UNDER normal circumstances, some of the conditionalities in the Kerry-Lugal Bill could be considered as highly intrusive in the affairs of Pakistan. But these are not normal times in the unhappy life of the country. The problem then is not with conditionalities per se (which are never desirable as a rule), but with the messenger, the feudalistic and oligarchic regime of President Zardari.

Much has been written on the furore over the bill. But there is scope for further discussion since the matter has long-term implications for Pakistan. In their denunciation of the bill, the political leaders as well as commentators in the media, especially electronic media, have used words such as ghairat (honour), waqar (dignity), sell-out and attack on sovereignty. Some have gone as far as to suggest that the offer should be declined and equivalent of $1.5 billion be ‘saved’ by ‘living within our means’ and by ceasing military operations against militants who are anti-West and anti-India in any case. All this is the stuff for Alice in Wonderland. Rejecting the bill will have far-reaching effects, extending to facilities from IFIs (IMF, etc.) FoDP (Friends of a Democratic Pakistan), and the EU. And the militants are not just anti-West, they have a distinct worldview, unacceptable to a vast majority in Pakistan.

The fact is that the bill went through several drafts, in consultation with Pakistan authorities, and that Mr Zardari is reported to have said that amendments were made in it in accordance with their suggestions. Also, the final act was approved through a bi-partisan support from Democrats and Republicans, and that many Republicans had serious reservations about this offer but they accepted the final draft. Moreover, whatever role was played in this episode by Mr Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s ambassador to US, it could not have been done without knowledge of his master. After all, the bill is a pro-democracy package, according to Mr Zardari, and that it should be defended in all forums.

The lobbyist Mark Seagel, who was a friend of Benazir Bhutto, had claimed that the bill was a historical breakthrough. He has recently been replaced with another million-dollar lobbyist, Cassidy and Associates, a well-known company in Washington D.C. where Robin Raphael was a senior partner until her recent appointment as US security advisor for Pakistan.

From all these facts, it is not difficult to draw the obvious conclusion that President Zardari was confident about his role that he had made tangible achievements during his sixty-day sojourn in the US, as claimed by Farhatullah Babar, with Kerry-Lugar bill as the foremost among them. Obviously, in an important aid package such as the bill, some diplomatic exchange must have become part of this kind of large-scale arrangement. In this regard, what understanding he had given to the US administration when the future of General Musharraf was being decided would have played an important role, but nothing much is known about it.

Perhaps he had expected a welcome to the news of his successful mission upon his return to Pakistan along with some criticism from the usual sources from political opposition. But the intensity of raucousness over the bill must have come to him as a surprise.

What then has gone wrong? The short answer is that Mr Zardari has a problem with his credibility, and one source of trouble in this regard is his style of governance. He has established no meaningful interaction with political leaders, least of all in the opposition camp. The Charter of Democracy, for example, which could have been the basis of a dialogue is now history. The Murree Agreement which he had reached with Mr Nawaz Sharif has suffered from his Machiavellian manoeuvre. The coalition government which he put together to form PPP-led government is an alliance of convenience, with no shared views about the course of future legislative agenda for the country.

Then there was confrontation over the issue of reinstatement of deposed judges. Above all, the structure of government created by General Musharraf is still intact. He also combined the office of co-chairman of his political party with that of being president of the country, just as Soekarno of Indonesia did. In addition, rumours are floating around about misdemeanours and abuse of power along with special favours for friends and family members. These are not confidence-building measures.

The bill is under attack from politicians as well as the army. Concerning the position of the army, it is a well-know fact that for historical reasons it has been an important ‘political’ force in Pakistan. They adopted the India-centric policy which made it possible for them to divert a big chunk of the national budget to their defence related expenditure, including power and perks, patronised jihadi elements, and devised the plan of action for so-called strategic depth. They have become a state within the state.

In the political system established after February 2008 elections, Zardari government has been a virtual junior partner in its relations with the army. The Kerry-Lugar bill aims at bypassing this equation. In section 302 (15) of the bill, civilian oversight and approval of military budgets, of chain of command, of process of promotions for senior military leaders, and civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning are called for.

Can the historical pattern of military’s position in Pakistan be changed ‘overnight’ so to speak, by fiat, used by the foreign benefactor, through the edict of Kerry-Lugar bill? It is not likely and Mr Zardari does not have the moral fortitude to be able to do so. The spokesmen of the PPP government have suggested that the army should not have gone public on this issue. But the point is that Mr Zardari probably knew about this sub-section in the bill. The chief of the army surely could have been offered the courtesy about this fact.

On principle one cannot support a situation where the army maintains exclusive relations with Washington as it had for example during the Bush era. But part of the reason for this reality has been the weak political leadership. Now the foreign minister has again gone back to Washington for necessary changes in the bill to allay the military’s serious concerns. Since the bill cannot be changed, an explanatory note, mutually agreed, has been added to the bill which serves the purpose. Shah Mehmood Qureshi has called it a ‘historic agreement’. Besides, the US military may not want to alienate their counterpart in Pakistan.

In the media much has been made of the power of certification included in the bill among its conditionalities. The problem is that this proviso is a US prerogative and is an important part of the bill to make that its objectives are being fulfilled. It is an integral part of the arrangement that extends to five years and therefore progress report would be an essential part of the long run commitment. Similarly, there is a clear provision for full accountability of the funds disbursed through the bill. This point certainly has not been picked in the furore about the bill. One can assume therefore that public opinion is in favour of this requirement.

Pakistan has limited choice in regard to Kerry-Lugal bill because of various factors. First, terrorism in Pakistan has reached a menacing proportion and is supported by some strong domestic elements. International cooperation is a necessity for the country in this regard. Secondly, the state of the economy is so fragile that it cannot be restructured without foreign assistance. Third, in addition to providing cooperation in meeting the terrorist threat, the bill calls for dismantling of nuclear supply network, and for strengthening democracy (notwithstanding some clumsy sentences used in the bill) — the objectives which would contribute to promoting stability in Pakistan, subject of course to the direction which Mr Richard Holbrooke, the US ‘viceroy’ and ‘Governor General for Af-Pak region’ would establish for implementation of the aid package.