[B][CENTER][SIZE="5"]Our relationship with China[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]
[B][RIGHT]December 19th, 2010[/RIGHT][/B]

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s South Asian trip should come as a wake-up call to Pakistan, which has long considered China its closest ally. Yes, Wen was effusive in his praise during the Pakistan leg of the trip and signed $20 billion worth of business deals. But the visit was merely a re-enactment — at a much smaller scale — of Wen’s visit to India, where the two historical rivals agreed to increase bilateral trade to $100 billion. Alliances in South Asia are shifting and Pakistan has to ensure it is not left in the dust.

Despite the rhetoric surrounding the relationship, the China-Pakistan alliance, like all such alliances, is based on a mutual convergence of interest; in this case a distrust of India. With China and India competing for supremacy in the region, that rivalry is likely to ignite in the distant future. In the near future, though, China seems to have settled on wooing India for its own economic benefit rather than prolonging hostilities. This is likely to make Pakistan less valuable in the short-term. Not only will China not have as great a need to prop up Pakistan, it may also appease India by distancing itself slightly from Pakistan. As many observed, China was slow in reacting to Pakistan’s calls for flood relief aid. Given the impermanence of all international alliances, we should have been seeking alternative friendships anyway. Now we should have the impetus to do that sooner rather than later.

It is true that China has invested a lot of money in Pakistan and given more than its fair share of development assistance and technological knowhow, but there have been economic downsides too. The import of Chinese manufacturing goods, which are cheaper than local ones, have had an adverse impact on local businesses. We also have a significant trade deficit with China as we need their goods far more than they need ours. China has been the dominant partner from the start and, without abandoning the alliance altogether, we need more equitable friendships. Ultimately, as China gets closer to India, that decision may not even be ours to make. Before the tides of history overtake us, we should act quickly and build up regional alliances with India, Bangladesh and Nepal.

[B][CENTER][SIZE="5"]Dying to learn[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]
[B][RIGHT]December 19th, 2010[/RIGHT][/B]

The new report by the US-based rights watchdog Human Rights Watch puts some rather shocking facts before us. The report, titled “Their future at stake” describes the death of at least 22 teachers in Balochistan between January 2008 and October 2010, the transfer of at least 200 teachers and professors either to Quetta or out of the province and the fact that due to militant violence, schools in Balochistan opened for only 120 days in 2009, compared to 220 in the rest of the country.

In the context of the ethnic and nationalist violent stalking Balochistan, the report shows that the group most adversely affected by the attacks on education are the Baloch, as opposed to the groups that nationalist forces target. The operations of extremists in the region add a further complexity to the problem.

The issue is one the Baloch nationalists, and other political forces with a following in the province, need to take up as a matter of urgency. Balochistan cannot afford for its children to be left so far behind those elsewhere in the country. There are too few schools, literacy levels in some districts fall to below 20 per cent and far too many Baloch children lack access to education. It is only when these shortcomings are corrected that there can be any real development in our country’s most under-developed province. This development is vital to the future of Balochistan and its people. All those with an interest in the welfare of the territory must find ways to end the violence which holds it back. The target killing of teachers must end and an environment created which allows others to take up work in an area that desperately needs their services. Unless this happens the province will continue to slip further and further into the age of darkness and all the many problems that come with this. This process must be stopped before it is too late to do so.


[B][CENTER][SIZE="5"]Free for now[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]
[B][RIGHT]December 19th, 2010[/RIGHT][/B]

The founder of the whistle-blower WikiLeaks organisation is finally out on bail and recovering from his ordeal in a London jail at the country estate of a friend. He obtained bail only after an appeal by prosecuting lawyers was rejected by the High Court. A surety of $374,000 billion had to be raised by friends and Assange is being electronically tagged and must report daily to the police. He also faces extradition to Sweden where he faces charges of sexually molesting two women. These have been denied by Assange.

Is this the normal process of justice at play? There are as yet no answers but evidence is growing that, in what could prove to be a landmark case, Assange could be put on trial for leaking US diplomatic cables to the world. He says he fears attempts to extradite him to the US, with such a move apparently being planned in Washington. There, Assange could be tried under the US Espionage Act. An effort is said to be underway to detect those who leaked the documents to his organisation. They too face prosecution in a trial which, if it ever takes place, would open up new legal chapters. Persons accused of leaking information have only rarely before, in the US, faced action in courts.

Even in nations that pride themselves on democracy, it appears officials are willing to tolerate only a limited free flow of information. National security is being cited as a means to deny citizens access to information. It is this principle which is under dispute. The possibility that Assange has become a hunted man because he dared to break the rules and, metaphorically speaking, hung dirty US clothing up for the world to see, is very real. The leaked cables have given us an insight into how things work out in the corridors of power. More information continues to surface. Everything possible must be done to ensure this process can go on without hindrance.

[B][SIZE="5"][CENTER]Making sense of Af-Pak ambiguities[/CENTER][/SIZE][/B]
[B][RIGHT]December 20th, 2010[/RIGHT][/B]

US President Barack Obama has talked about the war in Afghanistan on December 16 with a growing background noise of American public opinion asking him to bring the troops home in short order. He had asked his National Security Staff (NSS) last year to lead an assessment of the war effort and was served a summary of it. He says he will not peg America’s security on results of opinion polls; but he will have to lean on Republican support if he wants to carry on and, in return for doing that, he may have to relent on some of the pet Democratic programmes at home.

He thinks his strategy on Afghanistan is on track and that the war is not yet unwinnable, though he conceded that it may take him long to win it. The policy review was focused on the effects of his troop-surge policy and his verdict was: “Today, al Qaeda’s senior leadership in the border region is under more pressure than at any point since they fled Afghanistan nine years ago. Senior leaders have been killed. It’s harder for them to recruit … it’s harder for them to plot and launch attacks. In short, al Qaeda is hunkered down.”

The document put before President Obama said that the Taliban had suffered a reversal too: “Progress had been made in some areas in Afghanistan, notably with tactics such as the killing of local Taliban leaders and in weakening the insurgents’ grip in the south of the country around Kandahar.” Therefore, he said, the start of the US troops withdrawal in 2011 was on track as the US tried to consolidate the gains it had made so far. The US National Intelligence Estimates, made by CIA and 15 other agencies, however say that the chance of success against the Taliban was limited “unless Pakistan tackled the insurgents’ safe havens on its territory”. To this, we would also like to add the caveat that a close reading of the review suggests that the Americans will not end their presence in Afghanistan even after 2014, which is the time by which the transition to the Afghans is to be completed.

