, generosity and forgiveness are the best characters of kings. But forgiveness is only applicable to those who have done wrong to you, not to others. If you forgive a person who has harmed someone else then you have done injustice.” “After my death, wash my body, wrap it with the shroud I have prepared and put it in a stone coffin. Place the coffin in the grave and leave it uncovered to remind you, whenever you visit my grave, that even your father and the king of 25 countries dies. You will too. This is everyone’s destiny, whether a king of 25 countries or a prickly-bush picker. No one is eternal.

“I have made these remarks in the presence of others so they know I have given you the above advice prior to my death.” Immaculate advice unheeded. Xerxes embarked upon a series of disastrous military campaigns and then returned to his capital cities, to a life of self-indulgence which sapped the strength and vitality of the Achaemenid empire. He was assassinated in 465BC. ¦

EMAIL
arfc@cyber.net.pk


Source: epaper.dawn.com

__________________
A successful person is one who can lay a firm foundation with the bricks that other throw at him. (David Brinkley)

Political Islam

Since Islamic heritage was selectively sifted to support certain political causes, intellectual revivalism in the Muslim world has suffered greatly.

By M. Zaidi


IN order to understand the logic — or the lack of it — behind terrorism, one needs to first understand the interplay of governance structures and radicalisation.
Islam has widely been used throughout the Islamic world to mobilise the masses. The ruling elite has utilised it for political purposes ranging from secular nationalist to pan-Arabist to Marxist, taking advantage of its populist appeal to support the agenda of self-preservation. Paradoxically, many of the same rulers created Islamist movements which they then crushed.

In Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser attempted to make the prestigious Al Azhar University dependent on the government in order to lend religious legitimacy to governmental policies, including his ruthless suppression of the Islamic Brotherhood. Saddam Hussein, leader of the zealously secularist Ba’ath party, put ‘God Is Great’ on the Iraqi flag and spoke about jihad in a failed effort to get Iraqis to fight to defend his regime. Ziaul Haq created jihadist groups and then attempted to disown ‘turncoats’.

This schizophrenic mindset becomes even more complicated when applied to states that have a large spectrum of tribes. Iran, for instance, has some 96 tribes and 647 independent clans according to a recent census. However, some of these clans have over time become redundant as power structures. But for the Pahlavi elites previously, it was a priority to suppress these tribal cultures to usher in the era of ‘modernity’. This made Reza Shah extremely unpopular amongst people in whom the ‘conservative spirit’ was deeply ingrained, and which arguably contributed to the rise of Islamism. The ruling elites tried to supplant a modernist project on a populace wholly unprepared for it; this made conditions ripe for the 1979 revolution.

An observable phenomenon in modern Iran is the alliance of politics with Islamism; arguably, Islamism has proved more adept at integrating different tribes in Iran than modernism.

This had the usual result of integrating tribal people who had lost their power base either to modern ethnic nationalism or, on the other end of the spectrum, detribalisation and absorption into ideology-based organisations. Since Islamism dominated, recruitment to these organi sations occurred at a greater rate, while the ethno-nationalism sentiments of the Baloch in Sistan and the Kurds were suppressed.

Similarly the Bakhtiaris, whose khans constituted the pre-revolutionary elite, were ruthlessly put down. This was a prominent feature accounting for the rise of Islamists, since they replaced the khans as the dominant ruling elite. Neither the modernity project nor subsequent Islamism could accommodate the ‘khan’ power structures. This was anathema for Islamism and modernity projects in Iran, so the khanate system was suppressed and eventually died out.

The Shia state of Iran and the Taliban in Afghanistan were governments taking over systems driven by a tribal mindset. The existing literature about these regimes shows how they foisted their versions of Islamism upon the masses. Political scientist Mia Bloom postulates that ‘martyrdom’ operations tend to boost the reputation of the organisation carrying them out, as evidenced in the case of Palestine. For instance, Nichole Argo argues that martyrdom or shahadat has become a mainstream Palestinian social paradigm, with social status being congruent with the level of sacrifice.

During the Oslo process, the majority of Palestinians were opposed to violence. In November 1998, some 75 per cent opposed suicide operations. However, with incrementally ineffective governance, Yasser Arafat’s popularity plummeted. Along with an increase in their political credentials, there was a simultaneous rise in the popularity of the Islamic Jihad Movement and Hamas, with a share of almost 70 per cent going to Hamas.

