The Role of the United Nations in Maintaining International Peace and Security


The maintenance of international peace and security represents the primary purpose behind the establishment of the United Nations. It reflects the intentions and desires of its founders who sought to establish an international organization for achieving this end. It is a prerequisite to any other purpose of the United Nations. Without it no friendly relations, no international cooperation, and no harmonization of nation’s actions could be achieved.
Because of the importance of international peace and security, the founders of the United Nations insisted on it and emphasized it in the preamble and the Charter of the Organization. They stated all the possible principles, methods and procedures which are to be followed to attain this end.
The theme “we are going to create a collective security system, and this time we are going to make it work,” dominated the entire process of planning and formulating the United Nations Charter. The Charter provided a system for the pacific settlement or adjustment of disputes, and the use of collective measures in threat to or breaches of peace and acts of aggression.
The first method provided by the system is that of seeking peaceful settlement or adjustment of disputes and situation by peaceful means listed in the Charter. The second method is that of taking collective actions (measures) of a coercive nature for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression and other breaches of the peace. Through these two methods delineated in Chapter VI entitled “Pacific Settlement of Disputes” and Chapter VII entitled “Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression” of the Charter, the United Nations primarily exercises its role in maintaining international peace and security.

I. Pacific Settlement of Disputes
Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations contains the procedures for the pacific settlement of disputes. Article 33 obliges the parties to a dispute, “the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,” to seek a solution by “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangement, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”Under this Article, any party to any dispute which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security is obligated to seek, first of all, a settlement by the traditional peaceful procedures already established in international law.
In the contemplation of the Charter, the first recourse of nations in dispute should be to any of the peaceful methods, in a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. This position is justified, first, on the grounds that it will relieve the United Nations of the burden of handling too large number of controversies and, on the second, that it will minimize the interference of the United Nations in the affairs of sovereign states.
However, should the parties to a dispute fail to observe their obligation under Article 33 or their attempts be unsuccessful, the United Nations would intervene to consider the matters and to give its recommendations and decisions under the Charter. The Security Council is given the primary responsibility regarding peace and security. Whatever the action taken by the parties, they cannot prejudice the right of the Security Council to intervene by investigation or recommendation of appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment or settlement of any dispute which is likely to endanger international peace and security. The Security Council is entitled to intervene either by its own initiative, upon invitation of any member of the United Nations, upon a call of attention by the General Assembly, upon a call of attention by the Secretary General, or upon a complaint of a party to a dispute.
To discharge its duty for maintaining international peace and security, the Security Council may follow three courses of action. Firstly, the Security Council may call upon the parties to a dispute, the
continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, to settle their dispute by any of the peaceful means listed in Article 33(1).[ Secondly, it may, in case of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33, recommend “appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.”Thirdly, it may recommend “terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.”
Although under the Charter the Security Council is given the primary role for maintaining international peace and security, the General Assembly is not excluded from doing so. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. It may discuss any question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, and may make recommendations with regard to any dispute or situation to the concerned states or to the Security Council or to both. It may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations. Questions, disputes or situations may be brought before the General Assembly by the Security Council, by any member of the United Nations, or by any state which is a party to a dispute.
However, the General Assembly is prevented from making any recommendation with regard to any dispute or situation while the Security Council is exercising its function in respect of it, unless the Council so requests. This is a limitation imposed on the authority the General Assembly in making recommendations relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.