President Obama said Pakistan was aware of the threat the Taliban terror posed for the country but “progress has not come fast enough” and that he “will continue to insist to Pakistani leaders that terrorist safe havens within their borders must be dealt with”. The military opinion was less pessimistic but it, too, insisted on more cooperation from Pakistan. Hence, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen’s latest insistence to Pakistan that it “do more” by attacking North Waziristan.

The Americans can leave Afghanistan with good conscience if the Taliban are reduced to not being able to overthrow the post-withdrawal government in Kabul. They think this will be possible if Pakistan sorts out its approach to the problem. On the Pakistani side, the people have been made to think like the American people: get out because this war cannot be won. But Pakistani opinion says much more than just that. It questions the motivation of the war and wants it to end in defeat. The official line, made hostile by the perceived American softness to Indian presence in Afghanistan, indicates much more than that.

In fact, ‘official’ Pakistan is not only not interested in ‘doing more’ it wants to maintain the capacity of the Taliban to resist America, force it to leave Afghanistan and later to change the status quo in Afghanistan in Pakistan’s favour to counter India’s strategic outreach in Afghanistan. Politically, it is no longer possible for anyone to support the American policy. In fact, political parties are veering towards opposing American policy to retain public support. The popular line is: this is not our war; if the Americans leave, things will get back to normal; and terrorism experienced by innocent citizens in Pakistan is actually organised by America in tandem with India and Israel.

Strategies are not unfolding in a vacuum of information. Pakistan itself is flush with facts that do not buttress the current policy of waiting to see the Americans leave and then hoping to get the Taliban to do the right thing by us and take on the Indians in Afghanistan and make them run as they did in 1996. The stark fact is that the state has lost its writ in most of Fata, much of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and much of Balochistan.

Should Pakistan go on denying that al Qaeda is not located on its soil? General (retd) Pervez Musharraf has exploded this myth twice, once in his article in Newsweek and the second time in this newspaper (on December 15) saying: “Al Qaeda which has a presence in the mountains of Fata, though in small numbers, needs to be evicted”. The US insists that Pakistan remains its most important partner in the region as far as the war in Afghanistan and against terrorism is concerned. This plays out differently in Pakistan than what most outsiders may think.

It leads most analysts within the establishment to conclude that America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America, which means that Pakistan can do two things: resist American policy of fighting terrorism or dictate its own policy of forcing India to vacate Afghanistan and return to an antebellum Afghanistan where Pakistan calls the shots. What does not enter the calculations of these analysts is: does Pakistan need American aid and IMF assistance with any less intensity than America needs to get Pakistan to fight terrorism?

The last time there was a face-off between America and Pakistan, the latter won, which must have strengthened the thinking of the establishment. Pakistan achieved this victory over America when trucks carrying Nato supplies were torched in Pakistan. The Americans backed off and apologised. But the US policy review says drones remain a winning tactical device and insist that Pakistan go into North Waziristan and oust the ‘foreign’ Taliban from there. Pakistan can defeat America in Afghanistan, which means America will go home, but Pakistan will have surrendered itself to the forces of chaos for achieving this very dubious victory.

There are ambiguities about Afghanistan on both sides, in the American and Pakistani thinking. But sitting next to it, Pakistan is more vulnerable to what will follow the American exit. And its readiness to face the consequences of its Afghan policy is much in doubt.

[B][CENTER][SIZE="5"]Blasphemy law and lack of moral courage[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]
[B][RIGHT]December 21st, 2010[/RIGHT][/B]

There is news that the Gilani government in Islamabad might lean on an old Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) recommendation on the ‘humanising’ of the blasphemy law to prevent victimisation of innocent Pakistanis under it. The CII report, unearthed in the ministry for religious affairs, says the government could put in place certain procedural routines to prevent the abuse of the law by a society increasingly vulnerable to religious extremism.

The report says there should be a pre-FIR investigation by the police every time someone is accused of blasphemy; concrete evidence must be demanded and accused persons provided with legal defence; a ‘first class’ magistrate should supervise the police investigation prior to advising the registration of the FIR; and after the FIR is registered, the case must go directly to the High Court of the province.

The government is under pressure from the phalanx of political and religious opposition to not do anything to alleviate the suffering of the people victimised by the blasphemy law. The political parties are quiet, some of them having actually helped stiffen the law into its present diabolical shape, especially Section 295-C which awards the minimum punishment of death without ascertaining whether blasphemy has occurred by intent or unintentionally. The clergy is out in the streets scaring off politicians by adding xenophobia to their campaign in favour of retaining the law, saying ‘foreign masters’ are dictating the government.

Governor Punjab Salmaan Taseer had the moral courage to come to the help of an illiterate Christian woman accused of blasphemy. But he was taken aback by the backlash he has received from clerics and by the rejection of his humane gesture by the PPP federal law minister. President Asif Ali Zardari will not pardon the Christian woman as Mr Taseer mistakenly thought; and no one will even think of smuggling the poor woman out of the country.

The CII recommendation says nothing new and we don’t know how old the recommendation is. We do know that in the early 1990s, the PPP and PML-N both tried to water down the extremism of the blasphemy law without much success. The police did not carry out the new routines, blaming public pressure.

The Lahore High Court has shown bias in favour of the law rather than correcting the abuses that happen because of it. The present High Court has stayed the president from granting pardon to the latest victim, but a retired judge of the High Court Justice (retd) Nazir Akhtar has given a statement in favour of the dreaded law to confirm the bias of the conservative judiciary in Pakistan. As a sitting judge of the Lahore High Court, he used to tell people at social gatherings that they should kill the blasphemer instead of invoking the law against him.

Will the new CII, under Maulana Muhammad Khan Sherani of the JUI-F, supinely accept the old recommendations, even as the JUI-F hits the streets together with the old MMA parties to oust the PPP government through a violent campaign in favour of the blasphemy law? Some members of the old CII were cowed by clerical reaction and one had actually left it under pressure from mounting extremism. It is not likely that the new members will support even procedural changes, especially as Maulana Faqir Muhammad of the Bajaur Taliban, a close ally of al Qaeda, has sworn to get even with the supporters of the anti-blasphemy law opinion in Pakistan.

