HILLARY Clinton’s recent three-day visit to Pakistan, the most intensive and intrusive of any other per predecessor, is likely to cast long shadows over the two countries’ evolving bilateral relations.

The major malady that afflicts the relations between Washington and Islamabad is the trust deficit, which was also observed by Clinton. This has led to a feeling of acrimony between the two states.

Both believe that their concerns are not being addressed. She held wide-ranging talks with both high government officials and representatives of civil society. These meetings no doubt helped her develop a good understanding of Pakistani perceptions about their expectations from the bilateral relations.

While the offer of US assistance to Pakistan (Kerry-Lugar Bill) and its various modalities and conditionalties have irked Pakistanis, the issue is likely to be settled through adequate interaction with the administration and Congress.

The trust deficit problem, however, will continue to rankle and the deficit is not likely to be bridged unless a major exercise is undertaken and mutual concerns, particularly on the nuclear issue, are discussed frankly and remedies sought. Otherwise, the issue may prove intractable and disturb the apple cart.

Pakistan is genuinely perturbed by the reports and statements attributed to US officials, media and think tanks that go beyond the confines of this strategic partnership and appear malafide. Seymour Hersh’s recent report in The New Yorker on Pakistan’s inability to secure its nuclear warheads is just one illustration.

Over last 10 years, Pakistan has, at all levels and to all concerned, provided in detail the range and nature of security measures, the command and control structure and the legislative, institutional, procedural and administrative measures to ensure a fool-proof system.

Still, every now and then, questions are raised and hypothetical threat scenarios painted alleging that nuclear weapons and fissile material stock could fall into the wrong hands.

To ensure uncompromising security, a department — the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) — has been established under the Pakistan army for the security of these strategic assets. 10,000 personnel work with SPD to support this mandate.

Pakistan, as a responsible state and considering the obligations under international law, particularly under UNSC resolution 1540, has initiated legislative measure, currently before the National Assembly, “in order to re-demonstrate through the present law the resolve of the government to continue to exercise full and complete control and security and safety measures over all matters concerning nuclear and space technologies, nuclear establishments, nuclear systems, nuclear materials, relevant personnel and related information, etc.”

To allay the fears and apprehensions of the US, Pakistan voluntarily took the US in confidence. According to reports, US officials conducted a detailed review of the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear programme prior to military action in Afghanistan which included options for improving surveillance at sensitive sites, sharing devices to disable weapons and evaluating the reliability of essential personnel and security in the event that weapons must be transported.

During the Bush administration, 100 million dollars were reportedly spent on this highly classified programme to help Pakistan secure its nuclear stockpile.

Pakistan’s record on the nuclear issue has been consistent and transparent. In September, the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies in Monterrey, California, considered certain scenarios regarding Pakistani nuclear safety.

The first was about the potential impact of political instability, the second was the likelihood of nuclear terrorism, and the third related to the consequences of any temporary loss of centralised control over nuclear storage sites.

After analyzing each of these scenarios in detail, the center’s report concluded that public concerns about the security of Pakistan’s fissile material installations and safe custody of its strategic weapons might be overstated.

Notwithstanding Pakistan’s unblemished record, Pakistan welcomed US initiatives to help it secure its nuclear weapons.

The programme paid for training Pakistani personnel in the US and the construction of a nuclear security training centre in Pakistan. According to a New York Times report, a whole range of equipment was given to Pakistan to help secure its nuclear material, warheads and laboratories.

The Pakistan government is said to be reluctant to show American officials how or where the gear is actually used because it does not want to reveal the locations of the weapons or the amount or type of new bomb-grade fuel being produced.

The Pakistanis were suspicious that any American-made technology in their warheads could include a secret “kill switch” enabling the Americans to turn off their weapons.

US officials have complained that the Pakistan government’s reluctance to provide access has limited their efforts to assess the situation and not provided access to the nuclear laboratories where highly enriched uranium is produced.

On its part, there is deep suspicion among Pakistan’s public that the secret goal of the United States was to gather intelligence on how to locate and, if necessary, disable Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. It is no secret that Pakistan’s nuclear status is not acceptable to US and the West.

Ever since Pakistan detonated its nuclear device in July 1998, all kinds of alarming scenarios have been painted focused on the capacity of Pakistan to guard them well and not let them fall into the wrong hands.

Hersh’s report in The New Yorker, under the sub-title, “In an unstable Pakistan, can nuclear warheads be kept safe,” has caused quite a stir in both Islamabad and Washington.

The report deals with the issue in great detail and inter alia reported that a secret understanding between Pakistan and the US would allow specially trained units to provide added security for the Pakistan nuclear arsenal in case of crisis.

The report has been denied by Foreign Office spokesman, but the Plutzer prize winner stands by this report. In a subsequent TV interview, Hersh disclosed that an elite US Special Forces squad operating in the garb of anti-terrorist escorts is already based in US Embassy in Islamabad.

Despite Pakistan’s sincere and effective efforts to provide total security and secrecy to its nuclear weapons, nightmarish scenarios continue and have gained currency and credibility leading to near-paranoia in Washington. In a recent report in The Guardian, two investigative reporters, Adrian Lerry and Scott Clark, revealed that Bush had been advised to consider sending elite troops to Pakistan to secure its nuclear weapons, if the country were to descend into chaos.

The nuclear safety issue has been a thorn in the side of the two primarily due to a trust deficit and reports that the US may militarily intervene to secure, even seize, control of the nuclear assets, has greatly upset Pakistan, and confirmed their worst fears.

Hersh acknowledged that the Pakistan army is in full control of the nuclear arsenal but that “the Taliban are running Islamabad is not the only concern. The principal fear is mutiny that extremists inside the military might stage a coup, take control of some nuclear assets or even divert a warhead.”

Zardari rightly scoffed at the proposition, regretting that the US is obsessed with the vulnerability of Pakistan nuclear arsenal.

He advised that Obama, instead of fretting about nuclear security in Pakistan, should deal with the military disparity between India and Pakistan for stability in the region.

The US administration should take this advice seriously, if it is sincere in engaging Pakistan as a strategic partner and on a long-term basis.

The Pakistani nation is too passionately attached to its nuclear status, sees it as a source of great pride and any ill-advised move by the US will unravel the entire strategy for peace and stability in this region.