In practice with regard to the pacific settlement of disputes (or “peacemaking” as it may be known), the United Nations has provided various means through which conflicts, disputes, and situations are contained and resolved. The Security Council has applied all the available diplomatic techniques in various international disputes, in addition to open debate and behind-the scenes discussion and lobbying. It has called upon the parties to a dispute to resort to any peaceful means of their own choice to settle their disputes. It has recommended to the parties specific appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. It has recommended to the parties ways to resolve their disputes, or terms of settlement. It has dispatched special envoys or missions for specific tasks, such as investigation, fact finding, negotiation or reconciliation. It has requested the Secretary General to assist the parties in reaching a settlement to their disputes; the impartiality of the Secretary General is one of the United Nations’ assets. The Secretary General has taken diplomatic initiatives to encourage and maintain the momentum of negotiations. He has used his “good offices” for mediating, or to exercise “preventive diplomacy”, that is, to take actions in order to prevent dispute from arising, to resolve them before they escalate into conflicts or to limit the spread of conflicts when they occur. In many instances, the Secretary General has been instructed to avert threats to peace or to secure peace agreements.
To foster the maintenance of peace, the General Assembly has held special or emergency special sessions on issues such as disarmament, and the question of Palestine. Over years, it has helped promote peaceful relations among nations by adopting declarations on peace, the peaceful settlement of disputes and international cooperation. It has established investigatory organs to examine matters under consideration by it, and to report back to it. It has established subsidiary organs for observation, mediation, conciliation and good offices.
Under Chapter VI relating the pacific settlement of disputes and other articles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council and the General Assembly may exercise their role in maintaining international peace and security by discussions, investigations and recommendations. But the possibility remains that pacific settlement may fail to resolve the disputes which may become so serious as to constitute threats to or breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. In such cases, the United Nations may intervene by taking collective actions of coercive nature for the prevention and removal of the consequences of such disputes.

II. Collective Enforcement Actions
The method of using collective enforcement (coercive) actions by the United Nations is provided by Chapter VII of the Charter and the provisions of the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution.

A. Chapter VII of the Charter
Chapter VII authorizes the Security Council to deal with threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and to take collective enforcement actions (measures) in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. The Security Council, under article 39, the first article of Chapter VII, is given a wide discretion in determining “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”, and to “make recommendations”, or to “decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Such a determination under Article 39 is an essential pre-condition to the operation of Chapter VII of the Charter; the Security Council cannot exercise its powers under this Chapter, particularly Articles 41 and 42, without such a determination made expressly or implicitly.
Before exercising its most far-reaching powers under Articles 41 and 42, the Security Council, under Article 40, may call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, provided that such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, causes, or position of the parties concerned. Such provisional measures may include a demand that all parties concerned cease fire or withdraw their forces behind specified truce lines.
In case of failure of the parties or any of them to comply with the provisional measures, or the provisional measures are inappropriate, the Security Council may proceed to recommend or decide measures under Articles 41 and 42. Under Article 41, the Security Council may decide to take measures not involving the use of armed force to give effect to its decisions, and may call upon the members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These measures may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations, means of transportation, means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Should the measures of Article 41 be inadequate or have proved inadequate, the Security Council may decide to take measures under Articles 42. The Security Council may take armed action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. This action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of members of the United Nations.
To assist the Security Council in planning for the application of armed forces, It is required the establishment of a “Military Staff Committee” consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. This Committee is responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction and command of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council; this Committee ceased its operation in 1948.
To give assurance that effective forces will be at the disposal of the Security Council, all members of the United Nations undertake, under Article 43 of the Charter, to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security; no such special agreements under Article 43 have ever concluded between the United nations and its member states. Members are also required to make available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action; no such contingents have been ever made available.
To assure the effectiveness of the enforcement action decided by the Security Council, members of the United Nations are required to join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out such measures. Moreover, the action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security must be taken by all the members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the security Council may determine. All the members of the United Nations are bound by the decisions of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter.
In practice, the Security Council has exercised its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter. It has decided on collective enforcement measures to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such measures have ranged from economic and diplomatic sanctions to military actions.
The Security Council has resorted to economic sanctions as enforcement measures to maintain or restore international peace and security. Economic sanctions have taken many forms, ranging from specific trade ban to full embargoes. Such sanctions were imposed, for example, against South Africa’s apartheid regime in 1977, Iraq in 1990, the Former Yugoslavia in 1991, and Libya in 1992.
