The missing context
 

[B][U][CENTER][SIZE="5"]The missing context[/SIZE][/CENTER][/U][/B]

[B]Muhammad Amir Rana [/B]

EVEN though they’ve been around a long time, Pakistan’s militant groups remain shrouded largely in mystery.

The common Pakistani knows little about militants’ presence around him and few have knowledge about their objectives, agendas and structures — although the common ideological narratives and worldview may provide a common thread.

There could be many reasons for this lack of understanding. First, most militant groups operate under the guise of charities and actively strive to hide their motives and objectives from public view. Their recruitment patterns are becoming very sophisticated and a new trend of targeted indoctrination and recruitment has emerged.

Secondly, the glorification of militant jihad has engendered certain tendencies of acceptance among the masses; until they suffer directly at the hands of the militants, they tend to reject all criticism as conspiracy theories.

Because of the bitter experience of the people in Swat and parts of Fata at the hands of the Taliban, recent polls show that opposition to militancy is higher in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and some tribal agencies as compared to Punjab and Sindh. Yet a generally vague threat perception — not only among the masses but also at the policy level — undermines any gains from this unfavourable view of the militants.

Meanwhile, internationally even most leading experts on terrorism have a sketchy understanding of Pakistani militant groups.
This could be on account of limited access to primary sources, the lack of opportunities to interact with militants and poor understanding of the local social, religious, cultural and class structures that can contribute to unreliable assessment and analysis.

Many foreign analysts claim that they have access to their states’ databases, including intelligence departments’ resource centres. The analysis they come up with raises questions about the reliability of these databases. Cited across the world, these reports are often full of elementary factual errors. This is not to suggest mala fide intentions behind the reports but to point out the lack of intellectual depth and the failure to focus on perspective.

Ironically, many leading Pakistani experts quote these reports extensively, invariably seeing local militants through Western lenses. This reflects their indolence and lack of capacity in understanding local problems in the local context.

Does that mean that the militants are successful in deceiving the whole world? Do they have a conscious strategy to operate behind a smokescreen of ambiguities? But militant groups do not operate like criminal syndicates; they fight for certain political and ideological causes and need public support to sustain their activities. Therefore, they also have to be on the surface to sustain and expand their support base. The religious and ideological discourse acts as a catalyst for them, and the lack of understanding about them both at the national and international levels has contributed to their strength.

Cultivating primary sources in and rapport with militant groups is a risky proposition for journalists and researchers. The risks are outlined by the abduction and murder, thought to be a consequence of his level of penetration into militant ranks, of journalist Saleem Shahzad in May 2011. He had developed a good understanding of a few groups in Pakistan. Dealing with such threats urgently is obviously of critical importance and depends largely on a researcher’s perception and priorities. Research and investigative journalism on matters of politics, economy and crime is also difficult but the knowledge-base on these subjects is not as skeletal it is on militancy.

Consequently, only a few perceptions have developed that help in understanding the phenomenon of militancy in Pakistan.
Three broad sets of perceptions are available at the national and international level.

The first approach deals with historical perspective and links the emergence of militant groups with the religious discourse in the country and the influence of the Islamisation movements across the world. Wahabi or Salafi influences are considered the transforming agents in this approach, which argues that militancy is a violent expression of this discourse and cannot be dealt with without reform of the whole discourse. This approach does not provide any comprehensive solutions and merely suggests long-term initiatives such as promotion of alternative narratives, counter-arguments, modern education and cultural fusion.

The second approach places emphasis on the security and conflict perspective. It links the current state of militancy to lingering conflicts in the region, including Kashmir and Afghanistan, and sees them as the core problem. This approach helps explain and understand the strategic positions of states including notions such as ‘strategic depth’.

Understandably, it favours the resolution of long-standing border and territorial conflicts but at the same time assumes that militants or non-state actors are under full control of the state and the solutions lie in the hands of the state.

In Pakistan, many perceive that after the coalition forces leave Afghanistan, many of the militant groups will lose their legitimacy or raison d’être, which will lead to reduced security threats inside the country and most groups would be reconciled through negotiations.

This approach does not satisfy counter-terrorism practitioners and policy analysts who see the militants as an autonomous phenomenon that has developed a stake in the conflict economy, and developed cooperation and links with international terrorist groups and local crime syndicates.

The third approach perceives them as a lethal threat to internal and external security and something that needs to be dealt with an iron hand.

These approaches see militants from different viewpoints, varying from national security paradigms to strategic perspectives.
For the US, the concern may be confined to the militants’ international links and the potential threat they pose to regional security. For India, they are an irritant that could trigger a bigger conflict in the region. To Pakistan, they may be a threat to internal security.

Some analysts also favour a combination of the three approaches, although it is yet to seen if that would be feasible. One thing is clear: all are concerned about the militant groups’ operational capabilities and the ideological and political consequences of their actions but there is little interest in the circumstances of their birth and prospects of longevity.


[url]http://dawn.com/2012/07/29/the-missing-context/[/url]