Moral courage has vanished in an environment of intimidation. The conservative man in Pakistan has become more outspoken and more extreme; the moderates have looked at the battlefield and, seeing it bristling with odds against them, have bowed out of the contest of ideas. The debate is clearly bifurcated. It has not even started in Urdu. In English, it is getting nowhere because of the idiom’s lack of influence on national thinking.


[B][CENTER][SIZE="5"]Friendly words[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]
[B][RIGHT]December 21st, 2010[/RIGHT][/B]

Amidst a sea of hostility, friends are always welcome when they appear on the horizon. The Chinese premier’s words of support will, therefore, be received especially warmly in Islamabad. As he departed from the country, after a visit during which agreements worth around 35 billion dollars were signed, Wen Jiabao put up a robust defence of Pakistan and its fight against terror, directly countering US insinuations that it was not doing enough on that front. This is the first time China has risen to Pakistan’s defence in this manner on the issue of terrorism — and leaders in Islamabad who played a role in persuading Beijing to see things through its eyes must be commended.

The strong gesture of support from the Chinese premier should also make the US think about its own strategies and priorities. The heaping of ceaseless pressure on Pakistan to act against militants can really bring only limited results. What is required is support and practical assistance, which China has extended.

Wen Jiabao’s first visit to the country has gone well — even better than could be expected. This, of course, is important. As things stand now, Pakistan needs to build a network of friends. Its increasingly isolated position in the world leaves it vulnerable to attack. More friends need to stand with China in Pakistan’s corner. Islamabad must step up efforts to ensure this happens. Old allies, such as the Saudis, need to be brought back fully on board. Evidence from WikiLeaks cables suggests there have been tensions. At the same time, new friends too need to be won over. Pakistan, as the key victim of terror, needs to build around it a circle of friends who can help it combat a threat of immense proportions. China’s stance and its diversion from the US line may make other nations think just a little harder about the nature of terrorism and Pakistan’s actions. The drone attacks and related issue of sovereignty need to be addressed as well. Only when Pakistan’s own security concerns are put at rest will an all-out effort be made against militancy. Beijing and Islamabad need to play a role in this together by building an alliance against terror that spreads across the region and the world.

[B][CENTER][SIZE="5"]Terrorism and our neighbours[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]
[B][RIGHT]December 22nd, 2010[/RIGHT][/B]

Two neighbourhood complaints regarding terrorism emanating from Pakistan have come on the same day. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has repeated his condition of having friendly relations with Pakistan only if the latter ensures “that its territory is not used for terrorist activities against us.” Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad has rung President Asif Ali Zardari to demand that Pakistan capture and hand over the Jundallah terrorists who killed 39 people during a Muharram gathering on December 15 in Iran’s province of Sistan-Balochistan.

It is ironic how the two complaints are viewed by the international community. The Indian plaint, intensified after the 2008 reign of terror in Mumbai, goes back at least two decades and started with the ‘condition’ of Pakistan stopping ‘cross-border’ terrorism (read Kashmir). The entire world sympathises with India and holds Pakistan responsible for not suppressing the responsible jihadi organisations. Since these organisations also threaten other states because of their nexus with al Qaeda, the demand that Pakistan take action in eliminating them has the backing of the UN.

The plaint from Iran goes to the root of Iran’s decades-old grievances against Pakistan. The Iranian press has become sensitive to news coming in from Pakistan, often about Shia-killings at the hands of outfits that have been practicing jihad on the side in Pakistan’s covert proxy wars. It looks at Jundallah as a Baloch nationalist organisation that functions with impunity inside Pakistani Balochistan. Pakistan, sincerely wishing to shore up its relations with its western neighbour since General Zia spoiled them, is faced with the problem of lack of control over its territory in Balochistan where it is contending with insurgency. Its hands are tied by the fact that the Taliban in Balochistan are steadily targeting the Hazara Shia in Quetta.

Pakistan is playing on a weak wicket, but its attitude towards the two complaining neighbours is extremely interesting. To India and the international community lined up at the UN, it says that it is going through the judicial process of indicting the said jihadi organisations and is taking time because credible proof is required to get them convicted. It tells India that it, too, is doing ‘parallel’ mischief in Balochistan from the bases it has unfairly acquired in Afghanistan with the help of the US and Nato countries. The response from the international community to this is dismissive because Pakistan has not been able to furnish any evidence of India’s culpability so far, in contrast to the testimony against it by terrorists such as Pakistan-linked David Headley who planned the Mumbai attack. Pakistan, less credibly, opposes the Indian complaint with its own complaint: that India does not come to the negotiating table to discuss bilateral disputes, including Kashmir.

Iran has enemies at the regional as well as global level. It threatens the US with its aggressive nuclear programme which it will not open for inspection and faces punitive resolutions from the UN Security Council. That under a challenging President Ahmadinejad it also threatens Israel may be favoured by some radical anti-government elements in the Middle East, but neighbouring Arab regimes despise this policy and think Iran has hegemonic designs against them. Needless to say, these regimes are friendlier to Pakistan, which irks Iran and compels it to interpret Shia-killings in Pakistan as a ‘relocated’ Arab-Iranian war. Hence, no one apart from Pakistan is disturbed over the Iranian plaint. But Pakistan can do little about it, given the fact that it does not control Balochistan and is, in fact, allegedly banking on the anti-Iran Taliban to provide it ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan.

What should Pakistan do? There is a lesson in what the Chinese have done to sideline difficult bilateral disputes with India: open free trade and create mutual vested interest in resolving issues in a more favourable environment in the future. Had Pakistan not been hamstrung by the dominance of military thinking at home, it would have followed this route, which would have allowed it to mop up the terrorists on its territory.


[B][CENTER][SIZE="5"]MQM moves[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]
[B][RIGHT]December 22nd, 2010[/RIGHT][/B]

With the skills of an established healer, President Asif Ali Zardari seems to have succeeded in soothing ruffled feathers and, for now at least, keeping the MQM on board. Following talks with a delegation led by top party leaders, the president has won a little more time to take action against Sindh home minister Dr Zulfikar Mirza, whose comments a few days ago on extortion mafias in Karachi created a potential coalition crisis. The kind of action sought by the MQM has not been elaborated on, with the MQM suggesting it had left it to the president to take a decision on this. Encouragingly for the federal government, which had seemed somewhat panic-stricken by the prospect of an MQM pull-out from government, the party has expressed trust in the president. The fact that the party is continuing contacts with other political groups, including arch-rivals such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, should be enough to keep the federal government on its toes. This is all the more so given that another former ally, the JUI-F, has shown no inclination to move back to treasury benches and is reported to be discussing a possible change of the chief minister in Balochistan with other opposition parties.