The Security Council has authorized the use of military forces, for peace-keeping and peace-enforcing actions, to maintain or restore international peace and security. Peace-enforcing (Enforcement) actions were authorized against North Korea in 1950 and Iraq in 1991. Peace-keeping forces have been established in many instances, for example, in Palestine (1948), in the Congo (1960), in Cyprus (1964), in Lebanon 1978, in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995).
Although Chapter VII of the Charter which empowers the Security Council to decide collective enforcement measures for the purpose of maintaining peace and security does not empower the General Assembly with such authority, this organ can exercise such authority under the provisions of the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution.

B. Uniting for Peace Resolution
The Uniting for Peace Resolutions grants the General Assembly the powers to act in place of the Security Council if the latter fails, because of the lack of unanimity of its permanent members, to discharge its primary responsibility in maintaining international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. Under this Resolution, the General Assembly may do by recommendations anything the Security Council may do by decisions under chapter VII of the Charter. The Assembly may consider the matter immediately and recommend to members collective measures, including in case of a breach of peace or act of aggression the use of armed forces deemed necessary for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security.
To ensure that the General Assembly could act promptly and effectively, the Uniting for Peace Resolution provides a procedure for calling of an emergency special session of the Assembly. The Assembly may meet in an emergency special session within twenty-four hours upon the request of any nine members of the Council, by the majority of members of the United Nations, or by one member if the majority of members concur.
Under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the General Assembly asserts its right to act in the same manner that the Security council can act under Chapter VII of the Charter, but only when the Council fails to act. The Assembly may make a determination of the kind referred to in Article 39, and may recommend collective measures to be undertaken in case of threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. It should be noted that this right granted to the Assembly is not intended to be a substitute for the Council’s responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, but rather a supplement.
The General Assembly had its first experience with the Uniting for Peace Resolution on February 1, 1951, after the Soviet Union’s veto blocked the Security Council from taking any action against the intervention of the People’s Republic of China in Korea. The Assembly exercised its authority by adopting a resolution determining that the Chinese intervention in Korea constituted an act of aggression, and calling upon the Chinese Government to cease hostilities and to withdraw from Korea. After the failure of the Chinese Government to comply with the above resolution, the Assembly adopted another resolution recommending the employment of economic sanctions against the Chinese Government and the North Korean authorities.
The Uniting for Peace Resolution was again implemented during the 1956 Middle East Crisis. The General Assembly assumed its responsibility for maintaining international peace and security after the failure of the Security Council to discharge its duty because of the veto power used by the United Kingdom and France. In its emergency special session opened on November 1, 1956, the general Assembly adopted a series of resolutions. In the first resolution, it urged the parties to comply with certain provisional measures, including the cease-fire, the withdrawal of forces and the full observance of armistices agreements, and the reopening of the Suez Canal and the restoration of secure freedom of navigation. Also, it recommended that all members of the United Nations refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of its resolution. In the last resolution, the Assembly decided the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force for the task of implementing the measures provided for in its first resolution.
Regarding the Israeli annexation of the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, the failure of the Security Council to take any action against Israel, because of the United States’ veto, led to the transfer of the matter to the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. On February 6, 1982, the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling on all its members to apply economic and diplomatic sanctions against Israel on a voluntary basis, and laying the groundwork for the possible expulsion of Israel from the United Nations.
The practice of the General Assembly demonstrates that this organ can, under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, do by recommendations anything the Security Council can do by decisions under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Assembly can make a determination, call for provisional measures, and recommend economic, diplomatic and military measures similar to those which the Security Council can take under Articles 39, 40, 41, and 42 of the Charter. However, the recommendations of the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution do not have the legal force and effect that the Council’s decisions have. Such recommendations are not legally binding upon members of the United Nations. They do not legally commit members to action. However, although this might be the case, it might logically be expected that a resolution by the Assembly that has broad support and to which the great majority of members of the United Nations have committed themselves to the extent of voting for it, would receive as favorable a response in terms of compliance as a resolution by the Security Council.