They started using the suicide-bombing tactic, coupled with the provision of social services, to gain popularity among the masses. Against the backdrop of economic decay, rising unemployment and gloomy prospects, groups such as Hamas seen to be ‘doing something’ (suicide tactics) about the escalating Israeli aggression undermined a substantial chunk of the Palestinian Authority’s support base.

Although there are clear differences between the Iranian clerical leadership, the Taliban as well as the Palestinian Authority, the deterioration in socio-economic opportunities for the middle class and income disparities between the elite and the proletariat were identical drivers of Islamism. Arguably, these operate throughout the breadth of the radicalised Islamic world today, including Pakistan.

Another type of model one could use to draw analogies with Pakistan is the type of governments which modelled themselves on Stalinist lines. The ruling elite of these states used the rhetoric of the rising of the proletariat against the bourgeois, which petered out with the end of the Cold War. As in Iraq and Syria, these ‘caring’ regimes evolved into little more than brutal dictatorships utilising the secret police as coercive instruments. An epitome of this variant was Nasser’s’ government in Egypt, and Jaffer Numeiri’s government in Sudan, which prompted a violent reaction by the Islamists. Nasser’s strong-arm tactics would later fan the Islamist movement into a roaring flame.

However, the late Egyptian president Anwar Sadat was perhaps even more instrumental in igniting these movements. The Islamists felt betrayed by Sadat’s unfulfilled promises, which would lead more radical Islamists such as Al Jihad into the circle of never-ending violence. Sayyid Qutb’s sim plistic analysis has been inspirational for a vast majority of Islamists disillusioned by regimes that could be clearly discerned as having one agenda: self-sustenance. Thus Qutb used the classical preArabian Islamic concept of jahiliya or ignorance to denounce the Muslim leadership, which he saw as failing to overthrow the yoke of the West.

Placing Islamic tradition at the altar of political objectives and nationalistic causes has gravely affected the perception of Islam, particularly in the West. This is paradoxical since many of the leaders in this category tended to woo the West, but it has caused an identity crisis for their conservative masses. Since Islamic heritage was selectively sifted to support temperamental political causes, intellectual revivalism in the Muslim world has suffered greatly.

Also, Islam has started to signify the politics of identity, in which the leadership’s exploitation of the sentiments of the masses became inextricably intertwined with political agendas. This also served to display to the outside world a distorted picture of political Islam. ¦ The writer is a security analyst.

Source: Dawn ePaper

__________________
A successful person is one who can lay a firm foundation with the bricks that other throw at him. (David Brinkley)

What’s in a name?

By Hajrah Mumtaz


EMPATHY is dangerous emotion in which to indulge here in Pakistan. Allow yourself to be ‘soft’ enough to feel another’s pain — to actually care and have fellow feeling — and it will break your heart; it’ll rob you of any faith you might have had.
Here are just a few of the names of people who were subjected to brutality on a scale that numbs the mind: Sarfaraz Shah, shot and left to die by Rangers in Karachi; Syed Saleem Shahzad, tortured and murdered allegedly by state actors for his reportage, Shahbaz Bhatti and Salmaan Taseer, murdered for their stance — that it should come under parliamentary debate — on the blasphemy law; Prof Saba Dashtiari of Balochistan University, one of the 30 teachers to have been murdered in the province over the past three years; Hafiz Muneeb and Hafiz Mughees, lynched in Sialkot by a blood-crazed mob.

Different people killed under different circumstances, with one thing in common: the soul-destroying brutality they suffered. These are some of the names I can recall instantly, and they represent a mere fraction of the numbers who have died or been tortured in ways that defy any notion of humanity on the part of their persecutors, be they state or non-state actors.

Imagine the pain of their families and friends. Imagine what this says about Pakistani society. Then there are the uncounted millions of others who suffer no less but whose names we do not know. Those killed and injured in suicide bombings and terror attacks, over 35,000 according to some estimates; those caught between the militants and the security forces in Balochistan and the northwest parts of the country, forced to flee with little but the clothes on their backs and then left by an uncaring, criminally inefficient state to fend for themselves as best as they can; those displaced by the floods, hit equally hard by natural disaster and the state’s inability to rehabilitate them so that a year later, many remain in camps battling disease and hunger; the ‘disappeared’ whose families appeal to the authorities in vain; those picked up by the security forces for suspected involvement in anti-state activities but never produced before a court of law.

