Pakistan under siege by Tariq Fatemi 23rd April 2009

I cannot recall another time when there was such widespread despondency in the country. That this has happened within a year of the restoration of democracy is disappointing, but not surprising.Many of today’s problems are the legacy of history, in which global politics, regional considerations and bilateral rivalries, have all played a role.

Also disastrous have been the long spells of authoritarian rule that looked to foreign powers for legitimacy, while destroying institutions of state, crippling infrastructures and breeding anger and alienation among people especially in the smaller provinces. Neglecting social sectors such as health and education, and promoting an economy geared to enriching the rich, it drove millions into the cesspool of militancy.

The manner in which the government recently caved in to the demands of the Swat militants has spawned frightening scenarios. Irrespective of the merits of their case, no government can permit any individual or organisation to challenge its writ and get its demands accepted at gunpoint. That such an initiative should have come from the ANP and be embraced by the PPP is more painful.

Worse, this ‘deal’ has come at a time when the country is facing unprecedented challenges, internally and externally. The government, however, appears unaware of the double whammy to which it is vulnerable: the militants at home and western capitals losing faith in our will and capacity to confront them.

When former national security advisers, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, begin to air their Cassandra-like prognostications, it is time for our leaders to wake up. Recently, both spoke of Pakistan’s collapse as not only inevitable but imminent, with Kissinger describing Pakistan as ‘a country that has numerous nuclear weapons but no government’. He also advised the US to discuss with China, India and Russia how to handle the post-dismemberment scenario.

Brzezinski was no less blunt, warning that the current situation in Pakistan ‘puts us in a complicated situation’ as to how long America could ‘back such a democratic government which is passing through internal chaos’.

Many of us are given to blaming ‘foreign powers’ for the malaise that afflicts us. Given our geo-strategic importance, proximity to the world’s energy fields, access to the Indian Ocean and possession of nuclear weapons, it is not unlikely that some foreign agencies are involved in stirring up trouble. But blaming foreign powers does not absolve us from taking measures to deter them while ensuring good governance at home.

Some Pakistanis claim to be disappointed with Obama’s policies. This betrays a failure to understand the complex nature of the US system of checks and balances. Obama’s speech may not have satisfied us but it certainly was a skillful mix of old and new, revealing the many competing interests currently swirling around Afghanistan.

Though rejecting the call of fellow Democrats who opposed deeper involvement in Afghanistan, he promised to use ‘all elements of our national power’ to ‘disrupt dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda’. He also abandoned his predecessor’s goal of nation-building, while offering a plan for increased US military strength and massive injection of resources. There was no reference to the earlier flirtation with an exit strategy, but a greater focus on reaching out to the ‘moderate’ Taliban. This represents a well-thought-out approach keeping all options open.

It is, however, the policy of continuing with drone attacks that is causing deep heartburn among Pakistanis. As their frequency increases, so does the intensity of anti-American sentiments, making the government look both confused and ineffective. The drones may occasionally net a few Al Qaeda terrorists, but the collateral damage is deep and long-lasting, adding to the impression that the Obama administration is as callous as its predecessor and our own government as subservient as the authoritarian regime. A more acceptable option would be to carry out joint operations with the Pakistanis. This would also force the government to ‘own’ this policy, rather than seek refuge behind unconvincing excuses.

In the meantime, there is mischief afoot in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, where it appears that the Indian lobby has been most active. This is evident from the language of the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Act of 2009. After its approval, the bill will go to a House-Senate conference committee, along with the Senate’s Kerry-Lugar bill, for a compromise bill to be thrashed out. But rather than wait for that stage, it is incumbent on us to engage in a vigorous lobbying exercise to ensure that these demeaning provisions are taken out.

The other issue which has given rise to deep misgivings in Islamabad is the manner in which the Obama administration has modified its much celebrated ‘regional approach’. The expectation of US support for Pakistan-India normalisation as well as a satisfactory resolution of the Kashmir issue had renewed hopes for the region’s peace and development, as well as easing some of Pakistan’s concerns on its eastern frontier. But few in Washington could anticipate the intensity of Indian lobbying that constrained the administration to restrict Holbrooke’s mandate to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Emboldened by this success, New Delhi appears to have also convinced the administration to pursue the Bush administration’s flawed policy of promoting India as the regional hegemon. Holbrooke’s remarks in Delhi may have been music to Indian ears, but offensive to Pakistan.

Obama has promised more troops and greater resources to Afghanistan. But this will not win the hearts and minds of the locals, unless there is an effort at genuine reconciliation within Afghanistan. In this context, he needs to reach out to moderate Taliban, who may ‘have taken up arms because of coercion or simply for a price’. The US would be making a grave mistake in making no distinction between Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Journals such as the Economist, have also emphasised that ‘for most Taliban fighters, the ideology of global jihad is less important than other things: Pakhtun nationalism, opposition to western invasion, desire to defend conservative Muslim values’, etc.

Admittedly, these measures would help us, but militancy is primarily our problem and we have to deal with it. It is not yet too late for the government to bring all political parties on board, to arrive at a consensus on a multi-faceted approach, whose objective must be to confront the militants not by force alone, but through a mix of dialogue, development and deterrence. It is not enough for our leaders to travel to foreign capitals and beg for aid on the plea that ‘if we fail, you too will be the victims of terrorism’. It would carry far greater conviction if such exhortation had been accompanied by a resolute leadership at home.

Source Dawn opinion.