C. United Nations Forces
The use of military forces by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining and restoring international peace and security represents the effective measures which may be employed by the Organization under the system of collective actions. On many occasions, the United Nations has established international military forces. The constitutional bases for the establishment of each of these forces have been different. The tasks which these forces have been required to perform have ranged from a mere policing action to an enforcing action. The composition, size and command have varied. The relations of the forces with and within states have been diverse.
The constitutional bases for the establishment of United Nations forces are found in the Charter of the United Nations and the Uniting for Peace Resolution. Under the Charter, the Security Council may, in the last resort, take armed action involving the establishment of international forces for the purpose of enforcing its decisions for ending a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. Articles 29, 39, 40, 41 and 42 provide possible constitutional bases for the establishment of United Nations military forces by the Security Council in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. Article 29 authorizes the Security Council to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions; the establishment of United Nations forces is coming within this scope of authority. United Nations forces may be established as collective measures authorized to be taken by the Security Council under Articles 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Chapter VII.
With regard of the General Assembly, the Uniting for Peace Resolution provides a constitutional basis for the establishment of United Nations forces by the General Assembly. Further constitutional bases may be found in Articles 10, 11, 14, and 22 of the Charter of the United Nations. Under Articles 10, 11, and 14, the General Assembly may establish United Nations forces for the task of implementing its recommendations with regard to any question, situation or dispute, for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Article 22 authorizes the general Assembly to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions; the establishment of United Nations forces are coming within this scope of authority
The United Nations forces have performed various functions and tasks in accordance to the circumstances of each case. The functions and tasks of the United Nations forces have ranged from a peace-enforcing nature to a peace-keeping nature. The United Nations peace-keeping forces have been entrusted to perform peace-building functions in addition to the peace-keeping functions. Peace-building functions are functions aiming to support environments and structures which strengthen and consolidate peace and security; areas of activity include military security, civil law and order, judicial-building or reform, human rights, political progress (referendums and elections), administration, health, education, reconstruction, social development and economic development. The United Nations peace-keeping forces are increasingly charged with functions related to peace-building, in addition to those related to the maintenance of peace and security. Generally, they are charged to maintain ceasefires and separate forces, to prevent the recurrence of war and violence, to implement comprehensive settlement, and to protect or facilitate humanitarian operations and activities. It seems that there is no limit on the functions which the United Nations forces can perform. Future conflicts are likely to present new and complex challenges to the international community, to which it will respond. Effective responses to these challenges will require courageous and imaginative courses of action to be taken, and new means and tools for peace and security to be utilized.
Over the years the United Nations forces have been entrusted with the following missions: to repel an aggressor or aggressors by using full military actions by air, sea and land; to secure or supervise cease-fire, truce and armistice agreements; to control frontiers; to secure the withdrawal of armed forces and personnel of the conflicting parties; to maintain a buffer zone between the conflicting parties; to participate in mine clearance; to assist in the exchange of prisoners of war; to ensure the release of political prisoners or detainees; to assist in and secure safe return of refugees and displaced inhabitants; to establish and maintain safe zones or protected areas; to implement or assist in the implementation of peace agreements; to disarm or disband (or to assist in or supervise the disarming or disbanding) armed groups; to collect, storage or destruction of weapons; to establish and maintain law and order (security and stability); to restore peace and achieving national reconciliation; to prevent the occurrence of civil war; to maintain the territorial integrity and independence of a state; to assist legitimate governments in returning or maintaining their effective authority over their territory or in specific areas; to support transitional governments; to provide humanitarian protection; to coordinate, facilitate and protect humanitarian relief operations; to secure vital infrastructures; to establish or maintain the functioning of civil service facilities; to prepare, hold, or monitoring free referendums or elections; to administer a country, a territory or a specific zone; to provide technical assistance for institutional building, such as the building of law enforcement institutions and judicial organizations; to perform certain civil administrative functions; to secure or monitor the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms; to assist in the development and economic reconstruction of a particular territory.