The president will also need to decide what kind of action to initiate against Dr Mirza. His explanation to the MQM about his remarks being entirely personal in nature also suggests measures may be required to enforce more discipline within the party. A situation where opinions not endorsed by the party are expressed by various stakeholders on highly sensitive matters will obviously lead to chaos. The MQM threat to pull out of government has already created a great deal of instability. More needs to be avoided at all costs. We need desperately to create an environment conducive to political and economic equilibrium.

This having been said, the president must be congratulated on handling a difficult situation successfully. Any immediate threat to the coalition government has been warded off and the lessons to be learnt are quite obvious. There is a need to handle matters which have an impact on relations with other parties with more dexterity and finesse, so that the kind of unnecessary crisis we saw over the last few days can be avoided altogether.

[B][CENTER][SIZE="5"]Another ‘abduction’?[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]
[B][RIGHT]December 23rd, 2010[/RIGHT][/B]

Even though intelligence agencies have informed the courts that no persons other than the 11 men taken from Adiala Jail are in their custody, people continue to be ‘picked up’ across the country. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) has expressed alarm over the abduction, apparently by intelligence agency personnel, of activist Siddique Eido from Pasni in Balochistan. He was taken away by several men in two vehicles. Mr Eido had been granted bail in the criminal case. The HRCP has launched an urgent appeal and called on people to write in to authorities.

Such appeals have been made before. The latest case highlights the fact that the tactics used by agencies have not changed. The wave of ‘abductions’ that began soon after 9/11 may have slowed down but it has not stopped. It is alarming that these abductions still take place in Balochistan, where nationalist groups say thousands remain missing. This can only add to the anger and angst that runs through the province. Most of those who have ‘disappeared’ in the country are Baloch who may, or may not, have links to nationalists.

The government must take up the issue of Mr Eido’s kidnapping as a matter of urgency. His whereabouts need to be ascertained and his illegal detention ended. The problem is complicated by the lack of command over agencies which have established themselves as an entity that exists beyond the authority of civilian governments. This must end. The Supreme Court has made it clear that agencies are obliged to follow the law of the land which makes it mandatory that anyone arrested be charged and specific procedures be followed. The failure to do so in the case of Siddique Eido is terrifying. It is time all those who have gone missing in Balochistan were tracked down and permitted to return home.


[B][CENTER][SIZE="5"]Nineteenth amendment[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]
[B][RIGHT]December 23rd, 2010[/RIGHT][/B]

For the second time in the year, the constitution of the republic is going to be amended, this time in order to comply with the Supreme Court’s ruling on the previous amendment. The Nineteenth Amendment was passed in the National Assembly on December 22 but still needs to be passed by the senate and signed into law by the president. While we were not opposed to the Eighteenth Amendment as it currently stands, we feel that the Nineteenth Amendment, which amends the procedure for the appointment of judges, is a good compromise that retains the system of checks and balances between the three branches of government.

Under the proposed amendment, judges would be nominated by a judicial commission and approved or rejected by a parliamentary panel, though a rejection would have to be accompanied by an explanatory note. This gives parliament some power over the judiciary while also protecting the judiciary from being politicised by parliament. The judiciary is prevented from being a largely self-selecting elite as it currently is and parliament, by virtue of having to publicly justify and defend its reasons for rejecting judicial nominees, is prevented from making such decisions for overtly political motives. The amendment, therefore, can be expected to result in a balance of institutional power and we would urge members of parliament to approve it as soon as possible.

While the legal challenges to the Eighteenth Amendment had been viewed by some to be a threat to the current administration, the prime minister deserves credit for resolving the situation without causing any further acrimony. The prime minister is correct in his assessment that this administration may well be the most powerful democratic administration in the country’s history, in large part owing to its ability to compromise at the appropriate junctures.

A special note of gratitude is due to Senator Raza Rabbani. Leading the parliamentary committee on constitutional reforms, which includes members from across the entire political spectrum, cannot have been an easy task and yet the senator has been able to produce legislation that the nation can be justifiably proud of.


[B][CENTER][SIZE="5"]Handling of rape cases[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]
[B][RIGHT]December 23rd, 2010[/RIGHT][/B]

It is hard to ensure that justice will be served when authorities are not convinced that a heinous crime has been committed. The response of the police to the gang rape of a young woman in Karachi shows that they are indulging in odious blame-the-victim behaviour. It is not their job to cast aspersions on the moral character of victims or pass comment on their testimony. It is also inappropriate for anyone — be it the media or politicians — to identify rape victims by name, as happened in this case. There is a longstanding directive from the Supreme Court to not name rape victims unless they themselves wish to come out in the open, as was the case with Mukhtaran Mai. This is a universally accepted norm, as it brings undue attention to the victim and takes focus away from punishing the culprits.

The conduct of authorities in this case raises fears that justice may not be served. Sources in the police have hinted that the suspects may have strong political connections. As we saw in the Dr Shazia Khalid rape case of 2005, political clout can be an impediment to justice. It has been established by a medico-legal report that the woman had been raped. Now it is the media’s job to ensure that the case doesn’t suffer from collective amnesia once the initial flurry of attention has died down.

There is an urgent need to review Pakistan’s rape laws. In 2006, Pervez Musharraf’s government stipulated that rape cases be tried in civil rather than Sharia courts. However, if a woman is unable to prove that she has been raped, she can be tried for adultery in both courts. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan estimates that a rape occurs in Pakistan every two hours and a gang rape every eight hours. Not all these women are able to prove that they have been raped. Until laws against rape are modernised, justice for rape survivors will only be partially served.

[B][CENTER][SIZE="5"]Law and extremism in Pakistan[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]
[B][RIGHT]December 24th, 2010[/RIGHT][/B]

Just as the nation was getting ready to face the onslaught of religious parties and their jihadi adjuncts on the question of the blasphemy law, the Federal Shariat Court has ruled sections of the Women Protection Act (2006), among other legislations, to be violating the Constitution and given the government till June 2011 to remove the flaws in it. It has asserted its remit over the matter saying it is expressly permitted by the Constitution to review all legislation in the light of Quran and Sunnah.

