Time to Take on Pakistan’s Jihadist Spies By Mansoor Ijaz.Dear members please give your opinion about this matter. Is it Myth or Reality or Conspiracy?

Early on May 9, a week after US Special Forces stormed the hideout of Osama bin Laden and killed him, a senior Pakistani diplomat telephoned me with an urgent request. Asif Ali Zardari, Pakistan’s president, needed to communicate a message to White House national security officials that would bypass Pakistan’s military and intelligence channels. The embarrassment of bin Laden being found on Pakistani soil had humiliated Mr Zardari’s weak civilian government to such an extent that the president feared a military takeover was imminent. He needed an American fist on his army chief’s desk to end any misguided notions of a coup – and fast.
Gen Ashfaq Kayani, the army chief, and his troops were demoralised by the embarrassing ease with which US Special Forces had violated Pakistani sovereignty. Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan’s feared spy service, was charged by virtually the entire international community with complicity in hiding bin Laden for almost six years. Both camps were looking for a scapegoat; Mr Zardari was their most convenient target.
The diplomat made clear that the civilian government’s preferred channel to receive Mr Zardari’s message was Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was a time-tested friend of Pakistan and could convey the necessary message with force not only to President Barack Obama, but also to Gen Kayani.
In a flurry of phone calls and emails over two days a memorandum was crafted that included a critical offer from the Pakistani president to the Obama administration: “The new national security team will eliminate Section S of the ISI charged with maintaining relations to the Taliban, Haqqani network, etc. This will dramatically improve relations with Afghanistan.”
The memo was delivered to Admiral Mullen at 14.00 hours on May 10. A meeting between him and Pakistani national security officials took place the next day at the White House. Pakistan’s military and intelligence chiefs, it seems, neither heeded the warning, nor acted on the admiral’s advice.
On September 22, in his farewell testimony to the Senate armed services committee, Admiral Mullen said he had “credible intelligence” that a bombing on September 11 that wounded 77 US and NATO troops and an attack on the US embassy in Kabul on September 13 were done “with ISI support." Essentially he was indicting Pakistan’s intelligence services for carrying out a covert war against the US – perhaps in retaliation for the raid on bin Laden’s compound, perhaps out of strategic national interest to put Taliban forces back in power in Afghanistan so that Pakistan would once again have the “strategic depth” its paranoid security policies against India always envisioned.
Questions about the ISI’s role in Pakistan have intensified in recent months. The finger of responsibility in many otherwise inexplicable attacks has often pointed to a shadowy outfit of ISI dubbed “S-Wing”, which is said to be dedicated to promoting the dubious agenda of a narrow group of nationalists who believe only they can protect Pakistan’s territorial integrity.
The time has come for the state department to declare the S-Wing a sponsor of terrorism under the designation of “foreign governmental organisations”. Plans by the Obama administration to blacklist the Haqqani network are toothless and will have no material impact on the group’s military support and intelligence logistics; it is S-Wing that allegedly provides all of this in the first place. It no longer matters whether ISI is wilfully blind, complicit or incompetent in the attacks its S-Wing is carrying out. S-Wing must be stopped.
ISI embodies the scourge of radicalism that has become a cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy. The time has come for America to take the lead in shutting down the political and financial support that sustains an organ of the Pakistani state that undermines global antiterrorism efforts at every turn. Measures such as stopping aid to Pakistan, as a bill now moving through Congress aims to do, are not the solution. More precise policies are needed to remove the cancer that ISI and its rogue wings have become on the Pakistani state.
Pakistanis are not America’s enemies. Neither is their incompetent and toothless civilian government – the one Admiral Mullen was asked to help that May morning. The enemy is a state organ that breeds hatred among Pakistan’s Islamist masses and then uses their thirst for jihad against Pakistan’s neighbours and allies to sate its hunger for power. Taking steps to reduce its influence over Pakistan’s state affairs is a critical measure of the world’s willingness to stop the terror masters at their very roots.
The writer is an American of Pakistani ancestry. In 1997 he negotiated Sudan’s offer of counter-terrorism assistance to the Clinton administration

WASHINGTON: Geo News has received the controversial memo that was allegedly given by Mansoor Ijaz, an American citizen of Pakistani origin, to Admiral Mike Mullen who was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time.

