ONCE upon a time, four wise men met with recalcitrant TTP leaders. Impressed by the merit of their arguments, convincing mannerisms and generosity of the state to let bygones be bygones, the cruel resolve of hardened terrorists melted away and they suddenly saw the light.

They returned to the fold of civilised society, swore allegiance to the Constitution and the state`s writ, surrendered their weapons, released hostages, repented of the killing of innocent civilians and agreed to work with community leaders and state officials to rebuild war-tattered Fata.

In response the state announced an amnesty scheme for everyone who admitted past wrongdoing and repented. It amended Article 247 of the Constitution to mainstream Fata and extended rights enjoyed by ordinary Pakistanis to tribesmen as well. Its team of leaders, legal experts and scholars devised indigenous local government and criminal justice systems for Fata within the framework of the Constitution, Sharia and tribal riwaaj. Fata emerged as the Switzerland of the East and everyone lived happily ever after.

If wishes were horses, peace talks with terrorists would produce happy endings. It has been said before and it needs to be said again: the predominant opposition to talks is not rooted in the belief that exterminating members of the TTP-led terror syndicate or revenge is a goal as desirable as peace.

Notwithstanding the TTP`s savagery and the thousands of citizens lost to it, the argument for forgiveness over retributive justice wouldwin any day if the probability of talks resulting in the surrender of terrorists as opposed to the surrender of the state was a reasonable one.

Let`s quickly revisit our experience with militants and peace agreements. In 2004, the Shakai agreement was signed with Nek Mohammad in South Waziristan. The government was to release militants taken prisoner during the military operation and pay compensation for casualties and collateral damage. Nek Mohammad and his men were granted amnesty. In return, the militants agreed not to attack state property and personnel and to desist from participating in armed conflict in Afghanistan. There was no requirement to oust foreign militants or surrender heavy weapons.

Within days the agreement blew up in the military`s face: Nek Mohammad reiterated allegiance to Al Qaeda and had to be taken out by a drone.

In 2005, the Sararogha peace deal was signed with Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan. Baitullah agreed not to attack government functionaries and property or harbour foreign militants. In return he and his men were afforded amnesty for past actions. There was no prohibition on crossborder actions.

Abdullah Mehsud opted out of the agreement and Baitullah never really abided by it. Eventually, Baitullah was taken out by a drone attack in 2009 and Operation Rah-i-Nijat was carried out.

In 2006, the 16-point Miramshah peace deal was signed in North Waziristan withHafiz Gul Bahadur and others. There were to be no terrorist attacks in Pakistan, cross-border attacks in Afghanistan or attacks on state personnel and property. Foreigners were to be asked to remain peaceful or leave. The government agreed to halt the military operation, release militants, pay compensation for collateral damage and withdraw the army to the barracks. Some understanding with Hafiz Gul Bahadur has probably survived but North Waziristan is enemy territory today.

In 2008, a peace deal was concluded in Khyber Agency with militants including Lashkar-i-Islam (Mangal Bagh) and Ansarul Islam (Qazi Mehbub). Militants agreed not to set up a parallel administration, initiate incursions into Peshawar, allow foreigners in the Bara area, attack government property, impede developmental work or brandish unauthorised weapons. The deal didn`t survive long and eventually a military operation (Sirat-i-Mustageem) was carried out. The 2008 deal with Faqir Hussain in Bajaur also didn`t last and was followed up by Operation Sher Dil.

The year 2009 saw the infamous Swat agreement with Sufi Mohammad and the TTP`s current head Mullah Fazlullah. It was agreed that Sharia would be enforced (Nizam-i-Adl Regulations, 2009 were promulgated), militants would be released, no private militias would exist, foreign militants would surrender and barber shops and vaccination campaigns would not be attacked. The state agreed to withdraw the army. In response militants annexed Buner andShangla and rejected democracy and the Constitution. Operation Rah-i-Haq had to be launched to reacquire Swat.

What are the lessons? Peace talks failed each time not because of deficient skills of interlocutors or the talks` agenda, but because of the fundamental clash between the interests of Pakistan and those of the militants. Militant leaders have no social or political prospects in a peaceful Fata. They are the new power elite within the tribal areas and across Pakistan (as patrons of the crime and terror-syndicate spread all over). It is a zero-sum game for them. Their power flows from the gun. If they put it down, they become irrelevant.

Re-establishing preeminence of traditional tribal leadership won`t happen amicably.

The power has not shifted from the maliks to the army but from maliks to the militants.

The hands of the clock can`t simply be turned back. The state needs to help strengthen and rejuvenate traditional tribal structures in Fata but it can only be done through introduction of new instruments such as local government and criminal justice structures contrived in consultation with the tribes.