It is sad that the Court has kept its eyes closed to the situation on the ground and obeyed the conservative tradition of following the letter of Islamic jurisprudential interpretation. Already, many Islamic laws in Pakistan are more honoured in their breach than their observance simply because their literalist application has neglected to take into account the social conditions in which the laws have to be prosecuted. Unfortunately, the utopian outlook seeks to coerce society into obedience with divine laws as handled by fallible human beings, rejecting the more realistic approach of moulding the law to the social conditions in which it has to be applied.

There are two ways laws can be made: by amending the Constitution; and by acts of parliament. In Pakistan there is a third way: a law may be promulgated by a military ruler which is later validated by a two-thirds majority in an elected parliament. In regard to Islamic law, a large section of the clerical community considers their interpretation of Islamic Law as being above any legislative process. Opposed to this view is the non-clerical opinion which believes in the sovereignty of the parliament, but this opinion is divided on liberal and conservative lines. This division tilts the debate in favour of the clerics who are empowered beyond normal levels to intimidate the executive, the media and the judiciary.

The latest verdict handed down by the Federal Shariat Court actually removes the legislative method of moderating the intensity of the application of Hudood Laws in today’s society. For instance, the clergy is divided over the question of rape. Again and again, ‘ulema’ have appeared on TV programmes to declare that a victim of rape should be partially considered culpable, insisting that she be subjected to the condition of producing four male eyewitnesses to prove that she has been forced to submit to sexual assault.

The law relating to zina — a part of the Hudood that the Federal Shariat Court seeks to protect as Islamic Law — had registered marked negative effects on society in Pakistan. Women daring to report rape were made to face charges of false accusation because they could not produce four eyewitnesses and were thereafter punished under the Qazaf law. The honourable Court has annulled that section of the Women’s Protection Act which sought to remove, through procedural changes, the abuse of the said law. Thousands of women who had rotted in jail simply because they protested rape have borne witness to the flaw in the literalist approach.

Will the bad days return for women? Already, the literalist approach has divided the judges at the high court level on the question of child marriage as raised in the Family Law Ordinance, leading to dubious implementation. The law of Diyat ordained by law has been subject to abuse by the powerful section of society which commits crimes of oppression against the weak sections. Procedural difficulties also haunt those who come under the effect of Diyat. In other extreme cases like cutting of hands, and stoning of people — mostly women whose witness is not accepted as full — Pakistan has saved its skin by somehow not enforcing the sentences. The same kind of thing has happened with the victims of the blasphemy law.

The unfolding of legal evolution in Pakistan tells us that conservative military rulers hand down literalist laws which then cannot be rolled back; and liberal military rulers hand down realistic laws which are then either removed by a conservative judiciary or by violence on the streets. General Ayub’s liberal Family Law Ordinance was never properly made a law as Pakistan evolved into a more ideologically strict society as time passed; the parliament under Musharraf accepted ‘modern’ provisions like joint electorates and women’s seats but could not amend the Constitution after three Women’s Rights Commissions steadily recommended the removal of the Hudood Laws, and had to be content with the Women’s Protection Act.

As judicial evolution has tended to favour strict ideology, extremism has gradually increased in Pakistani society. As an agent of negative change, the decision of the state to wage jihad through non-state actors has enriched and empowered a certain kind of clergy and their madrassas. Extremism is always tempered by law which is called ‘adl’ in Arabic which, in turn, means the ‘middle path’ and forms the word ‘etadaal’ meaning moderation. But in Pakistan, because of the street power of the clergy and the increasing recourse by the common man to the powerful jihadi organisations for problem-solving, extremism has been ‘enforced’ and has now become a part of our minds.

The government has already been intimidated into passivity on the question of Aasia Bibi. The judges have stayed the president from pardoning the Christian victim of the blasphemy law, and the clerics have threatened Islamabad with dire consequences if she is made to flee Pakistan. In the 1990s, when another pre-teen Christian victim Salamat Masih was sent into exile, the reaction was not so extreme; today in the case of Aasia Bibi, it is. In fact, the government risks a fall in the coming month when the clergy of Barelvi and Deobandi brands gets together with jihadi organisations, banned by the UN Security Council as terrorists, to prevent the government from tinkering with the procedures under the blasphemy law.

Women and non-Muslims in Pakistan bear the brunt of this extremism and lack of tolerance, mixed with xenophobia because the international community protests at what is happening in Pakistan. The Federal Shariat Court has indirectly expressed itself against procedural changes in the blasphemy law too and has once again ignored factors responsible for the malfunction of Islamic legal provisions.

[B][CENTER][SIZE="5"]Lost vision[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]
[B][RIGHT]December 25th, 2010[/RIGHT][/B]

Let us imagine that Mohammad Ali Jinnah were to step into the country he founded today, on his 134th birth anniversary, and walk down the streets of Karachi, the city he made his home. What he found would almost certainly shock him: slogans suggesting ethnic discord scratched out on graffiti-covered walls, drug users gathering at chosen spots to inject heroin into veins, a shattered civic infrastructure and an atmosphere permeated with intense political and sectarian tensions. Of course, he would encounter similar horrors in other places: from the Taliban in the north, to flood victims in the south, existing on the shores of a sea made up of mass despondency as a consequence of unemployment, inflation and social inequality. We can only imagine his feelings and his thoughts.

Quite obviously this was not the vision Jinnah had for the country he had carved onto the map in 1947, after three decades of assiduous effort. As Pakistan marked its first year in existence, Jinnah, on August 14, 1948, had said in a message to the people of Pakistan that the foundations of a state had been laid down for them and it was now up to them to build on these as quickly and as well as they could. The Quaid-i-Azam died less than a month later. But we wonder if much thought has been given to why the construction on the foundations he put down has been so shoddy. Could we really not have done better?

Jinnah had clearly articulated during his lifetime a desire for a state that was democratic, secular in orientation and just to all its people. His own death, barely a year after Pakistan came into being, was of course one factor in the failure to establish such a Republic. The unifying force that Jinnah offered was too quickly lost. Failings by leaders and faults in policy contributed to the problems that quickly crept up. But is this adequate explanation for why we have strayed so far from the path chalked out by Jinnah? Has enough been done over the years to demarcate it again so it can be followed? These are questions we need to ponder in some depth as we observe Mr Jinnah’s birth anniversary. The answers could help us determine our future.