There are still others, the wretched of the earth that you and I see and ignore every day: the sick and the old and the dying, the babies hanging on to life by a thread, the mutilated, the handicapped and the destitute. All of them left to fend for themselves as best as they can in a society where no one has any rights, one can only have power. And power comes only with wealth, so if you have no money you have no rights either. How many cases can you think of in which this grim thesis has been demonstrated until there can be no doubt at all about its validity?

So, Pakistan is not a place for the faint-hearted, even if you are well-off enough to think that the power you have are actually rights. And because a true recognition of the misery that abounds in this country would cause madness, most people who are fortunate enough to be higher up in the pyramid develop a carapace of numbness with which to shield themselves. The ones in big cars look out through the windows unseeing, and the ones in rickshaws and buses hand out a few rupees worth of alms with the vague emotion, I imagine, of ‘there but for the grace of God go I’.

The haunting irony, to my mind, is that the condition to which Pakistan has brought itself has certain parallels with those that brought about independence itself.

Why did pre-Partition Indians rise up against the British? The myriad sociopolitico-economic factors can, at root, be boiled down to one particular problem: that a nation of myriad millions was being ruled by outsiders who had no stake in the country itself. Governance was topdown, often brutal, and little the colonists did was geared towards improving the lot of the common man on the street (except the railroads, universities, hospitals etc).

The white ruling elite and its obsequious implementing posse of brown civil servants lived in comfort with wealth and prestige, cut off from the masses. Those at the top of the pyramid siphoned off the subcontinent’s resources to their own country, leaving for the Indian people whatever dregs were left.

Fast forward to the Pakistan of today and do you see any similarities? Ruling elites, civilian and military, cut off from the masses, seemingly oblivious to the misery and pain around them. Pakistan’s modern-day elites, like the British imperialists from whom they inherited their mindset, are engaged in diverting all possible resources towards their own ends, with apparently only one aim: the perpetuation of their own power and position at the top of the pyramid.

So what if the elites today have the same skin colour and racial descent as you or I? What’s in a name?

In the years preceding Partition, there were some anti-imperialists who tried to bring about change through peaceful, non-violent means. Jinnah, Gandhi, Nehru, other leaders of India’s independence movement, lobbied for change through dialogue and discourse, through the pen and the conference room. But then, as now, there were anarchic elements that exploited people’s frustration and fanned communal tensions in a country where Muslims, Hindus and people of other religions had lived in relative harmony for centuries. And thus, we had mass murder, rape and pillage on such a horrifying scale at the time of Partition.

Today too, as the gap between the ruling elites and the people grows wider, there are elements exploiting the situation and unleashing unending violence. In Pakistan’s case today, it is the militant-terrorist network. Some were imported, others were created but as has often been pointed out, sympathisers for those advocating change — of any sort — are an inevitable consequence when people are fed up with a seemingly uncaring and obviously inefficient state.

Most obviously, this is demonstrated by the manner in which the people of Swat initially supported the Taliban since the latter promised a quick justice system. That this system was comprised of bullets and the chopping off of appendages was recognised only later.

What can Pakistan expect? Unless the mindset of those with power changes, only more of the same. On my part, I find myself thinking of the circumstances that led to the 1789 French Revolution, which ended in the Terror. ¦ The writer is a member of staff.

EMAIL
hajrahmumtaz@gmail.com


Source: Dawn ePaper

__________________
A successful person is one who can lay a firm foundation with the bricks that other throw at him. (David Brinkley)

The problem within

High-cost security has not given protection to the average citizen.

By Syed Talat Hussain

IT is realistic to imagine that some among the military and intelligence high command are gnashing their teeth as they look at the screens before them and watch talk shows on the murders of Saleem Shahzad and the young man in Karachi killed at point-blank range by the Rangers in broad daylight.
Some of the starred soldiers might even be discussing among themselves the various ways the ‘media’ can be ‘sorted out’. Others could well be marking in their minds and their pocket diaries the names and faces of those who are very vocal in articulating the public’s anger at these murders. Still others may be actually planning how to declare these critics ‘enemies of the state’.

No less likely is that many of them might have already concluded that the media’s criticism of their role and power is part of a conspiracy to break up the country and is in all likelihood funded by India.

What is unimaginable, however, is that there are people in the top hierarchy of the formidable security establishment looking within themselves to understand the thunder of protest that has been rolling ever since Saleem Shahzad’s tortured body was recovered far from Islamabad where he was kidnapped. They are all trained in the delusional tradition of seeing themselves as ‘men at their best’. They are taught to believe that they can do no wrong, and that they have to be constantly on guard against their mortal enemies. This mindset does not allow for the openhearted admission of guilt or faults, and is forever looking for extraneous forces to lay the blame on.