In the practice of the United Nations, the structure, composition, size and command of the United Nations forces have varied in accordance to the circumstances of each case, and the tasks and functions they have been requested to perform. The United Nations forces have been composed of national contingents voluntarily provided by member states of the United Nations. Their size ranged from several observers to thousands and hundreds of thousands of persons. The strategic and political controls over the forces have been for the United Nations (the Security Council, the General Assembly or the Secretary General). The direct operational responsibility and day-to-day administration of a force have been entrusted to the commander of the force. The commander has operated under the instruction and guidance of the United Nations. Since the United Nations forces have been composed of national contingents from the contributing states, each of these contingents has been placed under the command of its own national commanding officers who have been under the control of the United Nations. The chain of command has run directly from the commander of the force to the commanding officers of each national contingent. A force has been subject to orders and instructions only from its commander and, through him, from the United Nations. The officers of the contingents have to receive their instructions and directions from the commander of the force, advised and assisted by his staff. The commanding offices of the units have been responsible to the commander of the force for the proper functioning and discipline of their personnel.
The United Nations has established its international forces on the basis of voluntary contribution of its member states. The contributing states have entered into negotiations with the Secretary General acting on behalf of the United Nations, and have concluded agreements with him. They have provided contingents to serve under the control of the United Nations, and its political and strategic direction in the field. However, a contributing state has retained the right to withdraw all its contingents or a particular unit or to replace the national commanders of its units, after a notice to the United Nations of its decision. Nevertheless, it has been required that any change in the contingents must have been made in consultation between the contributing states and the commander of the United Nations forces. The national contingents have retained their separate national identities and organizational units. The national commanders have retained direct responsibility for national contingents serving under them. Although the national commanders have the right to communicate with their governments, they have had to receive instructions from the United Nations through the commander of the United Nations forces, not from their governments. In this context, the United Nations have been regarded international forces representing the interests of the United Nations (the international community), not the national interests of contributing states. This has been the main principle upon which the relationship between the contributing states and the United Nations forces has been based.
The practice of the United Nations has demonstrated that the consent of the host states on whose territory the United Nations forces have operated has been a pre-condition for the presence of these forces.[54] The consent of the host states has been required in every action taken by the United Nations. It has been required for the entry, stationing and remaining of the forces. With regard to the questions of the composition, functions of the force, and the contributing states, the position has been that the view of the host state has been one of the determined elements to be considered, although the United Nations has had the sole and complete freedom of decision on these questions.
The United Nations, on many occasions, has performed different functions, and played various roles. Its forces have constituted an executive action on behalf of the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Although in most of the crises, the United Nations has succeeded in preventing further fighting between the parties, it has not succeeded in finding solutions, or in reaching lasting peace to most of these cries. It has failed to respond to major crises, prevent wars and violence, or repel aggression. Its efforts in urging and encouraging parties to settle their differences peacefully have not been successful in most cases brought before it. Its efforts to enforce world law, peace and order have not been effective or successful.
The experience of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security cannot be viewed with complete satisfaction. This imperfection raises a serious question regarding the effectiveness of the United Nations system for maintaining international peace and security. Apart from all the arguments in this respect, the United Nations present system for maintaining international peace and security through the use of military forces constitutes the better system that has ever been established by the international community. It is not clear that the situation in the international stage would have been better if the United Nations system had been differently constructed. The present United Nations system provides effective
means and processes which may be employed by the international community for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security. The defect is not related only to the system, but primarily to the unwillingness of certain members of the United Nations to make it work. International peace and security is entirely dependent upon the willingness of the member states of the United Nations to cooperate toward this end. Until they are willing to comply with international law and order, this system cannot operate effectively.
