The federation debate
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"][COLOR="DarkGreen"]The federation debate[/COLOR][/SIZE]
Haider Nizamani | Opinion | From the Newspaper[/CENTER][/B]
[I][CENTER]13th Feb 2012[/CENTER][/I]


[B]DISCOURSE about the nature of federation in Pakistan is often conflated with patriotism, leaving little room for a reasoned discussion.[/B]

For most of its existence, the country has been a federation in name and a highly centralised state in substance. Political classes in federating units use different goalposts in deciding on an amicable political contract for Pakistan.

With the second anniversary of the passage of the 18th Amendment due in a couple of months, it is appropriate to delineate the contours of the federation discourse and look at the historical narratives these perspectives rely on.

If we conceive of this debate as a bar, Punjab would be on one end and Balochistan on the opposite end of the spectrum with Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) somewhere in the middle.

In the mainstream discourse in Punjab the 1973 constitution contains adequate provisions for provincial autonomy. Its restoration and further constitutional guarantees to provinces incorporated in the 18th Amendment are the best possible arrangement for a robust federal arrangement.

Baloch nationalists, on the other hand, are sceptical of any constitutional tweaking. There is a growing feeling that Balochistan will never get a fair deal within a Pakistani set-up; so the preferred political option for many is to get out of the federation.

Nationalists in Sindh and KP are mindful of the limits of the 1973 constitution as a basis for a social and political contract.
However, unlike the majority Baloch nationalists, Sindhi and Pakhtun nationalists emphasise on overhauling the federal structure instead of dismantling it altogether. Interaction and contestations among these political classes have shaped the dynamics of the federation debate in post-1971 Pakistan.

In pre-1971 Pakistan, Bengalis were at the heart of politics surrounding centre-province relations; in 2012 the politics of federalism will have, among others, Seraiki and Hazara voices. These voices, however, are not discussed in this write-up.Why does the discourse in Punjab use the 1973 constitution as a valid goalpost to play the federation game? Why are the political classes of other provinces not keen to play the game under these demarcations? What are their suggested goalposts?

The 1973 constitution, to federalist voices in Punjab, serves the purpose well. Drafted after the break-up of the country in 1971, it pledges to run Pakistan as a federal, Islamic and parliamentary democracy. It was the product of a democratically elected constituent assembly and there was consensus among a representative political class to make it the basis for the new political contract among federating units.

Political discourse, especially amongst nationalists in smaller provinces, perceives the 1973 constitution quite differently and refers to other sets of contemporary and historical goalposts.

The case of the Baloch nationalists is straightforward. Gen Zia treated the constitution as 15 pages of worthless paper. Baloch nationalists argue that Balochistan was effectively under military rule by 1974, well before Zia pulverised the 1973 constitution. Most of them believe that Pakistan forcibly brought Balochistan into its fold and coercion is what is keeping the province in the federation.

Even after the passage of the 18th Amendment and Islamabad’s public assertions about granting genuine autonomy to Balochistan, unelected military and paramilitary forces act with impunity in the province.

Pakhtun and Sindhi nationalists use different goalposts and point to, what they term, the inherent limitations of the 1973 constitution. The 1940 Lahore resolution of the All India Muslim League is a popular goalpost among Sindhi nationalists as the basis for robust federalism in Pakistan. Adoption of the resolution on March 23 is officially celebrated in Pakistan as a national holiday.

In Punjab and the Urdu media, March 23 gets attention for its symbolic value as the day when the League officially demanded a separate homeland for Muslim-majority regions of India. Beyond celebratory and symbolic value, little attention is paid to the contents of the resolution.

Sindhi nationalists never tire of drawing attention to the 1940 resolution’s contents envisaging that “the areas in which Muslims are in majority as in north-western and eastern zones of India, should be so grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign”.

Punjab’s political class may overlook the contents of the resolution but its wording continues to resonate among Sindhi nationalists for whom an amended 1973 constitution is no answer to the kind of federation Sindh aspires for and was promised by the League in 1940.

Other fixed goalposts, popular or uncontested, in Punjab’s political discourse are the iconic status for Mohammad Ali Jinnah, desirability of Urdu as the national language and the prominent role assigned to Islam as a unifying factor in the country.

Pakhtun and Sindhi nationalists, as well as the Baloch, do not elevate the founder as someone beyond criticism. Jinnah’s political choices and strategies are subjected to critical appraisal by Sindhi nationalists dating back to G.M. Syed’s differences with Jinnah in the 1940s.

Adoption of Urdu as the national language is a settled point in Punjab, but Pakhtun nationalists maintain that along with Urdu, languages such as Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushto and Seraiki be recognised as national languages in the constitution. Such is the irony of Pakistan’s chequered political history that there aren’t many voices in Punjab speaking out to make Punjabi one of the national languages of Pakistan.

Similarly, the quantum of role assigned to Islam in the 1973 constitution and subsequent amendments inserted during the Zia period is acceptable to Punjab’s political class because Islam and Pakistan go hand-in-hand in Punjab’s mainstream discourse.

Pakhtun nationalists, as witnessed in the ANP assertions during the deliberation over the 18th Amendment would like to annul the constitutional stipulation which requires that the president and prime minister be practising Muslims. Furthermore, the ANP believes in secularism. Sindhi and Baloch nationalists share these sentiments.

Federations are by definition political compromises among diverse units. Disagreements over the nature of federation seldom cause its dismantling. Accommodation and adaptability only strengthen the federation and the political classes in Pakistan will have to learn to play the game with multiple goalposts.

[I]The writer is a Canada-based academic.[/I]