Afghanistan: perils on the road to peace
 

Afghanistan: perils on the road to peace
Ayaz Wazir

Afghanistan and Pakistan have agreed to hold a conference in Kabul of ulemas (religious scholars) from both countries towards the end of January. This was announced in a joint press conference at the end of the one-day visit of the Afghan foreign minister to Islamabad on November 30, 2012.
The ulema conference is to find a way to restore peace in Afghanistan. But the question is: How will that objective be achieved without the participation of the main opposition party, the Taliban? However, if the past is any guide then it can safely be concluded that the fate of this conference will not be much different than the jirga that was constituted by the two sides for the same purpose and which could not move an inch beyond holding only two meetings, one each in Kabul and Islamabad.
More importantly than that is the question whether the ulemas, particularly those heading the political parties or religious seminaries and who have clout with the Taliban, will participate in this conference at all. It is more probable that they will not and will follow the same route as they did when invited to attend the meetings of the jirga. They did not participate in those meetings either, terming them useless in the absence of the major player – the Taliban.
Just two weeks before the Afghan foreign minister’s visit to Pakistan, another important visitor from Afghanistan, Salahuddin Rabbani, chairman high peace council visited Islamabad and held meetings with the president, the PM and the army chief in addition to meetings with other important leaders in the country. His visit had rekindled hopes for a dialogue with the Taliban, when Pakistan agreed to release some mid-ranking Taliban leaders from its prison. This had also been the objective of his father in the past who so vigorously pursued this goal even at the cost of his own life.
The younger Rabbani, who took over after his father both as a Tajik leader and as head of the high peace council, has an uphill task to perform. He is to surmount some of the difficult obstacles that his father’s legacy has left behind before convincing the Taliban to enter into some kind of negotiations with his peace council.
These two visits to Pakistan, in quick succession, are indicative of the fact that the government in Afghanistan is desperately trying to find a way for some sort of patch up with the Taliban in order to avoid a complete collapse of the system in Afghanistan after the departure of foreign troops.
Pakistan’s government seems eager, at least at the political level, to facilitate the two sides (the Taliban and the Afghan government) to initiate a process for the restoration of peace in the war-ravaged country. But will such attempts succeed without the support of the military establishment in Pakistan. On the flip side, will the forces that oppose Pakistan within the Afghan establishment support this; these are some of the questions that need to be looked at seriously before proceeding further with the proposed conference.
Another important aspect before venturing into any conference is bridging the trust deficit between the two governments, irrespective of the recent announcement of refraining from accusing each other of cross border violations.
Also, the forthcoming election in the two countries before the completion of the drawdown of the foreign troops from Afghanistan is yet another important factor to be considered carefully. Will the leadership that emerges in the two countries be able to bridge the gap and work in unison for the restoration of peace and stability in Afghanistan?
Another very valid question arises at this stage: why should the Taliban step into the process of reconciliation when foreign troops are about to leave the country? If they could fight against a superpower for so long, why should they now come to terms with a government they had already rejected in the past?
The Taliban don’t seem to have any other option. Should they keep fighting until they take over the country? Even if this is achieved, many believe it will not be acceptable to the common Afghans. The Taliban are cognisant of this fact, which is why they have made it known to all that they will not repeat their actions of the past. At the same time it is also widely believed that, with the combat troops gone, the government in Kabul will not survive too long, even with the support of the residuary forces that the US intends to leave behind.
So far neither the Taliban nor the present Afghan government have been able to win popular support when in power. The Taliban could not muster support when in control of 95 percent of the country before the US invasion. Similarly, the present government didn’t achieve any positive results despite the support of the US, Nato and Isaf. The reason is that they are not acceptable by the common people in their individual capacities to rule the country. There ought to be a system acceptable to the general public and to do that there seems no other way than these two finding a middle ground to function.
The Taliban have proved their strength and resilience as the party with a stronger position to begin talks with their opponents. They need to consider this option to avoid missing an opportunity that has come their way of bringing peace to Afghanistan.
For this to happen, some work needs to be done through quiet diplomacy. With the approval of the two (the Taliban and the Afghan government) the process of proximity talks could be initiated by an individual or a group of like-minded individuals to work on narrowing the gap of differences that so widely exist between the two. Tacit agreement from Pakistan and the US to such a move would ensure success of this process.
Once some understanding has been reached through these proximity talks, only then should they be brought face-to-face to the negotiating table to iron out their differences and bring a dispensation to the fore to take over the reigns of power and bring permanent peace to the country.
The writer is a former ambassador.
Email; [email]waziruk@hotmail.com[/email]