But whether the generals, admirals and air marshals, who collectively form the nucleus of Pakistan’s state power, like it or not, the present spate of criticism has little to do with anyone’s nefarious designs. It is a result of long-standing issues that they have been ignoring or contemptuously dismissing as drivel. These have all come to a head.

On top of the list of ignored issues sits the primary issue of accountability and transparency of punitive action. Over the past years, many embarrassing events have taken place raising disturbing questions about the competence of the operation command of high-ranking officers, but no action has been initiated or punishment meted out. Whether it is the Parade Lane attack in Rawalpindi or the terrorists’ thrust into the army’s heartland, the GHQ, inquiries have been kept under wraps without anyone in the top ranks getting the sack for professional failure.

Indeed the brazenness with which the military command has sidetracked culpability in Osama bin Laden’s presence and killing on the country’s soil is striking. No less shocking is the utterly ridiculous stand of the naval chief on the PNS Mehran attack that appeared to suggest there was no security lapse. Just as scandalous are Pakistan Air Force claims on radar failure to detect America’s deep intrusion.

But these are all part of a long-held tradition in the secu rity establishment of not laying the blame where it is due and instead diving into the caves of national security to avoid accountability. An extension of the same tradition is to constantly present themselves as victims of machinations, rather than admit to bad judgment or poor performance requiring punishment.

While this has saved many heads that should have rolled for committing blunders in maintaining national security, it has made the public and its representatives weary of the security establishment’s power. The top brass, in popular perception, always wants exceptional treatment and in their role as self-appointed definers of national interest insists on operating above the law. The bottled-up rage against this attitude is what has propelled protests over Saleem Shahzad’s killing to a new level. This also explains the intense anger in the nationwide condemnation of the Rangers’ extra-judicial killing and the loud demand that the DG Rangers be sacked.

These incidents are bad enough, but now are seen as part of the immunity that the security establishment has given itself from being held accountable or being probed for illegal and inhuman conduct. This is particularly true of the ISI, whose officers, of all ranks, have become used to the idea of complying only with their own definition of right and wrong.

Adding to this frustration and public pique is the lifestyle that the top brass of all the services has maintained. This is not a guns vs butter argument, but a contrast between the reality of the life led by the military elite at state expense and the general situation for ordinary citizens.

The naval chief’s expensive car(s) would not have become an indigestible sight if the reality of those watching it on their screens wasn’t so depressing and horrendous.

The sense that much luxury that has nothing to do with core defence needs is being showered on the top heads of the security establishment lowers the threshold of public tolerance. When the average Pakistani is being asked to eat grass for security, lush golf courses with their imported grass are an affront and a provocation.

An even bigger tragedy is that beyond providing partial and episodic relief, this highcost security has not protected and enhanced the citizens’ personal well-being nor has it defended national pride. If CIA operates freely in Pakistan and terrorists continue to wreak havoc on internal stability, it is next to impossible to convince anyone in their right mind that criticism of the failure of the security apparatus is tantamount to compromising national interest.

These are factors the military elite needs to focus on. Throwing punches at the media may be cathartic but is hardly the right cure for what really ails it. ¦ The writer is a senior journalist at DawnNews.