[B][CENTER][SIZE="5"]American courts and our sovereignty[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]
[B][RIGHT]December 25th, 2010[/RIGHT][/B]

Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani — not a little egged on by parliamentary opposition leader Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan — has bravely told off an American court asking Pakistan’s chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and two other army officers to appear before it to answer accusations made against them in regard to the 2008 Mumbai attacks in India. The suit has been filed by relatives of Rabbi Gavriel Noach Holtzberg and his wife, who were among the 166 people killed in the attacks. He, however, left a little opening by allowing that he could actually agree to the summons “after consulting the country’s top intelligence agency and other stakeholders.”

Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, intending to put the government on the back foot, had condemned the US court for summoning the ISI chief and other officers in the case. He said: “It is not the decision of the court, but a political move to bring Pakistan under pressure.” He challenged the prime minister to “protect Pakistan’s sovereignty”, presumably under attack by the US. Mr Gilani thought he could steal Mr Khan’s thunder by launching into another subject where Pakistan’s sovereignty was under challenge, and added; “No one should have an impression that they can dictate when military operations should be conducted in North Waziristan and South Waziristan.”

Legally, there is nothing the American courts can do if Pakistan is not ready to surrender its ISI chief to them for trial and presumably conviction too. But what if there is something the US is doing which already seriously violates our sovereignty — like the drone attacks — and puts the onus of response on Pakistan? The red line drawn by Pakistan in this regard is that America can ply its drones in some areas of Pakistan but not in others. There have been occasions when the red line was crossed but Pakistan did nothing. Does that mean that Pakistan is not in a position to retaliate in order to assert its sovereignty? No, the last time American troops violated the territorial boundary of Pakistan, dozen of Nato supply trucks were attacks and burnt (in separate incidents) during transit and this continued till the Americans apologised.

There is apparently nothing the Americans can do to make Pakistan surrender its ISI chief, in which case the court will wait till the chief visits America and then get him to attend proceedings. Pakistan and the US have no extradition treaty, therefore it is not possible for the Americans to take up the matter effectively with Pakistan. But there are things that must embarrass Pakistan when it comes to its nationals doing funny things in other countries. Dual nationality terrorists caught in the US and the UK routinely reveal that they had taken their training in Fata.

There are safe havens for foreign terrorists inside Pakistan from where they carry out attacks inside the territory of other states like India, Afghanistan, Iran and Uzbekistan — violating their sovereignty. Can they do anything about it under international law? Their courts can’t but they can approach the United Nations and get the UN Security Council and to pass a resolution under Chapter 7 to force Pakistan to stop this activity. But the UN is no court and, if Pakistan can manage a veto, there is nothing anyone can do. But ‘illegal’ actions can be taken against Pakistan’s perceived transgressions. Some of it is happening and some more can happen in the future. India and Iran have threatened action in their own different ways but America, aware that Pakistan is doing something positive but ‘not enough’, is already doing a little as a prelude of all that it can do in the last resort.

Pakistan’s plea that it is not violating other countries’ sovereignty, simply because Pakistan itself is a victim of terrorism at the hands of the same non-state actors, will not hold. Its protest that the non-state actors destroying its law and order were created by America during the war against the Soviet Union will hold even less. What is difficult to establish is sovereignty over territory without effectively holding that territory. And there is no way Pakistan can prove its effective control over the territory where it is inconclusively fighting foreign elements who are trying to establish Pakistan as their platform for international terrorism.

[B][CENTER][SIZE="5"]Ominous show of clerical power[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]
[B][RIGHT]December 26th, 2010[/RIGHT][/B]

There is an unprecedented rallying of the clerical parties against any changes brought in the blasphemy law or its procedures by the government. The first glimpse of what the clerics can achieve on December 31 came into full view on December 24 all over the country. It was also an expression of the high degree of discontent, among the men of God, over the nature and function of the state in Pakistan. Looking back over the past years, this kind of rallying of clerical power has rarely been seen.

The target of these post-Friday prayer protests, in various cities of the country, was the PPP and its office-bearers who are seen as minions of their ‘foreign masters’ bent upon allowing infidels to insult the Holy Prophet (pbuh). In the crosshairs was Sherry Rehman who has very courageously tabled a watered-down version of the law in parliament, aimed at eliminating widespread abuse of the blasphemy law in the country. The other target was Governor Punjab Salmaan Taseer who had dared to send a request of pardon for the Christian victim Aasia Bibi to President Asif Ali Zardari. After that the general target were the secularist renegades in all walks of life plotting to turn the state away from its Islamic identity.

The demonstrations were staged in Lahore, Karachi and Multan where the clerics have their strongholds and can mobilise their seminarian youths. The one at Lahore was 1,500 strong, calling aggressively for jihad to save the honour of the Prophet (pbuh). The JUI-F was up front, its leader shouting: “Pakistan was created in the name of Islam and we will not tolerate any attempt to amend the law.” The banned Jamaatud Dawa took out a rally of some 500 people in Lahore, its leader saying: “We will launch a national movement against all those lawmakers who support efforts to amend the law.”

In Karachi, over 2,000 clerics and their pupils came out protesting Ms Rehman’s draft law. In Islamabad, the upfront religious organisation was Tahaffuz Khatam-e-Nubuwwat led by the Barelvis whose tendency to defend the honour of the Prophet (pbuh) had at first put off the more strict Deobandis. But at this point, there is a convergence of interests among all the three schools of thought: Barelvis, Deobandis and Ahle Hadith or Wahhabis. The Islamabad rally was organised in part by the UN-banned Ahle Hadith Jamaatud Dawa whose lead in this campaign introduces a new intensity to the crisis. The Friday wave of protest was the result of an All-Parties Conference headed by the JUI-F’s Maulana Fazlur Rehman in Islamabad. Rawalpindi saw an impressive demonstration of clerical strength based on the mushroom growth of seminaries in the Islamabad-Rawalpindi area. The target was widened to include president of the Supreme Court Bar Association Asma Jahangir, the internationally-known human rights worker under whom the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan has produced voluminous literature cataloguing injustice done to minorities under the blasphemy law.

The Jamaat-i-Islami, one of the more organised religious parties in the country, has got the more tribal JUI-F on board finally, to raise the hope of reviving the religious alliance called the MMA which ruled Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa under Musharraf. Now, there is virtually no division among the various schools of thought. And this coming together of the clerics could be very destabilising for Pakistan, already under pressure from the international community to mend its extremist ways. It must be scary to the outside world to hear the deputy commander of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Maulvi Faqir Muhammad of Bajaur say that the TTP will stand behind the nation-wide protest on December 31.

