THE message that emerged from the recent visit of US secretary of state to Pakistan is that despite claims of a long-term, multi-faceted partnership, trust deficit continues to characterise the relations between the two countries.

On the part of Washington, the trust deficit is on two counts: One, the suspicion that the security establishment of Pakistan is not going all-out in tracking down Al Qaeda leadership; two, the apprehension that Pakistan’s nuclear material may fall into the hands of terrorists, who may use it against the US. On the other hand, a significant segment of Pakistani intelligentsia continues to suspect that the war against terrorism in which Islamabad is a frontline player is essentially Washington’s war and that all the repercussions of the war on the country’s society and the economy are a ‘gift’ of American ‘friendship’.

Seen in the context of Pak-US relations during the last sixty years, the trust deficit is hardly surprising.

A watershed in Pak-US relations was the conclusion of a mutual defence assistance agreement between the two countries in 1954. This was followed by Pakistan’s joining South East Asia Treaty Organisation (Seato) and the Baghdad pact subsequently renamed Central Treaty Organisation (Cento). These agreements institutionalised Pakistan’s relations with the US and made it a recipient of huge American military assistance.

However, there was an inherent flaw in that relationship: lack of identity of vital interests. Perceptions of Indian threat and its military superiority had driven Pakistan to court America’s friendship. For Pakistan, the membership of the American club gave it the umbrella to shield itself against any Indian aggression. However, the US was not much interested in protecting Pakistan against India. Seato and Cento were created to contain communism, and the US was obliged to help Pakistan only in the event of an attack by a communist power.

Hence, not surprisingly, when war broke out between Pakistan and India in 1965, the US opted to remain neutral and clamped an arm embargo on both countries. For Pakistan, being overwhelmingly dependent on US military assistance, the arm embargo was a stab in the back. The American neutrality brought out the ineffectiveness of Pakistan’s defence agreement with the US and also of Seato and Cento accords. This warranted the need for reviewing Pakistan’s ties with the USA.

Then, again in 1971 Indo-Pak war, the US did not help Pakistan. It merely condemned Indian invasion of the then East Pakistan which was of little help to Pakistan. The US neutrality was in spite of the fact that Pakistan had facilitated the famous secret visit of Henry Kissinger to China a few months before the 1971 war.

During the Z.A. Bhutto government, there was a fundamental shift in Pakistan’s relations with the US. Bhutto had the vision of a powerful Islamic bloc as a counterweight to world powers. During this period, Pakistan left Seato but remained a member of Cento because of its relations with Iran and Turkey who were also its members.

It was left to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 to revive Pak-US relations. The invasion which coincided with the advent of Islamic revolution in Iran was considered by the US as a serious threat to its interests in the region. It was through Pakistan that the US fought its proxy war with the Soviets. Islamabad, of course, was fully rewarded for its services, militarily and economically.

However, in the absence of the Soviet or communist threat, nuclear non-proliferation came to dominate the relations between the two countries as it was at the top of the US foreign policy agenda.

The 9/11 reshaped US foreign policy. Counter-terrorism became the criterion for defining US allies and enemies. This also forced the US to re-define its relations with Pakistan.

Osama bin Laden was believed to be operating in the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. The Taliban were the creation of Pakistan and until then enjoyed friendly relations with Islamabad. In fact, Pakistan was one of the few countries which had recognised the Taliban regime.

American policy makers knew well that without Pakistan’s support it would not be possible for the US to crush the Taliban and Al Qaeda. In the words of the US secretary of state, “To get at Al Qaeda, we had to end Pakistan’s support for the Taliban. So we had to recast our relations with that country.” That is why immediately after the 9/11 strikes, the US faced Pakistan with the choice, “Either you are with us or against us”.

There was not to be a middle course. Pakistan decided to side with the USA.

Since then South Asia has been the frontline region and Pakistan the frontline state in the US counter-terrorism campaign. The war against terrorism is a drawn-out one, and as long as the focal point of war remains this region, Pakistan will remain a top US ally.

However, once the war is over or the focal point shifts to another region, the party will be over. Then the US will see Pakistan through the glasses of non-proliferation. And this is an area where the two countries have divergent views.

Washington has never approved of Islamabad’s nuclear programme and would like to see it rolled back or capped. Islamabad, on the other hand, has so far resisted all attempts at bringing its nuclear programme to a halt and would go ahead with that.

Despite their convergence of interest — fight against religious extremism and terrorism — the two countries do differ as to the locus of the threat. Pakistan’s immediate threat emanates from the Taliban and it is the Taliban insurgency that the security forces are fighting in Waziristan. The US regards Al Qaeda as its main enemy.

The 9/11 incident was planned and executed by Al Qaeda and not the Taliban, although Al Qaeda leadership was reportedly operating from Afghanistan under the umbrella of Taliban regime.

There is a strong nexus between the Taliban and Al Qaeda as both profess the same ideology of ‘militant Islam’. But they are not the same. Whereas the Taliban are a local organisation, Al Qaeda is a global outfit. The demise of the Taliban will not root out Al Qaeda, though it may weaken it. The Taliban do not pose a direct threat to US security, though they are a menace to Pakistan’s security. For Washington, the dismantling of the Taliban is merely a means to that of Al Qaeda. It may even embrace the Taliban if they cease their support to Al Qaeda.

The US suspects that religious elements in the security establishment of Pakistan have a soft corner for Al Qaeda. It is this suspicion which accounts for stringent conditions contained in the Kerry-Lugar law. In particular, the provisions of the Act relating to strengthening of democracy in Pakistan, non-interference of the armed forces and spy agencies in political matters and civilian control over military affairs are rooted not in US love for democracy in Pakistan but in its perception of the involvement of security forces of Pakistan in terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

Whether this perception is correct or not is beside the point. What is important is that this perception exists. This perception notwithstanding, Washington is aware that without the support of Islamabad’s security establishment, it cannot dismantle Al Qaeda network in the region. For the US, one way out of this dilemma is to make the security establishment completely subservient to the civilian government, which itself does not hold much of a promise.

No doubt, the US has used Pakistan as an instrument to safeguard its interest on several occasions — the most obvious being the campaign against USSR invasion of Afghanistan, and this can be a good reason for suspecting the current US claims of friendship with Pakistan. However, the fact remains that the war against terrorism is Pakistan’s own war, which we have to fight and win with or without US assistance.