it is realistic to imag- ine that some among the military and intelli- gence high command are gnashing their teeth as they look at the screens before them and watch talk shows on the murders of saleem shahzad and the young man in karachi killed at point-blank range by the rangers in broad daylight. some of the starred sol- diers might even be dis- cussing among themselves the various ways the ‘media’ can be ‘sorted out’. others could well be marking in their minds and their pocket diaries the names and faces of those who are very vocal in articulating the public’s anger at these murders. still others may be actually plan- ning how to declare these crit- ics ‘enemies of the state’. no less likely is that many of them might have already concluded that the media’s criticism of their role and power is part of a conspiracy to break up the country and is in all likelihood funded by india. what is unimaginable, how- ever, is that there are people in the top hierarchy of the for- midable security establish- ment looking within them- selves to understand the thun- der of protest that has been rolling ever since saleem shahzad’s tortured body was recovered far from islamabad where he was kidnapped. they are all trained in the delusional tradition of seeing themselves as ‘men at their best’. they are taught to believe that they can do no wrong, and that they have to be constantly on guard against their mortal enemies. this mindset does not allow for the openhearted admission of guilt or faults, and is forever looking for extraneous forces to lay the blame on. but whether the generals, admirals and air marshals, who collectively form the nucleus of pakistan’s state power, like it or not, the present spate of criticism has little to do with anyone’s nefarious designs. it is a result of long-standing issues that they have been ignoring or contemptuously dismissing as drivel. these have all come to a head. on top of the list of ignored issues sits the primary issue of accountability and trans- parency of punitive action. over the past years, many embarrassing events have taken place raising disturbing questions about the compe- tence of the operation com- mand of high-ranking officers, but no action has been initiat- ed or punishment meted out. whether it is the parade lane attack in rawalpindi or the terrorists’ thrust into the army’s heartland, the ghq, inquiries have been kept under wraps without anyone in the top ranks getting the sack for professional failure. indeed the brazenness with which the military command has sidetracked culpability in osama bin laden’s presence and killing on the country’s soil is striking. no less shocking is the utterly ridiculous stand of the naval chief on the pns mehran attack that appeared to suggest there was no securi- ty lapse. just as scandalous are pakistan air force claims on radar failure to detect america’s deep intrusion. but these are all part of a long-held tradition in the secu- rity establishment of not lay- ing the blame where it is due and instead diving into the caves of national security to avoid accountability. an extension of the same tradi- tion is to constantly present themselves as victims of machinations, rather than admit to bad judgment or poor performance requiring pun- ishment. while this has saved many heads that should have rolled for committing blunders in maintaining national security, it has made the public and its representatives weary of the security establishment’s power. the top brass, in popu- lar perception, always wants exceptional treatment and in their role as self-appointed definers of national interest insists on operating above the law. the bottled-up rage against this attitude is what has propelled protests over saleem shahzad’s killing to a new level. this also explains the intense anger in the nationwide condemnation of the rangers’ extra-judicial killing and the loud demand that the dg rangers be sacked. these incidents are bad enough, but now are seen as part of the immunity that the security establishment has given itself from being held accountable or being probed for illegal and inhuman con- duct. this is particularly true of the isi, whose officers, of all ranks, have become used to the idea of complying only with their own definition of right and wrong. adding to this frustration and public pique is the lifestyle that the top brass of all the services has maintained. this is not a guns vs butter argu- ment, but a contrast between the reality of the life led by the military elite at state expense and the general situation for ordinary citizens. the naval chief’s expensive car(s) would not have become an indigestible sight if the reality of those watching it on their screens wasn’t so depressing and horrendous. the sense that much luxury that has nothing to do with core defence needs is being showered on the top heads of the security establishment lowers the threshold of public tolerance. when the average pakistani is being asked to eat grass for security, lush golf courses with their imported grass are an affront and a provocation. an even bigger tragedy is that beyond providing partial and episodic relief, this high- cost security has not protected and enhanced the citizens’ personal well-being nor has it defended national pride. if cia operates freely in pakis- tan and terrorists continue to wreak havoc on internal sta- bility, it is next to impossible to convince anyone in their right mind that criticism of the failure of the security appara- tus is tantamount to compro- mising national interest. these are factors the mili- tary elite needs to focus on. throwing punches at the media may be cathartic but is hardly the right cure for what really ails it. ¦ the writer is a senior journalist at dawnnews.

Source: Dawn ePaper

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A successful person is one who can lay a firm foundation with the bricks that other throw at him. (David Brinkley)

Who owns the Doha Round?

If the WTO is to avoid the risk of evolving into a talking shop, world leaders must decide that they own the talks and put political weight behind them.

By Ashraf Hayat and Edward Gresser


SOME things we take for gra nted. Since the 1940s, the world had come to expect that trade and tariff barriers would fall continuously. It was only natural to believe so as liberalisation had generated large-scale gro wth for the world economy.
Twelve sets of trade negotiations had ended with agreements, opening mar kets in ever-larger numbers of countries. The Doha Round has been the troubling exception. Launched in 2001, it is near its 10th anniversary with negotiations struggling. The WTO director general sees the gaps as too big to bridge soon and is looking for a way to salvage the talks. If it is premature to write an obit uary for the Doha Round, it is time for us to ask whether to commission a requiem — and why.

What has changed? Growth in world trade brought about by successive trade rounds has been a winall, underpinning globalisation and bringing firms closer to their customers and suppliers. Average tariffs have dropped — in Pakistan’s case from 46 to 9.5 per cent and from five to two per cent in the United States. Accompanied by financial deregulation, the communications revolution and improved logistics, even small and medium enterprises, have started to think globally. Helped by foreign direct investment, some developing countries have emerged as economic powerhouses.