Al Qaeda, the global terrorist organisation that presides over religious extremism in Pakistan, has already pursued the policy of punishing those in the West who commit blasphemy through cartoons and by other means. It is a patron of the TTP and has its embedded cells in all the big cities of the country. The coming week could be an ominous demonstration of the extent to which Pakistan is politically unstable and to what extent its government has lost the capacity to control events that threaten the lives of the people.


[B][CENTER][SIZE="5"]Bajaur bombing[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]
[B][RIGHT]December 26th, 2010[/RIGHT][/B]

Thousands of IDPs who have returned to Bajaur after fleeing fighting in the agency, will now face even tougher times. These IDPs, who had in many cases lost everything in the months of conflict, today struggle to survive; the task of re-building homes and restoring lands looms before them. In such circumstances we can only wonder at the sheer evil inherent in the suicide attack on a World Food Programme (WFP) distribution point in the town of Khar that killed at least 41 people, wounded another 60 and forced the WFP to wrap up operations in the area. As a result, there are families that will go hungry and children who will cry for food.

The militants behind the most recent attack have chosen to strike at their own people and have chosen from amongst their ranks the most vulnerable, who are least able to defend themselves. The motives behind the blast are unclear. It can only be assumed that the purpose was to hit a ‘foreign’ target, in this case represented by the WFP, despite the fact that its efforts aided local people. The agency has been targeted before, leading to a toning down of services. The attacks on NGOs engaged in humanitarian work through the years has obviously had a negative impact, causing a number to pull out or scale-down operations. There are not many countries in the world where relief workers are targeted by bombers and teachers or doctors are shot dead. Something has clearly gone terribly amiss in our society. We need to try and understand what it is.

We can now also see that the militants remain perfectly capable of operating across the tribal belt and perhaps beyond it. The loudly proclaimed ‘success’ of the operation against them needs to be reviewed. Raising victory cries can serve no purpose when defeat of the Taliban and their allies is still a distant dream. This week alone they have been horrific attacks in Mohmand and Hangu, apart from the latest in Bajaur. Some are sectarian in nature while others are driven by other motives. Are we then failing in the bid to vanquish militants? Are we destined to see more events such as the carnage at Khar? The thought is a terrible one and there seems to be no instant hope of salvation anywhere in sight.

[B][CENTER][SIZE="5"]Unsolved murder[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]
[B][RIGHT]December 27th, 2010[/RIGHT][/B]

Two former policemen arrested from a Rawalpindi anti-terrorism court on December 22, after their bail pleas were rejected in the Benazir Bhutto murder case, now say they were in touch with four or five top intelligence officials in the moments before the assassination. It is hard to say how significant this is. The contacts could have been innocuous or very significant. The public prosecutor has pledged to get to the bottom of the matter. Let us hope he succeeds.

Three years after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007, we have a distinct pattern. Around the anniversary of the murder, a flurry of activity takes place — with discussions in the media focused on the events that occurred on that cold evening in Rawalpindi as she left Liaquat Bagh. Theories abound as to whether or not she was hit by a bullet or why she stood up in the vehicle that was taking her away from the venue. But the fact is that even today, we have no idea who killed Benazir, or what their motives were. Like other assassinations that have marked Pakistan’s chequered political history, this one stands in danger of becoming a mystery forever.

This would be extremely unfortunate. The doubts and speculation surrounding the case haunt us all. We, as a nation, cannot sustain the shock and the loss of strength that comes with the brutal killing of leaders. Our democracy is too fragile to withstand such blows. Most of all, we need our political leadership to help build the foundations for the future. The loss of Benazir means the possibility of this has decreased.

There have been many rumours surrounding the killing. Some may have been intended to inflict damage on certain individuals. But people want an end to conjecture and the uncovering of the truth. The premise that the Tehreek-i-Taliban was behind the carefully planned attack may be accurate. But the matter can be settled only by the uncovering of evidence. The trail that leads away from the murder may now be cold. But it is still not too late to walk along it and try and determine what really happened on that fateful day in 2007.


[B][CENTER][SIZE="5"]Caches, convoys and conspiracies[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]
[B][RIGHT]December 27th, 2010[/RIGHT][/B]

The arrest of Shahzain Bugti, the provincial chief of the Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP) and grandson of the late Nawab Akbar Bugti, has raised the temperature in Balochistan by several degrees. The icy winter winds of Quetta are insufficient to lower it. The JWP has called a strike and stated a long march, from Kashmore to Dera Bugti, to press for the return of displaced Bugti tribesmen. Shahzain was to have led the march. The central president of the JWP, Talal Bugti, says he was ‘set up’ by intelligence agencies in a bid to prevent this. Both Shahzain and Talal Bugti hold that the huge cache of illegal weapons allegedly found in a convoy of vehicles, which included one belonging to Shahzain as he returned from Chaman to Quetta, was actually planted, with other vehicles carryings rocket launchers, guns and other arms suddenly joining Shahzain’s vehicles as they approached Quetta.

Such actions have been carried out before by agencies. It is not beyond them to devise such a plot. This is especially true in the context of Balochistan. It is hardly surprising that the JWP has expressed a lack of confidence in the probe ordered by the interior minister and sought an independent judicial investigation. There appears to be no harm in ordering one. The matter needs to be investigated so that there is no further acrimony with JWP leaders and other nationalists in the province.

It is ironic that the grandsons of the late Nawab Bugti should count among nationalists. For most of his life, he had stayed aloof from nationalist politics. From one perspective, the one already adopted by the Frontier Corps which arrested Shahzain, the affair can be regarded as a criminal act which deserves to be punished. This is true. But given the delicate situation of Balochistan, it is necessary to try and take leaders from the province along and avoid adding to existing tensions within the federation.


[B][CENTER][SIZE="5"]Fathers and sons[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]
[B][RIGHT]December 27th, 2010[/RIGHT][/B]

Media reports of the arrest of the son of the aging leader of the Haqqani network, Jalaluddin Haqqani, come at a time when there has been increased pressure from Washington on Islamabad to go after the North Waziristan-based group thought to be responsible for many of the attacks on US-led security forces in Afghanistan. Details coming in are sketchy, but it is thought the man detained is Nasiruddin Haqqani. Accounts as to where Nasiruddin is being held vary.

