Where are the answers?
By Shahid Javed Burki
Tuesday, 22 Jun, 2010
PAKISTAN has struggled with two questions ever since its birth as an independent state almost 63 years ago.
The first focuses on what kind of a Muslim state should it become. Should it be an Islamic state or a state that blends a Muslim way of life with the western — or Indian — style of secularism.
The second focuses on the type of alliances it should seek with other states that would strengthen its national security. Should it work with the West to protect itself against India’s real or perceived designs? Should it align itself with the Arab world and aim to become an important component in the pan-Islamic community? Or should it look to Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey, the non-Arab countries in the Muslim world?
These questions were not important in the minds of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and his associates who founded Pakistan. They did not anticipate the massive transfer of population that occurred soon after the partition of British India that turned Pakistan from a Muslim-majority to a predominantly Muslim country. Had a sizeable number of non-Muslims continued to live in Pakistan after independence — before independence about 30 per cent of the population of the areas that would become Pakistan was non-Muslim — these questions would not have acquired the significance they did. This is one reason why they were not asked, let alone answered, by the founders of the country.
Had East Pakistan not separated and one of its part become the independent state of Bangladesh, the Bengali influence on West Pakistan would have forced it to remain a more liberal society. These are two important ‘what ifs…?’ of Pakistan’s history. These questions force us to ask another: where would the country have been today had certain things not happened? But they did happen and the present set of policymakers must deal with the situation as it is today.
What should inform the making of foreign policy in a country in Pakistan’s situation? Of the many available options the following four could become the basis of policymaking. One, we need to address the question of whether Pakistan should continue to be concerned about India’s seeming designs towards it and continue to develop appropriate mechanisms for defending itself. That, after all, was the focus of policymaking in external affairs for much of the country’s history.
Two, as it is a predominantly Muslim country we have to ask whether it should follow the rest of the Muslim world in defining its place in the global community. But the Muslim world does not sing from the same sheet of music. Which of the various Muslim blocs should Islamabad follow in designing its approach?
Three, it is also a country that has seriously mismanaged its economy for the last several decades and has become dependent on foreign largesse for economic survival. In these circumstances, should it work with the world so that the flow of the external resources it needs continues?
Four, we must also ask how much attention should policymakers give to the enormously important changes occurring in Pakistan’s immediate neighbourhood. We are seeing the emergence of China as an economic superpower that is now being courted by the United States as a partner. We are also witnessing the rise of India as a major economic presence in the global system. How much weight should be given to these developments in the making of foreign policy?
My answer to these questions will take us towards the adoption of a composite approach. I would like to see Islamabad change its attitude towards India in a fundamental way. It should seek to become a partner of that country in helping South Asia catch up with the rest of the continent and not continue to be distracted by the misplaced fear that New Delhi is bent upon hurting its neighbour.
The New York Times recently carried a story about the extremist group Lashkar-i-Taiba being encouraged by some Pakistani elements to carry out anti-India operations in Afghanistan. With the United States having declared its intention of beginning to pull out of that country next year, a vacuum is likely to occur that will suck in a number of regional powers, including India and Pakistan, into Afghanistan. To prepare itself for that outcome, the newspaper alleges that many in Pakistan have begun to support extremist groups to fight a proxy war in Afghanistan. This, as we know from our recent history, is a dangerous course to pursue.
The formulation of foreign policy can become difficult if the objectives being sought are not clearly defined. The questions regarding the four observations above — the approach towards India, the role of Islamic ideology, the importance of securing a flow of finance on a sustained basis, the importance of focusing on Asia’s rising powers — should not only be asked they must also be clearly answered. It is clear to me that the time has come when we need to totally reorient our external policy away from constant preoccupation with India and basing it on the vaguely defined interests of the Muslim world.
We should shape our policies towards the world by focusing on only one thing: the need to improve our economic situation and prospects so that a better life can be delivered to the rapidly expanding population. Such an approach would have many outcomes. Of these the following three will be very important.
First, we will begin to view India from a different angle. That country’s rapid rise can become an asset for Pakistan if we are prepared to cast off the burden of history and seek to align our economy with the one that is rapidly developing across the border. Two, we will pay much greater attention to the continent of Asia in seeking markets for our products and sources of finance. Three, we will dispense with the use of Islamic ideology to determine the way we look at the Muslim world. Foreign relations will be defined totally on the basis of economics. Perhaps a clear statement by the new managers of the economy that economics will be the foundation on which we will build the country will help to clear the air.