The effectiveness of using forces by the United Nations to achieve its objectives has been adversely affected by the primary weakness of the United Nations which lies within the divisions among its members, particularly the super powers, the permanent members of the Security Council. The Security Council, which is entrusted with the primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security, is dominated by policies and interests of its permanent members. Its decisions reflect such one-sided interests. Partiality and double standard is the name of the game played by the super powers. The members of the United Nations, including the super powers, have failed to cooperate together in times of crises. They have failed to agree on important issues, and to make full use of the United Nations resources available for solving major international disputes. They have failed to agree on peaceful solutions or adjustments of major world crises. They have failed to conclude agreements, under Article 43 of the Charter and Section C of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, making available to the United Nations the forces and facilities for the full discharge of its responsibility. The super powers failed to cooperate together within the Military Staff Committee provided for in Article 47 of the Charter, thus this Committee ceased to operate in 1948.
The absence of special agreements under Article 43 of the Charter and the lack of cooperation between the members of the United Nations, particularly the permanent members of the Security Council, constitute two major factors which have primarily contributed to the ineffectiveness of the United Nations system relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, and to the dissatisfaction with the work of the Organization.
To override the problems facing the international community, it is necessary to have a comprehensive and genuine prospect for international peace and security. Peace and security should be universal value-goals which must be produced, promoted and shared in a manner whereby everyone can enjoy them. Security must include not only freedom from war and threats of war, but also full opportunity to preserve, promote and share all values of mankind by peaceful non-coercive means. Peace must include the conditions of peace and the reduction of the severe frustrations which drive nations or peoples to war. Peace and security must be a dynamic and continuous world process for the realization of freedom, justice and progress on a world-wide scale. They must facilitate the necessary environment for creative changes in the general interest of mankind to take place.
The realization of such comprehensive and genuine peace and security requires the existence of a comprehensive and genuine international organization, a world decision-making process. The United Nations can be such an organization. It is one of the most hopeful factors on the world horizon. It is, with the extent of its experience, suitable to be the comprehensive world decision-making process that will be dedicated to regulating the processes of public order of the world community. First, however, series of amendments to the Charter of the United Nations must be made to transform this Organization into the required comprehensive and genuine international organization.


References:
[1] See generally, Mohammad Walid Abdulrahim, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, Saida-Beirut (1994) [In Arabic]; L. Goodrich & A. Simons, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, New York (1955); and United Nations, Basic Facts about the United Nations, chapter 2, UN, New York (2004) [Hereinafter cited as UN Basic Facts].
[2] D. Mitrany, “The Functional Approach to World Organization”, in The New International Actors, p. 131, C. Cosgrove & K. Twitchett eds., London (1970).
[3]See generally, Abdulrahim, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, part one; J. Collier and V. Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in International Law, Cambridge (1999); J.G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, 3rd edn, Cambridge (1998); K.V. Raman, Dispute settlement Through the UN, Dobbs Ferry (1997); M.N. Shaw, International Law, pp. 1099-1118, 5th edn, Cambridge (2003); United Nations, Handbook on the Peaceful settlement of Disputes Between States, UN, New York (1992).; and UN Basic Facts, chapter 2.
[4] For a discussion on the means of peaceful settlement of disputes, see Mohammad Walid Abdulrahim, Introduction to Public International Law, chapter 14, Beirut (2006); and P. Malanczuk ed., Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, chapter 18, 7th rev. edn, London and New York (1997);
[5] N. Hill, International Organization, 299, New York (1952).
[6] UN Charter art. 33(2).
[7] Id. art. 35(1).
[8] Id. art. 11(3).
[9] Id. art. 99.
[10] Id. arts. 35(2) & 37(1).
[11] Id. art. 33(2).
[12] Id. art. 36(1).
[13] Id. art. 37(2).
[14] Id. art. 11(3).
[15] Id. art. 11(2).
[16] Id. art. 14.
