Minimal role for police

By Muhammad Amir Rana

THE police are responsible not just for maintaining law and order but also for keeping intact the faith of the common man in state systems. Their behaviour towards citizens plays a critical role in nurturing law-abiding attitudes.

In countries such as Pakistan, where the police have an additional role in countering terrorism and insurgency, the department faces problems because of lack of capacity, training and logistics, and because of political influence and departmental structure issues.

Engaging the police in rehabilitationor de-radicalisation programmes would appear a challenge, particularly when security forces including the police are the militants` targets. The security forces` struggle and physical sacrifices in maintaining order in conflict zones notwithstanding, the issue of their opera-tional capacity and counter terrorism training is also generally overlooked in policy discourse.

In Pakistan, a rehabilitation programme for terrorist detainees was built in the post-insurgency perspective of Swat in which the police play a minimal role.

The military is running the project and wants to extend it. The Punjab government has taken a similar initiative, assigning very little role to the police.

The police infrastructure in Pakistan comprises the four provincial police organisations and those operational in Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan`s total population is estimated to be around 180 million, and the combined federal and provincial law enforcement forces (including the paramilitary and related wings of the intelligence organisations) have a total strength of close to 575,000 personnel including 354, 221 police personnel. The police-to-population ratio is therefore one police official for every 304 persons.

This fares well vis-Ã -vis the UN standard for peacetime policing, which recommends one police officer for every 400 persons. However, given the nature of the crisis in Pakistan, especially terrorist activity and the insurgency situation in Fata and parts of Balochistan coupled with rising crime figures, the numbers are not satisfactory. Further, the capacity of the police is constrained by political manipulation, the lack of forensic services, inadequate training and equipment, corruption and weaknesses in the judicial sphere.

The police do not enjoy the trust of the citizenry due to rampant corruption and what is generally perceived by many as discriminatory responses towards citizens. At the same time, the police are a permanent target of militants, along with other wings of the security forces.

In 2010 and 2011 alone about 1,458 personnel including 423 policemen of low and high ranks of the security forces lost their lives, mainly in terrorist attacks or clashes with militants. Another 2,818 were injured, including 634 policemen.

These realities leave little space for the police to effectively engage in de-radicalisation and rehabilitation programmes. There is need for thorough police reform and the creation of a comprehensive, multi-faceted de-radicalisation programme.

Nonetheless, lessons can be learned from how de-radicalisation programmes in different countries use the police and security forces at different stages.

The de-radicalisation programme in Indonesia is based on the belief among those in charge that the police can change the jihadis` assumption that government officials are anti-Islamic. The police not only treat jihadi prisoners kindly but also support them financially.

In Malaysia, the police play a major role in monitoring militants after their release. That programme has another dimension too: coercion and threats are also brought to bear in order to deter militants from re-engaging in militancy and terrorism. Militants are beaten, tortured and subjected to long periods of solitary confinement in addition to other punishments.Germany`s disengagement programme is based on multiple initiatives. A high level of cooperation and coordination among various agencies such as the police, municipal corporations and NGOs is deemed the programme`s basic strength and the basis of its success.

It can be discerned from the practices cited above that a comprehensive de radicalisation programme in Pakistan has the space to engage the police, particularly in post-release monitoring and in facilitating the reintegration of freed individuals.

For instance, like the German model, a multi-level coordination mechanism can be evolved that may connect district or sub-district-level police offices to differ-ent departments/institutions of technical education and financial assistance such as the Baitul Maal through the district coordination officers (DCOs).

According to the Fourth Schedule of the anti-terrorism law, the police must maintain a register that holds lists and records of suspected terrorists that can prove useful for DCOs in assessing the needs of released prisoners and ex-militants and referring them to relevant departments and institutions.

The purpose should be to prevent recidivism by providing proper facilitation to released prisoners or ex-militants to learn skills, obtain an education and reintegrate in society. Successful de-radicalisation programmes place much emphasis on the post-release stage where rehabilitated detainees are provided sufficient and prolonged `after care`.

Besides post-release monitoring, keeping regular liaison with ex-militants, and coordinating with other state institutions in a broader de-radicalisation programme, another vital role played by the police in such initiatives could be behavioural: that is, to treat people kindly in police stations and prisons.

Similarly, the police can coordinate with family members of detained militants and encourage community involvement in their rehabilitation and reintegration.