Bringing North Waziristan back within the fold of Pakistan is only one part of an antiterror policy. As we continue to rely on the miracle of talks succeeding, let`s not suspend work on its other vital components meant for all of Pakistan.• The writer is a lawyer.

sattar@post.harvard.edu Twitter: @babar sattar

A lot has so far been said and written by analysts about the peace talks offered by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in a video message released to the media on February 3. So far the crux of all commentaries is that TTP is not serious about any peace talks and it is only interested in buying some time to reorganize itself and in the process also wants to send out a message to those within its ranks and files who want peace with the government that actually it's the government which is least interested. Nominating Adnan Rashid, a convicted murderer, with the precondition that talks will be only held within the parameters of constitution and law set by the All Parties Conference (called by ANP in Islamabad on 14 February) gives credence to the above mentioned arguments.

Notwithstanding, some very interesting developments have unfolded both within and outside the geographical borders of Pakistan and it seems that the impetus for the 'Peace Talks' offer extended by TTP owes much to these developments. Firstly Tehrik-e-Taliban Afghanistan has formally started negotiations with the US and Afghan government on the Afghan imbroglio. Both sides are showing the required flexibility by burying all preconditions which were previously attached to such dialogues. After this development TTP is haunted by the fear that if the Afghan Peace and reconciliation process succeeds it will certainly marginalize and isolate it on two accounts. Firstly the pretext on which the TTP are attracting recruits to its folds will diminish i.e. they claim that foreign forces are occupying Afghanistan and they have every right to wage jihad against US and its allies. And secondly TTP Mehsud group depends on others for its strength. For instance Hakimullah Mehsud and Wali-ur-Rehman both lost their area (South Waziristan Agency) to the Pak Army during operation Rah-e-Nijat. They are now operating from North Waziristan Agency where they are backed by Maulana Sadiq Noor of Khatti Kalai who is Dawar of the minority tribe of North Waziristan Agency. They also derive their strength from non-locals such as Punjabi Taliban, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Arab, Chechen and other smaller groups. It is believed that if these groups relocate themselves to other fragile parts of the world if and when US and NATO forces withdraw from the region, Mehsud group will obviously lose ground in North Waziristan, its operational base, as majority of locals are against them.

Similarly Hafiz Gul Bahadar the local Taliban commander of North Waziristan, Who is Utmanzai Wazir by tribe, has great reservations against Hakimullah Mahsud and Wali-ur-Rehman. So far Hafiz Gul Bahadr has exercised restraint perhaps because he lacks the required strength or will to compel TTP to accept his authority. He mainly draws his strength from sub tribes of Utmanzai Wazir; Mada Khel and Tori Khel whereas he has some pockets of strength in Kabul Khel, Bura Khel, Zoni Khel, Baki Khel and Datta Khel.

To avoid disrespect to Wazir families Hafiz Gul Bahadar is strongly against the military operation in North Waziristan Agency and in that regard he and his Shura have already signed a peace pact with the government which is often violated by Mehsud group (TTP) and its affiliates. Visibly perturbed with the activities of the TTP, who are not only targeting the security forces but also the local tribesmen in North Waziristan Agency in total disregard of the peace agreement which Hafiz Gul Bahadar has reached with the government, Gul bahadar convened Jirga of Bora Khel, Datta Khel and Darpa Khel at Anghar village located on the brink of river Tochi some two months back. This event went unnoticed in both print and electronic media yet it is a significant development which will have enormous impact on the events unfolding in the future.

It was decided in that Jirga that the local tribes i.e. Bora Khel, Datta Khel and Darpa Khel will form a joint lashkar to improve fragile security situation in Miranshah Bazar, agency headquarter of North Waziristan Agency. As a result of this meeting joint laskhar was raised by these three tribes and within two months it has completely secured the Miranshah bazaar which was largely insecure due to the activities of TTP.

On account of these two events Hakimullah Mehsud group (TTP) has smelled the danger which the future holds for it. It would be indeed a nightmare for TTP in case Gul Bahadar and Utmanzai Wazir further extend the lashkar to Mir Ali, Razmak, Datta Khel, Esha, Spinwam, Shewa and Spulga areas of North Waziristan. Similarly if Afghan Taliban (TTA) reaches an agreement with United States of America and Afghan government then in such a situation non-local Taliban will certainly relocate themselves and so will the Haqqani Network which often plays role of mediator between different factions of Taliban in case of any differences. In such a scenario it would be very hard for Mehsud group (TTP) to survive and keep its structure intact. Therefore, it seems very sagacious on part of TTP to offer peace talks to the government of Pakistan and ultimately cut peace agreement before it gets late.

Whatever the case is it is good news for the people of Pakistan generally and for tribesmen specifically that at least both sides value the need to negotiate peace. It is pertinent to mention here that at the start of any negotiation opposing parties do come with an unrealistic list of conditions, however, their position dilutes with the passage of time which is evident from the case of US and Afghan Taliban dialogues. Therefore, the government should take the offer seriously as the people and the region deserves peace.

Written by Asmatullah Khan Wazir who is Director at Research Advocacy and Development (RAD) an Islamabad Based Research Think Tank.

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