[17] Id. art. 11(2).
[18] Id.
[19] Id. arts. 11(2) & 35(2).
[20] Id. art. 12(1).
[21] “Peacemaking” refers to the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute.
[22] See UN Basic Facts, chapter 2.
[23] Probably the most famous Security Council’s resolution recommending terms of settlement is the Resolution 242 (1967) dealing with the Middle East.
[24] The General Assembly adopted this resolution on November 3, 1950, G.A. Res. 377(a) (V), 5 GAOR, Supp. 20, U.N. Doc. A/1775, at 10 (1950).
[25] See generally, UN Basic Facts, chapter 2; Abdulrahim, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, chapter 5; Malanczuk, pp. 387-430; and Shaw, 1119-1151.
[26] Cf. Shaw, p. 1120.
[27] The use of force by authorization of the Security Council, and upon a recommendation of the General Assembly constitute two exceptions to the principle of the prohibition of the use of force provided in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations. On this subject, see Abdulrahim, Introduction to Public International Law, pp. 180-183.
[28] UN Charter arts. 46 and 47(1) & (2).
[29] Id. art. 47(3).
[30] Id art.45.
[31] Id. art. 49.
[32] Id. art. 48.
[33] See generally, UN Basic Facts, chapter 2.
[34] The Ongoing UN Peace-keeping operations as of June 2007 are:
UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organization May 1948 present
UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan January 1949 present
UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus March 1964 present
UNDOF United Nations Disengagement Force June 1974 present
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon March 1978 present
MINURSO United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara April 1991 present
UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia August 1993 present
UNMIK UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo June 1999 present
MONUC UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo November 1999 present
UNMEE United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea July 2000 present
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia September 2003 present
UNOCI United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire April 2004 present
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti June 2004 present
UNMIS United Nations Mission in the Sudan March 2005 present
UNMIT United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste August 2006 present
[35] See generally, UN Basic Facts, chapter 2; Abdulrahim, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, chapter 6; and Shaw, 1151-1154.
[36] Uniting for Peace Resolution section A.
[37] Id.
[38] Id.
[39] Cf id. the preamble.
[40] G.A. Res. 498 (V) of 1 February 1951, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20 A) at 1, U.N. Doc A/1775/Add. 1 (1951).
[41] G.A. Res. 500 (V) of 18 May 1951, id. at 2.
[42] G.A. Res. 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956, U.N. GAOR ES-I Supp.(No. 1) at 2, U.N. Doc. A/3354 (1956).
[43] G.A. Res. 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956, id. at 2.
[44] S.C. Res. 500 (1982), 37 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. (1982) at 2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/37 (1982). Note that the S.C. adopted a resolution in December 1981, after the annexation of the Golan Heights by Israel, calling on Israel to rescind its legislation, and declaring such annexation null and void. S.C. Res. 497 (1981), 36 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. (1981) at 6, U.N. Doc. S/INF/36 (1981). However, the council failed because of the negative vote of the U.S. to adopt a draft resolution introduced by Jordan calling on all members of the United Nations to consider sanctions against Israel for annexing the Syrian Golan Heights. See 37 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Jan.-Mar. 1882) at 5, U.N. Doc. S/14832/Rev. 1 (1982).
[45] G.A. Res. 1 (ES-IX) of 5 February 1982.
[46] Goodrich & Simons, at 445.
[47] See generally, Abdulrahim, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, chapter 7; D.W. Bowett, UN Forces, London (1964); R. Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 4 vols., Oxford (1969-81) ; Malanczuk, pp. 416-430; UN Basic Facts chapter 2; United Nations, The Blue Helmet: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, 2nd edn, UN, New York (1990); and the UN web site at //www.un.org/.