Mansoor Ijaz has claimed that the memo was handed over to him by the Pakistan Ambassador and was asked to deliver to the US president containing message from the Pakistan government. The memo was sent to Adm Mike Millen on May10.

According to the memo, a commission will be formed to probe the presence of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad as civil government is under army's pressure.

It has been demanded in the memo that Adm Mike Mullen should convey a strict message to the army leadership.

"Request your direct intervention in conveying a strong, urgent and direct message to Gen Kayani that delivers Washington’s demand for him and Gen Pasha to end their brinkmanship aimed at bringing down the civilian apparatus."

It is important to note that Adm Mike Mullen has confirmed the receiving of the memo on Thursday.

Following is the complete text of memo.

BRIEFING FOR ADM. MIKE MULLEN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

During the past 72 hours since a meeting was held between the president, the prime minister and the chief of army staff, there has seen a significant deterioration in Pakistan's political atmosphere. Increasingly desperate efforts by the various agencies and factions within the government to find a home - ISI and/or Army, or the civilian government - for assigning blame over the UBL raid now dominate the tug of war between military and civilian sectors. Subsequent tit-for-tat reactions, including outing of the CIA station chief's name in Islamabad by ISI officials, demonstrates a dangerous devolution of the ground situation in Islamabad where no central control appears to be in place.

Civilians cannot withstand much more of the hard pressure being delivered from the Army to succumb to wholesale changes. If civilians are forced from power, Pakistan becomes a sanctuary for UBL's legacy and potentially the platform for far more rapid spread of al Qaeda's brand of fanaticism and terror. A unique window of opportunity exists for the civilians to gain the upper hand over army and intelligence directorates due to their complicity in the UBL matter.

Request your direct intervention in conveying a strong, urgent and direct message to Gen Kayani that delivers Washington's demand for him and Gen Pasha to end their brinkmanship aimed at bringing down the civilian apparatus - that this is a 1971 moment in Pakistan's history. Should you be willing to do so, Washington's political/military backing would result in a revamp of the civilian government that, while weak at the top echelon in terms of strategic direction and implementation (even though mandated by domestic political forces), in a wholesale manner replaces the national security adviser and other national security officials with trusted advisers that include ex-military and civilian leaders favorably viewed by Washington, each of whom have long and historical ties to the US military, political and intelligence communities. Names will be provided to you in a face-to-face meeting with the person delivering this message.

In the event Washington's direct intervention behind the scenes can be secured through your personal communication with Kayani (he will likely listen only to you at this moment) to stand down the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment, the new national security team is prepared, with full backing of the civilian apparatus, to do the following:

1. President of Pakistan will order an independent inquiry into the allegations that Pakistan harbored and offered assistance to UBL and other senior Qaeda operatives. The White House can suggest names of independent investigators to populate the panel, along the lines of the bipartisan 9-11 Commission, for example.

2. The inquiry will be accountable and independent, and result in findings of tangible value to the US government and the American people that identify with exacting detail those elements responsible for harboring and aiding UBL inside and close to the inner ring of influence in Pakistan's Government (civilian, intelligence directorates and military). It is certain that the UBL Commission will result in immediate termination of active service officers in the appropriate government offices and agencies found responsible for complicity in assisting UBL.

3. The new national security team will implement a policy of either handing over those left in the leadership of Al Qaeda or other affiliated terrorist groups who are still on Pakistani soil, including Ayman Al Zawahiri, Mullah Omar and Sirajuddin Haqqani, or giving US military forces a "green light" to conduct the necessary operations to capture or kill them on Pakistani soil. This "carte blanche" guarantee is not without political risks, but should demonstrate the new group's commitment to rooting out bad elements on our soil. This commitment has the backing of the top echelon on the civilian side of our house, and we will insure necessary collateral support.

4. One of the great fears of the military-intelligence establishment is that with your stealth capabilities to enter and exit Pakistani airspace at will, Pakistan's nuclear assets are now legitimate targets. The new national security team is prepared, with full backing of the Pakistani government - initially civilian but eventually all three power centers - to develop an acceptable framework of discipline for the nuclear program. This effort was begun under the previous military regime, with acceptable results. We are prepared to reactivate those ideas and build on them in a way that brings Pakistan's nuclear assets under a more verifiable, transparent regime.