The Haqqani network marks the line of rift between Washington and Islamabad on policy against militancy. The Pakistani establishment had evolved a close working relationship with the network during the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The Haqqanis are said also to retain a friendship with Pakistan military elements and, unlike other Taliban or al Qaeda affiliated groups, choose not to launch attacks in Pakistan. Their assault on forces inside Afghanistan, however, has led to fervent demands that a military operation be conducted in North Waziristan. The Pakistan military has so far remained reluctant to venture into this territory.

It is possible that, recognising this, a direct bid to nab Haqqani was made from Afghanistan. The episode so far, like much of the war on terror, is locked in shadows. There have been suggestions that Nasiruddin had recently completed a visit to the Gulf to collect funds for the militant cause. This pipeline of money needs to be blocked off. It is now obvious the Haqqani network is in the centre of US and Afghan actions against terrorism. How this eventually latches in with Pakistan’s own efforts is something that will be closely watched over the coming days as more information begins to emerge about the arrest of a key Haqqani network leader.

[B][CENTER][SIZE="5"]The Taliban in Bajaur[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]
[B][RIGHT]December 28th, 2010[/RIGHT][/B]

After news that the Pakistan army had the Taliban on the run from South Waziristan, Orakzai and Mohmand agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata), the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has struck a heavy blow in Bajaur, killing 47 innocent citizens collecting food items from a World Food Programme distribution point in Khar, the main bazaar in Bajaur Agency.

The TTP and its escaping warriors were hit hard by drones in Tirah in Khyber Agency recently and the speculation was that this represented part of an important reversal inflicted by the army on the terrorists. This could still be true, judging by the lethality of the retaliatory attack on Sunday, which was carried out by a girl suicide bomber. The TTP had remained quiet during the first ten days of Muharram and may have been licking its wounds till now.

The practice of inducting girls as suicide bombers was uncovered in February this year when a girl named Meena from Malakand was interviewed by the BBC as an escapee from an underground ‘factory’ where her father and brother were earning good money training and transporting suicide bombers from South Punjab to the Taliban for attacks inside Afghanistan. Her sister had met her death near Kabul as a suicide bomber but she had somehow overcome the effect of drugs to escape from the den where she was being ‘prepared’ as a ‘martyr’ to earn big money for her family.

Spokesman of TTP, Azam Tariq — named after the late leader of the Sipah-i-Sahaba — says his organisation carried out the attack in Bajaur to prevent the Salarzai tribe from fielding an anti-TTP militia with the help of the government. This makes us aware of the local reaction against the TTP and its Arab friends across the Durand Line in the Afghan province of Kunar. Bajaur is the smallest tribal agency in terms of area and largest in terms of population and qualifies to be integrated with the rest of Pakistan because of the high level of consciousness of its people. It has 70 percent television coverage which is comparable to that in Kurram Agency, which too qualifies for integration before other agencies.

The population, dependent on remittances from within Pakistan and the Gulf, is not easily persuaded to the cause of the Taliban war, but the neighbourhood of Kunar has produced a serious dent in the resolve of the local tribes — mostly of Uthmanzai origin — to resist the TTP. Aiman alZawahiri, the ideological boss of al Qaeda, lived here comfortably and married into a local pro-Taliban tribe, the Tarkani. TTP also got its most ferocious commander from the Tarkanis, Maulvi Faqir Muhammad, who boasts of having collected the most number of suicide bombers after Hussain Mehsud of Orakzai. The army went into Bajaur in 2008 with all guns blazing but he survived the onslaught. Today, Maulvi Faqir commands around 6,000 fighters, including about 500 Afghans and 100 other foreign fighters, mostly Arabs and Chechens. Uzbek fighters — commanded by Qari Ziaur Rehman, who also trains other foreign fighters — are present in the Charmang area of Bajaur’s Nawagai tehsil.

Among the agencies, Bajaur is most inclined to resist the TTP and its patron al Qaeda, but the strength of the likes of Maulvi Faqir is more than they can fight. Thinking that Bajaur was strategically important — it abuts on Swat-Malakand and can easily reverse the military’s victory in Swat — the army has tried to clean it up. However, the two big sections, Salarzai and Tarkanis, are at loggerheads, and this has caused the TTP and al Qaeda to kill a large number of local elders to ‘persuade’ the population in their favour. The battle in Bajaur continues to fluctuate. The army is in control but the TTP warriors return to the cleared areas at night. There is a great misunderstanding in Pakistan that the Taliban are of two kinds, and that al Qaeda stands apart from them. Maulvi Faqir, the ruler of Bajaur has proclaimed allegiance to both the Taliban of Mullah Umar and Osama bin Laden and will send TTP warriors into Afghanistan to fight the Americans while the same Taliban kill innocent Pakistanis in our cities.

[B][CENTER][SIZE="5"]Coalition concerns[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]
[B][RIGHT]December 28th, 2010[/RIGHT][/B]

At the PPP Central Executive Committee meeting in Naudero, President Asif Ali Zardari has made it clear how much significance he attaches to the need to retain allies. In the wake of the JUI-F’s angry exit from the coalition and the MQM’s threat to follow suit, the President has imposed a gag order on PPP legislators, urging them not to make provocative statements. The move comes as both parties consider their future ties with the PPP. In some ways, at least the order makes sense. Running a coalition government is always a task that involves good sense and tact and the attack launched on the MQM recently by the Sindh home minister, Zulfiqar Ali Mirza, triggering the latest crisis, was obviously unwise. Some degree of restraint is definitely required because nothing is achieved when elected representatives wash their dirty linen in public.

Perhaps the president’s warning can persuade PPP members to more carefully consider what they are saying and what impact it could have. It is also sensible to work out internal differences through calm dialogue, rather than public airing them. This indeed needs to be made clear to all lawmakers.

But at the same time, a balance needs to be found between the requirements of coalition government and the question of offering people the kind of government they voted for. Too many compromises make the matter of sticking to principal rather hard, and this disillusions people. The key purpose of government is to offer leadership to people, to solve their problems and set a direction for the future. Too great a focus on pleasing coalition partners can only detract from this. In view of some of the comments we have heard from government members and the ugly squabble between ministers which led to the dismissal from the cabinet of the JUI-F’s Azam Swati, a little discipline would do no harm. Seeing more deeds and fewer words would do us all a great deal of good. The president’s attempts to control damage therefore seem wise under the prevailing circumstances. We need somehow to create greater political stability in order to move forward. Preventing lawmakers from expressing controversial opinions without obtaining approval from the party high command could help achieve this and lay the ground for more successful governance in the future.