The Uruguay Round, for example, ended with agreements on investment, inclusion of agriculture in multilateral rules and phasing out of textile quotas. Pakistan has used the end of textile quotas to double its exports from $6bn to $12bn since 2000, and put millions of young people to work. Clear lines of causation are hard to draw, but the many decades of trade liberalisation have witnessed the fastest reduction in world poverty ever measured. Doha could certainly build upon this.

Why then the deadlock? Thoughts that it reflected acrimony among individual trade ministers have faded as new governments in major players take office. Nor has it reflected a problem with procedures: within the constraints of a single undertaking, Doha has experimented with a number of negotiating platforms, at various times constituting the ‘Group of Seven’ and a ‘Group of Four’. But throughout, negotiations have only hardened already fixed positions, and individual country or regional priorities have trumped any vision of shared good.

A more fundamental challenge is the fact that each of the WTO’s 153 members wants trade liberalisation by others, but worries about politics at home. To an extent, this was also true in earlier rounds. This time most major players view the Doha Round as one in which only others are to make concessions.

This attitude can be traced to the Round’s launch in 2001, when the Doha Round started life as the Doha Development Agenda. Developing countries assumed immediately an ambitious Round aligned completely with their perceived interests. Industrial economies thought otherwise. Their view has been that fast-growing giants such as China, India and Brazil — as the principal beneficiaries of the trading system — would open their markets.

Given such expectations, the outcome has been an impasse.

Other developments may also have reduced the perceived urgency of a multilateral agreement. As globalisation progressed, countries that hitherto believed in import substitution liberalised voluntarily. Such reduction of barriers, often beyond World Trade Organisation commitments, reduced the bargaining power of developing economies. Also, the European Union’s success brought about a burst of regional and bilateral trade agreements, allowing big countries to concentrate on agreements with smaller economies and work around tricky issues like farm subsidies. These too compromised commitment to a multilateral agreement.

In this regard, Pakistan has been a victim as a country without FTA (Free Trade Agreements) relationships in Europe, the United States or East Asia. Relying on textile exports for much of the nation’s foreign exchange and highquality urban employment, the country faces very high tariffs in its major markets, up to 32 per cent in the case of the United States.

All of these have made conclusion of Doha difficult, with negotiations languishing and deadlines fixed only to be postponed. This in turn has led to a perceptible drift in policy. Even obviously protectionist measures by industrial and emerging economies in the wake of the global financial crisis went with little comment.

The obvious question is whether there is a way to revive the larger vision of Doha and the global trading system. This calls for wisdom and political risk-taking that few members have displayed so far — but it is worth the effort, and perhaps they can find this wisdom when they must. Estimates of benefits from Doha vary greatly though these are uniformly large. The numbers one may contest. The greatest loss would be weakened confidence in the multilateral trading system and the fear that protectionism could rear its menacing head anytime. It is incumbent on world leaders to save world trade from uncertainty and a possible repeat of the kind of protectionism that caused the Great Depression 80 years ago.Calls to ‘save WTO from Doha’ have not so far come with an alternative agenda, let alone one with value comparable to that of a multilateral round. If the WTO is to avoid the risk of evolving into a talking shop comparable to another UN General Assembly or simply left to resolve disputes, world leaders must decide that they — not the line negotiators — own the talks and put political weight behind them.

Meanwhile, members must deliberate on evolving new modalities for negotiations that would make an agreement likely. They may also deliberate new areas of possible congruence of interest among members. Likewise, countries and companies that have benefited so much from world trade must commit themselves to further liberalisation. An enlarged trading pie will benefit all, including those that do not perceive immediate gains for themselves.

The few voices left in support of multilateral trade agreements must not give up. ¦
Ashraf Hayat is a former civil servant currently with NUST and COMSATS, Islamabad. Edward Gresser is director at the Global Works Foundation, Washington DC and teaches at Johns Hopkins University.

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A successful person is one who can lay a firm foundation with the bricks that other throw at him. (David Brinkley)

A wearily familiar bag of tricks

By Cyril Almeida


ONE set of rules for themselves. Another set for the people they rule over, or who dare cross them. The army has been busy rounding up the OBL support network.
But not the network which helped the world’s most wanted terrorist hide a stone’s throw from where the army chief boasted his forces had broken the backbone of the terrorists.

No, the army has gone after the support network that helped capture and eliminate the world’s most wanted terrorist. You couldn’t make this stuff up — unless you knew what makes the army tick in the first place.