5. The new national security team will eliminate Section S of the ISI charged with maintaining relations to the Taliban, Haqqani network, etc. This will dramatically improve relations with Afghanistan.

6. We are prepared to cooperate fully under the new national security team's guidance with the Indian government on bringing all perpetrators of Pakistani origin to account for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, whether outside government or inside any part of the government, including its intelligence agencies. This includes handing over those against whom sufficient evidence exists of guilt to the Indian security services.

Pakistan faces a decision point of unprecedented importance. We, who believe in democratic governance and building a much better structural relationship in the region with India AND Afghanistan, seek US assistance to help us pigeon-hole the forces lined up against your interests and ours, including containment of certain elements inside our country that require appropriate re-sets and re-tasking in terms of direction and extent of responsibility after the UBL affair.

We submit this memorandum for your consideration collectively as the members of the new national security team who will be inducted by the President of Pakistan with your support in this undertaking.

ISLAMABAD: The identity of the mystery government official whom American businessman Mansoor Ijaz claimed to have met in a European city and shared his trough of forensic communication data with, has remained a key missing link in the memo-authenticity-chain. Mansoor had also said that the gentleman was not a parliamentarian or a political personality. And he was right. According to highly classified information obtained by The News, the mystery caller was none other than the Director General ISI, Lt Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha.

It was revealed that owing to the sensitivity of the charges levelled by Mansoor, including the alleged authorisation of the controversial memo by President Zardari, it was decided at the highest level of the military leadership that the initial investigation must be carried out by the top spymaster himself.

When asked by The News to confirm whether the official who met him on Oct 22 was the ISI chief Lt General Ahmed Shuja Pasha himself, Mansoor Ijaz simply said: ‘Yes.’ He has been saying in several statements in the last few days that the full data and evidence was given to the official including records of phone calls, SMS messages, BBM chat exchanges, emails etc. According to details, the meeting took place on the eve of October 22, in a Park Lane Intercontinental hotel room in London. The meeting is said to have started around 6:30pm and lasted for over four hours. The News has learnt that during the meeting, Mansoor Ijaz was exhaustively grilled over his claims and that Mansoor handed a fairly large quantity of records, both copies and originals.

The records were subsequently put through a verification process and once the DG ISI was convinced about their authenticity, he then briefed the army chief who ultimately discussed the matter in his one-on-one meeting with President Zardari on November 15. The COAS, according to a highly informed insider, had impressed upon the president the inevitable necessity of Ambassador Haqqani’s presence in the country to explain his alleged role in the memo controversy.

After the Zardari-Kayani meeting, the Presidency announced the summoning of Ambassador Haqqani to explain his position to the “national leadership”, and not just the political leadership. According to sources, the president had been fairly confident about stubbing out the matter for good in his one-on-one huddle but the outcome was not entirely to his satisfaction. Not surprisingly, in the later half of the same day, the trouble-shooter prime minister called up COAS Kayani and set up a meeting of the troika for the very next day (Nov 16). The PM, known for not harbouring any exceptional love for the beleaguered envoy, also thundered on the floor of the house that “Ambassador or no ambassador, he will have to come and explain his position.” Husain Haqqani was not available for his version on this report as he was on a flight from Washington to Islamabad.

All this happened in a dizzyingly fast changing political environment, where only hours earlier the Presidency had contemptuously dismissed the claims of Mansoor Ijaz while shrugging him off as a man of dubious credentials. What had really caused this paradigm change in the earlier recalcitrant official attitude is another revelation, made to The News.

The media may have been huffing and puffing with half truths and whole lies, dealing with an all-claiming Mansoor on one side and an all-denying combine of Haqqani- the Presidency-FO-everyone official on the other, and opposition politicians too may have been adding their voices to the slowly growing cacophony of those demanding an investigation into the matter, but these factors did not play the decisive role. It now transpires that the ‘swift’ transformation of the official mood may have been caused by an official communication, quietly sent to the president over the weekend preceding the one-on-one meeting between the supreme commander and his top commander. In this communication, the president had reportedly been specifically requested to order an enquiry into the memo issue. The significance of this communication was not lost on the political leadership. Stonewalling was no longer a tenable option.