[48] UN Peace-keeping operations (1948 – 2007)
UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organization May 1948 present
UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan January 1949 present
UNEF I First United Nations Emergency Force November 1956 June 1967
UNOGIL United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon June 1958 December 1958
ONUC United Nations Operation in the Congo July 1960 June 1964
UNSF United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea October 1962 April 1963
UNYOM United Nations Yemen Observation Mission July 1963 September 1964
UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus March 1964 present
DOMREP Mission of the Representative of the SG in the Dominican Republic May 1965 October 1966
UNIPOM United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission September 1965 March 1966
UNEF II Second United Nations Emergency Force October 1973 July 1979
UNDOF United Nations Disengagement Force June 1974 present
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon March 1978 present
UNGOMAP United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan May 1988 March 1990
UNIIMOG United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group August 1988 February 1991
UNAVEM I United Nations Angola Verification Mission I January 1989 June 1991
UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group April 1989 March 1990
ONUCA United Nations Observer Group in Central America November 1989 January 1992
UNIKOM United Nations Iraq - Kuwait Observation Mission April 1991 October 2003
MINURSO United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara April 1991 present
UNAVEM II United Nations Angola Verification Mission II June 1991 February 1995
ONUSAL United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador July 1991 April 1995
UNAMIC United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia October 1991 March 1992
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force February 1992 December 1995
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia March 1992 September 1993
UNOSOM I United Nations Operation in Somalia I April 1992 March 1993
ONUMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique December 1992 December 1994
UNOSOM II United Nations Operation in Somalia II March 1993 March 1995
UNOMUR United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda June 1993 September 1994
UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia August 1993 present
UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia September 1993 September 1997
UNMIH United Nations Mission in Haiti September 1993 June 1996
UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda October 1993 March 1996
UNASOG United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group May 1994 June 1994
UNMOT United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan December 1994 May 2000
UNAVEM III United Nations Angola Verification Mission III February 1995 June 1997
UNCRO United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia May 1995 January 1996
UNPREDEP United Nations Preventive Deployment Force March 1995 February 1999
UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina December 1995 December 2002
UNTAES United Nations transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
January 1996 January 1998
UNMOP United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka January 1996 December 2002
UNSMIH United Nations Support Mission in Haiti July 1996 July 1997
MINUGUA United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala January 1997 May 1997
MONUA United Nations Observer Mission in Angola June 1997 February 1999
UNTMIH United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti August 1997 November 1997
MINOPUH UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti December 1997 March 2000 January 1998 October 1998
MINURCA United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic April 1998 February 2000
UNOMSIL United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone July 1998 October 1999
UNMIK UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo June 1999 present
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone October 1999 December 2005
UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor October 1999 May 2002
MONUC UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo November 1999 present
UNMEE United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea July 2000 present
UNMISET United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor May 2002 May 2005
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia September 2003 present
UNOCI United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire April 2004 present
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti June 2004 present
ONUB United Nations Operation in Burundi June 2004 December 2006
UNMIS United Nations Mission in the Sudan March 2005 present
UNMIT United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste August 2006 present
[49] The UN force which was established in Korea in 1950 was the only force of a peace-enforcing nature.
[50] The United Nations electoral assistance has become a regular and increasingly important feature in United Nations peace operations. In 2005 and 2006, UN peace-keeping forces supported elections in six post-conflict countries – Afghanistan, Burundi, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo-with populations totaling over 120 million.
[51]This was the case of Unified Command in Korea (1950-1953).
[52] See Abdulrahim, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, pp. 154-162.
[53] The smallest peace-keeping force is UNMOGIP (1949-) between India and Pakistan, it is consisted of 45 military observers and 19 international civilians. The largest peace-keeping forces was UNPF (1995-1996) in the republics of the former Yugoslavia, its authorized strength was 57,370 personnel. The UN Unified Command in Korea reached at its peak to 740,000 personnel. Note that the UNIFIL in South Lebanon consists of as of 30 April 2007 of: troops 13,251; international civilian 202, local civilian 308.