The army high command has two constituencies: the public at large and the military rank and file. With those two constituencies won over, and with their rear and flanks thus covered, the army high command is able to do what’s necessary to retain its internal predominance.

Since May, however, those two constituencies — so key to the army high command’s image of itself and what it’s able to get away with at home and outside — have been up in arms.

Perhaps most critically, the army rank and file (the ones at the top have more to lose and so are less inclined to criticise openly) has expressed deep unhappiness with the policies of their institution, increasingly exposed by events as duplicitous.Which leaves Gen K and his diminishing band of supporters in desperate need of something to stop the haemorrhaging of support accumulated through a combination of serendipity and shrewdness since the end of the Musharraf era.

No brilliant thinkers or strategists among them, they have turned to the obvious: pander to the populist tripe they have helped perpetuate and which has become an article of faith for people in uniform — that the US ultimately seeks to harm Pakistan and we must wriggle away from its deadly embrace.

Kicking out the Raymond Davis clones, arresting anyone remotely western-looking on an expired visa, detaining the people who helped piece together the goings-on in the OBL compound — all is meant to try and send a message that the army knows who the enemy is and is willing to take them on.

There is also signalling at another level. The infamous corps commanders’ statement was more carefully crafted than first recognised. “It needs to be clarified that Army had never accepted any training assistance from the US except for training on the newly inducted weapons and some training assistance for the Frontier Corps only. Even that has ceased now.” See what that does, bold typeface and all? It says, the army is a self-sufficient fighting machine and doesn’t need Americans to teach it how to fight. In the macho world of soldiering, nothing is worse than having to rely on others to defend oneself.

In fact, the entire statement can be read as a pointby-point rebuttal to and reassurance on issues raised during Kayani’s town hall-style meetings with his troops.

Faced with a choice — do you put some daylight between the US and the army to appease the rank and file or do you locate the relationship with the US in a necessary and pivotal fight against terrorism and extremism? — the army high command appears to have decided to appease its core constituency, the rank and file.

The path chosen shouldn’t come as a surprise. While the ability for this institution to self-reflect or course correct is non-existent, the survival instinct is well-entrenched. A disgruntled rank and file is never a recipe for survival.

The trouble is, attempting to win back the affections of the rank and file and the admiration of the public at large in this way means pushing the US further away — but that comes at a great cost and in any case, the US has developed a few tricks of its own to hit back.

Since May 2, the media has been used with great success by American officials to keep the squeeze on the army and prevent it from wriggling away.

After the OBL raid, the army was forced to keep changing its account of the American operation almost on the hour. What was initially spun as a ‘joint operation’ eventually became a humiliating admission of failure to detect the US intrusion into Pakistani airspace. Then, when Hillary Clinton presented a list of demands to the generals, American officials made sure those demands were leaked to the media one by one, forcing the generals here to deny yet more secret deals were in the works.

Soon, the North Waziristan bomb factories made their way into the news, ostensibly once again exposing the army’s perfidy and earning it a fresh round of criticism from the US. Now, we are told the local CIA spy network which helped capture OBL is in the army’s bad books — embarrassing the army by making it look petty and vindictive, or worse.

Weak, stupid, vulnerable, secretive, duplicitous — with each successive media leak, the US is chipping away at the army’s self-belief, eroding the space for it to convincingly vilify the US while further vilifying the army in the minds of many who already regarded it with suspicion.

(Of course, this being Pakistan, where things are never simple, the Americans may be being too clever by half. The campaign of embarrassing media leaks may actually be making it more difficult for the army high command to do anything but embrace anti-Americanism further, rendering the anyway likely into the certain.) All the while, the public at large — the army’s second core constituency and internal line of defence — has been looking on in bewilderment, unsure of what it all means but pretty sure they have been lied to at all times.

What comes next? Unhappily, more of the same for now, it seems.

But at least this army high command won’t be able to argue, after it, the deluge. The deluge is already here. ¦ The writer is a member of staff.

EMAIL
cyril.a@gmail.com

__________________
A successful person is one who can lay a firm foundation with the bricks that other throw at him. (David Brinkley)

Pendulum of war

The situation on the ground contradicts hopeful projections.

By Khalid Aziz


IN the past couple of weeks, Al Qaeda and its franchises have come back with a vengeance, attacking Pakistan, its security forces and the public. This also appears to be a prelude to an increase in violence in Afghanistan in the near future.
An important aspect of these new series of attacks is their concentration on Islamabad, Peshawar and locations along the Durand Line. In their latest onslaughts on urban centres, militants have used both improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers. Clearly, the militants are in good health and pose a serious existential threat to Pakistan.