According to highly informed insiders, it has now been decided amongst the troika that Ambassador Haqqani (who will have landed in Islamabad by the time these lines appear in print) will present his version of the ‘truth’ in an all-important meeting restricted to the president, prime minister, COAS and the DG ISI. The ambassador will be required also to respond to a set of questions already prepared in this regard, including why he has not even given an indication of suing Mansoor Ijaz for defamation and slander. Interestingly, to date the Pakistan government too has not even shot off a letter of complaint to the Financial Times, let alone agitate legally, for publishing what it has itself been describing as objectionable material.

On the enquiry front, it is evident from the string of Mr Haqqani’s recent public statements that he will undoubtedly trash all Mansoor Ijaz’s claims and the civilian leadership is hoping that his ‘convincing performance’ would carry the day and that would be the end of the matter. Any possibility of curtains being drawn after a maiden performance by the astute diplomat, however, appears a desperate pipe dream, as those demanding an enquiry are clear that the focus shall remain on substance and not the form. The situation is hardly being helped with new revelations adding new twists by the day. The latest being the admission by US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta that he too was in the know of the memo. In one of the messages exchanged between Mansoor Ijaz and Husain Haqqani, Leon Panetta was also mentioned. On Oct 28, 2011 Mansoor Ijaz wrote: Tell me one important thing. Who likes you and who hates you in the US establishment? Who wants you to stay and who wants to — you up?

Husain Haqqani responded: The debate abt your oped has caused my detractors to put pressure on my boss

He then sent this message: Husain Haqqani: In US estab, I can count on Leon and Petraeus

According to informed insiders, the decision has been made to ignore the obvious and to take the matter to its legitimate logical conclusion and in the expected event of Ambassador Haqqani flatly rejecting all charges, the civilian leadership will be asked to request Mansoor Ijaz to appear before the relevant forum (which could be the same as in this meeting) and prove his claims. Apprehending a diluting of the issue by subjecting it to a deliberately slow and protracted investigation process, it has also been decided that Islamabad shall be ‘requested to agree’ to a firm cut-off date which must be limited to days, and not extended to weeks.

It has also been decided, The News was told by a reliable source, that if need be then the government of Pakistan will be asked to officially contact the Blackberry company to obtain certified data (Pin codes) and to “spare no influence, including cessation of Blackberry services in Pakistan, were the company to act reluctant in complying with the request”. The source went on to state: “If so needed, the option of initiating a judicial enquiry and issuing a subpoena to the company would also be exercised”. According to details trickling out of Rawalpindi, the leadership there appears determined on two things: a) the memo issue carries risks of national proportions and therefore must be thoroughly investigated and taken to its logical conclusion and b) no politics would be played or allowed to be played in deciding the matter.

On the Islamabad political front, however, things may be progressing on a different tangent. It was learnt that initially President Zardari had favoured the option of relieving Ambassador Haqqani of his responsibilities in a bid to seek a swift resolution to this brewing major political crisis, but now he has been advised against this course of action by an ace legal advisor. According to sources, the president was warned that an immediate firing of Ambassador Haqqani could be misperceived as the desperate attempt of a “guilty president severing a critical link” and he has been warned that such a move could also begin a domino effect that could reach his office.

In political terms too, the thinking on the hill is now favouring a strong defiant stance, not out of any love for Mr Haqqani, but for the sole purpose that were the Presidency to appear to have “saved its man once again from the all powerful military establishment”, as put by the source, “then it would garner immense indirect political benefit by appearing impregnable and immensely powerful and once again fence-huggers and even others will gravitate towards it.” Playing politics, in what is an open and shut case of one party lying and the other telling the truth and simply making the guilty pay, is fraught with fatal risks.

Were politics to be played, yet again, it remains to be seen whether the non-civilian establishment will meekly suffer public humiliation and internal institutional discontent by backing down in a matter involving national security, sovereignty and the safety of country’s nuclear assets.