The new attacks are significant in that they convey a message to Pakistan and the combined forces of more than 43 nations deployed in Afghanistan, that the recent loss of Osama bin Laden and one of Al Qaeda’s foremost commanders, Ilyas Kashmiri, have not stripped it of its fighting abilities. The attacks also reflect the resilience and institutional capacity of the second tier of the insurgent team which is proving itself adept at meeting new challenges.Another factor that has added significance to the recent militant activity is the capacity of Al Qaeda and its various branches in Pakistan and Afghanistan to carry out multiple border incursions, as seen in Dir, Kurram and South Waziristan, within a short span of time.

Add these capacities to the assumed presence of militant cells within the Pakistani security services and serious questions are raised about whether the strategy followed so far in dealing with the militants is actually effective. The militants’ ability to field insurgent groups of up to 300 men, as seen in the two recent attacks on Dir in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, is worrying.

According to local officials, a Taliban force of more than 200 fighters who were armed with light and heavy weapons and some of whom wore military uniforms attacked a police station in Shaldalo village of Upper Dir on June 1. The incursion was resisted by the Pakistani police and paramilitary forces and the engagement lasted several hours. Pakistani helicopter gunships took part in forcing back the militants — 23 security personnel were killed and the Taliban are said to have suffered casualties, but no dead bodies were recovered.

The Taliban had earlier launched a similar attack on April 22, when more than 400 fighters attacked a police post in Kharakhai in Lower Dir district. They overran the outpost while killing 16 Pakistani police personnel. Both attacks originated from across the border in the Afghan province of Kunar, where the Taliban and Al Qaeda have established safe havens after the US forces made a questionable withdrawal from Kunar and Nuristan in March 2010, creating a security hazard for Pakistani forces.

The Taliban have learnt that if they are relentless in their resistance, the US does withdraw. In leaving Kunar and more specifically the strategic Korengal valley, the US followed the path taken by the erstwhile USSR when it too withdrew from this part after the Mujahideen attacks became deadly. This was heralded as the beginning of the end of Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Does the loss of control over Kunar and Nuristan also herald a similar retreat by the US from Afghanistan?

“The withdrawal is a great victory for us,” said Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid in April 2010, when the Taliban forces occupied US posts in Korengal and Pech valleys. “The area is very, very important for us. Its mountains provide a good hideout, it can be used as training ground and lead our operations from the region there.” The severity of attacks on Pakistani territory in 2011 has proved him right.

It is not understood why Isaf commander Gen Petraeus told the US Senate Armed Services Committee on March 15 that the Taliban’s momentum had been reversed in most areas of Afghanistan. At best, the situation is fragile and easily reversible. The situation on the ground seems to contradict the general’s hopeful projection.

Gen Petraeus added that America’s “core objective” was to “ensure that Afghanistan does not once again become a sanctuary for Al Qaeda”. Yet the two attacks on Dir clearly show that Al Qaeda has become a formidable presence in this part of the Hindu Kush and that the US has not been able to deny it this sanctuary.

For Pakistan, the policy options are either to conduct hot pursuit into Afghanistan, or to fence the Durand Line to protect itself against attacks. To do nothing is dangerous.

Due to this security threat from Afghanistan, the recent Pakistani gains in Swat, Buner, Dir, Bajaur and Mohmand appear to be tenuous. It is also clear that the insurgents are now deeply embedded within the region.

So, what next?

The following predictions can be safely made: the gains made by the Pakistan military in Swat, Dir and Bajaur will be tested; it is also clear that while the Pakistani military holds sway in the valleys, the mountains mostly belong to the militants. Yet while the Hindu Kush range provides them with advantages, it also limits the type of war that they can wage: they cannot field large groups. However, the mountains give them the ability to easily change their axis of attack more quickly than the military, which is dependent on a long supply chain.

Furthermore, public opinion in Pakistan that is favourable to the militants allows them to receive a steady supply of volunteers. These factors provide them the ability to conduct a war of attrition against Pakistan for a long time to come. They also have the ability to extend insecurity to other parts of the country to lessen the pressure against them. ¦ The writer is chairman of the Regional Institute of Policy Research in Peshawar.

EMAIL
azizkhalid@gmail.com

__________________
A successful person is one who can lay a firm foundation with the bricks that other throw at him. (David Brinkley)